# Party, belief and the political map: report Introduction of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-belief-and-the-political-map. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Party, belief and the political map - Chapter: Introduction - Question: How closely do party, ideological label, issue positions and the geography of the vote line up, and where do they remain distinct? - Dek: Party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement moved closer together in the ANES, with a correlation of +0.32 in 1972 and +0.72 in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024: seven-point party identification and seven-point liberal-conservative scale, respondents who answered both; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z) - General Social Survey. General Social Survey, 1974-2024: partyid and polviews, in the reused party-ideology figure only; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use - Cooperative Election Study. Cooperative Election Study: the cumulative file, 2006-2024, in the party-ideology figure; the cumulative common content, 2013-2021, in the party gap and place gap figure; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled waves) - County election returns. County presidential returns, 1868-2024, in the county swing map; 2004-2020, with the CES, in the party gap and place gap figure; years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-belief-and-the-political-map - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-belief-and-the-political-map/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-belief-and-the-political-map/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026partybeliefandthepoliticalmap ```bibtex @misc{singh2026partybeliefandthepoliticalmap, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Party, belief and the political map}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-belief-and-the-political-map}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1972 | +0.32 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.36 | 1,545 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_r_1972 | | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | +0.72 | 95% CI 0.70 to 0.74 | 4,716 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_r_2024 | | count of respondents who answered both questions | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1972 | 1,545 | | | unweighted count of respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_n_1972 | | count of respondents who answered both questions | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | 4,716 | | | unweighted count of respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_n_2024 | ## Findings Among respondents to the American National Election Studies (ANES) who answered both the party-identification and the liberal-conservative questions, the weighted correlation between the two answers rose from +0.32 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.36) in 1972 to +0.72 (95% CI 0.70 to 0.74) in 2024. Those respondents numbered 1,545 in 1972 and 4,716 in 2024. A correlation describes how closely two answers move together; a higher positive value here means that a more Republican identification goes more consistently with a more conservative placement. The intervals describe model-based sampling uncertainty, not every source of survey error. (Note: The estimates come from the ANES Cumulative Data File, weighted with the cumulative-file weight, and are built in Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology). Each interval uses the Fisher z transformation [1] with the Kish effective sample size [2] and does not incorporate the full survey design.) Table 1 plots the correlation in every survey year, for three surveys. Table 1. The party-ideology correlation ended higher than it began on all three surveys The increase is one starting point for this book. It shows that knowing someone's party tells us more about their ideological label than it did in the earlier survey. It does not establish that their views became more extreme, that their positions on different issues became identical to their party's, or that party attachment caused their beliefs to change. Those are separate questions. *The Public Mind* studies how political identities, beliefs and electoral choices align, and where they remain distinct. The American evidence is its center. Comparisons across countries test whether relationships familiar in the United States hold elsewhere. Election returns and campaign-finance records extend the inquiry to the places where votes are cast and the people who give money to political campaigns. ### Political alignment has several meanings Party identification is a person's attachment to a political party. Ideological self-placement is the label a person chooses for their views. A policy preference is an answer to a more specific question, such as what government should provide or what the law should allow. These measures often move together, but they describe different things. Partisan sorting means that political characteristics become more consistently associated with party. It can occur when people change parties while keeping their opinions. It can also occur when their opinions change, or when the composition of the groups changes. A series of surveys interviewing different people can describe the resulting alignment without identifying which process produced it. Issue polarization concerns the distance between positions on policy. Affective polarization concerns the difference between feelings toward one's own party and the other party. A person can dislike the opposing party while holding some views in common with its supporters. An ideological moderate can be a committed partisan. A county that divides its vote closely can contain reporting units with very different margins. The book keeps these distinctions visible. Its chapter on economic and cultural dimensions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions) finds that the correlation between its economic and cultural indices rose from +0.10 in 1984 to +0.51 in 2024 and is still below one, at +0.69, after correction for measurement error. Its chapter on partisan feeling (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party) finds a long-run fall in ratings of the other party, from 48.0 in 1978 to 20.6 in 2024 on the feeling thermometer, while the average own-party rating ends near its starting level. The recent movement in those ratings also depends on which interview modes are compared. ### The American alignment developed on different schedules The first volume, *The great sorting*, examines the changing relationship between party identity and ideology, then follows the evidence through partisan feeling, electoral groups, issues, racial attitudes and institutional confidence. The timing differs by subject. On abortion, the surveys show a widening party gap over their observed periods, from 3.5 points in 1980 to 52.3 in 2024 in the ANES. The economic-perception chapter (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy) describes a gap that reverses at each change of party in the presidency. Partisans are more likely to say that the national economy got better over the past year when their own party holds the presidency, by 34.0 points on average. A persistent difference on an issue and a difference that changes sign with control of government are different patterns, and the chapters describe each without explaining it. (Note: The chapters behind this paragraph are Chapter 4.1, The abortion sort (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort), Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) and Chapter 4.4, Perceptions of the economy (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy).) The composition of political groups matters too. The income chapter finds a change in the comparison between the highest and lowest household-income brackets, from −9.1 points in 2008 to +5.7 in 2024, but the 2024 profile is U-shaped rather than a simple rising ladder. Within education groups the 2024 gap cannot be told apart from zero, although it still rose after 2008. A straight line summarizes a U poorly, so a description of the parties as the parties of the rich or the poor leaves out that structure. (Note: See Chapter 3.3, The income ladder (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder).) The volume also asks how the alignment changed within birth cohorts. A cohort is a group of people born in the same years. Its average can change as its members change their views, but also as people enter or leave the observed group. The cohort analysis therefore cannot identify individual switching. Its estimates of the contribution of replacement depend on assumptions about cohort rates. (Note: See Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened).) ### Left and right contain different combinations of beliefs The second volume, *Ideology, values and religion*, examines the content behind political labels. It distinguishes economic from cultural views, considers the relationship between basic values and ideological placement, and studies religious attendance and affiliation. Cross-national comparisons are useful because the American combination is only one observed combination. In the book's comparative analysis, left-right placement follows economic attitudes most closely in some countries, the importance of God in others and moral attitudes in others, and in the remaining countries no one attitude leads clearly. Even within post-communist Europe, conservation values, meaning the importance people give to conformity, tradition and security, can relate to the left in one country and the right in another. The post-communist average conceals opposite signs, so it does not support one uniform regional account. (Note: The chapters behind this paragraph are Chapter 7.4, Left and right across countries (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries), Chapter 8.1, Basic values and left-right (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/basic-values-and-left-right) and Chapter 8.4, The obedience-autonomy disposition (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition).) These comparisons also test the measures. Questions about the qualities desirable in a child differ from portraits used to measure personal values. Religious attendance differs from the importance of God. When related measures give similar results, that agreement is informative. It does not make the questions interchangeable or prove that they all measure a single disposition. The comparative chapters written so far therefore qualify the American account. The book asks which relationships recur and which depend on the political label, the survey question or the country. The strength of an association and its direction are empirical questions, even when a theory predicts both. ### Election maps describe distributions of votes The third volume, *The political map*, begins with county election returns and then examines finer reporting units, demographic characteristics, local economic and environmental conditions, and political donations. It ends by relating the geography of voting to individual opinion. A county's margin describes its result in one election. Its swing describes the change between elections. Counties can swing by similar amounts while remaining far apart in their levels of support. The nationalization chapter measures the spread of those changes. The county-margin chapter measures distance from the national result within an election. The measures answer different questions. (Note: The chapters behind this paragraph are Chapter 10.1, Nationalization of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote) and Chapter 10.2, Distance from the national vote, 1868 to 2024 (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-landslide-county).) Table 2. The share of counties within 5 points of the national swing rose from 21.2% in 1972 to 1976 to 75.6% in 2020 to 2024 Moving below the county line reveals variation that a county average hides. The precinct chapter compares counties that finished near a tie but had different distributions of reporting-unit margins. A close county result does not tell us whether most units were close or whether more one-sided results balanced each other. Nor does a reporting-unit margin reveal the views of every resident; some reporting units are categories of ballots rather than geographic neighborhoods. (Note: See Chapter 11.1, Precincts within counties (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/precincts-within-counties).) Campaign-finance records supply another comparison. Donors are a selected group, and their scores are inferred from giving rather than chosen as survey labels. The donor-pool chapter follows changes in who is active on a scale that assigns each donor a fixed score. The donor-voter chapter compares county pools drawn from a long record of giving with a particular election. Neither comparison directly measures how an individual donor voted. (Note: The chapters behind this paragraph are Chapter 14.4, The ideology of the donor pool (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool) and Chapter 14.7, Counties where donors and voters diverge (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge).) ### People and places answer different questions A relationship across places can differ from a relationship among the people who live in them. Across ZIP codes, for example, more capital-gains filers went with a swing toward the Democrats, while within education groups investors were more Republican than non-investors; with education held fixed, the two results agree in sign. The book places those comparisons alongside one another and identifies the different populations and periods they describe. (Note: See Chapter 12.4, Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote).) The final part returns directly to survey respondents. Chapter 15.1, Party and place (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place) compares Democrats and Republicans living in the same kind of county, then compares members of the same party across strongly Democratic and strongly Republican counties. On every issue it examines (Table 3), the party gap is larger than the within-party place gap, averaging 43.1 and 5.6 points. The place differences remain observable, and their size depends on the issue and adjustment. Table 3. On every issue the gap between parties is larger than the gap between deep-red and deep-blue counties That comparison does not establish what moving to another county would do to someone's views. People select where they live, party attachments relate to other characteristics, and the measured county margin captures only one aspect of local context. Separating influence from selection requires different evidence. ### Reading the evidence Each chapter defines the comparison its figures make. Survey weights adjust how much each respondent contributes so that the sample matches specified population characteristics, not every unobserved one. Confidence intervals describe uncertainty under an estimator's assumptions and do not by themselves include errors from wording, nonresponse or selection into an online panel. Election returns count recorded votes. Estimates allocated from precincts to other geographic areas add modeling assumptions. Historical returns also describe the people who could and did vote under the rules of their period. Campaign-finance files describe the contributions covered by their reporting and scoring procedures. These sources cannot be treated as equivalent samples of the public. The [methods reference](https://vishalsingh.org/politics/reference/methods) explains the recurring choices. The chapters can be read in sequence, through the [map-first path](https://vishalsingh.org/politics/path/start-with-the-map) or by subject. Each provides its data sources, methods and limitations so that it can be read on its own. Planned chapters are identified as questions still to be investigated; their presence in the contents is not evidence of a finding. ### What these data cannot show The analyses in the current chapters describe relationships more often than they identify causes. They cannot by themselves determine whether party leaders changed voters' views, whether voters selected leaders who matched them, or whether both responded to other changes. Those limits apply to the interpretation of the patterns, even when the patterns themselves are measured precisely. ## Tables ### Table 1. The party-ideology correlation ended higher than it began on all three surveys Weighted correlation between party identification (seven-point scale, leaners kept) and liberal-conservative self-placement, respondents who answered both, ANES 1972 to 2024, GSS 1974 to 2024, CES 2006 to 2024, with 95% intervals; the differences view plots the ANES value minus each other survey's value in the same year | Survey | Respondents included | Year | Estimate | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES | All interviews | 1972 | +0.32 | +0.27 | +0.36 | 1,545 | 1,545 | | ANES | All interviews | 1974 | +0.33 | +0.27 | +0.39 | 1,140 | 857 | | ANES | All interviews | 1976 | +0.38 | +0.33 | +0.42 | 1,497 | 1,441 | | ANES | All interviews | 1978 | +0.35 | +0.31 | +0.39 | 1,658 | 1,658 | | ANES | All interviews | 1980 | +0.39 | +0.33 | +0.44 | 1,004 | 1,004 | | ANES | All interviews | 1982 | +0.41 | +0.36 | +0.47 | 891 | 891 | | ANES | All interviews | 1984 | +0.41 | +0.37 | +0.45 | 1,546 | 1,546 | | ANES | All interviews | 1986 | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.41 | 1,622 | 1,622 | | ANES | All interviews | 1988 | +0.40 | +0.36 | +0.45 | 1,419 | 1,419 | | ANES | All interviews | 1990 | +0.34 | +0.29 | +0.39 | 1,315 | 1,315 | | ANES | All interviews | 1992 | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.47 | 1,819 | 1,812 | | ANES | All interviews | 1994 | +0.51 | +0.46 | +0.55 | 1,398 | 1,144 | | ANES | All interviews | 1996 | +0.54 | +0.50 | +0.58 | 1,326 | 1,070 | | ANES | All interviews | 1998 | +0.44 | +0.39 | +0.49 | 1,012 | 858 | | ANES | All interviews | 2000 | +0.47 | +0.40 | +0.53 | 669 | 546 | | ANES | All interviews | 2002 | +0.52 | +0.47 | +0.57 | 1,223 | 828 | | ANES | All interviews | 2004 | +0.58 | +0.53 | +0.63 | 913 | 766 | | ANES | All interviews | 2008 | +0.61 | +0.57 | +0.65 | 1,607 | 1,053 | | ANES | All interviews | 2012 | +0.61 | +0.59 | +0.63 | 5,288 | 2,970 | | ANES | All interviews | 2016 | +0.70 | +0.68 | +0.72 | 3,298 | 2,332 | | ANES | All interviews | 2020 | +0.74 | +0.72 | +0.75 | 7,041 | 3,929 | | ANES | All interviews | 2024 | +0.72 | +0.70 | +0.74 | 4,716 | 2,228 | | GSS | All interviews | 1974 | +0.17 | +0.12 | +0.23 | 1,345 | 1,122 | | GSS | All interviews | 1975 | +0.23 | +0.18 | +0.29 | 1,384 | 1,136 | | GSS | All interviews | 1976 | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,393 | 1,137 | | GSS | All interviews | 1977 | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,440 | 1,160 | | GSS | All interviews | 1978 | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.22 | 1,422 | 885 | | GSS | All interviews | 1980 | +0.14 | +0.08 | +0.21 | 1,418 | 941 | | GSS | All interviews | 1982 | +0.24 | +0.19 | +0.30 | 1,723 | 1,032 | | GSS | All interviews | 1983 | +0.28 | +0.20 | +0.36 | 763 | 482 | | GSS | All interviews | 1984 | +0.26 | +0.20 | +0.32 | 1,386 | 889 | | GSS | All interviews | 1985 | +0.28 | +0.22 | +0.34 | 1,444 | 919 | | GSS | All interviews | 1986 | +0.31 | +0.26 | +0.36 | 1,390 | 1,132 | | GSS | All interviews | 1987 | +0.31 | +0.25 | +0.36 | 1,666 | 1,126 | | GSS | All interviews | 1988 | +0.30 | +0.24 | +0.35 | 1,411 | 1,139 | | GSS | All interviews | 1989 | +0.27 | +0.21 | +0.32 | 1,429 | 1,127 | | GSS | All interviews | 1990 | +0.29 | +0.23 | +0.35 | 1,301 | 1,023 | | GSS | All interviews | 1991 | +0.26 | +0.20 | +0.31 | 1,443 | 1,105 | | GSS | All interviews | 1993 | +0.34 | +0.28 | +0.38 | 1,528 | 1,196 | | GSS | All interviews | 1994 | +0.37 | +0.34 | +0.41 | 2,806 | 2,204 | | GSS | All interviews | 1996 | +0.38 | +0.35 | +0.42 | 2,702 | 2,168 | | GSS | All interviews | 1998 | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.40 | 2,622 | 2,033 | | GSS | All interviews | 2000 | +0.34 | +0.30 | +0.38 | 2,593 | 2,038 | | GSS | All interviews | 2002 | +0.37 | +0.31 | +0.42 | 1,299 | 944 | | GSS | All interviews | 2004 | +0.43 | +0.38 | +0.48 | 1,289 | 937 | | GSS | All interviews | 2006 | +0.47 | +0.44 | +0.50 | 4,253 | 2,952 | | GSS | All interviews | 2008 | +0.48 | +0.44 | +0.52 | 1,890 | 1,324 | | GSS | All interviews | 2010 | +0.50 | +0.46 | +0.54 | 1,914 | 1,231 | | GSS | All interviews | 2012 | +0.47 | +0.42 | +0.51 | 1,815 | 1,153 | | GSS | All interviews | 2014 | +0.50 | +0.46 | +0.53 | 2,368 | 1,734 | | GSS | All interviews | 2016 | +0.50 | +0.46 | +0.53 | 2,668 | 1,782 | | GSS | All interviews | 2018 | +0.56 | +0.52 | +0.60 | 2,149 | 1,285 | | GSS | All interviews | 2021 | +0.64 | +0.62 | +0.67 | 3,833 | 2,501 | | GSS | All interviews | 2022 | +0.63 | +0.59 | +0.66 | 3,303 | 1,304 | | GSS | All interviews | 2024 | +0.63 | +0.60 | +0.66 | 3,062 | 1,557 | | CES | All interviews | 2006 | +0.66 | +0.65 | +0.67 | 33,755 | 26,295 | | CES | All interviews | 2007 | +0.68 | +0.67 | +0.70 | 8,787 | 4,593 | | CES | All interviews | 2008 | +0.68 | +0.67 | +0.68 | 29,939 | 20,888 | | CES | All interviews | 2009 | +0.66 | +0.64 | +0.67 | 12,229 | 9,223 | | CES | All interviews | 2010 | +0.66 | +0.65 | +0.66 | 51,574 | 20,318 | | CES | All interviews | 2011 | +0.60 | +0.58 | +0.61 | 18,329 | 8,715 | | CES | All interviews | 2012 | +0.63 | +0.62 | +0.64 | 48,972 | 21,136 | | CES | All interviews | 2013 | +0.60 | +0.58 | +0.61 | 14,712 | 7,302 | | CES | All interviews | 2014 | +0.62 | +0.61 | +0.63 | 49,876 | 21,741 | | CES | All interviews | 2015 | +0.63 | +0.61 | +0.64 | 12,807 | 6,907 | | CES | All interviews | 2016 | +0.59 | +0.58 | +0.60 | 58,788 | 30,529 | | CES | All interviews | 2017 | +0.63 | +0.62 | +0.65 | 16,356 | 7,800 | | CES | All interviews | 2018 | +0.68 | +0.68 | +0.69 | 54,063 | 25,503 | | CES | All interviews | 2019 | +0.69 | +0.68 | +0.70 | 16,478 | 9,481 | | CES | All interviews | 2020 | +0.69 | +0.68 | +0.69 | 55,395 | 27,431 | | CES | All interviews | 2021 | +0.69 | +0.68 | +0.70 | 23,450 | 13,577 | | CES | All interviews | 2022 | +0.70 | +0.69 | +0.70 | 54,964 | 24,917 | | CES | All interviews | 2023 | +0.65 | +0.64 | +0.66 | 22,029 | 12,323 | | CES | All interviews | 2024 | +0.72 | +0.71 | +0.73 | 55,835 | 18,536 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1972 | +0.32 | +0.27 | +0.36 | 1,545 | 1,545 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1974 | +0.33 | +0.27 | +0.39 | 1,140 | 857 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1976 | +0.38 | +0.33 | +0.42 | 1,497 | 1,441 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1978 | +0.35 | +0.31 | +0.39 | 1,658 | 1,658 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1980 | +0.39 | +0.33 | +0.44 | 1,004 | 1,004 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1982 | +0.41 | +0.36 | +0.47 | 891 | 891 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1984 | +0.41 | +0.37 | +0.45 | 1,546 | 1,546 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1986 | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.41 | 1,622 | 1,622 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1988 | +0.40 | +0.36 | +0.45 | 1,419 | 1,419 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1990 | +0.34 | +0.29 | +0.39 | 1,315 | 1,315 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1992 | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.47 | 1,819 | 1,812 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1994 | +0.51 | +0.46 | +0.55 | 1,398 | 1,144 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1996 | +0.54 | +0.50 | +0.58 | 1,326 | 1,070 | | ANES | Left out: telephone or mixed-mode study | 1998 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES | Left out: telephone or mixed-mode study | 2000 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES | Left out: telephone or mixed-mode study | 2002 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 2004 | +0.58 | +0.53 | +0.63 | 913 | 766 | | ANES | Face-to-face respondents | 2008 | +0.61 | +0.57 | +0.65 | 1,607 | 1,053 | | ANES | Face-to-face respondents | 2012 | +0.63 | +0.59 | +0.67 | 1,454 | 794 | | ANES | Face-to-face respondents | 2016 | +0.67 | +0.62 | +0.71 | 903 | 598 | | ANES | Face-to-face respondents | 2024 | +0.72 | +0.68 | +0.77 | 868 | 442 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1974 | +0.17 | +0.12 | +0.23 | 1,345 | 1,122 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1975 | +0.23 | +0.18 | +0.29 | 1,384 | 1,136 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1976 | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,393 | 1,137 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1977 | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,440 | 1,160 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1978 | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.22 | 1,422 | 885 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1980 | +0.14 | +0.08 | +0.21 | 1,418 | 941 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1982 | +0.24 | +0.19 | +0.30 | 1,723 | 1,032 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1983 | +0.28 | +0.20 | +0.36 | 763 | 482 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1984 | +0.26 | +0.20 | +0.32 | 1,386 | 889 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1985 | +0.28 | +0.22 | +0.34 | 1,444 | 919 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1986 | +0.31 | +0.26 | +0.36 | 1,390 | 1,132 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1987 | +0.31 | +0.25 | +0.36 | 1,666 | 1,126 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1988 | +0.30 | +0.24 | +0.35 | 1,411 | 1,139 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1989 | +0.27 | +0.21 | +0.32 | 1,429 | 1,127 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1990 | +0.29 | +0.23 | +0.35 | 1,301 | 1,023 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1991 | +0.26 | +0.20 | +0.31 | 1,443 | 1,105 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1993 | +0.34 | +0.28 | +0.38 | 1,528 | 1,196 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1994 | +0.37 | +0.34 | +0.41 | 2,806 | 2,204 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1996 | +0.38 | +0.35 | +0.42 | 2,702 | 2,168 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1998 | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.40 | 2,622 | 2,033 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 2000 | +0.34 | +0.30 | +0.38 | 2,593 | 2,038 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 2002 | +0.37 | +0.31 | +0.42 | 1,299 | 944 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2004 | +0.44 | +0.38 | +0.50 | 1,025 | 761 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2006 | +0.47 | +0.44 | +0.49 | 3,972 | 2,812 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2008 | +0.46 | +0.42 | +0.51 | 1,667 | 1,180 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2010 | +0.49 | +0.45 | +0.54 | 1,706 | 1,100 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2012 | +0.47 | +0.42 | +0.52 | 1,579 | 1,016 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2014 | +0.48 | +0.44 | +0.52 | 2,054 | 1,503 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2016 | +0.51 | +0.47 | +0.54 | 2,487 | 1,651 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2018 | +0.55 | +0.51 | +0.59 | 1,920 | 1,177 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2022 | +0.59 | +0.53 | +0.64 | 1,424 | 566 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2024 | +0.56 | +0.50 | +0.61 | 1,029 | 536 | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1974 | +0.15 | +0.07 | +0.24 | 2,485 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1976 | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.23 | 2,890 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1978 | +0.19 | +0.12 | +0.27 | 3,080 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1980 | +0.24 | +0.16 | +0.33 | 2,422 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1982 | +0.17 | +0.09 | +0.25 | 2,614 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1984 | +0.15 | +0.07 | +0.22 | 2,932 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1986 | +0.05 | −0.01 | +0.12 | 3,012 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1988 | +0.11 | +0.04 | +0.18 | 2,830 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1990 | +0.05 | −0.02 | +0.12 | 2,616 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1994 | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.19 | 4,204 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1996 | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.21 | 4,028 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1998 | +0.08 | +0.01 | +0.15 | 3,634 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2000 | +0.12 | +0.05 | +0.20 | 3,262 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2002 | +0.15 | +0.07 | +0.22 | 2,522 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2004 | +0.15 | +0.08 | +0.22 | 2,202 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2008 | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.19 | 3,497 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2012 | +0.14 | +0.09 | +0.19 | 7,103 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2016 | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.24 | 5,966 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2024 | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 7,778 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents | 2008 | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.21 | 3,274 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents | 2012 | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.22 | 3,033 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents | 2016 | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.22 | 3,390 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents | 2024 | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.24 | 1,897 | n/a | | ANES minus CES | All interviews in both surveys | 2008 | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 31,546 | n/a | | ANES minus CES | All interviews in both surveys | 2012 | −0.02 | −0.04 | +0.01 | 54,260 | n/a | | ANES minus CES | All interviews in both surveys | 2016 | +0.11 | +0.09 | +0.13 | 62,086 | n/a | | ANES minus CES | All interviews in both surveys | 2020 | +0.05 | +0.04 | +0.07 | 62,436 | n/a | | ANES minus CES | All interviews in both surveys | 2024 | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.02 | 60,551 | n/a | Views: All interviews (view_id = all); In person only (view_id = inperson); Differences between surveys (view_id = diff). Note: The in-person view keeps all respondents in the years before the file records interview mode; the methods note of the chapter Party and ideology gives its rules. Note: In the all-interviews view, rings mark ANES 2000 and GSS 1983, 2002 and 2004. The label is the share of respondents with a party answer who placed themselves on the ideology scale, fewer than in the years around them, so each ringed point rests on fewer respondents. Note: A year is drawn only when it has at least 150 respondents who answered both questions and passes a second size condition given in the methods note of the chapter Party and ideology. A difference needs both surveys to pass. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024 (weight VCF0009z; weight_ftf for the in-person view); GSS, 1974-2024 (weight_use); CES cumulative file, 2006-2024 (weight); all estimates weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-belief-and-the-political-map/figures/staircase.json ### Table 2. The share of counties within 5 points of the national swing rose from 21.2% in 1972 to 1976 to 75.6% in 2020 to 2024 Change in each county's Democratic minus Republican margin, minus the national change, percentage points, for each of 39 pairs of presidential elections No inline rows: the values of Table 2 are in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/party-belief-and-the-political-map/swing_map.json. Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the estimates have no confidence interval. Note: Counties are drawn on 2020 boundaries and matched across elections on FIPS code. A county with no return in one of the two elections, or whose code is absent from the 2020 map, draws as no data. Values are rounded to one decimal place, except that a county within 5 points of the national swing is never rounded to the edge of the palest class, so that class holds the counties counted in the chapter Nationalization of the county vote. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-belief-and-the-political-map/figures/swing_map.json ### Table 3. On every issue the gap between parties is larger than the gap between deep-red and deep-blue counties Gap in the share taking the Democratic side, in points, by issue; Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | Issue | Democratic side of the question | Survey years | Party gap | Party gap, low | Party gap, high | Place gap | Place gap, low | Place gap, high | Ratio | Smallest group, n | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Assault weapons ban | Support an assault weapons ban | 2013 to 2021 | 41.9 | 40.3 | 43.8 | 7.5 | 6.1 | 9.0 | 5.6 | 16,440 | | Background checks | Support universal background checks for gun buyers | 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 13.3 | 12.0 | 14.9 | 2.1 | 0.9 | 3.1 | 6.5 | 13,375 | | Concealed carry | Oppose easier concealed carry | 2013 to 2021 | 38.8 | 37.1 | 40.7 | 4.8 | 3.4 | 6.4 | 8.1 | 16,452 | | Border security | Oppose more spending on border security | 2013 to 2021, not 2018 | 40.2 | 38.6 | 42.0 | 5.3 | 3.7 | 6.7 | 7.6 | 13,428 | | Path to legal status | Support a path to legal status for undocumented immigrants | 2013 to 2021, not 2018 | 38.7 | 36.9 | 40.3 | 4.1 | 2.6 | 5.8 | 9.6 | 13,422 | | Border wall | Oppose spending on a border wall | 2017 to 2021, not 2019 | 64.1 | 62.5 | 65.8 | 4.1 | 2.9 | 5.3 | 15.5 | 8,257 | | Gay marriage | Support legal gay marriage | 2013 to 2016 | 36.4 | 33.6 | 39.3 | 10.2 | 6.6 | 13.7 | 3.6 | 7,161 | | Repeal the ACA | Oppose repealing the Affordable Care Act | 2013 to 2021 | 57.2 | 55.8 | 58.8 | 4.2 | 2.8 | 5.4 | 13.7 | 16,459 | | EPA regulates CO2 | Support letting the EPA regulate carbon dioxide | 2014 to 2021 | 44.4 | 42.3 | 46.5 | 5.2 | 3.5 | 6.9 | 8.6 | 15,459 | | Abortion legal | Support always allowing abortion as a matter of choice | 2014 to 2021 | 46.5 | 44.7 | 48.7 | 12.0 | 9.2 | 14.6 | 3.9 | 15,818 | | Medicare for All | Support Medicare for All | 2018 to 2021 | 51.3 | 49.3 | 53.6 | 4.2 | 1.7 | 6.4 | 12.1 | 8,385 | | Cut immigration | Oppose cutting legal immigration by half | 2018 to 2020 | 44.2 | 42.6 | 45.7 | 4.1 | 2.5 | 5.9 | 10.8 | 7,157 | Note: A deep county is one where the two-party presidential margin is at or beyond the cutoff stated in the chapter Party and place. The share is measured on the side of each issue that Democrats take more often, which the data table names for each question. Note: The issues were asked in different survey years, listed in the data table, so the averages combine periods. The number in a tooltip is the smallest of the four party by county-type groups behind the row. Note: Ratios are computed from unrounded gaps, so a ratio can differ in its last digit from the quotient of the gaps as printed. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states; they are model based and ignore the design of the panel. Source: CES cumulative common content, 2013-2021; county returns for the two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-belief-and-the-political-map/figures/gaps_by_issue.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (34), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | abortion_gap_1980 | 3.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1980 | 95% CI −1.8 to 8.8 | 1,313 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_gap_2024 | 52.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2024 | 95% CI 48.8 to 55.9 | 4,666 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_n_1972 | 1,545 | respondents | count of respondents who answered both questions | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1972 | | | unweighted count of respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_n_2024 | 4,716 | respondents | count of respondents who answered both questions | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | | | unweighted count of respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_r_1972 | +0.32 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1972 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.36 | 1,545 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_r_2024 | +0.72 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.70 to 0.74 | 4,716 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | band | 5 | percentage points of the two-party margin | definition of 'near the national swing' | half-width of the band around the national swing | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | ces_r_2008 | +0.68 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | CES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, not sure excluded) and an ideology answer (not sure excluded) | 2008 | 95% CI 0.67 to 0.68 | 29,939 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_r_2016 | +0.59 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | CES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, not sure excluded) and an ideology answer (not sure excluded) | 2016 | 95% CI 0.58 to 0.60 | 58,788 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_r_2024 | +0.72 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | CES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, not sure excluded) and an ideology answer (not sure excluded) | 2024 | 95% CI 0.71 to 0.73 | 55,835 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | counties_within_1976 | 21.2% | percent of matched counties | share of counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | counties_within_latest | 75.6% | percent of matched counties | share of counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | econcult_r_1984 | +0.10 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.15 | 1,508 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econcult_r_2024 | +0.51 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 0.48 to 0.55 | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econcult_rc_2024 | +0.69 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | observed correlation divided by the square root of the product of the two alphas (bootstrap percentile interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 0.65 to 0.74 | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | economy_own_party_gap | 34.0 | percentage points | mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) | 95% CI 32.5 to 35.4 | 20,874 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gss_ip_2018 | +0.55 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2018, in-person interviews | 95% CI 0.51 to 0.59 | 1,920 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_ip_2024 | +0.56 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI 0.50 to 0.61 | 1,029 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | income_gap_2008 | −9.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI −12.9 to −5.4 | 5,534 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | income_gap_2024 | +5.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 1.1 to 10.3 | 12,281 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_pairs | 39 | pairs of consecutive presidential elections | count of pairs | counties with returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | nat_swing_latest | −6.1 | change in the two-party margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | change in the summed two-party margin of matched counties | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | off_gss_k | 19 | survey years | count of matched survey years | years in which both the ANES and the GSS asked both questions | 1974-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_gss_sig | 17 | survey years | count of matched years in which the interval of the ANES minus GSS difference lies above zero | matched ANES and GSS survey years | 1974-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_inperson_k | 4 | survey years | count of matched years with mode information in both surveys | years in which both the ANES and the GSS identify in-person interviews | 2008-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | other_party_1978 | 48.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 | 95% CI 47.1 to 48.9 | 1,723 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | other_party_2024 | 20.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 95% CI 19.8 to 21.5 | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | party_gap_max | 64.1 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | largest party gap over the issues (border wall) | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 62.5 to 65.8 | 60,875 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | party_gap_mean | 43.1 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues of the party gap: Democratic minus Republican share taking the Democratic side, averaged over deep-red and deep-blue counties | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 41.8 to 44.5 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | party_gap_min | 13.3 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | smallest party gap over the issues (universal background checks) | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 12.0 to 14.9 | 96,237 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | place_gap_max | 12.0 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | largest place gap over the issues (abortion) | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 9.2 to 14.6 | 113,602 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | place_gap_mean | 5.6 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues of the place gap: deep-blue minus deep-red county share taking the Democratic side, averaged over Democrats and Republicans | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 4.7 to 6.6 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | place_gap_min | 2.1 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | smallest place gap over the issues (universal background checks) | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 0.9 to 3.1 | 96,237 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | south_above_1976 | 93.5% | percent of counties in the Census South region | share of counties that swung 5 or more points more toward the Democrats than the nation | counties in the Census South region | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | ## Definitions - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Party sorting: The alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. - Affective polarization: The gap between how warmly people feel toward their own party and how coldly they feel toward the other party. It measures feeling, not disagreement on issues. - Cohort: People born in the same period, such as the same decade. Comparing cohorts shows whether a difference comes from when people were born, as distinct from their age or the year they were surveyed. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. ## Methods Sample: ANES respondents who answered both the seven-point party-identification question and the seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement question, 1,545 in 1972 and 4,716 in 2024. Estimator: the survey-weighted Pearson correlation within a survey year, with the ANES weight (VCF0009z), computed by the code of the chapter Party and ideology. Party identification runs from strong Democrat to strong Republican and keeps leaners on their own points; self-placement runs from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, so a positive correlation means that conservatives sit with Republicans. Respondents who do not place themselves are missing on that item and are left out. Intervals: 95% intervals from Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and do not follow the sampling design. The three figures are reused from the chapters Party and ideology, Nationalization of the county vote and Party and place, with their rows, specifications, source lines, alt text and views. Each of those chapters gives the sample, weights, estimators and suppression rules for its figure in its own methods note, and the numbers a figure prints are read from the same chapter's facts. The county swing map uses full counts of votes and has no sampling interval. The numbers printed in sentences about other chapters are read from those chapters' facts files, and the other statements about chapters describe what those chapters report. ## What these data cannot show - The analyses in the current chapters describe relationships more often than they identify causes. - They cannot by themselves determine whether party leaders changed voters' views, whether voters selected leaders who matched them, or whether both responded to other changes. - Those limits apply to the interpretation of the patterns, even when the patterns themselves are measured precisely. ## References 1. Fisher, Ronald A. (1921). On the Probable Error of a Coefficient of Correlation Deduced from a Small Sample. Metron 1(4): 3-32. 2. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/party-belief-and-the-political-map/build.py (sha256 c94c720f2663296229f85baafc2d1e265270b83bb4fb53b6da42c93c2b2383ba) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 | | C:/github/politics-book/content/chapters/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/data/facts.json | 45,363 | 2951ffeac47b3a0909e6cf2b156c5681801216a36579844a0e6d0a3aee736495 | 2951ffeac47b3a0909e6cf2b156c5681801216a36579844a0e6d0a3aee736495 | | C:/github/politics-book/content/chapters/feelings-toward-the-other-party/data/facts.json | 72,189 | 3f7c8674564306087618216b5acb6cc2c9d38a854ee535af326884644a628dd8 | 3f7c8674564306087618216b5acb6cc2c9d38a854ee535af326884644a628dd8 | | C:/github/politics-book/content/chapters/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/data/facts.json | 42,255 | 6381c8032eba068d911ea297533463f34fb33e5c4a82a0b68bd4e64cf816608e | 6381c8032eba068d911ea297533463f34fb33e5c4a82a0b68bd4e64cf816608e | | C:/github/politics-book/content/chapters/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/data/figures/swing_map.json | 3,574 | 31dec551a60bcf9ca16d581c0367c4913af50f1ad9886af169cece7c37d945ec | 31dec551a60bcf9ca16d581c0367c4913af50f1ad9886af169cece7c37d945ec | | C:/github/politics-book/content/chapters/party-and-ideology/data/facts.json | 66,818 | aecf9398163e8ed142b15e8aadd9ab2f4c55c7b80519173dbc3bc373d386679d | aecf9398163e8ed142b15e8aadd9ab2f4c55c7b80519173dbc3bc373d386679d | | C:/github/politics-book/content/chapters/party-and-ideology/data/figures/staircase.json | 48,476 | b0a6a0a6a08fa981cca661c00999b8a0e2be26f93f407d033a72fee60be1a0fa | b0a6a0a6a08fa981cca661c00999b8a0e2be26f93f407d033a72fee60be1a0fa | | C:/github/politics-book/content/chapters/party-and-place/data/facts.json | 85,014 | c7aadf423f1ef59d59aaf7ee50ced06ff442b18ceb481acd2f7367548887cd27 | c7aadf423f1ef59d59aaf7ee50ced06ff442b18ceb481acd2f7367548887cd27 | | C:/github/politics-book/content/chapters/party-and-place/data/figures/gaps_by_issue.json | 8,124 | 100be0bddfa5d2c27e21156b7c6756cbf0049c929c6a46938f1b181c06efe0bb | 100be0bddfa5d2c27e21156b7c6756cbf0049c929c6a46938f1b181c06efe0bb | | C:/github/politics-book/content/chapters/perceptions-of-the-economy/data/facts.json | 46,036 | 3ddb57bf606953b125471134b2ef26b947ac3f9e064599163a7b50263a886d2c | 3ddb57bf606953b125471134b2ef26b947ac3f9e064599163a7b50263a886d2c | | C:/github/politics-book/content/chapters/the-abortion-sort/data/facts.json | 54,015 | 62a3b6209ea71c08e6ecf9a8592b9341b23d44b0436da177e44fa33287dfc045 | 62a3b6209ea71c08e6ecf9a8592b9341b23d44b0436da177e44fa33287dfc045 | | C:/github/politics-book/content/chapters/the-income-ladder/data/facts.json | 58,990 | 94b439d32d17779b39b3c43a576350de23cb090efde900a2f824a170506c9a37 | 94b439d32d17779b39b3c43a576350de23cb090efde900a2f824a170506c9a37 | | C:/github/politics-book/public/data/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/swing_map.json | 3,608,101 | b48164cb5c8979403b4d5145588e6654d542a6a8e99b57efb6609eb8750ca186 | da68b4077b5e36a7553276eddcee356533073c88c73221fd19381fe387d295c4 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 67de93e1fdd9f7c5876dd22d04b4ea01d2e0df6e34bb55ec908b0fac69caa6ef | | figures/gaps_by_issue.json | c72a9b4b1318027d1c156a53d4c4243cb6d35d686483682909592525f146facc | | figures/staircase.json | 3de632cda1c2ad83fd98dc9efe91fa93bf407d8f0df1e10b8b8e966f38c72d2a | | figures/swing_map.json | 24d5affe6b00e9337f81fb5c666fac1a5bbd3653d9b10a3d177bf8566e142faa | | meta.json | 540cf3d925939f14d88f47dc4f8909dcdaa967c1bee649aacca1cbc35b240035 | | public/data/party-belief-and-the-political-map/swing_map.json | 508df5251e39fe2340235548a78786d05325902cc2b871e5d3a32e3fb19b90ba | | refs.json | 479e72f99353914a3875a958a71e8634a63c7f0200140ee7de6b4794c97a7012 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-belief-and-the-political-map/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-belief-and-the-political-map/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-belief-and-the-political-map/facts.json - Table 1, figure "staircase" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-belief-and-the-political-map/figures/staircase.json - Table 2, figure "swing_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-belief-and-the-political-map/figures/swing_map.json - Table 3, figure "gaps_by_issue" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-belief-and-the-political-map/figures/gaps_by_issue.json - Payload of "swing_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/party-belief-and-the-political-map/swing_map.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Party and ideology: report Chapter 1.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Party and ideology - Chapter: 1.1 (Part I, The sort; The great sorting) - Question: How much more closely did party identification and ideological self-placement come to line up, and did the change happen inside every group? - Dek: Among ANES respondents, the correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement rose from +0.32 in 1972 to +0.72 in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024: seven-point party identification and seven-point liberal-conservative scale; interview mode from the mode weights (2008, 2012, 2016, 2024); years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for interview mode - General Social Survey. General Social Survey, 1974-2024: partyid and polviews; interview mode joined from the raw file (from 2004); years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use - Cooperative Election Study. Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, 2006-2024: pid7 and ideo5; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled waves) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026partyandideology ```bibtex @misc{singh2026partyandideology, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Party and ideology}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1972 | +0.32 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.36 | 1,545 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_r_1972 | | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | +0.72 | 95% CI 0.70 to 0.74 | 4,716 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_r_2024 | | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1974 | +0.17 | 95% CI 0.12 to 0.23 | 1,345 | weight_use | General Social Survey | gss_r_1974 | | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | +0.63 | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.66 | 3,062 | weight_use | General Social Survey | gss_r_2024 | ## Findings Among respondents to the American National Election Studies (ANES) who answered both questions, the correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement rose from +0.32 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.36) in 1972 to +0.72 (95% CI 0.70 to 0.74) in 2024. A correlation measures linear association, how closely self-placement rises along a straight line as party identification moves from strong Democrat to strong Republican. A value near zero means that no straight line links the two answers, and a value near one means that the party scale nearly fixes the placement along that line. In the General Social Survey (GSS) the correlation rose from +0.17 in 1974 to +0.63 in 2024. Party identification is a seven-point scale from strong Democrat to strong Republican, and leaners keep their own points on it. Self-placement runs from extremely liberal to extremely conservative on a seven-point scale in the ANES and the GSS and on a five-point scale in the Cooperative Election Study (CES), which starts in 2006. Every correlation, difference and share is weighted (survey weights) and carries a confidence interval, shown in parentheses or in the popover on the number. Researchers call the movement of liberals into the Democratic Party and of conservatives into the Republican Party the partisan sort [1], and the wider alignment of party with traits such as religion, race and place party sorting. Early survey research found that most Americans' answers to separate political questions were only loosely tied together [2], and work on the ANES of the 1970s to 1990s found party identification realigning along ideological lines [3]. Both measures here are labels. Agreement between the party label and the ideology label is not agreement on issues. Chapter 1.5, Constraint among issue positions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/constraint-among-issue-positions; planned) asks whether issue positions are more tightly bundled than they were in the 1980s, and Chapter 7.2, Economic and cultural dimensions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions) asks whether economic and cultural conservatism form one dimension or two. This chapter measures how far the two labels merged, whether the three surveys agree on the size of the change, and whether the change appears inside every group. Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened) describes the change by birth cohort, which cannot show whether individuals changed, and Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates the point at which particular attitudes became divided by party. ### The correlation over time on three surveys Table 1 plots the correlation for each survey year. (Note: Each interval is computed on the Fisher z transformation of the correlation, which makes its sampling error close to normal [4], with the Kish effective sample size [5] in place of the number of respondents. It treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample, so it does not follow the sampling design, which selects respondents in clusters within sampled areas; the section on interview mode reports the design-based check that was possible. A difference between two surveys combines their two standard errors, because the surveys share no respondents.) The CES, which starts in 2006, goes from +0.66 in that year to +0.72 in 2024, so all three surveys end higher than they start, at different levels. The ANES correlation stayed between +0.32 and +0.41 in every survey year from 1972 through 1990. Every ANES estimate from 1992 on is higher than the 1982 estimate, the highest before 1992. The highest GSS estimate before 1993 is +0.31 in 1986, and every GSS estimate from 1993 on is higher. Table 1. The party-ideology correlation ended higher than it began on all three surveys Both series also rose earlier, and the ANES estimate for 1992 and the GSS estimate for 1993 do not differ detectably from the earlier peaks, so neither series dates the step to a single year. (Note: The ANES correlation went from +0.32 in 1972 to +0.41 in 1982, a change of +0.09 (95% CI 0.02 to 0.16), and the GSS correlation went from +0.14 in 1980 to +0.31 in 1986, a change of +0.17 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.25). The 1992 ANES estimate minus the 1982 estimate is +0.02 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.09), and the 1993 GSS estimate minus the 1986 estimate is +0.02 (95% CI −0.05 to 0.10).) The chapter compares two windows, 1980 to 1988 and 2020 to 2024, each estimated from all respondents in its survey years together (pooled). In the ANES the pooled correlation is +0.39 (95% CI 0.37 to 0.41) for 1980 to 1988 and +0.73 (95% CI 0.72 to 0.74) for 2020 to 2024, a change of +0.34 (95% CI 0.31 to 0.36). The 2020 estimate is +0.74 (95% CI 0.72 to 0.75), and the 2024 minus 2020 difference is −0.01 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.01), an interval that includes zero, so the ANES shows no further rise between 2020 and 2024. The GSS goes from +0.27 (95% CI 0.24 to 0.29) pooled over 1980 to 1988 to +0.63 (95% CI 0.62 to 0.65) pooled over 2021, 2022 and 2024, a change of +0.37 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.40). The CES has no reading before 2006, when its correlation of +0.66 was already above the ANES and GSS readings of that period, and it is +0.69 pooled over 2020 to 2024. Its 2024 minus 2006 difference is +0.06 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.07), but the path in between is not steady. The CES correlation falls from +0.68 in 2008 to +0.59 in 2016, a change of −0.09 (95% CI −0.10 to −0.08), while the ANES 2016 minus 2008 difference is +0.08 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.13). #### The surveys sit at different levels The three lines end higher than they start and do not coincide. The differences view of Table 1 subtracts the GSS correlation from the ANES correlation in each of the 19 years in which both surveys ran. The ANES correlation is the higher of the two in all 19 of them, and the interval of the difference is above zero in 17 and includes zero in the other 2. The mean of the yearly differences is +0.14 (95% CI 0.12 to 0.15), and the difference ranges from +0.05 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.12) in 1990 to +0.24 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.33) in 1980. It is present in both windows: +0.13 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.16) pooled over 1980 to 1988 and +0.10 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.12) pooled over 2020 to 2024. The ANES figure for the 1980s therefore describes the ANES and does not stand in for the GSS. The CES does not sit on the ANES path either. The ANES minus CES difference is −0.06 (95% CI −0.10 to −0.03) in 2008 and +0.11 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.13) in 2016, and it averages +0.02 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.03) over the years in which both surveys ran. In the pooled 2020 to 2024 window the ANES minus CES difference is +0.04 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.05) and the CES minus GSS difference is +0.05 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.07), so no two of the three surveys give the same level in that window. The surveys differ in sampling frame, interview mode, the number of points on the ideology scale and the way a respondent who declines to place themselves is recorded. These data do not identify which of those differences produces the level differences. The chapter therefore reports each survey at its own level and compares changes within each survey. ### Interview mode and the level difference Both the ANES and the GSS added web interviews, and a change in survey mode can move a correlation without any change in the public. The files identify mode for some years only: the ANES mode weights cover 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024, and the GSS records mode from 2004. Table 2 splits the GSS estimates by mode. The in-person view of Table 1 uses the recorded mode where there is one. For earlier years it keeps all respondents, on the ground that those studies were mainly in person, and it leaves out the ANES studies of 1998, 2000 and 2002, which used telephone interviews wholly or in part. Table 2. In the GSS, web respondents show a higher correlation than in-person respondents In the GSS the web minus in-person difference is +0.11 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.17) in 2022 and +0.14 (95% CI 0.07 to 0.21) in 2024. The 2021 GSS was mostly web and has no in-person estimate. Among in-person respondents the GSS correlation is +0.55 (95% CI 0.51 to 0.59) in 2018 and +0.56 (95% CI 0.50 to 0.61) in 2024, two readings whose intervals overlap, while the estimate over all interviews goes from +0.56 to +0.63. Pooled over 2022 and 2024, the in-person correlation is +0.58 (95% CI 0.53 to 0.62), against +0.63 for all interviews pooled over 2021, 2022 and 2024. The GSS rise of the 2020s therefore combines any change among Americans with a change in how the GSS interviewed them, and these data cannot separate the two. Standard errors that follow the sampling design leave these results in place. The web minus in-person difference is +0.11 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.18) in 2022 and +0.14 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.24) in 2024, with intervals above zero, and the in-person estimate for 2024 minus the one for 2018 is 0.00 (95% CI −0.09 to 0.10), an interval that includes zero. (Note: The GSS files carry the stratum and the primary sampling unit of each respondent. A jackknife that leaves out one primary sampling unit at a time within its stratum gives design-based standard errors for the 7 GSS year-and-mode cells quoted in this section. They are 1.13 to 1.68 times the model-based standard errors, which treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. The same check was not made for the ANES or the CES.) In the ANES, the web minus face-to-face difference is −0.02 (95% CI −0.07 to 0.03) in 2012, +0.04 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.09) in 2016 and +0.03 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.08) in 2024, and each interval includes zero. The face-to-face ANES estimate for 2024 is +0.72 (95% CI 0.68 to 0.77), against +0.72 for all interviews. Mode does not remove the level difference between the ANES and the GSS. The in-person line of the differences view of Table 1 compares face-to-face ANES respondents with in-person GSS respondents. The mean of the ANES minus GSS differences is +0.16 (95% CI 0.13 to 0.19) over the 4 years in which both files identify in-person interviews, and the 2024 difference is +0.16 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.24). Among web respondents in 2024 the ANES minus GSS difference is +0.05 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.09). ### Distance between the party averages The correlation measures how well one answer predicts the other. A second measure asks how far apart the parties' supporters sit on the ideology scale. For each survey year, take the mean placement of Republican identifiers, leaners included, and subtract the mean placement of Democratic identifiers. In the ANES that difference was 0.9 (95% CI 0.7 to 1.0) points on the seven-point scale in 1972 and 2.4 (95% CI 2.3 to 2.5) points in 2024. Table 3 divides the difference by a standard deviation of placements, so that surveys with different scales can be compared. Dividing by the ANES standard deviation across all years, 1.48 scale points, gives 0.58 (95% CI 0.50 to 0.67) in 1972 and 1.60 (95% CI 1.53 to 1.67) in 2024. The 2024 value means that the average Republican identifier places themselves 1.60 standard deviations to the right of the average Democratic identifier, where a standard deviation is the ANES figure above. The unit is fixed across years, so a change in the value is a change in the distance between two averages. The value says nothing about how spread out the electorate is on either side of the middle. Dividing instead by the standard deviation of the same year gives 0.68 (95% CI 0.58 to 0.78) in 1972 and 1.43 (95% CI 1.37 to 1.50) in 2024. The rise is smaller under this scaling because the spread of ANES placements within a year also grew, from 1.28 scale points in 1972 to 1.66 in 2024. The GSS series goes from 0.39 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.50) in 1974 to 1.50 (95% CI 1.39 to 1.60) in 2024 and the CES series from 1.32 (95% CI 1.30 to 1.34) in 2006 to 1.60 (95% CI 1.58 to 1.62) in 2024. The ANES series is higher than the GSS series in 19 of the 19 years that both ran, with each survey in its own standard deviations, and the interval of the difference lies above zero in 15 of them. In 2024 the ANES minus GSS difference is +0.10 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.23), an interval that includes zero. The CES series begins above the GSS series. Table 3. The two parties' average placements moved further apart on all three surveys ### The rise inside every group Table 4 re-estimates the ANES correlation by year inside three birth cohorts, three education groups and two regions. In each of the 8 groups the line ends above where it starts. Table 5 compares the pooled 1980 to 1988 window with the pooled 2020 to 2024 window. Of the 7 groups with a reading in both windows, which is every group except the youngest cohort, 7 rose by an amount whose interval lies above zero. Table 4. The correlation rose inside every cohort, education and region group in the ANES The groups started at different levels. In 1980 to 1988 the correlation was +0.26 among people with a high school education or less and +0.61 among college graduates, and it was +0.31 in the South against +0.44 in the rest of the country. College graduates rose less than either of the other two education groups. The change among college graduates minus the change among people with a high school education or less is −0.17 (95% CI −0.23 to −0.11), and minus the change among people with some college it is −0.12 (95% CI −0.18 to −0.07). A correlation cannot pass one, so a group that starts at +0.61 has less room to rise than a group that starts at +0.26. The differences between groups are smaller in 2020 to 2024. The three education groups stand at +0.62 to +0.80, against +0.26 to +0.61 in 1980 to 1988, and the South, at +0.71, is still below the rest of the country, at +0.75, by less than in 1980 to 1988. Table 5. The correlation rose in every group, and less among college graduates than among other education groups Respondents born before 1943 went from +0.41 to +0.67, a change of +0.25 (95% CI 0.19 to 0.32). Respondents born in 1975 or later, who were too young for the earlier window, stand at +0.74 in the 2020s. The two smallest changes of the 7 groups belong to college graduates and to people born before 1943. The chapter does not compare those two changes with an interval, because a college graduate can also be born before 1943 and the two groups overlap; changes are compared only between groups of one classification. The GSS gives the same result for the groups it can define: among in-person respondents in 2020 to 2024, 3 of the 3 groups with a reading in both windows rose by an amount whose interval lies above zero. A cohort is not a fixed set of people. The group born before 1943 in the 2020s consists of its oldest surviving members who agreed to be interviewed, so a rise inside a cohort does not show that the same people changed. Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened) follows the cohorts and states what that comparison cannot show. ### Partisans and their camps Table 6 counts the party's identifiers, leaners included, who place themselves left of the middle, at the middle or right of the middle. On the seven-point scales, left and right of the middle include slightly liberal and slightly conservative. In the ANES the liberal share of Democrats who placed themselves rose from 36% (95% CI 33% to 40%) in 1972 to 62% (95% CI 59% to 65%) in 2024, and the conservative share of Republicans rose from 53% (95% CI 49% to 57%) to 77% (95% CI 75% to 80%). The opposite camps shrank: conservative Democrats went from 25% to 8%, and liberal Republicans from 13% to 4%. The GSS shows the same direction, with liberal Democrats going from 36% in 1974 to 59% in 2024 and conservative Republicans from 42% to 71%. In the CES, which starts in 2006, the liberal share of Democrats rose and the conservative share of Republicans did not change detectably. Table 6. Larger shares of Democrats are liberal and of Republicans conservative than in the 1970s These shares describe people who placed themselves. In the ANES the share of respondents with a party answer who placed themselves was 57% (95% CI 55% to 59%) in 1972 and 84% (95% CI 82% to 85%) in 2024, so the 1972 correlation describes a smaller share of respondents than the 2024 correlation. (Note: In 2000 only 34% of ANES respondents with a party answer have a placement, and in 2002 only 48% of GSS respondents do; the GSS pattern repeats in 1983 and 2004. Those years carry smaller samples, and the placement rates quoted here come from other years.) The GSS placement rate was 96% in 1974 and 96% in 2024, and its correlation rose over that span from +0.17 to +0.63, so a change in who places themselves cannot be the only source of the rise. ### What these data cannot show The data are repeated cross-sections, so they show that party and self-placement became more tightly linked and do not show which of the two changed. A panel study that followed the same people found movement in both directions: some changed party identification to match their issue positions, and others changed issue positions to match their party [6]. A study of issue attitudes over 1972 to 2004 found that attitudes came to line up with party more than they lined up with each other [7]. The rise in the correlation here is a rise in the link between two labels and is silent on which label moved first. Self-placement is a label. Its meaning for respondents draws partly on their feelings toward the groups and symbols tied to each label [8], and the public is more likely to call itself conservative than liberal while favoring more government action on many problems [9]. A rise in the correlation between party and label is not a rise in the correlation between party and any set of policy positions. The correlation also says nothing about extremity, and the distance between party averages in scale points is a separate measure. The three surveys give different levels, and these data cannot say which is closer to the level in the population. The GSS reading of the 2020s mixes web and in-person interviews that give different correlations, and the ANES mode weights are missing for 2020, so mode is identified in only some years. Every estimate describes respondents who placed themselves, and the share who did so differs between ANES years. The intervals are model based and do not follow the sampling design. Where the design could be checked, in the GSS cells behind the mode comparison, the design-based standard errors were 1.13 to 1.68 times the model-based ones. The ANES and CES intervals were not checked that way, and the CES intervals rest on the weighting of an online panel of volunteers to population totals. The data hold no measure of what party leaders did. They cannot say whether the electorate moved toward parties that had moved apart or the parties moved apart because the electorate had. Chapter 1.2, Polarization in Congress (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/polarization-in-congress; planned) takes up how far apart the parties are in Congress. ## Tables ### Table 1. The party-ideology correlation ended higher than it began on all three surveys Weighted correlation between party identification (seven-point scale, leaners kept) and liberal-conservative self-placement, respondents who answered both, ANES 1972 to 2024, GSS 1974 to 2024, CES 2006 to 2024, with 95% intervals; the differences view plots the ANES value minus each other survey's value in the same year | Survey | Respondents included | Year | Estimate | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES | All interviews | 1972 | +0.32 | +0.27 | +0.36 | 1,545 | 1,545 | | ANES | All interviews | 1974 | +0.33 | +0.27 | +0.39 | 1,140 | 857 | | ANES | All interviews | 1976 | +0.38 | +0.33 | +0.42 | 1,497 | 1,441 | | ANES | All interviews | 1978 | +0.35 | +0.31 | +0.39 | 1,658 | 1,658 | | ANES | All interviews | 1980 | +0.39 | +0.33 | +0.44 | 1,004 | 1,004 | | ANES | All interviews | 1982 | +0.41 | +0.36 | +0.47 | 891 | 891 | | ANES | All interviews | 1984 | +0.41 | +0.37 | +0.45 | 1,546 | 1,546 | | ANES | All interviews | 1986 | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.41 | 1,622 | 1,622 | | ANES | All interviews | 1988 | +0.40 | +0.36 | +0.45 | 1,419 | 1,419 | | ANES | All interviews | 1990 | +0.34 | +0.29 | +0.39 | 1,315 | 1,315 | | ANES | All interviews | 1992 | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.47 | 1,819 | 1,812 | | ANES | All interviews | 1994 | +0.51 | +0.46 | +0.55 | 1,398 | 1,144 | | ANES | All interviews | 1996 | +0.54 | +0.50 | +0.58 | 1,326 | 1,070 | | ANES | All interviews | 1998 | +0.44 | +0.39 | +0.49 | 1,012 | 858 | | ANES | All interviews | 2000 | +0.47 | +0.40 | +0.53 | 669 | 546 | | ANES | All interviews | 2002 | +0.52 | +0.47 | +0.57 | 1,223 | 828 | | ANES | All interviews | 2004 | +0.58 | +0.53 | +0.63 | 913 | 766 | | ANES | All interviews | 2008 | +0.61 | +0.57 | +0.65 | 1,607 | 1,053 | | ANES | All interviews | 2012 | +0.61 | +0.59 | +0.63 | 5,288 | 2,970 | | ANES | All interviews | 2016 | +0.70 | +0.68 | +0.72 | 3,298 | 2,332 | | ANES | All interviews | 2020 | +0.74 | +0.72 | +0.75 | 7,041 | 3,929 | | ANES | All interviews | 2024 | +0.72 | +0.70 | +0.74 | 4,716 | 2,228 | | GSS | All interviews | 1974 | +0.17 | +0.12 | +0.23 | 1,345 | 1,122 | | GSS | All interviews | 1975 | +0.23 | +0.18 | +0.29 | 1,384 | 1,136 | | GSS | All interviews | 1976 | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,393 | 1,137 | | GSS | All interviews | 1977 | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,440 | 1,160 | | GSS | All interviews | 1978 | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.22 | 1,422 | 885 | | GSS | All interviews | 1980 | +0.14 | +0.08 | +0.21 | 1,418 | 941 | | GSS | All interviews | 1982 | +0.24 | +0.19 | +0.30 | 1,723 | 1,032 | | GSS | All interviews | 1983 | +0.28 | +0.20 | +0.36 | 763 | 482 | | GSS | All interviews | 1984 | +0.26 | +0.20 | +0.32 | 1,386 | 889 | | GSS | All interviews | 1985 | +0.28 | +0.22 | +0.34 | 1,444 | 919 | | GSS | All interviews | 1986 | +0.31 | +0.26 | +0.36 | 1,390 | 1,132 | | GSS | All interviews | 1987 | +0.31 | +0.25 | +0.36 | 1,666 | 1,126 | | GSS | All interviews | 1988 | +0.30 | +0.24 | +0.35 | 1,411 | 1,139 | | GSS | All interviews | 1989 | +0.27 | +0.21 | +0.32 | 1,429 | 1,127 | | GSS | All interviews | 1990 | +0.29 | +0.23 | +0.35 | 1,301 | 1,023 | | GSS | All interviews | 1991 | +0.26 | +0.20 | +0.31 | 1,443 | 1,105 | | GSS | All interviews | 1993 | +0.34 | +0.28 | +0.38 | 1,528 | 1,196 | | GSS | All interviews | 1994 | +0.37 | +0.34 | +0.41 | 2,806 | 2,204 | | GSS | All interviews | 1996 | +0.38 | +0.35 | +0.42 | 2,702 | 2,168 | | GSS | All interviews | 1998 | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.40 | 2,622 | 2,033 | | GSS | All interviews | 2000 | +0.34 | +0.30 | +0.38 | 2,593 | 2,038 | | GSS | All interviews | 2002 | +0.37 | +0.31 | +0.42 | 1,299 | 944 | | GSS | All interviews | 2004 | +0.43 | +0.38 | +0.48 | 1,289 | 937 | | GSS | All interviews | 2006 | +0.47 | +0.44 | +0.50 | 4,253 | 2,952 | | GSS | All interviews | 2008 | +0.48 | +0.44 | +0.52 | 1,890 | 1,324 | | GSS | All interviews | 2010 | +0.50 | +0.46 | +0.54 | 1,914 | 1,231 | | GSS | All interviews | 2012 | +0.47 | +0.42 | +0.51 | 1,815 | 1,153 | | GSS | All interviews | 2014 | +0.50 | +0.46 | +0.53 | 2,368 | 1,734 | | GSS | All interviews | 2016 | +0.50 | +0.46 | +0.53 | 2,668 | 1,782 | | GSS | All interviews | 2018 | +0.56 | +0.52 | +0.60 | 2,149 | 1,285 | | GSS | All interviews | 2021 | +0.64 | +0.62 | +0.67 | 3,833 | 2,501 | | GSS | All interviews | 2022 | +0.63 | +0.59 | +0.66 | 3,303 | 1,304 | | GSS | All interviews | 2024 | +0.63 | +0.60 | +0.66 | 3,062 | 1,557 | | CES | All interviews | 2006 | +0.66 | +0.65 | +0.67 | 33,755 | 26,295 | | CES | All interviews | 2007 | +0.68 | +0.67 | +0.70 | 8,787 | 4,593 | | CES | All interviews | 2008 | +0.68 | +0.67 | +0.68 | 29,939 | 20,888 | | CES | All interviews | 2009 | +0.66 | +0.64 | +0.67 | 12,229 | 9,223 | | CES | All interviews | 2010 | +0.66 | +0.65 | +0.66 | 51,574 | 20,318 | | CES | All interviews | 2011 | +0.60 | +0.58 | +0.61 | 18,329 | 8,715 | | CES | All interviews | 2012 | +0.63 | +0.62 | +0.64 | 48,972 | 21,136 | | CES | All interviews | 2013 | +0.60 | +0.58 | +0.61 | 14,712 | 7,302 | | CES | All interviews | 2014 | +0.62 | +0.61 | +0.63 | 49,876 | 21,741 | | CES | All interviews | 2015 | +0.63 | +0.61 | +0.64 | 12,807 | 6,907 | | CES | All interviews | 2016 | +0.59 | +0.58 | +0.60 | 58,788 | 30,529 | | CES | All interviews | 2017 | +0.63 | +0.62 | +0.65 | 16,356 | 7,800 | | CES | All interviews | 2018 | +0.68 | +0.68 | +0.69 | 54,063 | 25,503 | | CES | All interviews | 2019 | +0.69 | +0.68 | +0.70 | 16,478 | 9,481 | | CES | All interviews | 2020 | +0.69 | +0.68 | +0.69 | 55,395 | 27,431 | | CES | All interviews | 2021 | +0.69 | +0.68 | +0.70 | 23,450 | 13,577 | | CES | All interviews | 2022 | +0.70 | +0.69 | +0.70 | 54,964 | 24,917 | | CES | All interviews | 2023 | +0.65 | +0.64 | +0.66 | 22,029 | 12,323 | | CES | All interviews | 2024 | +0.72 | +0.71 | +0.73 | 55,835 | 18,536 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1972 | +0.32 | +0.27 | +0.36 | 1,545 | 1,545 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1974 | +0.33 | +0.27 | +0.39 | 1,140 | 857 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1976 | +0.38 | +0.33 | +0.42 | 1,497 | 1,441 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1978 | +0.35 | +0.31 | +0.39 | 1,658 | 1,658 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1980 | +0.39 | +0.33 | +0.44 | 1,004 | 1,004 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1982 | +0.41 | +0.36 | +0.47 | 891 | 891 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1984 | +0.41 | +0.37 | +0.45 | 1,546 | 1,546 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1986 | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.41 | 1,622 | 1,622 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1988 | +0.40 | +0.36 | +0.45 | 1,419 | 1,419 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1990 | +0.34 | +0.29 | +0.39 | 1,315 | 1,315 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1992 | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.47 | 1,819 | 1,812 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1994 | +0.51 | +0.46 | +0.55 | 1,398 | 1,144 | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 1996 | +0.54 | +0.50 | +0.58 | 1,326 | 1,070 | | ANES | Left out: telephone or mixed-mode study | 1998 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES | Left out: telephone or mixed-mode study | 2000 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES | Left out: telephone or mixed-mode study | 2002 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES | All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008) | 2004 | +0.58 | +0.53 | +0.63 | 913 | 766 | | ANES | Face-to-face respondents | 2008 | +0.61 | +0.57 | +0.65 | 1,607 | 1,053 | | ANES | Face-to-face respondents | 2012 | +0.63 | +0.59 | +0.67 | 1,454 | 794 | | ANES | Face-to-face respondents | 2016 | +0.67 | +0.62 | +0.71 | 903 | 598 | | ANES | Face-to-face respondents | 2024 | +0.72 | +0.68 | +0.77 | 868 | 442 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1974 | +0.17 | +0.12 | +0.23 | 1,345 | 1,122 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1975 | +0.23 | +0.18 | +0.29 | 1,384 | 1,136 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1976 | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,393 | 1,137 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1977 | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,440 | 1,160 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1978 | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.22 | 1,422 | 885 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1980 | +0.14 | +0.08 | +0.21 | 1,418 | 941 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1982 | +0.24 | +0.19 | +0.30 | 1,723 | 1,032 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1983 | +0.28 | +0.20 | +0.36 | 763 | 482 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1984 | +0.26 | +0.20 | +0.32 | 1,386 | 889 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1985 | +0.28 | +0.22 | +0.34 | 1,444 | 919 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1986 | +0.31 | +0.26 | +0.36 | 1,390 | 1,132 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1987 | +0.31 | +0.25 | +0.36 | 1,666 | 1,126 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1988 | +0.30 | +0.24 | +0.35 | 1,411 | 1,139 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1989 | +0.27 | +0.21 | +0.32 | 1,429 | 1,127 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1990 | +0.29 | +0.23 | +0.35 | 1,301 | 1,023 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1991 | +0.26 | +0.20 | +0.31 | 1,443 | 1,105 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1993 | +0.34 | +0.28 | +0.38 | 1,528 | 1,196 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1994 | +0.37 | +0.34 | +0.41 | 2,806 | 2,204 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1996 | +0.38 | +0.35 | +0.42 | 2,702 | 2,168 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 1998 | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.40 | 2,622 | 2,033 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 2000 | +0.34 | +0.30 | +0.38 | 2,593 | 2,038 | | GSS | All respondents (no mode variable before 2004) | 2002 | +0.37 | +0.31 | +0.42 | 1,299 | 944 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2004 | +0.44 | +0.38 | +0.50 | 1,025 | 761 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2006 | +0.47 | +0.44 | +0.49 | 3,972 | 2,812 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2008 | +0.46 | +0.42 | +0.51 | 1,667 | 1,180 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2010 | +0.49 | +0.45 | +0.54 | 1,706 | 1,100 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2012 | +0.47 | +0.42 | +0.52 | 1,579 | 1,016 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2014 | +0.48 | +0.44 | +0.52 | 2,054 | 1,503 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2016 | +0.51 | +0.47 | +0.54 | 2,487 | 1,651 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2018 | +0.55 | +0.51 | +0.59 | 1,920 | 1,177 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2022 | +0.59 | +0.53 | +0.64 | 1,424 | 566 | | GSS | In-person respondents | 2024 | +0.56 | +0.50 | +0.61 | 1,029 | 536 | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1974 | +0.15 | +0.07 | +0.24 | 2,485 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1976 | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.23 | 2,890 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1978 | +0.19 | +0.12 | +0.27 | 3,080 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1980 | +0.24 | +0.16 | +0.33 | 2,422 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1982 | +0.17 | +0.09 | +0.25 | 2,614 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1984 | +0.15 | +0.07 | +0.22 | 2,932 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1986 | +0.05 | −0.01 | +0.12 | 3,012 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1988 | +0.11 | +0.04 | +0.18 | 2,830 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1990 | +0.05 | −0.02 | +0.12 | 2,616 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1994 | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.19 | 4,204 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1996 | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.21 | 4,028 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 1998 | +0.08 | +0.01 | +0.15 | 3,634 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2000 | +0.12 | +0.05 | +0.20 | 3,262 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2002 | +0.15 | +0.07 | +0.22 | 2,522 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2004 | +0.15 | +0.08 | +0.22 | 2,202 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2008 | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.19 | 3,497 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2012 | +0.14 | +0.09 | +0.19 | 7,103 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2016 | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.24 | 5,966 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | All interviews in both surveys | 2024 | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 7,778 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents | 2008 | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.21 | 3,274 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents | 2012 | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.22 | 3,033 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents | 2016 | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.22 | 3,390 | n/a | | ANES minus GSS | ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents | 2024 | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.24 | 1,897 | n/a | | ANES minus CES | All interviews in both surveys | 2008 | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 31,546 | n/a | | ANES minus CES | All interviews in both surveys | 2012 | −0.02 | −0.04 | +0.01 | 54,260 | n/a | | ANES minus CES | All interviews in both surveys | 2016 | +0.11 | +0.09 | +0.13 | 62,086 | n/a | | ANES minus CES | All interviews in both surveys | 2020 | +0.05 | +0.04 | +0.07 | 62,436 | n/a | | ANES minus CES | All interviews in both surveys | 2024 | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.02 | 60,551 | n/a | Views: All interviews (view_id = all); In person only (view_id = inperson); Differences between surveys (view_id = diff). Note: The in-person view keeps all respondents in the years before the file records interview mode; the methods note gives its rules. Note: In the all-interviews view, rings mark ANES 2000 and GSS 1983, 2002 and 2004. The label is the share of respondents with a party answer who placed themselves on the ideology scale, fewer than in the years around them, so each ringed point rests on fewer respondents. Note: A year is drawn only when it has at least 150 respondents who answered both questions and passes a second size condition given in the methods note. A difference needs both surveys to pass. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024 (weight VCF0009z; weight_ftf for the in-person view); GSS, 1974-2024 (weight_use); CES cumulative file, 2006-2024 (weight); all estimates weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/staircase.json ### Table 2. In the GSS, web respondents show a higher correlation than in-person respondents Weighted party-ideology correlation by interview mode among GSS respondents who answered both questions, 2004 to 2024; bands are 95% intervals for the in-person and web lines | Interview mode | Year | Estimate | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All interviews | 2004 | 0.43 | 0.38 | 0.48 | 1,289 | 937 | | All interviews | 2006 | 0.47 | 0.44 | 0.50 | 4,253 | 2,952 | | All interviews | 2008 | 0.48 | 0.44 | 0.52 | 1,890 | 1,324 | | All interviews | 2010 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.54 | 1,914 | 1,231 | | All interviews | 2012 | 0.47 | 0.42 | 0.51 | 1,815 | 1,153 | | All interviews | 2014 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.53 | 2,368 | 1,734 | | All interviews | 2016 | 0.50 | 0.46 | 0.53 | 2,668 | 1,782 | | All interviews | 2018 | 0.56 | 0.52 | 0.60 | 2,149 | 1,285 | | All interviews | 2021 | 0.64 | 0.62 | 0.67 | 3,833 | 2,501 | | All interviews | 2022 | 0.63 | 0.59 | 0.66 | 3,303 | 1,304 | | All interviews | 2024 | 0.63 | 0.60 | 0.66 | 3,062 | 1,557 | | In person | 2004 | 0.44 | 0.38 | 0.50 | 1,025 | 761 | | In person | 2006 | 0.47 | 0.44 | 0.49 | 3,972 | 2,812 | | In person | 2008 | 0.46 | 0.42 | 0.51 | 1,667 | 1,180 | | In person | 2010 | 0.49 | 0.45 | 0.54 | 1,706 | 1,100 | | In person | 2012 | 0.47 | 0.42 | 0.52 | 1,579 | 1,016 | | In person | 2014 | 0.48 | 0.44 | 0.52 | 2,054 | 1,503 | | In person | 2016 | 0.51 | 0.47 | 0.54 | 2,487 | 1,651 | | In person | 2018 | 0.55 | 0.51 | 0.59 | 1,920 | 1,177 | | In person | 2022 | 0.59 | 0.53 | 0.64 | 1,424 | 566 | | In person | 2024 | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.61 | 1,029 | 536 | | Web | 2021 | 0.65 | 0.62 | 0.67 | 3,370 | 2,198 | | Web | 2022 | 0.69 | 0.65 | 0.73 | 1,561 | 650 | | Web | 2024 | 0.70 | 0.67 | 0.73 | 1,683 | 843 | Note: Telephone and other GSS interviews are in the all-interviews line and in neither of the other two. The all-interviews line has no band; its intervals are in the data table. Source: GSS, 2004-2024 (weight_use, interview mode from the raw file); all estimates weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/mode.json ### Table 3. The two parties' average placements moved further apart on all three surveys Mean liberal-conservative self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers (leaners included, pure independents left out), in standard deviations (SD) of placement, with 95% intervals | Survey | Year | Estimate | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES | 1972 | 0.58 | 0.50 | 0.67 | 1,371 | 595 | | ANES | 1974 | 0.69 | 0.57 | 0.82 | 977 | 303 | | ANES | 1976 | 0.71 | 0.62 | 0.81 | 1,306 | 558 | | ANES | 1978 | 0.74 | 0.65 | 0.83 | 1,430 | 563 | | ANES | 1980 | 0.78 | 0.66 | 0.89 | 892 | 377 | | ANES | 1982 | 0.77 | 0.66 | 0.88 | 806 | 327 | | ANES | 1984 | 0.79 | 0.70 | 0.88 | 1,401 | 682 | | ANES | 1986 | 0.64 | 0.56 | 0.72 | 1,441 | 648 | | ANES | 1988 | 0.75 | 0.66 | 0.85 | 1,286 | 638 | | ANES | 1990 | 0.60 | 0.51 | 0.70 | 1,220 | 547 | | ANES | 1992 | 0.89 | 0.80 | 0.97 | 1,630 | 756 | | ANES | 1994 | 0.92 | 0.82 | 1.02 | 1,279 | 500 | | ANES | 1996 | 0.99 | 0.89 | 1.08 | 1,233 | 461 | | ANES | 1998 | 0.80 | 0.68 | 0.91 | 922 | 345 | | ANES | 2000 | 0.94 | 0.79 | 1.09 | 603 | 240 | | ANES | 2002 | 1.06 | 0.93 | 1.18 | 1,171 | 372 | | ANES | 2004 | 1.13 | 1.01 | 1.25 | 849 | 351 | | ANES | 2008 | 1.31 | 1.21 | 1.41 | 1,448 | 409 | | ANES | 2012 | 1.26 | 1.19 | 1.32 | 4,613 | 1,161 | | ANES | 2016 | 1.54 | 1.47 | 1.61 | 2,949 | 1,021 | | ANES | 2020 | 1.71 | 1.65 | 1.76 | 6,353 | 1,745 | | ANES | 2024 | 1.60 | 1.53 | 1.67 | 4,482 | 1,035 | | GSS | 1974 | 0.39 | 0.27 | 0.50 | 1,208 | 360 | | GSS | 1975 | 0.53 | 0.41 | 0.65 | 1,196 | 360 | | GSS | 1976 | 0.51 | 0.39 | 0.63 | 1,195 | 336 | | GSS | 1977 | 0.47 | 0.35 | 0.58 | 1,290 | 374 | | GSS | 1978 | 0.36 | 0.23 | 0.49 | 1,225 | 288 | | GSS | 1980 | 0.30 | 0.17 | 0.42 | 1,189 | 315 | | GSS | 1982 | 0.54 | 0.42 | 0.67 | 1,528 | 315 | | GSS | 1983 | 0.54 | 0.38 | 0.70 | 678 | 174 | | GSS | 1984 | 0.49 | 0.37 | 0.62 | 1,244 | 322 | | GSS | 1985 | 0.51 | 0.38 | 0.63 | 1,316 | 394 | | GSS | 1986 | 0.57 | 0.46 | 0.68 | 1,221 | 427 | | GSS | 1987 | 0.60 | 0.48 | 0.71 | 1,502 | 397 | | GSS | 1988 | 0.60 | 0.48 | 0.71 | 1,248 | 450 | | GSS | 1989 | 0.58 | 0.46 | 0.70 | 1,278 | 497 | | GSS | 1990 | 0.54 | 0.41 | 0.66 | 1,162 | 455 | | GSS | 1991 | 0.53 | 0.42 | 0.65 | 1,279 | 510 | | GSS | 1993 | 0.64 | 0.53 | 0.75 | 1,347 | 492 | | GSS | 1994 | 0.76 | 0.68 | 0.85 | 2,471 | 869 | | GSS | 1996 | 0.75 | 0.67 | 0.83 | 2,312 | 870 | | GSS | 1998 | 0.77 | 0.68 | 0.86 | 2,211 | 766 | | GSS | 2000 | 0.75 | 0.66 | 0.84 | 2,113 | 756 | | GSS | 2002 | 0.79 | 0.67 | 0.92 | 1,061 | 356 | | GSS | 2004 | 0.87 | 0.74 | 1.00 | 1,092 | 377 | | GSS | 2006 | 1.03 | 0.95 | 1.10 | 3,365 | 1,044 | | GSS | 2008 | 1.05 | 0.95 | 1.15 | 1,611 | 471 | | GSS | 2010 | 1.12 | 1.00 | 1.23 | 1,583 | 445 | | GSS | 2012 | 1.06 | 0.94 | 1.18 | 1,487 | 360 | | GSS | 2014 | 1.06 | 0.97 | 1.16 | 1,922 | 590 | | GSS | 2016 | 1.15 | 1.06 | 1.25 | 2,245 | 652 | | GSS | 2018 | 1.22 | 1.10 | 1.33 | 1,790 | 435 | | GSS | 2021 | 1.53 | 1.46 | 1.61 | 3,046 | 846 | | GSS | 2022 | 1.52 | 1.41 | 1.63 | 2,522 | 422 | | GSS | 2024 | 1.50 | 1.39 | 1.60 | 2,304 | 580 | | CES | 2006 | 1.32 | 1.30 | 1.34 | 30,222 | 11,342 | | CES | 2007 | 1.40 | 1.35 | 1.44 | 8,001 | 1,983 | | CES | 2008 | 1.47 | 1.44 | 1.49 | 27,354 | 9,277 | | CES | 2009 | 1.36 | 1.33 | 1.40 | 10,859 | 3,973 | | CES | 2010 | 1.27 | 1.25 | 1.29 | 46,430 | 8,965 | | CES | 2011 | 1.08 | 1.05 | 1.11 | 16,020 | 3,710 | | CES | 2012 | 1.22 | 1.20 | 1.24 | 43,847 | 8,888 | | CES | 2013 | 1.20 | 1.17 | 1.24 | 12,250 | 2,683 | | CES | 2014 | 1.18 | 1.16 | 1.20 | 42,901 | 8,687 | | CES | 2015 | 1.26 | 1.23 | 1.30 | 11,025 | 2,725 | | CES | 2016 | 1.14 | 1.12 | 1.16 | 50,082 | 11,665 | | CES | 2017 | 1.29 | 1.26 | 1.33 | 13,724 | 2,859 | | CES | 2018 | 1.60 | 1.58 | 1.62 | 47,245 | 10,926 | | CES | 2019 | 1.71 | 1.67 | 1.74 | 14,276 | 4,090 | | CES | 2020 | 1.59 | 1.57 | 1.61 | 48,071 | 11,264 | | CES | 2021 | 1.64 | 1.61 | 1.67 | 19,863 | 5,244 | | CES | 2022 | 1.61 | 1.59 | 1.63 | 47,741 | 9,659 | | CES | 2023 | 1.51 | 1.48 | 1.55 | 18,941 | 5,124 | | CES | 2024 | 1.60 | 1.58 | 1.62 | 49,320 | 7,984 | Note: Standard deviations are of the seven-point placement in the ANES and GSS and of the five-point placement in the CES, so one unit is not the same number of scale points across surveys. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024 (weight VCF0009z); GSS, 1974-2024 (weight_use); CES cumulative file, 2006-2024 (weight_cumulative); all estimates weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/gap.json ### Table 4. The correlation rose inside every cohort, education and region group in the ANES Weighted party-ideology correlation by year within each group (solid lines) and among all ANES respondents (dashed line), 1972 to 2024 | Grouping | Line | Year | Estimate | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1972 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.37 | 1,071 | 1,071 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1974 | 0.33 | 0.25 | 0.39 | 818 | 616 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1976 | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.45 | 920 | 883 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1978 | 0.37 | 0.31 | 0.42 | 913 | 913 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1980 | 0.44 | 0.38 | 0.51 | 554 | 554 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1982 | 0.40 | 0.32 | 0.47 | 436 | 436 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1984 | 0.40 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 675 | 675 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1986 | 0.37 | 0.30 | 0.43 | 649 | 649 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1988 | 0.46 | 0.39 | 0.52 | 565 | 565 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1990 | 0.33 | 0.25 | 0.41 | 467 | 467 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1992 | 0.42 | 0.35 | 0.48 | 625 | 622 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1994 | 0.43 | 0.35 | 0.50 | 485 | 407 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1996 | 0.46 | 0.37 | 0.53 | 432 | 369 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 1998 | 0.36 | 0.24 | 0.47 | 265 | 217 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 2000 | 0.55 | 0.41 | 0.65 | 163 | 136 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 2002 | 0.51 | 0.41 | 0.60 | 328 | 228 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 2004 | 0.59 | 0.48 | 0.68 | 195 | 163 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 2008 | 0.64 | 0.54 | 0.72 | 249 | 173 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 2012 | 0.63 | 0.57 | 0.69 | 641 | 377 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 2016 | 0.73 | 0.66 | 0.79 | 297 | 196 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 2020 | 0.70 | 0.63 | 0.76 | 467 | 251 | | cohort | Born before 1943 | 2024 | 0.61 | 0.48 | 0.72 | 217 | 105 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1972 | 0.32 | 0.24 | 0.40 | 469 | 469 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1974 | 0.26 | 0.14 | 0.37 | 312 | 250 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1976 | 0.34 | 0.27 | 0.41 | 570 | 555 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1978 | 0.34 | 0.27 | 0.40 | 738 | 738 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1980 | 0.31 | 0.22 | 0.39 | 448 | 448 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1982 | 0.44 | 0.36 | 0.51 | 454 | 454 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1984 | 0.42 | 0.36 | 0.47 | 858 | 858 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1986 | 0.37 | 0.31 | 0.42 | 972 | 972 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1988 | 0.38 | 0.32 | 0.43 | 852 | 852 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1990 | 0.35 | 0.29 | 0.41 | 848 | 848 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1992 | 0.46 | 0.41 | 0.50 | 1,188 | 1,184 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1994 | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.60 | 883 | 731 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1996 | 0.58 | 0.53 | 0.63 | 853 | 698 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 1998 | 0.49 | 0.42 | 0.55 | 636 | 548 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 2000 | 0.48 | 0.39 | 0.55 | 451 | 380 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 2002 | 0.54 | 0.48 | 0.60 | 804 | 614 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 2004 | 0.58 | 0.52 | 0.64 | 543 | 462 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 2008 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.65 | 928 | 614 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 2012 | 0.62 | 0.59 | 0.65 | 3,241 | 1,859 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 2016 | 0.72 | 0.70 | 0.75 | 1,790 | 1,306 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 2020 | 0.75 | 0.73 | 0.77 | 3,657 | 2,172 | | cohort | Born 1943 to 1974 | 2024 | 0.72 | 0.69 | 0.74 | 2,436 | 1,163 | | cohort | Born 1975 or later | 2004 | 0.54 | 0.41 | 0.65 | 175 | 144 | | cohort | Born 1975 or later | 2008 | 0.60 | 0.51 | 0.67 | 404 | 254 | | cohort | Born 1975 or later | 2012 | 0.60 | 0.55 | 0.64 | 1,364 | 782 | | cohort | Born 1975 or later | 2016 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.68 | 1,121 | 778 | | cohort | Born 1975 or later | 2020 | 0.73 | 0.71 | 0.76 | 2,640 | 1,428 | | cohort | Born 1975 or later | 2024 | 0.75 | 0.72 | 0.77 | 1,937 | 961 | | cohort | All respondents | 1972 | 0.32 | 0.27 | 0.36 | 1,545 | 1,545 | | cohort | All respondents | 1974 | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.39 | 1,140 | 857 | | cohort | All respondents | 1976 | 0.38 | 0.33 | 0.42 | 1,497 | 1,441 | | cohort | All respondents | 1978 | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.39 | 1,658 | 1,658 | | cohort | All respondents | 1980 | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.44 | 1,004 | 1,004 | | cohort | All respondents | 1982 | 0.41 | 0.36 | 0.47 | 891 | 891 | | cohort | All respondents | 1984 | 0.41 | 0.37 | 0.45 | 1,546 | 1,546 | | cohort | All respondents | 1986 | 0.36 | 0.32 | 0.41 | 1,622 | 1,622 | | cohort | All respondents | 1988 | 0.40 | 0.36 | 0.45 | 1,419 | 1,419 | | cohort | All respondents | 1990 | 0.34 | 0.29 | 0.39 | 1,315 | 1,315 | | cohort | All respondents | 1992 | 0.44 | 0.40 | 0.47 | 1,819 | 1,812 | | cohort | All respondents | 1994 | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.55 | 1,398 | 1,144 | | cohort | All respondents | 1996 | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0.58 | 1,326 | 1,070 | | cohort | All respondents | 1998 | 0.44 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 1,012 | 858 | | cohort | All respondents | 2000 | 0.47 | 0.40 | 0.53 | 669 | 546 | | cohort | All respondents | 2002 | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.57 | 1,223 | 828 | | cohort | All respondents | 2004 | 0.58 | 0.53 | 0.63 | 913 | 766 | | cohort | All respondents | 2008 | 0.61 | 0.57 | 0.65 | 1,607 | 1,053 | | cohort | All respondents | 2012 | 0.61 | 0.59 | 0.63 | 5,288 | 2,970 | | cohort | All respondents | 2016 | 0.70 | 0.68 | 0.72 | 3,298 | 2,332 | | cohort | All respondents | 2020 | 0.74 | 0.72 | 0.75 | 7,041 | 3,929 | | cohort | All respondents | 2024 | 0.72 | 0.70 | 0.74 | 4,716 | 2,228 | | education | High school or less | 1972 | 0.26 | 0.20 | 0.32 | 950 | 950 | | education | High school or less | 1974 | 0.23 | 0.15 | 0.31 | 689 | 517 | | education | High school or less | 1976 | 0.31 | 0.25 | 0.37 | 822 | 791 | | education | High school or less | 1978 | 0.27 | 0.21 | 0.32 | 926 | 926 | | education | High school or less | 1980 | 0.29 | 0.21 | 0.37 | 522 | 522 | | education | High school or less | 1982 | 0.26 | 0.17 | 0.35 | 401 | 401 | | education | High school or less | 1984 | 0.26 | 0.20 | 0.33 | 744 | 744 | | education | High school or less | 1986 | 0.24 | 0.17 | 0.31 | 785 | 785 | | education | High school or less | 1988 | 0.28 | 0.21 | 0.35 | 654 | 654 | | education | High school or less | 1990 | 0.17 | 0.09 | 0.24 | 633 | 633 | | education | High school or less | 1992 | 0.28 | 0.22 | 0.35 | 769 | 765 | | education | High school or less | 1994 | 0.32 | 0.24 | 0.40 | 552 | 461 | | education | High school or less | 1996 | 0.38 | 0.30 | 0.47 | 490 | 394 | | education | High school or less | 1998 | 0.23 | 0.12 | 0.33 | 363 | 313 | | education | High school or less | 2000 | 0.33 | 0.17 | 0.47 | 179 | 146 | | education | High school or less | 2002 | 0.41 | 0.30 | 0.51 | 342 | 250 | | education | High school or less | 2004 | 0.45 | 0.34 | 0.55 | 290 | 242 | | education | High school or less | 2008 | 0.44 | 0.35 | 0.51 | 634 | 398 | | education | High school or less | 2012 | 0.47 | 0.42 | 0.52 | 1,708 | 987 | | education | High school or less | 2016 | 0.59 | 0.53 | 0.65 | 648 | 480 | | education | High school or less | 2020 | 0.63 | 0.59 | 0.68 | 1,209 | 722 | | education | High school or less | 2024 | 0.60 | 0.54 | 0.65 | 878 | 522 | | education | Some college | 1972 | 0.36 | 0.27 | 0.46 | 320 | 320 | | education | Some college | 1974 | 0.45 | 0.32 | 0.56 | 240 | 181 | | education | Some college | 1976 | 0.39 | 0.29 | 0.47 | 348 | 336 | | education | Some college | 1978 | 0.43 | 0.35 | 0.51 | 392 | 392 | | education | Some college | 1980 | 0.41 | 0.30 | 0.51 | 255 | 255 | | education | Some college | 1982 | 0.48 | 0.37 | 0.57 | 256 | 256 | | education | Some college | 1984 | 0.46 | 0.39 | 0.53 | 455 | 455 | | education | Some college | 1986 | 0.37 | 0.28 | 0.45 | 419 | 419 | | education | Some college | 1988 | 0.41 | 0.32 | 0.49 | 376 | 376 | | education | Some college | 1990 | 0.39 | 0.29 | 0.48 | 308 | 308 | | education | Some college | 1992 | 0.49 | 0.42 | 0.56 | 460 | 459 | | education | Some college | 1994 | 0.55 | 0.47 | 0.62 | 390 | 317 | | education | Some college | 1996 | 0.57 | 0.49 | 0.64 | 391 | 319 | | education | Some college | 1998 | 0.50 | 0.40 | 0.58 | 307 | 267 | | education | Some college | 2000 | 0.44 | 0.32 | 0.55 | 227 | 188 | | education | Some college | 2002 | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.58 | 385 | 264 | | education | Some college | 2004 | 0.53 | 0.44 | 0.61 | 292 | 260 | | education | Some college | 2008 | 0.61 | 0.54 | 0.67 | 522 | 351 | | education | Some college | 2012 | 0.63 | 0.59 | 0.66 | 1,746 | 961 | | education | Some college | 2016 | 0.69 | 0.65 | 0.72 | 1,132 | 842 | | education | Some college | 2020 | 0.74 | 0.71 | 0.76 | 2,320 | 1,349 | | education | Some college | 2024 | 0.72 | 0.69 | 0.76 | 1,461 | 667 | | education | College graduate | 1972 | 0.50 | 0.41 | 0.59 | 274 | 274 | | education | College graduate | 1974 | 0.53 | 0.41 | 0.64 | 202 | 153 | | education | College graduate | 1976 | 0.56 | 0.48 | 0.63 | 322 | 310 | | education | College graduate | 1978 | 0.54 | 0.46 | 0.61 | 338 | 338 | | education | College graduate | 1980 | 0.58 | 0.49 | 0.66 | 225 | 225 | | education | College graduate | 1982 | 0.63 | 0.55 | 0.70 | 233 | 233 | | education | College graduate | 1984 | 0.63 | 0.56 | 0.69 | 341 | 341 | | education | College graduate | 1986 | 0.60 | 0.53 | 0.66 | 403 | 403 | | education | College graduate | 1988 | 0.61 | 0.54 | 0.67 | 358 | 358 | | education | College graduate | 1990 | 0.61 | 0.54 | 0.67 | 349 | 349 | | education | College graduate | 1992 | 0.65 | 0.60 | 0.70 | 540 | 539 | | education | College graduate | 1994 | 0.77 | 0.73 | 0.81 | 422 | 358 | | education | College graduate | 1996 | 0.74 | 0.69 | 0.78 | 443 | 385 | | education | College graduate | 1998 | 0.65 | 0.58 | 0.71 | 337 | 292 | | education | College graduate | 2000 | 0.66 | 0.58 | 0.72 | 262 | 232 | | education | College graduate | 2002 | 0.70 | 0.65 | 0.75 | 487 | 390 | | education | College graduate | 2004 | 0.76 | 0.71 | 0.80 | 331 | 288 | | education | College graduate | 2008 | 0.78 | 0.73 | 0.82 | 441 | 313 | | education | College graduate | 2012 | 0.77 | 0.74 | 0.79 | 1,771 | 1,019 | | education | College graduate | 2016 | 0.79 | 0.77 | 0.81 | 1,490 | 1,169 | | education | College graduate | 2020 | 0.80 | 0.78 | 0.81 | 3,417 | 2,240 | | education | College graduate | 2024 | 0.79 | 0.77 | 0.81 | 2,342 | 1,111 | | education | All respondents | 1972 | 0.32 | 0.27 | 0.36 | 1,545 | 1,545 | | education | All respondents | 1974 | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.39 | 1,140 | 857 | | education | All respondents | 1976 | 0.38 | 0.33 | 0.42 | 1,497 | 1,441 | | education | All respondents | 1978 | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.39 | 1,658 | 1,658 | | education | All respondents | 1980 | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.44 | 1,004 | 1,004 | | education | All respondents | 1982 | 0.41 | 0.36 | 0.47 | 891 | 891 | | education | All respondents | 1984 | 0.41 | 0.37 | 0.45 | 1,546 | 1,546 | | education | All respondents | 1986 | 0.36 | 0.32 | 0.41 | 1,622 | 1,622 | | education | All respondents | 1988 | 0.40 | 0.36 | 0.45 | 1,419 | 1,419 | | education | All respondents | 1990 | 0.34 | 0.29 | 0.39 | 1,315 | 1,315 | | education | All respondents | 1992 | 0.44 | 0.40 | 0.47 | 1,819 | 1,812 | | education | All respondents | 1994 | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.55 | 1,398 | 1,144 | | education | All respondents | 1996 | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0.58 | 1,326 | 1,070 | | education | All respondents | 1998 | 0.44 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 1,012 | 858 | | education | All respondents | 2000 | 0.47 | 0.40 | 0.53 | 669 | 546 | | education | All respondents | 2002 | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.57 | 1,223 | 828 | | education | All respondents | 2004 | 0.58 | 0.53 | 0.63 | 913 | 766 | | education | All respondents | 2008 | 0.61 | 0.57 | 0.65 | 1,607 | 1,053 | | education | All respondents | 2012 | 0.61 | 0.59 | 0.63 | 5,288 | 2,970 | | education | All respondents | 2016 | 0.70 | 0.68 | 0.72 | 3,298 | 2,332 | | education | All respondents | 2020 | 0.74 | 0.72 | 0.75 | 7,041 | 3,929 | | education | All respondents | 2024 | 0.72 | 0.70 | 0.74 | 4,716 | 2,228 | | region | South | 1972 | 0.26 | 0.17 | 0.34 | 473 | 473 | | region | South | 1974 | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.35 | 363 | 273 | | region | South | 1976 | 0.35 | 0.26 | 0.43 | 414 | 398 | | region | South | 1978 | 0.31 | 0.23 | 0.38 | 574 | 574 | | region | South | 1980 | 0.36 | 0.26 | 0.45 | 336 | 336 | | region | South | 1982 | 0.33 | 0.22 | 0.42 | 290 | 290 | | region | South | 1984 | 0.32 | 0.23 | 0.40 | 447 | 447 | | region | South | 1986 | 0.26 | 0.18 | 0.34 | 523 | 523 | | region | South | 1988 | 0.31 | 0.22 | 0.39 | 431 | 431 | | region | South | 1990 | 0.24 | 0.15 | 0.34 | 376 | 376 | | region | South | 1992 | 0.38 | 0.31 | 0.45 | 561 | 559 | | region | South | 1994 | 0.47 | 0.39 | 0.54 | 475 | 387 | | region | South | 1996 | 0.56 | 0.48 | 0.62 | 458 | 361 | | region | South | 1998 | 0.37 | 0.27 | 0.47 | 348 | 298 | | region | South | 2000 | 0.40 | 0.27 | 0.51 | 226 | 181 | | region | South | 2002 | 0.46 | 0.37 | 0.55 | 424 | 290 | | region | South | 2004 | 0.49 | 0.39 | 0.58 | 295 | 246 | | region | South | 2008 | 0.59 | 0.53 | 0.65 | 746 | 471 | | region | South | 2012 | 0.57 | 0.53 | 0.61 | 2,012 | 1,102 | | region | South | 2016 | 0.67 | 0.63 | 0.71 | 1,215 | 887 | | region | South | 2020 | 0.70 | 0.67 | 0.73 | 2,567 | 1,461 | | region | South | 2024 | 0.72 | 0.68 | 0.76 | 958 | 482 | | region | Outside the South | 1972 | 0.36 | 0.31 | 0.41 | 1,072 | 1,072 | | region | Outside the South | 1974 | 0.38 | 0.31 | 0.45 | 777 | 584 | | region | Outside the South | 1976 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.45 | 1,083 | 1,043 | | region | Outside the South | 1978 | 0.38 | 0.33 | 0.43 | 1,084 | 1,084 | | region | Outside the South | 1980 | 0.41 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 668 | 668 | | region | Outside the South | 1982 | 0.47 | 0.40 | 0.53 | 601 | 601 | | region | Outside the South | 1984 | 0.46 | 0.41 | 0.50 | 1,099 | 1,099 | | region | Outside the South | 1986 | 0.41 | 0.36 | 0.46 | 1,099 | 1,099 | | region | Outside the South | 1988 | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.50 | 988 | 988 | | region | Outside the South | 1990 | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.44 | 939 | 939 | | region | Outside the South | 1992 | 0.46 | 0.42 | 0.50 | 1,258 | 1,254 | | region | Outside the South | 1994 | 0.53 | 0.47 | 0.58 | 923 | 758 | | region | Outside the South | 1996 | 0.53 | 0.48 | 0.58 | 868 | 709 | | region | Outside the South | 1998 | 0.48 | 0.42 | 0.54 | 664 | 560 | | region | Outside the South | 2000 | 0.50 | 0.42 | 0.57 | 441 | 363 | | region | Outside the South | 2002 | 0.56 | 0.50 | 0.61 | 799 | 539 | | region | Outside the South | 2004 | 0.63 | 0.57 | 0.68 | 618 | 520 | | region | Outside the South | 2008 | 0.62 | 0.56 | 0.66 | 861 | 583 | | region | Outside the South | 2012 | 0.64 | 0.61 | 0.66 | 3,276 | 1,868 | | region | Outside the South | 2016 | 0.71 | 0.68 | 0.73 | 2,083 | 1,450 | | region | Outside the South | 2020 | 0.76 | 0.74 | 0.77 | 4,474 | 2,468 | | region | Outside the South | 2024 | 0.73 | 0.70 | 0.76 | 1,629 | 801 | | region | All respondents | 1972 | 0.32 | 0.27 | 0.36 | 1,545 | 1,545 | | region | All respondents | 1974 | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.39 | 1,140 | 857 | | region | All respondents | 1976 | 0.38 | 0.33 | 0.42 | 1,497 | 1,441 | | region | All respondents | 1978 | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.39 | 1,658 | 1,658 | | region | All respondents | 1980 | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.44 | 1,004 | 1,004 | | region | All respondents | 1982 | 0.41 | 0.36 | 0.47 | 891 | 891 | | region | All respondents | 1984 | 0.41 | 0.37 | 0.45 | 1,546 | 1,546 | | region | All respondents | 1986 | 0.36 | 0.32 | 0.41 | 1,622 | 1,622 | | region | All respondents | 1988 | 0.40 | 0.36 | 0.45 | 1,419 | 1,419 | | region | All respondents | 1990 | 0.34 | 0.29 | 0.39 | 1,315 | 1,315 | | region | All respondents | 1992 | 0.44 | 0.40 | 0.47 | 1,819 | 1,812 | | region | All respondents | 1994 | 0.51 | 0.46 | 0.55 | 1,398 | 1,144 | | region | All respondents | 1996 | 0.54 | 0.50 | 0.58 | 1,326 | 1,070 | | region | All respondents | 1998 | 0.44 | 0.39 | 0.49 | 1,012 | 858 | | region | All respondents | 2000 | 0.47 | 0.40 | 0.53 | 669 | 546 | | region | All respondents | 2002 | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.57 | 1,223 | 828 | | region | All respondents | 2004 | 0.58 | 0.53 | 0.63 | 913 | 766 | | region | All respondents | 2008 | 0.61 | 0.57 | 0.65 | 1,607 | 1,053 | | region | All respondents | 2012 | 0.61 | 0.59 | 0.63 | 5,288 | 2,970 | | region | All respondents | 2016 | 0.70 | 0.68 | 0.72 | 3,298 | 2,332 | | region | All respondents | 2020 | 0.74 | 0.72 | 0.75 | 7,041 | 3,929 | | region | All respondents | 2024 | 0.72 | 0.70 | 0.74 | 4,716 | 2,228 | Views: Birth cohort (lens = cohort); Education (lens = education); Region (lens = region). Note: A year is drawn only when it has at least 150 respondents who answered both questions and passes a second size condition given in the methods note. Note: The chart draws no interval bands, so that the lines stay readable; every yearly estimate has a 95% interval in the data table. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024 (weight VCF0009z); all estimates weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/groups.json ### Table 5. The correlation rose in every group, and less among college graduates than among other education groups Weighted party-ideology correlation estimated from all respondents in 1980 to 1988 together and in 2020 to 2024 together, by group, with 95% intervals; rows run by classification and, within each, by the size of the change | Survey | Group | 1980 to 1988 | Low | High | Respondents | 2020 to 2024 | Low | High | Respondents | Change | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES | Everyone | 0.39 | 0.37 | 0.41 | 6,482 | 0.73 | 0.72 | 0.74 | 11,757 | +0.34 | | ANES | Born 1943 to 1974 | 0.38 | 0.35 | 0.41 | 3,584 | 0.74 | 0.72 | 0.75 | 6,093 | +0.35 | | ANES | Born before 1943 | 0.41 | 0.38 | 0.44 | 2,879 | 0.67 | 0.60 | 0.72 | 684 | +0.25 | | ANES | High school or less | 0.26 | 0.23 | 0.30 | 3,106 | 0.62 | 0.58 | 0.65 | 2,087 | +0.35 | | ANES | Some college | 0.42 | 0.38 | 0.46 | 1,761 | 0.73 | 0.71 | 0.75 | 3,781 | +0.31 | | ANES | College graduate | 0.61 | 0.58 | 0.64 | 1,560 | 0.80 | 0.78 | 0.81 | 5,759 | +0.19 | | ANES | South | 0.31 | 0.27 | 0.35 | 2,027 | 0.71 | 0.69 | 0.73 | 3,525 | +0.40 | | ANES | Outside the South | 0.44 | 0.41 | 0.46 | 4,455 | 0.75 | 0.73 | 0.76 | 6,103 | +0.31 | | GSS | Everyone | 0.27 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 11,201 | 0.58 | 0.53 | 0.62 | 2,453 | +0.31 | | GSS | Born 1943 to 1974 | 0.27 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 5,860 | 0.59 | 0.53 | 0.64 | 1,153 | +0.32 | | GSS | No bachelor's degree | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.23 | 9,220 | 0.49 | 0.44 | 0.55 | 1,751 | +0.29 | | GSS | Bachelor's degree or more | 0.55 | 0.52 | 0.59 | 1,961 | 0.76 | 0.71 | 0.81 | 702 | +0.21 | Views: ANES, all interviews (survey = ANES); GSS, in-person interviews (survey = GSS). Note: Americans born 1975 or later have no 1980 to 1988 reading, so they are not in the comparison. Their 2020 to 2024 correlation is +0.74. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-1988 and 2020-2024 (weight VCF0009z); GSS, 1980-1988 and 2020-2024 in-person interviews (weight_use); all estimates weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/eras.json ### Table 6. Larger shares of Democrats are liberal and of Republicans conservative than in the 1970s Share of each party's identifiers (leaners included) who place themselves as liberal, moderate or conservative, among identifiers who placed themselves, with 95% intervals; liberal and conservative include slightly liberal and slightly conservative on the seven-point scales of the ANES and GSS | Survey | Party | Camp | Year | Share | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1972 | 36.1% | 32.8% | 39.5% | 776 | 776 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1974 | 39.3% | 34.8% | 44.0% | 573 | 431 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1976 | 36.6% | 33.1% | 40.2% | 725 | 699 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1978 | 37.1% | 34.0% | 40.4% | 867 | 867 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1980 | 37.9% | 33.8% | 42.1% | 515 | 515 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1982 | 34.2% | 30.1% | 38.6% | 479 | 479 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1984 | 40.5% | 36.9% | 44.1% | 719 | 719 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1986 | 35.7% | 32.4% | 39.1% | 793 | 793 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1988 | 38.1% | 34.4% | 41.9% | 638 | 638 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1990 | 36.7% | 33.1% | 40.4% | 673 | 673 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1992 | 44.1% | 40.8% | 47.4% | 871 | 868 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1994 | 35.5% | 31.4% | 39.8% | 622 | 500 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1996 | 40.9% | 36.8% | 45.1% | 667 | 537 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 1998 | 38.1% | 33.7% | 42.7% | 515 | 437 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 2000 | 44.1% | 38.1% | 50.2% | 319 | 255 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 2002 | 46.5% | 41.5% | 51.6% | 568 | 372 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 2004 | 44.2% | 39.2% | 49.4% | 438 | 363 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 2008 | 51.7% | 47.5% | 55.9% | 894 | 547 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 2012 | 49.0% | 46.4% | 51.6% | 2,709 | 1,417 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 2016 | 61.2% | 58.2% | 64.2% | 1,467 | 1,021 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 2020 | 65.1% | 62.9% | 67.3% | 3,277 | 1,745 | | ANES | Democrats | Liberal | 2024 | 61.7% | 58.8% | 64.5% | 2,310 | 1,087 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1972 | 39.3% | 35.9% | 42.8% | 776 | 776 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1974 | 37.7% | 33.3% | 42.4% | 573 | 431 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1976 | 39.4% | 35.8% | 43.0% | 725 | 699 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1978 | 39.8% | 36.6% | 43.1% | 867 | 867 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1980 | 34.2% | 30.2% | 38.4% | 515 | 515 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1982 | 40.3% | 36.0% | 44.7% | 479 | 479 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1984 | 37.3% | 33.8% | 40.9% | 719 | 719 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1986 | 39.7% | 36.4% | 43.2% | 793 | 793 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1988 | 34.5% | 30.9% | 38.3% | 638 | 638 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1990 | 37.4% | 33.9% | 41.2% | 673 | 673 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1992 | 32.6% | 29.5% | 35.8% | 871 | 868 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1994 | 41.9% | 37.6% | 46.2% | 622 | 500 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1996 | 37.3% | 33.3% | 41.5% | 667 | 537 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 1998 | 40.4% | 35.9% | 45.1% | 515 | 437 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 2000 | 33.7% | 28.2% | 39.7% | 319 | 255 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 2002 | 32.4% | 27.8% | 37.3% | 568 | 372 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 2004 | 39.7% | 34.8% | 44.8% | 438 | 363 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 2008 | 31.7% | 28.0% | 35.8% | 894 | 547 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 2012 | 36.6% | 34.1% | 39.1% | 2,709 | 1,417 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 2016 | 28.5% | 25.8% | 31.3% | 1,467 | 1,021 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 2020 | 28.3% | 26.2% | 30.5% | 3,277 | 1,745 | | ANES | Democrats | Moderate | 2024 | 30.1% | 27.5% | 32.9% | 2,310 | 1,087 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1972 | 24.6% | 21.7% | 27.8% | 776 | 776 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1974 | 23.0% | 19.2% | 27.1% | 573 | 431 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1976 | 24.1% | 21.0% | 27.4% | 725 | 699 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1978 | 23.1% | 20.4% | 26.0% | 867 | 867 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1980 | 28.0% | 24.3% | 32.0% | 515 | 515 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1982 | 25.5% | 21.8% | 29.6% | 479 | 479 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1984 | 22.3% | 19.4% | 25.4% | 719 | 719 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1986 | 24.6% | 21.7% | 27.7% | 793 | 793 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1988 | 27.4% | 24.1% | 31.0% | 638 | 638 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1990 | 25.9% | 22.7% | 29.3% | 673 | 673 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1992 | 23.4% | 20.7% | 26.3% | 871 | 868 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1994 | 22.6% | 19.2% | 26.5% | 622 | 500 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1996 | 21.8% | 18.5% | 25.4% | 667 | 537 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 1998 | 21.5% | 17.9% | 25.6% | 515 | 437 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 2000 | 22.3% | 17.6% | 27.7% | 319 | 255 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 2002 | 21.1% | 17.3% | 25.6% | 568 | 372 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 2004 | 16.1% | 12.7% | 20.2% | 438 | 363 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 2008 | 16.6% | 13.7% | 19.9% | 894 | 547 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 2012 | 14.5% | 12.7% | 16.4% | 2,709 | 1,417 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 2016 | 10.3% | 8.6% | 12.3% | 1,467 | 1,021 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 2020 | 6.6% | 5.5% | 7.8% | 3,277 | 1,745 | | ANES | Democrats | Conservative | 2024 | 8.2% | 6.7% | 10.0% | 2,310 | 1,087 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1972 | 13.1% | 10.6% | 16.1% | 595 | 595 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1974 | 11.4% | 8.3% | 15.4% | 404 | 303 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1976 | 9.8% | 7.6% | 12.5% | 581 | 558 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1978 | 10.1% | 7.9% | 12.9% | 563 | 563 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1980 | 9.8% | 7.2% | 13.2% | 377 | 377 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1982 | 7.3% | 5.0% | 10.7% | 327 | 327 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1984 | 11.4% | 9.3% | 14.0% | 682 | 682 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1986 | 11.0% | 8.8% | 13.6% | 648 | 648 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1988 | 9.9% | 7.8% | 12.4% | 648 | 648 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1990 | 12.1% | 9.6% | 15.1% | 547 | 547 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1992 | 9.5% | 7.6% | 11.8% | 759 | 756 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1994 | 5.1% | 3.5% | 7.3% | 657 | 547 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1996 | 6.1% | 4.3% | 8.7% | 566 | 461 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 1998 | 8.3% | 5.9% | 11.7% | 407 | 345 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 2000 | 8.7% | 5.8% | 13.0% | 284 | 240 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 2002 | 8.4% | 6.1% | 11.4% | 603 | 427 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 2004 | 6.6% | 4.4% | 9.7% | 411 | 351 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 2008 | 5.2% | 3.5% | 7.8% | 554 | 409 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 2012 | 4.6% | 3.5% | 5.9% | 1,904 | 1,161 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 2016 | 4.0% | 3.0% | 5.4% | 1,482 | 1,063 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 2020 | 3.7% | 3.0% | 4.7% | 3,076 | 1,816 | | ANES | Republicans | Liberal | 2024 | 4.4% | 3.3% | 5.8% | 2,172 | 1,035 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1972 | 33.4% | 29.8% | 37.3% | 595 | 595 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1974 | 32.4% | 27.4% | 37.9% | 404 | 303 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1976 | 30.0% | 26.4% | 34.0% | 581 | 558 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1978 | 28.4% | 24.8% | 32.3% | 563 | 563 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1980 | 23.1% | 19.1% | 27.6% | 377 | 377 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1982 | 25.7% | 21.3% | 30.7% | 327 | 327 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1984 | 25.2% | 22.1% | 28.6% | 682 | 682 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1986 | 30.2% | 26.8% | 33.9% | 648 | 648 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1988 | 24.8% | 21.7% | 28.3% | 648 | 648 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1990 | 33.1% | 29.3% | 37.1% | 547 | 547 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1992 | 26.9% | 23.9% | 30.2% | 759 | 756 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1994 | 24.9% | 21.4% | 28.6% | 657 | 547 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1996 | 22.6% | 19.0% | 26.6% | 566 | 461 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 1998 | 26.5% | 22.2% | 31.4% | 407 | 345 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 2000 | 25.5% | 20.4% | 31.4% | 284 | 240 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 2002 | 22.3% | 18.6% | 26.5% | 603 | 427 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 2004 | 22.8% | 18.7% | 27.5% | 411 | 351 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 2008 | 18.7% | 15.2% | 22.7% | 554 | 409 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 2012 | 21.7% | 19.4% | 24.2% | 1,904 | 1,161 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 2016 | 19.5% | 17.2% | 22.0% | 1,482 | 1,063 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 2020 | 18.0% | 16.3% | 19.8% | 3,076 | 1,816 | | ANES | Republicans | Moderate | 2024 | 18.3% | 16.0% | 20.7% | 2,172 | 1,035 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1972 | 53.4% | 49.4% | 57.4% | 595 | 595 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1974 | 56.2% | 50.6% | 61.7% | 404 | 303 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1976 | 60.2% | 56.0% | 64.1% | 581 | 558 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1978 | 61.5% | 57.4% | 65.4% | 563 | 563 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1980 | 67.1% | 62.2% | 71.7% | 377 | 377 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1982 | 67.0% | 61.7% | 71.8% | 327 | 327 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1984 | 63.3% | 59.7% | 66.9% | 682 | 682 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1986 | 58.8% | 55.0% | 62.5% | 648 | 648 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1988 | 65.3% | 61.5% | 68.8% | 648 | 648 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1990 | 54.8% | 50.7% | 59.0% | 547 | 547 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1992 | 63.6% | 60.1% | 67.0% | 759 | 756 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1994 | 70.0% | 66.1% | 73.7% | 657 | 547 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1996 | 71.3% | 67.0% | 75.2% | 566 | 461 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 1998 | 65.1% | 60.0% | 70.0% | 407 | 345 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 2000 | 65.7% | 59.5% | 71.5% | 284 | 240 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 2002 | 69.3% | 64.8% | 73.5% | 603 | 427 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 2004 | 70.6% | 65.7% | 75.2% | 411 | 351 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 2008 | 76.1% | 71.7% | 80.0% | 554 | 409 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 2012 | 73.7% | 71.1% | 76.2% | 1,904 | 1,161 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 2016 | 76.5% | 73.8% | 78.9% | 1,482 | 1,063 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 2020 | 78.3% | 76.4% | 80.1% | 3,076 | 1,816 | | ANES | Republicans | Conservative | 2024 | 77.4% | 74.7% | 79.8% | 2,172 | 1,035 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1974 | 36.0% | 32.4% | 39.7% | 789 | 653 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1975 | 38.2% | 34.5% | 42.1% | 766 | 623 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1976 | 33.4% | 29.8% | 37.1% | 791 | 641 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1977 | 35.9% | 32.3% | 39.6% | 841 | 664 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1978 | 33.8% | 29.7% | 38.2% | 756 | 479 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1980 | 28.2% | 24.4% | 32.3% | 741 | 486 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1982 | 34.1% | 30.4% | 38.0% | 1,041 | 594 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1983 | 30.0% | 24.8% | 35.7% | 420 | 269 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1984 | 31.8% | 27.7% | 36.1% | 724 | 466 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1985 | 34.8% | 30.6% | 39.4% | 719 | 448 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1986 | 31.4% | 27.7% | 35.3% | 703 | 570 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1987 | 38.4% | 34.6% | 42.3% | 961 | 615 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1988 | 39.4% | 35.4% | 43.5% | 697 | 559 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1989 | 41.1% | 36.9% | 45.5% | 666 | 504 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1990 | 38.1% | 33.8% | 42.6% | 590 | 461 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1991 | 39.1% | 34.9% | 43.4% | 655 | 510 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1993 | 40.8% | 36.8% | 44.9% | 725 | 567 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1994 | 39.2% | 36.4% | 42.2% | 1,370 | 1,074 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1996 | 36.8% | 33.8% | 39.8% | 1,272 | 997 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 1998 | 38.8% | 35.8% | 41.8% | 1,274 | 986 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2000 | 36.0% | 32.9% | 39.2% | 1,189 | 914 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2002 | 37.4% | 32.9% | 42.1% | 596 | 425 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2004 | 39.8% | 35.2% | 44.6% | 588 | 411 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2006 | 42.7% | 40.0% | 45.4% | 1,918 | 1,312 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2008 | 41.7% | 38.0% | 45.5% | 954 | 653 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2010 | 46.9% | 42.9% | 51.0% | 932 | 569 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2012 | 43.2% | 39.3% | 47.2% | 902 | 605 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2014 | 41.5% | 38.2% | 44.9% | 1,143 | 818 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2016 | 48.7% | 45.4% | 52.1% | 1,334 | 865 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2018 | 52.2% | 48.3% | 56.0% | 1,013 | 636 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2021 | 58.3% | 55.4% | 61.1% | 1,818 | 1,138 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2022 | 59.8% | 55.8% | 63.7% | 1,416 | 592 | | GSS | Democrats | Liberal | 2024 | 58.9% | 54.9% | 62.7% | 1,215 | 603 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1974 | 39.5% | 35.8% | 43.3% | 789 | 653 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1975 | 40.6% | 36.8% | 44.5% | 766 | 623 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1976 | 42.4% | 38.7% | 46.3% | 791 | 641 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1977 | 40.8% | 37.1% | 44.6% | 841 | 664 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1978 | 39.4% | 35.1% | 43.9% | 756 | 479 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1980 | 45.0% | 40.6% | 49.4% | 741 | 486 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1982 | 40.9% | 37.0% | 44.9% | 1,041 | 594 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1983 | 45.0% | 39.2% | 51.0% | 420 | 269 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1984 | 40.9% | 36.5% | 45.4% | 724 | 466 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1985 | 40.3% | 35.9% | 44.9% | 719 | 448 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1986 | 43.3% | 39.3% | 47.4% | 703 | 570 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1987 | 40.3% | 36.5% | 44.2% | 961 | 615 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1988 | 36.7% | 32.8% | 40.8% | 697 | 559 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1989 | 38.4% | 34.2% | 42.7% | 666 | 504 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1990 | 37.1% | 32.8% | 41.6% | 590 | 461 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1991 | 38.5% | 34.4% | 42.8% | 655 | 510 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1993 | 35.0% | 31.2% | 39.1% | 725 | 567 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1994 | 38.0% | 35.1% | 40.9% | 1,370 | 1,074 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1996 | 38.7% | 35.8% | 41.8% | 1,272 | 997 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 1998 | 38.9% | 35.9% | 41.9% | 1,274 | 986 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2000 | 43.6% | 40.4% | 46.8% | 1,189 | 914 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2002 | 43.2% | 38.5% | 47.9% | 596 | 425 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2004 | 39.0% | 34.4% | 43.8% | 588 | 411 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2006 | 39.6% | 37.0% | 42.3% | 1,918 | 1,312 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2008 | 40.9% | 37.2% | 44.7% | 954 | 653 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2010 | 37.2% | 33.3% | 41.3% | 932 | 569 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2012 | 39.4% | 35.6% | 43.3% | 902 | 605 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2014 | 42.0% | 38.7% | 45.4% | 1,143 | 818 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2016 | 35.2% | 32.1% | 38.5% | 1,334 | 865 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2018 | 35.5% | 31.9% | 39.3% | 1,013 | 636 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2021 | 32.4% | 29.7% | 35.2% | 1,818 | 1,138 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2022 | 30.1% | 26.5% | 33.9% | 1,416 | 592 | | GSS | Democrats | Moderate | 2024 | 29.7% | 26.2% | 33.5% | 1,215 | 603 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1974 | 24.6% | 21.4% | 28.0% | 789 | 653 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1975 | 21.2% | 18.2% | 24.6% | 766 | 623 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1976 | 24.2% | 21.1% | 27.7% | 791 | 641 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1977 | 23.3% | 20.3% | 26.7% | 841 | 664 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1978 | 26.8% | 23.0% | 30.9% | 756 | 479 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1980 | 26.8% | 23.1% | 30.9% | 741 | 486 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1982 | 25.0% | 21.7% | 28.7% | 1,041 | 594 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1983 | 25.0% | 20.2% | 30.5% | 420 | 269 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1984 | 27.4% | 23.5% | 31.6% | 724 | 466 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1985 | 24.8% | 21.0% | 29.0% | 719 | 448 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1986 | 25.3% | 21.9% | 29.0% | 703 | 570 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1987 | 21.3% | 18.2% | 24.7% | 961 | 615 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1988 | 23.9% | 20.6% | 27.6% | 697 | 559 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1989 | 20.5% | 17.2% | 24.2% | 666 | 504 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1990 | 24.8% | 21.1% | 29.0% | 590 | 461 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1991 | 22.4% | 19.0% | 26.3% | 655 | 510 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1993 | 24.2% | 20.9% | 27.9% | 725 | 567 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1994 | 22.8% | 20.4% | 25.4% | 1,370 | 1,074 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1996 | 24.5% | 21.9% | 27.3% | 1,272 | 997 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 1998 | 22.4% | 19.9% | 25.1% | 1,274 | 986 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2000 | 20.4% | 18.0% | 23.2% | 1,189 | 914 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2002 | 19.4% | 16.0% | 23.5% | 596 | 425 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2004 | 21.2% | 17.5% | 25.4% | 588 | 411 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2006 | 17.7% | 15.7% | 19.9% | 1,918 | 1,312 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2008 | 17.4% | 14.7% | 20.5% | 954 | 653 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2010 | 15.9% | 13.1% | 19.1% | 932 | 569 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2012 | 17.4% | 14.6% | 20.6% | 902 | 605 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2014 | 16.5% | 14.1% | 19.2% | 1,143 | 818 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2016 | 16.0% | 13.8% | 18.6% | 1,334 | 865 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2018 | 12.4% | 10.0% | 15.2% | 1,013 | 636 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2021 | 9.3% | 7.8% | 11.1% | 1,818 | 1,138 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2022 | 10.1% | 8.0% | 12.8% | 1,416 | 592 | | GSS | Democrats | Conservative | 2024 | 11.4% | 9.1% | 14.2% | 1,215 | 603 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1974 | 19.0% | 15.3% | 23.4% | 419 | 360 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1975 | 18.5% | 14.8% | 22.8% | 430 | 360 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1976 | 18.7% | 14.9% | 23.3% | 404 | 336 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1977 | 21.2% | 17.3% | 25.6% | 449 | 374 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1978 | 20.2% | 16.0% | 25.2% | 469 | 288 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1980 | 20.7% | 16.6% | 25.5% | 448 | 315 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1982 | 14.1% | 10.7% | 18.4% | 487 | 315 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1983 | 14.5% | 10.1% | 20.5% | 258 | 174 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1984 | 12.5% | 9.3% | 16.6% | 520 | 322 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1985 | 14.6% | 11.5% | 18.5% | 597 | 394 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1986 | 14.5% | 11.4% | 18.1% | 518 | 427 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1987 | 17.1% | 13.7% | 21.1% | 541 | 397 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1988 | 16.0% | 12.9% | 19.6% | 551 | 450 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1989 | 16.8% | 13.8% | 20.4% | 612 | 497 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1990 | 19.0% | 15.6% | 22.8% | 572 | 455 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1991 | 18.1% | 15.0% | 21.6% | 624 | 513 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1993 | 13.4% | 10.7% | 16.7% | 622 | 492 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1994 | 14.8% | 12.6% | 17.3% | 1,101 | 869 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1996 | 11.3% | 9.3% | 13.6% | 1,040 | 870 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 1998 | 13.0% | 10.8% | 15.6% | 937 | 766 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2000 | 13.0% | 10.8% | 15.6% | 924 | 756 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2002 | 10.6% | 7.8% | 14.3% | 465 | 356 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2004 | 10.3% | 7.6% | 13.7% | 504 | 377 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2006 | 9.0% | 7.4% | 10.9% | 1,447 | 1,044 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2008 | 6.0% | 4.2% | 8.6% | 657 | 471 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2010 | 10.3% | 7.8% | 13.4% | 651 | 445 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2012 | 8.2% | 5.8% | 11.5% | 585 | 360 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2014 | 7.4% | 5.5% | 9.8% | 779 | 590 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2016 | 6.8% | 5.1% | 8.9% | 911 | 652 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2018 | 8.7% | 6.4% | 11.7% | 777 | 435 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2021 | 3.7% | 2.6% | 5.2% | 1,228 | 846 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2022 | 4.2% | 2.7% | 6.6% | 1,106 | 422 | | GSS | Republicans | Liberal | 2024 | 5.7% | 4.1% | 7.9% | 1,089 | 580 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1974 | 39.1% | 34.2% | 44.2% | 419 | 360 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1975 | 37.0% | 32.2% | 42.1% | 430 | 360 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1976 | 32.9% | 28.1% | 38.1% | 404 | 336 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1977 | 33.0% | 28.5% | 37.9% | 449 | 374 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1978 | 32.4% | 27.2% | 38.0% | 469 | 288 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1980 | 32.2% | 27.3% | 37.6% | 448 | 315 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1982 | 36.8% | 31.6% | 42.2% | 487 | 315 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1983 | 31.2% | 24.8% | 38.4% | 258 | 174 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1984 | 35.9% | 30.8% | 41.3% | 520 | 322 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1985 | 37.4% | 32.8% | 42.3% | 597 | 394 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1986 | 33.3% | 29.0% | 37.9% | 518 | 427 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1987 | 34.6% | 30.1% | 39.4% | 541 | 397 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1988 | 32.7% | 28.6% | 37.2% | 551 | 450 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1989 | 36.3% | 32.1% | 40.6% | 612 | 497 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1990 | 31.0% | 26.9% | 35.4% | 572 | 455 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1991 | 37.0% | 32.9% | 41.3% | 624 | 513 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1993 | 34.1% | 30.1% | 38.4% | 622 | 492 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1994 | 28.6% | 25.7% | 31.7% | 1,101 | 869 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1996 | 32.6% | 29.6% | 35.8% | 1,040 | 870 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 1998 | 29.7% | 26.6% | 33.1% | 937 | 766 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2000 | 30.4% | 27.2% | 33.8% | 924 | 756 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2002 | 29.3% | 24.8% | 34.3% | 465 | 356 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2004 | 31.6% | 27.1% | 36.4% | 504 | 377 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2006 | 28.7% | 26.0% | 31.5% | 1,447 | 1,044 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2008 | 29.1% | 25.2% | 33.3% | 657 | 471 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2010 | 27.2% | 23.3% | 31.5% | 651 | 445 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2012 | 26.2% | 21.9% | 31.0% | 585 | 360 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2014 | 28.6% | 25.1% | 32.4% | 779 | 590 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2016 | 29.0% | 25.7% | 32.6% | 911 | 652 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2018 | 31.3% | 27.1% | 35.8% | 777 | 435 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2021 | 24.7% | 21.9% | 27.7% | 1,228 | 846 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2022 | 25.4% | 21.4% | 29.7% | 1,106 | 422 | | GSS | Republicans | Moderate | 2024 | 23.4% | 20.1% | 27.0% | 1,089 | 580 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1974 | 41.9% | 36.9% | 47.0% | 419 | 360 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1975 | 44.5% | 39.5% | 49.7% | 430 | 360 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1976 | 48.4% | 43.1% | 53.7% | 404 | 336 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1977 | 45.8% | 40.8% | 50.9% | 449 | 374 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1978 | 47.4% | 41.7% | 53.2% | 469 | 288 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1980 | 47.1% | 41.6% | 52.6% | 448 | 315 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1982 | 49.1% | 43.7% | 54.6% | 487 | 315 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1983 | 54.3% | 46.9% | 61.5% | 258 | 174 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1984 | 51.6% | 46.1% | 57.0% | 520 | 322 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1985 | 47.9% | 43.0% | 52.9% | 597 | 394 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1986 | 52.3% | 47.5% | 57.0% | 518 | 427 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1987 | 48.3% | 43.4% | 53.2% | 541 | 397 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1988 | 51.3% | 46.7% | 55.9% | 551 | 450 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1989 | 46.9% | 42.6% | 51.3% | 612 | 497 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1990 | 50.0% | 45.5% | 54.6% | 572 | 455 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1991 | 44.9% | 40.7% | 49.3% | 624 | 513 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1993 | 52.5% | 48.1% | 56.9% | 622 | 492 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1994 | 56.6% | 53.3% | 59.9% | 1,101 | 869 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1996 | 56.1% | 52.8% | 59.4% | 1,040 | 870 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 1998 | 57.3% | 53.7% | 60.7% | 937 | 766 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2000 | 56.6% | 53.0% | 60.1% | 924 | 756 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2002 | 60.0% | 54.9% | 65.0% | 465 | 356 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2004 | 58.2% | 53.1% | 63.0% | 504 | 377 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2006 | 62.3% | 59.3% | 65.2% | 1,447 | 1,044 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2008 | 64.9% | 60.5% | 69.1% | 657 | 471 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2010 | 62.6% | 58.0% | 66.9% | 651 | 445 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2012 | 65.6% | 60.6% | 70.3% | 585 | 360 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2014 | 64.0% | 60.0% | 67.8% | 779 | 590 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2016 | 64.2% | 60.5% | 67.8% | 911 | 652 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2018 | 60.1% | 55.4% | 64.5% | 777 | 435 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2021 | 71.6% | 68.5% | 74.5% | 1,228 | 846 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2022 | 70.4% | 65.9% | 74.6% | 1,106 | 422 | | GSS | Republicans | Conservative | 2024 | 70.9% | 67.0% | 74.4% | 1,089 | 580 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2006 | 47.1% | 46.2% | 48.0% | 15,560 | 12,187 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2007 | 51.3% | 49.2% | 53.4% | 4,281 | 2,226 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2008 | 50.9% | 49.9% | 52.0% | 13,793 | 9,277 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2009 | 49.7% | 48.2% | 51.3% | 5,581 | 3,973 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2010 | 48.9% | 47.8% | 49.9% | 23,352 | 9,329 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2011 | 36.1% | 34.7% | 37.6% | 8,870 | 4,108 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2012 | 46.7% | 45.7% | 47.7% | 23,773 | 9,916 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2013 | 47.9% | 46.3% | 49.6% | 7,103 | 3,435 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2014 | 44.8% | 43.9% | 45.8% | 24,367 | 10,280 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2015 | 47.8% | 46.1% | 49.5% | 6,299 | 3,272 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2016 | 45.1% | 44.3% | 45.9% | 29,784 | 14,600 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2017 | 49.3% | 47.7% | 50.9% | 8,105 | 3,795 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2018 | 59.6% | 58.7% | 60.5% | 26,268 | 12,043 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2019 | 62.4% | 60.9% | 63.8% | 7,963 | 4,354 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2020 | 58.6% | 57.7% | 59.4% | 28,303 | 13,342 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2021 | 60.4% | 59.2% | 61.6% | 11,987 | 6,476 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2022 | 60.2% | 59.3% | 61.0% | 28,102 | 12,736 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2023 | 56.6% | 55.3% | 57.9% | 10,391 | 5,748 | | CES | Democrats | Liberal | 2024 | 59.9% | 58.9% | 60.9% | 28,559 | 8,993 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2006 | 46.9% | 46.0% | 47.8% | 15,560 | 12,187 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2007 | 41.5% | 39.4% | 43.5% | 4,281 | 2,226 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2008 | 41.4% | 40.4% | 42.4% | 13,793 | 9,277 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2009 | 42.2% | 40.7% | 43.8% | 5,581 | 3,973 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2010 | 42.0% | 41.0% | 43.0% | 23,352 | 9,329 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2011 | 51.7% | 50.2% | 53.2% | 8,870 | 4,108 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2012 | 42.7% | 41.8% | 43.7% | 23,773 | 9,916 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2013 | 40.0% | 38.4% | 41.7% | 7,103 | 3,435 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2014 | 42.9% | 41.9% | 43.8% | 24,367 | 10,280 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2015 | 41.0% | 39.3% | 42.7% | 6,299 | 3,272 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2016 | 41.6% | 40.8% | 42.4% | 29,784 | 14,600 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2017 | 40.0% | 38.5% | 41.6% | 8,105 | 3,795 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2018 | 31.8% | 31.0% | 32.6% | 26,268 | 12,043 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2019 | 30.6% | 29.3% | 32.0% | 7,963 | 4,354 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2020 | 34.2% | 33.4% | 35.0% | 28,303 | 13,342 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2021 | 33.0% | 31.9% | 34.2% | 11,987 | 6,476 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2022 | 33.7% | 32.9% | 34.6% | 28,102 | 12,736 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2023 | 36.0% | 34.7% | 37.2% | 10,391 | 5,748 | | CES | Democrats | Moderate | 2024 | 35.1% | 34.2% | 36.1% | 28,559 | 8,993 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2006 | 6.0% | 5.6% | 6.4% | 15,560 | 12,187 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2007 | 7.2% | 6.2% | 8.4% | 4,281 | 2,226 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2008 | 7.7% | 7.2% | 8.3% | 13,793 | 9,277 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2009 | 8.0% | 7.2% | 8.9% | 5,581 | 3,973 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2010 | 9.2% | 8.6% | 9.8% | 23,352 | 9,329 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2011 | 12.2% | 11.2% | 13.2% | 8,870 | 4,108 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2012 | 10.6% | 10.0% | 11.2% | 23,773 | 9,916 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2013 | 12.0% | 11.0% | 13.2% | 7,103 | 3,435 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2014 | 12.3% | 11.7% | 12.9% | 24,367 | 10,280 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2015 | 11.2% | 10.2% | 12.3% | 6,299 | 3,272 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2016 | 13.2% | 12.7% | 13.8% | 29,784 | 14,600 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2017 | 10.7% | 9.7% | 11.7% | 8,105 | 3,795 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2018 | 8.6% | 8.1% | 9.1% | 26,268 | 12,043 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2019 | 7.0% | 6.3% | 7.8% | 7,963 | 4,354 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2020 | 7.2% | 6.8% | 7.7% | 28,303 | 13,342 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2021 | 6.6% | 6.0% | 7.2% | 11,987 | 6,476 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2022 | 6.1% | 5.7% | 6.5% | 28,102 | 12,736 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2023 | 7.4% | 6.8% | 8.2% | 10,391 | 5,748 | | CES | Democrats | Conservative | 2024 | 5.0% | 4.5% | 5.4% | 28,559 | 8,993 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2006 | 2.4% | 2.1% | 2.7% | 14,662 | 11,342 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2007 | 2.0% | 1.5% | 2.7% | 3,720 | 1,983 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2008 | 2.8% | 2.5% | 3.1% | 13,561 | 10,315 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2009 | 2.2% | 1.8% | 2.7% | 5,278 | 4,289 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2010 | 2.3% | 2.0% | 2.7% | 23,078 | 8,965 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2011 | 1.9% | 1.5% | 2.4% | 7,150 | 3,710 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2012 | 2.2% | 1.9% | 2.5% | 20,074 | 8,888 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2013 | 2.5% | 2.0% | 3.1% | 5,147 | 2,683 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2014 | 2.2% | 1.9% | 2.6% | 18,534 | 8,687 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2015 | 2.3% | 1.8% | 3.0% | 4,726 | 2,725 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2016 | 2.5% | 2.2% | 2.8% | 20,298 | 11,665 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2017 | 1.9% | 1.4% | 2.4% | 5,619 | 2,859 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2018 | 2.9% | 2.6% | 3.3% | 20,977 | 10,926 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2019 | 3.8% | 3.2% | 4.4% | 6,313 | 4,090 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2020 | 3.3% | 3.0% | 3.6% | 19,768 | 11,264 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2021 | 2.7% | 2.3% | 3.2% | 7,876 | 5,244 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2022 | 2.7% | 2.4% | 3.0% | 19,639 | 9,659 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2023 | 3.4% | 3.0% | 4.0% | 8,550 | 5,124 | | CES | Republicans | Liberal | 2024 | 2.3% | 2.0% | 2.7% | 20,761 | 7,984 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2006 | 24.8% | 24.0% | 25.6% | 14,662 | 11,342 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2007 | 22.5% | 20.7% | 24.4% | 3,720 | 1,983 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2008 | 21.2% | 20.5% | 22.0% | 13,561 | 10,315 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2009 | 21.2% | 20.0% | 22.5% | 5,278 | 4,289 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2010 | 19.9% | 19.1% | 20.8% | 23,078 | 8,965 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2011 | 22.6% | 21.3% | 24.0% | 7,150 | 3,710 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2012 | 20.3% | 19.5% | 21.2% | 20,074 | 8,888 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2013 | 22.1% | 20.6% | 23.7% | 5,147 | 2,683 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2014 | 22.8% | 22.0% | 23.7% | 18,534 | 8,687 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2015 | 23.9% | 22.3% | 25.5% | 4,726 | 2,725 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2016 | 24.8% | 24.0% | 25.6% | 20,298 | 11,665 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2017 | 22.0% | 20.5% | 23.6% | 5,619 | 2,859 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2018 | 21.0% | 20.2% | 21.8% | 20,977 | 10,926 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2019 | 20.2% | 19.0% | 21.5% | 6,313 | 4,090 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2020 | 22.3% | 21.6% | 23.1% | 19,768 | 11,264 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2021 | 22.1% | 21.0% | 23.3% | 7,876 | 5,244 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2022 | 23.3% | 22.5% | 24.2% | 19,639 | 9,659 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2023 | 25.4% | 24.2% | 26.6% | 8,550 | 5,124 | | CES | Republicans | Moderate | 2024 | 24.5% | 23.5% | 25.4% | 20,761 | 7,984 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2006 | 72.8% | 72.0% | 73.7% | 14,662 | 11,342 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2007 | 75.4% | 73.5% | 77.3% | 3,720 | 1,983 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2008 | 76.0% | 75.1% | 76.8% | 13,561 | 10,315 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2009 | 76.6% | 75.3% | 77.8% | 5,278 | 4,289 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2010 | 77.7% | 76.8% | 78.6% | 23,078 | 8,965 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2011 | 75.4% | 74.0% | 76.8% | 7,150 | 3,710 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2012 | 77.5% | 76.6% | 78.3% | 20,074 | 8,888 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2013 | 75.4% | 73.7% | 77.0% | 5,147 | 2,683 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2014 | 74.9% | 74.0% | 75.8% | 18,534 | 8,687 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2015 | 73.8% | 72.1% | 75.4% | 4,726 | 2,725 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2016 | 72.7% | 71.9% | 73.5% | 20,298 | 11,665 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2017 | 76.1% | 74.5% | 77.6% | 5,619 | 2,859 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2018 | 76.1% | 75.3% | 76.9% | 20,977 | 10,926 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2019 | 76.0% | 74.6% | 77.3% | 6,313 | 4,090 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2020 | 74.4% | 73.6% | 75.2% | 19,768 | 11,264 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2021 | 75.1% | 73.9% | 76.3% | 7,876 | 5,244 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2022 | 74.0% | 73.1% | 74.9% | 19,639 | 9,659 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2023 | 71.2% | 69.9% | 72.4% | 8,550 | 5,124 | | CES | Republicans | Conservative | 2024 | 73.2% | 72.2% | 74.2% | 20,761 | 7,984 | Views: ANES (survey = ANES); GSS (survey = GSS); CES (survey = CES). Note: Respondents who did not place themselves are left out of every share, and the share who placed themselves is reported in the text. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024 (weight VCF0009z); GSS, 1974-2024 (weight_use); CES cumulative file, 2006-2024 (weight); all estimates weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/camps.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (124), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | anes_chg | +0.34 | difference in correlation coefficients | change in the pooled ANES correlation between the two windows; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1980-1988 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 0.31 to 0.36 | 18,239 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_d_1972_1982 | +0.09 | difference in correlation coefficients | 1982 minus 1972 ANES correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1972 and 1982 | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.16 | 2,436 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_d_1982_1992 | +0.02 | difference in correlation coefficients | 1992 minus 1982 ANES correlation (1982 is the highest estimate before 1992); standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1982 and 1992 | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.09 | 2,710 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_d_2008_2016 | +0.08 | difference in correlation coefficients | 2016 minus 2008 ANES correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2008 and 2016 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.13 | 4,905 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_d_2020_2024 | −0.01 | difference in correlation coefficients | 2024 minus 2020 ANES correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.01 | 11,757 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_dem_con_1972 | 25% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the conservative camp, Wilson interval | ANES Democrat identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 1972 | 95% CI 22% to 28% | 776 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_dem_con_2024 | 8% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the conservative camp, Wilson interval | ANES Democrat identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 2024 | 95% CI 7% to 10% | 2,310 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_dem_lib_1972 | 36% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the liberal camp, Wilson interval | ANES Democrat identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 1972 | 95% CI 33% to 40% | 776 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_dem_lib_2024 | 62% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the liberal camp, Wilson interval | ANES Democrat identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 2024 | 95% CI 59% to 65% | 2,310 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ftf_2024 | +0.72 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 0.68 to 0.77 | 868 | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1972 | 0.58 | standard deviations of self-placement (survey-wide, all years pooled) | weighted mean ideological self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers, divided by the survey-wide standard deviation of placements | ANES identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 1972 | 95% CI 0.50 to 0.67 | 1,371 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1972_year | 0.68 | standard deviations of self-placement in the same year | weighted mean ideological self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers, divided by the same-year standard deviation of placements | ANES identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 1972 | 95% CI 0.58 to 0.78 | 1,371 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2024 | 1.60 | standard deviations of self-placement (survey-wide, all years pooled) | weighted mean ideological self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers, divided by the survey-wide standard deviation of placements | ANES identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 2024 | 95% CI 1.53 to 1.67 | 4,482 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2024_year | 1.43 | standard deviations of self-placement in the same year | weighted mean ideological self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers, divided by the same-year standard deviation of placements | ANES identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 2024 | 95% CI 1.37 to 1.50 | 4,482 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_pts_1972 | 0.9 | points on the seven-point liberal-conservative scale | weighted mean self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers | ANES identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 1972 | 95% CI 0.7 to 1.0 | 1,371 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_pts_2024 | 2.4 | points on the seven-point liberal-conservative scale | weighted mean self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers | ANES identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 2024 | 95% CI 2.3 to 2.5 | 4,482 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_placed_1972 | 57% | percent of respondents with a party identification | weighted share who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale, Wilson interval | ANES respondents with a party identification (other party and not sure excluded) | 1972 | 95% CI 55% to 59% | 2,695 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_placed_2000 | 34% | percent of respondents with a party identification | weighted share who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale, Wilson interval | ANES respondents with a party identification (other party and not sure excluded) | 2000 | 95% CI 32% to 37% | 1,792 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_placed_2024 | 84% | percent of respondents with a party identification | weighted share who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale, Wilson interval | ANES respondents with a party identification (other party and not sure excluded) | 2024 | 95% CI 82% to 85% | 5,483 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_r_1972 | +0.32 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1972 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.36 | 1,545 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_r_1982 | +0.41 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1982 | 95% CI 0.36 to 0.47 | 891 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_r_2020 | +0.74 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2020 | 95% CI 0.72 to 0.75 | 7,041 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_r_2020s | +0.73 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2020 and 2024, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.72 to 0.74 | 11,757 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_r_2024 | +0.72 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.70 to 0.74 | 4,716 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_r_reagan | +0.39 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1980-1988, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.37 to 0.41 | 6,482 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_rep_con_1972 | 53% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the conservative camp, Wilson interval | ANES Republican identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 1972 | 95% CI 49% to 57% | 595 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_rep_con_2024 | 77% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the conservative camp, Wilson interval | ANES Republican identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 2024 | 95% CI 75% to 80% | 2,172 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_rep_lib_1972 | 13% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the liberal camp, Wilson interval | ANES Republican identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 1972 | 95% CI 11% to 16% | 595 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_rep_lib_2024 | 4% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the liberal camp, Wilson interval | ANES Republican identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 2024 | 95% CI 3% to 6% | 2,172 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_sd | 1.48 | points on the seven-point liberal-conservative scale | weighted standard deviation of liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents who placed themselves, all survey years 1972-2024 pooled | 1972-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_sd_1972 | 1.28 | points on the seven-point liberal-conservative scale | weighted standard deviation of liberal-conservative self-placement within the year | ANES respondents who placed themselves that year | 1972 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_sd_2024 | 1.66 | points on the seven-point liberal-conservative scale | weighted standard deviation of liberal-conservative self-placement within the year | ANES respondents who placed themselves that year | 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ces_d_2006_2024 | +0.06 | difference in correlation coefficients | 2024 minus 2006 CES correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | CES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, not sure excluded) and an ideology answer (not sure excluded) | 2006 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.07 | 89,590 | weight | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_d_2008_2016 | −0.09 | difference in correlation coefficients | 2016 minus 2008 CES correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | CES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, not sure excluded) and an ideology answer (not sure excluded) | 2008 and 2016 | 95% CI −0.10 to −0.08 | 88,727 | weight | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_dem_lib_2006 | 47% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the liberal camp, Wilson interval | CES Democrat identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 2006 | 95% CI 46% to 48% | 15,560 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_dem_lib_2024 | 60% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the liberal camp, Wilson interval | CES Democrat identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 2024 | 95% CI 59% to 61% | 28,559 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2006 | 1.32 | standard deviations of self-placement (survey-wide, all years pooled) | weighted mean ideological self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers, divided by the survey-wide standard deviation of placements | CES identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 2006 | 95% CI 1.30 to 1.34 | 30,222 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2008 | 1.47 | standard deviations of self-placement (survey-wide, all years pooled) | weighted mean ideological self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers, divided by the survey-wide standard deviation of placements | CES identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 2008 | 95% CI 1.44 to 1.49 | 27,354 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2016 | 1.14 | standard deviations of self-placement (survey-wide, all years pooled) | weighted mean ideological self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers, divided by the survey-wide standard deviation of placements | CES identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 2016 | 95% CI 1.12 to 1.16 | 50,082 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2024 | 1.60 | standard deviations of self-placement (survey-wide, all years pooled) | weighted mean ideological self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers, divided by the survey-wide standard deviation of placements | CES identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 2024 | 95% CI 1.58 to 1.62 | 49,320 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_r_2006 | +0.66 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | CES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, not sure excluded) and an ideology answer (not sure excluded) | 2006 | 95% CI 0.65 to 0.67 | 33,755 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_r_2008 | +0.68 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | CES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, not sure excluded) and an ideology answer (not sure excluded) | 2008 | 95% CI 0.67 to 0.68 | 29,939 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_r_2016 | +0.59 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | CES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, not sure excluded) and an ideology answer (not sure excluded) | 2016 | 95% CI 0.58 to 0.60 | 58,788 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_r_2020s | +0.69 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | CES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, not sure excluded) and an ideology answer (not sure excluded) | 2020-2024, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.69 to 0.69 | 211,673 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_r_2024 | +0.72 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | CES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, not sure excluded) and an ideology answer (not sure excluded) | 2024 | 95% CI 0.71 to 0.73 | 55,835 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_rep_con_2006 | 73% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the conservative camp, Wilson interval | CES Republican identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 2006 | 95% CI 72% to 74% | 14,662 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_rep_con_2024 | 73% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the conservative camp, Wilson interval | CES Republican identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 2024 | 95% CI 72% to 74% | 20,761 | weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled years) | Cooperative Election Study | | | college_r_2020s | +0.80 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents in the group 'College graduate' with both answers | 2020 and 2024, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.78 to 0.81 | 5,759 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | college_r_reagan | +0.61 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents in the group 'College graduate' with both answers | 1980-1988, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.58 to 0.64 | 1,560 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | college_vs_hs_chg | −0.17 | difference in changes of correlation coefficients | change in the pooled ANES correlation among college graduates minus the change among respondents with high school or less; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES college graduates and respondents with high school or less (disjoint education groups) | 1980-1988 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI −0.23 to −0.11 | 12,512 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | college_vs_some_chg | −0.12 | difference in changes of correlation coefficients | change in the pooled ANES correlation among college graduates minus the change among respondents with some college; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES college graduates and respondents with some college (disjoint education groups) | 1980-1988 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI −0.18 to −0.07 | 12,861 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_anes_ces_2020s | +0.04 | difference in correlation coefficients | ANES minus CES pooled correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2020-2024 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.05 | 223,430 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_anes_gss_2020s | +0.10 | difference in correlation coefficients | ANES minus GSS pooled correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2020-2024 | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.12 | 21,955 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_anes_gss_reagan | +0.13 | difference in correlation coefficients | ANES minus GSS pooled correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1980-1988 | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.16 | 17,683 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_ces_gss_2020s | +0.05 | difference in correlation coefficients | CES minus GSS pooled correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | CES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, not sure excluded) and an ideology answer (not sure excluded) | 2020-2024 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.07 | 221,871 | weight_cumulative; weight_use | Cooperative Election Study | | | design_ratio_max | 1.68 | ratio of standard errors | largest ratio of the jackknife standard error over primary sampling units within strata to the model-based standard error of the correlation | GSS respondents with both answers in the 7 year-and-mode cells behind the interview-mode comparison | 2018, 2022 and 2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | design_ratio_min | 1.13 | ratio of standard errors | smallest ratio of the jackknife standard error over primary sampling units within strata to the model-based standard error of the correlation | GSS respondents with both answers in the 7 year-and-mode cells behind the interview-mode comparison | 2018, 2022 and 2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gap_off_2024 | +0.10 | difference in standard deviations of self-placement (each survey in its own survey-wide standard deviation) | ANES minus GSS distance between the party centers; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES and GSS identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 2024 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.23 | 6,786 | weight (VCF0009z); weight_use | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_off_pos | 19 | survey years | count of matched years in which the ANES distance between the party centers exceeds the GSS distance (each in its own standard deviations) | years in which both the ANES and the GSS asked both questions | 1974-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_off_sig | 15 | survey years | count of matched years in which the interval of the ANES minus GSS distance lies above zero (each in its own standard deviations) | years in which both the ANES and the GSS asked both questions | 1974-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gss_chg | +0.37 | difference in correlation coefficients | change in the pooled GSS correlation between the two windows; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1980-1988 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.40 | 21,399 | weight_use | General Social Survey | The 2020-2024 window includes web interviews. | | gss_d_1980_1986 | +0.17 | difference in correlation coefficients | 1986 minus 1980 GSS correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1980 and 1986 | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.25 | 2,808 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_d_1986_1993 | +0.02 | difference in correlation coefficients | 1993 minus 1986 GSS correlation (1986 is the highest estimate before 1993); standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1986 and 1993 | 95% CI −0.05 to 0.10 | 2,918 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_dem_lib_1974 | 36% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the liberal camp, Wilson interval | GSS Democrat identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 1974 | 95% CI 32% to 40% | 789 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_dem_lib_2024 | 59% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the liberal camp, Wilson interval | GSS Democrat identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 2024 | 95% CI 55% to 63% | 1,215 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_gap_1974 | 0.39 | standard deviations of self-placement (survey-wide, all years pooled) | weighted mean ideological self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers, divided by the survey-wide standard deviation of placements | GSS identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 1974 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.50 | 1,208 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_gap_2024 | 1.50 | standard deviations of self-placement (survey-wide, all years pooled) | weighted mean ideological self-placement of Republican identifiers minus that of Democratic identifiers, divided by the survey-wide standard deviation of placements | GSS identifiers (leaners included; pure independents excluded) who placed themselves | 2024 | 95% CI 1.39 to 1.60 | 2,304 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_ip_2018 | +0.55 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2018, in-person interviews | 95% CI 0.51 to 0.59 | 1,920 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_ip_2024 | +0.56 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI 0.50 to 0.61 | 1,029 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_ip_d_2018_2024_design | 0.00 | difference in correlation coefficients | 2024 minus 2018 GSS correlation among in-person respondents; jackknife standard error over primary sampling units within strata, normal interval | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2018 and 2024 | 95% CI −0.09 to 0.10 | 2,949 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_placed_1974 | 96% | percent of respondents with a party identification | weighted share who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale, Wilson interval | GSS respondents with a party identification (other party and not sure excluded) | 1974 | 95% CI 95% to 97% | 1,402 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_placed_2002 | 48% | percent of respondents with a party identification | weighted share who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale, Wilson interval | GSS respondents with a party identification (other party and not sure excluded) | 2002 | 95% CI 46% to 51% | 2,681 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_placed_2024 | 96% | percent of respondents with a party identification | weighted share who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale, Wilson interval | GSS respondents with a party identification (other party and not sure excluded) | 2024 | 95% CI 94% to 96% | 3,185 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_r_1974 | +0.17 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1974 | 95% CI 0.12 to 0.23 | 1,345 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_r_1980 | +0.14 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1980 | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.21 | 1,418 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_r_1986 | +0.31 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.36 | 1,390 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_r_2018 | +0.56 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2018 | 95% CI 0.52 to 0.60 | 2,149 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_r_2020s | +0.63 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2021, 2022 and 2024, waves pooled; web and in-person interviews | 95% CI 0.62 to 0.65 | 10,198 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_r_2020s_inperson | +0.58 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2022 and 2024, waves pooled; in-person interviews only | 95% CI 0.53 to 0.62 | 2,453 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_r_2024 | +0.63 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.66 | 3,062 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_r_reagan | +0.27 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1980-1988, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.24 to 0.29 | 11,201 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_rep_con_1974 | 42% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the conservative camp, Wilson interval | GSS Republican identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 1974 | 95% CI 37% to 47% | 419 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_rep_con_2024 | 71% | percent of the party's identifiers who placed themselves | weighted share in the conservative camp, Wilson interval | GSS Republican identifiers (leaners included) who placed themselves on the liberal-conservative scale | 2024 | 95% CI 67% to 74% | 1,089 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_web_2021 | +0.65 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2021, web interviews | 95% CI 0.62 to 0.67 | 3,370 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | hs_r_2020s | +0.62 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents in the group 'High school or less' with both answers | 2020 and 2024, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.58 to 0.65 | 2,087 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hs_r_reagan | +0.26 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents in the group 'High school or less' with both answers | 1980-1988, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.23 to 0.30 | 3,106 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_anes_2012 | −0.02 | difference in correlation coefficients | web minus face-to-face ANES correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2012 | 95% CI −0.07 to 0.03 | 5,288 | weight_web; weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_anes_2016 | +0.04 | difference in correlation coefficients | web minus face-to-face ANES correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2016 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.09 | 3,298 | weight_web; weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_anes_2024 | +0.03 | difference in correlation coefficients | web minus face-to-face ANES correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.08 | 2,587 | weight_web; weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_gss_2022 | +0.11 | difference in correlation coefficients | web minus in-person GSS correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2022 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.17 | 2,985 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | mode_gss_2022_design | +0.11 | difference in correlation coefficients | web minus in-person GSS correlation; jackknife standard error over primary sampling units within strata, normal interval | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2022 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.18 | 2,985 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | mode_gss_2024 | +0.14 | difference in correlation coefficients | web minus in-person GSS correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.21 | 2,712 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | mode_gss_2024_design | +0.14 | difference in correlation coefficients | web minus in-person GSS correlation; jackknife standard error over primary sampling units within strata, normal interval | GSS respondents with a party identification (leaners kept, other party excluded) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.24 | 2,712 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | n_design_cells | 7 | year-and-mode cells | count of GSS year and interview-mode cells whose correlation was re-estimated with a design-based standard error | GSS cells behind the interview-mode comparison (2018, 2022, 2024) | 2018-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | General Social Survey | | | n_groups | 7 | groups | count of groups compared across the two windows | ANES cohort, education and region groups with a reading in both windows | 1980-1988 and 2020-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_groups_rose | 7 | groups | count of groups whose change between the windows has an interval above zero | ANES cohort, education and region groups with a reading in both windows | 1980-1988 and 2020-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_gss_groups | 3 | groups | count of groups compared across the two windows | GSS cohort and education groups with a reading in both windows (in-person interviews) | 1980-1988 and 2020-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | General Social Survey | | | n_gss_groups_rose | 3 | groups | count of groups whose change between the windows has an interval above zero | GSS cohort and education groups with a reading in both windows (in-person interviews) | 1980-1988 and 2020-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | General Social Survey | | | n_lens_groups | 8 | groups | count of groups with a yearly correlation line | ANES birth-cohort, education and region groups | 1972-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nonsouth_r_2020s | +0.75 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents in the group 'Outside the South' with both answers | 2020 and 2024, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.73 to 0.76 | 6,103 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nonsouth_r_reagan | +0.44 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents in the group 'Outside the South' with both answers | 1980-1988, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.41 to 0.46 | 4,455 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_ces_max | +0.11 | difference in correlation coefficients | ANES minus CES correlation in the year of the largest difference; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2016 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.13 | 62,086 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_ces_mean | +0.02 | difference in correlation coefficients | mean over matched years of the ANES minus CES correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.03 | 270,879 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Mean of yearly differences between two independent surveys. | | off_ces_min | −0.06 | difference in correlation coefficients | ANES minus CES correlation in the year of the smallest difference; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2008 | 95% CI −0.10 to −0.03 | 31,546 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_gss_k | 19 | survey years | count of matched survey years | years in which both the ANES and the GSS asked both questions | 1974-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_gss_max | +0.24 | difference in correlation coefficients | ANES minus GSS correlation in the year of the largest difference; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1980 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.33 | 2,422 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Year 1980. | | off_gss_mean | +0.14 | difference in correlation coefficients | mean over matched years of the ANES minus GSS correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1974-2024, 19 matched survey years | 95% CI 0.12 to 0.15 | 69,077 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Mean of yearly differences between two independent surveys. | | off_gss_min | +0.05 | difference in correlation coefficients | ANES minus GSS correlation in the year of the smallest difference; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 1990 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.12 | 2,616 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Year 1990. | | off_gss_ns | 2 | survey years | count of matched years in which the interval of the ANES minus GSS difference includes zero | matched ANES and GSS survey years | 1974-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_gss_pos | 19 | survey years | count of matched years in which the ANES correlation exceeds the GSS correlation | matched ANES and GSS survey years | 1974-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_gss_sig | 17 | survey years | count of matched years in which the interval of the ANES minus GSS difference lies above zero | matched ANES and GSS survey years | 1974-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_inperson_2024 | +0.16 | difference in correlation coefficients | ANES face-to-face minus GSS in-person correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.24 | 1,897 | weight_ftf; weight_use | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_inperson_k | 4 | survey years | count of matched years with mode information in both surveys | years in which both the ANES and the GSS identify in-person interviews | 2008-2024 | | | count of yearly estimates, each weighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_inperson_mean | +0.16 | difference in correlation coefficients | mean over matched years of the ANES face-to-face minus GSS in-person correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.13 to 0.19 | 11,594 | weight_ftf; weight_use | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | off_web_2024 | +0.05 | difference in correlation coefficients | ANES web minus GSS web correlation; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.09 | 3,402 | weight_web; weight_use | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | old_chg | +0.25 | difference in correlation coefficients | change in the pooled ANES correlation among respondents born before 1943; standard errors of independent estimates combined in quadrature | ANES respondents born before 1943 with both answers | 1980-1988 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.32 | 3,563 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | old_neff_2024 | 104 | effective respondents (Kish effective sample size) | Kish effective sample size of the weighted 2024 sample behind the yearly correlation | ANES respondents born before 1943 with both answers | 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | old_r_2016 | +0.73 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents born before 1943 with both answers | 2016, yearly estimate | 95% CI 0.66 to 0.79 | 297 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | old_r_2020s | +0.67 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents in the group 'Born before 1943' with both answers | 2020 and 2024, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.72 | 684 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | old_r_2024 | +0.61 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents born before 1943 with both answers | 2024, yearly estimate | 95% CI 0.48 to 0.72 | 217 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | old_r_reagan | +0.41 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents in the group 'Born before 1943' with both answers | 1980-1988, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.38 to 0.44 | 2,879 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | south_r_2020s | +0.71 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents in the group 'South' with both answers | 2020 and 2024, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.69 to 0.73 | 3,525 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | south_r_reagan | +0.31 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents in the group 'South' with both answers | 1980-1988, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.35 | 2,027 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | young_r_2020s | +0.74 | correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1 | weighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement | ANES respondents in the group 'Born 1975 or later' with both answers | 2020 and 2024, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.72 to 0.76 | 4,577 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Party sorting: The alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Cohort: People born in the same period, such as the same decade. Comparing cohorts shows whether a difference comes from when people were born, as distinct from their age or the year they were surveyed. ## Methods Sample: respondents who answered both the party-identification question and the liberal-conservative self-placement question: 43,947 ANES respondents in 22 survey years from 1972 to 2024, 64,452 GSS respondents in 33 survey years from 1974 to 2024 and 638,338 CES respondents in 19 survey years from 2006 to 2024. The three surveys share no respondents, and every estimate is computed inside one survey; surveys are compared, never pooled. Measures: party identification is the seven-point scale (ANES pid_7pt; GSS partyid 0 to 6 with the other-party code dropped; CES pid7 with not sure dropped), which gives leaners their own points. Ideology is the seven-point liberal-conservative scale in the ANES (lib_con_7pt) and the GSS (polviews) and the five-point scale in the CES (ideo5, not sure dropped). Every scale runs from Democratic or liberal to Republican or conservative by its codebook, so a positive correlation means that conservatives sit with Republicans; the sign is never chosen from a result. Respondents who do not place themselves on the ideology scale are missing on that item and are left out, so every estimate describes people who placed themselves. Estimators: the survey-weighted Pearson correlation of the party scale and the ideology scale within a survey and year; for pooled windows (1980 to 1988 and 2020 to 2024) the respondents of all survey years of one survey in the window are estimated together with its weight. The distance between the party centers is the weighted mean placement of Republican identifiers (leaners included) minus that of Democratic identifiers (leaners included), divided by the weighted standard deviation of placements among all placers in the survey over all years (first view) or in the same year (second view); pure independents are left out of the distance. Shares of ideological camps are weighted shares among identifiers who placed themselves. Weights: ANES weight (VCF0009z); interview-mode estimates use weight_ftf for face-to-face respondents and weight_web for web respondents, which exist for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024 only; GSS weight_use, with interview mode joined from the raw file (recorded from 2004); CES weight within a survey year and weight_cumulative for pooled windows. In-person view of Figure 1: it uses the recorded mode where the file has one (ANES face-to-face from 2008, GSS in person from 2004) and all respondents in the earlier years, which were interviewed mainly in person, except that it leaves out the ANES studies of 1998, 2000 and 2002, which used telephone interviews wholly or in part. It leaves out the CES, which is online only, and draws no line across a year with no in-person estimate. In the interview-mode figure, telephone and other GSS interviews are in the all-interviews line and in neither of the other two; in the ANES the 2024 face-to-face and web estimates leave out the panel and paper respondents. Intervals: 95% intervals from Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size for correlations, a normal interval on the effective sample size for means, and a Wilson interval for shares. A difference between two independent estimates combines their standard errors in quadrature, and the standard error of a correlation r is taken as (1 minus r squared) divided by the square root of the effective sample size minus 3. The mean of yearly differences treats years as independent samples. Differences in changes are formed only between disjoint groups. All intervals are model based: they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and do not follow the sampling design (stratification and clustering of respondents within sampled areas). For the seven GSS year-and-interview-mode cells behind the interview-mode comparison (2018, 2022 and 2024) the chapter also reports a design-based check: the stratified delete-one-primary-sampling-unit jackknife on the GSS variables vstrat and vpsu (two primary sampling units in every stratum of those years), with the same estimator and weights. Its standard errors are 1.13 to 1.68 times the model-based ones, and the web minus in-person differences and the 2018 to 2024 in-person difference use it. Design-based intervals were not computed for the ANES (its variance-estimation variables take only one or two values a year from 1972 to 1990) or the CES (an online panel of volunteers, weighted to match population totals). Suppression: a survey-year or group-year cell is drawn only with at least 150 respondents and a Kish effective sample of at least 100; a pooled group cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100 in each window. Groups: birth cohort is the ANES cohort code grouped into born before 1943, 1943 to 1974 and 1975 or later (GSS: year minus age); education groups grade school with high school (GSS: no bachelor's degree against bachelor's degree or more, because the GSS degree item cannot separate some college from a high school diploma); region is the census South against the other census regions. The GSS comparison of the two windows uses in-person interviews only in 2020 to 2024. Coverage: among ANES respondents with a party answer, 34 percent have an ideology placement in 2000, against 57 to 91 percent in the other years (1972 to 2024); among GSS respondents, 48, 48 and 46 percent have one in 1983, 2002 and 2004, against 93 percent or more in the other years. The share who placed themselves is reported only from years outside those exceptions. The ANES 2020 wave has no mode weights. Item order, wording and response options differ across the three surveys, and this chapter does not adjust for those differences. ## What these data cannot show - The data are repeated cross-sections, so they show that party and self-placement became more tightly linked and do not show which of the two changed. - A panel study that followed the same people found movement in both directions: some changed party identification to match their issue positions, and others changed issue positions to match their party [6]. - A study of issue attitudes over 1972 to 2004 found that attitudes came to line up with party more than they lined up with each other [7]. - The rise in the correlation here is a rise in the link between two labels and is silent on which label moved first. - Self-placement is a label. - Its meaning for respondents draws partly on their feelings toward the groups and symbols tied to each label [8], and the public is more likely to call itself conservative than liberal while favoring more government action on many problems [9]. - A rise in the correlation between party and label is not a rise in the correlation between party and any set of policy positions. - The correlation also says nothing about extremity, and the distance between party averages in scale points is a separate measure. - The three surveys give different levels, and these data cannot say which is closer to the level in the population. - The GSS reading of the 2020s mixes web and in-person interviews that give different correlations, and the ANES mode weights are missing for 2020, so mode is identified in only some years. - Every estimate describes respondents who placed themselves, and the share who did so differs between ANES years. - The intervals are model based and do not follow the sampling design. - Where the design could be checked, in the GSS cells behind the mode comparison, the design-based standard errors were 1.13 to 1.68 times the model-based ones. - The ANES and CES intervals were not checked that way, and the CES intervals rest on the weighting of an online panel of volunteers to population totals. - The data hold no measure of what party leaders did. - They cannot say whether the electorate moved toward parties that had moved apart or the parties moved apart because the electorate had. - Chapter 1.2, Polarization in Congress (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/polarization-in-congress; planned) takes up how far apart the parties are in Congress. ## References 1. Levendusky, Matthew (2009). The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans. University of Chicago Press. 2. Converse, Philip E. (1964). The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. In David E. Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent. New York: Free Press, pp. 206-261. 3. Abramowitz, Alan I.; Saunders, Kyle L. (1998). Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate. Journal of Politics 60(3): 634-652. https://doi.org/10.2307/2647642 4. Fisher, Ronald A. (1921). On the Probable Error of a Coefficient of Correlation Deduced from a Small Sample. Metron 1(4): 3-32. 5. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 6. Carsey, Thomas M.; Layman, Geoffrey C. (2006). Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate. American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 464-477. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00196.x 7. Baldassarri, Delia; Gelman, Andrew (2008). Partisans without Constraint: Political Polarization and Trends in American Public Opinion. American Journal of Sociology 114(2): 408-446. https://doi.org/10.1086/590649 8. Conover, Pamela Johnston; Feldman, Stanley (1981). The Origins and Meaning of Liberal/Conservative Self-Identifications. American Journal of Political Science 25(4): 617-645. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2110756 9. Ellis, Christopher; Stimson, James A. (2012). Ideology in America. Cambridge University Press. ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/party-and-ideology/build.py (sha256 e3da33bb0c0e3fa63b5b246b4cb4e290c77a5708d798b6b775fff2831e798618) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | aecf9398163e8ed142b15e8aadd9ab2f4c55c7b80519173dbc3bc373d386679d | | figures/camps.json | bc7ab69ea409ceb789916d669e27162d0e910dfb6246a0e834b79e40471867ec | | figures/eras.json | 9c4891124372a8028b149dec51d7635a81bd0a4f814aeef6a6d82dd12c0888e6 | | figures/gap.json | da6d5f19ff7c9d9f2a1ff8b487dcdb4373c15ad093c7ce0ca5965099e606eaa0 | | figures/groups.json | b6f72c07b72654df02cacdc068191a6f950041dae0203b210e27d3222344597f | | figures/mode.json | 6ff7f0bf14fdf5b8a8470bb9f909bec572d6d43d96c7409c5e6dd5ed5c66fdf9 | | figures/staircase.json | b0a6a0a6a08fa981cca661c00999b8a0e2be26f93f407d033a72fee60be1a0fa | | meta.json | 43717fc02ecb65bd01a55bc63e3072047c12d2c68b0c95d667b1b53ceabbdc1c | | refs.json | 9fe921f101240c7d2eef250cb3d5cdd31da65575ecb671c8515434bfdb458c84 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/facts.json - Table 1, figure "staircase" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/staircase.json - Table 2, figure "mode" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/mode.json - Table 3, figure "gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/gap.json - Table 4, figure "groups" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/groups.json - Table 5, figure "eras" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/eras.json - Table 6, figure "camps" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-ideology/figures/camps.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Sort dates by attitude: report Chapter 1.3 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Sort dates by attitude - Chapter: 1.3 (Part I, The sort; The great sorting) - Question: When did the party gap on each attitude (abortion, religion, racial resentment, economic perceptions) pass a fixed threshold, and which gaps persist rather than reverse with the party in the White House? - Dek: Among ANES partisans, the party gap passed a fixed threshold by the lower bound of its interval on racial resentment in 1992, on abortion in 2008 and on the importance of religion in 2016. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024, study years 1980-2024; mode weights for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode views - ANES 2024 Time Series. 2024 Time Series, importance of religion on the five-point scale; years: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews); weights: V240107a (pre-election) - General Social Survey. General Social Survey extract, 1977-2024; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use - Cooperative Election Study. Cooperative Election Study, even years 2008-2024; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026sortdatesbyattitude ```bibtex @misc{singh2026sortdatesbyattitude, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Sort dates by attitude}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | first survey year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (sort date), the racial resentment index, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | 1992 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | race_bound | | first survey year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (sort date), abortion (higher = more restrictive), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | 2008 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | abortion_bound | | first survey year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (sort date), the importance of religion, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | 2016 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | religion_bound | | sort-date rule carried over from an earlier analysis of the same surveys and kept | threshold applied to every party-gap series | 1980-2024 | 0.25 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | rule_sd | | lowest or highest threshold in the sensitivity check | threshold applied to every party-gap series | 1980-2024 | 0.15 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | rule_min | | lowest or highest threshold in the sensitivity check | threshold applied to every party-gap series | 1980-2024 | 0.50 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | rule_max | ## Findings Among Republican and Democratic identifiers in the American National Election Studies (ANES), leaners included, the party gap on racial resentment passed 0.25 standard deviations (SD) of the answers by the lower bound of its 95% interval in 1992. The gap on abortion passed that mark in 2008 and the gap on the importance of religion in 2016, and each stays above it in every later survey. A date here is the survey year in which a gap crosses a threshold; it is not the historical beginning of a divide. The fourth gap in this chapter, on perceptions of the economy, changes sign whenever the presidency changes parties. The dates move with the test, the sample and the survey, as later sections show. A sort date is the survey year in which the party gap on an attitude crosses a fixed threshold and stays above it. This chapter finds that year with one rule for every attitude. For each attitude and survey year the answers are standardized among all respondents who answered the item that year, partisans and independents alike, so that their average is zero and their standard deviation is one. A gap in SD is therefore measured against the spread of answers in the whole sample of that year; the White and face-to-face views standardize within their own samples. The party gap is the average of that score among Republican identifiers minus the average among Democratic identifiers, with leaners counted with the party they lean toward. A gap of zero means the parties answer alike, and a gap of one means their averages sit one standard deviation apart. The data are the ANES Cumulative Data File, which asked the abortion, religion and economic items from 1980 to 2024 and a racial resentment battery from 1986. The Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology) chapter dates the merger of party and ideology, and this one compares four attitudes and dates three. The lower-bound test applies the rule to the lower end of the 95% interval, so it asks whether the gap is reliably above the mark, and the sort date is the first survey year in which that end exceeds 0.25 SD and stays above it in every later survey. The point-estimate test applies the same rule to the estimate itself and shows how early the estimates alone put the date. (Note: The mark is a convention, a little above Cohen's conventional label for a small difference between two means [1]. It was set in an earlier analysis of the same surveys and kept, and the views of Table 2 move it from 0.15 to 0.50 SD. Intervals use the effective sample size, treat the weighted sample as if respondents were drawn independently rather than in the geographic sampling clusters of the ANES design, and treat the standard deviation used for standardizing as a fixed number, so they may be narrower than intervals that follow the design, which the Cumulative Data File has no variables to test.) ### The three gaps crossed the mark in different decades Table 1 plots the gap for each attitude and survey year. On abortion the gap was −0.02 (95% CI −0.13 to 0.08) SD in 1980 and 1.06 (95% CI 0.99 to 1.14) in 2024. Between 1992 and 1996 the estimates fall on both sides of the mark and every interval includes it, and the 1996 estimate is 0.003 SD under the mark, so the point-estimate date of 1998 rests on that reading. (Note: The abortion gap was 0.06 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.16) in 1990, 0.26 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.34) in 1992, 0.19 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.30) in 1994 and 0.247 (95% CI 0.134 to 0.359) in 1996, and the change from 1992 to 1994 is −0.06 (95% CI −0.20 to 0.07) SD, so these readings do not separate a fall from sampling variation.) Adams [2] tested whether abortion followed the pattern of issue evolution (a new issue slowly realigning the parties) that Carmines and Stimson [3] described for race, using congressional roll calls and General Social Survey (GSS) data through 1994. The ANES point estimate for the gap between identifiers is under the mark in 1994, the last year of his survey data, and its interval includes the mark. The Chapter 4.1, The abortion sort (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort) chapter follows the abortion item in detail. Table 1. By the point estimates, party gaps stay above 0.25 SD from 1986 on racial resentment, 1998 on abortion and 2012 on religion The gap on the importance of religion was 0.05 (95% CI −0.06 to 0.16) SD in 1980 and 0.08 (95% CI −0.03 to 0.19) in 2000, then 0.30 (95% CI 0.23 to 0.37) in 2012 and 0.52 (95% CI 0.44 to 0.59) in 2024. Layman [4] traced growing religious differences between the parties from the early 1960s to the late 1990s. The item here asks whether religion is important in the respondent's own life, and the gap on it between all Democratic and Republican identifiers stays small through 2000. Church attendance and the sample matter for the date, as a later section shows. The Chapter 9.1, The god gap in America (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america) chapter compares importance, attendance and denomination. Racial resentment is the mean of the standardized answers to the Kinder and Sanders items [5], scored so that a higher value means more resentment. Its gap was 0.37 (95% CI 0.24 to 0.49) SD at the first reading in 1986, 0.73 (95% CI 0.62 to 0.84) in 2008, 1.29 (95% CI 1.24 to 1.34) in 2020 and 1.23 (95% CI 1.16 to 1.30) in 2024, and the 2020 and 2024 estimates are within sampling error of each other. The series begins after the realignment on race that Carmines and Stimson described, so for all respondents these data cannot say when the gap first passed the mark (White respondents are dated below). Tesler [6] reported that racial attitudes were more closely tied to political evaluations in the Obama years than before. Among all respondents the gap rises at each survey from 2008 to 2020, including from 0.73 in 2008 to 0.89 in 2012, and part of the 2012 step comes from the web respondents added that year, whose gap is higher than the face-to-face gap (Table 3). The Chapter 5.2, Racial attitudes and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology) chapter takes up the tie between resentment and ideology. ### Two tests date religion after abortion Table 2 shows both tests for each attitude. For abortion the point estimate passes the mark between 1996 and 1998, and the lower bound stays above it from 2008, which is 10 years later. For religion the point estimate passes it between 2008 and 2012 and the lower bound from 2016, 4 years later. The upper bound gives the other side of the range: it stays above the mark from 1992 for abortion and from 2008 for religion, so the interval allows dates from 1992 to 2008 for abortion and from 2008 to 2016 for religion. For racial resentment the point estimate is above the mark at the first reading, 1986, and the lower bound stays above it from 1992 after falling below it in 1990. Taken as ranges, the dates for racial resentment and abortion meet in 1992 and those for abortion and religion in 2008, so the order holds test by test, and the ranges leave open that adjacent attitudes share a survey year. (Note: The abortion lower-bound date rests on a single survey year: in 2008 the item went to part of the sample, 893 respondents were in the two parties, and the lower bound clears the mark by 0.009 SD.) Table 2. Racial resentment, abortion and religion are dated in that order at every rule Survey spacing widens the ranges. ANES surveys are 2 to 4 years apart, so a date can only fall on a survey year. The order is the same under both tests: racial resentment first, then abortion, then religion. It holds at every rule from 0.15 to 0.50 SD. At the highest rule the point estimate passes it in 1994 for racial resentment, 2012 for abortion and 2024 for religion, and the lower bound for religion has not stayed above it by 2024. At the lowest rule the point-estimate dates are 1992 for abortion and 2008 for religion. ### White respondents date the gaps differently The all-respondent gap compares identifiers of every race. Limiting the sample to White non-Hispanic respondents moves the point-estimate date for abortion from 1998 to 1992 and for religion from 2012 to 2002, and the lower-bound dates to 2000 and 2012. One difference lies in who is in the Democratic group. In 2000, 85.1% (95% CI 80.6% to 89.7%) of Democratic identifiers who were Black, Hispanic or of another group said religion was important, against 70.0% (95% CI 65.8% to 74.1%) of White Democrats. On abortion, 36.9% (95% CI 30.7% to 43.1%) of the first group said a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion, against 52.9% (95% CI 48.3% to 57.5%) of White Democrats. Both differences raise the Democratic average on the religious and restrictive sides, so they shrink the gap among all respondents. For racial resentment the direction reverses. In 1986, 93.7% (95% CI 89.7% to 97.7%) of Black partisans identified with the Democratic Party, and their average score was −0.84 (95% CI −0.99 to −0.69) SD, against 0.14 (95% CI 0.07 to 0.21) for White partisans. Part of the all-respondent gap at the first reading therefore separates racial groups that sit in different parties. Among White respondents the gap was 0.19 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.34) SD in 1986, its point estimate passes the mark between 1990 and 1992 and its lower bound stays above it from 2000, and by 2024 it was 1.28 (95% CI 1.20 to 1.36) SD. The date at which the racial resentment gap passed the mark depends on whether the population is all respondents or White respondents. ### The face-to-face series dates religion later Limiting the sample to face-to-face interviews leaves the abortion and racial resentment dates unchanged and moves religion to 2016 for the point estimate and 2024 for the lower bound. The face-to-face series is smaller. It leaves out 2000, a study that mixed face-to-face and telephone interviews, 2002, which was conducted by telephone, and 2020, which has no weights for face-to-face or web respondents separately, and the ANES adds web respondents from 2012. The face-to-face gap on religion in 2016 is 0.38 (95% CI 0.23 to 0.53) SD with a lower bound under the mark, and 2020 has no face-to-face estimate, so its lower-bound date falls in 2024, the last survey, and no later survey can test it. Table 3 compares respondents by interview mode, web against face-to-face, in the years that have both. The interval for the web minus face-to-face difference includes zero in 8 of 9 comparisons. The exception is racial resentment in 2012, when the web gap was 0.958 (95% CI 0.874 to 1.043) SD and the face-to-face gap 0.784 (95% CI 0.664 to 0.905), a difference of 0.174 (95% CI 0.027 to 0.321). Across 9 comparisons with no mode difference, the expected number of 95% intervals that exclude zero is 0.45, so one exclusion is close to what chance alone would produce. The intervals that include zero reach as far as 0.32 SD from zero, so the check cannot rule out a mode difference larger than the 0.25 SD mark. In 2012, the year that sets the all-respondent point-estimate date for religion, the face-to-face gap on religion is 0.22 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.35) and the web gap 0.35 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.44), on either side of the mark, and their difference is 0.13 (95% CI −0.03 to 0.28) SD. In 2024 the face-to-face gap on religion is 0.62 (95% CI 0.45 to 0.79) and the web gap 0.51 (95% CI 0.39 to 0.62). (Note: The 2024 question on the importance of religion was revised to a graded scale, and the cumulative file counts extremely, very and moderately important as yes. On the graded scale in the 2024 Time Series the gap is 0.57 (95% CI 0.50 to 0.65) SD, against 0.52 (95% CI 0.44 to 0.59) on the collapsed item used here.) Table 3. Web and face-to-face gaps differ by 0.174 SD or less, and the interval for the difference excludes zero only for racial resentment in 2012 ### The GSS and CES date the gaps differently The GSS and the Cooperative Election Study (CES) ask different items, so Table 4 compares timing and not height. The GSS abortion-for-any-reason item has a gap of −0.13 (95% CI −0.26 to −0.01) SD in 1977 and 0.96 (95% CI 0.84 to 1.09) in 2024. Its point estimate stays above the mark from 2010 and its lower bound from 2012, later than the ANES dates for abortion. The GSS estimate was 0.24 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.39) in 2008, just under the mark, so the point-estimate date falls after 2008. Table 4. The GSS abortion gap passes 0.25 SD 12 years after the ANES gap by the point estimate and 4 years after by the lower bound Religion gives a different answer by measure. GSS church attendance passes the mark in the point estimates between 2004 and 2006, and its lower bound clears the mark only in 2024, the last survey. ANES attendance, available through 2020, passes the mark by both tests in 2008. The point-estimate dates for both attendance measures are earlier than the ANES importance point-estimate date of 2012, and by the lower bound GSS attendance (2024) is later than ANES importance (2016). The GSS item on whether Black Americans should work their way up without special favors (the work-your-way-up item) begins in the extract in 1994 already above the mark, at 0.34 (95% CI 0.22 to 0.47) SD, and its lower bound stays above it from 2010. The CES begins too late to date either sort: its first religion gap, in 2008, is 0.49 (95% CI 0.46 to 0.52) SD and its first abortion gap, in 2014, is 0.86 (95% CI 0.83 to 0.88). The ANES importance gap in 2008 is 0.21 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.32), so the CES gap is larger by 0.28 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.39) SD in the same year, and the ANES religion date is specific to its yes-or-no item. GSS interviews since 2021 include web respondents (87.3% of respondents in 2021). The GSS race gap moves from 0.72 SD in 2018 to 1.06 in 2021. In 2024 the face-to-face gap on that item is 0.73 (95% CI 0.51 to 0.95) SD and the web gap 1.14 (95% CI 0.97 to 1.30), a difference of 0.41 (95% CI 0.13 to 0.68), so the GSS race level after 2020 depends on interview mode. On abortion in 2024 the face-to-face gap is 0.84 (95% CI 0.63 to 1.06) SD and the web gap 1.06 (95% CI 0.90 to 1.22). Table 5 lists the dates for the ANES all-respondent series and the other surveys. Table 5. Sort dates differ across surveys and items for the same attitude ### Pooled trends hide the parties moving apart Table 6 shows, for the question chosen to stand for each attitude, the share giving one answer, split by party and pooled. On religion the share saying it is important falls among Democrats and stays level among Republicans, so the gap grows through a fall on the Democratic side. On abortion the share saying a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion rises among Democrats and falls among Republicans. Table 6. The share saying religion is important fell among Democrats and stayed level among Republicans, so the pooled trend hides the party gap On racial resentment the share agreeing that Black Americans would be as well off if they tried harder falls in both parties, and falls further among Democrats. The pooled line describes the country, and the two party lines show in which party's identifiers the level changed. ### The economic gap follows the president's party Economic perceptions have no sort date. The item asks whether the national economy got better over the past year, and its gap takes the sign of the president's party: in 18 of 18 survey years the point estimate shows the president's party as the more optimistic, and in 16 of them the interval also excludes zero on that side. The survey years whose intervals include zero are 1990 and 1994. The sign of the point estimate changed at 6 of 6 changes in the party of the president, and at 5 of them the intervals at both readings exclude zero. The gap was 0.89 (95% CI 0.83 to 0.94) SD in 2020 under a Republican president and −1.02 (95% CI −1.09 to −0.95) SD in 2024 under a Democratic one. The Chapter 4.4, Perceptions of the economy (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy) chapter follows that item with a second survey. Table 7. The economic gap follows the president's party in all 18 survey years ### What these data cannot show The gaps are associations between party and an answer in one survey year. They do not show whether an attitude drew people to a party, whether party led people to change their answers, or whether new voters and departing voters changed the makeup of each party. Panel studies address direction. Margolis [7] found that for many Americans partisanship shapes religious identity, and Engelhardt [8] found White respondents aligning their racial attitudes with their party. The Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened) chapter describes the change in party and ideology by birth cohort and cannot show whether any individual switched. A sort date is the year a survey-based gap passes a threshold. It is not the year party elites took positions, and the ANES cannot show it. The dates also depend on choices the data cannot settle: the rule, the item, the sample and the survey. Each 95% interval is computed on its own, and the lower-bound test needs the interval of every later survey to stay above the mark, so one low draw can push a date later. The standardization is within year, so a gap in standard deviations can move when the spread of answers changes and the parties do not. ## Tables ### Table 1. By the point estimates, party gaps stay above 0.25 SD from 1986 on racial resentment, 1998 on abortion and 2012 on religion Republican minus Democratic identifiers (leaners included) in standard deviations of each attitude in that survey year, ANES 1980-2024, 95% intervals | Sample | Attitude | Survey year | Party gap (SD) | Lower 95% bound | Upper 95% bound | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All respondents | Abortion | 1980 | −0.02 | −0.13 | 0.08 | 1313 | | All respondents | Abortion | 1982 | −0.09 | −0.21 | 0.03 | 1173 | | All respondents | Abortion | 1984 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.21 | 1888 | | All respondents | Abortion | 1986 | −0.03 | −0.12 | 0.06 | 1818 | | All respondents | Abortion | 1988 | 0.04 | −0.05 | 0.14 | 1751 | | All respondents | Abortion | 1990 | 0.06 | −0.04 | 0.16 | 1692 | | All respondents | Abortion | 1992 | 0.26 | 0.17 | 0.34 | 2097 | | All respondents | Abortion | 1994 | 0.19 | 0.08 | 0.30 | 1537 | | All respondents | Abortion | 1996 | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.36 | 1521 | | All respondents | Abortion | 1998 | 0.32 | 0.19 | 0.45 | 1106 | | All respondents | Abortion | 2000 | 0.27 | 0.16 | 0.38 | 1532 | | All respondents | Abortion | 2004 | 0.37 | 0.23 | 0.51 | 931 | | All respondents | Abortion | 2008 | 0.42 | 0.26 | 0.58 | 893 | | All respondents | Abortion | 2012 | 0.65 | 0.58 | 0.72 | 5068 | | All respondents | Abortion | 2016 | 0.70 | 0.63 | 0.78 | 3630 | | All respondents | Abortion | 2020 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 1.02 | 7002 | | All respondents | Abortion | 2024 | 1.06 | 0.99 | 1.14 | 4666 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 1986 | 0.37 | 0.24 | 0.49 | 927 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 1988 | 0.42 | 0.33 | 0.52 | 1554 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 1990 | 0.31 | 0.18 | 0.44 | 857 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 1992 | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.57 | 1947 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 1994 | 0.52 | 0.41 | 0.62 | 1566 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 1998 | 0.51 | 0.38 | 0.63 | 1104 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 2000 | 0.57 | 0.45 | 0.68 | 1348 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 2004 | 0.74 | 0.62 | 0.87 | 948 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 2008 | 0.73 | 0.62 | 0.84 | 1824 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 2012 | 0.89 | 0.82 | 0.96 | 4741 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 2016 | 1.03 | 0.96 | 1.11 | 3151 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 2020 | 1.29 | 1.24 | 1.34 | 6495 | | All respondents | Racial resentment | 2024 | 1.23 | 1.16 | 1.30 | 4565 | | All respondents | Religion | 1980 | 0.05 | −0.06 | 0.16 | 1196 | | All respondents | Religion | 1984 | −0.04 | −0.13 | 0.06 | 1667 | | All respondents | Religion | 1986 | 0.00 | −0.13 | 0.13 | 908 | | All respondents | Religion | 1988 | −0.05 | −0.15 | 0.05 | 1554 | | All respondents | Religion | 1990 | −0.06 | −0.15 | 0.04 | 1713 | | All respondents | Religion | 1992 | 0.00 | −0.09 | 0.09 | 1989 | | All respondents | Religion | 1994 | 0.04 | −0.07 | 0.15 | 1569 | | All respondents | Religion | 1996 | −0.01 | −0.12 | 0.10 | 1543 | | All respondents | Religion | 1998 | 0.03 | −0.10 | 0.16 | 1114 | | All respondents | Religion | 2000 | 0.08 | −0.03 | 0.19 | 1564 | | All respondents | Religion | 2002 | 0.18 | 0.05 | 0.31 | 1366 | | All respondents | Religion | 2004 | 0.11 | −0.02 | 0.24 | 1068 | | All respondents | Religion | 2008 | 0.21 | 0.10 | 0.32 | 2010 | | All respondents | Religion | 2012 | 0.30 | 0.23 | 0.37 | 5077 | | All respondents | Religion | 2016 | 0.42 | 0.34 | 0.49 | 3652 | | All respondents | Religion | 2020 | 0.46 | 0.40 | 0.52 | 7265 | | All respondents | Religion | 2024 | 0.52 | 0.44 | 0.59 | 5086 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 1980 | −0.02 | −0.13 | 0.08 | 1313 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 1982 | −0.09 | −0.21 | 0.03 | 1173 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 1984 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.21 | 1888 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 1986 | −0.03 | −0.12 | 0.06 | 1818 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 1988 | 0.04 | −0.05 | 0.14 | 1751 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 1990 | 0.06 | −0.04 | 0.16 | 1692 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 1992 | 0.26 | 0.17 | 0.34 | 2097 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 1994 | 0.19 | 0.08 | 0.30 | 1537 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 1996 | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.36 | 1521 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 1998 | 0.32 | 0.19 | 0.45 | 1106 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 2004 | 0.37 | 0.23 | 0.51 | 931 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 2008 | 0.42 | 0.26 | 0.58 | 893 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 2012 | 0.58 | 0.45 | 0.70 | 1791 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 2016 | 0.77 | 0.63 | 0.91 | 1030 | | Face-to-face only | Abortion | 2024 | 1.09 | 0.94 | 1.24 | 953 | | Face-to-face only | Racial resentment | 1986 | 0.37 | 0.24 | 0.49 | 927 | | Face-to-face only | Racial resentment | 1988 | 0.42 | 0.33 | 0.52 | 1554 | | Face-to-face only | Racial resentment | 1990 | 0.31 | 0.18 | 0.44 | 857 | | Face-to-face only | Racial resentment | 1992 | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.57 | 1947 | | Face-to-face only | Racial resentment | 1994 | 0.52 | 0.41 | 0.62 | 1566 | | Face-to-face only | Racial resentment | 1998 | 0.51 | 0.38 | 0.63 | 1104 | | Face-to-face only | Racial resentment | 2004 | 0.74 | 0.62 | 0.87 | 948 | | Face-to-face only | Racial resentment | 2008 | 0.73 | 0.62 | 0.84 | 1824 | | Face-to-face only | Racial resentment | 2012 | 0.78 | 0.66 | 0.90 | 1694 | | Face-to-face only | Racial resentment | 2016 | 0.97 | 0.83 | 1.11 | 940 | | Face-to-face only | Racial resentment | 2024 | 1.26 | 1.12 | 1.41 | 862 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 1980 | 0.05 | −0.06 | 0.16 | 1196 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 1984 | −0.04 | −0.13 | 0.06 | 1667 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 1986 | 0.00 | −0.13 | 0.13 | 908 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 1988 | −0.05 | −0.15 | 0.05 | 1554 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 1990 | −0.06 | −0.15 | 0.04 | 1713 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 1992 | 0.00 | −0.09 | 0.09 | 1989 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 1994 | 0.04 | −0.07 | 0.15 | 1569 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 1996 | −0.01 | −0.12 | 0.10 | 1543 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 1998 | 0.03 | −0.10 | 0.16 | 1114 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 2004 | 0.11 | −0.02 | 0.24 | 1068 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 2008 | 0.21 | 0.10 | 0.32 | 2010 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 2012 | 0.22 | 0.09 | 0.35 | 1797 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 2016 | 0.38 | 0.23 | 0.53 | 1039 | | Face-to-face only | Religion | 2024 | 0.62 | 0.45 | 0.79 | 966 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 1980 | 0.00 | −0.12 | 0.11 | 1092 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 1982 | −0.06 | −0.18 | 0.07 | 999 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 1984 | 0.19 | 0.09 | 0.29 | 1531 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 1986 | 0.01 | −0.09 | 0.11 | 1415 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 1988 | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.23 | 1320 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 1990 | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.24 | 1283 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 1992 | 0.37 | 0.27 | 0.46 | 1605 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 1994 | 0.26 | 0.14 | 0.39 | 1183 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 1996 | 0.33 | 0.20 | 0.45 | 1181 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 1998 | 0.37 | 0.22 | 0.51 | 826 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 2000 | 0.44 | 0.32 | 0.56 | 1144 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 2004 | 0.50 | 0.34 | 0.66 | 672 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 2008 | 0.53 | 0.33 | 0.73 | 444 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 2012 | 0.75 | 0.67 | 0.83 | 3009 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 2016 | 0.82 | 0.73 | 0.90 | 2631 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 2020 | 1.12 | 1.06 | 1.18 | 5147 | | White non-Hispanic only | Abortion | 2024 | 1.16 | 1.08 | 1.24 | 3389 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 1986 | 0.19 | 0.05 | 0.34 | 731 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 1988 | 0.19 | 0.07 | 0.30 | 1195 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 1990 | 0.17 | 0.01 | 0.32 | 655 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 1992 | 0.35 | 0.24 | 0.45 | 1512 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 1994 | 0.39 | 0.27 | 0.52 | 1206 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 1998 | 0.33 | 0.18 | 0.48 | 826 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 2000 | 0.47 | 0.34 | 0.61 | 1045 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 2004 | 0.58 | 0.41 | 0.74 | 685 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 2008 | 0.71 | 0.57 | 0.85 | 907 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 2012 | 0.84 | 0.75 | 0.93 | 2819 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 2016 | 1.04 | 0.95 | 1.13 | 2307 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 2020 | 1.33 | 1.27 | 1.39 | 4827 | | White non-Hispanic only | Racial resentment | 2024 | 1.28 | 1.20 | 1.36 | 3350 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 1980 | 0.13 | 0.01 | 0.25 | 1001 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 1984 | 0.06 | −0.04 | 0.17 | 1358 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 1986 | 0.09 | −0.05 | 0.24 | 693 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 1988 | 0.07 | −0.04 | 0.18 | 1194 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 1990 | 0.04 | −0.07 | 0.14 | 1299 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 1992 | 0.14 | 0.04 | 0.23 | 1552 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 1994 | 0.15 | 0.02 | 0.27 | 1207 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 1996 | 0.10 | −0.02 | 0.22 | 1197 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 1998 | 0.14 | −0.01 | 0.28 | 829 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 2000 | 0.19 | 0.07 | 0.32 | 1167 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 2002 | 0.32 | 0.18 | 0.47 | 1065 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 2004 | 0.28 | 0.13 | 0.44 | 758 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 2008 | 0.34 | 0.21 | 0.48 | 990 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 2012 | 0.53 | 0.44 | 0.62 | 3012 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 2016 | 0.61 | 0.52 | 0.70 | 2642 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 2020 | 0.75 | 0.68 | 0.81 | 5348 | | White non-Hispanic only | Religion | 2024 | 0.71 | 0.62 | 0.80 | 3698 | Views: All respondents (view = All respondents); Face-to-face only (view = Face-to-face only); White non-Hispanic only (view = White non-Hispanic only). Note: A positive gap means Republican identifiers score higher on the attitude. Abortion is scored so that a higher value means more restrictive, racial resentment so that a higher value means more resentment (mean of four standardized items) and religion so that a higher value means religion is more important. Racial resentment is not asked in 1996 and has only part of its battery in 1998. Abortion in 2008 was asked of part of the sample. Note: Web respondents enter the ANES in 2012, and 2020 has no weights for face-to-face or web respondents separately. The face-to-face view leaves out 2000 (a study that mixed face-to-face and telephone interviews), 2002 (telephone only) and 2020, and draws no line across 2000 or 2020. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode views) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/gap_timelines.json ### Table 2. Racial resentment, abortion and religion are dated in that order at every rule First survey year in which the party gap exceeds the rule and stays above it in every later survey, by the point estimate (open dot) and by the lower bound of the 95% interval (solid dot), ANES | Attitude | Sample | Rule | First reading | Last reading at or below the rule | Point estimate above from | Lower bound above from (sort date) | Upper bound above from | Above the rule at the first reading | Drawn in the chart | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 0.15 SD | 1986 | n/a | 1986 | 1986 | 1986 | yes | yes | | Racial resentment | White non-Hispanic only | 0.15 SD | 1986 | n/a | 1986 | 1992 | 1986 | yes | yes | | Racial resentment | Face-to-face only | 0.15 SD | 1986 | n/a | 1986 | 1986 | 1986 | yes | no | | Abortion | All respondents | 0.15 SD | 1980 | 1990 | 1992 | 1998 | 1990 | no | yes | | Abortion | White non-Hispanic only | 0.15 SD | 1980 | 1990 | 1992 | 1996 | 1988 | no | yes | | Abortion | Face-to-face only | 0.15 SD | 1980 | 1990 | 1992 | 1998 | 1990 | no | no | | Religion | All respondents | 0.15 SD | 1980 | 2004 | 2008 | 2012 | 1998 | no | yes | | Religion | White non-Hispanic only | 0.15 SD | 1980 | 1998 | 2000 | 2008 | 1992 | no | yes | | Religion | Face-to-face only | 0.15 SD | 1980 | 2004 | 2008 | 2016 | 1998 | no | yes | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 0.25 SD | 1986 | n/a | 1986 | 1992 | 1986 | yes | yes | | Racial resentment | White non-Hispanic only | 0.25 SD | 1986 | 1990 | 1992 | 2000 | 1986 | no | yes | | Racial resentment | Face-to-face only | 0.25 SD | 1986 | n/a | 1986 | 1992 | 1986 | yes | no | | Abortion | All respondents | 0.25 SD | 1980 | 1996 | 1998 | 2008 | 1992 | no | yes | | Abortion | White non-Hispanic only | 0.25 SD | 1980 | 1990 | 1992 | 2000 | 1992 | no | yes | | Abortion | Face-to-face only | 0.25 SD | 1980 | 1996 | 1998 | 2008 | 1992 | no | no | | Religion | All respondents | 0.25 SD | 1980 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2008 | no | yes | | Religion | White non-Hispanic only | 0.25 SD | 1980 | 2000 | 2002 | 2012 | 1998 | no | yes | | Religion | Face-to-face only | 0.25 SD | 1980 | 2012 | 2016 | 2024 | 2008 | no | yes | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 0.35 SD | 1986 | 1990 | 1992 | 1992 | 1986 | no | yes | | Racial resentment | White non-Hispanic only | 0.35 SD | 1986 | 1998 | 2000 | 2004 | 1992 | no | yes | | Racial resentment | Face-to-face only | 0.35 SD | 1986 | 1990 | 1992 | 1992 | 1986 | no | no | | Abortion | All respondents | 0.35 SD | 1980 | 2000 | 2004 | 2012 | 1996 | no | yes | | Abortion | White non-Hispanic only | 0.35 SD | 1980 | 1996 | 1998 | 2012 | 1992 | no | yes | | Abortion | Face-to-face only | 0.35 SD | 1980 | 1998 | 2004 | 2012 | 1996 | no | no | | Religion | All respondents | 0.35 SD | 1980 | 2012 | 2016 | 2020 | 2012 | no | yes | | Religion | White non-Hispanic only | 0.35 SD | 1980 | 2008 | 2012 | 2012 | 2002 | no | yes | | Religion | Face-to-face only | 0.35 SD | 1980 | 2012 | 2016 | 2024 | 2016 | no | yes | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 0.50 SD | 1986 | 1992 | 1994 | 2004 | 1992 | no | yes | | Racial resentment | White non-Hispanic only | 0.50 SD | 1986 | 2000 | 2004 | 2008 | 2000 | no | yes | | Racial resentment | Face-to-face only | 0.50 SD | 1986 | 1992 | 1994 | 2004 | 1992 | no | no | | Abortion | All respondents | 0.50 SD | 1980 | 2008 | 2012 | 2012 | 2004 | no | yes | | Abortion | White non-Hispanic only | 0.50 SD | 1980 | 2000 | 2004 | 2012 | 1998 | no | yes | | Abortion | Face-to-face only | 0.50 SD | 1980 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2004 | no | yes | | Religion | All respondents | 0.50 SD | 1980 | 2020 | 2024 | n/a | 2020 | no | yes | | Religion | White non-Hispanic only | 0.50 SD | 1980 | 2008 | 2012 | 2016 | 2012 | no | yes | | Religion | Face-to-face only | 0.50 SD | 1980 | 2016 | 2024 | n/a | 2016 | no | yes | Views: Rule 0.25 SD (drawn = true, rule = 0.25 SD); Rule 0.15 SD (drawn = true, rule = 0.15 SD); Rule 0.35 SD (drawn = true, rule = 0.35 SD); Rule 0.50 SD (drawn = true, rule = 0.50 SD). Note: * The series is above the rule at its first reading, so the open dot marks that reading and not a crossing, and the date is not identified. A star marks each such row. Note: A face-to-face row with the same three dates as the all-respondent row is not drawn: that is racial resentment at every rule and abortion at every rule but the highest. Show data lists them. At the highest rule no lower bound stays above the rule through 2024 for religion among all respondents or among face-to-face respondents, so those two rows are not drawn. Note: Survey years are 2 to 4 years apart, so a date is known to the survey year, not to the month. A date in 2024, the last survey, cannot be tested for staying above the rule. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode views) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/sort_dates.json ### Table 3. Web and face-to-face gaps differ by 0.174 SD or less, and the interval for the difference excludes zero only for racial resentment in 2012 Party gap by interview mode in the years that have both mode weights, difference and each mode, in standard deviations, with 95% intervals, ANES #### Table 3.1. Difference Each dot is one web minus face-to-face difference, and 8 of 9 intervals include zero Web minus face-to-face difference in the party gap (Republican minus Democratic identifiers, leaners included) in standard deviations, with 95% intervals, ANES | Row | Web minus face-to-face (SD) | Lower 95% bound | Upper 95% bound | Face-to-face respondents | Web respondents | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Abortion, 2012 | 0.110 | −0.042 | 0.262 | 1791 | 3277 | | Abortion, 2016 | −0.092 | −0.257 | 0.073 | 1030 | 2600 | | Abortion, 2024 | −0.019 | −0.204 | 0.165 | 953 | 1761 | | Racial resentment, 2012 | 0.174 | 0.027 | 0.321 | 1694 | 3047 | | Racial resentment, 2016 | 0.092 | −0.071 | 0.255 | 940 | 2211 | | Racial resentment, 2024 | 0.001 | −0.179 | 0.181 | 862 | 1581 | | Religion, 2012 | 0.129 | −0.026 | 0.284 | 1797 | 3280 | | Religion, 2016 | 0.047 | −0.124 | 0.219 | 1039 | 2613 | | Religion, 2024 | −0.113 | −0.317 | 0.090 | 966 | 1850 | #### Table 3.2. Each mode The two modes lie on either side of the sort-date rule only for religion in 2012 Party gap (Republican minus Democratic identifiers, leaners included) in standard deviations, face-to-face interviews (open dot) and web interviews (solid dot), with 95% intervals, ANES | Row | Face-to-face gap (SD) | Lower 95% bound | Upper 95% bound | Face-to-face respondents | Web gap (SD) | Lower 95% bound | Upper 95% bound | Web respondents | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Abortion, 2012 | 0.577 | 0.452 | 0.702 | 1791 | 0.687 | 0.601 | 0.774 | 3277 | | Abortion, 2016 | 0.768 | 0.628 | 0.908 | 1030 | 0.676 | 0.589 | 0.763 | 2600 | | Abortion, 2024 | 1.092 | 0.942 | 1.243 | 953 | 1.073 | 0.967 | 1.180 | 1761 | | Racial resentment, 2012 | 0.784 | 0.664 | 0.905 | 1694 | 0.958 | 0.874 | 1.043 | 3047 | | Racial resentment, 2016 | 0.969 | 0.830 | 1.107 | 940 | 1.061 | 0.976 | 1.146 | 2211 | | Racial resentment, 2024 | 1.264 | 1.118 | 1.411 | 862 | 1.265 | 1.160 | 1.370 | 1581 | | Religion, 2012 | 0.219 | 0.092 | 0.347 | 1797 | 0.348 | 0.260 | 0.437 | 3280 | | Religion, 2016 | 0.380 | 0.232 | 0.528 | 1039 | 0.427 | 0.340 | 0.515 | 2613 | | Religion, 2024 | 0.622 | 0.455 | 0.789 | 966 | 0.509 | 0.393 | 0.625 | 1850 | Note: The ANES mode weights exist for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024. The 2008 sample was face-to-face only and 2020 has no mode weights. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2012, 2016 and 2024; weighted (weight_ftf and weight_web) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/mode_check.json ### Table 4. The GSS abortion gap passes 0.25 SD 12 years after the ANES gap by the point estimate and 4 years after by the lower bound Republican minus Democratic identifiers (leaners included) in standard deviations of each survey's item in that year, ANES, GSS and CES, 95% intervals | Attitude | Survey and measure | Survey year | Party gap (SD) | Lower 95% bound | Upper 95% bound | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Abortion | ANES | 1980 | −0.02 | −0.13 | 0.08 | 1313 | | Abortion | ANES | 1982 | −0.09 | −0.21 | 0.03 | 1173 | | Abortion | ANES | 1984 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.21 | 1888 | | Abortion | ANES | 1986 | −0.03 | −0.12 | 0.06 | 1818 | | Abortion | ANES | 1988 | 0.04 | −0.05 | 0.14 | 1751 | | Abortion | ANES | 1990 | 0.06 | −0.04 | 0.16 | 1692 | | Abortion | ANES | 1992 | 0.26 | 0.17 | 0.34 | 2097 | | Abortion | ANES | 1994 | 0.19 | 0.08 | 0.30 | 1537 | | Abortion | ANES | 1996 | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.36 | 1521 | | Abortion | ANES | 1998 | 0.32 | 0.19 | 0.45 | 1106 | | Abortion | ANES | 2000 | 0.27 | 0.16 | 0.38 | 1532 | | Abortion | ANES | 2004 | 0.37 | 0.23 | 0.51 | 931 | | Abortion | ANES | 2008 | 0.42 | 0.26 | 0.58 | 893 | | Abortion | ANES | 2012 | 0.65 | 0.58 | 0.72 | 5068 | | Abortion | ANES | 2016 | 0.70 | 0.63 | 0.78 | 3630 | | Abortion | ANES | 2020 | 0.96 | 0.91 | 1.02 | 7002 | | Abortion | ANES | 2024 | 1.06 | 0.99 | 1.14 | 4666 | | Abortion | GSS | 1977 | −0.13 | −0.26 | −0.01 | 1299 | | Abortion | GSS | 1978 | −0.08 | −0.22 | 0.06 | 1263 | | Abortion | GSS | 1980 | 0.05 | −0.09 | 0.19 | 1165 | | Abortion | GSS | 1982 | −0.02 | −0.16 | 0.12 | 1532 | | Abortion | GSS | 1983 | −0.16 | −0.30 | −0.02 | 1322 | | Abortion | GSS | 1984 | −0.10 | −0.24 | 0.04 | 1245 | | Abortion | GSS | 1985 | 0.04 | −0.09 | 0.17 | 1322 | | Abortion | GSS | 1987 | −0.05 | −0.18 | 0.08 | 1527 | | Abortion | GSS | 1988 | 0.19 | 0.04 | 0.34 | 817 | | Abortion | GSS | 1989 | 0.09 | −0.06 | 0.24 | 861 | | Abortion | GSS | 1990 | 0.13 | −0.03 | 0.29 | 766 | | Abortion | GSS | 1991 | 0.05 | −0.10 | 0.21 | 816 | | Abortion | GSS | 1993 | 0.31 | 0.16 | 0.46 | 872 | | Abortion | GSS | 1994 | 0.17 | 0.06 | 0.28 | 1647 | | Abortion | GSS | 1996 | 0.23 | 0.12 | 0.34 | 1513 | | Abortion | GSS | 1998 | 0.30 | 0.18 | 0.41 | 1449 | | Abortion | GSS | 2000 | 0.25 | 0.13 | 0.37 | 1378 | | Abortion | GSS | 2002 | 0.39 | 0.22 | 0.55 | 719 | | Abortion | GSS | 2004 | 0.36 | 0.19 | 0.53 | 700 | | Abortion | GSS | 2006 | 0.41 | 0.28 | 0.53 | 1486 | | Abortion | GSS | 2008 | 0.24 | 0.10 | 0.39 | 1051 | | Abortion | GSS | 2010 | 0.39 | 0.24 | 0.54 | 968 | | Abortion | GSS | 2012 | 0.48 | 0.33 | 0.64 | 966 | | Abortion | GSS | 2014 | 0.47 | 0.35 | 0.60 | 1290 | | Abortion | GSS | 2016 | 0.43 | 0.31 | 0.56 | 1465 | | Abortion | GSS | 2018 | 0.62 | 0.48 | 0.76 | 1189 | | Abortion | GSS | 2021 | 0.74 | 0.59 | 0.88 | 1044 | | Abortion | GSS | 2022 | 1.08 | 0.90 | 1.26 | 831 | | Abortion | GSS | 2024 | 0.96 | 0.84 | 1.09 | 1534 | | Abortion | CES | 2014 | 0.86 | 0.83 | 0.88 | 44398 | | Abortion | CES | 2016 | 0.92 | 0.90 | 0.94 | 51939 | | Abortion | CES | 2018 | 1.07 | 1.05 | 1.09 | 49255 | | Abortion | CES | 2020 | 1.11 | 1.09 | 1.13 | 49758 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 1986 | 0.37 | 0.24 | 0.49 | 927 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 1988 | 0.42 | 0.33 | 0.52 | 1554 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 1990 | 0.31 | 0.18 | 0.44 | 857 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 1992 | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.57 | 1947 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 1994 | 0.52 | 0.41 | 0.62 | 1566 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 1998 | 0.51 | 0.38 | 0.63 | 1104 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 2000 | 0.57 | 0.45 | 0.68 | 1348 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 2004 | 0.74 | 0.62 | 0.87 | 948 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 2008 | 0.73 | 0.62 | 0.84 | 1824 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 2012 | 0.89 | 0.82 | 0.96 | 4741 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 2016 | 1.03 | 0.96 | 1.11 | 3151 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 2020 | 1.29 | 1.24 | 1.34 | 6495 | | Racial resentment | ANES | 2024 | 1.23 | 1.16 | 1.30 | 4565 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 1994 | 0.34 | 0.22 | 0.47 | 1211 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 1996 | 0.46 | 0.36 | 0.57 | 1608 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 1998 | 0.35 | 0.24 | 0.46 | 1478 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2000 | 0.38 | 0.27 | 0.50 | 1417 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2002 | 0.32 | 0.15 | 0.49 | 698 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2004 | 0.44 | 0.27 | 0.60 | 742 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2006 | 0.43 | 0.32 | 0.55 | 1556 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2008 | 0.34 | 0.20 | 0.49 | 1083 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2010 | 0.55 | 0.42 | 0.69 | 1134 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2012 | 0.51 | 0.36 | 0.66 | 997 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2014 | 0.54 | 0.41 | 0.66 | 1282 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2016 | 0.63 | 0.52 | 0.75 | 1496 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2018 | 0.72 | 0.58 | 0.86 | 1182 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2021 | 1.06 | 0.97 | 1.15 | 2044 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2022 | 0.89 | 0.75 | 1.03 | 1703 | | Racial resentment | GSS | 2024 | 0.94 | 0.81 | 1.07 | 1538 | | Religion | ANES importance | 1980 | 0.05 | −0.06 | 0.16 | 1196 | | Religion | ANES importance | 1984 | −0.04 | −0.13 | 0.06 | 1667 | | Religion | ANES importance | 1986 | 0.00 | −0.13 | 0.13 | 908 | | Religion | ANES importance | 1988 | −0.05 | −0.15 | 0.05 | 1554 | | Religion | ANES importance | 1990 | −0.06 | −0.15 | 0.04 | 1713 | | Religion | ANES importance | 1992 | 0.00 | −0.09 | 0.09 | 1989 | | Religion | ANES importance | 1994 | 0.04 | −0.07 | 0.15 | 1569 | | Religion | ANES importance | 1996 | −0.01 | −0.12 | 0.10 | 1543 | | Religion | ANES importance | 1998 | 0.03 | −0.10 | 0.16 | 1114 | | Religion | ANES importance | 2000 | 0.08 | −0.03 | 0.19 | 1564 | | Religion | ANES importance | 2002 | 0.18 | 0.05 | 0.31 | 1366 | | Religion | ANES importance | 2004 | 0.11 | −0.02 | 0.24 | 1068 | | Religion | ANES importance | 2008 | 0.21 | 0.10 | 0.32 | 2010 | | Religion | ANES importance | 2012 | 0.30 | 0.23 | 0.37 | 5077 | | Religion | ANES importance | 2016 | 0.42 | 0.34 | 0.49 | 3652 | | Religion | ANES importance | 2020 | 0.46 | 0.40 | 0.52 | 7265 | | Religion | ANES importance | 2024 | 0.52 | 0.44 | 0.59 | 5086 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1977 | 0.06 | −0.07 | 0.18 | 1333 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1978 | 0.15 | 0.01 | 0.29 | 1293 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1980 | 0.14 | 0.00 | 0.28 | 1204 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1982 | 0.04 | −0.09 | 0.18 | 1607 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1983 | 0.03 | −0.10 | 0.17 | 1386 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1984 | 0.09 | −0.05 | 0.23 | 1275 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1985 | 0.01 | −0.12 | 0.15 | 1364 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1986 | 0.09 | −0.03 | 0.22 | 1269 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1987 | 0.05 | −0.07 | 0.17 | 1586 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1988 | 0.23 | 0.11 | 0.35 | 1288 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1989 | 0.08 | −0.04 | 0.20 | 1326 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1990 | 0.15 | 0.03 | 0.28 | 1170 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1991 | 0.04 | −0.08 | 0.16 | 1289 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1993 | 0.20 | 0.08 | 0.32 | 1345 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1994 | 0.17 | 0.08 | 0.25 | 2490 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1996 | 0.11 | 0.02 | 0.20 | 2328 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 1998 | 0.21 | 0.12 | 0.30 | 2251 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2000 | 0.27 | 0.17 | 0.36 | 2139 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2002 | 0.29 | 0.19 | 0.38 | 2147 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2004 | 0.21 | 0.11 | 0.30 | 2292 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2006 | 0.29 | 0.21 | 0.37 | 3415 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2008 | 0.32 | 0.21 | 0.44 | 1646 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2010 | 0.26 | 0.14 | 0.38 | 1617 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2012 | 0.27 | 0.15 | 0.40 | 1530 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2014 | 0.33 | 0.23 | 0.44 | 1945 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2016 | 0.30 | 0.20 | 0.40 | 2284 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2018 | 0.26 | 0.14 | 0.38 | 1816 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2021 | 0.37 | 0.28 | 0.45 | 3041 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2022 | 0.34 | 0.22 | 0.47 | 2551 | | Religion | GSS attendance | 2024 | 0.44 | 0.33 | 0.55 | 2343 | | Religion | CES importance | 2008 | 0.49 | 0.46 | 0.52 | 28578 | | Religion | CES importance | 2010 | 0.42 | 0.39 | 0.44 | 47850 | | Religion | CES importance | 2012 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.56 | 45816 | | Religion | CES importance | 2014 | 0.48 | 0.45 | 0.51 | 44749 | | Religion | CES importance | 2016 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.48 | 51957 | | Religion | CES importance | 2018 | 0.61 | 0.58 | 0.63 | 49085 | | Religion | CES importance | 2020 | 0.63 | 0.61 | 0.65 | 49754 | | Religion | CES importance | 2022 | 0.67 | 0.65 | 0.70 | 49506 | | Religion | CES importance | 2024 | 0.75 | 0.72 | 0.78 | 50837 | Views: Abortion (attitude = Abortion); Racial resentment (attitude = Racial resentment); Religion (attitude = Religion). Note: ANES: four-category abortion legality, racial resentment index, importance of religion. GSS: abortion for any reason, whether Black Americans should work their way up without special favors, church attendance. CES: always-allow abortion (2014 to 2020) and importance of religion (2008 to 2024), even years only. Each item is standardized within survey and year. Note: GSS interviews from 2021 include web respondents (87.3% of the 2021 respondents). In 2024 the face-to-face and web gaps are 0.84 and 1.06 SD on abortion, 0.73 and 1.14 on the work-your-way-up item and 0.40 and 0.51 on church attendance. The web gap is higher on all three items, beyond sampling error on the work-your-way-up item only. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File 1980-2024, General Social Survey 1977-2024 and Cooperative Election Study 2008-2024; weighted (VCF0009z, weight_use, weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/other_surveys.json ### Table 5. Sort dates differ across surveys and items for the same attitude Survey years in which the party gap passes the sort-date rule and stays above it, by survey and measure, all respondents | Survey | Measure | Lower bound above the rule from | Point estimate passes the rule between | Upper bound above the rule from | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | ANES | Abortion, 4-category | 2008 | 1996 to 1998 | 1992 | | GSS | Abortion for any reason, answer no | 2012 | 2008 to 2010 | 1993 | | CES | Abortion, always allow | at or before 2014 | at or before 2014 | at or before 2014 | | ANES | Racial resentment, 4-item index | 1992 | at or before 1986 | at or before 1986 | | GSS | Work your way up (one item) | 2010 | at or before 1994 | at or before 1994 | | ANES | Religion, importance | 2016 | 2008 to 2012 | 2008 | | ANES | Church attendance, attends often | 2008 | 2004 to 2008 | 1992 | | GSS | Church attendance, 0 to 8 scale | 2024 | 2004 to 2006 | 1998 | | CES | Religion, importance | at or before 2008 | at or before 2008 | at or before 2008 | | ANES | Economy got better over the past year | none | none | none | Note: A date given as at or before a year belongs to a series that is above the rule at its first reading, so the date is not identified. The CES gaps are above the rule at their first readings, in 2008 for religion and 2014 for abortion. Note: ANES attendance ends in 2020: in the Cumulative Data File the attendance question has an answer for 49.1% of respondents in 2024 against 99.0% in 2020, so 2024 is not comparable. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File 1980-2024, General Social Survey 1977-2024 and Cooperative Election Study 2008-2024; weighted (VCF0009z, weight_use, weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/dates_table.json ### Table 6. The share saying religion is important fell among Democrats and stayed level among Republicans, so the pooled trend hides the party gap Weighted percent giving one answer to the question chosen to stand for each attitude, by party (leaners included) and for all respondents, ANES 1980-2024, 95% intervals | Attitude | Group | Survey year | Percent | Lower 95% bound | Upper 95% bound | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Abortion | All respondents | 1980 | 36.8 | 34.4 | 39.2 | 1547 | | Abortion | All respondents | 1982 | 36.4 | 33.9 | 39.0 | 1359 | | Abortion | All respondents | 1984 | 36.4 | 34.4 | 38.5 | 2171 | | Abortion | All respondents | 1986 | 39.3 | 37.2 | 41.4 | 2120 | | Abortion | All respondents | 1988 | 35.6 | 33.5 | 37.7 | 1996 | | Abortion | All respondents | 1990 | 40.2 | 38.0 | 42.4 | 1932 | | Abortion | All respondents | 1992 | 46.8 | 44.8 | 48.8 | 2406 | | Abortion | All respondents | 1994 | 40.5 | 37.9 | 43.1 | 1730 | | Abortion | All respondents | 1996 | 40.3 | 37.6 | 42.9 | 1679 | | Abortion | All respondents | 1998 | 40.6 | 37.7 | 43.6 | 1258 | | Abortion | All respondents | 2000 | 40.3 | 37.8 | 42.9 | 1758 | | Abortion | All respondents | 2004 | 35.9 | 32.7 | 39.1 | 1047 | | Abortion | All respondents | 2008 | 40.1 | 36.4 | 43.8 | 1031 | | Abortion | All respondents | 2012 | 44.4 | 42.7 | 46.2 | 5855 | | Abortion | All respondents | 2016 | 45.0 | 43.2 | 46.8 | 4207 | | Abortion | All respondents | 2020 | 49.7 | 48.2 | 51.2 | 7900 | | Abortion | All respondents | 2024 | 48.9 | 46.9 | 50.9 | 5021 | | Abortion | Democrats | 1980 | 37.3 | 34.0 | 40.7 | 801 | | Abortion | Democrats | 1982 | 36.0 | 32.6 | 39.5 | 741 | | Abortion | Democrats | 1984 | 39.4 | 36.5 | 42.4 | 1032 | | Abortion | Democrats | 1986 | 40.9 | 37.9 | 43.9 | 1061 | | Abortion | Democrats | 1988 | 37.0 | 33.9 | 40.1 | 938 | | Abortion | Democrats | 1990 | 43.3 | 40.2 | 46.4 | 993 | | Abortion | Democrats | 1992 | 52.8 | 49.9 | 55.6 | 1201 | | Abortion | Democrats | 1994 | 46.4 | 42.5 | 50.2 | 810 | | Abortion | Democrats | 1996 | 46.1 | 42.4 | 49.8 | 879 | | Abortion | Democrats | 1998 | 47.2 | 43.0 | 51.4 | 647 | | Abortion | Democrats | 2000 | 47.2 | 43.5 | 50.9 | 868 | | Abortion | Democrats | 2004 | 44.6 | 39.7 | 49.4 | 498 | | Abortion | Democrats | 2008 | 51.0 | 45.9 | 56.2 | 600 | | Abortion | Democrats | 2012 | 59.0 | 56.5 | 61.4 | 3081 | | Abortion | Democrats | 2016 | 60.4 | 57.7 | 63.0 | 1915 | | Abortion | Democrats | 2020 | 72.1 | 70.1 | 74.1 | 3713 | | Abortion | Democrats | 2024 | 73.7 | 71.2 | 76.2 | 2459 | | Abortion | Republicans | 1980 | 33.8 | 29.7 | 37.9 | 512 | | Abortion | Republicans | 1982 | 36.1 | 31.6 | 40.6 | 432 | | Abortion | Republicans | 1984 | 32.8 | 29.7 | 36.0 | 856 | | Abortion | Republicans | 1986 | 38.2 | 34.7 | 41.6 | 757 | | Abortion | Republicans | 1988 | 33.5 | 30.2 | 36.7 | 813 | | Abortion | Republicans | 1990 | 38.6 | 35.0 | 42.2 | 699 | | Abortion | Republicans | 1992 | 38.7 | 35.5 | 41.9 | 896 | | Abortion | Republicans | 1994 | 33.9 | 30.1 | 37.7 | 727 | | Abortion | Republicans | 1996 | 33.7 | 29.6 | 37.9 | 642 | | Abortion | Republicans | 1998 | 31.7 | 27.1 | 36.4 | 459 | | Abortion | Republicans | 2000 | 31.0 | 27.2 | 34.9 | 664 | | Abortion | Republicans | 2004 | 25.7 | 21.3 | 30.2 | 433 | | Abortion | Republicans | 2008 | 29.3 | 23.3 | 35.3 | 293 | | Abortion | Republicans | 2012 | 29.0 | 26.4 | 31.6 | 1987 | | Abortion | Republicans | 2016 | 27.5 | 24.9 | 30.0 | 1715 | | Abortion | Republicans | 2020 | 24.0 | 22.1 | 25.9 | 3289 | | Abortion | Republicans | 2024 | 21.4 | 18.9 | 23.8 | 2207 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 1986 | 55.4 | 52.4 | 58.4 | 1062 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 1988 | 57.6 | 55.2 | 59.9 | 1746 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 1990 | 54.3 | 51.2 | 57.4 | 967 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 1992 | 61.1 | 59.1 | 63.1 | 2227 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 1994 | 63.4 | 60.9 | 65.9 | 1749 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 2000 | 51.8 | 49.0 | 54.6 | 1532 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 2004 | 56.3 | 53.0 | 59.6 | 1058 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 2008 | 57.7 | 55.1 | 60.4 | 2079 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 2012 | 50.9 | 49.1 | 52.7 | 5484 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 2016 | 40.3 | 38.4 | 42.2 | 3626 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 2020 | 30.5 | 29.0 | 31.9 | 7367 | | Racial resentment | All respondents | 2024 | 30.8 | 28.9 | 32.7 | 4902 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 1986 | 50.1 | 45.9 | 54.3 | 549 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 1988 | 52.9 | 49.5 | 56.3 | 828 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 1990 | 52.2 | 47.7 | 56.7 | 479 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 1992 | 54.4 | 51.4 | 57.3 | 1100 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 1994 | 58.2 | 54.5 | 62.0 | 826 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 2000 | 45.2 | 41.2 | 49.3 | 743 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 2004 | 46.0 | 41.2 | 50.9 | 502 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 2008 | 49.3 | 45.7 | 52.9 | 1212 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 2012 | 40.3 | 37.8 | 42.8 | 2880 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 2016 | 25.8 | 23.2 | 28.3 | 1669 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 2020 | 13.7 | 12.1 | 15.3 | 3441 | | Racial resentment | Democrats | 2024 | 14.9 | 12.8 | 17.0 | 2393 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 1986 | 61.0 | 56.0 | 65.9 | 374 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 1988 | 61.4 | 57.9 | 65.0 | 718 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 1990 | 56.2 | 51.1 | 61.2 | 372 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 1992 | 68.7 | 65.5 | 71.8 | 841 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 1994 | 68.7 | 65.0 | 72.3 | 733 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 2000 | 56.8 | 52.4 | 61.2 | 595 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 2004 | 66.9 | 62.2 | 71.7 | 438 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 2008 | 69.9 | 65.6 | 74.2 | 598 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 2012 | 63.8 | 60.9 | 66.6 | 1852 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 2016 | 57.4 | 54.4 | 60.4 | 1474 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 2020 | 49.2 | 46.9 | 51.5 | 3042 | | Racial resentment | Republicans | 2024 | 47.7 | 44.7 | 50.8 | 2167 | | Religion | All respondents | 1980 | 75.3 | 73.0 | 77.5 | 1398 | | Religion | All respondents | 1984 | 79.3 | 77.5 | 81.1 | 1911 | | Religion | All respondents | 1986 | 78.5 | 76.1 | 81.0 | 1071 | | Religion | All respondents | 1988 | 77.8 | 75.9 | 79.8 | 1760 | | Religion | All respondents | 1990 | 79.2 | 77.4 | 81.0 | 1958 | | Religion | All respondents | 1992 | 78.5 | 76.8 | 80.2 | 2295 | | Religion | All respondents | 1994 | 76.9 | 74.7 | 79.1 | 1760 | | Religion | All respondents | 1996 | 78.2 | 76.0 | 80.4 | 1706 | | Religion | All respondents | 1998 | 77.2 | 74.7 | 79.7 | 1270 | | Religion | All respondents | 2000 | 76.2 | 74.0 | 78.4 | 1799 | | Religion | All respondents | 2002 | 75.4 | 72.7 | 78.1 | 1504 | | Religion | All respondents | 2004 | 77.3 | 74.7 | 79.9 | 1203 | | Religion | All respondents | 2008 | 71.5 | 69.2 | 73.8 | 2309 | | Religion | All respondents | 2012 | 67.1 | 65.5 | 68.7 | 5882 | | Religion | All respondents | 2016 | 65.1 | 63.4 | 66.8 | 4243 | | Religion | All respondents | 2020 | 66.6 | 65.2 | 68.0 | 8249 | | Religion | All respondents | 2024 | 65.8 | 64.0 | 67.7 | 5494 | | Religion | Democrats | 1980 | 75.2 | 72.0 | 78.4 | 718 | | Religion | Democrats | 1984 | 79.9 | 77.3 | 82.5 | 896 | | Religion | Democrats | 1986 | 80.2 | 76.7 | 83.6 | 524 | | Religion | Democrats | 1988 | 80.4 | 77.7 | 83.1 | 831 | | Religion | Democrats | 1990 | 81.3 | 78.9 | 83.7 | 1004 | | Religion | Democrats | 1992 | 79.5 | 77.1 | 81.9 | 1138 | | Religion | Democrats | 1994 | 77.1 | 73.9 | 80.3 | 829 | | Religion | Democrats | 1996 | 78.9 | 75.9 | 81.9 | 891 | | Religion | Democrats | 1998 | 76.8 | 73.2 | 80.3 | 652 | | Religion | Democrats | 2000 | 75.4 | 72.2 | 78.6 | 887 | | Religion | Democrats | 2002 | 72.1 | 68.0 | 76.2 | 698 | | Religion | Democrats | 2004 | 75.0 | 71.1 | 78.9 | 588 | | Religion | Democrats | 2008 | 68.6 | 65.4 | 71.8 | 1358 | | Religion | Democrats | 2012 | 61.1 | 58.7 | 63.5 | 3086 | | Religion | Democrats | 2016 | 57.1 | 54.4 | 59.8 | 1930 | | Religion | Democrats | 2020 | 57.1 | 54.9 | 59.2 | 3830 | | Religion | Democrats | 2024 | 54.0 | 51.3 | 56.8 | 2636 | | Religion | Republicans | 1980 | 77.4 | 73.7 | 81.2 | 478 | | Religion | Republicans | 1984 | 78.5 | 75.6 | 81.4 | 771 | | Religion | Republicans | 1986 | 80.2 | 76.2 | 84.2 | 384 | | Religion | Republicans | 1988 | 78.3 | 75.3 | 81.3 | 723 | | Religion | Republicans | 1990 | 79.0 | 76.0 | 82.0 | 709 | | Religion | Republicans | 1992 | 79.5 | 76.8 | 82.2 | 851 | | Religion | Republicans | 1994 | 78.8 | 75.5 | 82.0 | 740 | | Religion | Republicans | 1996 | 78.5 | 74.9 | 82.0 | 652 | | Religion | Republicans | 1998 | 77.8 | 73.7 | 82.0 | 462 | | Religion | Republicans | 2000 | 78.9 | 75.5 | 82.2 | 677 | | Religion | Republicans | 2002 | 79.7 | 76.0 | 83.4 | 668 | | Religion | Republicans | 2004 | 79.5 | 75.6 | 83.5 | 480 | | Religion | Republicans | 2008 | 78.1 | 74.4 | 81.8 | 652 | | Religion | Republicans | 2012 | 75.3 | 72.8 | 77.7 | 1991 | | Religion | Republicans | 2016 | 77.0 | 74.6 | 79.4 | 1722 | | Religion | Republicans | 2020 | 78.7 | 76.9 | 80.6 | 3435 | | Religion | Republicans | 2024 | 78.6 | 76.2 | 80.9 | 2450 | Views: Religion (attitude = Religion); Abortion (attitude = Abortion); Racial resentment (attitude = Racial resentment). Note: Questions chosen to stand for each attitude: religion important (yes or no); abortion: by law a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion; racial resentment: agree strongly or somewhat that if blacks would only try harder they could be just as well off as whites. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/party_levels.json ### Table 7. The economic gap follows the president's party in all 18 survey years Republican minus Democratic identifiers (leaners included) in standard deviations of the answer to whether the national economy got better over the past year, ANES 1980-2024, 95% intervals | Survey year | President | President's party | Party gap (SD) | Lower 95% bound | Upper 95% bound | Respondents | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1980 | Carter | Democratic | −0.25 | −0.35 | −0.15 | 1341 | | 1982 | Reagan | Republican | 0.57 | 0.44 | 0.69 | 1193 | | 1984 | Reagan | Republican | 0.86 | 0.78 | 0.94 | 1881 | | 1986 | Reagan | Republican | 0.42 | 0.33 | 0.51 | 1798 | | 1988 | Reagan | Republican | 0.56 | 0.47 | 0.65 | 1721 | | 1990 | George H. W. Bush | Republican | 0.07 | −0.03 | 0.17 | 1710 | | 1992 | George H. W. Bush | Republican | 0.48 | 0.39 | 0.57 | 2135 | | 1994 | Clinton | Democratic | −0.11 | −0.22 | 0.00 | 1560 | | 1996 | Clinton | Democratic | −0.45 | −0.56 | −0.34 | 1537 | | 1998 | Clinton | Democratic | −0.35 | −0.47 | −0.22 | 1114 | | 2000 | Clinton | Democratic | −0.51 | −0.61 | −0.40 | 1555 | | 2002 | George W. Bush | Republican | 0.34 | 0.21 | 0.47 | 1368 | | 2004 | George W. Bush | Republican | 0.93 | 0.81 | 1.05 | 1064 | | 2008 | George W. Bush | Republican | 0.22 | 0.10 | 0.34 | 2013 | | 2012 | Obama | Democratic | −0.97 | −1.03 | −0.90 | 5083 | | 2016 | Obama | Democratic | −0.83 | −0.90 | −0.76 | 3660 | | 2020 | Trump | Republican | 0.89 | 0.83 | 0.94 | 7254 | | 2024 | Biden | Democratic | −1.02 | −1.09 | −0.95 | 4877 | Note: Presidential terms are from the historical record, not from the ANES. Each survey year is assigned the president recorded for that year in the ANES file. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode views) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/economy_gap.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (144), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | ab_all_1980 | 36.8% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion | all respondents with an answer | 1980 | 95% CI 34.4% to 39.2% | 1,547 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ab_all_2024 | 48.9% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion | all respondents with an answer | 2024 | 95% CI 46.9% to 50.9% | 5,021 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ab_dem_1980 | 37.3% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion | Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980 | 95% CI 34.0% to 40.7% | 801 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ab_dem_2024 | 73.7% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion | Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 71.2% to 76.2% | 2,459 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ab_dem_nonwhite_2000 | 36.9% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion | Democratic identifiers, leaners included, Black, Hispanic and other respondents | 2000 | 95% CI 30.7% to 43.1% | 294 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ab_dem_white_2000 | 52.9% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion | Democratic identifiers, leaners included, White non-Hispanic | 2000 | 95% CI 48.3% to 57.5% | 574 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ab_rep_1980 | 33.8% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion | Republican identifiers, leaners included | 1980 | 95% CI 29.7% to 37.9% | 512 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ab_rep_2024 | 21.4% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion | Republican identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 18.9% to 23.8% | 2,207 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_bound | 2008 | survey year | first survey year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (sort date), abortion (higher = more restrictive), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_bound_white | 2000 | survey year | first survey year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (sort date), abortion (higher = more restrictive), White non-Hispanic respondents | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_chg_9294 | −0.06 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | change in the abortion party gap from 1992 to 1994 (1994 minus 1992), standard errors of the two estimates combined in quadrature | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1992 to 1994 | 95% CI −0.20 to 0.07 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_gap_1980 | −0.02 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized abortion (higher = more restrictive), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980 | 95% CI −0.13 to 0.08 | 1,313 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_gap_1990 | 0.06 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized abortion (higher = more restrictive), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1990 | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.16 | 1,692 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_gap_1992 | 0.26 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized abortion (higher = more restrictive), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1992 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.34 | 2,097 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_gap_1994 | 0.19 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized abortion (higher = more restrictive), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1994 | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.30 | 1,537 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_gap_1996 | 0.247 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized abortion item (higher = more restrictive), three decimals to show it lies under the rule | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1996 | 95% CI 0.134 to 0.359 | 1,521 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_gap_2024 | 1.06 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized abortion (higher = more restrictive), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 0.99 to 1.14 | 4,666 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_lag | 10 | years | years between the point-estimate date and the lower-bound date for abortion (higher = more restrictive) | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_margin_1996 | 0.003 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | sort-date rule minus the 1996 party gap in the standardized abortion item (how far the 1996 estimate lies under the rule) | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1996 | | 1,521 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_margin_2008 | 0.009 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | lower 95% bound of the party gap in the standardized abortion item minus the sort-date rule (the margin by which the 2008 lower bound clears the rule) | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2008 | | 893 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_n_2008 | 893 | respondents | respondents in the two parties with an abortion answer (the item went to part of the sample) | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included, asked the abortion item | 2008 | | 893 | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_point | 1998 | survey year | first survey year whose point estimate exceeds the rule and stays above it, abortion (higher = more restrictive), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_point_r15 | 1992 | survey year | sort date under a 0.15 SD rule (point), abortion (higher = more restrictive) | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_point_r50 | 2012 | survey year | sort date under a 0.50 SD rule (point), abortion (higher = more restrictive) | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_point_white | 1992 | survey year | first survey year whose point estimate exceeds the rule and stays above it, abortion (higher = more restrictive), White non-Hispanic respondents | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_prev | 1996 | survey year | last survey year before the point estimate stays above the rule, abortion (higher = more restrictive), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_upper | 1992 | survey year | first survey year whose upper 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (the earliest date the interval allows), abortion (higher = more restrictive), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abortion_white_gap_2024 | 1.16 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized abortion (higher = more restrictive), White non-Hispanic respondents | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 1.08 to 1.24 | 3,389 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_attend_last | 2020 | survey year | last survey year of the ANES attendance series (2024 attendance coding is unusable) | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_attend_point | 2008 | survey year | first survey year whose point estimate exceeds the rule and stays above it, ANES church attendance (attends often), series ends 2020 | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | attend_answered_2020 | 99.0% | percent of respondents | share of respondents with an answer to the church attendance question (unweighted count) | respondents in the ANES Cumulative Data File in the study year | 2020 | | 8,280 | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | attend_answered_2024 | 49.1% | percent of respondents | share of respondents with an answer to the church attendance question (unweighted count) | respondents in the ANES Cumulative Data File in the study year | 2024 | | 5,521 | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | black_dem_share_1986 | 93.7% | percent of respondents | weighted share identifying with or leaning toward the Democratic Party | Black non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included, with a racial resentment score | 1986 | 95% CI 89.7% to 97.7% | 143 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | black_rr_1986 | −0.84 | standard deviations of the racial resentment index among all respondents in 1986 | weighted mean of the standardized racial resentment index | Black non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1986 | 95% CI −0.99 to −0.69 | 143 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ces_abortion_first | 0.86 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the standardized always-allow abortion item at the first CES year with the item | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the CES, leaners included | 2014 | 95% CI 0.83 to 0.88 | 44,398 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_anes_diff_2008 | 0.28 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | CES minus ANES party gap on the importance of religion in 2008, standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the CES and the ANES | 2008 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.39 | | weight_cumulative and weight (VCF0009z) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_religion_first | 0.49 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the standardized importance of religion item at the first CES year with the item | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the CES, leaners included | 2008 | 95% CI 0.46 to 0.52 | 28,578 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_religion_gap_2024 | 0.75 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the standardized importance-of-religion item | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the CES, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 0.72 to 0.78 | 50,837 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | econ_ci_flips | 5 | transitions | count of of those transitions, the ones at which both readings have a 95% interval that excludes zero on the side of the president's party | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_ci_match | 16 | survey years | count of survey years in which the 95% interval excludes zero on the side of the president's party | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_flips | 6 | transitions | count of party-gap sign changes (point estimates) at those transitions | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_match | 18 | survey years | count of survey years in which the point estimate shows the president's party as the more optimistic | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_miss_a | 1990 | survey year | survey year whose 95% interval for the economic party gap includes zero (the president's party is not distinguishable from the other party) | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_miss_b | 1994 | survey year | survey year whose 95% interval for the economic party gap includes zero (the president's party is not distinguishable from the other party) | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_readings | 18 | survey years | count of survey years with the retrospective economy item | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_transitions | 6 | transitions | count of changes in the party of the president between consecutive survey years | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | economy_gap_2020 | 0.89 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the retrospective economy item (higher = more optimistic), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2020 | 95% CI 0.83 to 0.94 | 7,254 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | economy_gap_2024 | −1.02 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the retrospective economy item (higher = more optimistic), all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI −1.09 to −0.95 | 4,877 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gss_ab_after_anes_bound | 4 | years | years from the ANES lower-bound date to the GSS lower-bound date for abortion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the ANES and the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use and weight (VCF0009z) | General Social Survey | | | gss_ab_after_anes_point | 12 | years | years from the ANES point-estimate date to the GSS point-estimate date for abortion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the ANES and the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use and weight (VCF0009z) | General Social Survey | | | gss_abortion_2024_ftf | 0.84 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the standardized abortion-for-any-reason item, ftf interviews only | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, face-to-face interviews | 2024 | 95% CI 0.63 to 1.06 | 518 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_abortion_2024_web | 1.06 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the standardized abortion-for-any-reason item, web interviews only | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, web interviews | 2024 | 95% CI 0.90 to 1.22 | 832 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_abortion_bound | 2012 | survey year | first GSS year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it, abortion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_abortion_gap_1977 | −0.13 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized GSS item for abortion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 1977 | 95% CI −0.26 to −0.01 | 1,299 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_abortion_gap_2008 | 0.24 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized GSS item for abortion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 2008 | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.39 | 1,051 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_abortion_gap_2024 | 0.96 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized GSS item for abortion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 0.84 to 1.09 | 1,534 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_abortion_point | 2010 | survey year | first GSS year whose point estimate exceeds the rule and stays above it, abortion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_abortion_prev | 2008 | survey year | last GSS year before the point estimate stays above the rule, abortion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_att_after_anes_bound | 8 | years | years from the ANES importance lower-bound date to the GSS attendance lower-bound date | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the ANES and the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use and weight (VCF0009z) | General Social Survey | | | gss_att_before_anes_point | 6 | years | years from the GSS attendance point-estimate date to the ANES importance point-estimate date | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the ANES and the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use and weight (VCF0009z) | General Social Survey | | | gss_race_2024_diff | 0.41 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | web minus face-to-face difference in the work-your-way-up party gap, standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS | 2024 | 95% CI 0.13 to 0.68 | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_race_2024_ftf | 0.73 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the standardized work-your-way-up item, ftf interviews only | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, face-to-face interviews | 2024 | 95% CI 0.51 to 0.95 | 532 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_race_2024_web | 1.14 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the standardized work-your-way-up item, web interviews only | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, web interviews | 2024 | 95% CI 0.97 to 1.30 | 821 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_race_bound | 2010 | survey year | first GSS year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it, race | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_race_first | 1994 | survey year | first GSS year in the series for race | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_race_gap_1994 | 0.34 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized GSS item for race | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 1994 | 95% CI 0.22 to 0.47 | 1,211 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_race_gap_2018 | 0.72 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized GSS item for race | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 2018 | 95% CI 0.58 to 0.86 | 1,182 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_race_gap_2021 | 1.06 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized GSS item for race | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 2021 | 95% CI 0.97 to 1.15 | 2,044 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_race_gap_2024 | 0.94 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized GSS item for race | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 0.81 to 1.07 | 1,538 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_religion_2024_ftf | 0.40 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the standardized church attendance item, ftf interviews only | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, face-to-face interviews | 2024 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.59 | 813 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_religion_2024_web | 0.51 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the standardized church attendance item, web interviews only | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, web interviews | 2024 | 95% CI 0.36 to 0.67 | 1,252 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_religion_bound | 2024 | survey year | first GSS year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it, religion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_religion_gap_2024 | 0.44 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized GSS item for religion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.55 | 2,343 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_religion_point | 2006 | survey year | first GSS year whose point estimate exceeds the rule and stays above it, religion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_religion_prev | 2004 | survey year | last GSS year before the point estimate stays above the rule, religion | Republican and Democratic identifiers in the GSS, leaners included | 1977-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_web_share_2021 | 87.3% | percent of respondents | share of interviews conducted by web (unweighted count) | all GSS respondents in 2021 | 2021 | | 4,032 | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | mode_expected_by_chance | 0.45 | comparisons | expected number of the 95% intervals that exclude zero by chance alone if no mode difference existed (0.05 times the number of comparisons) | three attitudes in 2012, 2016 and 2024 | 2012-2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_max_bound | 0.32 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | largest distance from zero of an end of the 95% interval for the web minus face-to-face difference, among the comparisons whose interval includes zero | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2012-2024 | | | weight_web and weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_max_diff | 0.174 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | largest absolute web minus face-to-face difference in the party gap across the nine comparisons | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2012-2024 | | | weight_web and weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_n_cmp | 9 | comparisons | count of web minus face-to-face comparisons | three attitudes in 2012, 2016 and 2024 | 2012-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_n_zero | 8 | comparisons | count of comparisons whose 95% interval for the web minus face-to-face difference includes zero | three attitudes in 2012, 2016 and 2024 | 2012-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_race_2012_diff | 0.174 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | web minus face-to-face difference in the racial resentment party gap, each mode standardized within itself | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2012 | 95% CI 0.027 to 0.321 | 4,741 | weight_web and weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_race_2012_ftf | 0.784 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | racial resentment party gap, face-to-face only | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included, face-to-face interviews | 2012 | 95% CI 0.664 to 0.905 | 1,694 | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_race_2012_web | 0.958 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | racial resentment party gap, web only | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included, web interviews | 2012 | 95% CI 0.874 to 1.043 | 3,047 | weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rel_2012_diff | 0.13 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | web minus face-to-face difference in the importance-of-religion party gap, each mode standardized within itself | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2012 | 95% CI −0.03 to 0.28 | 5,077 | weight_web and weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rel_2012_ftf | 0.22 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | importance-of-religion party gap, face-to-face only | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included, face-to-face interviews | 2012 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.35 | 1,797 | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rel_2012_web | 0.35 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | importance-of-religion party gap, web only | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included, web interviews | 2012 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.44 | 3,280 | weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rel_2024_ftf | 0.62 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | importance-of-religion party gap, face-to-face only | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included, face-to-face interviews | 2024 | 95% CI 0.45 to 0.79 | 966 | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rel_2024_web | 0.51 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | importance-of-religion party gap, web only | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included, web interviews | 2024 | 95% CI 0.39 to 0.62 | 1,850 | weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_bound | 1992 | survey year | first survey year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (sort date), the racial resentment index, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_bound_white | 2000 | survey year | first survey year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (sort date), the racial resentment index, White non-Hispanic respondents | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_boundprev | 1990 | survey year | last survey year before the lower bound stays above the rule, the racial resentment index, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_first | 1986 | survey year | first survey year in the series for the racial resentment index, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_gap_1986 | 0.37 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the racial resentment index, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1986 | 95% CI 0.24 to 0.49 | 927 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_gap_2008 | 0.73 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the racial resentment index, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2008 | 95% CI 0.62 to 0.84 | 1,824 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_gap_2012 | 0.89 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the racial resentment index, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2012 | 95% CI 0.82 to 0.96 | 4,741 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_gap_2020 | 1.29 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the racial resentment index, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2020 | 95% CI 1.24 to 1.34 | 6,495 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_gap_2024 | 1.23 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the racial resentment index, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 1.16 to 1.30 | 4,565 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_point_r50 | 1994 | survey year | sort date under a 0.50 SD rule (point), the racial resentment index | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_point_white | 1992 | survey year | first survey year whose point estimate exceeds the rule and stays above it, the racial resentment index, White non-Hispanic respondents | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_prev_white | 1990 | survey year | last survey year before the point estimate stays above the rule, the racial resentment index, White non-Hispanic respondents | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_white_gap_1986 | 0.19 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the racial resentment index, White non-Hispanic respondents | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1986 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.34 | 731 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | race_white_gap_2024 | 1.28 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the racial resentment index, White non-Hispanic respondents | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 1.20 to 1.36 | 3,350 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rel_after_ab_bound | 8 | years | years between the abortion date and the religion date, lower bounds | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rel_after_ab_point | 14 | years | years between the abortion date and the religion date, point estimates | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rel_all_1980 | 75.3% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying religion is important in their life | all respondents with an answer | 1980 | 95% CI 73.0% to 77.5% | 1,398 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rel_all_2024 | 65.8% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying religion is important in their life | all respondents with an answer | 2024 | 95% CI 64.0% to 67.7% | 5,494 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rel_dem_1980 | 75.2% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying religion is important in their life | Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980 | 95% CI 72.0% to 78.4% | 718 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rel_dem_2024 | 54.0% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying religion is important in their life | Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 51.3% to 56.8% | 2,636 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rel_dem_nonwhite_2000 | 85.1% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying religion is important in their life | Democratic identifiers, leaners included, Black, Hispanic and other respondents | 2000 | 95% CI 80.6% to 89.7% | 302 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rel_dem_white_2000 | 70.0% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying religion is important in their life | Democratic identifiers, leaners included, White non-Hispanic | 2000 | 95% CI 65.8% to 74.1% | 585 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rel_rep_1980 | 77.4% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying religion is important in their life | Republican identifiers, leaners included | 1980 | 95% CI 73.7% to 81.2% | 478 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rel_rep_2024 | 78.6% | percent of respondents | weighted share saying religion is important in their life | Republican identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 76.2% to 80.9% | 2,450 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_2024_five | 0.57 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the five-point importance-of-religion item, ANES 2024 Time Series | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 0.50 to 0.65 | 5,086 | V240107a (pre-election) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | religion_bound | 2016 | survey year | first survey year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (sort date), the importance of religion, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_bound_ftf | 2024 | survey year | first survey year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (sort date), the importance of religion, face-to-face interviews only | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included, face-to-face interviews | 1980-2024 | | | weight_ftf on face-to-face interviews (weight before 2008) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_bound_white | 2012 | survey year | first survey year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (sort date), the importance of religion, White non-Hispanic respondents | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_ftf_gap_2016 | 0.38 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the importance of religion, face-to-face interviews only | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included, face-to-face interviews | 2016 | 95% CI 0.23 to 0.53 | 1,039 | weight_ftf on face-to-face interviews (weight before 2008) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_gap_1980 | 0.05 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the importance of religion, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980 | 95% CI −0.06 to 0.16 | 1,196 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_gap_2000 | 0.08 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the importance of religion, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2000 | 95% CI −0.03 to 0.19 | 1,564 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_gap_2008 | 0.21 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the importance of religion, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2008 | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.32 | 2,010 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_gap_2012 | 0.30 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the importance of religion, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2012 | 95% CI 0.23 to 0.37 | 5,077 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_gap_2024 | 0.52 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the importance of religion, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 0.44 to 0.59 | 5,086 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_lag | 4 | years | years between the point-estimate date and the lower-bound date for the importance of religion | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_point | 2012 | survey year | first survey year whose point estimate exceeds the rule and stays above it, the importance of religion, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_point_ftf | 2016 | survey year | first survey year whose point estimate exceeds the rule and stays above it, the importance of religion, face-to-face interviews only | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included, face-to-face interviews | 1980-2024 | | | weight_ftf on face-to-face interviews (weight before 2008) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_point_r15 | 2008 | survey year | sort date under a 0.15 SD rule (point), the importance of religion | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_point_r50 | 2024 | survey year | sort date under a 0.50 SD rule (point), the importance of religion | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_point_white | 2002 | survey year | first survey year whose point estimate exceeds the rule and stays above it, the importance of religion, White non-Hispanic respondents | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_prev | 2008 | survey year | last survey year before the point estimate stays above the rule, the importance of religion, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_upper | 2008 | survey year | first survey year whose upper 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it (the earliest date the interval allows), the importance of religion, all respondents, all interview modes | Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1980-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | religion_white_gap_2024 | 0.71 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | party gap in the within-year standardized the importance of religion, White non-Hispanic respondents | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 0.62 to 0.80 | 3,698 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rr_all_1986 | 55.4% | percent of respondents | weighted share agreeing that Black Americans would be as well off as whites if they tried harder | all respondents with an answer | 1986 | 95% CI 52.4% to 58.4% | 1,062 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rr_all_2024 | 30.8% | percent of respondents | weighted share agreeing that Black Americans would be as well off as whites if they tried harder | all respondents with an answer | 2024 | 95% CI 28.9% to 32.7% | 4,902 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rr_dem_1986 | 50.1% | percent of respondents | weighted share agreeing that Black Americans would be as well off as whites if they tried harder | Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1986 | 95% CI 45.9% to 54.3% | 549 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rr_dem_2024 | 14.9% | percent of respondents | weighted share agreeing that Black Americans would be as well off as whites if they tried harder | Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 12.8% to 17.0% | 2,393 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rr_rep_1986 | 61.0% | percent of respondents | weighted share agreeing that Black Americans would be as well off as whites if they tried harder | Republican identifiers, leaners included | 1986 | 95% CI 56.0% to 65.9% | 374 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rr_rep_2024 | 47.7% | percent of respondents | weighted share agreeing that Black Americans would be as well off as whites if they tried harder | Republican identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 44.7% to 50.8% | 2,167 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rule_max | 0.50 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | lowest or highest threshold in the sensitivity check | threshold applied to every party-gap series | 1980-2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rule_min | 0.15 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | lowest or highest threshold in the sensitivity check | threshold applied to every party-gap series | 1980-2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rule_sd | 0.25 | standard deviations of the attitude (Republican minus Democratic identifiers) | sort-date rule carried over from an earlier analysis of the same surveys and kept | threshold applied to every party-gap series | 1980-2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | spacing_max | 4 | years between consecutive ANES surveys | largest gap between consecutive survey years | ANES survey years in the four series | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | spacing_min | 2 | years between consecutive ANES surveys | smallest gap between consecutive survey years | ANES survey years in the four series | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | white_rr_1986 | 0.14 | standard deviations of the racial resentment index among all respondents in 1986 | weighted mean of the standardized racial resentment index | White non-Hispanic Republican and Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 1986 | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.21 | 731 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Racial resentment: A survey scale, developed by Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders, that measures moral judgments about the work ethic and deservingness of Black Americans. Higher scores mean more resentment. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Party sorting: The alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. ## Methods Sample: respondents of the ANES Cumulative Data File in the study years 1980 to 2024 who identify with or lean toward a party (pid_7pt 1 to 3 Democratic, 5 to 7 Republican) and answered the item. Respondents with a positive weight in those study years, before any item is required: 49,597 in the all view, 26,570 in the face-to-face view and 35,623 in the White view. Items: abortion (4-category legality, 17 study years), racial resentment (mean of four standardized Kinder-Sanders items, at least two answered, 13 years; not asked in 1996, two items in 1998), importance of religion (yes or no, 17 years) and the retrospective national economy (worse, same, better, 18 years). Each attitude is scored before estimation so that a higher value means more restrictive on abortion, more resentment on the race items, religion more important and the economy better; the direction comes from the stored value labels, not from a correlation with party. The 2024 importance-of-religion item was revised to a five-point scale; the cumulative file codes extremely, very and moderately important as yes, which matches the 2024 Time Series on the same collapse. Estimand: the party gap, the weighted mean of the within-year z-score among Republican identifiers minus the weighted mean among Democratic identifiers, where the z-score uses the weighted mean and standard deviation of all respondents with the item in that year and sample. Weights and samples: the ANES analysis weight (VCF0009z). The face-to-face view uses weight_ftf from 2008 (interviews before 2008 are in person by design, apart from a few abbreviated telephone post-election interviews in 1984). It leaves out 2000, a study that mixed face-to-face and telephone interviews and has no interview-form variable in the file, 2002, which was conducted entirely by telephone, and 2020, which has no mode weights. The mode check uses weight_ftf and weight_web for 2012, 2016 and 2024, standardizing each mode within itself. The White view keeps White non-Hispanic respondents and standardizes within them. Intervals: 95% normal intervals from the Kish effective sample size, combining the standard errors of the two party means in quadrature. They treat the weighted sample as if it were drawn without clustering and treat the standard deviation used for standardizing as a fixed number, so they ignore the ANES strata and clusters and may be narrower or wider than design-based intervals. Suppression: a study year enters a series with 150 respondents in the two parties and an effective sample of 100 in the smaller party; a party-share cell needs 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100. Sort dates: the rule is a party gap of 0.25 SD, carried over from an earlier analysis of the same surveys and kept; the sensitivity rules are 0.15, 0.35 and 0.50 SD. The point-estimate date is the first study year whose estimate exceeds the rule and stays above it in every later study year. The sort date is the first study year whose lower 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it in every later study year. The upper-bound year, the earliest date the interval allows, is the first study year whose upper 95% bound exceeds the rule and stays above it. A date in the last study year cannot be tested for staying above the rule. GSS and CES: the GSS extract uses weight_use, party 0 to 2 against 4 to 6, abortion for any reason (no), the item on whether Black Americans should work their way up without special favors (reversed) and church attendance, 1977 to 2024; GSS interviews from 2021 include web respondents, and the 2024 face-to-face and web gaps are reported for each item. The CES uses weight_cumulative, even years only, party 1 to 3 against 5 to 7, always-allow abortion (2014 to 2020) and importance of religion (2008 to 2024). ## What these data cannot show - The gaps are associations between party and an answer in one survey year. - They do not show whether an attitude drew people to a party, whether party led people to change their answers, or whether new voters and departing voters changed the makeup of each party. - Panel studies address direction. - Margolis [7] found that for many Americans partisanship shapes religious identity, and Engelhardt [8] found White respondents aligning their racial attitudes with their party. - The Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened) chapter describes the change in party and ideology by birth cohort and cannot show whether any individual switched. - A sort date is the year a survey-based gap passes a threshold. - It is not the year party elites took positions, and the ANES cannot show it. - The dates also depend on choices the data cannot settle: the rule, the item, the sample and the survey. - Each 95% interval is computed on its own, and the lower-bound test needs the interval of every later survey to stay above the mark, so one low draw can push a date later. - The standardization is within year, so a gap in standard deviations can move when the spread of answers changes and the parties do not. ## References 1. Cohen, Jacob (1988). Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 2. Adams, Greg D. (1997). Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution. American Journal of Political Science 41(3): 718-737. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111673 3. Carmines, Edward G.; Stimson, James A. (1989). Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9780691218250 4. Layman, Geoffrey C. (2001). The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics. Columbia University Press. 5. Kinder, Donald R.; Sanders, Lynn M. (1996). Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. University of Chicago Press. 6. Tesler, Michael (2016). Post-Racial or Most-Racial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era. University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226353159.001.0001 7. Margolis, Michele F. (2018). From Politics to the Pews: How Partisanship and the Political Environment Shape Religious Identity. University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226555812.001.0001 8. Engelhardt, Andrew M. (2021). Racial Attitudes Through a Partisan Lens. British Journal of Political Science 51(3): 1062-1079. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000437 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/sort-dates-by-attitude/build.py (sha256 e54e6043909c4378699b94d7dff4a0fb6392e20e49579d815930856e26393785) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes2024_ts/anes_timeseries_2024_spss_20260519.sav | 12,757,094 | 3107c838755f88353d0e3e39b2c3d5f76a2888cf56a179e3acac84ab431335d2 | bb318a018a39b4cf87ccc91b50a5b7c5b41746d28c0226f4a6c176e8c74966d6 | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 95fab0f67e86340a3b05c0e486d2245cab3a5cd329822a06863b998c683a9a7d | | figures/dates_table.json | 0191668f3df02760d18a5e07105b951d6855abf9565a6910b027199d03446de4 | | figures/economy_gap.json | 468a3cbb7ae8e5601a8fe5bd00c17c7a682af66a2951447bd6f22df047a4bca4 | | figures/gap_timelines.json | c2bb49c1ae1e2539c06cb8bad25bb0dcb26da8dce5545c8481a6758ec1137e0a | | figures/mode_check.json | eea281f05dbf81524cd34caa79940884ab5ccebdb408084d88cf749da93190ce | | figures/other_surveys.json | cc4ed1f519f08817094e0c9a40c908e306d0f95715772f631b3625702947de42 | | figures/party_levels.json | b6541a8fcf2275e98ddcb1798a52421fee8d0c0ab5a507a01da911ed7c25b336 | | figures/sort_dates.json | 03597b528ed761acbdff7615caf29ce807c68c4e59b8e2946d90612e410ac0ae | | meta.json | 288aaa0977b3c4e5aca5c446fa2c4b433f72ce9b193f30952fa547e37dd2f86a | | refs.json | e760f5423903b9750dae882fe2cce2c7178918f7f4b044b6dcc7fed94dc8f58f | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/facts.json - Table 1, figure "gap_timelines" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/gap_timelines.json - Table 2, figure "sort_dates" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/sort_dates.json - Table 3, figure "mode_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/mode_check.json - Table 4, figure "other_surveys" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/other_surveys.json - Table 5, figure "dates_table" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/dates_table.json - Table 6, figure "party_levels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/party_levels.json - Table 7, figure "economy_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/sort-dates-by-attitude/figures/economy_gap.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Cohort change in partisan sorting: report Chapter 1.4 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Cohort change in partisan sorting - Chapter: 1.4 (Part I, The sort; The great sorting) - Question: Did the share of cross-pressured partisans fall within birth cohorts, and how much of the fall could cohort replacement account for? - Dek: Among ANES partisans who place themselves on the ideology scale, conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans fell from 19.6% in 1972 to 6.3% in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File, study years 1972-2024 that carry the seven-point ideology item; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z) - ANES 2024 Time Series. 2024 Time Series, Census region of the sample location (V243007) for the 2024 panel and paper cases; years: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews); weights: none (a respondent attribute) - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative file, even-year waves 2006-2024, party identification and five-point ideology, for the second-survey comparison; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight of each wave (the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026howthesorthappened ```bibtex @misc{singh2026howthesorthappened, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Cohort change in partisan sorting}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted share who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1972 | 19.6% | 95% CI 17.6% to 21.8% | 1,371 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | cross_1972 | | weighted share who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2024 | 6.3% | 95% CI 5.4% to 7.4% | 4,482 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | cross_2024 | | count of study years with placed partisans | ANES study years that carry the seven-point ideology item | 1972-2024 | 22 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_years | | count of placed partisans over all study years | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1972-2024 | 39,662 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_placed | ## Findings In 1972, 19.6% of the Democrats and Republicans in the American National Election Studies (ANES) who placed themselves on the seven-point liberal-conservative scale were conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans, whom this chapter calls cross-pressured partisans. In 2024 the share was 6.3%. (Note: The word has another meaning in Chapter 15.4, Partisans in the other party's territory (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/partisans-outvoted-at-home; planned), which is about partisans who live where their party loses. The correlation between party identification and ideology is the subject of Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology), and Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates the sort attitude by attitude. How tightly issue positions bundle inside each party is the subject of Chapter 1.5, Constraint among issue positions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/constraint-among-issue-positions; planned).) The ANES draws a new sample at each election, so it cannot follow the same people and cannot show that any individual switched. It can show whether the fall occurs within groups of people born in the same years, so every statement in this chapter is about birth cohorts. Two accounts differ in where the fall occurs. Under replacement, each cohort keeps roughly the rate it had when it entered the electorate, and the national share falls as the older cohorts that held mixed positions leave the sample and younger cohorts with lower rates arrive. Under within-cohort change, the rate falls inside each cohort as the years pass. The fall appears inside the cohorts born 1927 to 1974, and the share of it that replacement accounts for depends on assumptions the data cannot test. A placed partisan is a Democrat or Republican, with leaners counted with the party they lean toward, who gives a position on the scale. Positions on the liberal side are liberal, the midpoint is moderate and positions on the conservative side are conservative. A fully sorted partisan is a liberal Democrat or a conservative Republican, the pattern that party sorting produces. The chapter uses the 22 ANES study years since 1972 that carry the item, which gives 39,662 placed partisans, and every estimate uses the survey weights. (Note: Each interval is a confidence interval computed with the Wilson method [1] on the Kish effective sample size [2]. The intervals treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering and stratification, which can raise or lower the variance. The last section says which verdicts a larger variance would change.) ### The cross-pressured share was level until 1990, then fell Table 1 plots the yearly share. From 1972 to 1990 it stayed between 17.0% (95% CI 15.1% to 19.0%) in 1984 and 20.3% (95% CI 17.8% to 23.1%) in 1980. It was 19.7% (95% CI 17.5% to 22.0%) in 1990, 11.5% (95% CI 9.4% to 14.0%) in 2004 and 5.2% (95% CI 4.5% to 5.9%) in 2020, and the fall from 1972 to 2024 is 13.3 (95% CI 10.9 to 15.6) points. The share in 2024, 6.3% (95% CI 5.4% to 7.4%), differs from the 2020 share by +1.2 (95% CI −0.1 to 2.4) points, an interval that includes zero and runs up to 2.4 points, so the data cannot separate a plateau from a rise of up to that size. The 2024 sample mixes interview modes, and the notes to the figure give the estimate for each mode. The 2000 point comes from a study that put the item to a subsample of respondents, which the section on unplaced partisans describes. Table 1. Cross-pressured partisans fell from 19.6% of placed partisans in 1972 to 6.3% in 2024 The fall appears in both parties (the By party tab of Table 1). Conservatives were 24.6% (95% CI 21.7% to 27.8%) of placed Democrats in 1972 and 8.2% (95% CI 6.7% to 10.0%) in 2024. Liberals were 13.1% (95% CI 10.6% to 16.1%) of placed Republicans in 1972 and 4.4% (95% CI 3.3% to 5.8%) in 2024. The 2024 share is 0.33 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.42) of the 1972 share among Democrats and 0.33 (95% CI 0.23 to 0.47) among Republicans, although conservative Democrats started higher and fell further in points. Over the same years the fully sorted share rose from 43.6% (95% CI 41.0% to 46.3%) to 69.3% (95% CI 67.3% to 71.2%) and the moderate share fell from 36.8% (95% CI 34.2% to 39.3%) to 24.4% (95% CI 22.6% to 26.2%) (the Sorted and moderate tab). This is the pattern in Levendusky's account of the partisan sort, in which liberals became Democrats and conservatives became Republicans [3]. ### The fall appears in cohorts born 1927 to 1974 Table 2 traces one birth cohort per panel, and Table 3 gives each cohort's change from its first to its last plotted decade. The 1943 to 1958 cohort went from 17.6% (95% CI 15.7% to 19.6%) in the 1970s to 8.9% (95% CI 7.5% to 10.5%) in the 2010s and 5.0% (95% CI 4.0% to 6.1%) in the 2020s, a change of −12.6 (95% CI −14.9 to −10.4) points. The cohorts born 1927 to 1942 and 1959 to 1974 fell as well, with changes of −8.7 (95% CI −12.6 to −4.7) and −14.9 (95% CI −17.9 to −11.9) points, and the cohort born 1991 or later changed by −4.9 (95% CI −8.6 to −1.1) points between the 2010s and the 2020s. The two oldest cohorts have enough respondents only through the 1980s (born 1895 to 1910) and the 2000s (born 1911 to 1926), and their changes are −3.3 (95% CI −8.5 to 1.9) and −1.5 (95% CI −7.9 to 4.9) points; the change for the 1975 to 1990 cohort, whose first cell has 153 respondents, is −4.9 (95% CI −10.5 to 0.6) points. All three intervals include zero. Table 2. Every cohort born 1927 to 1974 fell, mostly after 1990 Table 3. The changes for the two oldest cohorts and the 1975 to 1990 cohort include zero, and the other cohorts fell #### What a cohort line contains A cohort line follows a group of people born in the same years, and the group changes as the years pass. It mixes four things: individuals who changed party or ideology; loss, because some members of a cohort die or stop answering surveys; entry, because a cohort keeps arriving in the sample as its youngest members reach adulthood; and changes in who is a partisan and who places themselves on the scale. (Note: The 1943 to 1958 cohort was not fully adult in the 1970s. People born from 1955 on reached voting age during that decade, so its 1970s cell includes newcomers to the sample.) A simple bound shows what loss alone would require. In the 1943 to 1958 cohort the odds of being cross-pressured in the 2020s are 0.24 (95% CI 0.19 to 0.32) times the odds in the 1970s. If loss alone produced that fall, the cross-pressured would have had to survive, and stay in the survey samples, at only that fraction of the rate of other partisans over the whole period. The bound covers one channel, loss, and gives no estimate of anyone's mortality or of the other three channels. Studies that re-interview the same people find movement in both directions. A panel of the 1992 to 1996 elections found that people who saw party differences on an issue they cared about changed party to fit their views, and people who saw differences on an issue they did not care about changed their views to fit their party [4]. A panel that followed one cohort from 1973 to 1997 found that partisanship shaped issue orientations early and that issue orientations shaped partisanship later [5]. Work on the 1992 to 1994 ANES panel describes citizens choosing a party identification to match their policy preferences as the parties' positions became clearer [6]. A cohort line also mixes age and period, because a cohort ages a decade in each step and age, period and cohort effects cannot be separated without further assumptions [7]. Chapter 3.6, Age and generation (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation) takes up what repeated surveys can and cannot separate. ### The cohort-mix share of the fall depends on assumptions Table 4 puts a number on replacement. The exercise takes the observed mix of birth cohorts among placed partisans in each decade and applies fixed cohort rates to it. The mix changed: 38.5% of placed partisans in the 1970s were born before 1927, and 73.9% of those in the 2020s were born after 1958. The first version freezes every cohort at its 1970s rate. Cohorts without enough respondents in the 1970s, which are the cohorts born after 1958 and the oldest, take the mean 1970s cohort rate of 18.5%. This version predicts a 2020s share of 18.3% (95% CI 17.1% to 19.5%), against 5.6% (95% CI 5.0% to 6.3%) observed, and the change in the mix alone moves the share by +0.1 (95% CI −0.2 to 0.3) points, which is −0.4% (95% CI −2.2% to 1.4%) of the fall. That result is close to built in, because the assumption gives later cohorts the rate of the older ones. The second version freezes every cohort at its entry rate, the rate it had in the first decade in which it has enough respondents. The older cohorts keep their 1970s rates, and the later ones take 21.4% for people born 1959 to 1974, 10.4% for 1975 to 1990 and 8.9% for 1991 or later. This version predicts 15.1% (95% CI 13.5% to 16.7%) for the 2020s. The mix alone then lowers the share by 3.2 (95% CI 1.3 to 5.0) points, which is 25.2% (95% CI 10.8% to 38.0%) of the fall in the observed share from the 1970s to the 2020s, 12.8 (95% CI 11.5 to 14.2) points. This version credits replacement with everything that distinguishes later cohorts when they arrive, including the part that comes from the years in which they arrived. It is the more generous of the two versions and is not an upper bound. Table 4. Freezing cohort rates predicts a 2020s cross-pressured share of 15.1% to 18.3%, against 5.6% observed Table 5 gives the mix effect under those two versions and three variations of the second: a stricter and a looser rule for a well-observed cell, and a limiting case that holds the cohorts born after 1958 at their own 2020s rates instead of their entry rates. The limiting case counts the fall inside those cohorts as a fixed cohort trait, so it is not a replacement counterfactual, and it shows that the answer depends on the rate given to a cohort before it is observed. Table 5. The share of the fall due to the mix of cohorts ranges from −0.4% to 74.0% depending on the rates given to later cohorts The parts sum to the fall. Under the second version the share falls by 9.6 (95% CI 7.9 to 11.4) points inside cohorts and by 3.2 points through the mix, together 12.8 points. Under the first version the inside-cohort part is 12.9 (95% CI 11.5 to 14.3) points and the mix moves the share by +0.1 points. The inside-cohort part is the observed fall minus the mix part, so it also contains a small residual that the notes to Table 4 give. Both versions are accounting statements. They hold cohort rates fixed by assumption and do not say why the rates fell. ### The education gap widened, then returned to its 1970s size The change in the education mix accounts for 1.3 (95% CI 0.9 to 1.8) points, or 10.3% (95% CI 6.6% to 15.1%), of the fall of 12.7 (95% CI 11.4 to 13.9) points in this sample. College graduates went from 20.6% (95% CI 19.4% to 21.8%) of placed partisans in the 1970s to 41.3% (95% CI 40.0% to 42.6%) in the 2020s, and applying the 1970s education mix to the 2020s group rates gives a cross-pressured share of 7.0% (95% CI 6.1% to 8.1%) in the 2020s, against 5.7% (95% CI 5.1% to 6.4%) observed. The remainder of the fall occurs inside education groups. Table 6 plots the cross-pressured share for each education group. The gap between partisans with a high school education or less and college graduates was 5.4 (95% CI 2.6 to 8.3) points in the 1970s, 11.3 (95% CI 9.2 to 13.5) in the 1990s, 11.0 (95% CI 8.1 to 14.0) in the 2000s and 5.1 (95% CI 3.4 to 6.9) in the 2020s. The 2020s interval excludes zero and overlaps the 1970s interval, so the gap returned to about its starting size and did not close. Table 6. The education gap in the cross-pressured share was 5.4 points in the 1970s, 11.3 in the 1990s and 5.1 in the 2020s College graduates fell first. Their share lies below its 1970s interval from the 1990s on, and the shares of partisans with some college and with a high school education or less lie below theirs from the 2010s on. The timing is descriptive, since the data hold no measure of exposure to elite messages. ### The South's gap in the Democratic share of conservatives closed Table 7 compares the South with the rest of the country. In the 1970s 48.6% (95% CI 44.5% to 52.8%) of placed Southern conservatives were Democrats, against 30.6% (95% CI 27.9% to 33.3%) outside the South, a gap of 18.1 (95% CI 13.1 to 23.0) points. In the 2020s the shares were 9.3% (95% CI 7.7% to 11.2%) and 8.3% (95% CI 7.0% to 9.9%), and the gap of 1.0 (95% CI −1.3 to 3.3) points is within sampling error of zero. The cross-pressured share of all placed partisans fell in both regions, from 22.9% (95% CI 20.7% to 25.2%) to 6.9% (95% CI 5.9% to 8.1%) in the South and from 16.4% (95% CI 15.1% to 17.8%) to 4.9% (95% CI 4.2% to 5.6%) elsewhere, and a gap of 2.0 (95% CI 0.7 to 3.3) points remains, down from 6.5 (95% CI 3.9 to 9.1) points in the 1970s. Table 7. Southern and other partisans converged as the Democratic share of conservatives fell from 48.6% to 9.3% in the South and 30.6% to 8.3% elsewhere The rise of Southern Republicans has been traced through offices and elections [8], and the data here describe how respondents label themselves. The cumulative file has no region for the 2,049 placed partisans among the 2024 panel and paper cases, the same cases that have no mode weight. Their region comes from the sample location recorded in the 2024 Time Series file, which reproduces the cumulative-file flag for every 2024 respondent who has both. Chapter 1.7, The South (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-south; planned) compares the region with the rest of the country on other gaps. ### The fall is smaller with unplaced partisans in the base The base of every share so far is the placed partisans, and that base changed. The share of partisans who placed themselves was 59.7% (95% CI 57.7% to 61.7%) in 1972, between 65.2% and 81.2% in the study years from 1974 to 2008 other than 2000, between 77.1% and 92.5% from 2012 to 2024, and 85.8% (95% CI 84.3% to 87.1%) in 2024. The 2000 value, 35.6% (95% CI 33.1% to 38.3%), reflects the design of that study. 52.1% of the 2000 respondents have no recorded answer to the item, against at most 0.9% in 1996, 1998, 2002 and 2004, and among the respondents who have an answer the share choosing "don't know" is 22.3%, inside the 16.8% to 24.0% range of those years. That pattern fits an item put to a subsample of respondents. The 2000 point therefore rests on 603 placed partisans, and its low placement rate is not evidence that more partisans declined the scale. The design is inferred from the response pattern and has not been checked against the codebook. Partisans who decline the scale are outside every share above, and many Americans do not describe their views with ideological labels [9]. Three checks ask whether the fall depends on who is in the base. The first reweights placed partisans, within each year, to the party, education, age group and race mix of all partisans in that year. The second divides cross-pressured partisans by everyone with a party identification and a placement, so pure independents stay in the denominator. The third divides by all partisans and counts those who did not place themselves as not cross-pressured; Table 8 leaves that series blank for 2000, when the item went to a subsample. The reweighted share goes from 19.9% (95% CI 17.8% to 22.2%) to 6.9% (95% CI 5.8% to 8.1%), a fall of 13.0 (95% CI 10.5 to 15.5) points, and the share with independents included from 17.4% (95% CI 15.6% to 19.4%) to 6.0% (95% CI 5.1% to 7.1%), a fall of 11.4 (95% CI 9.2 to 13.5) points, against 19.6% and 6.3% for the placed partisans. The share of all partisans goes from 11.7% (95% CI 10.5% to 13.1%) to 5.4% (95% CI 4.6% to 6.4%), a fall of 6.3 (95% CI 4.7 to 7.9) points against 13.3 points for the placed partisans, because the share of partisans who placed themselves rose from 59.7% to 85.8%. Table 8. The fall is 11.4 to 13.3 points under three bases and 6.3 points when unplaced partisans count as not cross-pressured The reweighting corrects for the traits it uses. The 13.3-point fall for placed partisans carries over to all partisans only if the partisans who place themselves resemble those who do not on those traits, an assumption the ANES cannot test. With no assumption about the unplaced, the 1972 share lies between 11.7% and 52.0% and the 2024 share between 5.4% and 19.6%. The two ranges overlap, so the data alone fix neither the direction nor the size of the change. ### A second survey follows a different path, 2008 to 2016 The Cooperative Election Study (CES) asks party identification and a five-point ideology item every year from 2006. It is an opt-in online sample, and its intervals, like the ANES intervals, describe sampling variation and leave out selection into the sample. This chapter uses the even-year waves, which are the main national waves, and leaves out the smaller odd-year waves. The series starts after most of the ANES fall, so it cannot show whether the fall happened. Within a survey the coding is held fixed, so a path needs no mapping between the scales. From 2008 to 2016 the ANES share fell by 4.1 (95% CI 1.8 to 6.4) points and the CES share rose by 3.0 (95% CI 2.5 to 3.4) points (Table 9). From 2008 to 2024 both fell, the ANES by 4.9 (95% CI 2.7 to 7.2) points and the CES by 1.8 (95% CI 1.4 to 2.2). The chapter takes from the CES only that both surveys read lower in 2024 than in 2008 and that the CES does not follow the ANES path from 2008 to 2016. It does not use the CES to corroborate the size of the ANES fall. Table 9. From 2008 to 2016 the ANES cross-pressured share fell while the CES share rose Levels are a different matter, because the two surveys use different scales and the level of the cross-pressured share depends on how the seven-point scale is mapped to the five-point one. Table 10 gives the CES-to-ANES ratio of the share under two mappings. When every point on each side of the midpoint counts as liberal or conservative, the ratio is 0.49 (95% CI 0.40 to 0.59) in 2008 and 0.58 (95% CI 0.48 to 0.70) in 2024, so the CES share is the lower one in both years. When only the two outer points on each side count, the ratio is 1.22 (95% CI 0.90 to 1.64) and 1.41 (95% CI 1.07 to 1.85), and its interval lies above one in every shared year except 2008. The sign of the level difference follows the mapping, and no mapping is correct by construction, so the chapter draws no conclusion about which survey reads higher. Table 10. The CES share is above or below the ANES share depending on how the seven-point scale is mapped to the five-point one ### What these data cannot show Repeated cross-sections cannot show that any person switched, and no panel is in this chapter's data. The chapter also cannot say which identity moved. A conservative Democrat who leaves the cross-pressured group may have changed party to match ideology or changed ideology to match party, and the share counts both the same way. Age, period and cohort are not separated. The accounting exercise rests on assumptions about the rates of cohorts that were not observed in the 1970s. The versions above put the share of the fall due to the mix of cohorts at −0.4% in the first version, at 25.2% in the second and at 74.0% in the limiting case, and the data do not choose among them. The measure covers only people who place themselves on the scale. The reweighting handles differences in observed traits, and the ANES cannot show what people who decline the scale would have answered; with them in the base the fall is smaller. The scale may mean different things across decades and education groups, and the CES comparison shows that a comparison of levels across scales depends on the mapping. The ANES added an online sample in 2012, has no weights by interview mode for 2020, and gives a 2024 estimate that differs by mode within sampling error. The intervals are model based and ignore clustering and stratification, which can raise or lower the variance, and the chapter runs no design-based check. As an illustration, if clustering made the sampling variance larger by a design effect (the ratio of the true sampling variance to the model-based variance) of 2, every interval would extend 41% further from its estimate on each side. Among the cohort changes, the cohort-mix effect, the regional and education gaps and the fall from 1972 to 2024, one verdict would change: the interval for the change in the cohort born 1991 or later would become −4.9 (95% CI −10.1 to 0.4) and include zero. The data hold no measure of what parties and elites did. One account in the literature holds that party leaders clarified what the labels meant [3], and this chapter tests none of it. Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates the sort issue by issue. ## Tables ### Table 1. Cross-pressured partisans fell from 19.6% of placed partisans in 1972 to 6.3% in 2024 Percent of placed partisans who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans, ANES 1972-2024, with 95% intervals | Measure | Year | Share (%) | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents in the base | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1972 | 19.6 | 17.6 | 21.8 | 1,371 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1974 | 18.4 | 15.7 | 21.3 | 977 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1976 | 17.8 | 15.8 | 20.0 | 1,306 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1978 | 18.0 | 16.1 | 20.0 | 1,430 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1980 | 20.3 | 17.8 | 23.1 | 892 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1982 | 18.1 | 15.6 | 20.9 | 806 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1984 | 17.0 | 15.1 | 19.0 | 1,401 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1986 | 18.5 | 16.5 | 20.5 | 1,441 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1988 | 18.6 | 16.6 | 20.8 | 1,286 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1990 | 19.7 | 17.5 | 22.0 | 1,220 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1992 | 16.9 | 15.2 | 18.8 | 1,630 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1994 | 13.6 | 11.7 | 15.8 | 1,279 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1996 | 14.5 | 12.5 | 16.9 | 1,233 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1998 | 15.6 | 13.2 | 18.3 | 922 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2000 | 16.0 | 13.0 | 19.5 | 603 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2002 | 14.9 | 12.6 | 17.5 | 1,171 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2004 | 11.5 | 9.4 | 14.0 | 849 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2008 | 11.3 | 9.4 | 13.4 | 1,448 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2012 | 9.8 | 8.7 | 11.0 | 4,613 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2016 | 7.2 | 6.2 | 8.4 | 2,949 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2020 | 5.2 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 6,353 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2024 | 6.3 | 5.4 | 7.4 | 4,482 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1972 | 24.6 | 21.7 | 27.8 | 776 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1974 | 23.0 | 19.2 | 27.1 | 573 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1976 | 24.1 | 21.0 | 27.4 | 725 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1978 | 23.1 | 20.4 | 26.0 | 867 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1980 | 28.0 | 24.3 | 32.0 | 515 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1982 | 25.5 | 21.8 | 29.6 | 479 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1984 | 22.3 | 19.4 | 25.4 | 719 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1986 | 24.6 | 21.7 | 27.7 | 793 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1988 | 27.4 | 24.1 | 31.0 | 638 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1990 | 25.9 | 22.7 | 29.3 | 673 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1992 | 23.4 | 20.7 | 26.3 | 871 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1994 | 22.6 | 19.2 | 26.5 | 622 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1996 | 21.8 | 18.5 | 25.4 | 667 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 1998 | 21.5 | 17.9 | 25.6 | 515 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 2000 | 22.3 | 17.6 | 27.7 | 319 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 2002 | 21.1 | 17.3 | 25.6 | 568 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 2004 | 16.1 | 12.7 | 20.2 | 438 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 2008 | 16.6 | 13.7 | 19.9 | 894 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 2012 | 14.5 | 12.7 | 16.4 | 2,709 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 2016 | 10.3 | 8.6 | 12.3 | 1,467 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 2020 | 6.6 | 5.5 | 7.8 | 3,277 | | Conservative share of placed Democrats | 2024 | 8.2 | 6.7 | 10.0 | 2,310 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1972 | 13.1 | 10.6 | 16.1 | 595 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1974 | 11.4 | 8.3 | 15.4 | 404 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1976 | 9.8 | 7.6 | 12.5 | 581 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1978 | 10.1 | 7.9 | 12.9 | 563 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1980 | 9.8 | 7.2 | 13.2 | 377 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1982 | 7.3 | 5.0 | 10.7 | 327 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1984 | 11.4 | 9.3 | 14.0 | 682 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1986 | 11.0 | 8.8 | 13.6 | 648 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1988 | 9.9 | 7.8 | 12.4 | 648 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1990 | 12.1 | 9.6 | 15.1 | 547 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1992 | 9.5 | 7.6 | 11.8 | 759 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1994 | 5.1 | 3.5 | 7.3 | 657 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1996 | 6.1 | 4.3 | 8.7 | 566 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 1998 | 8.3 | 5.9 | 11.7 | 407 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 2000 | 8.7 | 5.8 | 13.0 | 284 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 2002 | 8.4 | 6.1 | 11.4 | 603 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 2004 | 6.6 | 4.4 | 9.7 | 411 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 2008 | 5.2 | 3.5 | 7.8 | 554 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 2012 | 4.6 | 3.5 | 5.9 | 1,904 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 2016 | 4.0 | 3.0 | 5.4 | 1,482 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 2020 | 3.7 | 3.0 | 4.7 | 3,076 | | Liberal share of placed Republicans | 2024 | 4.4 | 3.3 | 5.8 | 2,172 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1972 | 43.6 | 41.0 | 46.3 | 1,371 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1974 | 46.0 | 42.4 | 49.6 | 977 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1976 | 46.9 | 44.2 | 49.7 | 1,306 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1978 | 46.7 | 44.1 | 49.3 | 1,430 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1980 | 50.2 | 46.9 | 53.5 | 892 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1982 | 47.5 | 44.1 | 51.0 | 806 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1984 | 51.6 | 49.0 | 54.2 | 1,401 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1986 | 46.1 | 43.5 | 48.7 | 1,441 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1988 | 51.8 | 49.1 | 54.5 | 1,286 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1990 | 44.8 | 42.1 | 47.6 | 1,220 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1992 | 53.2 | 50.7 | 55.6 | 1,630 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1994 | 53.2 | 50.2 | 56.2 | 1,279 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1996 | 55.0 | 51.9 | 58.0 | 1,233 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 1998 | 50.2 | 46.7 | 53.7 | 922 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 2000 | 54.2 | 49.7 | 58.5 | 603 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 2002 | 57.7 | 54.3 | 61.1 | 1,171 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 2004 | 57.0 | 53.3 | 60.6 | 849 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 2008 | 63.1 | 60.0 | 66.1 | 1,448 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 2012 | 60.6 | 58.7 | 62.5 | 4,613 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 2016 | 68.8 | 66.8 | 70.7 | 2,949 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 2020 | 71.7 | 70.2 | 73.1 | 6,353 | | Fully sorted share of placed partisans | 2024 | 69.3 | 67.3 | 71.2 | 4,482 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1972 | 36.8 | 34.2 | 39.3 | 1,371 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1974 | 35.6 | 32.2 | 39.2 | 977 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1976 | 35.3 | 32.7 | 38.0 | 1,306 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1978 | 35.3 | 32.9 | 37.8 | 1,430 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1980 | 29.5 | 26.6 | 32.6 | 892 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1982 | 34.4 | 31.2 | 37.7 | 806 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1984 | 31.4 | 29.0 | 33.9 | 1,401 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1986 | 35.5 | 33.0 | 38.0 | 1,441 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1988 | 29.6 | 27.2 | 32.2 | 1,286 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1990 | 35.5 | 32.9 | 38.2 | 1,220 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1992 | 29.9 | 27.8 | 32.2 | 1,630 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1994 | 33.1 | 30.4 | 36.0 | 1,279 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1996 | 30.5 | 27.7 | 33.4 | 1,233 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 1998 | 34.2 | 31.0 | 37.6 | 922 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 2000 | 29.9 | 26.0 | 34.1 | 603 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 2002 | 27.4 | 24.4 | 30.6 | 1,171 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 2004 | 31.5 | 28.2 | 35.0 | 849 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 2008 | 25.6 | 22.9 | 28.5 | 1,448 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 2012 | 29.6 | 27.9 | 31.4 | 4,613 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 2016 | 24.0 | 22.2 | 25.9 | 2,949 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 2020 | 23.2 | 21.8 | 24.6 | 6,353 | | Moderate share of placed partisans | 2024 | 24.4 | 22.6 | 26.2 | 4,482 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1972 | 19.6 | 17.6 | 21.8 | 1,371 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1974 | 18.4 | 15.7 | 21.3 | 977 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1976 | 17.8 | 15.8 | 20.0 | 1,306 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1978 | 18.0 | 16.1 | 20.0 | 1,430 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1980 | 20.3 | 17.8 | 23.1 | 892 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1982 | 18.1 | 15.6 | 20.9 | 806 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1984 | 17.0 | 15.1 | 19.0 | 1,401 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1986 | 18.5 | 16.5 | 20.5 | 1,441 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1988 | 18.6 | 16.6 | 20.8 | 1,286 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1990 | 19.7 | 17.5 | 22.0 | 1,220 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1992 | 16.9 | 15.2 | 18.8 | 1,630 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1994 | 13.6 | 11.7 | 15.8 | 1,279 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1996 | 14.5 | 12.5 | 16.9 | 1,233 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 1998 | 15.6 | 13.2 | 18.3 | 922 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2000 | 16.0 | 13.0 | 19.5 | 603 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2002 | 14.9 | 12.6 | 17.5 | 1,171 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2004 | 11.5 | 9.4 | 14.0 | 849 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2008 | 11.3 | 9.4 | 13.4 | 1,448 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2012 | 9.8 | 8.7 | 11.0 | 4,613 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2016 | 7.2 | 6.2 | 8.4 | 2,949 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2020 | 5.2 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 6,353 | | Cross-pressured share of placed partisans | 2024 | 6.3 | 5.4 | 7.4 | 4,482 | Views: Cross-pressured share (view = overall); By party (view = party); Sorted and moderate (view = three). Note: There was no ANES study in 2006, 2010 or 2014, so the line joins the neighboring study years. Note: The 2000 point rests on 603 placed partisans, the fewest in any year. The seven-point item went to a subsample of respondents that year: 52.1% of respondents have no recorded answer, and 35.6% of partisans placed themselves. Note: The ANES adds an online sample in 2012, and 2020 has no separate weights by interview mode. In 2024 the share is 7.2% in the face-to-face sample, 4.6% in the web sample and 7.1% among the 2,049 panel and paper cases (45.7% of the placed partisans in 2024), which have no separate weights by interview mode. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); placed partisans, leaners included Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/cross_share.json ### Table 2. Every cohort born 1927 to 1974 fell, mostly after 1990 Cross-pressured share of placed partisans by birth cohort (solid) and for all placed partisans (dashed), ANES survey years pooled by decade, 1972-2024, with 95% intervals | Panel | Series | Survey years pooled | Share (%) | Interval low | Interval high | Placed partisans | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Born 1895-1910 | This cohort | 1972-1978 | 19.7 | 16.6 | 23.3 | 644 | | Born 1895-1910 | This cohort | 1980-1988 | 16.5 | 12.8 | 20.9 | 328 | | Born 1895-1910 | All placed partisans | 1972-1978 | 18.4 | 17.3 | 19.6 | 5,084 | | Born 1895-1910 | All placed partisans | 1980-1988 | 18.4 | 17.4 | 19.4 | 5,826 | | Born 1895-1910 | All placed partisans | 1990-1998 | 16.2 | 15.2 | 17.1 | 6,284 | | Born 1895-1910 | All placed partisans | 2000-2008 | 12.9 | 11.8 | 14.2 | 4,071 | | Born 1895-1910 | All placed partisans | 2012-2016 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 9.7 | 7,562 | | Born 1895-1910 | All placed partisans | 2020-2024 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 10,835 | | Born 1911-1926 | This cohort | 1972-1978 | 18.1 | 15.9 | 20.5 | 1,262 | | Born 1911-1926 | This cohort | 1980-1988 | 18.5 | 16.3 | 21.0 | 1,053 | | Born 1911-1926 | This cohort | 1990-1998 | 19.8 | 17.1 | 22.7 | 835 | | Born 1911-1926 | This cohort | 2000-2008 | 16.6 | 11.5 | 23.4 | 201 | | Born 1911-1926 | All placed partisans | 1972-1978 | 18.4 | 17.3 | 19.6 | 5,084 | | Born 1911-1926 | All placed partisans | 1980-1988 | 18.4 | 17.4 | 19.4 | 5,826 | | Born 1911-1926 | All placed partisans | 1990-1998 | 16.2 | 15.2 | 17.1 | 6,284 | | Born 1911-1926 | All placed partisans | 2000-2008 | 12.9 | 11.8 | 14.2 | 4,071 | | Born 1911-1926 | All placed partisans | 2012-2016 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 9.7 | 7,562 | | Born 1911-1926 | All placed partisans | 2020-2024 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 10,835 | | Born 1927-1942 | This cohort | 1972-1978 | 18.7 | 16.5 | 21.0 | 1,324 | | Born 1927-1942 | This cohort | 1980-1988 | 18.3 | 16.2 | 20.5 | 1,276 | | Born 1927-1942 | This cohort | 1990-1998 | 16.6 | 14.5 | 19.0 | 1,174 | | Born 1927-1942 | This cohort | 2000-2008 | 12.2 | 9.6 | 15.5 | 678 | | Born 1927-1942 | This cohort | 2012-2016 | 7.9 | 5.8 | 10.7 | 797 | | Born 1927-1942 | This cohort | 2020-2024 | 10.0 | 7.3 | 13.7 | 625 | | Born 1927-1942 | All placed partisans | 1972-1978 | 18.4 | 17.3 | 19.6 | 5,084 | | Born 1927-1942 | All placed partisans | 1980-1988 | 18.4 | 17.4 | 19.4 | 5,826 | | Born 1927-1942 | All placed partisans | 1990-1998 | 16.2 | 15.2 | 17.1 | 6,284 | | Born 1927-1942 | All placed partisans | 2000-2008 | 12.9 | 11.8 | 14.2 | 4,071 | | Born 1927-1942 | All placed partisans | 2012-2016 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 9.7 | 7,562 | | Born 1927-1942 | All placed partisans | 2020-2024 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 10,835 | | Born 1943-1958 | This cohort | 1972-1978 | 17.6 | 15.7 | 19.6 | 1,702 | | Born 1943-1958 | This cohort | 1980-1988 | 17.5 | 16.0 | 19.1 | 2,279 | | Born 1943-1958 | This cohort | 1990-1998 | 15.1 | 13.5 | 16.7 | 2,120 | | Born 1943-1958 | This cohort | 2000-2008 | 13.5 | 11.4 | 15.8 | 1,263 | | Born 1943-1958 | This cohort | 2012-2016 | 8.9 | 7.5 | 10.5 | 2,392 | | Born 1943-1958 | This cohort | 2020-2024 | 5.0 | 4.0 | 6.1 | 2,910 | | Born 1943-1958 | All placed partisans | 1972-1978 | 18.4 | 17.3 | 19.6 | 5,084 | | Born 1943-1958 | All placed partisans | 1980-1988 | 18.4 | 17.4 | 19.4 | 5,826 | | Born 1943-1958 | All placed partisans | 1990-1998 | 16.2 | 15.2 | 17.1 | 6,284 | | Born 1943-1958 | All placed partisans | 2000-2008 | 12.9 | 11.8 | 14.2 | 4,071 | | Born 1943-1958 | All placed partisans | 2012-2016 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 9.7 | 7,562 | | Born 1943-1958 | All placed partisans | 2020-2024 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 10,835 | | Born 1959-1974 | This cohort | 1980-1988 | 21.4 | 18.8 | 24.3 | 863 | | Born 1959-1974 | This cohort | 1990-1998 | 16.5 | 14.8 | 18.3 | 1,881 | | Born 1959-1974 | This cohort | 2000-2008 | 12.7 | 10.7 | 15.0 | 1,248 | | Born 1959-1974 | This cohort | 2012-2016 | 9.4 | 7.9 | 11.1 | 2,037 | | Born 1959-1974 | This cohort | 2020-2024 | 6.5 | 5.4 | 7.9 | 2,785 | | Born 1959-1974 | All placed partisans | 1972-1978 | 18.4 | 17.3 | 19.6 | 5,084 | | Born 1959-1974 | All placed partisans | 1980-1988 | 18.4 | 17.4 | 19.4 | 5,826 | | Born 1959-1974 | All placed partisans | 1990-1998 | 16.2 | 15.2 | 17.1 | 6,284 | | Born 1959-1974 | All placed partisans | 2000-2008 | 12.9 | 11.8 | 14.2 | 4,071 | | Born 1959-1974 | All placed partisans | 2012-2016 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 9.7 | 7,562 | | Born 1959-1974 | All placed partisans | 2020-2024 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 10,835 | | Born 1975-1990 | This cohort | 1990-1998 | 10.4 | 6.2 | 17.1 | 153 | | Born 1975-1990 | This cohort | 2000-2008 | 12.3 | 9.6 | 15.8 | 641 | | Born 1975-1990 | This cohort | 2012-2016 | 8.4 | 6.9 | 10.3 | 1,758 | | Born 1975-1990 | This cohort | 2020-2024 | 5.5 | 4.5 | 6.8 | 2,789 | | Born 1975-1990 | All placed partisans | 1972-1978 | 18.4 | 17.3 | 19.6 | 5,084 | | Born 1975-1990 | All placed partisans | 1980-1988 | 18.4 | 17.4 | 19.4 | 5,826 | | Born 1975-1990 | All placed partisans | 1990-1998 | 16.2 | 15.2 | 17.1 | 6,284 | | Born 1975-1990 | All placed partisans | 2000-2008 | 12.9 | 11.8 | 14.2 | 4,071 | | Born 1975-1990 | All placed partisans | 2012-2016 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 9.7 | 7,562 | | Born 1975-1990 | All placed partisans | 2020-2024 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 10,835 | | Born 1991 or later | This cohort | 2012-2016 | 8.9 | 6.0 | 13.0 | 407 | | Born 1991 or later | This cohort | 2020-2024 | 4.0 | 2.8 | 5.7 | 1,363 | | Born 1991 or later | All placed partisans | 1972-1978 | 18.4 | 17.3 | 19.6 | 5,084 | | Born 1991 or later | All placed partisans | 1980-1988 | 18.4 | 17.4 | 19.4 | 5,826 | | Born 1991 or later | All placed partisans | 1990-1998 | 16.2 | 15.2 | 17.1 | 6,284 | | Born 1991 or later | All placed partisans | 2000-2008 | 12.9 | 11.8 | 14.2 | 4,071 | | Born 1991 or later | All placed partisans | 2012-2016 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 9.7 | 7,562 | | Born 1991 or later | All placed partisans | 2020-2024 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 10,835 | Note: A cell is plotted only when it has 100 or more placed partisans and an effective sample (the sample size after weighting) of 100 or more, the floor of this chapter, so a line starts and ends where the cohort is well observed. The two oldest cohorts are plotted for only two and four decades. Note: The pooled 2020s combine 2020 and 2024, and 553 placed partisans with no birth cohort in the file are excluded from the cohort lines. The dashed line uses all placed partisans, including those with no birth cohort. Note: Two cells below the floor are not plotted: the 1895-1910 cohort in the 1990s (13.1%, 105 respondents) and the 1911-1926 cohort in the 2010s (12.8%, 60 respondents). Note: The 1927-1942 cohort is at 7.9% in the 2010s and 10.0% in the 2020s, a difference of +2.1 points that is within sampling error. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); placed partisans, leaners included Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/cohort_panels.json ### Table 3. The changes for the two oldest cohorts and the 1975 to 1990 cohort include zero, and the other cohorts fell Change in the cross-pressured share of placed partisans from a cohort's first to its last plotted decade, ANES 1972-2024, with 95% intervals | Cohort | First plotted decade | Last plotted decade | Change (points) | Interval low | Interval high | Placed partisans in the two cells | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Born 1895-1910 | 1970s | 1980s | −3.3 | −8.5 | +1.9 | 972 | | Born 1911-1926 | 1970s | 2000s | −1.5 | −7.9 | +4.9 | 1,463 | | Born 1927-1942 | 1970s | 2020s | −8.7 | −12.6 | −4.7 | 1,949 | | Born 1943-1958 | 1970s | 2020s | −12.6 | −14.9 | −10.4 | 4,612 | | Born 1959-1974 | 1980s | 2020s | −14.9 | −17.9 | −11.9 | 3,648 | | Born 1975-1990 | 1990s | 2020s | −4.9 | −10.5 | +0.6 | 2,942 | | Born 1991 or later | 2010s | 2020s | −4.9 | −8.6 | −1.1 | 1,770 | Note: Plotted decades by cohort: Born 1895-1910, 1970s to 1980s; Born 1911-1926, 1970s to 2000s; Born 1927-1942, 1970s to 2020s; Born 1943-1958, 1970s to 2020s; Born 1959-1974, 1980s to 2020s; Born 1975-1990, 1990s to 2020s; Born 1991 or later, 2010s to 2020s. Note: The 1975-1990 cohort's first plotted cell has 153 placed partisans, close to the floor of 100. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); placed partisans, leaners included Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/cohort_changes.json ### Table 4. Freezing cohort rates predicts a 2020s cross-pressured share of 15.1% to 18.3%, against 5.6% observed Cross-pressured share of placed partisans, observed and under two frozen-rate counterfactuals, ANES survey years pooled by decade, 1972-2024, with 95% bootstrap intervals | Series | Survey years pooled | Share (%) | Interval low | Interval high | Placed partisans | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Observed | 1972-1978 | 18.5 | 17.3 | 19.6 | 5,059 | | Observed | 1980-1988 | 18.4 | 17.4 | 19.3 | 5,808 | | Observed | 1990-1998 | 16.2 | 15.2 | 17.1 | 6,268 | | Observed | 2000-2008 | 12.9 | 11.8 | 14.2 | 4,034 | | Observed | 2012-2016 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 9.7 | 7,451 | | Observed | 2020-2024 | 5.6 | 5.0 | 6.3 | 10,489 | | 1970s rates | 1972-1978 | 18.3 | 17.1 | 19.5 | 5,059 | | 1970s rates | 1980-1988 | 18.2 | 16.9 | 19.4 | 5,808 | | 1970s rates | 1990-1998 | 18.2 | 17.0 | 19.4 | 6,268 | | 1970s rates | 2000-2008 | 18.3 | 17.0 | 19.5 | 4,034 | | 1970s rates | 2012-2016 | 18.3 | 17.0 | 19.4 | 7,451 | | 1970s rates | 2020-2024 | 18.3 | 17.1 | 19.5 | 10,489 | | Entry rates | 1972-1978 | 18.3 | 17.1 | 19.5 | 5,059 | | Entry rates | 1980-1988 | 18.6 | 17.5 | 19.7 | 5,808 | | Entry rates | 1990-1998 | 18.8 | 17.6 | 20.0 | 6,268 | | Entry rates | 2000-2008 | 17.5 | 16.1 | 19.1 | 4,034 | | Entry rates | 2012-2016 | 16.2 | 14.6 | 17.9 | 7,451 | | Entry rates | 2020-2024 | 15.1 | 13.5 | 16.7 | 10,489 | Note: Placed partisans with no birth cohort in the file are left out of all three series so that the accounting is exact. Note: Cohorts not observed with 100 or more placed partisans in the 1970s take the mean 1970s cohort rate of 18.5% in the first counterfactual. Note: The within-cohort part of the fall is the observed fall minus the mix part, so it includes a baseline residual: the frozen rates applied to the 1970s mix predict a 1970s share 0.2 points (1970s rates) and 0.2 points (entry rates) below the observed one. Note: The bootstrap re-draws respondents with replacement within each pooled decade many times and re-estimates every quantity each time; the intervals are the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles. Note: Bands are drawn for the observed and entry-rate lines; the interval of the 1970s-rate line is in the data table. Differences are computed from unrounded values, so a printed difference can differ in the last digit from the difference of the printed shares. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); placed partisans, leaners included; intervals from a bootstrap over respondents within pooled decades (1,000 replicates, seed 12345) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/frozen_cohorts.json ### Table 5. The share of the fall due to the mix of cohorts ranges from −0.4% to 74.0% depending on the rates given to later cohorts Change in the cross-pressured share of placed partisans from the 1970s to the 2020s that the mix of birth cohorts produces under five assumptions about cohort rates, with 95% bootstrap intervals | Assumption about cohort rates | Change from the mix (points) | 95% interval low (points) | 95% interval high (points) | Share of the fall (%) | 95% interval low (%) | 95% interval high (%) | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Every cohort at its 1970s rate | +0.1 | −0.2 | +0.3 | −0.4 | −2.2 | 1.4 | | Every cohort at its entry rate | −3.2 | −5.0 | −1.3 | 25.2 | 10.8 | 38.0 | | Entry rates, stricter rule for a well-observed cell | −2.8 | −4.4 | −1.1 | 21.4 | 9.0 | 32.6 | | Entry rates, looser rule for a well-observed cell | −3.3 | −5.1 | −1.4 | 26.0 | 11.6 | 38.9 | | Cohorts born after 1958 at their own 2020s rates (limiting case) | −9.5 | −10.7 | −8.4 | 74.0 | 70.6 | 77.8 | Note: The change from the mix is the frozen-rate share in the 2020s minus the frozen-rate share in the 1970s, in percentage points; the share of the fall is that change divided by the observed change. Differences are computed from unrounded values, so a printed difference can differ in the last digit from the difference of the printed shares. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); placed partisans, leaners included; intervals from a bootstrap over respondents within pooled decades Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/mix_versions.json ### Table 6. The education gap in the cross-pressured share was 5.4 points in the 1970s, 11.3 in the 1990s and 5.1 in the 2020s Cross-pressured share of placed partisans by highest education and for all placed partisans (dashed), ANES survey years pooled by decade, 1972-2024, with 95% intervals | Series | Survey years pooled | Share (%) | Interval low | Interval high | Placed partisans | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | College degree | 1972-1978 | 15.1 | 12.9 | 17.6 | 1,039 | | College degree | 1980-1988 | 12.6 | 11.0 | 14.4 | 1,448 | | College degree | 1990-1998 | 9.8 | 8.5 | 11.2 | 1,960 | | College degree | 2000-2008 | 6.9 | 5.5 | 8.7 | 1,438 | | College degree | 2012-2016 | 5.2 | 4.3 | 6.3 | 2,953 | | College degree | 2020-2024 | 3.6 | 3.0 | 4.3 | 5,419 | | Some college | 1972-1978 | 15.9 | 13.7 | 18.3 | 1,124 | | Some college | 1980-1988 | 17.8 | 16.0 | 19.8 | 1,616 | | Some college | 1990-1998 | 14.8 | 13.1 | 16.7 | 1,706 | | Some college | 2000-2008 | 13.6 | 11.6 | 15.9 | 1,320 | | Some college | 2012-2016 | 8.0 | 6.8 | 9.5 | 2,518 | | Some college | 2020-2024 | 5.6 | 4.6 | 6.7 | 3,431 | | High school or less | 1972-1978 | 20.5 | 19.0 | 22.2 | 2,906 | | High school or less | 1980-1988 | 21.7 | 20.2 | 23.3 | 2,712 | | High school or less | 1990-1998 | 21.1 | 19.5 | 22.8 | 2,513 | | High school or less | 2000-2008 | 18.0 | 15.6 | 20.6 | 1,294 | | High school or less | 2012-2016 | 13.3 | 11.5 | 15.3 | 2,011 | | High school or less | 2020-2024 | 8.7 | 7.2 | 10.5 | 1,874 | | All placed partisans | 1972-1978 | 18.4 | 17.3 | 19.6 | 5,084 | | All placed partisans | 1980-1988 | 18.4 | 17.4 | 19.4 | 5,826 | | All placed partisans | 1990-1998 | 16.2 | 15.2 | 17.1 | 6,284 | | All placed partisans | 2000-2008 | 12.9 | 11.8 | 14.2 | 4,071 | | All placed partisans | 2012-2016 | 8.8 | 8.0 | 9.7 | 7,562 | | All placed partisans | 2020-2024 | 5.7 | 5.1 | 6.3 | 10,835 | Note: Grade school and high school are combined because the grade-school cells fall below the floor of 100 respondents in the 2000s and 2010s. Note: The pooled 2020s combine 2020 and 2024. The gap is the high school or less share minus the college share. Differences are computed from unrounded values, so a printed difference can differ in the last digit from the difference of the printed shares. Note: Bands are drawn for the three education groups; the interval of the dashed line is in the data table. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); placed partisans, leaners included Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/education_panels.json ### Table 7. Southern and other partisans converged as the Democratic share of conservatives fell from 48.6% to 9.3% in the South and 30.6% to 8.3% elsewhere Two shares of placed partisans by region (Census South and the rest of the country), ANES survey years pooled by decade, 1972-2024, with 95% intervals | Measure | Region | Survey years pooled | Share (%) | Interval low | Interval high | Placed partisans | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | South | 1972-1978 | 22.9 | 20.7 | 25.2 | 1,591 | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | South | 1980-1988 | 22.6 | 20.7 | 24.6 | 1,813 | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | South | 1990-1998 | 18.6 | 16.8 | 20.4 | 2,024 | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | South | 2000-2008 | 14.5 | 12.5 | 16.7 | 1,548 | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | South | 2012-2016 | 10.3 | 8.9 | 11.8 | 2,847 | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | South | 2020-2024 | 6.9 | 5.9 | 8.1 | 3,993 | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | Non-South | 1972-1978 | 16.4 | 15.1 | 17.8 | 3,493 | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | Non-South | 1980-1988 | 16.4 | 15.3 | 17.6 | 4,013 | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | Non-South | 1990-1998 | 15.0 | 13.9 | 16.2 | 4,260 | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | Non-South | 2000-2008 | 12.0 | 10.6 | 13.6 | 2,521 | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | Non-South | 2012-2016 | 8.0 | 7.0 | 9.0 | 4,715 | | Cross-pressured, % of placed partisans | Non-South | 2020-2024 | 4.9 | 4.2 | 5.6 | 6,842 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | South | 1972-1978 | 48.6 | 44.5 | 52.8 | 653 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | South | 1980-1988 | 40.9 | 37.6 | 44.4 | 799 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | South | 1990-1998 | 32.4 | 29.4 | 35.7 | 943 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | South | 2000-2008 | 22.7 | 19.3 | 26.5 | 735 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | South | 2012-2016 | 17.2 | 14.8 | 20.0 | 1,291 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | South | 2020-2024 | 9.3 | 7.7 | 11.2 | 1,910 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | Non-South | 1972-1978 | 30.6 | 27.9 | 33.3 | 1,299 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | Non-South | 1980-1988 | 27.5 | 25.4 | 29.7 | 1,705 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | Non-South | 1990-1998 | 26.8 | 24.7 | 29.1 | 1,744 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | Non-South | 2000-2008 | 21.5 | 18.7 | 24.7 | 999 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | Non-South | 2012-2016 | 14.8 | 12.9 | 17.0 | 1,825 | | Democrats, % of placed conservatives | Non-South | 2020-2024 | 8.3 | 7.0 | 9.9 | 2,583 | Note: The cumulative file has no region for the 2,049 placed partisans among the 2024 panel and paper cases; their region is the Census region of the sample location in the ANES 2024 Time Series, which reproduces the cumulative-file flag for every 2024 respondent who has both. Note: Conservatives are placed partisans at points 5 to 7 of the seven-point scale. Differences are computed from unrounded values, so a printed difference can differ in the last digit from the difference of the printed shares. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); placed partisans, leaners included; region is the Census South as coded by the ANES, and for the 2024 panel and paper cases the Census region of the sample location in the ANES 2024 Time Series Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/region_panels.json ### Table 8. The fall is 11.4 to 13.3 points under three bases and 6.3 points when unplaced partisans count as not cross-pressured Cross-pressured share under four bases, ANES study years 1972-2024, with 95% intervals for the Placed line | Series | Year | Share (%) | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents in the base | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Placed | 1972 | 19.6 | 17.6 | 21.8 | 1,371 | | Placed | 1974 | 18.4 | 15.7 | 21.3 | 977 | | Placed | 1976 | 17.8 | 15.8 | 20.0 | 1,306 | | Placed | 1978 | 18.0 | 16.1 | 20.0 | 1,430 | | Placed | 1980 | 20.3 | 17.8 | 23.1 | 892 | | Placed | 1982 | 18.1 | 15.6 | 20.9 | 806 | | Placed | 1984 | 17.0 | 15.1 | 19.0 | 1,401 | | Placed | 1986 | 18.5 | 16.5 | 20.5 | 1,441 | | Placed | 1988 | 18.6 | 16.6 | 20.8 | 1,286 | | Placed | 1990 | 19.7 | 17.5 | 22.0 | 1,220 | | Placed | 1992 | 16.9 | 15.2 | 18.8 | 1,630 | | Placed | 1994 | 13.6 | 11.7 | 15.8 | 1,279 | | Placed | 1996 | 14.5 | 12.5 | 16.9 | 1,233 | | Placed | 1998 | 15.6 | 13.2 | 18.3 | 922 | | Placed | 2000 | 16.0 | 13.0 | 19.5 | 603 | | Placed | 2002 | 14.9 | 12.6 | 17.5 | 1,171 | | Placed | 2004 | 11.5 | 9.4 | 14.0 | 849 | | Placed | 2008 | 11.3 | 9.4 | 13.4 | 1,448 | | Placed | 2012 | 9.8 | 8.7 | 11.0 | 4,613 | | Placed | 2016 | 7.2 | 6.2 | 8.4 | 2,949 | | Placed | 2020 | 5.2 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 6,353 | | Placed | 2024 | 6.3 | 5.4 | 7.4 | 4,482 | | Reweighted | 1972 | 19.9 | 17.8 | 22.2 | 1,365 | | Reweighted | 1974 | 19.5 | 16.7 | 22.6 | 958 | | Reweighted | 1976 | 19.0 | 16.8 | 21.4 | 1,290 | | Reweighted | 1978 | 18.7 | 16.7 | 20.9 | 1,420 | | Reweighted | 1980 | 21.4 | 18.7 | 24.4 | 888 | | Reweighted | 1982 | 20.6 | 17.7 | 23.8 | 803 | | Reweighted | 1984 | 18.4 | 16.4 | 20.6 | 1,381 | | Reweighted | 1986 | 18.8 | 16.8 | 21.0 | 1,426 | | Reweighted | 1988 | 19.9 | 17.7 | 22.3 | 1,254 | | Reweighted | 1990 | 20.7 | 18.4 | 23.2 | 1,197 | | Reweighted | 1992 | 18.2 | 16.3 | 20.2 | 1,582 | | Reweighted | 1994 | 15.3 | 13.1 | 17.8 | 1,217 | | Reweighted | 1996 | 15.9 | 13.6 | 18.4 | 1,224 | | Reweighted | 1998 | 17.4 | 14.7 | 20.4 | 901 | | Reweighted | 2000 | 18.8 | 15.3 | 23.0 | 596 | | Reweighted | 2002 | 16.0 | 13.4 | 18.9 | 1,152 | | Reweighted | 2004 | 13.1 | 10.7 | 15.9 | 843 | | Reweighted | 2008 | 13.0 | 11.0 | 15.3 | 1,402 | | Reweighted | 2012 | 10.1 | 9.0 | 11.3 | 4,507 | | Reweighted | 2016 | 8.4 | 7.2 | 9.8 | 2,846 | | Reweighted | 2020 | 5.7 | 4.9 | 6.6 | 6,036 | | Reweighted | 2024 | 6.9 | 5.8 | 8.1 | 4,207 | | With independents | 1972 | 17.4 | 15.6 | 19.4 | 1,545 | | With independents | 1974 | 15.5 | 13.2 | 18.1 | 1,140 | | With independents | 1976 | 15.4 | 13.7 | 17.4 | 1,497 | | With independents | 1978 | 15.5 | 13.8 | 17.3 | 1,658 | | With independents | 1980 | 18.0 | 15.8 | 20.5 | 1,004 | | With independents | 1982 | 16.4 | 14.1 | 19.0 | 891 | | With independents | 1984 | 15.4 | 13.7 | 17.3 | 1,546 | | With independents | 1986 | 16.4 | 14.7 | 18.3 | 1,622 | | With independents | 1988 | 16.8 | 15.0 | 18.9 | 1,419 | | With independents | 1990 | 18.3 | 16.3 | 20.4 | 1,315 | | With independents | 1992 | 15.2 | 13.6 | 16.9 | 1,819 | | With independents | 1994 | 12.4 | 10.6 | 14.5 | 1,398 | | With independents | 1996 | 13.5 | 11.6 | 15.7 | 1,326 | | With independents | 1998 | 14.2 | 12.0 | 16.7 | 1,012 | | With independents | 2000 | 14.4 | 11.7 | 17.6 | 669 | | With independents | 2002 | 14.2 | 12.0 | 16.8 | 1,223 | | With independents | 2004 | 10.8 | 8.8 | 13.1 | 913 | | With independents | 2008 | 10.2 | 8.5 | 12.2 | 1,607 | | With independents | 2012 | 8.5 | 7.6 | 9.6 | 5,288 | | With independents | 2016 | 6.4 | 5.5 | 7.5 | 3,298 | | With independents | 2020 | 4.7 | 4.1 | 5.4 | 7,041 | | With independents | 2024 | 6.0 | 5.1 | 7.1 | 4,716 | | All partisans | 1972 | 11.7 | 10.5 | 13.1 | 2,295 | | All partisans | 1974 | 13.6 | 11.6 | 15.9 | 1,305 | | All partisans | 1976 | 12.3 | 10.8 | 13.9 | 1,879 | | All partisans | 1978 | 13.5 | 12.1 | 15.2 | 1,898 | | All partisans | 1980 | 13.2 | 11.5 | 15.1 | 1,369 | | All partisans | 1982 | 12.0 | 10.3 | 13.9 | 1,220 | | All partisans | 1984 | 12.2 | 10.8 | 13.7 | 1,948 | | All partisans | 1986 | 14.3 | 12.8 | 15.9 | 1,863 | | All partisans | 1988 | 13.4 | 11.9 | 15.1 | 1,783 | | All partisans | 1990 | 13.9 | 12.3 | 15.6 | 1,729 | | All partisans | 1992 | 12.8 | 11.4 | 14.2 | 2,155 | | All partisans | 1994 | 10.7 | 9.1 | 12.5 | 1,589 | | All partisans | 1996 | 11.2 | 9.6 | 13.1 | 1,549 | | All partisans | 1998 | 12.5 | 10.5 | 14.7 | 1,124 | | All partisans | 2000 | n/a | n/a | n/a | 1,568 | | All partisans | 2002 | 12.1 | 10.1 | 14.4 | 1,372 | | All partisans | 2004 | 9.0 | 7.3 | 11.1 | 1,074 | | All partisans | 2008 | 8.7 | 7.3 | 10.3 | 2,018 | | All partisans | 2012 | 9.1 | 8.1 | 10.2 | 5,098 | | All partisans | 2016 | 5.5 | 4.7 | 6.5 | 3,668 | | All partisans | 2020 | 4.4 | 3.8 | 5.1 | 7,277 | | All partisans | 2024 | 5.4 | 4.6 | 6.4 | 5,103 | Note: The share of partisans who place themselves was 59.7% in 1972, 35.6% in 2000, 84.9% in 2020 and 85.8% in 2024. Note: The All partisans line has no value for 2000: 52.1% of the 2000 respondents have no recorded answer to the item, so the share of partisans who place themselves reflects the design of that study and not the partisans. Note: With no assumption about the unplaced, the 1972 share lies between 11.7% and 52.0% and the 2024 share between 5.4% and 19.6%. Note: Intervals for the reweighted series use the effective sample size of the adjusted weights and ignore the estimation of the adjustment factors. Note: Bands are drawn for the Placed line only; the intervals of the other lines are in the data table. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); placed partisans, leaners included; the reweighted series adjusts the weights within each year Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/denominators.json ### Table 9. From 2008 to 2016 the ANES cross-pressured share fell while the CES share rose Cross-pressured share of placed partisans in the ANES (seven-point ideology scale) and the CES (five-point scale, even-year waves), 2004-2024, with 95% intervals | Series | Year | Share (%) | Interval low | Interval high | Placed partisans | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES | 2004 | 11.5 | 9.4 | 14.0 | 849 | | ANES | 2008 | 11.3 | 9.4 | 13.4 | 1,448 | | ANES | 2012 | 9.8 | 8.7 | 11.0 | 4,613 | | ANES | 2016 | 7.2 | 6.2 | 8.4 | 2,949 | | ANES | 2020 | 5.2 | 4.5 | 5.9 | 6,353 | | ANES | 2024 | 6.3 | 5.4 | 7.4 | 4,482 | | CES | 2006 | 4.3 | 4.0 | 4.5 | 30,222 | | CES | 2008 | 5.5 | 5.2 | 5.8 | 27,354 | | CES | 2010 | 5.9 | 5.6 | 6.3 | 46,430 | | CES | 2012 | 7.0 | 6.7 | 7.4 | 43,847 | | CES | 2014 | 7.5 | 7.1 | 7.9 | 42,901 | | CES | 2016 | 8.4 | 8.1 | 8.8 | 50,082 | | CES | 2018 | 5.9 | 5.6 | 6.3 | 47,245 | | CES | 2020 | 5.3 | 5.1 | 5.6 | 48,071 | | CES | 2022 | 4.5 | 4.2 | 4.7 | 47,741 | | CES | 2024 | 3.7 | 3.4 | 4.0 | 49,320 | Note: The CES is an opt-in online sample. Its intervals are narrow because it samples tens of thousands of respondents each wave; like the ANES intervals they are model based and do not reflect selection into the sample. Note: Only the even-year CES waves are plotted. The CES also fields smaller odd-year waves, which are left out. The ANES line before 2004 is in the first figure of the chapter. Note: CES partisans are pid7 points 1 to 3 and 5 to 7; conservatives are the two conservative points of the five-point scale and 'not sure' counts as not placed. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024, and Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, 2006-2024; weighted (VCF0009z in the ANES, the survey weight in each CES wave); placed partisans, leaners included Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/two_surveys.json ### Table 10. The CES share is above or below the ANES share depending on how the seven-point scale is mapped to the five-point one Ratio of the CES cross-pressured share to the ANES share in the five shared study years under two mappings of the ANES scale, with 95% intervals; a ratio of one means equal shares | Year | ANES points counted | ANES share (%) | CES share (%) | CES over ANES | 95% interval low | 95% interval high | ANES respondents | CES respondents | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2008 | Three points each side | 11.3 | 5.5 | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.59 | 1,448 | 27,354 | | 2008 | Two outer points each side | 4.5 | 5.5 | 1.22 | 0.90 | 1.64 | 1,448 | 27,354 | | 2012 | Three points each side | 9.8 | 7.0 | 0.72 | 0.63 | 0.81 | 4,613 | 43,847 | | 2012 | Two outer points each side | 3.9 | 7.0 | 1.80 | 1.47 | 2.19 | 4,613 | 43,847 | | 2016 | Three points each side | 7.2 | 8.4 | 1.17 | 1.00 | 1.38 | 2,949 | 50,082 | | 2016 | Two outer points each side | 2.6 | 8.4 | 3.23 | 2.48 | 4.22 | 2,949 | 50,082 | | 2020 | Three points each side | 5.2 | 5.3 | 1.03 | 0.89 | 1.20 | 6,353 | 48,071 | | 2020 | Two outer points each side | 1.9 | 5.3 | 2.83 | 2.22 | 3.61 | 6,353 | 48,071 | | 2024 | Three points each side | 6.3 | 3.7 | 0.58 | 0.48 | 0.70 | 4,482 | 49,320 | | 2024 | Two outer points each side | 2.6 | 3.7 | 1.41 | 1.07 | 1.85 | 4,482 | 49,320 | Note: The CES asks a five-point item, so no mapping of the seven-point ANES item to it is correct by construction. The two shown are two natural readings of liberal and conservative on the seven-point scale. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024, and Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, 2006-2024; weighted (VCF0009z in the ANES, the survey weight in each CES wave); placed partisans, leaners included; intervals by the delta method Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/survey_ratio.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (139), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | adj_1972 | 19.9% | percent of placed partisans | cross-pressured share re-weighted to the party, education, age group and race mix of all partisans in the year (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective n of the adjusted weights) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1972 | 95% CI 17.8% to 22.2% | 1,365 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | adj_2024 | 6.9% | percent of placed partisans | cross-pressured share re-weighted to the party, education, age group and race mix of all partisans in the year (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective n of the adjusted weights) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2024 | 95% CI 5.8% to 8.1% | 4,207 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | adj_fall | 13.0 | percentage points | fall in the cross-pressured share re-weighted to the party, education, age group and race mix of all partisans, 2024 minus 1972 (sign dropped) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1972 to 2024 | 95% CI 10.5 to 15.5 | 5,572 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the fall; the change is negative. | | allp_1972 | 11.7% | percent of partisans | cross-pressured partisans as a share of all partisans, unplaced partisans counted as not cross-pressured (lower bound; 95% Wilson interval) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 1972 | 95% CI 10.5% to 13.1% | 2,295 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | allp_2024 | 5.4% | percent of partisans | cross-pressured partisans as a share of all partisans, unplaced partisans counted as not cross-pressured (lower bound; 95% Wilson interval) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 2024 | 95% CI 4.6% to 6.4% | 5,103 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | allp_fall | 6.3 | percentage points | fall in the cross-pressured share of all partisans (unplaced counted as not cross-pressured), 2024 minus 1972 (sign dropped) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 1972 to 2024 | 95% CI 4.7 to 7.9 | 7,398 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the fall; the change is negative. | | anes_chg_0816 | 4.1 | percentage points | change in the ANES cross-pressured share, 2016 minus 2008 (sign dropped) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI 1.8 to 6.4 | 4,397 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the fall; the change is negative. | | anes_chg_0824 | 4.9 | percentage points | change in the ANES cross-pressured share, 2024 minus 2008 (sign dropped) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.7 to 7.2 | 5,930 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the fall; the change is negative. | | avg70 | 18.5% | percent of placed partisans | unweighted mean of the 1970s rates of the four cohorts with 100 or more placed partisans, used for cohorts not observed then | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 pooled | | 5,059 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | c1927_2010 | 7.9% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the birth cohort and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans born 1927 to 1942 | 2012-2016 pooled | 95% CI 5.8% to 10.7% | 797 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | c1927_2020 | 10.0% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the birth cohort and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans born 1927 to 1942 | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 7.3% to 13.7% | 625 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | c1943_1970 | 17.6% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the birth cohort and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans born 1943 to 1958 | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 15.7% to 19.6% | 1,702 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | c1943_2010 | 8.9% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the birth cohort and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans born 1943 to 1958 | 2012-2016 pooled | 95% CI 7.5% to 10.5% | 2,392 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | c1943_2020 | 5.0% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the birth cohort and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans born 1943 to 1958 | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 4.0% to 6.1% | 2,910 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | c1959_1980 | 21.4% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the birth cohort and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans born 1959 to 1974 | 1980-1988 pooled | 95% CI 18.8% to 24.3% | 863 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | c1975_1990 | 10.4% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the birth cohort and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans born 1975 to 1990 | 1990-1998 pooled | 95% CI 6.2% to 17.1% | 153 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | c1991_2010 | 8.9% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the birth cohort and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans born 1991 or later | 2012-2016 pooled | 95% CI 6.0% to 13.0% | 407 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cchg_1895 | −3.3 | percentage points | change in the cross-pressured share from the cohort's first to its last plotted pooled period | placed partisans born 1895 to 1910 | 1972-1978 to 1980-1988 | 95% CI −8.5 to 1.9 | 972 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cchg_1911 | −1.5 | percentage points | change in the cross-pressured share from the cohort's first to its last plotted pooled period | placed partisans born 1911 to 1926 | 1972-1978 to 2000-2008 | 95% CI −7.9 to 4.9 | 1,463 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cchg_1927 | −8.7 | percentage points | change in the cross-pressured share from the cohort's first to its last plotted pooled period | placed partisans born 1927 to 1942 | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI −12.6 to −4.7 | 1,949 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cchg_1927_last | +2.1 | percentage points | change in the cross-pressured share between the last two plotted pooled periods | placed partisans born 1927 to 1942 | 2012-2016 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI −2.0 to 6.1 | 1,422 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cchg_1943 | −12.6 | percentage points | change in the cross-pressured share from the cohort's first to its last plotted pooled period | placed partisans born 1943 to 1958 | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI −14.9 to −10.4 | 4,612 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cchg_1959 | −14.9 | percentage points | change in the cross-pressured share from the cohort's first to its last plotted pooled period | placed partisans born 1959 to 1974 | 1980-1988 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI −17.9 to −11.9 | 3,648 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cchg_1975 | −4.9 | percentage points | change in the cross-pressured share from the cohort's first to its last plotted pooled period | placed partisans born 1975 to 1990 | 1990-1998 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI −10.5 to 0.6 | 2,942 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cchg_1991 | −4.9 | percentage points | change in the cross-pressured share from the cohort's first to its last plotted pooled period | placed partisans born 1991 or later | 2012-2016 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI −8.6 to −1.1 | 1,770 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cchg_1991_deff | −4.9 | percentage points | change in the cross-pressured share from the cohort's first to its last plotted pooled period, with the 95% interval widened by the factor sqrt(2) that a design effect of 2 implies | placed partisans born 1991 or later | 2012-2016 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI −10.1 to 0.4 | 1,770 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ces_2006 | 4.3% | percent of placed CES partisans | weighted share who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans on the five-point scale (95% Wilson interval) | CES respondents who identify with a party (leaners included) and place themselves on the five-point ideology scale | 2006 | 95% CI 4.0% to 4.5% | 30,222 | weight (one wave; the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_2016 | 8.4% | percent of placed CES partisans | weighted share who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans on the five-point scale (95% Wilson interval) | CES respondents who identify with a party (leaners included) and place themselves on the five-point ideology scale | 2016 | 95% CI 8.1% to 8.8% | 50,082 | weight (one wave; the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_2024 | 3.7% | percent of placed CES partisans | weighted share who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans on the five-point scale (95% Wilson interval) | CES respondents who identify with a party (leaners included) and place themselves on the five-point ideology scale | 2024 | 95% CI 3.4% to 4.0% | 49,320 | weight (one wave; the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_chg_0816 | 3.0 | percentage points | change in the CES cross-pressured share, 2016 minus 2008 (a rise) | CES respondents who identify with a party (leaners included) and place themselves on the five-point ideology scale | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI 2.5 to 3.4 | 77,436 | weight (one wave; the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) | Cooperative Election Study | Size of the rise. | | ces_chg_0824 | 1.8 | percentage points | change in the CES cross-pressured share, 2024 minus 2008 (sign dropped) | CES respondents who identify with a party (leaners included) and place themselves on the five-point ideology scale | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.4 to 2.2 | 76,674 | weight (one wave; the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) | Cooperative Election Study | Size of the fall; the change is negative. | | cfa_2020 | 18.3% | percent of placed partisans | cross-pressured share with every cohort held at its 1970s rate, bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 17.1% to 19.5% | 10,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cfb_2020 | 15.1% | percent of placed partisans | cross-pressured share with every cohort held at its entry rate, bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 13.5% to 16.7% | 10,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | comp_a | +0.1 | percentage points | change in the share from the cohort mix alone, cohorts frozen at 1970s rates; bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI −0.2 to 0.3 | 10,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | comp_b | 3.2 | percentage points | fall in the share from the cohort mix alone, cohorts frozen at entry rates (sign dropped); bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 1.3 to 5.0 | 10,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the fall; the change is negative. | | consdem_1972 | 24.6% | percent of placed Democrats | weighted share of placed Democrats who are conservative (95% Wilson interval) | placed Democrats (leaners included) | 1972 | 95% CI 21.7% to 27.8% | 776 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | consdem_2024 | 8.2% | percent of placed Democrats | weighted share of placed Democrats who are conservative (95% Wilson interval) | placed Democrats (leaners included) | 2024 | 95% CI 6.7% to 10.0% | 2,310 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | consdem_ratio | 0.33 | ratio of the 2024 share to the 1972 share | conservative share of placed Democrats in 2024 divided by the same share in 1972, 95% interval by the delta method (normal-theory standard errors) | placed Democrats (leaners included) | 2024 over 1972 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.42 | 3,086 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cross_1972 | 19.6% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1972 | 95% CI 17.6% to 21.8% | 1,371 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cross_1990 | 19.7% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1990 | 95% CI 17.5% to 22.0% | 1,220 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cross_2004 | 11.5% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2004 | 95% CI 9.4% to 14.0% | 849 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cross_2020 | 5.2% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2020 | 95% CI 4.5% to 5.9% | 6,353 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cross_2024 | 6.3% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share who are conservative Democrats or liberal Republicans (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2024 | 95% CI 5.4% to 7.4% | 4,482 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cross_2024_ftf | 7.2% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured in the face-to-face sample (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans interviewed in 2024 by face-to-face | 2024 | 95% CI 5.1% to 10.1% | 834 | weight_ftf (mode-specific ANES weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cross_2024_other | 7.1% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured among the 2024 cases with no mode weight (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans interviewed in 2024 who are in neither the face-to-face nor the web sample (panel and paper cases) | 2024 | 95% CI 5.7% to 8.8% | 2,049 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cross_2024_web | 4.6% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured in the web sample (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans interviewed in 2024 by web | 2024 | 95% CI 3.4% to 6.1% | 1,599 | weight_web (mode-specific ANES weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | decline_cf | 12.8 | percentage points | fall in the observed share (sign dropped); bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 11.5 to 14.2 | 15,548 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the fall; the change is negative. | | deff | 2 | ratio of variances | assumed ratio of the true sampling variance to the model-based variance, used only to show which verdicts are close to zero | illustrative design effect | all periods | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deff_width | 41% | percent | percent by which every half-width of an interval grows when the sampling variance is multiplied by the assumed design effect | illustrative design effect | all periods | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dk_2000 | 22.3% | percent of respondents with a recorded answer (unweighted) | share of respondents with a recorded answer who chose don't know | 2000 ANES respondents with a recorded answer to the item | 2000 | | 866 | none (unweighted counts of respondents) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dk_other_max | 24.0% | percent of respondents with a recorded answer (unweighted) | highest yearly share who chose don't know among respondents with a recorded answer | ANES respondents with a recorded answer in 1996, 1998, 2002 and 2004 | 1996, 1998, 2002, 2004 | | 5,700 | none (unweighted counts of respondents) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dk_other_min | 16.8% | percent of respondents with a recorded answer (unweighted) | lowest yearly share who chose don't know among respondents with a recorded answer | ANES respondents with a recorded answer in 1996, 1998, 2002 and 2004 | 1996, 1998, 2002, 2004 | | 5,700 | none (unweighted counts of respondents) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_col_1970 | 15.1% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the education group and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans with college degree | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 12.9% to 17.6% | 1,039 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_col_2000 | 6.9% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the education group and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans with college degree | 2000-2008 pooled | 95% CI 5.5% to 8.7% | 1,438 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_col_2020 | 3.6% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the education group and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans with college degree | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 3.0% to 4.3% | 5,419 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_fall | 12.7 | percentage points | observed fall in the cross-pressured share (sign dropped); bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within the two pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known education level | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 11.4 to 13.9 | 15,793 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the fall; the change is negative. | | edu_gap_1970 | 5.4 | percentage points | cross-pressured share of partisans with a high school education or less minus that of college graduates | placed partisans with a high school education or less, and college graduates | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 2.6 to 8.3 | 3,945 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_gap_1990 | 11.3 | percentage points | cross-pressured share of partisans with a high school education or less minus that of college graduates | placed partisans with a high school education or less, and college graduates | 1990-1998 pooled | 95% CI 9.2 to 13.5 | 4,473 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_gap_2000 | 11.0 | percentage points | cross-pressured share of partisans with a high school education or less minus that of college graduates | placed partisans with a high school education or less, and college graduates | 2000-2008 pooled | 95% CI 8.1 to 14.0 | 2,732 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_gap_2020 | 5.1 | percentage points | cross-pressured share of partisans with a high school education or less minus that of college graduates | placed partisans with a high school education or less, and college graduates | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 3.4 to 6.9 | 7,293 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_hs_2000 | 18.0% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the education group and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans with high school or less | 2000-2008 pooled | 95% CI 15.6% to 20.6% | 1,294 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_hs_2020 | 8.7% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the education group and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans with high school or less | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 7.2% to 10.5% | 1,874 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_mix | 1.3 | percentage points | cross-pressured share at the 1970s education mix minus the observed 2020s share, 2020s group rates; bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within the two pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known education level | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 0.9 to 1.8 | 10,724 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_mix_share | 10.3% | percent of the fall | education-mix effect as a share of the observed fall; bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within the two pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known education level | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 6.6% to 15.1% | 15,793 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_obs_2020 | 5.7% | percent of placed partisans | observed cross-pressured share; bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within the two pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known education level | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 5.1% to 6.4% | 10,724 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_share_1970 | 20.6% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share with a college degree (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans with a known education level | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 19.4% to 21.8% | 5,069 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_share_2020 | 41.3% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share with a college degree (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans with a known education level | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 40.0% to 42.6% | 10,724 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_std_2020 | 7.0% | percent of placed partisans | cross-pressured share with the 2020s rates of the three education groups and the 1970s education mix; bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within the two pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known education level | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 6.1% to 8.1% | 10,724 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fall_7224 | 13.3 | percentage points | fall in the cross-pressured share, 2024 minus 1972 (sign dropped) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1972 to 2024 | 95% CI 10.9 to 15.6 | 5,853 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the fall; the change is negative. | | flat_high | 20.3% | percent of placed partisans | highest yearly cross-pressured share from 1972 to 1990 | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1980 | 95% CI 17.8% to 23.1% | 892 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | flat_low | 17.0% | percent of placed partisans | lowest yearly cross-pressured share from 1972 to 1990 | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1984 | 95% CI 15.1% to 19.0% | 1,401 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | floor_n | 100 | respondents (and Kish effective sample size) | minimum number of placed partisans, and minimum effective sample size, for a subgroup cell to be shown | cells of the figures and tables | all periods | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ind_1972 | 17.4% | percent of respondents with a party identification and an ideology placement | cross-pressured partisans as a share of everyone who reports a party identification and places themselves, independents in the denominator (95% Wilson interval) | respondents with a party identification and an ideology placement | 1972 | 95% CI 15.6% to 19.4% | 1,545 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ind_2024 | 6.0% | percent of respondents with a party identification and an ideology placement | cross-pressured partisans as a share of everyone who reports a party identification and places themselves, independents in the denominator (95% Wilson interval) | respondents with a party identification and an ideology placement | 2024 | 95% CI 5.1% to 7.1% | 4,716 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ind_fall | 11.4 | percentage points | fall in the cross-pressured share with pure independents in the denominator, 2024 minus 1972 (sign dropped) | respondents with a party identification and an ideology placement | 1972 to 2024 | 95% CI 9.2 to 13.5 | 6,261 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the fall; the change is negative. | | librep_1972 | 13.1% | percent of placed Republicans | weighted share of placed Republicans who are liberal (95% Wilson interval) | placed Republicans (leaners included) | 1972 | 95% CI 10.6% to 16.1% | 595 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | librep_2024 | 4.4% | percent of placed Republicans | weighted share of placed Republicans who are liberal (95% Wilson interval) | placed Republicans (leaners included) | 2024 | 95% CI 3.3% to 5.8% | 2,172 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | librep_ratio | 0.33 | ratio of the 2024 share to the 1972 share | liberal share of placed Republicans in 2024 divided by the same share in 1972, 95% interval by the delta method (normal-theory standard errors) | placed Republicans (leaners included) | 2024 over 1972 | 95% CI 0.23 to 0.47 | 2,767 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | moderate_1972 | 36.8% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share who place themselves at the midpoint of the scale (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1972 | 95% CI 34.2% to 39.3% | 1,371 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | moderate_2024 | 24.4% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share who place themselves at the midpoint of the scale (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2024 | 95% CI 22.6% to 26.2% | 4,482 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mort_ratio | 0.24 | ratio of survival odds | odds ratio of the cross-pressured share (2020s over 1970s), read as the survival of the cross-pressured relative to other partisans if the fall were all differential loss | placed partisans born 1943 to 1958 | 1972-1978 versus 2020-2024 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.32 | 4,612 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_2000 | 603 | respondents | count of placed partisans in the smallest study year | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2000 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_c1975_1990 | 153 | respondents | count of placed partisans in the first plotted cell of the cohort | placed partisans born 1975 to 1990 | 1990-1998 pooled | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_missing_cohort | 553 | respondents | count | placed partisans with no birth cohort in the file | 1972-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_other_2024 | 2,049 | respondents | count of 2024 placed partisans with no mode weight; the same respondents have no region in the cumulative file | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_placed | 39,662 | respondents | count of placed partisans over all study years | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1972-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_sub_1895_1990 | 105 | respondents | count of placed partisans in a cell below the floor, not plotted | placed partisans born 1895 to 1910 | 1990-1998 pooled | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_sub_1911_2010 | 60 | respondents | count of placed partisans in a cell below the floor, not plotted | placed partisans born 1911 to 1926 | 2012-2016 pooled | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_years | 22 | survey years | count of study years with placed partisans | ANES study years that carry the seven-point ideology item | 1972-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | noanswer_2000 | 52.1% | percent of respondents (unweighted) | share of respondents with no recorded answer to the seven-point liberal-conservative item | all 2000 ANES respondents | 2000 | | 1,807 | none (unweighted counts of respondents) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | noanswer_other_max | 0.9% | percent of respondents (unweighted) | highest share of respondents with no recorded answer to the item in the four neighboring study years | ANES respondents in 1996, 1998, 2002 and 2004 | 1996, 1998, 2002, 2004 | | 5,718 | none (unweighted counts of respondents) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | non_cross_1970 | 16.4% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the region and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans outside the Census South | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 15.1% to 17.8% | 3,493 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | non_cross_2020 | 4.9% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the region and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans outside the Census South | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 4.2% to 5.6% | 6,842 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | non_dem_1970 | 30.6% | percent of placed conservative partisans | weighted share of placed conservative partisans who are Democrats (95% Wilson interval) | placed conservative partisans outside the Census South | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 27.9% to 33.3% | 1,299 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | non_dem_2020 | 8.3% | percent of placed conservative partisans | weighted share of placed conservative partisans who are Democrats (95% Wilson interval) | placed conservative partisans outside the Census South | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 7.0% to 9.9% | 2,583 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | obs_1970 | 18.5% | percent of placed partisans | observed cross-pressured share, bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 17.3% to 19.6% | 5,059 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | obs_2020 | 5.6% | percent of placed partisans | observed cross-pressured share, bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 5.0% to 6.3% | 10,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | placed_1972 | 59.7% | percent of partisans | weighted share who place themselves on the seven-point scale (95% Wilson interval) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 1972 | 95% CI 57.7% to 61.7% | 2,295 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | placed_2000 | 35.6% | percent of partisans | weighted share who place themselves on the seven-point scale (95% Wilson interval) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 2000 | 95% CI 33.1% to 38.3% | 1,568 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | placed_2020 | 84.9% | percent of partisans | weighted share who place themselves on the seven-point scale (95% Wilson interval) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 2020 | 95% CI 83.8% to 86.0% | 7,277 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | placed_2024 | 85.8% | percent of partisans | weighted share who place themselves on the seven-point scale (95% Wilson interval) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 2024 | 95% CI 84.3% to 87.1% | 5,103 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | placed_early_max | 81.2% | percent of partisans | highest yearly placement rate (weighted share who place themselves on the seven-point scale) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 1974 to 2008 except 2000 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | placed_early_min | 65.2% | percent of partisans | lowest yearly placement rate (weighted share who place themselves on the seven-point scale) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 1974 to 2008 except 2000 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | placed_late_max | 92.5% | percent of partisans | highest yearly placement rate (weighted share who place themselves on the seven-point scale) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 2012 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | placed_late_min | 77.1% | percent of partisans | lowest yearly placement rate (weighted share who place themselves on the seven-point scale) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 2012 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ratio_b_2008 | 0.49 | ratio of the CES share to the ANES share | CES cross-pressured share divided by the ANES share, ANES conservatives and liberals defined as points 1-3 and 5-7 of the seven-point scale, 95% interval by the delta method (normal-theory standard errors) | placed partisans in each survey | 2008 | 95% CI 0.40 to 0.59 | 28,802 | weight (VCF0009z); weight (one wave; the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ratio_b_2016 | 1.17 | ratio of the CES share to the ANES share | CES cross-pressured share divided by the ANES share, ANES conservatives and liberals defined as points 1-3 and 5-7 of the seven-point scale, 95% interval by the delta method (normal-theory standard errors) | placed partisans in each survey | 2016 | 95% CI 1.00 to 1.38 | 53,031 | weight (VCF0009z); weight (one wave; the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ratio_b_2024 | 0.58 | ratio of the CES share to the ANES share | CES cross-pressured share divided by the ANES share, ANES conservatives and liberals defined as points 1-3 and 5-7 of the seven-point scale, 95% interval by the delta method (normal-theory standard errors) | placed partisans in each survey | 2024 | 95% CI 0.48 to 0.70 | 53,802 | weight (VCF0009z); weight (one wave; the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ratio_s_2008 | 1.22 | ratio of the CES share to the ANES share | CES cross-pressured share divided by the ANES share, ANES conservatives and liberals defined as points 1-2 and 6-7 of the seven-point scale, 95% interval by the delta method (normal-theory standard errors) | placed partisans in each survey | 2008 | 95% CI 0.90 to 1.64 | 28,802 | weight (VCF0009z); weight (one wave; the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ratio_s_2016 | 3.23 | ratio of the CES share to the ANES share | CES cross-pressured share divided by the ANES share, ANES conservatives and liberals defined as points 1-2 and 6-7 of the seven-point scale, 95% interval by the delta method (normal-theory standard errors) | placed partisans in each survey | 2016 | 95% CI 2.48 to 4.22 | 53,031 | weight (VCF0009z); weight (one wave; the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ratio_s_2024 | 1.41 | ratio of the CES share to the ANES share | CES cross-pressured share divided by the ANES share, ANES conservatives and liberals defined as points 1-2 and 6-7 of the seven-point scale, 95% interval by the delta method (normal-theory standard errors) | placed partisans in each survey | 2024 | 95% CI 1.07 to 1.85 | 53,802 | weight (VCF0009z); weight (one wave; the cumulative weight gives the same within-year shares) | Cooperative Election Study | | | reg_dem_gap_1970 | 18.1 | percentage points | Democratic share of placed conservatives in the South minus that outside the South | placed conservative partisans | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 13.1 to 23.0 | 1,952 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | reg_dem_gap_2020 | 1.0 | percentage points | Democratic share of placed conservatives in the South minus that outside the South | placed conservative partisans | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI −1.3 to 3.3 | 4,493 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | reg_gap_1970 | 6.5 | percentage points | cross-pressured share in the South minus that outside the South | placed partisans | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 3.9 to 9.1 | 5,084 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | reg_gap_2020 | 2.0 | percentage points | cross-pressured share in the South minus that outside the South | placed partisans | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.7 to 3.3 | 10,835 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | resid_a | 0.2 | percentage points | observed 1970s share minus the share that the cohort mix of the 1970s gives at the fixed cohort rates, cohorts frozen at 1970s rates; bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 0.0 to 0.4 | 5,059 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the baseline residual; the frozen rates predict a 1970s share below the observed one. | | resid_b | 0.2 | percentage points | observed 1970s share minus the share that the cohort mix of the 1970s gives at the fixed cohort rates, cohorts frozen at entry rates; bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI −0.1 to 0.4 | 5,059 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the baseline residual; the frozen rates predict a 1970s share below the observed one. | | share_2024_other | 45.7% | percent of placed partisans (unweighted count) | share of the 2024 placed partisans with no mode weight (panel and paper cases) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2024 | | 4,482 | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_a | −0.4% | percent of the fall | cohort-mix change with cohorts frozen at 1970s rates as a share of the observed fall (negative when the mix alone raises the share); bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI −2.2% to 1.4% | 10,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_b | 25.2% | percent of the fall | cohort-mix change with cohorts frozen at entry rates as a share of the observed fall; bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 10.8% to 38.0% | 10,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_bl | 26.0% | percent of the fall | cohort-mix change as a share of the observed fall, cohorts frozen at entry rates with a looser rule for a well-observed cell (50 placed partisans and an effective sample of 50); bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 11.6% to 38.9% | 10,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_bs | 21.4% | percent of the fall | cohort-mix change as a share of the observed fall, cohorts frozen at entry rates with a stricter rule for a well-observed cell (200 placed partisans and an effective sample of 150); bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 9.0% to 32.6% | 10,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_c | 74.0% | percent of the fall | cohort-mix change as a share of the observed fall, with the cohorts born after 1958 held at their own 2020s rates instead of their entry rates; bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 70.6% to 77.8% | 10,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_new_2020 | 73.9% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share of placed partisans born after 1958 | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 2020-2024 pooled | | 10,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_old_1970 | 38.5% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share of placed partisans born before 1927 | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 pooled | | 5,059 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sorted_1972 | 43.6% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share who are liberal Democrats or conservative Republicans (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 1972 | 95% CI 41.0% to 46.3% | 1,371 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sorted_2024 | 69.3% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share who are liberal Democrats or conservative Republicans (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2024 | 95% CI 67.3% to 71.2% | 4,482 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | south_cross_1970 | 22.9% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the region and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans in the Census South | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 20.7% to 25.2% | 1,591 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | south_cross_2020 | 6.9% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured within the region and pooled period (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans in the Census South | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 5.9% to 8.1% | 3,993 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | south_dem_1970 | 48.6% | percent of placed conservative partisans | weighted share of placed conservative partisans who are Democrats (95% Wilson interval) | placed conservative partisans in the Census South | 1972-1978 pooled | 95% CI 44.5% to 52.8% | 653 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | south_dem_2020 | 9.3% | percent of placed conservative partisans | weighted share of placed conservative partisans who are Democrats (95% Wilson interval) | placed conservative partisans in the Census South | 2020-2024 pooled | 95% CI 7.7% to 11.2% | 1,910 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sub_1895_1990 | 13.1% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured in a cell below the floor of 100 placed partisans and an effective sample of 100, not plotted (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans born 1895 to 1910 | 1990-1998 pooled | 95% CI 7.8% to 21.2% | 105 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Below the chapter's floor; reported only to show that the cell gives no support for a level line. | | sub_1911_2010 | 12.8% | percent of placed partisans | weighted share cross-pressured in a cell below the floor of 100 placed partisans and an effective sample of 100, not plotted (95% Wilson interval) | placed partisans born 1911 to 1926 | 2012-2016 pooled | 95% CI 5.5% to 27.0% | 60 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Below the chapter's floor; reported only to show that the cell gives no support for a level line. | | ub_1972 | 52.0% | percent of partisans | cross-pressured or unplaced partisans as a share of all partisans, unplaced partisans counted as cross-pressured (upper bound; 95% Wilson interval) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 1972 | 95% CI 49.9% to 54.0% | 2,295 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ub_2024 | 19.6% | percent of partisans | cross-pressured or unplaced partisans as a share of all partisans, unplaced partisans counted as cross-pressured (upper bound; 95% Wilson interval) | partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included) | 2024 | 95% CI 18.1% to 21.3% | 5,103 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | uptick_diff | +1.2 | percentage points | difference in the cross-pressured share between 2024 and 2020 (independent samples, normal-theory interval) | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2024 minus 2020 | 95% CI −0.1 to 2.4 | 10,835 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | uptick_hi | 2.4 | percentage points | upper end of the 95% interval of the difference in the cross-pressured share between 2024 and 2020 | placed partisans (Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, who place themselves on the seven-point ideology scale) | 2024 minus 2020 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | within_a | 12.9 | percentage points | observed fall minus the cohort-mix part, cohorts frozen at 1970s rates (sign dropped); bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 11.5 to 14.3 | 15,548 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the within-cohort part; the parts sum to the observed fall. | | within_b | 9.6 | percentage points | observed fall minus the cohort-mix part, cohorts frozen at entry rates (sign dropped); bootstrap 95% percentile interval (1,000 replicates over respondents within pooled periods, seed 12345) | placed partisans with a known birth cohort | 1972-1978 to 2020-2024 | 95% CI 7.9 to 11.4 | 15,548 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | Size of the within-cohort part; the parts sum to the observed fall. | ## Definitions - Cohort: People born in the same period, such as the same decade. Comparing cohorts shows whether a difference comes from when people were born, as distinct from their age or the year they were surveyed. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Party sorting: The alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. ## Methods Sample: 50,884 Democrats and Republicans (leaners counted with the party they lean toward: pid_7pt 1 to 3 and 5 to 7) interviewed in the 22 ANES study years from 1972 to 2024 that carry the seven-point liberal-conservative item; 39,662 of them place themselves on the scale and are the placed partisans on whom every share is based. Coding fixed in advance from the item wording (1 = liberal, 7 = conservative): liberal 1 to 3, moderate 4, conservative 5 to 7. Cross-pressured means a conservative Democrat or a liberal Republican; fully sorted means a liberal Democrat or a conservative Republican. Decades pool study years (1972-1978, 1980-1988, 1990-1998, 2000-2008, 2012-2016, 2020-2024) and are plotted at the midpoint of the years pooled. Birth cohort is the ANES cohort variable; it is missing for 553 placed partisans, who are left out of the cohort lines and of the accounting exercise. Education has three levels (high school or less, some college, college degree). Region is the Census South as coded by the ANES. The cumulative file has no region for the 2,049 placed partisans among the 2024 panel and paper cases (the same cases that have no mode weight); their region is the Census region of the sample location in the ANES 2024 Time Series file (V243007, matched on the respondent identifier), which reproduces the cumulative-file South flag for every 2024 respondent who has both. Estimand: the weighted share within each cell. Weights: the ANES full-sample weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weights (weight_ftf, weight_web) are used only for the 2024 face-to-face and web comparison, and the 2024 panel and paper cases, which have no mode weight, take the full-sample weight. Intervals: 95% Wilson intervals on the Kish effective sample size, which are model based and ignore clustering and stratification, which can raise or lower the variance, and no design-based interval was computed; differences between two independent estimates combine their standard errors in quadrature. A design effect of 2 is used only to show which verdicts are close to zero: every half-width is multiplied by the square root of 2. Suppression: a yearly cell needs at least 150 placed partisans and an effective sample of 100 or more, and a subgroup-by-decade cell needs at least 100 and an effective sample of 100 or more. Two cohort-by-decade cells that fail the floor are reported in a note to the cohort figure with their sample sizes and are not plotted. Placement in 2000: 52% of the 2000 respondents have no recorded answer to the seven-point item, against at most 1% in 1996, 1998, 2002 and 2004, and among those with an answer the share who chose don't know is in the range of those years, which fits an item put to a subsample of respondents; the 2000 placement rate is not read as partisans declining the scale. The design was inferred from the response pattern and not checked against the codebook, and the all-partisans series is left blank for 2000. Accounting exercise: the observed mix of cohorts in each decade is combined with fixed cohort rates (version A, the 1970s rate; version B, the rate in the cohort's first well-observed decade; a stricter rule (200 placed partisans and an effective sample of 150) and a looser rule (50 and 50) for a well-observed cell; and a limiting case that holds the cohorts born after 1958 at their 2020s rates). The within-cohort part is the observed fall minus the mix part. Intervals are percentile intervals from 1,000 bootstrap replicates that resample respondents within decades (seed 12345). Education mix: the 2020s rates of the three education groups are combined with the 1970s education mix, with bootstrap intervals of the same kind. Bases: within each year the placed partisans are weighted to the party, education, age-group and race mix of all partisans; pure independents are put back in the denominator; and all partisans are the base with the unplaced counted as not cross-pressured (lower bound) or as cross-pressured (upper bound). Second survey: the Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, even-year waves 2006 to 2024, with party identification (pid7 1 to 3 and 5 to 7) and the five-point ideology item (liberal 1 to 2, moderate 3, conservative 4 to 5; 'not sure' is not placed) and the survey weight of each wave; the ratio of the CES share to the ANES share is shown under two mappings of the seven-point scale (points 1-3 and 5-7, and points 1-2 and 6-7) with 95% delta-method intervals, and no verdict on the level is drawn. Mode: the ANES adds an online sample in 2012, has mode weights for 2012, 2016 and 2024 only, and none for 2020. Displayed differences are computed from unrounded values, so a printed difference can differ in the last digit from the difference of the printed shares. ## What these data cannot show - Repeated cross-sections cannot show that any person switched, and no panel is in this chapter's data. - The chapter also cannot say which identity moved. - A conservative Democrat who leaves the cross-pressured group may have changed party to match ideology or changed ideology to match party, and the share counts both the same way. - Age, period and cohort are not separated. - The accounting exercise rests on assumptions about the rates of cohorts that were not observed in the 1970s. - The versions above put the share of the fall due to the mix of cohorts at −0.4% in the first version, at 25.2% in the second and at 74.0% in the limiting case, and the data do not choose among them. - The measure covers only people who place themselves on the scale. - The reweighting handles differences in observed traits, and the ANES cannot show what people who decline the scale would have answered; with them in the base the fall is smaller. - The scale may mean different things across decades and education groups, and the CES comparison shows that a comparison of levels across scales depends on the mapping. - The ANES added an online sample in 2012, has no weights by interview mode for 2020, and gives a 2024 estimate that differs by mode within sampling error. - The intervals are model based and ignore clustering and stratification, which can raise or lower the variance, and the chapter runs no design-based check. - As an illustration, if clustering made the sampling variance larger by a design effect (the ratio of the true sampling variance to the model-based variance) of 2, every interval would extend 41% further from its estimate on each side. - Among the cohort changes, the cohort-mix effect, the regional and education gaps and the fall from 1972 to 2024, one verdict would change: the interval for the change in the cohort born 1991 or later would become −4.9 (95% CI −10.1 to 0.4) and include zero. - The data hold no measure of what parties and elites did. - One account in the literature holds that party leaders clarified what the labels meant [3], and this chapter tests none of it. - Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates the sort issue by issue. ## References 1. Wilson, Edwin B. (1927). Probable Inference, the Law of Succession, and Statistical Inference. Journal of the American Statistical Association 22(158): 209-212. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1927.10502953 2. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 3. Levendusky, Matthew (2009). The Partisan Sort: How Liberals Became Democrats and Conservatives Became Republicans. University of Chicago Press. 4. Carsey, Thomas M.; Layman, Geoffrey C. (2006). Changing Sides or Changing Minds? Party Identification and Policy Preferences in the American Electorate. American Journal of Political Science 50(2): 464-477. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00196.x 5. Highton, Benjamin; Kam, Cindy D. (2011). The Long-Term Dynamics of Partisanship and Issue Orientations. Journal of Politics 73(1): 202-215. 6. Abramowitz, Alan I.; Saunders, Kyle L. (1998). Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate. Journal of Politics 60(3): 634-652. https://doi.org/10.2307/2647642 7. Glenn, Norval D. (1976). Cohort Analysts' Futile Quest: Statistical Attempts to Separate Age, Period and Cohort Effects. American Sociological Review 41(5): 900-904. https://doi.org/10.2307/2094738 8. Black, Earl; Black, Merle (2002). The Rise of Southern Republicans. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. https://www.hup.harvard.edu/books/9780674012486 9. Kinder, Donald R.; Kalmoe, Nathan P. (2017). Neither Liberal nor Conservative: Ideological Innocence in the American Public. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/N/bo25841664.html ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/how-the-sort-happened/build.py (sha256 4bf5bffcffbcb316a900c8084d4fc36dc8da45d4d52a15d8ad882c121e62f244) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes2024_ts/anes_timeseries_2024_spss_20260519.sav | 12,757,094 | 3107c838755f88353d0e3e39b2c3d5f76a2888cf56a179e3acac84ab431335d2 | bb318a018a39b4cf87ccc91b50a5b7c5b41746d28c0226f4a6c176e8c74966d6 | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | daa6f208ae6e5b33b66f38b7375d42625859c3dfd889a2e954f467a4287ba4be | | figures/cohort_changes.json | 33da0a5665f23c06eee38e42d86ab6ec542acd7006155d59838869844916b315 | | figures/cohort_panels.json | 1d7ce493a533c722d7b28143d94ecf56c391da6d56e1e8afc429b7049aed834a | | figures/cross_share.json | 063b8ed16df5a1534f2aba2d37b726bb74c581dfd47a5ce44667bc645ac5ac88 | | figures/denominators.json | de669927ef7e10a3cf37b8c9a86cc1c845aa8108b67f128f55e79daa1bc050c5 | | figures/education_panels.json | 2e28ea3e78578eb1fc1f62a407601372451c996eb5dc0a045b68886f081f84ac | | figures/frozen_cohorts.json | ea1bf23337ee591791a84a46909fe1c391072ab69205f9a93eb2d3c6dae100e1 | | figures/mix_versions.json | 053a80952814bc29c29ae9880abad93540d3bbdd7f887f1e60233fc3fd18b3ee | | figures/region_panels.json | 5afb536cabef2e8e282ebf94fc819bf1268771ae6d2c1b90aa1544c7c872fa7a | | figures/survey_ratio.json | 97bcccc2b4a06e803993230f20b858272c06b3591d18d816cf5feda6e04c826e | | figures/two_surveys.json | 0183752862d48652de68ed59be2f781a75bdf24c8483cca1c0d9b089bf9be5a8 | | meta.json | e4c33820f832a2a3a6b14d2926e1e44f8f7826883af959dadbbb072ef16577ed | | refs.json | 8f93514835bd238dcaeadc9b96fd9b5e2da62469a8bba0240f6c9a299a669799 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/facts.json - Table 1, figure "cross_share" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/cross_share.json - Table 2, figure "cohort_panels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/cohort_panels.json - Table 3, figure "cohort_changes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/cohort_changes.json - Table 4, figure "frozen_cohorts" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/frozen_cohorts.json - Table 5, figure "mix_versions" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/mix_versions.json - Table 6, figure "education_panels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/education_panels.json - Table 7, figure "region_panels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/region_panels.json - Table 8, figure "denominators" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/denominators.json - Table 9, figure "two_surveys" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/two_surveys.json - Table 10, figure "survey_ratio" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/how-the-sort-happened/figures/survey_ratio.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Feelings toward the other party: report Chapter 2.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Feelings toward the other party - Chapter: 2.1 (Part II, Partisan feeling; The great sorting) - Question: How have partisans' feelings toward their own party and the other party changed since 1978? - Dek: Among ANES partisans, the average rating of the other party on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer fell from 48.0 in 1978 to 20.6 in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024: party thermometers 1978-2024, presidential nominee thermometers 1968-2024; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web (VCF0009x, VCF0009y) for mode-specific estimates in 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024 - ANES 2024 Time Series. 2024 Time Series: party thermometers V241166 and V241167, party identification V241227x, variance strata V240107d and primary sampling units V240107c, used for one design-based check of the 2024 all-interview other-party mean; years: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews); weights: pre-election full-sample weight (V240107a), equal to the Cumulative File weight - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026feelingstowardtheotherparty ```bibtex @misc{singh2026feelingstowardtheotherparty, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Feelings toward the other party}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 | 48.0 | 95% CI 47.1 to 48.9 | 1,723 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | oth_1978 | | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 20.6 | 95% CI 19.8 to 21.5 | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | oth_2024 | | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 | 71.0 | 95% CI 70.2 to 71.8 | 1,723 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | own_1978 | | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 70.5 | 95% CI 69.7 to 71.3 | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | own_2024 | | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 | 23.0 | 95% CI 21.8 to 24.2 | 1,723 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | gap_1978 | | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 49.9 | 95% CI 48.6 to 51.2 | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | gap_2024 | | lowest answer the feeling thermometer allows (a definition of the scale, not an estimate) | answers to the feeling thermometer | 1978 to 2024 | 0 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | therm_min | | highest answer the feeling thermometer allows (a definition of the scale, not an estimate) | answers to the feeling thermometer | 1978 to 2024 | 100 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | therm_max | | count of survey years | ANES time-series studies with both party thermometers | 1978 to 2024 | 18 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_waves | | count of respondents in the sample | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 18 surveys, 1978 to 2024 | 43,063 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_paired | | all-interview other-party mean: Taylor-linearised standard error from the variance strata and primary sampling units of the 2024 Time Series file | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, 2024 Time Series file | 2024 | 0.36 | | 5,080 | pre-election full-sample weight (V240107a) | ANES 2024 Time Series | design_se_2024 | | all-interview other-party mean: standard error from the Kish effective sample size | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, 2024 Time Series file | 2024 | 0.42 | | 5,080 | pre-election full-sample weight (V240107a) | ANES 2024 Time Series | model_se_2024 | | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1988 | 30.7 | 95% CI 29.3 to 32.1 | 1,717 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | gap_1988 | | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1988 | 76.3 | 95% CI 75.4 to 77.1 | 1,717 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | own_1988 | | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1988 | 45.6 | 95% CI 44.5 to 46.6 | 1,717 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | oth_1988 | ## Findings Among Democrats and Republicans in the American National Election Studies (ANES), the average rating of the other party on the feeling thermometer fell from 48.0 in 1978 to 20.6 in 2024. The average rating of the own party went from 71.0 to 70.5 over the same years, so it ended near where it started. The difference between the two ratings, own party minus other party, is a separate quantity; its average rose from 23.0 points to 49.9. The thermometer asks respondents to rate a party or a person from cold to warm on a scale from 0 to 100. The ratings here come from the ANES Cumulative Data File: 18 surveys from 1978 to 2024 and 43,063 respondents who identify with a party or lean toward one (leaners included) and who rated both parties, so the own-party, other-party and gap averages in each year rest on the same people. Respondents who call themselves pure independents are left out because they have no own party. Averages use the ANES full-sample weight. (Note: Intervals come from the Kish effective sample size [1] and, for shares, the Wilson method [2], and they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. For 2024 the standard error of the all-interview other-party average is 0.36 points from the survey's strata and primary sampling units and 0.42 points from the effective sample size, so the printed interval for that average is the wider one.) Each survey is analyzed as a separate cross-section, so the chapter describes how averages among partisans changed and says nothing about how any one person's feelings changed. Researchers call the gap between how people feel about their own party and about the other party affective polarization [3] [4]. Work with these same ratings dates the rise of partisan animus to the 1980s and finds that it grew further in the decades that followed [5]. Published work with thermometer ratings describes contempt for the other party as now exceeding affection for one's own [6]. In the sample used here the gap rose from 23.0 in 1978 to 30.7 in 1988. More of that rise comes from the own-party rating, which went from 71.0 to 76.3, than from the other-party rating, which went from 48.0 to 45.6. Whether the fall in warmth matters for voting and other behavior is the subject of Chapter 2.2, Negative partisanship (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship), and how far apart partisans are on issues is in Chapter 2.3, Affective and issue polarization (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/affective-and-issue-polarization; planned). This chapter describes the ratings and then asks how much of the change goes with a change in survey mode, how much with a change in the mix of partisans, and whether the change from 2020 to 2024 holds up. ### Other-party ratings fell more than own-party ratings Table 1 plots the two averages. The rating of the other party was 48.0 (95% CI 47.1 to 48.9) in 1978 and 20.6 (95% CI 19.8 to 21.5) in 2024, a fall of 27.4 (95% CI 26.2 to 28.6) points. It was 46.8 in 1990, so most of the fall came after 1990. The gap between the two ratings peaked at 52.3 in 2020. Table 1. Partisans rated the other party 20.6 in 2024, down from 48.0 in 1978, and rated their own party 70.5 The own-party rating has a small negative slope. Table 2 gives the slope of each average on survey year. Over the whole record the own-party rating changes by −0.7 (95% CI −1.4 to −0.1) points per decade, an interval that excludes zero. The 1978 and 2024 endpoints differ by −0.5 (95% CI −1.7 to 0.7) points, an interval that includes zero, while the line fitted through all 18 surveys changes by −3.3 (95% CI −6.3 to −0.4) points, because own-party ratings were high in the 1980s (76.3 in 1988) and low in 2016 (67.1). The other-party rating changes by −6.9 (95% CI −7.9 to −5.9) points per decade, and the gap by +6.2 (95% CI 4.8 to 7.6). Standard errors are clustered on survey year, because respondents interviewed in one year share that year's events. Among face-to-face respondents alone, the own-party rating changed by −2.1 (95% CI −4.1 to −0.1) points between 2008 and 2024. Table 2. The other-party rating changed by −6.9 points per decade and the own-party rating by −0.7 Splitting the record at 1990 gives two windows (the second view of Table 2). Before 1990 the other-party slope is −0.8 (95% CI −3.3 to 1.7), an interval that includes zero, and from 1990 it is −8.2 (95% CI −9.7 to −6.8). The pre-1990 result depends on where the record is split: for 1978 to 1988 the slope is −1.8 (95% CI −4.0 to 0.5), and for 1978 to 1996 it is −3.2 (95% CI −4.5 to −1.9), an interval that excludes zero. The own-party intervals in both windows include zero, so they cannot separate a lower level after 1990 from a steady drift. ### More partisans rate the other party at zero The average hides a change in how people answer. In 1978, 5.4% (95% CI 4.4% to 6.6%) of partisans rated the other party at zero, the coldest answer the scale allows. The share peaked at 40.0% in 2020 and was 33.2% (95% CI 31.4% to 35.1%) in 2024 (Table 3). The share rating the other party above the neutral midpoint moved the other way, from 31.2% in 1978 to 6.5% in 2024. Table 3. The share of partisans rating the other party at zero rose from 5.4% in 1978 to 33.2% in 2024 The share at zero is lower in face-to-face interviews than on the web in every year with both modes. In 2024 it was 22.4% (95% CI 18.9% to 26.3%) among face-to-face respondents and 38.8% (95% CI 35.9% to 41.8%) among web respondents, so the pooled 33.2% depends on the mix of modes. Inside face-to-face interviews the share still rose, from 14.8% in 2008. ### Part of the fall after 2008 goes with survey mode The ANES changed how it interviews during this record. Through 2008 interviewing was mainly in person. In 2012 the study added a separate web sample, in 2020 it interviewed no one in person [7], and in 2024 it combined a new face-to-face sample, a new web sample and respondents from an earlier panel [8]. (Note: The 2024 analysis sample has 960 partisans from the new face-to-face sample, 1,850 from the new web sample and 2,270 who belong to neither: respondents re-interviewed from the 2016 and 2020 panel, and paper questionnaires. Their weights are not mode-specific, so they enter only the all-interview estimates. In the all-interview weights of 2024 the face-to-face sample carries 35.1% of the total, the web sample 31.3% and the group in neither 33.7%. The group in neither rates the other party at 17.5 (95% CI 16.3 to 18.6), close to the web value of 18.0.) The file carries mode-specific weights for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024, which allow each mode to be estimated by itself. Web respondents rate the other party lower than face-to-face respondents in every year with both: by 7.7 (95% CI 6.1 to 9.4) points in 2012, 6.3 (95% CI 4.4 to 8.2) in 2016 and 7.6 (95% CI 5.3 to 9.8) in 2024. The ANES web and face-to-face samples are separate samples, so the gap combines how people answer with who answers. The comparison describes the two samples; it does not identify what interviewing the same people in the other mode would have done to their answers. Table 4. Face-to-face respondents rated the other party 4.9 points warmer than the all-interview average in 2024, and web respondents colder The blended sample includes web respondents from 2012 and panel and paper respondents in 2024, and the all-interview average falls faster than the face-to-face average. The all-interview rating fell by 14.1 (95% CI 12.6 to 15.5) points between 2008, a year with face-to-face interviews only, and 2024, and the face-to-face rating by 9.2 (95% CI 6.9 to 11.4). The remaining 4.9 (95% CI 3.5 to 6.3) points, 34.7% (95% CI 23.8% to 46.6%) of the all-interview fall, are the distance between the 2024 all-interview average and the 2024 face-to-face average, and the second tab of Table 4 splits them between web respondents and panel and paper respondents. The gap first appears in 2012, when web respondents entered and the sample had only face-to-face and web respondents: between 2008 and 2012 the all-interview rating fell by 6.8 (95% CI 5.4 to 8.3) points and the face-to-face rating by 1.9 (95% CI 0.1 to 3.7). The fall continues inside each mode. From 2012 to 2024 the face-to-face rating fell by 7.3 (95% CI 5.0 to 9.6) points and the web rating by 7.1 (95% CI 5.6 to 8.7). The face-to-face and web views of Table 1 and Table 3 repeat the trend for each mode. The 2020 study has no mode weights, so the fall from 26.0 in 2016 to 19.2 in 2020 cannot be split by mode and is reported as it stands. The direction of the trend holds inside each mode, and its size depends on which interviews are counted. ### The fall happened inside every group A change in who counts as a strong or weak partisan could lower the average without any group changing. Strong partisans rate the other party lowest, and their share of partisans rose from 27.2% (95% CI 25.1% to 29.3%) in 1978 to 46.2% (95% CI 44.2% to 48.2%) in 2024. A shift-share decomposition [9] splits the change in the average into three terms: the change within groups, computed at the 1978 mix of groups; the change in the mix, computed at the 1978 group averages; and an interaction of the two. The three add to the total. Table 5. Change within groups accounts for 24.5 of the 27.4 points the other-party rating fell For strength groups (strong partisans, weak partisans and leaners) the total fall of 27.4 (95% CI 26.2 to 28.5) points splits into 24.5 (95% CI 23.2 to 25.8) from change within groups (89.7% (95% CI 87.8% to 91.7%) of the total), 1.8 (95% CI 1.3 to 2.3) from the change in the mix and 1.1 (95% CI 0.5 to 1.7) from the interaction. The face-to-face and education tabs give the same result: change within groups accounts for most of the fall in each. The own-party rating shows different arithmetic (the last tab of Table 5). Its total change of −0.5 (95% CI −1.6 to 0.6) points combines −3.6 (95% CI −4.6 to −2.5) from change within groups with +2.2 (95% CI 1.6 to 2.8) from the larger share of strong partisans, who rate their own party higher, and +0.9 (95% CI 0.4 to 1.4) from the interaction. The 1978 base is low for strong partisans, whose own-party rating was 81.5 in 1978, 84.3 in 1980, 84.5 in 1988 and 80.6 in 2024, so the change within that group depends on the base year. The steadiness of the overall own-party average is a balance between lower ratings inside the weaker groups and a larger share of the strongest group. The same fall shows up group by group. Table 6 plots the other-party average within each strength, party, education and birth cohort group, and each tab gives the start and end of its lines. All 12 groups have a lower average at the end of their record than at the start, and the interval for the change excludes zero in all of them. Leaners in 2024 rate the other party lower than strong partisans did in 1978. Table 6. The other-party rating fell in all 12 groups of partisans ### The 2020 to 2024 change depends on the 2024 sample Across all 2024 interviews the other-party average changed by +1.4 (95% CI 0.3 to 2.4) points from 2020, from 19.2 to 20.6. The 2020 study was interviewed online, by video and by telephone [7], so 2024 web respondents are the closest match to it, and among them the change is −1.3 (95% CI −2.7 to 0.1) points, an interval that includes zero. Among 2024 face-to-face respondents the change is +6.3 (95% CI 4.3 to 8.2) points, but the 2020 baseline has no face-to-face interviews. In 2024 face-to-face respondents rated the other party 7.6 (95% CI 5.3 to 9.8) points higher than web respondents, close to the change of +6.3 from 2020, so the face-to-face change cannot be read as a rise since 2020. The 2024 respondents in neither mode group, who carry 33.7% of the all-interview weight, rated the other party at 17.5 (95% CI 16.3 to 18.6), against 19.2 in 2020, so the face-to-face sample is the only one of the three 2024 groups above the 2020 average. Table 7 repeats the comparison for all partisans, Democrats and Republicans, and its second view adds subgroups by strength of attachment and interest in the campaign. (Note: The 2024 all-interview sample includes respondents who were also interviewed in 2020. The intervals treat the 2020 and 2024 samples as independent, which makes the intervals of the all-interview comparison wider than they need to be. The web and face-to-face comparisons use fresh 2024 samples.) Among web respondents the only subgroup change with an interval that excludes zero is negative: Democrats at −2.3 (95% CI −4.1 to −0.4). Among face-to-face respondents all 8 subgroups shown have an interval above zero. Across all 2024 interviews 3 of the 9 changes have an interval that excludes zero (all partisans, Republicans and leaners), and the other subgroups have intervals that include zero, so the data cannot separate their changes from no change. Table 7. Compared with 2020, the other-party rating differs by −1.3 points among 2024 web respondents and +6.3 among 2024 face-to-face respondents The change from 2020 is not the same in the two 2024 samples. Two readings fit the numbers. Warmth may have risen among people reachable face to face and held or fallen among people reachable online. Or the two 2024 samples may differ in who they reach and how they answer for reasons unrelated to 2020, which the 2024 gap between them allows. The files used here cannot separate the two, because 2020 has no face-to-face interviews to compare with. The subgroup changes were not tested against each other, so the figure does not show that any subgroup moved more than another. ### Since 2012 the other party's nominee is rated below the party The other party's presidential nominee was rated below the party in 9 of the 12 elections from 1980 to 2024, with an interval for the difference that excludes zero, and in every election from 2012 on (the second view of Table 8). The party average minus the nominee average was 1.6 (95% CI 0.4 to 2.8) points in 2012 and 7.3 (95% CI 6.1 to 8.5) in 2024. (Note: The nominee and party averages come from two overlapping samples: partisans who rated both nominees and partisans who rated both parties. The intervals treat the two samples as independent, so they are wider than needed.) In 2008 the nominee was rated 3.4 (95% CI 1.6 to 5.1) points above the party. The difference is among Democrats, who rated John McCain 5.7 (95% CI 3.5 to 7.9) points above the Republican Party; Republicans rated Barack Obama 0.3 (95% CI −2.6 to 3.1) points above the Democratic Party, an interval that includes zero. The intervals for 1996 and 2000 include zero. Table 8. The other party's nominee was rated 13.3 in 2024, below the 20.6 for the party, while the own party's nominee was rated 75.2 The nominee is also rated below the party in 2024 within each interview mode: 16.7 (95% CI 14.7 to 18.7) against 25.5 among face-to-face respondents and 11.6 (95% CI 10.4 to 12.9) against 18.0 among web respondents. The share rating the other party's nominee at zero was 5.3% (95% CI 4.1% to 6.7%) in 1968, 57.8% in 2020 and 59.7% (95% CI 57.7% to 61.7%) in 2024, against 33.2% for the party in 2024 (the third view of Table 8). Between 2020 and 2024 the party average changed by +1.4 points while the nominee average changed by −1.3 (95% CI −2.4 to −0.2) points, an interval below zero. The fall in the nominee average is among Republicans, who rated Joe Biden in 2020 and Kamala Harris in 2024, a change of −4.0 (95% CI −5.7 to −2.4) points. (Note: Republicans rated Biden at 20.2 in 2020 and Harris at 16.2 (95% CI 14.9 to 17.5) in 2024. Democrats rated Donald Trump in both years, at 9.6 in 2020 and 10.6 (95% CI 9.5 to 11.8) in 2024.) Democrats rated Donald Trump in both years, a change of +1.1 (95% CI −0.4 to 2.5) points, an interval that includes zero. Ratings of the own party's nominee did not move in step. They were 64.7 (95% CI 63.7 to 65.8) in 2016, the lowest in the record, and 75.2 (95% CI 74.3 to 76.2) in 2024, near the 75.8 of 1984 and the 75.7 of 2020. ### What these data cannot show The ratings come from repeated cross-sections, so they cannot show that any partisan grew colder. The decomposition shows that the fall is not accounted for by a shift among strength or education groups. It does not rule out that older cohorts leave the samples while younger ones enter, or that people who change party move between groups. The cohort lines cannot separate age, cohort and period. A panel that re-interviews the same people is needed to describe change within persons. The ANES 2016, 2020 and 2024 panel exists but is not in the files used here. The mode results rest on mode weights that exist for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024. The gap between the all-interview and face-to-face averages combines how people answer in each mode with who answers in each mode, and it is a decomposition of the record and not an estimate of a mode effect. The 2024 gap also includes the panel and paper respondents, who belong to neither mode group. Interviews before 2008 are not split by mode. The 2016 to 2020 change and the 2020 to 2024 change cannot be split by mode at all. A thermometer rating of a party may reflect feelings about party elites more than about fellow citizens who support it [10], and a rating of zero is the coldest answer and not a measure of behavior. What the ratings go with in voting, in willingness to live near or work with the other side and in support for political violence belongs to Chapter 2.2, Negative partisanship (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship) and Chapter 6.8, Political violence and democratic norms (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms). Feelings toward social groups are in Chapter 2.4, Party and feelings toward social groups (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-feelings-toward-groups; planned). Accounts that start from partisanship as a social identity [11], from the alignment of party with other traits (Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology)) or from negative partisanship [12] are candidate explanations, and the ratings alone cannot tell them apart. The intervals are model based and ignore the ANES sampling design. The check against the design variables in the note on intervals covers 2024 only, so the intervals for other years are not compared with design-based intervals. The split year 1990 was chosen after looking at the series, and the pre-1990 slope changes with the split year. Each sample in the 2020 to 2024 comparison reports up to nine changes without adjustment for multiple comparisons, so an interval that excludes zero in one sample is weaker evidence than it looks. The nominee series rates people, and the same Republican nominee appears in 2016, 2020 and 2024, so it mixes feelings about a party with feelings about a person. The Democratic nominee differs in each of those years, so a change in Republicans' ratings of the other nominee between elections compares different people. The decompositions cover strength of attachment and education and leave out race, religion and age, so the mix of each party by those traits is not decomposed here. The year-by-year distribution of the ratings is not shown beyond the shares at zero and above the midpoint. ## Tables ### Table 1. Partisans rated the other party 20.6 in 2024, down from 48.0 in 1978, and rated their own party 70.5 Mean feeling thermometer rating of the respondent's own party and of the other party, partisans including leaners, 1978 to 2024, 0 to 100 | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | mode | n | series | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | 48.87 | 47.12 | 48.00 | All interviews | 1,723 | Other party | 1978 | | 47.72 | 45.43 | 46.57 | All interviews | 1,310 | Other party | 1980 | | 45.43 | 43.12 | 44.27 | All interviews | 1,181 | Other party | 1982 | | 46.86 | 44.92 | 45.89 | All interviews | 1,881 | Other party | 1984 | | 47.25 | 45.25 | 46.25 | All interviews | 1,796 | Other party | 1986 | | 46.60 | 44.52 | 45.56 | All interviews | 1,717 | Other party | 1988 | | 47.83 | 45.74 | 46.78 | All interviews | 1,656 | Other party | 1990 | | 42.74 | 40.95 | 41.84 | All interviews | 2,098 | Other party | 1992 | | 43.63 | 41.40 | 42.51 | All interviews | 1,567 | Other party | 1994 | | 42.35 | 39.99 | 41.17 | All interviews | 1,528 | Other party | 1996 | | 42.34 | 39.59 | 40.96 | All interviews | 1,104 | Other party | 1998 | | 42.78 | 40.43 | 41.60 | All interviews | 1,525 | Other party | 2000 | | 41.05 | 38.08 | 39.57 | All interviews | 1,055 | Other party | 2004 | | 35.88 | 33.50 | 34.69 | All interviews | 1,979 | Other party | 2008 | | 28.65 | 27.07 | 27.86 | All interviews | 5,079 | Other party | 2012 | | 26.90 | 25.17 | 26.04 | All interviews | 3,610 | Other party | 2016 | | 19.91 | 18.58 | 19.24 | All interviews | 7,174 | Other party | 2020 | | 21.46 | 19.80 | 20.63 | All interviews | 5,080 | Other party | 2024 | | 71.84 | 70.19 | 71.01 | All interviews | 1,723 | Own party | 1978 | | 73.46 | 71.48 | 72.47 | All interviews | 1,310 | Own party | 1980 | | 75.23 | 73.31 | 74.27 | All interviews | 1,181 | Own party | 1982 | | 75.61 | 74.02 | 74.81 | All interviews | 1,881 | Own party | 1984 | | 75.27 | 73.66 | 74.46 | All interviews | 1,796 | Own party | 1986 | | 77.12 | 75.42 | 76.27 | All interviews | 1,717 | Own party | 1988 | | 72.07 | 70.30 | 71.19 | All interviews | 1,656 | Own party | 1990 | | 70.75 | 69.20 | 69.98 | All interviews | 2,098 | Own party | 1992 | | 71.12 | 69.25 | 70.19 | All interviews | 1,567 | Own party | 1994 | | 72.76 | 70.78 | 71.77 | All interviews | 1,528 | Own party | 1996 | | 71.63 | 69.22 | 70.42 | All interviews | 1,104 | Own party | 1998 | | 73.62 | 71.58 | 72.60 | All interviews | 1,525 | Own party | 2000 | | 74.80 | 72.50 | 73.65 | All interviews | 1,055 | Own party | 2004 | | 71.73 | 69.69 | 70.71 | All interviews | 1,979 | Own party | 2008 | | 70.50 | 69.05 | 69.78 | All interviews | 5,079 | Own party | 2012 | | 67.98 | 66.27 | 67.13 | All interviews | 3,610 | Own party | 2016 | | 72.17 | 70.89 | 71.53 | All interviews | 7,174 | Own party | 2020 | | 71.34 | 69.70 | 70.52 | All interviews | 5,080 | Own party | 2024 | | 35.88 | 33.50 | 34.69 | Face-to-face | 1,979 | Other party | 2008 | | 34.16 | 31.45 | 32.81 | Face-to-face | 1,798 | Other party | 2012 | | 32.22 | 29.01 | 30.61 | Face-to-face | 1,029 | Other party | 2016 | | 27.35 | 23.68 | 25.52 | Face-to-face | 960 | Other party | 2024 | | 71.73 | 69.69 | 70.71 | Face-to-face | 1,979 | Own party | 2008 | | 71.06 | 68.62 | 69.84 | Face-to-face | 1,798 | Own party | 2012 | | 66.53 | 63.35 | 64.94 | Face-to-face | 1,029 | Own party | 2016 | | 70.32 | 66.94 | 68.63 | Face-to-face | 960 | Own party | 2024 | | 26.02 | 24.12 | 25.07 | Web | 3,281 | Other party | 2012 | | 25.34 | 23.32 | 24.33 | Web | 2,581 | Other party | 2016 | | 19.19 | 16.73 | 17.96 | Web | 1,850 | Other party | 2024 | | 70.64 | 68.84 | 69.74 | Web | 3,281 | Own party | 2012 | | 68.96 | 66.94 | 67.95 | Web | 2,581 | Own party | 2016 | | 72.72 | 70.18 | 71.45 | Web | 1,850 | Own party | 2024 | Views: All interviews (mode = All interviews); Face-to-face only (mode = Face-to-face); Web only (mode = Web). Note: Bands are confidence intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/warmth_trend.json ### Table 2. The other-party rating changed by −6.9 points per decade and the own-party rating by −0.7 Slope of the mean thermometer rating on survey year, points per decade, partisans including leaners, 1978 to 2024 | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | period | waves | window | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | | −0.085 | −1.37 | −0.728 | 43,063 | Own party | 18 | Whole record | | −5.90 | −7.94 | −6.92 | 43,063 | Other party | 18 | Whole record | | 7.57 | 4.82 | 6.20 | 43,063 | Gap, own minus other | 18 | Whole record | | 7.14 | −3.98 | 1.58 | 11,264 | Own party, 1978 to 1990 | 7 | Split at 1990 | | 0.466 | −0.830 | −0.182 | 33,455 | Own party, 1990 to 2024 | 12 | Split at 1990 | | 1.73 | −3.34 | −0.803 | 11,264 | Other party, 1978 to 1990 | 7 | Split at 1990 | | −6.78 | −9.66 | −8.22 | 33,455 | Other party, 1990 to 2024 | 12 | Split at 1990 | Views: Whole record (window = Whole record); Split at 1990 (window = Split at 1990). Note: Intervals come from a t distribution, which is wider than the normal curve when there are few surveys, with one fewer degree of freedom than the number of surveys. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/slopes.json ### Table 3. The share of partisans rating the other party at zero rose from 5.4% in 1978 to 33.2% in 2024 Percent of partisans including leaners who rate the other party at the coldest possible answer of zero, 1978 to 2024 | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | mode | n | series | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | 6.57 | 4.43 | 5.40 | All interviews | 1,723 | Other party | 1978 | | 8.37 | 5.62 | 6.87 | All interviews | 1,310 | Other party | 1980 | | 8.81 | 5.86 | 7.20 | All interviews | 1,181 | Other party | 1982 | | 9.23 | 6.78 | 7.92 | All interviews | 1,881 | Other party | 1984 | | 9.13 | 6.64 | 7.80 | All interviews | 1,796 | Other party | 1986 | | 9.54 | 6.95 | 8.15 | All interviews | 1,717 | Other party | 1988 | | 8.92 | 6.37 | 7.55 | All interviews | 1,656 | Other party | 1990 | | 9.57 | 7.20 | 8.31 | All interviews | 2,098 | Other party | 1992 | | 8.24 | 5.49 | 6.74 | All interviews | 1,567 | Other party | 1994 | | 10.44 | 7.26 | 8.72 | All interviews | 1,528 | Other party | 1996 | | 11.50 | 7.75 | 9.46 | All interviews | 1,104 | Other party | 1998 | | 10.00 | 6.91 | 8.32 | All interviews | 1,525 | Other party | 2000 | | 14.69 | 10.33 | 12.35 | All interviews | 1,055 | Other party | 2004 | | 16.82 | 12.90 | 14.75 | All interviews | 1,979 | Other party | 2008 | | 24.36 | 21.25 | 22.77 | All interviews | 5,079 | Other party | 2012 | | 23.90 | 20.64 | 22.23 | All interviews | 3,610 | Other party | 2016 | | 41.57 | 38.51 | 40.03 | All interviews | 7,174 | Other party | 2020 | | 35.12 | 31.36 | 33.22 | All interviews | 5,080 | Other party | 2024 | | 16.82 | 12.90 | 14.75 | Face-to-face | 1,979 | Other party | 2008 | | 19.86 | 15.02 | 17.31 | Face-to-face | 1,798 | Other party | 2012 | | 20.19 | 14.51 | 17.16 | Face-to-face | 1,029 | Other party | 2016 | | 26.28 | 18.90 | 22.38 | Face-to-face | 960 | Other party | 2024 | | 27.89 | 23.91 | 25.85 | Web | 3,281 | Other party | 2012 | | 26.13 | 22.20 | 24.11 | Web | 2,581 | Other party | 2016 | | 41.76 | 35.88 | 38.78 | Web | 1,850 | Other party | 2024 | Views: All interviews (mode = All interviews); Face-to-face only (mode = Face-to-face); Web only (mode = Web). Note: Bands are Wilson intervals on the Kish effective sample size. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/zero_share.json ### Table 4. Face-to-face respondents rated the other party 4.9 points warmer than the all-interview average in 2024, and web respondents colder Rating of the other party by interview mode and the split of the all-interview fall, partisans including leaners, 2008 to 2024, 0 to 100 #### Table 4.1. Rating by mode Face-to-face respondents rated the other party 25.5 in 2024, web respondents 18.0 and all interviews 20.6 Mean feeling thermometer rating of the other party, partisans including leaners, by interview mode, 2008 to 2024, 0 to 100 | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | mode | n | series | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | 35.88 | 33.50 | 34.69 | All interviews | 1,979 | All interviews | 2008 | | 28.65 | 27.07 | 27.86 | All interviews | 5,079 | All interviews | 2012 | | 26.90 | 25.17 | 26.04 | All interviews | 3,610 | All interviews | 2016 | | 19.91 | 18.58 | 19.24 | All interviews | 7,174 | All interviews | 2020 | | 21.46 | 19.80 | 20.63 | All interviews | 5,080 | All interviews | 2024 | | 35.88 | 33.50 | 34.69 | Face-to-face | 1,979 | Face-to-face | 2008 | | 34.16 | 31.45 | 32.81 | Face-to-face | 1,798 | Face-to-face | 2012 | | 32.22 | 29.01 | 30.61 | Face-to-face | 1,029 | Face-to-face | 2016 | | 27.35 | 23.68 | 25.52 | Face-to-face | 960 | Face-to-face | 2024 | | 26.02 | 24.12 | 25.07 | Web | 3,281 | Web | 2012 | | 25.34 | 23.32 | 24.33 | Web | 2,581 | Web | 2016 | | 19.19 | 16.73 | 17.96 | Web | 1,850 | Web | 2024 | #### Table 4.2. Split of the fall Of the 14.1 points the all-interview rating fell from 2008 to 2024, 4.9 are the distance between the 2024 all-interview and face-to-face averages Split of the fall in the all-interview mean rating of the other party, partisans including leaners, 2008 to 2024, points on the 0 to 100 thermometer | conf_high | conf_low | kind | n | step | value | | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | 35.88 | 33.50 | start | 1,979 | 2008 mean | 34.69 | | −6.93 | −11.35 | delta | 7,059 | Face-to-face fall | −9.18 | | −1.49 | −2.92 | delta | 7,059 | Web in the mix | −2.20 | | −1.97 | −3.43 | delta | 7,059 | Panel and paper | −2.70 | | 21.46 | 19.80 | end | 5,080 | 2024 mean | 20.63 | Note: The 2008 study was interviewed in person only, so its face-to-face and all-interview estimates coincide and there is no web estimate. The 2024 all-interview sample also contains re-interviewed panel and paper respondents who belong to neither mode group. The steps of the second tab add to the total within rounding. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2008-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/mode_fall.json ### Table 5. Change within groups accounts for 24.5 of the 27.4 points the other-party rating fell Decomposition of the change in the mean rating between 1978 and 2024 over strength-of-attachment groups, partisans including leaners, points on the 0 to 100 thermometer | conf_high | conf_low | decomposition | kind | n | step | value | | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | 48.87 | 47.12 | oth_strength | start | 1,723 | 1978 mean | 48.00 | | −23.24 | −25.78 | oth_strength | delta | 6,803 | Within groups | −24.54 | | −1.27 | −2.31 | oth_strength | delta | 6,803 | Group mix | −1.77 | | −0.461 | −1.65 | oth_strength | delta | 6,803 | Interaction | −1.05 | | 21.46 | 19.80 | oth_strength | end | 5,080 | 2024 mean | 20.63 | | 48.87 | 47.12 | oth_strength_ftf | start | 1,723 | 1978 mean | 48.00 | | −18.01 | −22.46 | oth_strength_ftf | delta | 2,683 | Within groups | −20.25 | | −0.512 | −1.63 | oth_strength_ftf | delta | 2,683 | Group mix | −1.05 | | −0.204 | −2.19 | oth_strength_ftf | delta | 2,683 | Interaction | −1.18 | | 27.35 | 23.68 | oth_strength_ftf | end | 960 | 2024 mean, face-to-face | 25.52 | | 48.90 | 47.15 | oth_education | start | 1,718 | 1978 mean | 48.03 | | −25.43 | −28.18 | oth_education | delta | 6,753 | Within groups | −26.83 | | 0.030 | −0.904 | oth_education | delta | 6,753 | Group mix | −0.442 | | 0.618 | −0.797 | oth_education | delta | 6,753 | Interaction | −0.072 | | 21.51 | 19.85 | oth_education | end | 5,035 | 2024 mean | 20.68 | | 71.84 | 70.19 | own_strength | start | 1,723 | 1978 mean | 71.01 | | −2.49 | −4.61 | own_strength | delta | 6,803 | Within groups | −3.57 | | 2.76 | 1.57 | own_strength | delta | 6,803 | Group mix | 2.16 | | 1.42 | 0.412 | own_strength | delta | 6,803 | Interaction | 0.915 | | 71.34 | 69.70 | own_strength | end | 5,080 | 2024 mean | 70.52 | Views: Other party (decomposition = oth_strength); Face-to-face, 2024 (decomposition = oth_strength_ftf); Education groups (decomposition = oth_education); Own party (decomposition = own_strength). Note: The decomposition holds the 1978 mix of strong partisans, weak partisans and leaners fixed and lets each group's mean change, then adds the change in the mix and the term for both together, so the three steps add to the total. Intervals on the three steps come from redrawing the respondents of each year with replacement many times and taking the 95% interval of the redrawn estimates; the start and end bars use the Kish interval, so the totals differ slightly from the normal-curve intervals used elsewhere in the chapter. Note: Groups: strong (party identification 1 or 7), weak (2 or 6) and leaner (3 or 5) on the seven-point scale. The education view uses three groups and leaves out respondents with no education answer, so its total fall is 27.3 against 27.4 in the strength views. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978 and 2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; weight_ftf for the face-to-face view) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/decomposition.json ### Table 6. The other-party rating fell in all 12 groups of partisans Mean feeling thermometer rating of the other party within groups of partisans including leaners, by strength of attachment, party, education and birth cohort, 1978 to 2024, 0 to 100 | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | lens | n | series | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | 49.34 | 46.92 | 48.13 | Birth cohort | 1,022 | Born 1942 or earlier | 1978 | | 48.73 | 45.48 | 47.10 | Birth cohort | 763 | Born 1942 or earlier | 1980 | | 46.03 | 42.82 | 44.43 | Birth cohort | 651 | Born 1942 or earlier | 1982 | | 48.18 | 45.24 | 46.71 | Birth cohort | 892 | Born 1942 or earlier | 1984 | | 47.50 | 44.25 | 45.87 | Birth cohort | 792 | Born 1942 or earlier | 1986 | | 48.29 | 44.85 | 46.57 | Birth cohort | 730 | Born 1942 or earlier | 1988 | | 48.45 | 44.79 | 46.62 | Birth cohort | 648 | Born 1942 or earlier | 1990 | | 43.10 | 40.01 | 41.55 | Birth cohort | 786 | Born 1942 or earlier | 1992 | | 46.69 | 42.87 | 44.78 | Birth cohort | 563 | Born 1942 or earlier | 1994 | | 44.09 | 39.98 | 42.03 | Birth cohort | 534 | Born 1942 or earlier | 1996 | | 43.95 | 38.48 | 41.21 | Birth cohort | 304 | Born 1942 or earlier | 1998 | | 42.80 | 38.08 | 40.44 | Birth cohort | 401 | Born 1942 or earlier | 2000 | | 41.22 | 34.56 | 37.89 | Birth cohort | 237 | Born 1942 or earlier | 2004 | | 40.14 | 34.16 | 37.15 | Birth cohort | 331 | Born 1942 or earlier | 2008 | | 30.89 | 26.47 | 28.68 | Birth cohort | 615 | Born 1942 or earlier | 2012 | | 27.31 | 21.36 | 24.34 | Birth cohort | 332 | Born 1942 or earlier | 2016 | | 22.75 | 17.58 | 20.16 | Birth cohort | 471 | Born 1942 or earlier | 2020 | | 26.16 | 17.88 | 22.02 | Birth cohort | 243 | Born 1942 or earlier | 2024 | | 49.05 | 46.52 | 47.78 | Birth cohort | 651 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1978 | | 47.66 | 44.27 | 45.97 | Birth cohort | 459 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1980 | | 45.62 | 41.88 | 43.75 | Birth cohort | 420 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1982 | | 46.58 | 43.51 | 45.05 | Birth cohort | 689 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1984 | | 48.28 | 45.26 | 46.77 | Birth cohort | 680 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1986 | | 45.33 | 42.11 | 43.72 | Birth cohort | 622 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1988 | | 47.46 | 43.96 | 45.71 | Birth cohort | 533 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1990 | | 41.47 | 38.53 | 40.00 | Birth cohort | 691 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1992 | | 42.37 | 38.53 | 40.45 | Birth cohort | 482 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1994 | | 41.68 | 37.55 | 39.61 | Birth cohort | 477 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1996 | | 39.59 | 34.86 | 37.22 | Birth cohort | 356 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1998 | | 42.06 | 37.99 | 40.03 | Birth cohort | 485 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2000 | | 41.74 | 36.03 | 38.89 | Birth cohort | 316 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2004 | | 35.02 | 30.51 | 32.77 | Birth cohort | 546 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2008 | | 27.45 | 24.73 | 26.09 | Birth cohort | 1,658 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2012 | | 24.68 | 21.60 | 23.14 | Birth cohort | 999 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2016 | | 17.31 | 14.94 | 16.12 | Birth cohort | 1,966 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2020 | | 18.77 | 15.80 | 17.28 | Birth cohort | 1,336 | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2024 | | 48.89 | 41.75 | 45.32 | Birth cohort | 109 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1982 | | 47.86 | 43.03 | 45.44 | Birth cohort | 280 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1984 | | 48.43 | 43.98 | 46.21 | Birth cohort | 321 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1986 | | 48.74 | 44.54 | 46.64 | Birth cohort | 364 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1988 | | 49.99 | 46.40 | 48.20 | Birth cohort | 475 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1990 | | 45.85 | 42.62 | 44.23 | Birth cohort | 612 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1992 | | 43.86 | 39.82 | 41.84 | Birth cohort | 478 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1994 | | 43.72 | 39.71 | 41.72 | Birth cohort | 468 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1996 | | 46.05 | 41.11 | 43.58 | Birth cohort | 320 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1998 | | 44.83 | 40.88 | 42.86 | Birth cohort | 499 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2000 | | 43.96 | 38.83 | 41.39 | Birth cohort | 293 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2004 | | 37.08 | 32.69 | 34.89 | Birth cohort | 581 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2008 | | 30.25 | 27.24 | 28.74 | Birth cohort | 1,395 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2012 | | 28.07 | 24.76 | 26.42 | Birth cohort | 931 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2016 | | 20.40 | 17.94 | 19.17 | Birth cohort | 1,838 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2020 | | 21.90 | 18.75 | 20.33 | Birth cohort | 1,316 | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2024 | | 47.94 | 40.27 | 44.11 | Birth cohort | 133 | Born 1975 or later | 2000 | | 42.83 | 36.33 | 39.58 | Birth cohort | 209 | Born 1975 or later | 2004 | | 37.36 | 32.70 | 35.03 | Birth cohort | 486 | Born 1975 or later | 2008 | | 29.77 | 26.72 | 28.25 | Birth cohort | 1,363 | Born 1975 or later | 2012 | | 29.51 | 26.53 | 28.02 | Birth cohort | 1,260 | Born 1975 or later | 2016 | | 21.96 | 19.69 | 20.83 | Birth cohort | 2,646 | Born 1975 or later | 2020 | | 23.36 | 20.80 | 22.08 | Birth cohort | 2,057 | Born 1975 or later | 2024 | | 48.39 | 44.87 | 46.63 | Education | 317 | College degree or more | 1978 | | 44.77 | 40.21 | 42.49 | Education | 235 | College degree or more | 1980 | | 44.21 | 39.76 | 41.98 | Education | 231 | College degree or more | 1982 | | 44.03 | 39.87 | 41.95 | Education | 339 | College degree or more | 1984 | | 46.76 | 43.16 | 44.96 | Education | 391 | College degree or more | 1986 | | 45.29 | 41.22 | 43.26 | Education | 365 | College degree or more | 1988 | | 45.00 | 40.91 | 42.96 | Education | 358 | College degree or more | 1990 | | 38.14 | 34.85 | 36.49 | Education | 517 | College degree or more | 1992 | | 38.01 | 34.25 | 36.13 | Education | 409 | College degree or more | 1994 | | 40.08 | 36.41 | 38.25 | Education | 441 | College degree or more | 1996 | | 40.11 | 35.54 | 37.82 | Education | 323 | College degree or more | 1998 | | 42.04 | 38.46 | 40.25 | Education | 504 | College degree or more | 2000 | | 37.54 | 32.68 | 35.11 | Education | 339 | College degree or more | 2004 | | 33.06 | 28.62 | 30.84 | Education | 460 | College degree or more | 2008 | | 26.61 | 24.13 | 25.37 | Education | 1,621 | College degree or more | 2012 | | 25.45 | 23.19 | 24.32 | Education | 1,479 | College degree or more | 2016 | | 18.44 | 16.83 | 17.64 | Education | 3,299 | College degree or more | 2020 | | 21.29 | 19.01 | 20.15 | Education | 2,353 | College degree or more | 2024 | | 49.81 | 47.41 | 48.61 | Education | 1,041 | High school or less | 1978 | | 49.71 | 46.56 | 48.14 | Education | 777 | High school or less | 1980 | | 47.11 | 43.73 | 45.42 | Education | 649 | High school or less | 1982 | | 48.27 | 45.56 | 46.92 | Education | 1,038 | High school or less | 1984 | | 48.46 | 45.48 | 46.97 | Education | 952 | High school or less | 1986 | | 48.38 | 45.37 | 46.88 | Education | 916 | High school or less | 1988 | | 49.27 | 46.28 | 47.77 | Education | 920 | High school or less | 1990 | | 45.58 | 42.96 | 44.27 | Education | 1,036 | High school or less | 1992 | | 47.78 | 44.40 | 46.09 | Education | 710 | High school or less | 1994 | | 45.11 | 41.35 | 43.23 | Education | 661 | High school or less | 1996 | | 44.95 | 40.56 | 42.76 | Education | 454 | High school or less | 1998 | | 44.56 | 40.34 | 42.45 | Education | 543 | High school or less | 2000 | | 45.02 | 39.85 | 42.43 | Education | 376 | High school or less | 2004 | | 38.06 | 34.26 | 36.16 | Education | 890 | High school or less | 2008 | | 30.55 | 27.64 | 29.10 | Education | 1,707 | High school or less | 2012 | | 29.76 | 25.94 | 27.85 | Education | 852 | High school or less | 2016 | | 23.24 | 20.08 | 21.66 | Education | 1,397 | High school or less | 2020 | | 23.70 | 20.24 | 21.97 | Education | 1,102 | High school or less | 2024 | | 49.26 | 45.87 | 47.57 | Education | 360 | Some college | 1978 | | 48.20 | 43.77 | 45.99 | Education | 294 | Some college | 1980 | | 45.66 | 41.47 | 43.57 | Education | 297 | Some college | 1982 | | 48.28 | 44.66 | 46.47 | Education | 496 | Some college | 1984 | | 47.65 | 43.90 | 45.77 | Education | 436 | Some college | 1986 | | 46.49 | 42.46 | 44.48 | Education | 406 | Some college | 1988 | | 50.57 | 46.56 | 48.57 | Education | 351 | Some college | 1990 | | 43.55 | 40.00 | 41.78 | Education | 492 | Some college | 1992 | | 42.65 | 38.48 | 40.57 | Education | 414 | Some college | 1994 | | 42.11 | 37.69 | 39.90 | Education | 423 | Some college | 1996 | | 43.21 | 38.16 | 40.68 | Education | 323 | Some college | 1998 | | 43.35 | 39.53 | 41.44 | Education | 476 | Some college | 2000 | | 42.03 | 37.16 | 39.60 | Education | 340 | Some college | 2004 | | 38.65 | 34.60 | 36.62 | Education | 617 | Some college | 2008 | | 30.38 | 27.61 | 28.99 | Education | 1,687 | Some college | 2012 | | 27.31 | 24.55 | 25.93 | Education | 1,254 | Some college | 2016 | | 19.65 | 17.42 | 18.54 | Education | 2,384 | Some college | 2020 | | 21.35 | 18.43 | 19.89 | Education | 1,580 | Some college | 2024 | | 49.49 | 47.18 | 48.34 | Party | 1,088 | Democrats | 1978 | | 49.50 | 46.52 | 48.01 | Party | 797 | Democrats | 1980 | | 45.15 | 42.03 | 43.59 | Party | 750 | Democrats | 1982 | | 46.06 | 43.20 | 44.63 | Party | 1,028 | Democrats | 1984 | | 47.18 | 44.37 | 45.78 | Party | 1,049 | Democrats | 1986 | | 47.20 | 44.20 | 45.70 | Party | 921 | Democrats | 1988 | | 47.01 | 44.10 | 45.56 | Party | 976 | Democrats | 1990 | | 42.08 | 39.64 | 40.86 | Party | 1,196 | Democrats | 1992 | | 47.98 | 44.88 | 46.43 | Party | 822 | Democrats | 1994 | | 43.38 | 40.29 | 41.84 | Party | 879 | Democrats | 1996 | | 40.72 | 36.97 | 38.84 | Party | 643 | Democrats | 1998 | | 44.01 | 40.77 | 42.39 | Party | 862 | Democrats | 2000 | | 40.55 | 36.27 | 38.41 | Party | 579 | Democrats | 2004 | | 34.56 | 31.48 | 33.02 | Party | 1,336 | Democrats | 2008 | | 27.74 | 25.59 | 26.66 | Party | 3,093 | Democrats | 2012 | | 28.05 | 25.64 | 26.84 | Party | 1,903 | Democrats | 2016 | | 21.52 | 19.64 | 20.58 | Party | 3,780 | Democrats | 2020 | | 22.21 | 19.95 | 21.08 | Party | 2,631 | Democrats | 2024 | | 48.72 | 46.09 | 47.41 | Party | 635 | Republicans | 1978 | | 46.12 | 42.57 | 44.34 | Party | 513 | Republicans | 1980 | | 47.08 | 43.84 | 45.46 | Party | 431 | Republicans | 1982 | | 48.68 | 46.15 | 47.41 | Party | 853 | Republicans | 1984 | | 48.29 | 45.54 | 46.91 | Party | 747 | Republicans | 1986 | | 46.81 | 43.98 | 45.40 | Party | 796 | Republicans | 1988 | | 49.98 | 47.09 | 48.54 | Party | 680 | Republicans | 1990 | | 44.45 | 41.85 | 43.15 | Party | 902 | Republicans | 1992 | | 39.64 | 36.59 | 38.12 | Party | 745 | Republicans | 1994 | | 42.09 | 38.44 | 40.27 | Party | 649 | Republicans | 1996 | | 45.86 | 41.92 | 43.89 | Party | 461 | Republicans | 1998 | | 42.22 | 38.86 | 40.54 | Party | 663 | Republicans | 2000 | | 42.98 | 38.96 | 40.97 | Party | 476 | Republicans | 2004 | | 38.82 | 35.14 | 36.98 | Party | 643 | Republicans | 2008 | | 30.44 | 28.11 | 29.27 | Party | 1,986 | Republicans | 2012 | | 26.33 | 23.88 | 25.10 | Party | 1,707 | Republicans | 2016 | | 18.70 | 16.84 | 17.77 | Party | 3,394 | Republicans | 2020 | | 21.36 | 18.94 | 20.15 | Party | 2,449 | Republicans | 2024 | | 51.81 | 49.19 | 50.50 | Strength of attachment | 500 | Leaners | 1978 | | 51.30 | 47.33 | 49.32 | Strength of attachment | 332 | Leaners | 1980 | | 49.52 | 45.04 | 47.28 | Strength of attachment | 258 | Leaners | 1982 | | 50.26 | 46.91 | 48.59 | Strength of attachment | 502 | Leaners | 1984 | | 51.38 | 47.93 | 49.66 | Strength of attachment | 450 | Leaners | 1986 | | 51.26 | 47.72 | 49.49 | Strength of attachment | 489 | Leaners | 1988 | | 51.69 | 48.21 | 49.95 | Strength of attachment | 455 | Leaners | 1990 | | 45.59 | 42.57 | 44.08 | Strength of attachment | 639 | Leaners | 1992 | | 48.21 | 44.44 | 46.33 | Strength of attachment | 433 | Leaners | 1994 | | 46.64 | 42.45 | 44.55 | Strength of attachment | 411 | Leaners | 1996 | | 46.45 | 41.54 | 44.00 | Strength of attachment | 308 | Leaners | 1998 | | 47.08 | 43.01 | 45.04 | Strength of attachment | 484 | Leaners | 2000 | | 47.15 | 42.50 | 44.83 | Strength of attachment | 340 | Leaners | 2004 | | 42.81 | 38.89 | 40.85 | Strength of attachment | 603 | Leaners | 2008 | | 34.22 | 31.34 | 32.78 | Strength of attachment | 1,345 | Leaners | 2012 | | 31.84 | 28.64 | 30.24 | Strength of attachment | 971 | Leaners | 2016 | | 24.00 | 21.40 | 22.70 | Strength of attachment | 1,828 | Leaners | 2020 | | 28.29 | 24.92 | 26.60 | Strength of attachment | 1,418 | Leaners | 2024 | | 43.29 | 39.17 | 41.23 | Strength of attachment | 468 | Strong partisans | 1978 | | 44.23 | 39.40 | 41.81 | Strength of attachment | 405 | Strong partisans | 1980 | | 38.70 | 34.44 | 36.57 | Strength of attachment | 410 | Strong partisans | 1982 | | 40.49 | 36.72 | 38.60 | Strength of attachment | 630 | Strong partisans | 1984 | | 39.93 | 36.20 | 38.07 | Strength of attachment | 597 | Strong partisans | 1986 | | 40.28 | 36.72 | 38.50 | Strength of attachment | 619 | Strong partisans | 1988 | | 43.10 | 38.97 | 41.04 | Strength of attachment | 562 | Strong partisans | 1990 | | 37.01 | 33.72 | 35.37 | Strength of attachment | 705 | Strong partisans | 1992 | | 36.58 | 32.66 | 34.62 | Strength of attachment | 549 | Strong partisans | 1994 | | 35.81 | 31.57 | 33.69 | Strength of attachment | 539 | Strong partisans | 1996 | | 36.14 | 31.09 | 33.61 | Strength of attachment | 369 | Strong partisans | 1998 | | 37.70 | 33.80 | 35.75 | Strength of attachment | 568 | Strong partisans | 2000 | | 32.19 | 27.10 | 29.64 | Strength of attachment | 390 | Strong partisans | 2004 | | 27.74 | 24.04 | 25.89 | Strength of attachment | 799 | Strong partisans | 2008 | | 20.63 | 18.36 | 19.50 | Strength of attachment | 2,244 | Strong partisans | 2012 | | 19.85 | 17.47 | 18.66 | Strength of attachment | 1,594 | Strong partisans | 2016 | | 13.89 | 12.28 | 13.08 | Strength of attachment | 3,638 | Strong partisans | 2020 | | 13.99 | 12.07 | 13.03 | Strength of attachment | 2,472 | Strong partisans | 2024 | | 51.72 | 49.35 | 50.53 | Strength of attachment | 755 | Weak partisans | 1978 | | 49.92 | 46.78 | 48.35 | Strength of attachment | 573 | Weak partisans | 1980 | | 50.45 | 47.38 | 48.92 | Strength of attachment | 513 | Weak partisans | 1982 | | 51.57 | 48.87 | 50.22 | Strength of attachment | 749 | Weak partisans | 1984 | | 52.16 | 49.29 | 50.73 | Strength of attachment | 749 | Weak partisans | 1986 | | 51.24 | 47.92 | 49.58 | Strength of attachment | 609 | Weak partisans | 1988 | | 51.08 | 48.08 | 49.58 | Strength of attachment | 639 | Weak partisans | 1990 | | 47.39 | 44.66 | 46.02 | Strength of attachment | 754 | Weak partisans | 1992 | | 48.54 | 45.15 | 46.85 | Strength of attachment | 585 | Weak partisans | 1994 | | 46.93 | 43.49 | 45.21 | Strength of attachment | 578 | Weak partisans | 1996 | | 47.17 | 43.15 | 45.16 | Strength of attachment | 427 | Weak partisans | 1998 | | 46.85 | 42.95 | 44.90 | Strength of attachment | 473 | Weak partisans | 2000 | | 48.19 | 43.57 | 45.88 | Strength of attachment | 325 | Weak partisans | 2004 | | 40.55 | 36.38 | 38.47 | Strength of attachment | 577 | Weak partisans | 2008 | | 35.44 | 32.67 | 34.06 | Strength of attachment | 1,490 | Weak partisans | 2012 | | 34.94 | 31.78 | 33.36 | Strength of attachment | 1,045 | Weak partisans | 2016 | | 29.63 | 26.69 | 28.16 | Strength of attachment | 1,708 | Weak partisans | 2020 | | 29.53 | 26.15 | 27.84 | Strength of attachment | 1,190 | Weak partisans | 2024 | Views: Strength of attachment (lens = Strength of attachment); Party (lens = Party); Education (lens = Education); Birth cohort (lens = Birth cohort). Note: A group appears only where its yearly cell has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size, and only if it has estimates in four or more years. Note: All interview modes are pooled, so the fall after 2008 includes the mode composition effect shown in the mode figure. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z); all interview modes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/group_trends.json ### Table 7. Compared with 2020, the other-party rating differs by −1.3 points among 2024 web respondents and +6.3 among 2024 face-to-face respondents Change in the mean thermometer rating of the other party from the 2020 all-interview mean to the 2024 mean, points, partisans including leaners, by 2024 sample | conf_high | conf_low | core | estimate | kind_of_group | level_2020 | level_2024 | n | sample | subgroup | | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | 2.45 | 0.328 | yes | 1.39 | All partisans | 19.24 | 20.63 | 5,080 | 2024 all interviews | All partisans | | 1.97 | −0.968 | yes | 0.501 | Party | 20.58 | 21.08 | 2,631 | 2024 all interviews | Democrats | | 3.90 | 0.847 | yes | 2.37 | Party | 17.77 | 20.15 | 2,449 | 2024 all interviews | Republicans | | 1.20 | −1.30 | no | −0.048 | Strength of attachment | 13.08 | 13.03 | 2,472 | 2024 all interviews | Strong partisans | | 1.92 | −2.56 | no | −0.319 | Strength of attachment | 28.16 | 27.84 | 1,190 | 2024 all interviews | Weak partisans | | 6.03 | 1.78 | no | 3.90 | Strength of attachment | 22.70 | 26.60 | 1,418 | 2024 all interviews | Leaners | | 2.04 | −0.584 | no | 0.730 | Interest in the campaign | 14.92 | 15.65 | 2,550 | 2024 all interviews | Very interested in the campaign | | 3.33 | −0.371 | no | 1.48 | Interest in the campaign | 23.67 | 25.15 | 1,768 | 2024 all interviews | Somewhat interested | | 5.76 | −1.14 | no | 2.31 | Interest in the campaign | 24.55 | 26.86 | 547 | 2024 all interviews | Not much interested | | 0.113 | −2.68 | yes | −1.28 | All partisans | 19.24 | 17.96 | 1,850 | 2024 web respondents only | All partisans | | −0.363 | −4.14 | yes | −2.25 | Party | 20.58 | 18.32 | 966 | 2024 web respondents only | Democrats | | 1.85 | −2.28 | yes | −0.219 | Party | 17.77 | 17.55 | 884 | 2024 web respondents only | Republicans | | 0.070 | −3.25 | no | −1.59 | Strength of attachment | 13.08 | 11.49 | 900 | 2024 web respondents only | Strong partisans | | 0.964 | −4.99 | no | −2.01 | Strength of attachment | 28.16 | 26.14 | 454 | 2024 web respondents only | Weak partisans | | 3.31 | −2.33 | no | 0.489 | Strength of attachment | 22.70 | 23.19 | 496 | 2024 web respondents only | Leaners | | 0.300 | −3.28 | no | −1.49 | Interest in the campaign | 14.92 | 13.43 | 886 | 2024 web respondents only | Very interested in the campaign | | 0.390 | −4.32 | no | −1.96 | Interest in the campaign | 23.67 | 21.70 | 734 | 2024 web respondents only | Somewhat interested | | 2.13 | −6.33 | no | −2.10 | Interest in the campaign | 24.55 | 22.45 | 230 | 2024 web respondents only | Not much interested | | 8.22 | 4.32 | yes | 6.27 | All partisans | 19.24 | 25.52 | 960 | 2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews) | All partisans | | 8.63 | 3.12 | yes | 5.87 | Party | 20.58 | 26.45 | 522 | 2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews) | Democrats | | 9.44 | 3.94 | yes | 6.69 | Party | 17.77 | 24.46 | 438 | 2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews) | Republicans | | 5.58 | 0.766 | no | 3.17 | Strength of attachment | 13.08 | 16.26 | 407 | 2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews) | Strong partisans | | 9.14 | 1.23 | no | 5.19 | Strength of attachment | 28.16 | 33.34 | 223 | 2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews) | Weak partisans | | 10.83 | 3.89 | no | 7.36 | Strength of attachment | 22.70 | 30.06 | 330 | 2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews) | Leaners | | 6.65 | 1.92 | no | 4.29 | Interest in the campaign | 14.92 | 19.21 | 492 | 2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews) | Very interested in the campaign | | 9.59 | 2.92 | no | 6.25 | Interest in the campaign | 23.67 | 29.92 | 333 | 2024 face-to-face respondents only (2020 had no face-to-face interviews) | Somewhat interested | Views: All partisans and party (core = true); All subgroups. Note: n is the smaller of the 2020 and 2024 cell sizes. Subgroups with fewer than 100 respondents or an effective sample below that in either year are not shown. Note: The intervals treat the 2020 and 2024 samples as independent. The all-interview 2024 sample includes respondents who were also interviewed in 2020, so its intervals are wider than needed; the web and face-to-face comparisons use fresh 2024 samples. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2020 and 2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; weight_web and weight_ftf for the 2024 mode samples) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/group_change.json ### Table 8. The other party's nominee was rated 13.3 in 2024, below the 20.6 for the party, while the own party's nominee was rated 75.2 Mean feeling thermometer rating of the other party, the other party's presidential nominee (other nominee) and the own party's nominee (own nominee), partisans including leaners, 1968 to 2024, 0 to 100 | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | measure | n | series | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | 55.63 | 52.91 | 54.27 | Mean rating | 1,157 | Other nominee | 1968 | | 47.78 | 45.35 | 46.57 | Mean rating | 2,203 | Other nominee | 1972 | | 51.02 | 48.71 | 49.87 | Mean rating | 1,811 | Other nominee | 1976 | | 45.39 | 42.63 | 44.01 | Mean rating | 1,301 | Other nominee | 1980 | | 43.89 | 41.62 | 42.75 | Mean rating | 1,903 | Other nominee | 1984 | | 44.65 | 42.31 | 43.48 | Mean rating | 1,721 | Other nominee | 1988 | | 40.89 | 38.88 | 39.88 | Mean rating | 2,110 | Other nominee | 1992 | | 41.60 | 38.90 | 40.25 | Mean rating | 1,524 | Other nominee | 1996 | | 44.28 | 41.71 | 42.99 | Mean rating | 1,527 | Other nominee | 2000 | | 36.06 | 32.70 | 34.38 | Mean rating | 1,063 | Other nominee | 2004 | | 39.36 | 36.80 | 38.08 | Mean rating | 1,990 | Other nominee | 2008 | | 27.16 | 25.38 | 26.27 | Mean rating | 5,075 | Other nominee | 2012 | | 16.37 | 14.54 | 15.45 | Mean rating | 3,622 | Other nominee | 2016 | | 15.36 | 13.95 | 14.65 | Mean rating | 7,026 | Other nominee | 2020 | | 14.16 | 12.47 | 13.32 | Mean rating | 5,087 | Other nominee | 2024 | | 48.87 | 47.12 | 48.00 | Mean rating | 1,723 | Other party | 1978 | | 47.72 | 45.43 | 46.57 | Mean rating | 1,310 | Other party | 1980 | | 45.43 | 43.12 | 44.27 | Mean rating | 1,181 | Other party | 1982 | | 46.86 | 44.92 | 45.89 | Mean rating | 1,881 | Other party | 1984 | | 47.25 | 45.25 | 46.25 | Mean rating | 1,796 | Other party | 1986 | | 46.60 | 44.52 | 45.56 | Mean rating | 1,717 | Other party | 1988 | | 47.83 | 45.74 | 46.78 | Mean rating | 1,656 | Other party | 1990 | | 42.74 | 40.95 | 41.84 | Mean rating | 2,098 | Other party | 1992 | | 43.63 | 41.40 | 42.51 | Mean rating | 1,567 | Other party | 1994 | | 42.35 | 39.99 | 41.17 | Mean rating | 1,528 | Other party | 1996 | | 42.34 | 39.59 | 40.96 | Mean rating | 1,104 | Other party | 1998 | | 42.78 | 40.43 | 41.60 | Mean rating | 1,525 | Other party | 2000 | | 41.05 | 38.08 | 39.57 | Mean rating | 1,055 | Other party | 2004 | | 35.88 | 33.50 | 34.69 | Mean rating | 1,979 | Other party | 2008 | | 28.65 | 27.07 | 27.86 | Mean rating | 5,079 | Other party | 2012 | | 26.90 | 25.17 | 26.04 | Mean rating | 3,610 | Other party | 2016 | | 19.91 | 18.58 | 19.24 | Mean rating | 7,174 | Other party | 2020 | | 21.46 | 19.80 | 20.63 | Mean rating | 5,080 | Other party | 2024 | | 76.23 | 73.57 | 74.90 | Mean rating | 1,157 | Own nominee | 1968 | | 69.66 | 67.43 | 68.54 | Mean rating | 2,203 | Own nominee | 1972 | | 74.89 | 73.03 | 73.96 | Mean rating | 1,811 | Own nominee | 1976 | | 70.63 | 68.32 | 69.47 | Mean rating | 1,301 | Own nominee | 1980 | | 76.68 | 74.91 | 75.80 | Mean rating | 1,903 | Own nominee | 1984 | | 75.16 | 73.19 | 74.18 | Mean rating | 1,721 | Own nominee | 1988 | | 70.36 | 68.73 | 69.55 | Mean rating | 2,110 | Own nominee | 1992 | | 73.07 | 70.84 | 71.96 | Mean rating | 1,524 | Own nominee | 1996 | | 72.49 | 70.32 | 71.40 | Mean rating | 1,527 | Own nominee | 2000 | | 75.92 | 73.20 | 74.56 | Mean rating | 1,063 | Own nominee | 2004 | | 72.79 | 70.50 | 71.64 | Mean rating | 1,990 | Own nominee | 2008 | | 76.52 | 74.97 | 75.74 | Mean rating | 5,075 | Own nominee | 2012 | | 65.79 | 63.65 | 64.72 | Mean rating | 3,622 | Own nominee | 2016 | | 76.48 | 74.95 | 75.72 | Mean rating | 7,026 | Own nominee | 2020 | | 76.16 | 74.27 | 75.22 | Mean rating | 5,087 | Own nominee | 2024 | | −0.775 | −4.36 | −2.57 | Nominee minus party | 1,301 | Other nominee minus other party | 1980 | | −1.64 | −4.63 | −3.14 | Nominee minus party | 1,881 | Other nominee minus other party | 1984 | | −0.513 | −3.64 | −2.08 | Nominee minus party | 1,717 | Other nominee minus other party | 1988 | | −0.619 | −3.31 | −1.96 | Nominee minus party | 2,098 | Other nominee minus other party | 1992 | | 0.878 | −2.71 | −0.918 | Nominee minus party | 1,524 | Other nominee minus other party | 1996 | | 3.13 | −0.345 | 1.39 | Nominee minus party | 1,525 | Other nominee minus other party | 2000 | | −2.95 | −7.43 | −5.19 | Nominee minus party | 1,055 | Other nominee minus other party | 2004 | | 5.14 | 1.64 | 3.39 | Nominee minus party | 1,979 | Other nominee minus other party | 2008 | | −0.397 | −2.78 | −1.59 | Nominee minus party | 5,075 | Other nominee minus other party | 2012 | | −9.33 | −11.83 | −10.58 | Nominee minus party | 3,610 | Other nominee minus other party | 2016 | | −3.62 | −5.56 | −4.59 | Nominee minus party | 7,026 | Other nominee minus other party | 2020 | | −6.13 | −8.50 | −7.31 | Nominee minus party | 5,080 | Other nominee minus other party | 2024 | | 6.71 | 4.13 | 5.27 | Share at zero | 1,157 | Other nominee | 1968 | | 16.44 | 13.46 | 14.89 | Share at zero | 2,203 | Other nominee | 1972 | | 9.59 | 7.01 | 8.21 | Share at zero | 1,811 | Other nominee | 1976 | | 14.28 | 10.70 | 12.38 | Share at zero | 1,301 | Other nominee | 1980 | | 14.51 | 11.49 | 12.93 | Share at zero | 1,903 | Other nominee | 1984 | | 13.77 | 10.68 | 12.14 | Share at zero | 1,721 | Other nominee | 1988 | | 13.59 | 10.80 | 12.12 | Share at zero | 2,110 | Other nominee | 1992 | | 14.06 | 10.38 | 12.10 | Share at zero | 1,524 | Other nominee | 1996 | | 9.92 | 6.84 | 8.25 | Share at zero | 1,527 | Other nominee | 2000 | | 23.32 | 18.00 | 20.53 | Share at zero | 1,063 | Other nominee | 2004 | | 14.21 | 10.59 | 12.28 | Share at zero | 1,990 | Other nominee | 2008 | | 31.51 | 28.12 | 29.79 | Share at zero | 5,075 | Other nominee | 2012 | | 50.65 | 46.75 | 48.70 | Share at zero | 3,622 | Other nominee | 2016 | | 59.31 | 56.19 | 57.76 | Share at zero | 7,026 | Other nominee | 2020 | | 61.65 | 57.74 | 59.71 | Share at zero | 5,087 | Other nominee | 2024 | | 6.57 | 4.43 | 5.40 | Share at zero | 1,723 | Other party | 1978 | | 8.37 | 5.62 | 6.87 | Share at zero | 1,310 | Other party | 1980 | | 8.81 | 5.86 | 7.20 | Share at zero | 1,181 | Other party | 1982 | | 9.23 | 6.78 | 7.92 | Share at zero | 1,881 | Other party | 1984 | | 9.13 | 6.64 | 7.80 | Share at zero | 1,796 | Other party | 1986 | | 9.54 | 6.95 | 8.15 | Share at zero | 1,717 | Other party | 1988 | | 8.92 | 6.37 | 7.55 | Share at zero | 1,656 | Other party | 1990 | | 9.57 | 7.20 | 8.31 | Share at zero | 2,098 | Other party | 1992 | | 8.24 | 5.49 | 6.74 | Share at zero | 1,567 | Other party | 1994 | | 10.44 | 7.26 | 8.72 | Share at zero | 1,528 | Other party | 1996 | | 11.50 | 7.75 | 9.46 | Share at zero | 1,104 | Other party | 1998 | | 10.00 | 6.91 | 8.32 | Share at zero | 1,525 | Other party | 2000 | | 14.69 | 10.33 | 12.35 | Share at zero | 1,055 | Other party | 2004 | | 16.82 | 12.90 | 14.75 | Share at zero | 1,979 | Other party | 2008 | | 24.36 | 21.25 | 22.77 | Share at zero | 5,079 | Other party | 2012 | | 23.90 | 20.64 | 22.23 | Share at zero | 3,610 | Other party | 2016 | | 41.57 | 38.51 | 40.03 | Share at zero | 7,174 | Other party | 2020 | | 35.12 | 31.36 | 33.22 | Share at zero | 5,080 | Other party | 2024 | Views: Mean rating (measure = Mean rating); Nominee minus party (measure = Nominee minus party); Share at zero (measure = Share at zero). Note: Nominees are the major-party presidential candidates of each election, so the same person can appear in several years (Trump in 2016, 2020 and 2024) while the other party's nominee for Republican respondents is Clinton in 2016, Biden in 2020 and Harris in 2024. In the second view n is the smaller of the party and nominee sample sizes, and the interval treats those two overlapping samples as independent, so it is wider than needed. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1968-2024; partisans including leaners; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/party_vs_candidate.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (147), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | biden_rep_2020 | 20.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | Republicans, leaners included, with a rating of both nominees | 2020 | 95% CI 19.2 to 21.3 | 3,309 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coh_new_2000 | 44.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, born 1975 or later | 2000 | 95% CI 40.3 to 47.9 | 133 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coh_new_2024 | 22.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, born 1975 or later | 2024 | 95% CI 20.8 to 23.4 | 2,057 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coh_old_1978 | 48.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, born 1942 or earlier | 1978 | 95% CI 46.9 to 49.3 | 1,022 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coh_old_2024 | 22.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, born 1942 or earlier | 2024 | 95% CI 17.9 to 26.2 | 243 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coth_1968 | 54.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 1968 | 95% CI 52.9 to 55.6 | 1,157 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coth_2024 | 13.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 2024 | 95% CI 12.5 to 14.2 | 5,087 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coth_change_2024 | −1.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −2.4 to −0.2 | 12,113 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coth_ftf_2024 | 16.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 2024, face-to-face respondents | 95% CI 14.7 to 18.7 | 966 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coth_web_2024 | 11.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 2024, web respondents | 95% CI 10.4 to 12.9 | 1,854 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cown_1984 | 75.8 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 1984 | 95% CI 74.9 to 76.7 | 1,903 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cown_2016 | 64.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 2016 | 95% CI 63.7 to 65.8 | 3,622 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cown_2020 | 75.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 2020 | 95% CI 75.0 to 76.5 | 7,026 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cown_2024 | 75.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 2024 | 95% CI 74.3 to 76.2 | 5,087 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | czero_1968 | 5.3% | percent of partisans rating the other party's presidential nominee at zero | weighted share of partisans (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 1968 | 95% CI 4.1% to 6.7% | 1,157 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | czero_2020 | 57.8% | percent of partisans rating the other party's presidential nominee at zero | weighted share of partisans (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 2020 | 95% CI 56.2% to 59.3% | 7,026 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | czero_2024 | 59.7% | percent of partisans rating the other party's presidential nominee at zero | weighted share of partisans (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both presidential nominees | 2024 | 95% CI 57.7% to 61.7% | 5,087 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_oth_1978 | 48.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, democrats | 1978 | 95% CI 47.2 to 49.5 | 1,088 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_oth_2024 | 21.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, democrats | 2024 | 95% CI 20.0 to 22.2 | 2,631 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_oth_fall | 27.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | fall in the weighted mean other-party rating from the first to the last yearly estimate (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, democrats | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 25.6 to 28.9 | 3,719 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | design_se_2024 | 0.36 | standard error of the mean, points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | all-interview other-party mean: Taylor-linearised standard error from the variance strata and primary sampling units of the 2024 Time Series file | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, 2024 Time Series file | 2024 | | 5,080 | pre-election full-sample weight (V240107a) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | edu_col_1978 | 46.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, college degree or more | 1978 | 95% CI 44.9 to 48.4 | 317 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_col_2024 | 20.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, college degree or more | 2024 | 95% CI 19.0 to 21.3 | 2,353 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_hs_1978 | 48.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, high school or less | 1978 | 95% CI 47.4 to 49.8 | 1,041 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_hs_2024 | 22.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, high school or less | 2024 | 95% CI 20.2 to 23.7 | 1,102 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fall_all_0812 | 6.8 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI 5.4 to 8.3 | 7,058 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fall_all_0824 | 14.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | fall in the all-interview mean (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 12.6 to 15.5 | 7,059 | weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fall_ftf_0812 | 1.9 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI 0.1 to 3.7 | 3,777 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fall_ftf_0824 | 9.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | fall in the face-to-face mean (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 6.9 to 11.4 | 7,059 | weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fall_ftf_1224 | 7.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 5.0 to 9.6 | 2,758 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fall_mode_0824 | 4.9 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | gap between the all-interview and the face-to-face mean in 2024 (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 3.5 to 6.3 | 7,059 | weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fall_web_1224 | 7.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 5.6 to 8.7 | 5,131 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | floor_cell | 100 | respondents | minimum number of respondents (and of effective respondents) for a plotted cell | cells of a subgroup by year table | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_1978 | 23.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 | 95% CI 21.8 to 24.2 | 1,723 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_1988 | 30.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1988 | 95% CI 29.3 to 32.1 | 1,717 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_2020 | 52.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2020 | 95% CI 51.2 to 53.3 | 7,174 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_2024 | 49.9 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 95% CI 48.6 to 51.2 | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | harris_rep_2024 | 16.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | Republicans, leaners included, with a rating of both nominees | 2024 | 95% CI 14.9 to 17.5 | 2,451 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | harris_rep_change | −4.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | Republicans, leaners included, with a rating of both nominees | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −5.7 to −2.4 | 5,760 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | leaner_oth_1978 | 50.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, leaners | 1978 | 95% CI 49.2 to 51.8 | 500 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | leaner_oth_2024 | 26.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, leaners | 2024 | 95% CI 24.9 to 28.3 | 1,418 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | leaner_own_1978 | 62.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, leaners | 1978 | 95% CI 61.4 to 64.0 | 500 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | leaner_own_2024 | 59.8 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, leaners | 2024 | 95% CI 58.3 to 61.4 | 1,418 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_other_0824 | 2.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | part of the 2024 gap that comes from panel and paper respondents (their share of the all-interview weight times the distance between the face-to-face mean and their mean) (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 95% CI 2.0 to 3.4 | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_web_0824 | 2.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | part of the 2024 gap that comes from web respondents (their share of the all-interview weight times the distance between the face-to-face mean and their mean) (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 95% CI 1.5 to 2.9 | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | model_se_2024 | 0.42 | standard error of the mean, points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | all-interview other-party mean: standard error from the Kish effective sample size | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, 2024 Time Series file | 2024 | | 5,080 | pre-election full-sample weight (V240107a) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | n_excl_all | 3 | subgroups | count of subgroup changes whose 95% interval excludes zero | subgroups with at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100 in both years | 2020 to 2024, all 2024 interviews | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_excl_ftf | 8 | subgroups | count of subgroup changes whose 95% interval excludes zero | subgroups with at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100 in both years | 2020 to 2024, 2024 face-to-face respondents | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_excl_web | 1 | subgroups | count of subgroup changes whose 95% interval excludes zero | subgroups with at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100 in both years | 2020 to 2024, 2024 web respondents | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ftf_2024 | 960 | respondents | count | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024, fresh face-to-face sample | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_groups | 12 | groups | count of groups | strength, education and birth-cohort groups with at least four yearly estimates | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_nom_below | 9 | elections | count of elections in which the other party's nominee was rated below the party, with a 95% interval for the difference that excludes zero | presidential elections from 1980 to 2024 with both series | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_nom_elections | 12 | elections | count of elections | presidential elections from 1980 to 2024 with both series | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_other_2024 | 2,270 | respondents | count | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024, re-interviewed 2016-2020 panel and paper cases | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_paired | 43,063 | respondents | count of respondents in the sample | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 18 surveys, 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_sub_all | 9 | subgroups | count of subgroup changes reported | subgroups with at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100 in both years | 2020 to 2024, all 2024 interviews | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_sub_ftf | 8 | subgroups | count of subgroup changes reported | subgroups with at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100 in both years | 2020 to 2024, 2024 face-to-face respondents | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_sub_web | 9 | subgroups | count of subgroup changes reported | subgroups with at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100 in both years | 2020 to 2024, 2024 web respondents | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_waves | 18 | surveys | count of survey years | ANES time-series studies with both party thermometers | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_web_2024 | 1,850 | respondents | count | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024, fresh web sample without paper cases | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nom_above_2008 | 3.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | other party's nominee's mean rating minus the party's mean rating, from two overlapping samples treated as independent (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties (party) or both nominees (nominee) | 2008 | 95% CI 1.6 to 5.1 | 3,969 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nom_above_2008_dem | 5.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | other party's nominee's mean rating minus the party's mean rating, from two overlapping samples treated as independent (95% interval, independent samples) | Democrats, leaners included, with a rating of both parties (party) or both nominees (nominee) | 2008 | 95% CI 3.5 to 7.9 | 2,682 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nom_above_2008_rep | 0.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | other party's nominee's mean rating minus the party's mean rating, from two overlapping samples treated as independent (95% interval, independent samples) | Republicans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties (party) or both nominees (nominee) | 2008 | 95% CI −2.6 to 3.1 | 1,287 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nom_below_2012 | 1.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | other party's mean rating minus its nominee's mean rating, from two overlapping samples treated as independent (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties (party) or both nominees (nominee) | 2012 | 95% CI 0.4 to 2.8 | 10,154 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nom_below_2024 | 7.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | other party's mean rating minus its nominee's mean rating, from two overlapping samples treated as independent (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties (party) or both nominees (nominee) | 2024 | 95% CI 6.1 to 8.5 | 10,167 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_1978 | 48.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 | 95% CI 47.1 to 48.9 | 1,723 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_1988 | 45.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1988 | 95% CI 44.5 to 46.6 | 1,717 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_1990 | 46.8 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1990 | 95% CI 45.7 to 47.8 | 1,656 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_2008 | 34.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2008 | 95% CI 33.5 to 35.9 | 1,979 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_2016 | 26.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2016 | 95% CI 25.2 to 26.9 | 3,610 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_2020 | 19.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2020 | 95% CI 18.6 to 19.9 | 7,174 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_2024 | 20.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 95% CI 19.8 to 21.5 | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_fall | 27.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 26.2 to 28.6 | 6,803 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_ftf_2008 | 34.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2008, face-to-face respondents | 95% CI 33.5 to 35.9 | 1,979 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_ftf_2024 | 25.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024, face-to-face respondents | 95% CI 23.7 to 27.4 | 960 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_other_2024 | 17.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024, respondents in neither mode-weight group | 95% CI 16.3 to 18.6 | 2,270 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_web_2012 | 25.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012, web respondents | 95% CI 24.1 to 26.0 | 3,281 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_web_2024 | 18.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024, web respondents | 95% CI 16.7 to 19.2 | 1,850 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | own_1978 | 71.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 | 95% CI 70.2 to 71.8 | 1,723 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | own_1988 | 76.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1988 | 95% CI 75.4 to 77.1 | 1,717 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | own_2016 | 67.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2016 | 95% CI 66.3 to 68.0 | 3,610 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | own_2024 | 70.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 95% CI 69.7 to 71.3 | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | own_change | −0.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI −1.7 to 0.7 | 6,803 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | own_drift_total | −3.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | whole-period slope per decade times 4.6 decades | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 (4.6 decades) | 95% CI −6.3 to −0.4 | 43,063 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | own_ftf_change_0824 | −2.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.1 to −0.1 | 2,939 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rep_oth_1978 | 47.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, republicans | 1978 | 95% CI 46.1 to 48.7 | 635 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rep_oth_2024 | 20.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, republicans | 2024 | 95% CI 18.9 to 21.4 | 2,449 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rep_oth_fall | 27.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | fall in the weighted mean other-party rating from the first to the last yearly estimate (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, republicans | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 25.5 to 29.0 | 3,084 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_mode_0824 | 34.7% | percent of the all-interview fall | gap between the all-interview and face-to-face 2024 means as a share of the all-interview fall (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 23.8% to 46.6% | 7,059 | weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_gap | +6.2 | points on the 0 to 100 thermometer per decade | slope of the rating on year, weighted least squares, errors clustered on survey year, t interval with 17 degrees of freedom | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI 4.8 to 7.6 | 43,063 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_oth | −6.9 | points on the 0 to 100 thermometer per decade | slope of the rating on year, weighted least squares, errors clustered on survey year, t interval with 17 degrees of freedom | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI −7.9 to −5.9 | 43,063 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_oth_post | −8.2 | points on the 0 to 100 thermometer per decade | slope of the rating on year, weighted least squares, errors clustered on survey year, t interval with 11 degrees of freedom | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1990 to 2024 (12 surveys) | 95% CI −9.7 to −6.8 | 33,455 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_oth_pre | −0.8 | points on the 0 to 100 thermometer per decade | slope of the rating on year, weighted least squares, errors clustered on survey year, t interval with 6 degrees of freedom | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1990 (7 surveys) | 95% CI −3.3 to 1.7 | 11,264 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_oth_pre88 | −1.8 | points on the 0 to 100 thermometer per decade | slope of the rating on year, weighted least squares, errors clustered on survey year, t interval with 5 degrees of freedom | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1988 (6 surveys) | 95% CI −4.0 to 0.5 | 9,608 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_oth_pre96 | −3.2 | points on the 0 to 100 thermometer per decade | slope of the rating on year, weighted least squares, errors clustered on survey year, t interval with 9 degrees of freedom | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1996 (10 surveys) | 95% CI −4.5 to −1.9 | 16,457 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_own | −0.7 | points on the 0 to 100 thermometer per decade | slope of the rating on year, weighted least squares, errors clustered on survey year, t interval with 17 degrees of freedom | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI −1.4 to −0.1 | 43,063 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_own_post | −0.2 | points on the 0 to 100 thermometer per decade | slope of the rating on year, weighted least squares, errors clustered on survey year, t interval with 11 degrees of freedom | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1990 to 2024 (12 surveys) | 95% CI −0.8 to 0.5 | 33,455 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_own_pre | +1.6 | points on the 0 to 100 thermometer per decade | slope of the rating on year, weighted least squares, errors clustered on survey year, t interval with 6 degrees of freedom | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1990 (7 surveys) | 95% CI −4.0 to 7.1 | 11,264 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_edu_comp_fall | 0.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the other-party rating over three education groups: composition (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties and an education answer | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.0 to 0.9 | 6,753 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_edu_total_fall | 27.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the other-party rating over three education groups: total (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties and an education answer | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 26.2 to 28.6 | 6,753 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_edu_within_fall | 26.8 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the other-party rating over three education groups: within (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties and an education answer | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 25.4 to 28.2 | 6,753 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_ftf_total_fall | 22.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the other-party rating over strength groups: total (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024, 2024 face-to-face respondents | 95% CI 20.5 to 24.4 | 2,683 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_ftf_within_fall | 20.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the other-party rating over strength groups: within (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024, 2024 face-to-face respondents | 95% CI 18.0 to 22.5 | 2,683 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_oth_comp_fall | 1.8 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the other-party rating over strong, weak and leaning partisans: composition (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.3 to 2.3 | 6,803 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_oth_inter_fall | 1.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the other-party rating over strong, weak and leaning partisans: interaction (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.5 to 1.7 | 6,803 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_oth_total_fall | 27.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the other-party rating over strong, weak and leaning partisans: total (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 26.2 to 28.5 | 6,803 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_oth_within_fall | 24.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the other-party rating over strong, weak and leaning partisans: within (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 23.2 to 25.8 | 6,803 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_oth_within_share | 89.7% | percent of the total change | shift-share of the other-party rating over strong, weak and leaning partisans: within as a share of the total change (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 87.8% to 91.7% | 6,803 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_own_comp | +2.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the own-party rating over strength groups: composition (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.6 to 2.8 | 6,803 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_own_inter | +0.9 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the own-party rating over strength groups: interaction (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.4 to 1.4 | 6,803 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_own_total | −0.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the own-party rating over strength groups: total (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI −1.6 to 0.6 | 6,803 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ss_own_within | −3.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | shift-share of the own-party rating over strength groups: within (shift-share term (95% percentile interval, bootstrap within year)) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.6 to −2.5 | 6,803 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_oth_1978 | 41.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, strong partisans | 1978 | 95% CI 39.2 to 43.3 | 468 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_oth_2024 | 13.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, strong partisans | 2024 | 95% CI 12.1 to 14.0 | 2,472 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_own_1978 | 81.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, strong partisans | 1978 | 95% CI 80.0 to 83.0 | 468 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_own_1980 | 84.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, strong partisans | 1980 | 95% CI 82.8 to 85.8 | 405 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_own_1988 | 84.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, strong partisans | 1988 | 95% CI 83.3 to 85.7 | 619 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_own_2024 | 80.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, strong partisans | 2024 | 95% CI 79.6 to 81.6 | 2,472 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_share_1978 | 27.2% | percent of partisans | weighted share who are strong partisans (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 | 95% CI 25.1% to 29.3% | 1,723 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_share_2024 | 46.2% | percent of partisans | weighted share who are strong partisans (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 95% CI 44.2% to 48.2% | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | thaw_all_all | +1.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean other-party rating (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2020 to 2024, all 2024 interviews | 95% CI 0.3 to 2.4 | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | thaw_ftf_all | +6.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean other-party rating (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2020 to 2024, 2024 face-to-face respondents | 95% CI 4.3 to 8.2 | 960 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for 2024; weight (VCF0009z) for 2020 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | thaw_web_all | −1.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean other-party rating (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2020 to 2024, 2024 web respondents | 95% CI −2.7 to 0.1 | 1,850 | weight_web (VCF0009y) for 2024; weight (VCF0009z) for 2020 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | thaw_web_dem | −2.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean other-party rating (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, democrats | 2020 to 2024, 2024 web respondents | 95% CI −4.1 to −0.4 | 966 | weight_web (VCF0009y) for 2024; weight (VCF0009z) for 2020 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_max | 100 | points on the feeling thermometer | highest answer the feeling thermometer allows (a definition of the scale, not an estimate) | answers to the feeling thermometer | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_min | 0 | points on the feeling thermometer | lowest answer the feeling thermometer allows (a definition of the scale, not an estimate) | answers to the feeling thermometer | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | trump_dem_2020 | 9.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | Democrats, leaners included, with a rating of both nominees | 2020 | 95% CI 8.7 to 10.5 | 3,717 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | trump_dem_2024 | 10.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | Democrats, leaners included, with a rating of both nominees | 2024 | 95% CI 9.5 to 11.8 | 2,636 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | trump_dem_change | +1.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | Democrats, leaners included, with a rating of both nominees | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.4 to 2.5 | 6,353 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | warm_1978 | 31.2% | percent of partisans rating the other party above the neutral midpoint | weighted share of partisans (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 | 95% CI 29.1% to 33.5% | 1,723 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | warm_2024 | 6.5% | percent of partisans rating the other party above the neutral midpoint | weighted share of partisans (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 95% CI 5.6% to 7.6% | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | weak_oth_1978 | 50.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, weak partisans | 1978 | 95% CI 49.3 to 51.7 | 755 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | weak_oth_2024 | 27.8 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, weak partisans | 2024 | 95% CI 26.1 to 29.5 | 1,190 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | weak_own_1978 | 70.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, weak partisans | 1978 | 95% CI 68.8 to 71.2 | 755 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | weak_own_2024 | 64.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties, weak partisans | 2024 | 95% CI 62.9 to 65.8 | 1,190 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | web_colder_2012 | 7.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012 | 95% CI 6.1 to 9.4 | 5,079 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x); weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | web_colder_2016 | 6.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2016 | 95% CI 4.4 to 8.2 | 3,610 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x); weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | web_colder_2024 | 7.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | difference of two weighted means (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 95% CI 5.3 to 9.8 | 2,810 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x); weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wshare_ftf_2024 | 35.1% | percent of the all-interview weight | share of the summed all-interview weight held by the group | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024, face-to-face respondents | | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wshare_other_2024 | 33.7% | percent of the all-interview weight | share of the summed all-interview weight held by the group | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024, panel and paper respondents | | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wshare_web_2024 | 31.3% | percent of the all-interview weight | share of the summed all-interview weight held by the group | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024, web respondents | | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | zero_1978 | 5.4% | percent of partisans rating the other party at zero | weighted share of partisans (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 | 95% CI 4.4% to 6.6% | 1,723 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | zero_2020 | 40.0% | percent of partisans rating the other party at zero | weighted share of partisans (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2020 | 95% CI 38.5% to 41.6% | 7,174 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | zero_2024 | 33.2% | percent of partisans rating the other party at zero | weighted share of partisans (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024 | 95% CI 31.4% to 35.1% | 5,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | zero_ftf_2008 | 14.8% | percent of partisans rating the other party at zero | weighted share of partisans (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2008, face-to-face respondents | 95% CI 12.9% to 16.8% | 1,979 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | zero_ftf_2024 | 22.4% | percent of partisans rating the other party at zero | weighted share of partisans (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024, face-to-face respondents | 95% CI 18.9% to 26.3% | 960 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | zero_web_2024 | 38.8% | percent of partisans rating the other party at zero | weighted share of partisans (95% Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2024, web respondents | 95% CI 35.9% to 41.8% | 1,850 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Feeling thermometer: A 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Affective polarization: The gap between how warmly people feel toward their own party and how coldly they feel toward the other party. It measures feeling, not disagreement on issues. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. - Cohort: People born in the same period, such as the same decade. Comparing cohorts shows whether a difference comes from when people were born, as distinct from their age or the year they were surveyed. ## Methods Sample: respondents to the American National Election Studies (ANES) time series, from the Cumulative Data File, who identify as Democrats or Republicans on the seven-point party identification scale with leaners included (codes 1 to 3 and 5 to 7) and who gave a valid rating of both parties (the paired sample): 43,063 respondents in 18 surveys from 1978 to 2024. Series for presidential nominees use partisans with a valid rating of both major-party nominees, 39,120 respondents in the elections of 1968 to 2024. Pure independents are excluded because they have no own party. Each survey year is a separate cross-section of people, so every change is a change in a group average and not a change within persons. Measure: the feeling thermometer, from 0 (coldest) to 100 (warmest); own party is the party the respondent identifies with or leans toward. The gap is the respondent's own-party rating minus the other-party rating, averaged. Weights: the full-sample weight VCF0009z. Mode: weight_ftf (VCF0009x) on the fresh face-to-face sample and weight_web (VCF0009y) on the fresh web sample in 2008 (face-to-face only), 2012, 2016 and 2024; 2020 has no mode weights, and the 2024 re-interviewed panel and paper respondents belong to neither mode group and enter the all-interview estimate only. Estimators: weighted means and weighted shares by year with intervals on the Kish effective sample size (normal for means, Wilson for shares); they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering and stratification. Changes between two years or two samples combine the two standard errors in quadrature, which treats the samples as independent. Slopes: weighted least squares of the rating on year (in decades) over respondents, standard errors clustered on survey year, t interval with the number of surveys minus one degrees of freedom. Shift-share: with s the weighted share of a group and m its weighted mean, within = sum s0 (m1 - m0), composition = sum (s1 - s0) m0 and interaction = sum (s1 - s0)(m1 - m0), base 1978, end 2024, so the three terms add to the total change; intervals are percentile intervals from a bootstrap that resamples respondents within each year (2000 replicates, seed 12345), as are the intervals for the mode-composition terms. Strength groups: strong (party identification 1 or 7), weak (2 or 6), leaner (3 or 5). Education and birth cohort are recodes of the file's categories. Suppression: yearly cells need at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100 (timeline floor); subgroup-year cells need at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; a group needs estimates in four or more surveys. Interviews before 2008 are not split by mode. Mode terms for 2024: with s a group's share of the all-interview weight, m its mean and F the weight_ftf mean, the gap between the face-to-face and all-interview means is s_web (F - m_web) + s_other (F - m_other) plus a remainder for weighting the face-to-face respondents two ways; the bootstrap is the one used for the other mode terms. Design check (2024 only): the standard error of the 2024 all-interview other-party mean was recomputed from the variance strata (V240107d) and primary sampling units (V240107c) of the 2024 Time Series file, with the pre-election full-sample weight V240107a, by Taylor linearization with replacement within strata and the partisans with both ratings as a domain of the full sample; the sample and the mean equal the Cumulative File's. The Cumulative File used here has no strata or primary sampling units, so no other year is checked. The difference between a nominee average and the party average in an election treats two overlapping samples as independent. ## What these data cannot show - The ratings come from repeated cross-sections, so they cannot show that any partisan grew colder. - The decomposition shows that the fall is not accounted for by a shift among strength or education groups. - It does not rule out that older cohorts leave the samples while younger ones enter, or that people who change party move between groups. - The cohort lines cannot separate age, cohort and period. - A panel that re-interviews the same people is needed to describe change within persons. - The ANES 2016, 2020 and 2024 panel exists but is not in the files used here. - The mode results rest on mode weights that exist for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024. - The gap between the all-interview and face-to-face averages combines how people answer in each mode with who answers in each mode, and it is a decomposition of the record and not an estimate of a mode effect. - The 2024 gap also includes the panel and paper respondents, who belong to neither mode group. - Interviews before 2008 are not split by mode. - The 2016 to 2020 change and the 2020 to 2024 change cannot be split by mode at all. - A thermometer rating of a party may reflect feelings about party elites more than about fellow citizens who support it [10], and a rating of zero is the coldest answer and not a measure of behavior. - What the ratings go with in voting, in willingness to live near or work with the other side and in support for political violence belongs to Chapter 2.2, Negative partisanship (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship) and Chapter 6.8, Political violence and democratic norms (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms). - Feelings toward social groups are in Chapter 2.4, Party and feelings toward social groups (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-feelings-toward-groups; planned). - Accounts that start from partisanship as a social identity [11], from the alignment of party with other traits (Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology)) or from negative partisanship [12] are candidate explanations, and the ratings alone cannot tell them apart. - The intervals are model based and ignore the ANES sampling design. - The check against the design variables in the note on intervals covers 2024 only, so the intervals for other years are not compared with design-based intervals. - The split year 1990 was chosen after looking at the series, and the pre-1990 slope changes with the split year. - Each sample in the 2020 to 2024 comparison reports up to nine changes without adjustment for multiple comparisons, so an interval that excludes zero in one sample is weaker evidence than it looks. - The nominee series rates people, and the same Republican nominee appears in 2016, 2020 and 2024, so it mixes feelings about a party with feelings about a person. - The Democratic nominee differs in each of those years, so a change in Republicans' ratings of the other nominee between elections compares different people. - The decompositions cover strength of attachment and education and leave out race, religion and age, so the mix of each party by those traits is not decomposed here. - The year-by-year distribution of the ratings is not shown beyond the shares at zero and above the midpoint. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Wilson, Edwin B. (1927). Probable Inference, the Law of Succession, and Statistical Inference. Journal of the American Statistical Association 22(158): 209-212. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1927.10502953 3. Iyengar, Shanto; Sood, Gaurav; Lelkes, Yphtach (2012). Affect, Not Ideology: A Social Identity Perspective on Polarization. Public Opinion Quarterly 76(3): 405-431. https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/76/3/405/1894274 4. Iyengar, Shanto; Lelkes, Yphtach; Levendusky, Matthew; Malhotra, Neil; Westwood, Sean J. (2019). The Origins and Consequences of Affective Polarization in the United States. Annual Review of Political Science 22: 129-146. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-051117-073034 5. Iyengar, Shanto; Krupenkin, Masha (2018). The Strengthening of Partisan Affect. Political Psychology 39(S1): 201-218. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12487 6. Finkel, Eli J.; Bail, Christopher A.; Cikara, Mina; Ditto, Peter H.; Iyengar, Shanto; Klar, Samara; Mason, Lilliana; McGrath, Mary C.; Nyhan, Brendan; Rand, David G.; Skitka, Linda J.; Tucker, Joshua A.; Van Bavel, Jay J.; Wang, Cynthia S.; Druckman, James N. (2020). Political Sectarianism in America. Science 370(6516): 533-536. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.abe1715 7. American National Election Studies (2022). Methodology Report for the ANES 2020 Time Series Study. Stanford University and the University of Michigan. https://electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/anes_timeseries_2020_methodology_report.pdf 8. American National Election Studies (2025). ANES 2024 Time Series Study Full Release: User Guide and Codebook. Stanford University and the University of Michigan. https://electionstudies.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/anes_timeseries_2024_userguidecodebook_20250808.pdf 9. Kitagawa, Evelyn M. (1955). Components of a Difference Between Two Rates. Journal of the American Statistical Association 50(272): 1168-1194. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1955.10501299 10. Druckman, James N.; Levendusky, Matthew S. (2019). What Do We Measure When We Measure Affective Polarization?. Public Opinion Quarterly 83(1): 114-122. https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/83/1/114/5486527 11. Mason, Lilliana (2018). Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/U/bo27527354.html 12. Abramowitz, Alan I.; Webster, Steven W. (2016). The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century. Electoral Studies 41: 12-22. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0261379415001857 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/feelings-toward-the-other-party/build.py (sha256 1ce0f1ebeb4364945bbc231931df59000cbc2544033fd4b52dd0588045c66124) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes2024_ts/anes_timeseries_2024_spss_20260519.sav | 12,757,094 | 3107c838755f88353d0e3e39b2c3d5f76a2888cf56a179e3acac84ab431335d2 | bb318a018a39b4cf87ccc91b50a5b7c5b41746d28c0226f4a6c176e8c74966d6 | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 3f7c8674564306087618216b5acb6cc2c9d38a854ee535af326884644a628dd8 | | figures/decomposition.json | 1b7f3b5dcdaeb3e4e324c12682473f34066be36c3486f273ba3f75e9278a81ff | | figures/group_change.json | 9b0ea81126627ee9a597ab9066487a9cd56392950c14a81b8d0b1e3992a29eb2 | | figures/group_trends.json | f290718d94b7379deb740fd1e894294ea05d86036883573fa2ffed87d99eba31 | | figures/mode_fall.json | e84642beec68332952e6c43c527dd9d1f765de3a269eea1dd09a37cfe726fd1d | | figures/party_vs_candidate.json | 491b005ed02cb0b624d8778b1945c65099d825ccb5e2f9492860efc0803ce071 | | figures/slopes.json | becaa0b12fe59ce774fbc67ae6e66f7636302977a544279266819c8082e083a3 | | figures/warmth_trend.json | 20bbb5ccd4270b309bda3752dc2352dcf59271746398133164e6ad2a0ad70f1c | | figures/zero_share.json | 2d1b3b1e63499fe82ce24f7accad8c65f88b3cd245cbccb24e356522febda8be | | meta.json | fc464011521d56d19f0ce53a02a718ca15177406a2afe0218d6ed1786891219f | | refs.json | cfada010743aa86084889b1dfc4170b5af26c9b3064df3aefad09274bff6c423 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/facts.json - Table 1, figure "warmth_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/warmth_trend.json - Table 2, figure "slopes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/slopes.json - Table 3, figure "zero_share" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/zero_share.json - Table 4, figure "mode_fall" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/mode_fall.json - Table 5, figure "decomposition" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/decomposition.json - Table 6, figure "group_trends" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/group_trends.json - Table 7, figure "group_change" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/group_change.json - Table 8, figure "party_vs_candidate" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/feelings-toward-the-other-party/figures/party_vs_candidate.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Negative partisanship: report Chapter 2.2 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Negative partisanship - Chapter: 2.2 (Part II, Partisan feeling; The great sorting) - Question: Does dislike of the other party now organize partisan behavior more than attachment to one's own? - Dek: Among ANES partisans in 2012 to 2024, each 10 points of coldness toward the other party went with 3.5 points more own-party House voting, against 1.9 points for the same warmth toward the own party. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024: party thermometers 1978-2024; presidential vote VCF0704, House vote VCF0707, ticket splitting VCF0709, turnout VCF0702 and campaign activity VCF0717 to VCF0721; the 0 to 10 like-dislike scale for each party in seven studies from 1996; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web (VCF0009x, VCF0009y) for mode-specific estimates in 2012, 2016 and 2024 - County election returns. County presidential returns 2020 and 2024, Alaska excluded: the Democratic share of the two-party vote, used only to set beside the ANES self-reported vote; years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026negativepartisanship ```bibtex @misc{singh2026negativepartisanship, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Negative partisanship}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | size of the change in a rating that a coefficient describes (a definition, not an estimate) | the unit in which coefficients are reported | 1978 to 2024 | 10 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | step | | coldness toward the other party on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 3.5 | 95% CI 3.1 to 3.9 | 13,912 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | house_cold_3 | | warmth toward the own party on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 1.9 | 95% CI 1.5 to 2.3 | 13,912 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | house_warm_3 | | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 1.6 | 95% CI 1.0 to 2.1 | 13,912 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | house_diff_3 | | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on turnout, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 | 1.6 | 95% CI 1.0 to 2.2 | 18,976 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | turnout_diff_3 | | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012 to 2024 | 1.5 | 95% CI 0.8 to 2.3 | 18,697 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | act_any_diff_3 | | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 0.7 | 95% CI 0.3 to 1.2 | 15,612 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | pres_diff_3 | | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 0.0 | 95% CI −0.8 to 0.9 | 5,930 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | house_diff_1 | | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 1978 to 1990 | 0.0 | 95% CI −0.7 to 0.7 | 10,606 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | act_any_diff_1 | | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 2.6 | 95% CI 1.7 to 3.6 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | turnout_chg | | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990, presidential election years only | 2.0 | 95% CI 0.8 to 3.3 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | turnout_chg_p | | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews minus 1978 to 1990 | 3.5 | 95% CI 2.0 to 4.9 | | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | turnout_chg_ftf | | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews minus 1978 to 1990 | 2.3 | 95% CI 1.2 to 3.5 | | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | turnout_chg_web | | count of respondents in the sample | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 18 surveys, 1978 to 2024 | 43,063 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_resp | | count of survey years | ANES time-series studies with both party thermometers | 1978 to 2024 | 18 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_waves | | lowest answer the feeling thermometer allows (a definition of the scale, not an estimate) | answers to the feeling thermometer | 1978 to 2024 | 0 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | therm_min | | highest answer the feeling thermometer allows (a definition of the scale, not an estimate) | answers to the feeling thermometer | 1978 to 2024 | 100 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | therm_max | | weighted share who lean toward a party and do not identify with it | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012 to 2024 | 27% | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | leaner_share_3 | | weighted share who lean toward a party and do not identify with it | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1990 | 27% | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | leaner_share_1 | | share of the sample interviewed in a midterm election year (respondent count) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1990 | 56% | | 11,264 | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | midterm_share_1 | | share of the sample interviewed in a midterm election year (respondent count) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1992 to 2008 | 25% | | 10,856 | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | midterm_share_2 | ## Findings Among Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) in the American National Election Studies (ANES) of 2012 to 2024, a rating of the other party 10 points colder on the feeling thermometer went with 3.5 (95% CI 3.1 to 3.9) points more own-party House voting, with the rating of the own party held fixed. A rating of the own party 10 points warmer went with 1.9 (95% CI 1.5 to 2.3) points, with the rating of the other party held fixed. That comparison of recent levels, a larger coefficient on coldness toward the other party than on warmth toward the own party, is the chapter's principal result. This chapter calls coldness minus warmth the per-point difference. It was 1.6 (95% CI 1.0 to 2.1) points for House voting, 1.6 (95% CI 1.0 to 2.2) for reported turnout and 1.5 (95% CI 0.8 to 2.3) for campaign activity in 2012 to 2024, and 0.7 (95% CI 0.3 to 1.2) for party-line presidential voting. Whether the difference is new is a second question, and the answer depends on the comparison. In 1978 to 1990 the per-point difference was 0.0 (95% CI −0.8 to 0.9) for House voting and 0.0 (95% CI −0.7 to 0.7) for campaign activity. Only for reported turnout is the change since then above zero under every measure the chapter uses, in presidential years alone and within each interview mode, at 2.6 (95% CI 1.7 to 3.6) points in all interviews, 2.0 (95% CI 0.8 to 3.3) in presidential years alone, 3.5 (95% CI 2.0 to 4.9) face to face and 2.3 (95% CI 1.2 to 3.5) on the web. The changes for House voting and campaign activity are above zero in all interviews and include zero in presidential years alone and within each mode, and the cut-off measures disagree with the per-point measure about presidential voting. These are comparisons of how feelings and behavior go together, so the chapter says "went with". Both are measured in the same survey, so either may shape the other, and both may follow from traits that the survey measures only in part, such as interest in politics or the strength of party identification. The ratings and the behavior come from the ANES Cumulative Data File: 43,063 respondents in 18 surveys from 1978 to 2024 who identify with a party or lean toward one and rated both parties on a scale from 0 to 100. Pure independents are left out because they have no own party. Leaners count as partisans throughout, as in Chapter 2.1, Feelings toward the other party (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party), and they are 27% of partisans in 2012 to 2024 and 27% in 1978 to 1990; a check below drops them. Warmth is the rating of the own party. Coldness is 100 minus the rating of the other party, so that a higher value is colder and the two coefficients can be set side by side. Five behaviors follow. Party-line presidential voting is a vote for the own party's candidate among partisans who reported voting for a major-party candidate, and defection is its complement. Party-line House voting is the same for the House candidate. A straight-ticket vote is a vote for one party for president and the House, the complement of ticket splitting. Reported turnout is the report of having voted. Campaign activity is a yes to at least one of these: tried to persuade others how to vote, attended a meeting or rally, worked for a party or candidate, displayed a button or sticker, or gave money. All of these behaviors are self-reports. Presidential voting and the straight ticket exist only in presidential election years. The other three also exist in midterm years, which are 56% of the respondents in 1978 to 1990, 25% in 1992 to 2008 and none in 2012 to 2024, so a comparison of those three across periods mixes the period with the election type. (Note: Estimates use the ANES full-sample weight. Coefficients come from weighted linear probability models with year fixed effects, and their intervals use HC3 robust standard errors [1]. Shares of groups use the Wilson interval [2] on the Kish effective sample size [3]. All intervals treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the ANES strata and clusters.) Abramowitz and Webster use ANES ratings of parties and candidates to argue that increasingly negative feelings among party supporters, leaners included, about the opposing party have led to more party loyalty and more straight-ticket voting [4] [5]. A study of Canada reports that negative partisan attitudes influence turnout and a range of political activities as well as vote choice [6], a study of elections in Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States reports an autonomous influence of negative party identification [7], and a study of the 2016 American election examines negative and positive partisanship together [8]. This chapter asks the question of the ANES behavior items from 1978 to 2024: holding the rating of the own party fixed, is behavior more closely tied to the rating of the other party, and when did that start? The trend in the ratings themselves is in Chapter 2.1, Feelings toward the other party (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party), the comparison of emotional distance with distance on issues is in Chapter 2.3, Affective and issue polarization (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/affective-and-issue-polarization; planned), and feelings toward social groups are in Chapter 2.4, Party and feelings toward social groups (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-feelings-toward-groups; planned). ### Cold-only partisans now outnumber warm-only partisans The group comparisons sort partisans by two cut-offs. A partisan is very cold toward the other party when the rating of that party is at or below 15, and very warm toward the own party when the rating of the own party is at or above 85. A looser pair, 30 and 70, serves as a check. Four groups follow: neither, warm only, cold only and both. Table 1 gives the size of the four groups. In 1978 to 1990, 32.0% of partisans were warm only and 4.4% were cold only. In 2012 to 2024 the shares were 10.5% and 28.1%, and 25.2% were both. Cold only is also larger than warm only within each interview mode in 2012, 2016 and 2024 pooled: 19.5% (95% CI 17.8% to 21.2%) against 13.5% (95% CI 12.1% to 15.0%) face to face and 29.1% (95% CI 27.8% to 30.4%) against 11.0% (95% CI 10.1% to 11.9%) on the web. The average rating, the share rating the other party at zero and the mode checks on both belong to Chapter 2.1, Feelings toward the other party (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party). Table 1. Partisans very cold toward the other party only went from 4.4% of partisans in 1978 to 1990 to 28.1% in 2012 to 2024, and partisans very warm toward their own party only went from 32.0% to 10.5% ### Cold-only partisans voted the party line more often than warm-only partisans Table 2 compares the two groups that differ on one condition. Among partisans who voted for a major-party presidential candidate in 2012 to 2024, 98.1% (95% CI 97.5% to 98.5%) of those cold only voted for their own party's candidate, against 95.4% (95% CI 93.8% to 96.6%) of those warm only, 83.2% of those in neither group and 99.2% of those in both. Cold only minus warm only was 2.6 (95% CI 1.2 to 4.1) points in 2012 to 2024 and 6.0 (95% CI 2.3 to 9.6) in 1978 to 1990, so the very cold voted the party line more often in both periods, and the interval excludes zero in each. The gap is smaller in the later period, when party-line voting was higher everywhere: the share voting the party line among all partisans who voted for a major-party candidate was 85.9% in 1978 to 1990 and 93.3% in 2012 to 2024. Table 2. Partisans very cold toward the other party only voted for their own party's presidential candidate more often than those very warm toward their own party only in each period, at 98.1% against 95.4% in 2012 to 2024 Cold only is above warm only in all three periods for House voting as well, where cold only minus warm only was 10.1 (95% CI 5.9 to 14.2) points in 1978 to 1990 and 5.1 (95% CI 2.7 to 7.4) in 2012 to 2024, and for the straight ticket, at 11.7 (95% CI 5.0 to 18.4) and 4.6 (95% CI 2.2 to 6.9). The House gap fell by −5.0 (95% CI −9.8 to −0.3) points. Unlike presidential voting, in 1978 to 1990 the both group is not above cold only for either: 89.1% against 89.9% for House voting and 87.3% against 88.6% for the straight ticket. Reported turnout and campaign activity differ. In 1978 to 1990 warm-only partisans reported voting more often than cold-only partisans, with a difference of −5.5 (95% CI −10.1 to −0.8) points, and in 2012 to 2024 cold-only partisans reported it more often, by 5.7 (95% CI 3.2 to 8.3). For campaign activity the difference was 3.5 (95% CI −1.3 to 8.3) in 1978 to 1990, an interval that includes zero, and 5.4 (95% CI 2.0 to 8.9) in 2012 to 2024. For House voting, reported turnout and campaign activity the 1978 to 1990 cells include the midterm studies. The cold-only group was a small part of the partisans in 1978 to 1990, so its shares carry wide intervals, and the groups say nothing about partisans between the cut-offs, which the next section uses. ### Per rating point, coldness goes with more of each behavior in 2012 to 2024 A group comparison discards the variation inside each group. For each behavior and period, Table 3 uses the whole rating. It reports the coefficients on coldness and warmth from one linear probability model, in points of the behavior per 10 points of rating, with each rating held fixed when the other is estimated. The correlation between the own-party rating and the other-party rating, each centered on its survey year, was −0.06 (95% CI −0.08 to −0.04) in 1978 to 1990 and −0.23 (95% CI −0.25 to −0.21) in 2012 to 2024, so the two feelings are now more closely tied. Table 3. Per rating point, coldness toward the other party went with more House voting, reported turnout and campaign activity than warmth toward the own party did in 2012 to 2024, while in 1978 to 1990 the two went with similar amounts of House voting and campaign activity In 2012 to 2024 the coefficient on coldness exceeds the coefficient on warmth for all five behaviors. The per-point difference is 1.6 (95% CI 1.0 to 2.1) points for House voting, 1.6 (95% CI 1.0 to 2.2) for reported turnout, 1.5 (95% CI 0.8 to 2.3) for campaign activity, 1.3 (95% CI 0.8 to 1.9) for the straight ticket and 0.7 (95% CI 0.3 to 1.2) for presidential voting, and every interval is above zero. That period includes 2020, which has no mode weights. In 2012, 2016 and 2024 pooled the presidential difference is 0.54 (95% CI −0.05 to 1.12), an interval that includes zero, and the other four stay above zero, with campaign activity at 1.14 (95% CI 0.23 to 2.05). In 1978 to 1990 the difference had an interval that included zero for four behaviors: 0.0 (95% CI −0.8 to 0.9) for House voting, 0.0 (95% CI −0.7 to 0.7) for campaign activity, 0.8 (95% CI −0.5 to 2.1) for the straight ticket and −0.1 (95% CI −1.1 to 0.9) for presidential voting. Reported turnout is the exception, at −1.1 (95% CI −1.8 to −0.4) points, so warmth toward the own party went with more reported turnout than coldness toward the other party did. That result comes from the midterm studies: the difference was −1.5 (95% CI −2.4 to −0.5) in 1978, 1982, 1986 and 1990 and −0.5 (95% CI −1.5 to 0.6) in 1980, 1984 and 1988, an interval that includes zero. For House voting and campaign activity the presidential years alone also include zero, at 0.2 (95% CI −1.0 to 1.5) and 0.3 (95% CI −0.8 to 1.4). The middle period separates the behaviors. In 1992 to 2008 the difference for reported turnout was 1.1 (95% CI 0.3 to 1.9) and for campaign activity 1.7 (95% CI 0.9 to 2.5), both above zero, while the differences for House voting (0.2 (95% CI −0.6 to 1.1)) and presidential voting (−0.4 (95% CI −1.1 to 0.4)) still included zero. The edge for coldness reached participation first and party-line voting later. ### The yearly differences are noisy, and 2020 stands out Table 4 fits the same model to one survey at a time. The yearly differences scatter around zero before the 1990s. The interval lies above zero in 14 of 78 yearly estimates, all from 1992 on, and below zero in 3, all before 1998. In 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 the point estimate is above zero in every panel. Table 4. The edge of coldness over warmth rose by 0.3 to 0.5 points per decade for presidential voting, House voting and reported turnout, with intervals above zero, and the yearly estimates are too noisy to date the rise A model that lets each coefficient change linearly with time summarizes the movement. The coldness-minus-warmth difference rose by 0.5 (95% CI 0.3 to 0.8) points per decade for reported turnout, 0.5 (95% CI 0.2 to 0.7) for House voting and 0.3 (95% CI 0.1 to 0.6) for presidential voting, with intervals above zero. For the straight ticket the rise was 0.2 (95% CI −0.1 to 0.6), an interval that includes zero, and for campaign activity 0.3 (95% CI 0.0 to 0.6), an interval whose lower end reaches zero at one decimal. Fitted to presidential years alone, the rise is 0.5 (95% CI 0.1 to 0.8) for House voting, an interval above zero, and 0.3 for reported turnout, an interval whose lower end is just below zero. The yearly estimates are too wide to say whether the rise was gradual or sudden. The 2020 survey is the only one in which the interval is above zero in all five panels. In 2024 the point estimate is lower than in 2020 in every panel and every interval includes zero: 2.3 (95% CI 1.3 to 3.3) in 2020 and 0.6 (95% CI −0.5 to 1.7) in 2024 for House voting, and 2.4 (95% CI 1.0 to 3.7) and 0.4 (95% CI −1.3 to 2.1) for campaign activity. The 2020 study has no mode weights and the 2024 sample mixes new face-to-face, new web and panel respondents, so the figure cannot say whether the lower 2024 estimates reflect a change in feelings or in who was interviewed. ### Face-to-face and web respondents show the same sign The 2012 to 2024 sample mixes interview modes, and web respondents are more often cold only than face-to-face respondents (Table 1). Table 5 restricts the sample to 2012, 2016 and 2024, the years with mode weights, and estimates each mode alone. In both modes the per-point difference is positive for all five behaviors. For House voting it is 1.5 (95% CI 0.2 to 2.9) points face to face and 1.2 (95% CI 0.4 to 2.1) on the web. For reported turnout it is 2.4 (95% CI 1.1 to 3.7) and 1.3 (95% CI 0.3 to 2.2), with intervals above zero in both modes. For campaign activity it is 1.6 (95% CI −0.1 to 3.2) and 1.1 (95% CI −0.1 to 2.2), and for presidential voting 0.9 (95% CI −0.4 to 2.3) and 0.5 (95% CI −0.2 to 1.1), with intervals that include zero in both modes for both behaviors. Table 5. In 2012, 2016 and 2024 pooled, the coldness-minus-warmth difference has the same sign in face-to-face and web interviews for all five behaviors, and the two intervals overlap in every row ### Only the turnout change holds in presidential years and within each mode Table 6 sets the 2012 to 2024 per-point difference against the 1978 to 1990 difference. In all interviews the change was 2.6 (95% CI 1.7 to 3.6) points for reported turnout, 1.5 (95% CI 0.5 to 2.5) for House voting and 1.5 (95% CI 0.5 to 2.5) for campaign activity, with intervals above zero, and 0.8 (95% CI −0.2 to 1.9) for presidential voting and 0.6 (95% CI −0.8 to 2.0) for the straight ticket, with intervals that include zero. The interval for the presidential change reaches 1.9 points, more than the House point estimate, so the data cannot rule out a presidential change of that size. Two comparisons narrow the list. The first holds election type fixed by setting 2012 to 2024 against 1980, 1984 and 1988 alone. Reported turnout changed by 2.0 (95% CI 0.8 to 3.3) points, still above zero, while House voting changed by 1.3 and campaign activity by 1.3 (95% CI −0.1 to 2.6), intervals that include zero. The second holds interview mode fixed. The 1978 to 1990 studies were interviewed mainly in person, so the face-to-face estimate is the closer like-for-like comparison. Among face-to-face respondents in 2012, 2016 and 2024 reported turnout changed by 3.5 (95% CI 2.0 to 4.9) points and among web respondents by 2.3 (95% CI 1.2 to 3.5), both above zero, and both stay above zero against the presidential years alone (2.9 (95% CI 1.2 to 4.5) and 1.7 (95% CI 0.3 to 3.1)). House voting changed by 1.5 (95% CI −0.1 to 3.1) face to face and 1.2 on the web, and campaign activity by 1.5 (95% CI −0.2 to 3.3) and 1.0 (95% CI −0.3 to 2.4), and those intervals include zero or reach it. Table 6. Per rating point, the change since 1978 to 1990 in the difference between coldness and warmth is above zero for reported turnout in all interviews, in presidential years alone and within each interview mode, and for House voting and campaign activity only in all interviews Party-line voting also rose over these years, which compresses any coefficient on the probability scale. The share voting the party line was 77.1% for the House in 1978 to 1990 and 90.0% in 2012 to 2024, and 85.9% and 93.3% for the presidency. The log-odds views of Table 6 repeat the change on a scale where a constant proportional association gives a constant coefficient. On that scale the presidential difference was 0.09 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.17) in 1978 to 1990 and 0.08 (95% CI 0.02 to 0.14) in 2012 to 2024, a change of −0.01 (95% CI −0.11 to 0.09). Coldness went with more presidential voting than warmth in both periods, and the data show no change. The House change is 0.11 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.18) in all interviews and 0.10 (95% CI 0.02 to 0.19) in presidential years alone, both above zero, and 0.16 (95% CI 0.00 to 0.31) face to face and 0.08 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.18) on the web. For campaign activity it is 0.06 (95% CI 0.02 to 0.11) in all interviews and 0.05 (95% CI 0.00 to 0.11) in presidential years alone, an interval that reaches zero. ### The coldness edge comes from different coefficients for votes and participation The difference can rise because the coldness coefficient rises, because the warmth coefficient falls, or both. Interacting each coefficient with time separates them. For the three vote behaviors the warmth coefficient fell, by −0.4 (95% CI −0.6 to −0.2) points per decade for presidential voting, −0.4 (95% CI −0.5 to −0.2) for House voting and −0.4 (95% CI −0.6 to −0.2) for the straight ticket, while the coldness coefficient changed by −0.1 (95% CI −0.3 to 0.1), 0.1 (95% CI −0.1 to 0.3) and −0.2 (95% CI −0.4 to 0.0), all with intervals that include zero. For reported turnout the coldness coefficient rose, by 0.2 (95% CI 0.1 to 0.4) points per decade, as the warmth coefficient fell, by −0.3 (95% CI −0.5 to −0.1). For campaign activity the coldness coefficient rose by 0.4 (95% CI 0.2 to 0.6) and the warmth coefficient changed by 0.1 (95% CI −0.1 to 0.3), an interval that includes zero. In votes the association of warmth weakened and that of coldness held; in reported turnout and campaign activity the association with coldness grew. ### The recent sign holds under other measures, and the change does not The group comparison and the per-point comparison disagree about the 1980s, and Table 7 shows that the measure matters. In 2012 to 2024 the coefficient on coldness exceeds the coefficient on warmth for all five behaviors under the four measures the figure defines, and all 20 intervals are above zero. In 1978 to 1990 the measures disagree, and 12 of the 20 intervals include zero. The cut-off versions put the difference for House voting at 5.6 (95% CI 1.9 to 9.2) points and for the straight ticket at 7.2 (95% CI 1.6 to 12.8) in 1978 to 1990, above zero, as the group comparison above did, while the per-point difference is 0.0 (95% CI −0.8 to 0.9) and 0.8 (95% CI −0.5 to 2.1). The change since 1978 to 1990 also depends on the measure: 12 of the 20 change intervals are above zero, and which behaviors they cover differs by measure. Presidential voting changed by 6.1 (95% CI 2.5 to 9.7) points at the first pair of cut-offs and 8.4 (95% CI 4.0 to 12.8) at the looser pair, both above zero, against 0.8 (95% CI −0.2 to 1.9) per point and 0.4 (95% CI −1.7 to 2.6) per standard deviation, both including zero. House voting changed by 2.7 (95% CI −1.4 to 6.8) at the first pair, an interval that includes zero, and 4.29 (95% CI 0.03 to 8.55) at the looser pair. The straight ticket changed by −0.3 (95% CI −6.2 to 5.7) and −2.5 (95% CI −8.5 to 3.5), both including zero. Reported turnout is above zero under all four measures, at 5.0 (95% CI 3.2 to 6.8) per standard deviation, 10.1 (95% CI 5.9 to 14.3) at the first pair and 9.1 (95% CI 5.2 to 13.1) at the looser pair. The group comparison sides with the measures that show no growth for votes, because the gap between cold only and warm only fell for House voting and for the straight ticket (−5.0 (95% CI −9.8 to −0.3) and −7.1 (95% CI −14.2 to 0.0) points) and rose for reported turnout (11.2 (95% CI 5.9 to 16.5)). Table 7. In 2012 to 2024 the coldness coefficient exceeds the warmth coefficient for all five behaviors under each of four measures, every one of the 20 intervals lies above zero, and the measures disagree about the change since 1978 to 1990 Table 8 adds five checks for 2012 to 2024. Counting leaners as partisans is a choice, and dropping them leaves the differences positive and narrower: 0.3 (95% CI −0.3 to 0.9) for presidential voting and 0.7 (95% CI −0.1 to 1.4) for House voting, both with intervals that include zero, and 1.5 (95% CI 0.8 to 2.2) for reported turnout, 0.8 (95% CI 0.1 to 1.4) for the straight ticket and 1.2 (95% CI 0.2 to 2.2) for campaign activity, above zero. For the two vote items the edge for coldness depends partly on counting leaners. Holding party, strength of identification, education, age and interest in the campaign fixed leaves the presidential difference at 0.6 (95% CI 0.1 to 1.1) and the House difference at 1.2 (95% CI 0.6 to 1.9). Fitting each rating in its own model gives 0.5 (95% CI 0.1 to 0.9) and 1.2 (95% CI 0.7 to 1.6). On the log-odds scale every difference is above zero. On the like-dislike scale for each party, asked in 7 studies from 1996, the presidential difference is 0.3 (95% CI −0.2 to 0.8) and the turnout difference 0.3 (95% CI −0.4 to 0.9), both with intervals that include zero, while House voting, the straight ticket and campaign activity stay above zero. Across the 25 cells of Table 8 every difference is positive and 21 have an interval above zero. Table 8. In 2012 to 2024 the difference between coldness and warmth is positive in all 25 cells of five further checks, with an interval above zero in 21 ### In 2012 to 2024, coldness goes with persuading others and giving money The campaign activities differ. Table 9 splits the activity index into its items. In 2012 to 2024 the coefficient on coldness exceeds the coefficient on warmth for trying to persuade others, by 1.9 (95% CI 1.1 to 2.6) points, and for giving money, by 1.9 (95% CI 1.4 to 2.4). Attending a meeting (0.3 (95% CI −0.1 to 0.7)) and working for a party or candidate (0.3 (95% CI 0.0 to 0.7)) show smaller differences, with the second interval close to zero. Displaying a button or sticker shows none, at −0.1 (95% CI −0.7 to 0.4), and in 1978 to 1990 warmth led for that item, at −0.5 (95% CI −0.9 to −0.1). Table 9. In 2012 to 2024 coldness went with more persuading others and giving money than warmth did, and the two went with similar amounts of displaying a button ### What these data cannot show The comparison is between two feelings measured in the same survey as the behavior. A respondent who voted for a party's candidate may rate that party warmer afterward, and a respondent who dislikes the other party may be more willing to say that they voted or took part, so the coefficients cannot say which way the association runs. Interest in politics, strength of party identification, ideology and age may each raise warmth, coldness and behavior together. The checks hold a few of them fixed and do not hold ideology or issue positions fixed. Ratings of the parties may also reflect feelings about party elites more than about other citizens [9], and the party rating is not the rating of the presidential nominee, which goes with the presidential vote and is studied in Chapter 2.1, Feelings toward the other party (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party). The behaviors are reports. Validation against public records finds that survey respondents consistently overreport voting and that the nonvoters who say they voted tend to be politically engaged [10]. The file has no validated-vote variable, so the turnout results describe respondents who say they voted, and overreporting that is concentrated among engaged partisans could change the comparison of coldness and warmth. The self-reported vote also leans Democratic: among respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote, 56.0% reported a Democratic vote in 2020 and 55.3% in 2024, against 52.3% and 49.3% of the two-party vote in county returns, Alaska excluded. The party-line measures compare each partisan with the own party's candidate, so they are less exposed to that lean than a vote share is. The vote items cover only partisans who reported voting for a major-party candidate, so partisans who stayed home or chose a third-party candidate, among whom coldness toward both parties may be common, are outside them. Party-line voting is near its ceiling in recent years, which limits how much any coefficient can show, and the log-odds check addresses scale and not selection. The results come from repeated cross-sections, so they cannot show that any partisan grew colder or that any partisan's behavior changed as feelings changed. A panel that follows the same people is needed for that, and the ANES 2016, 2020 and 2024 panel is not in the files used here. The three periods were fixed before estimation, but their boundaries are a choice, and the per-decade slope and the yearly figure are there so that the result does not rest on them alone. The periods also differ in election type, and the presidential-years comparisons use three early studies. The 2012 to 2024 sample includes 2020, which has no mode weights, so the mode comparison covers 2012, 2016 and 2024 only. The intervals are model based and ignore the ANES sampling design. The chapter reports five behaviors, three periods and several measures without adjusting for multiple comparisons, so an interval that excludes zero in one cell is weaker evidence than it looks. What the ratings go with in views about political violence and democratic norms belongs to Chapter 6.8, Political violence and democratic norms (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms), and who turns out to vote belongs to Chapter 3.7, Turnout (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/turnout). ## Tables ### Table 1. Partisans very cold toward the other party only went from 4.4% of partisans in 1978 to 1990 to 28.1% in 2012 to 2024, and partisans very warm toward their own party only went from 32.0% to 10.5% Share of partisans, leaners included, in each of four groups defined by rating the other party at or below 15 (cold) and their own party at or above 85 (warm) on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer, three periods and two interview modes | conf_high | conf_low | cut | estimate | group | n | sample | | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | | 55.57 | 53.73 | strict | 54.65 | Neither | 11,264 | 1978 to 1990 | | 32.90 | 31.18 | strict | 32.03 | Warm only | 11,264 | 1978 to 1990 | | 4.81 | 4.05 | strict | 4.41 | Cold only | 11,264 | 1978 to 1990 | | 9.44 | 8.39 | strict | 8.90 | Both | 11,264 | 1978 to 1990 | | 58.11 | 56.03 | strict | 57.07 | Neither | 10,856 | 1992 to 2008 | | 23.87 | 22.10 | strict | 22.98 | Warm only | 10,856 | 1992 to 2008 | | 9.36 | 8.17 | strict | 8.75 | Cold only | 10,856 | 1992 to 2008 | | 11.89 | 10.56 | strict | 11.21 | Both | 10,856 | 1992 to 2008 | | 37.08 | 35.31 | strict | 36.19 | Neither | 20,943 | 2012 to 2024 | | 11.07 | 9.95 | strict | 10.50 | Warm only | 20,943 | 2012 to 2024 | | 28.93 | 27.28 | strict | 28.10 | Cold only | 20,943 | 2012 to 2024 | | 26.02 | 24.43 | strict | 25.21 | Both | 20,943 | 2012 to 2024 | | 28.61 | 26.96 | loose | 27.78 | Neither | 11,264 | 1978 to 1990 | | 49.67 | 47.83 | loose | 48.75 | Warm only | 11,264 | 1978 to 1990 | | 5.12 | 4.34 | loose | 4.71 | Cold only | 11,264 | 1978 to 1990 | | 19.49 | 18.05 | loose | 18.76 | Both | 11,264 | 1978 to 1990 | | 28.24 | 26.37 | loose | 27.30 | Neither | 10,856 | 1992 to 2008 | | 38.74 | 36.70 | loose | 37.71 | Warm only | 10,856 | 1992 to 2008 | | 10.01 | 8.79 | loose | 9.38 | Cold only | 10,856 | 1992 to 2008 | | 26.53 | 24.70 | loose | 25.61 | Both | 10,856 | 1992 to 2008 | | 16.98 | 15.63 | loose | 16.29 | Neither | 20,943 | 2012 to 2024 | | 15.06 | 13.77 | loose | 14.41 | Warm only | 20,943 | 2012 to 2024 | | 22.61 | 21.10 | loose | 21.85 | Cold only | 20,943 | 2012 to 2024 | | 48.37 | 46.54 | loose | 47.46 | Both | 20,943 | 2012 to 2024 | | 51.43 | 47.13 | strict | 49.28 | Neither | 3,787 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | | 15.04 | 12.10 | strict | 13.50 | Warm only | 3,787 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | | 21.25 | 17.85 | strict | 19.49 | Cold only | 3,787 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | | 19.43 | 16.14 | strict | 17.73 | Both | 3,787 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | | 38.73 | 35.95 | strict | 37.33 | Neither | 7,712 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | | 11.93 | 10.13 | strict | 11.00 | Warm only | 7,712 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | | 30.39 | 27.79 | strict | 29.07 | Cold only | 7,712 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | | 23.82 | 21.42 | strict | 22.60 | Both | 7,712 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | Views: Cut-offs 15 and 85 (cut = strict); Cut-offs 30 and 70 (cut = loose). Note: Face-to-face and web estimates use the mode weights weight_ftf and weight_web, which exist for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024. The 2020 study has no mode weights and the 2024 panel and paper respondents belong to neither mode group. Note: Respondents give the ratings 15, 30, 70 and 85 more often than the values next to them, so each cut-off sits on a common answer and includes it. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode estimates of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/group_shares.json ### Table 2. Partisans very cold toward the other party only voted for their own party's presidential candidate more often than those very warm toward their own party only in each period, at 98.1% against 95.4% in 2012 to 2024 Share of partisans, leaners included, who acted as the view names (first view: voted for their own party's presidential candidate), by whether they rated the other party at or below 15 (cold) and their own party at or above 85 (warm), three periods | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | group | n | outcome | period | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | 80.35 | 76.20 | 78.34 | Neither | 1,510 | pres | 1978 to 1990 | | 92.30 | 88.87 | 90.73 | Warm only | 1,100 | pres | 1978 to 1990 | | 98.71 | 91.81 | 96.69 | Cold only | 121 | pres | 1978 to 1990 | | 99.57 | 97.17 | 98.89 | Both | 359 | pres | 1978 to 1990 | | 85.96 | 82.95 | 84.51 | Neither | 2,753 | pres | 1992 to 2008 | | 95.72 | 93.01 | 94.52 | Warm only | 1,361 | pres | 1992 to 2008 | | 98.27 | 94.79 | 96.98 | Cold only | 496 | pres | 1992 to 2008 | | 99.74 | 98.27 | 99.32 | Both | 790 | pres | 1992 to 2008 | | 84.56 | 81.73 | 83.19 | Neither | 4,794 | pres | 2012 to 2024 | | 96.61 | 93.84 | 95.42 | Warm only | 1,651 | pres | 2012 to 2024 | | 98.52 | 97.47 | 98.06 | Cold only | 4,774 | pres | 2012 to 2024 | | 99.48 | 98.72 | 99.18 | Both | 4,393 | pres | 2012 to 2024 | | 73.64 | 70.49 | 72.09 | Neither | 3,117 | house | 1978 to 1990 | | 81.50 | 77.98 | 79.80 | Warm only | 1,995 | house | 1978 to 1990 | | 93.05 | 85.49 | 89.88 | Cold only | 247 | house | 1978 to 1990 | | 91.44 | 86.32 | 89.14 | Both | 571 | house | 1978 to 1990 | | 76.73 | 73.49 | 75.14 | Neither | 3,336 | house | 1992 to 2008 | | 87.03 | 83.04 | 85.14 | Warm only | 1,501 | house | 1992 to 2008 | | 93.13 | 87.97 | 90.87 | Cold only | 590 | house | 1992 to 2008 | | 96.34 | 92.90 | 94.89 | Both | 844 | house | 1992 to 2008 | | 82.17 | 79.03 | 80.65 | Neither | 4,286 | house | 2012 to 2024 | | 91.89 | 87.54 | 89.92 | Warm only | 1,376 | house | 2012 to 2024 | | 95.77 | 94.04 | 94.97 | Cold only | 4,397 | house | 2012 to 2024 | | 96.25 | 94.41 | 95.42 | Both | 3,853 | house | 2012 to 2024 | | 72.71 | 67.74 | 70.28 | Neither | 1,299 | straight | 1978 to 1990 | | 79.46 | 74.11 | 76.89 | Warm only | 952 | straight | 1978 to 1990 | | 93.34 | 81.08 | 88.57 | Cold only | 105 | straight | 1978 to 1990 | | 90.53 | 83.05 | 87.25 | Both | 306 | straight | 1978 to 1990 | | 77.70 | 73.79 | 75.80 | Neither | 2,282 | straight | 1992 to 2008 | | 87.61 | 83.07 | 85.49 | Warm only | 1,140 | straight | 1992 to 2008 | | 94.02 | 88.06 | 91.50 | Cold only | 421 | straight | 1992 to 2008 | | 97.17 | 93.60 | 95.73 | Both | 685 | straight | 1992 to 2008 | | 84.27 | 81.17 | 82.78 | Neither | 4,028 | straight | 2012 to 2024 | | 92.26 | 87.94 | 90.32 | Warm only | 1,351 | straight | 2012 to 2024 | | 95.71 | 93.92 | 94.89 | Cold only | 4,232 | straight | 2012 to 2024 | | 96.34 | 94.51 | 95.52 | Both | 3,824 | straight | 2012 to 2024 | | 63.52 | 61.05 | 62.29 | Neither | 5,885 | turnout | 1978 to 1990 | | 70.14 | 67.03 | 68.61 | Warm only | 3,405 | turnout | 1978 to 1990 | | 67.37 | 58.69 | 63.14 | Cold only | 472 | turnout | 1978 to 1990 | | 74.52 | 68.74 | 71.72 | Both | 930 | turnout | 1978 to 1990 | | 71.69 | 69.05 | 70.39 | Neither | 5,620 | turnout | 1992 to 2008 | | 75.50 | 71.55 | 73.57 | Warm only | 2,368 | turnout | 1992 to 2008 | | 82.05 | 76.01 | 79.19 | Cold only | 864 | turnout | 1992 to 2008 | | 85.34 | 80.40 | 83.01 | Both | 1,158 | turnout | 1992 to 2008 | | 79.53 | 76.83 | 78.21 | Neither | 6,432 | turnout | 2012 to 2024 | | 84.34 | 79.82 | 82.19 | Warm only | 2,043 | turnout | 2012 to 2024 | | 89.03 | 86.74 | 87.93 | Cold only | 5,582 | turnout | 2012 to 2024 | | 89.63 | 87.15 | 88.45 | Both | 4,919 | turnout | 2012 to 2024 | | 34.99 | 32.56 | 33.76 | Neither | 5,835 | act_any | 1978 to 1990 | | 41.70 | 38.40 | 40.04 | Warm only | 3,384 | act_any | 1978 to 1990 | | 48.08 | 39.09 | 43.53 | Cold only | 464 | act_any | 1978 to 1990 | | 47.75 | 41.35 | 44.53 | Both | 923 | act_any | 1978 to 1990 | | 40.49 | 37.66 | 39.07 | Neither | 5,614 | act_any | 1992 to 2008 | | 47.13 | 42.67 | 44.89 | Warm only | 2,362 | act_any | 1992 to 2008 | | 60.83 | 53.47 | 57.19 | Cold only | 864 | act_any | 1992 to 2008 | | 64.41 | 58.01 | 61.26 | Both | 1,157 | act_any | 1992 to 2008 | | 44.14 | 40.90 | 42.51 | Neither | 6,364 | act_any | 2012 to 2024 | | 57.54 | 51.61 | 54.59 | Warm only | 2,011 | act_any | 2012 to 2024 | | 61.75 | 58.28 | 60.03 | Cold only | 5,510 | act_any | 2012 to 2024 | | 64.07 | 60.26 | 62.18 | Both | 4,812 | act_any | 2012 to 2024 | Views: Presidential vote (outcome = pres); House vote (outcome = house); Straight ticket (outcome = straight); Reported turnout (outcome = turnout); Campaign activity (outcome = act_any). Note: Cells below 100 respondents are left out. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; weighted (VCF0009z) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/cells.json ### Table 3. Per rating point, coldness toward the other party went with more House voting, reported turnout and campaign activity than warmth toward the own party did in 2012 to 2024, while in 1978 to 1990 the two went with similar amounts of House voting and campaign activity Percentage points of each behavior per 10 points on the 0 to 100 thermometer, from one linear probability model per behavior and period with both ratings and year fixed effects, partisans including leaners | Behavior | Sample | Warmth coefficient | Warmth, lower end | Warmth, upper end | Coldness coefficient | Coldness, lower end | Coldness, upper end | Coldness minus warmth | Difference, lower end | Difference, upper end | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Party-line presidential vote | 1978 to 1990 | 4.27 | 3.54 | 5.01 | 4.17 | 3.64 | 4.71 | −0.10 | −1.06 | +0.87 | 3,090 | | Party-line House vote | 1978 to 1990 | 2.92 | 2.29 | 3.54 | 2.95 | 2.47 | 3.43 | +0.03 | −0.79 | +0.86 | 5,930 | | Straight ticket | 1978 to 1990 | 2.05 | 1.11 | 3.00 | 2.83 | 2.10 | 3.56 | +0.78 | −0.50 | +2.06 | 2,662 | | Reported turnout | 1978 to 1990 | 2.15 | 1.64 | 2.66 | 1.08 | 0.66 | 1.51 | −1.07 | −1.76 | −0.38 | 10,692 | | Campaign activity | 1978 to 1990 | 1.94 | 1.43 | 2.45 | 1.96 | 1.52 | 2.40 | +0.02 | −0.67 | +0.70 | 10,606 | | Party-line House vote | 1978 to 1990, midterm years | 3.11 | 2.26 | 3.95 | 2.98 | 2.33 | 3.63 | −0.12 | −1.23 | +0.99 | 3,138 | | Reported turnout | 1978 to 1990, midterm years | 2.33 | 1.64 | 3.02 | 0.88 | 0.29 | 1.46 | −1.45 | −2.37 | −0.54 | 6,348 | | Campaign activity | 1978 to 1990, midterm years | 1.68 | 1.03 | 2.33 | 1.52 | 0.95 | 2.08 | −0.16 | −1.02 | +0.69 | 6,321 | | Party-line presidential vote | 1978 to 1990, presidential years | 4.27 | 3.54 | 5.01 | 4.17 | 3.64 | 4.71 | −0.10 | −1.06 | +0.87 | 3,090 | | Party-line House vote | 1978 to 1990, presidential years | 2.71 | 1.79 | 3.64 | 2.93 | 2.23 | 3.64 | +0.22 | −1.03 | +1.46 | 2,792 | | Straight ticket | 1978 to 1990, presidential years | 2.05 | 1.11 | 3.00 | 2.83 | 2.10 | 3.56 | +0.78 | −0.50 | +2.06 | 2,662 | | Reported turnout | 1978 to 1990, presidential years | 1.86 | 1.11 | 2.62 | 1.39 | 0.79 | 1.99 | −0.47 | −1.51 | +0.57 | 4,344 | | Campaign activity | 1978 to 1990, presidential years | 2.26 | 1.43 | 3.08 | 2.54 | 1.84 | 3.23 | +0.28 | −0.85 | +1.41 | 4,285 | | Party-line presidential vote | 1992 to 2008 | 3.67 | 3.09 | 4.26 | 3.29 | 2.85 | 3.74 | −0.38 | −1.13 | +0.37 | 5,400 | | Party-line House vote | 1992 to 2008 | 3.11 | 2.48 | 3.73 | 3.34 | 2.86 | 3.81 | +0.23 | −0.61 | +1.07 | 6,271 | | Straight ticket | 1992 to 2008 | 2.84 | 2.10 | 3.59 | 3.31 | 2.75 | 3.87 | +0.46 | −0.56 | +1.48 | 4,528 | | Reported turnout | 1992 to 2008 | 1.34 | 0.78 | 1.91 | 2.41 | 1.95 | 2.88 | +1.07 | +0.29 | +1.86 | 10,010 | | Campaign activity | 1992 to 2008 | 1.86 | 1.27 | 2.46 | 3.55 | 3.05 | 4.06 | +1.69 | +0.88 | +2.50 | 9,997 | | Party-line presidential vote | 2012 to 2024 | 2.88 | 2.55 | 3.20 | 3.62 | 3.27 | 3.96 | +0.74 | +0.25 | +1.23 | 15,612 | | Party-line House vote | 2012 to 2024 | 1.92 | 1.55 | 2.29 | 3.48 | 3.07 | 3.88 | +1.56 | +0.99 | +2.13 | 13,912 | | Straight ticket | 2012 to 2024 | 1.21 | 0.85 | 1.57 | 2.55 | 2.16 | 2.93 | +1.34 | +0.77 | +1.90 | 13,435 | | Reported turnout | 2012 to 2024 | 0.68 | 0.30 | 1.06 | 2.25 | 1.87 | 2.64 | +1.58 | +0.98 | +2.17 | 18,976 | | Campaign activity | 2012 to 2024 | 2.02 | 1.54 | 2.50 | 3.56 | 3.09 | 4.04 | +1.54 | +0.79 | +2.30 | 18,697 | Views: 2012 to 2024 (view = p3); 1992 to 2008 (view = p2); 1978 to 1990 (view = p1); 1978 to 1990, presidential years (view = p1pres); 1978 to 1990, midterm years (view = p1mid). Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from HC3 robust standard errors (a linear probability model with year fixed effects) and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Note: Presidential voting is among partisans who voted for a major-party candidate. Turnout and campaign activity are self-reports. The 1978 to 1990 period has midterm studies in 1978, 1982, 1986 and 1990; 2012 to 2024 has none. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; weighted (VCF0009z) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/by_period.json ### Table 4. The edge of coldness over warmth rose by 0.3 to 0.5 points per decade for presidential voting, House voting and reported turnout, with intervals above zero, and the yearly estimates are too noisy to date the rise Coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient, percentage points of each behavior per 10 rating points, one model per survey year, partisans including leaners, 1978 to 2024 | behavior | diff_conf_high | diff_conf_low | diff_estimate | n | year | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.44 | −2.55 | −0.555 | 773 | 1980 | | Party-line presidential vote | 2.26 | −0.660 | 0.799 | 1,230 | 1984 | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.953 | −2.26 | −0.655 | 1,087 | 1988 | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.46 | −1.03 | 0.214 | 1,237 | 1992 | | Party-line presidential vote | −0.690 | −4.24 | −2.47 | 979 | 1996 | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.30 | −2.58 | −0.639 | 1,026 | 2000 | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.37 | −3.15 | −0.889 | 754 | 2004 | | Party-line presidential vote | 2.14 | −0.829 | 0.655 | 1,404 | 2008 | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.37 | −0.758 | 0.307 | 3,838 | 2012 | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.91 | −0.053 | 0.930 | 2,381 | 2016 | | Party-line presidential vote | 2.04 | 0.259 | 1.15 | 5,580 | 2020 | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.44 | −0.486 | 0.475 | 3,813 | 2024 | | Party-line House vote | 1.87 | −2.95 | −0.540 | 856 | 1978 | | Party-line House vote | 1.36 | −3.25 | −0.947 | 765 | 1980 | | Party-line House vote | 2.70 | −2.08 | 0.314 | 654 | 1982 | | Party-line House vote | 2.93 | −1.24 | 0.843 | 1,069 | 1984 | | Party-line House vote | 1.31 | −2.95 | −0.821 | 895 | 1986 | | Party-line House vote | 2.85 | −1.38 | 0.732 | 958 | 1988 | | Party-line House vote | 2.62 | −1.35 | 0.637 | 733 | 1990 | | Party-line House vote | 0.847 | −2.63 | −0.891 | 1,248 | 1992 | | Party-line House vote | 1.43 | −3.16 | −0.864 | 878 | 1994 | | Party-line House vote | 2.40 | −2.04 | 0.180 | 964 | 1996 | | Party-line House vote | 6.00 | 0.558 | 3.28 | 516 | 1998 | | Party-line House vote | 3.03 | −1.83 | 0.604 | 836 | 2000 | | Party-line House vote | 3.47 | −1.64 | 0.914 | 664 | 2004 | | Party-line House vote | 2.30 | −1.81 | 0.244 | 1,165 | 2008 | | Party-line House vote | 2.58 | 0.262 | 1.42 | 3,321 | 2012 | | Party-line House vote | 2.83 | 0.077 | 1.45 | 2,147 | 2016 | | Party-line House vote | 3.29 | 1.26 | 2.28 | 4,929 | 2020 | | Party-line House vote | 1.69 | −0.465 | 0.613 | 3,515 | 2024 | | Straight ticket | 2.13 | −2.58 | −0.227 | 683 | 1980 | | Straight ticket | 3.65 | −0.702 | 1.47 | 1,035 | 1984 | | Straight ticket | 3.11 | −1.26 | 0.925 | 944 | 1988 | | Straight ticket | 2.33 | −1.32 | 0.505 | 1,043 | 1992 | | Straight ticket | 0.642 | −4.11 | −1.74 | 878 | 1996 | | Straight ticket | 4.85 | −0.151 | 2.35 | 815 | 2000 | | Straight ticket | 3.03 | −1.95 | 0.537 | 654 | 2004 | | Straight ticket | 2.91 | −1.54 | 0.686 | 1,138 | 2008 | | Straight ticket | 2.71 | 0.494 | 1.60 | 3,239 | 2012 | | Straight ticket | 2.55 | −0.278 | 1.13 | 1,987 | 2016 | | Straight ticket | 2.77 | 0.677 | 1.73 | 4,793 | 2020 | | Straight ticket | 1.53 | −0.458 | 0.539 | 3,416 | 2024 | | Reported turnout | 2.98 | −0.683 | 1.15 | 1,722 | 1978 | | Reported turnout | 3.20 | −0.494 | 1.36 | 1,156 | 1980 | | Reported turnout | −1.15 | −5.58 | −3.36 | 1,174 | 1982 | | Reported turnout | 0.446 | −2.99 | −1.27 | 1,673 | 1984 | | Reported turnout | −1.15 | −4.68 | −2.91 | 1,796 | 1986 | | Reported turnout | 0.635 | −3.08 | −1.22 | 1,515 | 1988 | | Reported turnout | 0.269 | −3.03 | −1.38 | 1,656 | 1990 | | Reported turnout | 4.33 | 1.60 | 2.96 | 1,911 | 1992 | | Reported turnout | 3.07 | −1.37 | 0.852 | 1,567 | 1994 | | Reported turnout | 1.16 | −3.21 | −1.02 | 1,373 | 1996 | | Reported turnout | 4.05 | −0.834 | 1.61 | 1,102 | 1998 | | Reported turnout | 2.27 | −2.85 | −0.293 | 1,325 | 2000 | | Reported turnout | 7.19 | 1.95 | 4.57 | 934 | 2004 | | Reported turnout | 0.865 | −2.48 | −0.808 | 1,798 | 2008 | | Reported turnout | 3.58 | 1.28 | 2.43 | 4,747 | 2012 | | Reported turnout | 2.43 | −0.143 | 1.14 | 3,130 | 2016 | | Reported turnout | 2.58 | 0.503 | 1.54 | 6,498 | 2020 | | Reported turnout | 2.46 | −0.268 | 1.09 | 4,601 | 2024 | | Campaign activity | 3.00 | −0.538 | 1.23 | 1,719 | 1978 | | Campaign activity | 3.27 | −0.893 | 1.19 | 1,149 | 1980 | | Campaign activity | 1.11 | −3.21 | −1.05 | 1,171 | 1982 | | Campaign activity | 2.40 | −1.50 | 0.449 | 1,627 | 1984 | | Campaign activity | 0.826 | −2.50 | −0.839 | 1,777 | 1986 | | Campaign activity | 1.18 | −2.56 | −0.692 | 1,509 | 1988 | | Campaign activity | 1.20 | −1.70 | −0.251 | 1,654 | 1990 | | Campaign activity | 3.95 | 0.635 | 2.29 | 1,909 | 1992 | | Campaign activity | 3.03 | −1.14 | 0.949 | 1,558 | 1994 | | Campaign activity | 3.87 | −0.421 | 1.72 | 1,372 | 1996 | | Campaign activity | 4.19 | −0.066 | 2.06 | 1,103 | 1998 | | Campaign activity | 3.98 | −0.850 | 1.56 | 1,325 | 2000 | | Campaign activity | 4.87 | −1.02 | 1.92 | 934 | 2004 | | Campaign activity | 3.44 | −0.918 | 1.26 | 1,796 | 2008 | | Campaign activity | 3.24 | 0.228 | 1.73 | 4,731 | 2012 | | Campaign activity | 2.66 | −0.324 | 1.17 | 3,106 | 2016 | | Campaign activity | 3.71 | 1.04 | 2.38 | 6,449 | 2020 | | Campaign activity | 2.11 | −1.34 | 0.386 | 4,411 | 2024 | Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from HC3 robust standard errors (a linear probability model fitted to one year at a time) and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Note: Presidential vote and straight-ticket voting exist only in presidential election years; House vote, turnout and campaign activity also exist in midterm years. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; weighted (VCF0009z) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/yearly.json ### Table 5. In 2012, 2016 and 2024 pooled, the coldness-minus-warmth difference has the same sign in face-to-face and web interviews for all five behaviors, and the two intervals overlap in every row Coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient, percentage points of each behavior per 10 rating points, face-to-face and web respondents separately, partisans including leaners | behavior | ftf | ftf_hi | ftf_lo | n_ftf | n_web | period | web | web_hi | web_lo | year | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.17 | 3.61 | −1.28 | 1,250 | 2,588 | 2012 | −0.216 | 0.705 | −1.14 | 2012 | | Party-line House vote | 2.54 | 4.74 | 0.346 | 1,036 | 2,285 | 2012 | 0.957 | 2.24 | −0.330 | 2012 | | Straight ticket | 0.306 | 2.79 | −2.18 | 1,012 | 2,227 | 2012 | 2.36 | 3.42 | 1.29 | 2012 | | Reported turnout | 3.09 | 4.96 | 1.23 | 1,685 | 3,062 | 2012 | 1.76 | 3.23 | 0.283 | 2012 | | Campaign activity | 2.50 | 5.04 | −0.037 | 1,684 | 3,047 | 2012 | 1.44 | 3.36 | −0.490 | 2012 | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.653 | 2.31 | −1.01 | 696 | 1,685 | 2016 | 1.11 | 2.32 | −0.089 | 2016 | | Party-line House vote | 0.663 | 2.65 | −1.33 | 653 | 1,494 | 2016 | 2.03 | 3.82 | 0.236 | 2016 | | Straight ticket | 0.723 | 2.87 | −1.42 | 588 | 1,399 | 2016 | 1.51 | 3.31 | −0.294 | 2016 | | Reported turnout | 1.97 | 4.00 | −0.063 | 931 | 2,199 | 2016 | 0.887 | 2.48 | −0.707 | 2016 | | Campaign activity | 1.66 | 4.47 | −1.15 | 926 | 2,180 | 2016 | 0.919 | 2.69 | −0.855 | 2016 | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.934 | 3.17 | −1.30 | 674 | 1,313 | 2024 | 0.683 | 2.02 | −0.651 | 2024 | | Party-line House vote | 0.867 | 3.80 | −2.06 | 594 | 1,211 | 2024 | 0.382 | 1.82 | −1.05 | 2024 | | Straight ticket | 1.50 | 4.12 | −1.11 | 571 | 1,185 | 2024 | 0.196 | 1.62 | −1.23 | 2024 | | Reported turnout | 1.32 | 4.60 | −1.97 | 860 | 1,600 | 2024 | 1.12 | 2.79 | −0.545 | 2024 | | Campaign activity | −0.845 | 2.49 | −4.18 | 855 | 1,595 | 2024 | 0.476 | 3.23 | −2.28 | 2024 | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.936 | 2.31 | −0.437 | 2,620 | 5,586 | 2012, 2016 and 2024 pooled | 0.465 | 1.12 | −0.184 | pooled | | Party-line House vote | 1.53 | 2.91 | 0.151 | 2,283 | 4,990 | 2012, 2016 and 2024 pooled | 1.25 | 2.14 | 0.359 | pooled | | Straight ticket | 0.524 | 2.01 | −0.964 | 2,171 | 4,811 | 2012, 2016 and 2024 pooled | 1.58 | 2.42 | 0.740 | pooled | | Reported turnout | 2.41 | 3.68 | 1.13 | 3,476 | 6,861 | 2012, 2016 and 2024 pooled | 1.25 | 2.17 | 0.329 | pooled | | Campaign activity | 1.56 | 3.21 | −0.086 | 3,465 | 6,822 | 2012, 2016 and 2024 pooled | 1.06 | 2.24 | −0.122 | pooled | Views: 2012, 2016 and 2024 pooled (year = pooled); 2012 (year = 2012); 2016 (year = 2016); 2024 (year = 2024). Note: Mode groups are the fresh face-to-face and fresh web samples with their own weights. In 2024 the panel and paper respondents belong to neither group and are not in this figure. Pooled estimates include year fixed effects. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode estimates of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/mode.json ### Table 6. Per rating point, the change since 1978 to 1990 in the difference between coldness and warmth is above zero for reported turnout in all interviews, in presidential years alone and within each interview mode, and for House voting and campaign activity only in all interviews Coldness minus warmth coefficient in a later sample minus the same difference in 1978 to 1990, percentage points of each behavior per 10 rating points, partisans including leaners | behavior | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | sample_label | view | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.087 | −0.111 | −0.012 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | logodds_all | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.285 | −0.114 | 0.086 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | logodds_all | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.069 | −0.149 | −0.040 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | logodds_all | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.080 | −0.151 | −0.035 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | logodds_all | | Party-line House vote | 0.182 | 0.044 | 0.113 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | logodds_all | | Party-line House vote | 0.312 | 0.003 | 0.157 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | logodds_all | | Party-line House vote | 0.175 | −0.006 | 0.085 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | logodds_all | | Party-line House vote | 0.090 | −0.053 | 0.018 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | logodds_all | | Straight ticket | 0.161 | −0.016 | 0.072 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | logodds_all | | Straight ticket | 0.179 | −0.154 | 0.012 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | logodds_all | | Straight ticket | 0.199 | −0.013 | 0.093 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | logodds_all | | Straight ticket | 0.097 | −0.096 | 0.001 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | logodds_all | | Reported turnout | 0.205 | 0.101 | 0.153 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | logodds_all | | Reported turnout | 0.280 | 0.110 | 0.195 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | logodds_all | | Reported turnout | 0.196 | 0.059 | 0.128 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | logodds_all | | Reported turnout | 0.159 | 0.055 | 0.107 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | logodds_all | | Campaign activity | 0.107 | 0.020 | 0.063 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | logodds_all | | Campaign activity | 0.141 | −0.010 | 0.066 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | logodds_all | | Campaign activity | 0.101 | −0.014 | 0.043 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | logodds_all | | Campaign activity | 0.120 | 0.026 | 0.073 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | logodds_all | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.087 | −0.111 | −0.012 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | logodds_pres | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.285 | −0.114 | 0.086 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | logodds_pres | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.069 | −0.149 | −0.040 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | logodds_pres | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.080 | −0.151 | −0.035 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | logodds_pres | | Party-line House vote | 0.188 | 0.019 | 0.104 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | logodds_pres | | Party-line House vote | 0.310 | −0.014 | 0.148 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | logodds_pres | | Party-line House vote | 0.178 | −0.028 | 0.075 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | logodds_pres | | Party-line House vote | 0.088 | −0.097 | −0.004 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | logodds_pres | | Straight ticket | 0.161 | −0.016 | 0.072 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | logodds_pres | | Straight ticket | 0.179 | −0.154 | 0.012 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | logodds_pres | | Straight ticket | 0.199 | −0.013 | 0.093 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | logodds_pres | | Straight ticket | 0.097 | −0.096 | 0.001 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | logodds_pres | | Reported turnout | 0.196 | 0.058 | 0.127 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | logodds_pres | | Reported turnout | 0.266 | 0.073 | 0.169 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | logodds_pres | | Reported turnout | 0.184 | 0.020 | 0.102 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | logodds_pres | | Reported turnout | 0.162 | 0.010 | 0.086 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | logodds_pres | | Campaign activity | 0.109 | −0.004 | 0.052 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | logodds_pres | | Campaign activity | 0.139 | −0.029 | 0.055 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | logodds_pres | | Campaign activity | 0.100 | −0.036 | 0.032 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | logodds_pres | | Campaign activity | 0.126 | 0.001 | 0.063 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | logodds_pres | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.92 | −0.244 | 0.837 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | pp_all | | Party-line presidential vote | 2.71 | −0.645 | 1.03 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | pp_all | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.72 | −0.601 | 0.562 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | pp_all | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.938 | −1.50 | −0.283 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | pp_all | | Party-line House vote | 2.53 | 0.516 | 1.52 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | pp_all | | Party-line House vote | 3.10 | −0.114 | 1.49 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | pp_all | | Party-line House vote | 2.43 | −0.002 | 1.21 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | pp_all | | Party-line House vote | 1.37 | −0.984 | 0.195 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | pp_all | | Straight ticket | 1.96 | −0.845 | 0.557 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | pp_all | | Straight ticket | 1.71 | −2.22 | −0.254 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | pp_all | | Straight ticket | 2.34 | −0.730 | 0.804 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | pp_all | | Straight ticket | 1.32 | −1.95 | −0.314 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | pp_all | | Reported turnout | 3.56 | 1.73 | 2.64 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | pp_all | | Reported turnout | 4.93 | 2.02 | 3.47 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | pp_all | | Reported turnout | 3.47 | 1.16 | 2.32 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | pp_all | | Reported turnout | 3.18 | 1.09 | 2.14 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | pp_all | | Campaign activity | 2.54 | 0.514 | 1.53 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | pp_all | | Campaign activity | 3.33 | −0.238 | 1.55 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | pp_all | | Campaign activity | 2.41 | −0.321 | 1.04 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | pp_all | | Campaign activity | 2.74 | 0.614 | 1.67 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | pp_all | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.92 | −0.244 | 0.837 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | pp_pres | | Party-line presidential vote | 2.71 | −0.645 | 1.03 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | pp_pres | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.72 | −0.601 | 0.562 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | pp_pres | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.938 | −1.50 | −0.283 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | pp_pres | | Party-line House vote | 2.71 | −0.031 | 1.34 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | pp_pres | | Party-line House vote | 3.17 | −0.547 | 1.31 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | pp_pres | | Party-line House vote | 2.56 | −0.500 | 1.03 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | pp_pres | | Party-line House vote | 1.37 | −1.77 | −0.203 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | pp_pres | | Straight ticket | 1.96 | −0.845 | 0.557 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | pp_pres | | Straight ticket | 1.71 | −2.22 | −0.254 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | pp_pres | | Straight ticket | 2.34 | −0.730 | 0.804 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | pp_pres | | Straight ticket | 1.32 | −1.95 | −0.314 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | pp_pres | | Reported turnout | 3.25 | 0.848 | 2.05 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | pp_pres | | Reported turnout | 4.53 | 1.23 | 2.88 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | pp_pres | | Reported turnout | 3.12 | 0.331 | 1.72 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | pp_pres | | Reported turnout | 2.86 | 0.121 | 1.49 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | pp_pres | | Campaign activity | 2.62 | −0.092 | 1.26 | 2012 to 2024, all interviews | pp_pres | | Campaign activity | 3.28 | −0.716 | 1.28 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face to face | pp_pres | | Campaign activity | 2.41 | −0.856 | 0.779 | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web | pp_pres | | Campaign activity | 2.98 | 0.007 | 1.49 | 1992 to 2008, all interviews | pp_pres | Views: Percentage points, all earlier years (view = pp_all); Percentage points, presidential years only (view = pp_pres); Log-odds, all earlier years (view = logodds_all); Log-odds, presidential years only (view = logodds_pres). Note: The 1978 to 1990 comparison sample has no mode weights and was interviewed mainly in person; mode estimates of the later period use weight_ftf and weight_web and cover 2012, 2016 and 2024 only. The 2020 study has no mode weights. Note: In the presidential-years views the earlier sample is 1980, 1984 and 1988. Presidential voting and the straight ticket exist only in presidential years, so their two baselines coincide. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode estimates of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/change.json ### Table 7. In 2012 to 2024 the coldness coefficient exceeds the warmth coefficient for all five behaviors under each of four measures, every one of the 20 intervals lies above zero, and the measures disagree about the change since 1978 to 1990 Coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient, partisans including leaners, by measure of the ratings, 2012 to 2024; units are percentage points per 10 rating points, per standard deviation, or between groups | behavior | diff_conf_high | diff_conf_low | diff_estimate | n | period | spec_label | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.867 | −1.06 | −0.096 | 3,090 | 1978 to 1990 | Per 10 rating points | | Party-line House vote | 0.864 | −0.794 | 0.035 | 5,930 | 1978 to 1990 | Per 10 rating points | | Straight ticket | 2.06 | −0.503 | 0.779 | 2,662 | 1978 to 1990 | Per 10 rating points | | Reported turnout | −0.375 | −1.76 | −1.07 | 10,692 | 1978 to 1990 | Per 10 rating points | | Campaign activity | 0.699 | −0.666 | 0.016 | 10,606 | 1978 to 1990 | Per 10 rating points | | Party-line presidential vote | 3.22 | −0.507 | 1.36 | 3,090 | 1978 to 1990 | Per standard deviation | | Party-line House vote | 2.57 | −0.592 | 0.988 | 5,930 | 1978 to 1990 | Per standard deviation | | Straight ticket | 4.91 | −0.071 | 2.42 | 2,662 | 1978 to 1990 | Per standard deviation | | Reported turnout | −0.213 | −2.86 | −1.54 | 10,692 | 1978 to 1990 | Per standard deviation | | Campaign activity | 1.96 | −0.659 | 0.650 | 10,606 | 1978 to 1990 | Per standard deviation | | Party-line presidential vote | 3.67 | −3.04 | 0.314 | 3,090 | 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Party-line House vote | 9.19 | 1.95 | 5.57 | 5,930 | 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Straight ticket | 12.84 | 1.62 | 7.23 | 2,662 | 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Reported turnout | −0.132 | −7.10 | −3.61 | 10,692 | 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Campaign activity | 4.87 | −2.60 | 1.14 | 10,606 | 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.60 | −6.40 | −2.40 | 3,090 | 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Party-line House vote | 7.60 | 0.490 | 4.05 | 5,930 | 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Straight ticket | 14.44 | 3.45 | 8.95 | 2,662 | 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Reported turnout | 0.437 | −5.65 | −2.60 | 10,692 | 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Campaign activity | 7.24 | 0.921 | 4.08 | 10,606 | 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.370 | −1.13 | −0.379 | 5,400 | 1992 to 2008 | Per 10 rating points | | Party-line House vote | 1.07 | −0.609 | 0.229 | 6,271 | 1992 to 2008 | Per 10 rating points | | Straight ticket | 1.48 | −0.556 | 0.464 | 4,528 | 1992 to 2008 | Per 10 rating points | | Reported turnout | 1.86 | 0.287 | 1.07 | 10,010 | 1992 to 2008 | Per 10 rating points | | Campaign activity | 2.50 | 0.879 | 1.69 | 9,997 | 1992 to 2008 | Per 10 rating points | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.81 | −1.08 | 0.368 | 5,400 | 1992 to 2008 | Per standard deviation | | Party-line House vote | 3.06 | −0.158 | 1.45 | 6,271 | 1992 to 2008 | Per standard deviation | | Straight ticket | 3.86 | −0.080 | 1.89 | 4,528 | 1992 to 2008 | Per standard deviation | | Reported turnout | 4.17 | 1.14 | 2.65 | 10,010 | 1992 to 2008 | Per standard deviation | | Campaign activity | 5.70 | 2.55 | 4.13 | 9,997 | 1992 to 2008 | Per standard deviation | | Party-line presidential vote | 2.82 | −1.99 | 0.412 | 5,400 | 1992 to 2008 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Party-line House vote | 7.22 | 0.758 | 3.99 | 6,271 | 1992 to 2008 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Straight ticket | 8.32 | 0.699 | 4.51 | 4,528 | 1992 to 2008 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Reported turnout | 8.24 | 1.35 | 4.80 | 10,010 | 1992 to 2008 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Campaign activity | 14.15 | 6.30 | 10.23 | 9,997 | 1992 to 2008 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Party-line presidential vote | 2.57 | −3.01 | −0.216 | 5,400 | 1992 to 2008 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Party-line House vote | 4.73 | −2.09 | 1.32 | 6,271 | 1992 to 2008 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Straight ticket | 6.96 | −1.35 | 2.81 | 4,528 | 1992 to 2008 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Reported turnout | 8.16 | 2.03 | 5.10 | 10,010 | 1992 to 2008 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Campaign activity | 13.60 | 6.88 | 10.24 | 9,997 | 1992 to 2008 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.23 | 0.251 | 0.741 | 15,612 | 2012 to 2024 | Per 10 rating points | | Party-line House vote | 2.13 | 0.986 | 1.56 | 13,912 | 2012 to 2024 | Per 10 rating points | | Straight ticket | 1.90 | 0.768 | 1.34 | 13,435 | 2012 to 2024 | Per 10 rating points | | Reported turnout | 2.17 | 0.982 | 1.58 | 18,976 | 2012 to 2024 | Per 10 rating points | | Campaign activity | 2.30 | 0.794 | 1.54 | 18,697 | 2012 to 2024 | Per 10 rating points | | Party-line presidential vote | 2.83 | 0.767 | 1.80 | 15,612 | 2012 to 2024 | Per standard deviation | | Party-line House vote | 4.64 | 2.25 | 3.45 | 13,912 | 2012 to 2024 | Per standard deviation | | Straight ticket | 4.11 | 1.74 | 2.93 | 13,435 | 2012 to 2024 | Per standard deviation | | Reported turnout | 4.69 | 2.20 | 3.44 | 18,976 | 2012 to 2024 | Per standard deviation | | Campaign activity | 5.01 | 1.87 | 3.44 | 18,697 | 2012 to 2024 | Per standard deviation | | Party-line presidential vote | 7.79 | 5.01 | 6.40 | 15,612 | 2012 to 2024 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Party-line House vote | 10.23 | 6.40 | 8.31 | 13,912 | 2012 to 2024 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Straight ticket | 8.89 | 5.02 | 6.96 | 13,435 | 2012 to 2024 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Reported turnout | 8.87 | 4.15 | 6.51 | 18,976 | 2012 to 2024 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Campaign activity | 12.12 | 5.72 | 8.92 | 18,697 | 2012 to 2024 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Party-line presidential vote | 7.87 | 4.09 | 5.98 | 15,612 | 2012 to 2024 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Party-line House vote | 10.68 | 5.99 | 8.34 | 13,912 | 2012 to 2024 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Straight ticket | 8.86 | 4.10 | 6.48 | 13,435 | 2012 to 2024 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Reported turnout | 9.07 | 4.00 | 6.54 | 18,976 | 2012 to 2024 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Campaign activity | 9.48 | 2.93 | 6.20 | 18,697 | 2012 to 2024 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.92 | −0.244 | 0.837 | 18,702 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Per 10 rating points | | Party-line House vote | 2.53 | 0.516 | 1.52 | 19,842 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Per 10 rating points | | Straight ticket | 1.96 | −0.845 | 0.557 | 16,097 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Per 10 rating points | | Reported turnout | 3.56 | 1.73 | 2.64 | 29,668 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Per 10 rating points | | Campaign activity | 2.54 | 0.514 | 1.53 | 29,303 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Per 10 rating points | | Party-line presidential vote | 2.57 | −1.69 | 0.441 | 18,702 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Per standard deviation | | Party-line House vote | 4.44 | 0.476 | 2.46 | 19,842 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Per standard deviation | | Straight ticket | 3.27 | −2.25 | 0.511 | 16,097 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Per standard deviation | | Reported turnout | 6.80 | 3.16 | 4.98 | 29,668 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Per standard deviation | | Campaign activity | 4.84 | 0.744 | 2.79 | 29,303 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Per standard deviation | | Party-line presidential vote | 9.71 | 2.45 | 6.08 | 18,702 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Party-line House vote | 6.84 | −1.35 | 2.75 | 19,842 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Straight ticket | 5.66 | −6.21 | −0.274 | 16,097 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Reported turnout | 14.33 | 5.92 | 10.13 | 29,668 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Campaign activity | 12.70 | 2.86 | 7.78 | 29,303 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 15 and 85 | | Party-line presidential vote | 12.81 | 3.96 | 8.38 | 18,702 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Party-line House vote | 8.55 | 0.034 | 4.29 | 19,842 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Straight ticket | 3.52 | −8.45 | −2.47 | 16,097 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Reported turnout | 13.10 | 5.18 | 9.14 | 29,668 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | | Campaign activity | 6.67 | −2.43 | 2.12 | 29,303 | Change since 1978 to 1990 | Cut-offs 30 and 70 | Views: 2012 to 2024 (period = 2012 to 2024); 1992 to 2008 (period = 1992 to 2008); 1978 to 1990 (period = 1978 to 1990); Change since 1978 to 1990 (period = Change since 1978 to 1990). Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from HC3 robust standard errors (a linear probability model with year fixed effects) and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Note: Panels are on different scales and cannot be compared in size. The cut-off panels are indicator coefficients in one model per behavior and period; each indicator is adjusted for the other. The change view is the 2012 to 2024 difference minus the 1978 to 1990 difference, with the two standard errors combined in quadrature; its respondent count is the two periods together. The 1978 to 1990 and 1992 to 2008 samples include midterm studies for House voting, reported turnout and campaign activity, and 2012 to 2024 has none. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; weighted (VCF0009z) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/cutoffs.json ### Table 8. In 2012 to 2024 the difference between coldness and warmth is positive in all 25 cells of five further checks, with an interval above zero in 21 Coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient, partisans, by check, 2012 to 2024; percentage points per 10 rating points (log-odds in one panel, per scale point of the like-dislike scale in another) | behavior | diff_conf_high | diff_conf_low | diff_estimate | n | period | spec_label | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.457 | −1.78 | −0.662 | 2,345 | 1978 to 1990 | Leaners excluded | | Party-line House vote | 0.477 | −1.41 | −0.468 | 4,518 | 1978 to 1990 | Leaners excluded | | Straight ticket | 0.959 | −2.09 | −0.564 | 2,015 | 1978 to 1990 | Leaners excluded | | Reported turnout | 0.094 | −1.55 | −0.727 | 7,863 | 1978 to 1990 | Leaners excluded | | Campaign activity | 0.480 | −1.16 | −0.339 | 7,801 | 1978 to 1990 | Leaners excluded | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.446 | −1.56 | −0.560 | 3,021 | 1978 to 1990 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Party-line House vote | 1.76 | 0.004 | 0.880 | 5,830 | 1978 to 1990 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Straight ticket | 2.83 | 0.103 | 1.47 | 2,602 | 1978 to 1990 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Reported turnout | 0.844 | −0.459 | 0.192 | 10,525 | 1978 to 1990 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Campaign activity | 0.920 | −0.384 | 0.268 | 10,442 | 1978 to 1990 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.466 | −1.21 | −0.370 | 3,090 | 1978 to 1990 | Each rating in its own model | | Party-line House vote | 0.659 | −0.841 | −0.091 | 5,930 | 1978 to 1990 | Each rating in its own model | | Straight ticket | 1.60 | −0.601 | 0.498 | 2,662 | 1978 to 1990 | Each rating in its own model | | Reported turnout | −0.384 | −1.69 | −1.04 | 10,692 | 1978 to 1990 | Each rating in its own model | | Campaign activity | 0.623 | −0.666 | −0.021 | 10,606 | 1978 to 1990 | Each rating in its own model | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.169 | 0.013 | 0.091 | 3,090 | 1978 to 1990 | Log-odds scale | | Party-line House vote | 0.062 | −0.031 | 0.016 | 5,930 | 1978 to 1990 | Log-odds scale | | Straight ticket | 0.118 | −0.017 | 0.051 | 2,662 | 1978 to 1990 | Log-odds scale | | Reported turnout | −0.016 | −0.079 | −0.047 | 10,692 | 1978 to 1990 | Log-odds scale | | Campaign activity | 0.030 | −0.031 | 0.000 | 10,606 | 1978 to 1990 | Log-odds scale | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.543 | −1.13 | −0.296 | 4,029 | 1992 to 2008 | Leaners excluded | | Party-line House vote | 1.18 | −0.819 | 0.182 | 4,658 | 1992 to 2008 | Leaners excluded | | Straight ticket | 1.51 | −0.883 | 0.315 | 3,409 | 1992 to 2008 | Leaners excluded | | Reported turnout | 2.16 | 0.290 | 1.23 | 7,068 | 1992 to 2008 | Leaners excluded | | Campaign activity | 2.79 | 0.781 | 1.79 | 7,057 | 1992 to 2008 | Leaners excluded | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.027 | −1.69 | −0.833 | 4,637 | 1992 to 2008 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Party-line House vote | 1.66 | −0.240 | 0.710 | 5,593 | 1992 to 2008 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Straight ticket | 1.66 | −0.726 | 0.468 | 3,909 | 1992 to 2008 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Reported turnout | 1.98 | 0.432 | 1.21 | 8,970 | 1992 to 2008 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Campaign activity | 1.91 | 0.225 | 1.07 | 8,958 | 1992 to 2008 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.057 | −1.18 | −0.563 | 5,400 | 1992 to 2008 | Each rating in its own model | | Party-line House vote | 0.719 | −0.708 | 0.006 | 6,271 | 1992 to 2008 | Each rating in its own model | | Straight ticket | 0.956 | −0.696 | 0.130 | 4,528 | 1992 to 2008 | Each rating in its own model | | Reported turnout | 1.56 | 0.178 | 0.870 | 10,010 | 1992 to 2008 | Each rating in its own model | | Campaign activity | 2.10 | 0.664 | 1.38 | 9,997 | 1992 to 2008 | Each rating in its own model | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.141 | −0.029 | 0.056 | 5,400 | 1992 to 2008 | Log-odds scale | | Party-line House vote | 0.088 | −0.021 | 0.034 | 6,271 | 1992 to 2008 | Log-odds scale | | Straight ticket | 0.120 | −0.018 | 0.051 | 4,528 | 1992 to 2008 | Log-odds scale | | Reported turnout | 0.101 | 0.018 | 0.060 | 10,010 | 1992 to 2008 | Log-odds scale | | Campaign activity | 0.108 | 0.037 | 0.073 | 9,997 | 1992 to 2008 | Log-odds scale | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.30 | −0.759 | 0.270 | 3,127 | 1992 to 2008 | Like-dislike scale | | Party-line House vote | 3.04 | 0.427 | 1.73 | 2,783 | 1992 to 2008 | Like-dislike scale | | Straight ticket | 3.25 | 0.393 | 1.82 | 2,662 | 1992 to 2008 | Like-dislike scale | | Reported turnout | −0.857 | −3.21 | −2.03 | 4,075 | 1992 to 2008 | Like-dislike scale | | Campaign activity | 3.08 | 0.277 | 1.68 | 4,074 | 1992 to 2008 | Like-dislike scale | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.896 | −0.279 | 0.308 | 11,862 | 2012 to 2024 | Leaners excluded | | Party-line House vote | 1.40 | −0.054 | 0.672 | 10,454 | 2012 to 2024 | Leaners excluded | | Straight ticket | 1.45 | 0.132 | 0.791 | 10,207 | 2012 to 2024 | Leaners excluded | | Reported turnout | 2.24 | 0.788 | 1.51 | 13,947 | 2012 to 2024 | Leaners excluded | | Campaign activity | 2.16 | 0.243 | 1.20 | 13,739 | 2012 to 2024 | Leaners excluded | | Party-line presidential vote | 1.09 | 0.052 | 0.569 | 14,882 | 2012 to 2024 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Party-line House vote | 1.86 | 0.611 | 1.24 | 13,254 | 2012 to 2024 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Straight ticket | 1.97 | 0.734 | 1.35 | 12,804 | 2012 to 2024 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Reported turnout | 1.96 | 0.775 | 1.37 | 18,105 | 2012 to 2024 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Campaign activity | 2.00 | 0.488 | 1.25 | 18,007 | 2012 to 2024 | Party, strength, education, age and interest held fixed | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.878 | 0.129 | 0.504 | 15,612 | 2012 to 2024 | Each rating in its own model | | Party-line House vote | 1.60 | 0.732 | 1.17 | 13,912 | 2012 to 2024 | Each rating in its own model | | Straight ticket | 1.39 | 0.545 | 0.966 | 13,435 | 2012 to 2024 | Each rating in its own model | | Reported turnout | 1.65 | 0.737 | 1.19 | 18,976 | 2012 to 2024 | Each rating in its own model | | Campaign activity | 1.73 | 0.573 | 1.15 | 18,697 | 2012 to 2024 | Each rating in its own model | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.141 | 0.019 | 0.080 | 15,612 | 2012 to 2024 | Log-odds scale | | Party-line House vote | 0.180 | 0.077 | 0.129 | 13,912 | 2012 to 2024 | Log-odds scale | | Straight ticket | 0.180 | 0.066 | 0.123 | 13,435 | 2012 to 2024 | Log-odds scale | | Reported turnout | 0.147 | 0.064 | 0.106 | 18,976 | 2012 to 2024 | Log-odds scale | | Campaign activity | 0.094 | 0.032 | 0.063 | 18,697 | 2012 to 2024 | Log-odds scale | | Party-line presidential vote | 0.806 | −0.164 | 0.321 | 15,238 | 2012 to 2024 | Like-dislike scale | | Party-line House vote | 1.34 | 0.200 | 0.771 | 13,586 | 2012 to 2024 | Like-dislike scale | | Straight ticket | 2.10 | 0.944 | 1.52 | 13,126 | 2012 to 2024 | Like-dislike scale | | Reported turnout | 0.916 | −0.360 | 0.278 | 18,479 | 2012 to 2024 | Like-dislike scale | | Campaign activity | 2.38 | 0.878 | 1.63 | 18,475 | 2012 to 2024 | Like-dislike scale | Views: 2012 to 2024 (period = 2012 to 2024); 1992 to 2008 (period = 1992 to 2008); 1978 to 1990 (period = 1978 to 1990). Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from HC3 robust standard errors (a linear probability model with year fixed effects) and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. The log-odds panel uses a probability-weight sandwich covariance. Note: The like-dislike scale is the 0 to 10 scale for each party, asked in 1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; weighted (VCF0009z) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/checks.json ### Table 9. In 2012 to 2024 coldness went with more persuading others and giving money than warmth did, and the two went with similar amounts of displaying a button Percentage points of each campaign activity per 10 points on the 0 to 100 thermometer, one linear probability model per activity and period with both ratings and year fixed effects, partisans including leaners | activity | cold_conf_high | cold_conf_low | cold_estimate | diff_conf_high | diff_conf_low | diff_estimate | n | period | warm_conf_high | warm_conf_low | warm_estimate | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Tried to persuade others how to vote | 2.37 | 1.55 | 1.96 | 1.11 | −0.144 | 0.485 | 10,648 | 1978 to 1990 | 1.94 | 1.00 | 1.47 | | Attended a meeting or rally | 0.816 | 0.288 | 0.552 | 0.183 | −0.605 | −0.211 | 10,656 | 1978 to 1990 | 1.05 | 0.475 | 0.763 | | Worked for a party or candidate | 0.701 | 0.300 | 0.501 | 0.420 | −0.159 | 0.130 | 10,646 | 1978 to 1990 | 0.588 | 0.153 | 0.371 | | Displayed a button or sticker | 0.965 | 0.420 | 0.692 | −0.116 | −0.898 | −0.507 | 10,656 | 1978 to 1990 | 1.50 | 0.903 | 1.20 | | Gave money to a party or candidate | 1.21 | 0.656 | 0.933 | 0.705 | −0.116 | 0.295 | 10,634 | 1978 to 1990 | 0.943 | 0.334 | 0.638 | | Tried to persuade others how to vote | 4.20 | 3.22 | 3.71 | 3.62 | 2.07 | 2.84 | 10,006 | 1992 to 2008 | 1.45 | 0.293 | 0.869 | | Attended a meeting or rally | 1.19 | 0.645 | 0.916 | 0.594 | −0.158 | 0.218 | 10,006 | 1992 to 2008 | 0.991 | 0.404 | 0.698 | | Worked for a party or candidate | 0.775 | 0.381 | 0.578 | 0.525 | −0.009 | 0.258 | 10,004 | 1992 to 2008 | 0.523 | 0.118 | 0.320 | | Displayed a button or sticker | 1.88 | 1.13 | 1.51 | 0.452 | −0.675 | −0.111 | 10,007 | 1992 to 2008 | 2.03 | 1.20 | 1.62 | | Gave money to a party or candidate | 1.95 | 1.28 | 1.61 | 1.45 | 0.470 | 0.962 | 10,004 | 1992 to 2008 | 0.999 | 0.305 | 0.652 | | Tried to persuade others how to vote | 3.54 | 2.62 | 3.08 | 2.61 | 1.13 | 1.87 | 18,886 | 2012 to 2024 | 1.68 | 0.730 | 1.21 | | Attended a meeting or rally | 0.852 | 0.388 | 0.620 | 0.705 | −0.076 | 0.314 | 18,886 | 2012 to 2024 | 0.555 | 0.057 | 0.306 | | Worked for a party or candidate | 0.662 | 0.336 | 0.499 | 0.650 | 0.035 | 0.343 | 18,892 | 2012 to 2024 | 0.358 | −0.046 | 0.156 | | Displayed a button or sticker | 2.23 | 1.55 | 1.89 | 0.430 | −0.686 | −0.128 | 18,889 | 2012 to 2024 | 2.39 | 1.65 | 2.02 | | Gave money to a party or candidate | 3.02 | 2.40 | 2.71 | 2.45 | 1.42 | 1.94 | 18,708 | 2012 to 2024 | 1.12 | 0.433 | 0.774 | Views: 2012 to 2024 (period = 2012 to 2024); 1992 to 2008 (period = 1992 to 2008); 1978 to 1990 (period = 1978 to 1990). Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from HC3 robust standard errors (a linear probability model with year fixed effects) and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Note: The 1978 to 1990 and 1992 to 2008 samples include midterm studies, and 2012 to 2024 has none. The activity questions are the cumulative-file items VCF0717 (tried to influence others), VCF0718 (attended a meeting or rally), VCF0719 (worked for a party or candidate), VCF0720 (displayed a button or sticker) and VCF0721 (gave money). Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1978-2024; weighted (VCF0009z) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/items.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (186), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | act_any_chg | 1.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 0.5 to 2.5 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_chg_ftf | 1.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.2 to 3.3 | | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_chg_logit | 0.06 | log-odds of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, log-odds coefficient in a weighted logistic regression with year fixed effects, per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.11 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_chg_logit_p | 0.05 | log-odds of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, log-odds coefficient in a weighted logistic regression with year fixed effects, per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990, presidential election years only | 95% CI 0.00 to 0.11 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_chg_p | 1.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990, presidential election years only | 95% CI −0.1 to 2.6 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_chg_web | 1.0 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.3 to 2.4 | | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_cold_slope | 0.4 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness coefficient, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI 0.2 to 0.6 | 39,300 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_diff_1 | 0.0 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.7 to 0.7 | 10,606 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_diff_2 | 1.7 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 1992 to 2008 | 95% CI 0.9 to 2.5 | 9,997 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_diff_3 | 1.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.8 to 2.3 | 18,697 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_diff_3y | 1.14 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012, 2016 and 2024, all interviews | 95% CI 0.23 to 2.05 | 12,248 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_diff_ftf | 1.6 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −0.1 to 3.2 | 3,465 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_diff_web | 1.1 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews | 95% CI −0.1 to 2.2 | 6,822 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_diffp_1 | 0.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 1978 to 1990, presidential election years only | 95% CI −0.8 to 1.4 | 4,285 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_noleaner_diff_3 | 1.2 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, leaners excluded, per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.2 to 2.2 | 13,739 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_slope | 0.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness-minus-warmth difference, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI 0.0 to 0.6 | 39,300 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_warm_slope | 0.1 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the warmth coefficient, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI −0.1 to 0.3 | 39,300 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_yr_2020 | 2.4 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, one linear probability model for the survey year (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2020 | 95% CI 1.0 to 3.7 | 6,449 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | act_any_yr_2024 | 0.4 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on any campaign activity, one linear probability model for the survey year (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2024 | 95% CI −1.3 to 2.1 | 4,411 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_act_any_cold_3 | 60.0% | percent of the group | weighted share, any campaign activity, group: cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 58.3% to 61.8% | 5,510 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_act_any_warm_3 | 54.6% | percent of the group | weighted share, any campaign activity, group: warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 51.6% to 57.5% | 2,011 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_house_both_1 | 89.1% | percent of the group | weighted share, party-line House vote, group: both (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 86.3% to 91.4% | 571 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_house_cold_1 | 89.9% | percent of the group | weighted share, party-line House vote, group: cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 85.5% to 93.0% | 247 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_house_cold_3 | 95.0% | percent of the group | weighted share, party-line House vote, group: cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 94.0% to 95.8% | 4,397 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_house_warm_1 | 79.8% | percent of the group | weighted share, party-line House vote, group: warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 78.0% to 81.5% | 1,995 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_house_warm_3 | 89.9% | percent of the group | weighted share, party-line House vote, group: warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 87.5% to 91.9% | 1,376 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_pres_both_3 | 99.2% | percent of the group | weighted share, party-line presidential vote, group: both (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 98.7% to 99.5% | 4,393 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_pres_cold_3 | 98.1% | percent of the group | weighted share, party-line presidential vote, group: cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 97.5% to 98.5% | 4,774 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_pres_neither_3 | 83.2% | percent of the group | weighted share, party-line presidential vote, group: neither (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 81.7% to 84.6% | 4,794 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_pres_warm_3 | 95.4% | percent of the group | weighted share, party-line presidential vote, group: warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 93.8% to 96.6% | 1,651 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_straight_both_1 | 87.3% | percent of the group | weighted share, straight-ticket vote, group: both (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 83.1% to 90.5% | 306 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_straight_cold_1 | 88.6% | percent of the group | weighted share, straight-ticket vote, group: cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 81.1% to 93.3% | 105 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_straight_cold_3 | 94.9% | percent of the group | weighted share, straight-ticket vote, group: cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 93.9% to 95.7% | 4,232 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_straight_warm_1 | 76.9% | percent of the group | weighted share, straight-ticket vote, group: warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 74.1% to 79.5% | 952 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_straight_warm_3 | 90.3% | percent of the group | weighted share, straight-ticket vote, group: warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 87.9% to 92.3% | 1,351 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_turnout_cold_1 | 63.1% | percent of the group | weighted share, turnout, group: cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 58.7% to 67.4% | 472 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_turnout_cold_3 | 87.9% | percent of the group | weighted share, turnout, group: cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 86.7% to 89.0% | 5,582 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_turnout_warm_1 | 68.6% | percent of the group | weighted share, turnout, group: warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 67.0% to 70.1% | 3,405 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_turnout_warm_3 | 82.2% | percent of the group | weighted share, turnout, group: warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 79.8% to 84.3% | 2,043 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_act_any_1 | 3.5 | percentage points | difference between the share among partisans very cold toward the other party only and the share among those very warm toward their own party only, any campaign activity (95% interval, independent groups) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −1.3 to 8.3 | 3,848 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_act_any_3 | 5.4 | percentage points | difference between the share among partisans very cold toward the other party only and the share among those very warm toward their own party only, any campaign activity (95% interval, independent groups) | partisans, leaners included, who answered all five campaign activity questions | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.0 to 8.9 | 7,521 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_chg_house | −5.0 | percentage points | change in the difference between the share among partisans cold only and the share among partisans warm only, party-line House vote (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −9.8 to −0.3 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_chg_straight | −7.1 | percentage points | change in the difference between the share among partisans cold only and the share among partisans warm only, straight-ticket vote (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −14.2 to 0.0 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_chg_turnout | 11.2 | percentage points | change in the difference between the share among partisans cold only and the share among partisans warm only, turnout (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 5.9 to 16.5 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_house_1 | 10.1 | percentage points | difference between the share among partisans very cold toward the other party only and the share among those very warm toward their own party only, party-line House vote (95% interval, independent groups) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 5.9 to 14.2 | 2,242 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_house_3 | 5.1 | percentage points | difference between the share among partisans very cold toward the other party only and the share among those very warm toward their own party only, party-line House vote (95% interval, independent groups) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.7 to 7.4 | 5,773 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_pres_1 | 6.0 | percentage points | difference between the share among partisans very cold toward the other party only and the share among those very warm toward their own party only, party-line presidential vote (95% interval, independent groups) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 2.3 to 9.6 | 1,221 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_pres_3 | 2.6 | percentage points | difference between the share among partisans very cold toward the other party only and the share among those very warm toward their own party only, party-line presidential vote (95% interval, independent groups) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.2 to 4.1 | 6,425 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_straight_1 | 11.7 | percentage points | difference between the share among partisans very cold toward the other party only and the share among those very warm toward their own party only, straight-ticket vote (95% interval, independent groups) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 5.0 to 18.4 | 1,057 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_straight_3 | 4.6 | percentage points | difference between the share among partisans very cold toward the other party only and the share among those very warm toward their own party only, straight-ticket vote (95% interval, independent groups) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.2 to 6.9 | 5,583 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_turnout_1 | −5.5 | percentage points | difference between the share among partisans very cold toward the other party only and the share among those very warm toward their own party only, turnout (95% interval, independent groups) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −10.1 to −0.8 | 3,877 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cellgap_turnout_3 | 5.7 | percentage points | difference between the share among partisans very cold toward the other party only and the share among those very warm toward their own party only, turnout (95% interval, independent groups) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 3.2 to 8.3 | 7,625 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | corr_1 | −0.06 | correlation coefficient | weighted correlation between the rating of the own party and the rating of the other party, each centered on its survey-year mean (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.08 to −0.04 | 11,264 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | corr_3 | −0.23 | correlation coefficient | weighted correlation between the rating of the own party and the rating of the other party, each centered on its survey-year mean (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.21 | 20,943 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cut_cold_loose | 30 | points on the feeling thermometer | cut-off chosen by the author (a definition, not an estimate) | cut-off between a rating that counts as very cold toward the other party and one that does not | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cut_cold_strict | 15 | points on the feeling thermometer | cut-off chosen by the author (a definition, not an estimate) | cut-off between a rating that counts as very cold toward the other party and one that does not | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cut_warm_loose | 70 | points on the feeling thermometer | cut-off chosen by the author (a definition, not an estimate) | cut-off between a rating that counts as very warm toward the own party and one that does not | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cut_warm_strict | 85 | points on the feeling thermometer | cut-off chosen by the author (a definition, not an estimate) | cut-off between a rating that counts as very warm toward the own party and one that does not | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | floor_cell | 100 | respondents | minimum number of respondents (and of effective respondents) for a plotted cell | cells of a table of shares or coefficients | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | floor_year | 150 | respondents | minimum number of respondents who answered the behavior question for a yearly estimate | yearly models | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gmode_ftf_cold | 19.5% | percent of partisans | weighted share in the group cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 17.8% to 21.2% | 3,787 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gmode_ftf_warm | 13.5% | percent of partisans | weighted share in the group warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 12.1% to 15.0% | 3,787 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gmode_web_cold | 29.1% | percent of partisans | weighted share in the group cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 27.8% to 30.4% | 7,712 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gmode_web_warm | 11.0% | percent of partisans | weighted share in the group warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 10.1% to 11.9% | 7,712 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gshare_strict_both_1 | 8.9% | percent of partisans | weighted share in the group both (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 8.4% to 9.4% | 11,264 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gshare_strict_both_3 | 25.2% | percent of partisans | weighted share in the group both (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 24.4% to 26.0% | 20,943 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gshare_strict_cold_1 | 4.4% | percent of partisans | weighted share in the group cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 4.0% to 4.8% | 11,264 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gshare_strict_cold_3 | 28.1% | percent of partisans | weighted share in the group cold only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 27.3% to 28.9% | 20,943 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gshare_strict_warm_1 | 32.0% | percent of partisans | weighted share in the group warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 31.2% to 32.9% | 11,264 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gshare_strict_warm_3 | 10.5% | percent of partisans | weighted share in the group warm only (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 9.9% to 11.1% | 20,943 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_alone_diff_3 | 1.2 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, each feeling in its own model, per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.7 to 1.6 | 13,912 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_chg | 1.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 0.5 to 2.5 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_chg_ftf | 1.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.1 to 3.1 | | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_chg_logit | 0.11 | log-odds of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, log-odds coefficient in a weighted logistic regression with year fixed effects, per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.18 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_chg_logit_ftf | 0.16 | log-odds of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, log-odds coefficient in a weighted logistic regression with year fixed effects, per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 0.00 to 0.31 | | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_chg_logit_p | 0.10 | log-odds of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, log-odds coefficient in a weighted logistic regression with year fixed effects, per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990, presidential election years only | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.19 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_chg_logit_web | 0.08 | log-odds of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, log-odds coefficient in a weighted logistic regression with year fixed effects, per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.18 | | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_chg_loose | 4.29 | percentage points of the outcome between groups | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings as indicators (other party rated at or below the loose cut-off, own party at or above it) (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 0.03 to 8.55 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_chg_p | 1.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990, presidential election years only | 95% CI 0.0 to 2.7 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_chg_strict | 2.7 | percentage points of the outcome between groups | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings as indicators (other party rated at or below the strict cut-off, own party at or above it) (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −1.4 to 6.8 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_chg_web | 1.2 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 0.0 to 2.4 | | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_cold_3 | 3.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness toward the other party on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 3.1 to 3.9 | 13,912 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_cold_slope | 0.1 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness coefficient, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI −0.1 to 0.3 | 26,113 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_controls_diff_3 | 1.2 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, party, strength of identification, education, age and interest in the campaign held fixed, per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.6 to 1.9 | 13,254 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_diff_1 | 0.0 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.8 to 0.9 | 5,930 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_diff_2 | 0.2 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1992 to 2008 | 95% CI −0.6 to 1.1 | 6,271 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_diff_3 | 1.6 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.0 to 2.1 | 13,912 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_diff_ftf | 1.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 0.2 to 2.9 | 2,283 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_diff_web | 1.2 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 0.4 to 2.1 | 4,990 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_diffp_1 | 0.2 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 1990, presidential election years only | 95% CI −1.0 to 1.5 | 2,792 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_noleaner_diff_3 | 0.7 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, leaners excluded, per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.1 to 1.4 | 10,454 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_slope | 0.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness-minus-warmth difference, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI 0.2 to 0.7 | 26,113 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_slope_p | 0.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness-minus-warmth difference, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1980 to 2024, presidential election years only | 95% CI 0.1 to 0.8 | 21,581 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_strict_diff_1 | 5.6 | percentage points of the outcome between groups | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings as indicators (other party rated at or below the strict cut-off, own party at or above it) (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 1.9 to 9.2 | 5,930 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_warm_3 | 1.9 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | warmth toward the own party on party-line House vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.5 to 2.3 | 13,912 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_warm_slope | −0.4 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the warmth coefficient, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI −0.5 to −0.2 | 26,113 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_yr_2020 | 2.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, one linear probability model for the survey year (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2020 | 95% CI 1.3 to 3.3 | 4,929 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_yr_2024 | 0.6 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line House vote, one linear probability model for the survey year (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2024 | 95% CI −0.5 to 1.7 | 3,515 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_button_diff_1 | −0.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on act_button, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the question on whether they displayed a button or sticker | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.9 to −0.1 | 10,656 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_button_diff_3 | −0.1 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on act_button, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the question on whether they displayed a button or sticker | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.7 to 0.4 | 18,889 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_meeting_diff_3 | 0.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on act_meeting, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the question on whether they attended a political meeting or rally | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.1 to 0.7 | 18,886 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_money_diff_3 | 1.9 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on act_money, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the question on whether they gave money to a party or candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.4 to 2.4 | 18,708 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_persuade_diff_3 | 1.9 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on act_persuade, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the question on whether they tried to persuade others how to vote | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.1 to 2.6 | 18,886 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_work_diff_3 | 0.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on act_work, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the question on whether they worked for a party or candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.0 to 0.7 | 18,892 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lean_anes_2020 | 56.0% | percent of respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | weighted share reporting a Democratic vote (95% Wilson interval) | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2020 | 95% CI 54.3% to 57.7% | 6,119 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lean_anes_2024 | 55.3% | percent of respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | weighted share reporting a Democratic vote (95% Wilson interval) | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 53.0% to 57.5% | 3,948 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lean_county_2020 | 52.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote, summed over counties | votes cast for the Democratic or Republican candidate in all counties except Alaska | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | lean_county_2024 | 49.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote, summed over counties | votes cast for the Democratic or Republican candidate in all counties except Alaska | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | leaner_share_1 | 27% | percent of partisans | weighted share who lean toward a party and do not identify with it | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1990 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | leaner_share_3 | 27% | percent of partisans | weighted share who lean toward a party and do not identify with it | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 2012 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | midterm_share_1 | 56% | percent of respondents | share of the sample interviewed in a midterm election year (respondent count) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1978 to 1990 | | 11,264 | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | midterm_share_2 | 25% | percent of respondents | share of the sample interviewed in a midterm election year (respondent count) | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 1992 to 2008 | | 10,856 | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_chk_cells | 25 | count | count of estimates with the stated property (see the figure caption) | estimates shown in the chapter's figures | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_chk_excl | 21 | count | count of estimates with the stated property (see the figure caption) | estimates shown in the chapter's figures | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_chk_incl | 4 | count | count of estimates with the stated property (see the figure caption) | estimates shown in the chapter's figures | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_cut_cells | 20 | count | count of estimates with the stated property (see the figure caption) | estimates shown in the chapter's figures | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_cut_chg_cells | 20 | count | count of estimates with the stated property (see the figure caption) | estimates shown in the chapter's figures | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_cut_chg_pos | 12 | count | count of estimates with the stated property (see the figure caption) | estimates shown in the chapter's figures | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_cut_incl_1 | 12 | count | count of estimates with the stated property (see the figure caption) | estimates shown in the chapter's figures | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ld_waves | 7 | surveys | count of survey years | ANES time-series studies with the like-dislike scale for both parties | 1996 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_resp | 43,063 | respondents | count of respondents in the sample | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | 18 surveys, 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_waves | 18 | surveys | count of survey years | ANES time-series studies with both party thermometers | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_yr | 78 | count | count of estimates with the stated property (see the figure caption) | estimates shown in the chapter's figures | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_yr_neg | 3 | count | count of estimates with the stated property (see the figure caption) | estimates shown in the chapter's figures | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_yr_pos | 14 | count | count of estimates with the stated property (see the figure caption) | estimates shown in the chapter's figures | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_alone_diff_3 | 0.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, each feeling in its own model, per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.1 to 0.9 | 15,612 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_chg | 0.8 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.2 to 1.9 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_chg_hi | 1.9 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | upper end of the 95% interval for the change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods (independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_chg_logit | −0.01 | log-odds of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, log-odds coefficient in a weighted logistic regression with year fixed effects, per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.11 to 0.09 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_chg_loose | 8.4 | percentage points of the outcome between groups | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings as indicators (other party rated at or below the loose cut-off, own party at or above it) (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 4.0 to 12.8 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_chg_sd | 0.4 | percentage points of the outcome per standard deviation of the rating | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per within-year standard deviation (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −1.7 to 2.6 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_chg_strict | 6.1 | percentage points of the outcome between groups | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings as indicators (other party rated at or below the strict cut-off, own party at or above it) (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 2.5 to 9.7 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_cold_slope | −0.1 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness coefficient, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI −0.3 to 0.1 | 24,102 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_controls_diff_3 | 0.6 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, party, strength of identification, education, age and interest in the campaign held fixed, per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.1 to 1.1 | 14,882 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_diff_1 | −0.1 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −1.1 to 0.9 | 3,090 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_diff_2 | −0.4 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 1992 to 2008 | 95% CI −1.1 to 0.4 | 5,400 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_diff_3 | 0.7 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.3 to 1.2 | 15,612 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_diff_3y | 0.54 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012, 2016 and 2024, all interviews | 95% CI −0.05 to 1.12 | 10,032 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_diff_ftf | 0.9 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −0.4 to 2.3 | 2,620 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_diff_web | 0.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews | 95% CI −0.2 to 1.1 | 5,586 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_ld_diff_3 | 0.3 | percentage points of the outcome per scale point of the like-dislike scale | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, the 0 to 10 like-dislike scale for each party, per scale point (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.2 to 0.8 | 15,238 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_logit_diff_1 | 0.09 | log-odds of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, log-odds coefficient in a weighted logistic regression with year fixed effects, per 10 rating points (95% interval, probability-weight sandwich) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.17 | 3,090 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_logit_diff_3 | 0.08 | log-odds of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, log-odds coefficient in a weighted logistic regression with year fixed effects, per 10 rating points (95% interval, probability-weight sandwich) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.14 | 15,612 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_noleaner_diff_3 | 0.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on party-line presidential vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, leaners excluded, per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.3 to 0.9 | 11,862 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_slope | 0.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness-minus-warmth difference, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI 0.1 to 0.6 | 24,102 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pres_warm_slope | −0.4 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the warmth coefficient, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI −0.6 to −0.2 | 24,102 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rate_house_1 | 77.1% | percent of partisans | weighted share acting (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 76.0% to 78.1% | 5,930 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rate_house_3 | 90.0% | percent of partisans | weighted share acting (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party House candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 89.3% to 90.7% | 13,912 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rate_pres_1 | 85.9% | percent of partisans | weighted share acting (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 84.6% to 87.0% | 3,090 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rate_pres_3 | 93.3% | percent of partisans | weighted share acting (95% Wilson interval) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 92.7% to 93.8% | 15,612 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | step | 10 | points on the feeling thermometer | size of the change in a rating that a coefficient describes (a definition, not an estimate) | the unit in which coefficients are reported | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | straight_chg | 0.6 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.8 to 2.0 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | straight_chg_loose | −2.5 | percentage points of the outcome between groups | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings as indicators (other party rated at or below the loose cut-off, own party at or above it) (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −8.5 to 3.5 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | straight_chg_strict | −0.3 | percentage points of the outcome between groups | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings as indicators (other party rated at or below the strict cut-off, own party at or above it) (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −6.2 to 5.7 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | straight_cold_slope | −0.2 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness coefficient, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI −0.4 to 0.0 | 20,625 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | straight_diff_1 | 0.8 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on straight-ticket vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −0.5 to 2.1 | 2,662 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | straight_diff_3 | 1.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on straight-ticket vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.8 to 1.9 | 13,435 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | straight_noleaner_diff_3 | 0.8 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on straight-ticket vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, leaners excluded, per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.1 to 1.4 | 10,207 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | straight_slope | 0.2 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness-minus-warmth difference, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI −0.1 to 0.6 | 20,625 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | straight_strict_diff_1 | 7.2 | percentage points of the outcome between groups | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on straight-ticket vote, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings as indicators (other party rated at or below the strict cut-off, own party at or above it) (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 1.6 to 12.8 | 2,662 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | straight_warm_slope | −0.4 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the warmth coefficient, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who reported voting for a major-party candidate for both president and the House | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI −0.6 to −0.2 | 20,625 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_max | 100 | points on the feeling thermometer | highest answer the feeling thermometer allows (a definition of the scale, not an estimate) | answers to the feeling thermometer | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_min | 0 | points on the feeling thermometer | lowest answer the feeling thermometer allows (a definition of the scale, not an estimate) | answers to the feeling thermometer | 1978 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_chg | 2.6 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 1.7 to 3.6 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_chg_ftf | 3.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 2.0 to 4.9 | | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_chg_loose | 9.1 | percentage points of the outcome between groups | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings as indicators (other party rated at or below the loose cut-off, own party at or above it) (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 5.2 to 13.1 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_chg_p | 2.0 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990, presidential election years only | 95% CI 0.8 to 3.3 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_chg_p_ftf | 2.9 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews minus 1978 to 1990, presidential election years only | 95% CI 1.2 to 4.5 | | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_chg_p_web | 1.7 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews minus 1978 to 1990, presidential election years only | 95% CI 0.3 to 3.1 | | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_chg_sd | 5.0 | percentage points of the outcome per standard deviation of the rating | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per within-year standard deviation (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 3.2 to 6.8 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_chg_strict | 10.1 | percentage points of the outcome between groups | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings as indicators (other party rated at or below the strict cut-off, own party at or above it) (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 5.9 to 14.3 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_chg_web | 2.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | change in the coldness-minus-warmth difference between the two periods, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, independent samples) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews minus 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI 1.2 to 3.5 | | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_cold_slope | 0.2 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness coefficient, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI 0.1 to 0.4 | 39,678 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_diff_1 | −1.1 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on turnout, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 1978 to 1990 | 95% CI −1.8 to −0.4 | 10,692 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_diff_2 | 1.1 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on turnout, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 1992 to 2008 | 95% CI 0.3 to 1.9 | 10,010 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_diff_3 | 1.6 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on turnout, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.0 to 2.2 | 18,976 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_diff_ftf | 2.4 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on turnout, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012, 2016 and 2024, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 1.1 to 3.7 | 3,476 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_diff_web | 1.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on turnout, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012, 2016 and 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 0.3 to 2.2 | 6,861 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_diffm_1 | −1.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on turnout, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 1978 to 1990, midterm years only | 95% CI −2.4 to −0.5 | 6,348 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_diffp_1 | −0.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on turnout, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, both feelings per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 1978 to 1990, presidential election years only | 95% CI −1.5 to 0.6 | 4,344 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_ld_diff_3 | 0.3 | percentage points of the outcome per scale point of the like-dislike scale | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on turnout, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, the 0 to 10 like-dislike scale for each party, per scale point (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.4 to 0.9 | 18,479 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_noleaner_diff_3 | 1.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | coldness coefficient minus warmth coefficient on turnout, coefficient in a weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects, leaners excluded, per 10 rating points (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.8 to 2.2 | 13,947 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_slope | 0.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness-minus-warmth difference, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI 0.3 to 0.8 | 39,678 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_slope_p | 0.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the coldness-minus-warmth difference, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 1980 to 2024, presidential election years only | 95% CI 0.0 to 0.6 | 30,661 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | turnout_warm_slope | −0.3 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points, per decade | change per decade in the warmth coefficient, weighted linear probability model with year fixed effects and both feelings interacted with decades since 2001 (95% interval, HC3) | partisans, leaners included, who answered the turnout question | 1978 to 2024 (18 surveys) | 95% CI −0.5 to −0.1 | 39,678 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wcheck_max | 0.5 | percentage points of the outcome per 10 rating points | largest absolute difference, across five outcomes and those surveys, between a yearly coefficient (coldness, warmth or their difference) with the full-sample weight and with the post-election weight | partisans, leaners included, with a rating of both parties | the 7 surveys that have a post-election weight | | | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_postelection | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Feeling thermometer: A 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - HC3 robust standard errors: A way of computing standard errors that stays valid when the spread of the outcome differs across respondents, with a correction for small samples. The book uses it for regressions that have no clusters. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors. ## Methods Sample. Respondents to the American National Election Studies (ANES) time series, from the Cumulative Data File, who identify as Democrats or Republicans on the seven-point party identification scale with leaners included (codes 1 to 3 and 5 to 7) and who gave a valid rating of both parties on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer: 43,063 respondents in 18 surveys from 1978 to 2024 (the surveys with party thermometers; the 2002 study has none). Pure independents are left out because they have no own party. Each survey is a separate cross-section of people, so every result describes how ratings and behavior go together among partisans interviewed in the same year and not how any one person changed. Feelings. Warmth is the rating of the respondent's own party. Coldness is 100 minus the rating of the other party, so that a higher value is colder and a coefficient on coldness can be set beside a coefficient on warmth. Coefficients are reported per 10 rating points, or per standard deviation (each rating standardized within its survey year over the whole paired sample, weighted), or between groups. The classification used for the group comparisons marks a partisan as very cold toward the other party when the other-party rating is 15 or lower and as very warm toward the own party when the own-party rating is 85 or higher (the strict cut-offs, each 35 points from the midpoint of 50), with 30 and 70 as the looser pair (20 points from the midpoint). Four groups follow: neither, warm only, cold only and both. Respondents give 15, 30, 70 and 85 more often than the values next to them, so each cut-off sits on a common answer and includes it. A second measure of feeling, the 0 to 10 like-dislike scale for each party (asked in 1996, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024), is put in the same direction, and one scale point corresponds to 10 rating points. Behavior. Party-line presidential vote is a vote for the own party's candidate among partisans who reported voting for a major-party presidential candidate (VCF0704); defection is one minus this share. Party-line House vote is the same for the House candidate (VCF0707). Straight ticket is a vote for the same party for president and the House among partisans who reported both, the complement of ticket splitting (VCF0709); it is rebuilt from VCF0704 and VCF0707 in every year because the file carries VCF0709 only through 2020, and the rebuilt variable equals VCF0709 for every respondent who has both. Reported turnout is the report of having voted (VCF0702). Campaign activity is a yes to at least one of five questions, whether the respondent tried to influence how others vote (VCF0717), attended a meeting or rally (VCF0718), worked for a party or candidate (VCF0719), displayed a button or sticker (VCF0720) or gave money (VCF0721), with all five answered. All behaviors are self-reports, and the vote items are asked only of respondents who reported voting. Estimators. For each behavior and period, a weighted linear probability model of the 0/1 behavior on coldness and warmth with survey-year fixed effects and HC3 heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors (MacKinnon and White, 1985); the difference between the two coefficients (coldness minus warmth) and its interval come from the joint covariance matrix. The three periods are 1978 to 1990 (7 surveys), 1992 to 2008 (7 surveys) and 2012 to 2024 (4 surveys), fixed before estimation. The change between two periods is the difference of two independent estimates and combines their standard errors in quadrature. Yearly estimates fit the same model to one survey year without fixed effects. The trend per decade interacts coldness and warmth with decades since 2001 in a model with year fixed effects. The logit check fits a weighted logistic regression and uses a probability-weight sandwich covariance with an n/(n-k) factor. The check with each rating alone stacks the two single-rating models and clusters on the respondent so that their difference has an interval. The controls check adds party, strength of identification (strong, weak, leaner), education (four categories), age and interest in the campaign (three categories; complete cases). Group shares carry Wilson intervals on the Kish effective sample size, and the difference between two groups combines the two normal standard errors. Correlations use Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size, with each rating centered on its survey-year mean. All intervals treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the strata and clusters of the ANES design, which the Cumulative File does not carry. Election type. Presidential voting and the straight ticket exist only in presidential election years. House voting, reported turnout and campaign activity also exist in midterm years, which are 56% of the respondents in 1978 to 1990, 25% in 1992 to 2008 and none in 2012 to 2024. The presidential-years-only comparisons keep 1980, 1984 and 1988 from the earliest period (and every presidential year of the middle one), the midterm-only estimates use 1978, 1982, 1986 and 1990, and the trend per decade is also fitted on presidential years alone. Weights. The full-sample weight VCF0009z for all estimates. Mode: weight_ftf (VCF0009x) on the fresh face-to-face sample and weight_web (VCF0009y) on the fresh web sample, which exist for 2008 (face to face only), 2012, 2016 and 2024; the 2020 study has no mode weights, and the 2024 re-interviewed panel and paper respondents belong to neither mode group. Mode estimates pool 2012, 2016 and 2024 and are set against the 1978 to 1990 estimate (all years of that period, and its presidential years alone), which comes from studies interviewed mainly in person. A check with the post-election weight, available in the file for 7 surveys, changes a yearly coefficient or difference by at most 0.5 points. Lean of the self-reported vote. Among all ANES respondents who reported a vote for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate, the weighted Democratic share is 56.0% in 2020 and 55.3% in 2024; the Democratic share of the two-party vote in county returns, Alaska excluded, is 52.3% and 49.3%. Suppression. Cells of group shares need at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. A yearly model needs at least 150 respondents who answered the behavior question and an effective sample of 100 or more. Every pooled period estimate rests on at least 1,394 respondents. ## What these data cannot show - The comparison is between two feelings measured in the same survey as the behavior. - A respondent who voted for a party's candidate may rate that party warmer afterward, and a respondent who dislikes the other party may be more willing to say that they voted or took part, so the coefficients cannot say which way the association runs. - Interest in politics, strength of party identification, ideology and age may each raise warmth, coldness and behavior together. - The checks hold a few of them fixed and do not hold ideology or issue positions fixed. - Ratings of the parties may also reflect feelings about party elites more than about other citizens [9], and the party rating is not the rating of the presidential nominee, which goes with the presidential vote and is studied in Chapter 2.1, Feelings toward the other party (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party). - The behaviors are reports. - Validation against public records finds that survey respondents consistently overreport voting and that the nonvoters who say they voted tend to be politically engaged [10]. - The file has no validated-vote variable, so the turnout results describe respondents who say they voted, and overreporting that is concentrated among engaged partisans could change the comparison of coldness and warmth. - The self-reported vote also leans Democratic: among respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote, 56.0% reported a Democratic vote in 2020 and 55.3% in 2024, against 52.3% and 49.3% of the two-party vote in county returns, Alaska excluded. - The party-line measures compare each partisan with the own party's candidate, so they are less exposed to that lean than a vote share is. - The vote items cover only partisans who reported voting for a major-party candidate, so partisans who stayed home or chose a third-party candidate, among whom coldness toward both parties may be common, are outside them. - Party-line voting is near its ceiling in recent years, which limits how much any coefficient can show, and the log-odds check addresses scale and not selection. - The results come from repeated cross-sections, so they cannot show that any partisan grew colder or that any partisan's behavior changed as feelings changed. - A panel that follows the same people is needed for that, and the ANES 2016, 2020 and 2024 panel is not in the files used here. - The three periods were fixed before estimation, but their boundaries are a choice, and the per-decade slope and the yearly figure are there so that the result does not rest on them alone. - The periods also differ in election type, and the presidential-years comparisons use three early studies. - The 2012 to 2024 sample includes 2020, which has no mode weights, so the mode comparison covers 2012, 2016 and 2024 only. - The intervals are model based and ignore the ANES sampling design. - The chapter reports five behaviors, three periods and several measures without adjusting for multiple comparisons, so an interval that excludes zero in one cell is weaker evidence than it looks. - What the ratings go with in views about political violence and democratic norms belongs to Chapter 6.8, Political violence and democratic norms (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms), and who turns out to vote belongs to Chapter 3.7, Turnout (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/turnout). ## References 1. MacKinnon, James G.; White, Halbert (1985). Some Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimators with Improved Finite Sample Properties. Journal of Econometrics 29(3): 305-325. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4076(85)90158-7 2. Wilson, Edwin B. (1927). Probable Inference, the Law of Succession, and Statistical Inference. Journal of the American Statistical Association 22(158): 209-212. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1927.10502953 3. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 4. Abramowitz, Alan I.; Webster, Steven W. (2016). The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century. Electoral Studies 41: 12-22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.11.001 5. Abramowitz, Alan I.; Webster, Steven W. (2018). Negative Partisanship: Why Americans Dislike Parties But Behave Like Rabid Partisans. Political Psychology 39(S1): 119-135. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12479 6. Caruana, Nicholas J.; McGregor, R. Michael; Stephenson, Laura B. (2015). The Power of the Dark Side: Negative Partisanship and Political Behaviour in Canada. Canadian Journal of Political Science 48(4): 771-789. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008423914000882 7. Medeiros, Mike; Noël, Alain (2014). The Forgotten Side of Partisanship: Negative Party Identification in Four Anglo-American Democracies. Comparative Political Studies 47(7): 1022-1046. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013488560 8. Bankert, Alexa (2021). Negative and Positive Partisanship in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections. Political Behavior 43(4): 1467-1485. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-020-09599-1 9. Druckman, James N.; Levendusky, Matthew S. (2019). What Do We Measure When We Measure Affective Polarization?. Public Opinion Quarterly 83(1): 114-122. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfz003 10. Ansolabehere, Stephen; Hersh, Eitan (2012). Validation: What Big Data Reveal About Survey Misreporting and the Real Electorate. Political Analysis 20(4): 437-459. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mps023 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/negative-partisanship/build.py (sha256 c768cf95e245ad5b298018e7a6c0c254c2840f064f15e573381a70bfa0f1b4d3) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/county/pres_county_1868_2024.parquet | 6,295,675 | bec11c7a0cb5d4180bbd6809d048bc892dd00dfcdde527fa4da871b1dd3f835f | b2a4f000f2eea72d09af8939555289e924875cca40cd95ec8869104cd575bed7 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 94aada9675e8d45c4a9d30335a094512e2f6a09c2135cee40fcc2cf987177d06 | | figures/by_period.json | 43ae5fb9dd224fb066cb8f268a14d653c101fba416e5375c4f8f9d78403674d9 | | figures/cells.json | 1275025394ad67b3abd356bc71b50565d561401ebb182b95ee4297091b0e7a8e | | figures/change.json | a7abb35df6b101d40828a18386d252b4b9b67ae2c0b5e5ac8d92122ab9769fab | | figures/checks.json | db76dc8f91b24b4c8a0d8fdbebb1930ec73d6552de6634891145a502754e58dc | | figures/cutoffs.json | a2cbfe4c0579d0c2d9f170460a9312f91e1678e47795beed4e59b5b86519ba69 | | figures/group_shares.json | fb19e4ab814fea8ff5dba719fb7cbac69d21e91690d43d437349f29243e3ae59 | | figures/items.json | 7b8bcad8d9e502e7ec0184edc667d29df727aa07a4ff6e62a7c143a4ad006da4 | | figures/mode.json | 41825c7920f778f70facc20c0183676ebe0a25aef6a40472baea5b9fa73e1733 | | figures/yearly.json | 6ee25ab48c8335d36039fc852a5ab850c5df95e7ab711d4c13e26da035bb56dd | | meta.json | 9c356b83b2a3c11c31b5b2d752fb8e041bfadf033594d53ed0b74991a7aa84d0 | | refs.json | 5efba825458f058fbd084923a2e702dc330b8a08e45b4fe37d368a757966aa8b | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/facts.json - Table 1, figure "group_shares" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/group_shares.json - Table 2, figure "cells" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/cells.json - Table 3, figure "by_period" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/by_period.json - Table 4, figure "yearly" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/yearly.json - Table 5, figure "mode" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/mode.json - Table 6, figure "change" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/change.json - Table 7, figure "cutoffs" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/cutoffs.json - Table 8, figure "checks" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/checks.json - Table 9, figure "items" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/negative-partisanship/figures/items.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # The two coalitions: report Chapter 3.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: The two coalitions - Chapter: 3.1 (Part III, The party coalitions; The great sorting) - Question: How has the composition of each party's voters changed by education, income, race, religion, age and gender? - Dek: Voters with a four-year degree rose from 19.2% to 43.4% of Democratic voters in the ANES between the presidential elections of 1976 to 1988 and those of 2012 to 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File, presidential years 1952 to 2024; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight_postelection where available, else VCF0009z - ANES 2024 Time Series. 2024 Time Series, summary religion code, one comparison with the CES; years: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews); weights: V240107b - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content, presidential years 2008 to 2024; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative - CPS Voting and Registration Supplement. November Voting and Registration Supplement, presidential years 1996 to 2024 (and 1976 to 1988 for one comparison), adults aged 18 or older; years: 1976-2024 (25 November samples, biennial, even years); weights: VOSUPPWT - State presidential returns. State presidential returns 1976 to 2024, certified national two-party share; years: 1976-2024 (13 elections); weights: none (full counts) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026thetwocoalitions ```bibtex @misc{singh2026thetwocoalitions, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {The two coalitions}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are holders of a four-year degree | Democratic two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 19.2% | 95% CI 17.5% to 20.9% | 2,173 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | deg_d0 | | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are holders of a four-year degree | Democratic two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 43.4% | 95% CI 42.0% to 44.8% | 9,449 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | deg_d1 | | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are holders of a four-year degree | Republican two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 25.2% | 95% CI 23.5% to 26.9% | 2,563 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | deg_r0 | | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are holders of a four-year degree | Republican two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 31.4% | 95% CI 29.9% to 32.8% | 7,156 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | deg_r1 | | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are holders of a four-year degree | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 39.2% | 95% CI 36.2% to 42.2% | 1,063 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | deg_v0 | | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are holders of a four-year degree | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 62.0% | 95% CI 60.6% to 63.5% | 7,626 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | deg_v1 | | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are white non-Hispanic | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 39.4% | 95% CI 37.8% to 40.9% | 4,030 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | wh_v0 | | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are white non-Hispanic | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 44.4% | 95% CI 43.2% to 45.6% | 12,097 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | wh_v1 | | earlier minus later share of Democratic voters; independent periods, standard errors combined | Democratic two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 14.7 | 95% CI 12.3 to 17.1 | | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | wh_dchg | | count of respondents with a positive vote weight | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 1952 to 2024 | 34,423 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_voters | | count of elections | ANES presidential elections 1952 to 2024 | 1952 to 2024 | 19 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_years | | count of respondents with a positive weight | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 188,145 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_ces_voters | | lowest age in the youngest band | definition of an age band | all years | 18 | | | none (definition) | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | age_lo | ## Findings In the American National Election Studies (ANES), voters with a four-year degree made up 19.2% (95% CI 17.5% to 20.9%) of Democratic voters in the presidential elections of 1976 to 1988 and 43.4% (95% CI 42.0% to 44.8%) of those in 2012 to 2024. Among Republican voters the share went from 25.2% (95% CI 23.5% to 26.9%) to 31.4% (95% CI 29.9% to 32.8%). Those are shares of a party's voters, and the party is the denominator. The other denominator is the group: over the same two periods the Democratic share among degree holders rose from 39.2% (95% CI 36.2% to 42.2%) to 62.0% (95% CI 60.6% to 63.5%). The two numbers answer different questions, and a change in one does not identify a change in the other. They can also move in opposite directions. White voters were 39.4% (95% CI 37.8% to 40.9%) Democratic in 1976 to 1988 and 44.4% (95% CI 43.2% to 45.6%) in 2012 to 2024, a rise, while their share of Democratic voters fell by 14.7 points. The chapter keeps the two denominators apart throughout, and it keeps apart four populations that are easy to blur: eligible adults, voters, party identifiers and nonvoters. Three surveys carry the evidence. The ANES Cumulative Data File has presidential vote and demographics for every election from 1952 to 2024, with 34,423 respondents in 19 elections who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican candidate. The Cooperative Election Study (CES), an online panel, has 188,145 such respondents from 2008 to 2024 and finer religious and racial categories. The Current Population Survey (CPS) voting supplement records no vote choice. The chapter uses it for one purpose, the make-up of citizens aged 18 or older, who are the eligible adults here, and of the voters among them, in the presidential elections from 1996 to 2024. (Note: Every interval is a 95% confidence interval. Shares use the Kish effective sample size [1] and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample, which leaves out the stages of each sample design. The CES is an opt-in panel and the CPS extract carries no replicate weights, so their intervals are narrower than a design-based interval would be. The terms of the two decompositions come from a seeded bootstrap, described in the methods note.) A voter in the ANES and the CES is a respondent who reported voting for one of the two major-party candidates; third-party voters and nonvoters are outside that frame, which is why a party's group shares sum to a whole. A party identifier is a respondent who calls themselves a Democrat or a Republican and counts leaners. ### A group's Democratic share and its share of Democratic voters differ In the 2024 CES, 43.5% (95% CI 42.7% to 44.4%) of white voters supported the Democratic candidate, and white voters made up 64.3% (95% CI 63.3% to 65.3%) of Democratic voters. Black voters supported the Democratic candidate at 81.9% (95% CI 79.8% to 84.0%), the highest rate of any racial or ethnic group, and made up 15.6% (95% CI 14.8% to 16.3%) of Democratic voters. The first group leans Republican and is a majority of the coalition because it is 72.3% of all voters. The second is overwhelmingly Democratic and a small part of the coalition because it is 9.3% of all voters. Table 1 shows both numbers for every group in the CES. Table 1. In 2024 white voters leaned Republican and still made up most of the Democratic coalition For a group $g$, the share of Democratic voters who belong to it is $$c_D(g) = s(g)\,\frac{d(g)}{D},$$ where $s(g)$ is the group's share of all voters, $d(g)$ is the share of the group's voters who vote Democratic and $D$ is the Democratic share of all voters. The ratio $d(g)/D$ is the group's relative lean. The share of Republican voters who belong to the group is the same product with Republican shares in place of Democratic ones. Axelrod's account of the party coalitions from 1952 to 1968 used the same arithmetic, breaking a group's contribution to a party's vote into its size, its turnout and its loyalty [2]. A group can become a larger part of a coalition because it grew, because it leans further toward the party, or both, and its share of the coalition can fall while its Democratic share rises. The rest of the chapter applies this arithmetic to education, income, race, religion, age and sex, and then to the surveys' disagreements. ### Eligible adults, voters, party identifiers and nonvoters differ in make-up Eligible adults are citizens aged 18 or older. Voters are the eligible adults who voted, party identifiers are people who identify with a party whether or not they vote, and nonvoters are eligible adults who did not vote. (Note: The definition of eligible adults here excludes noncitizens, whom the CPS identifies from 1994, and keeps everyone else, including adults who are barred from voting for other reasons [3]. The CPS counts a respondent who gave no turnout answer as a nonvoter, the Census convention, which Hur and Achen examine [4]. Turnout is self-reported in all three surveys.) In the CPS, 37.1% (95% CI 36.7% to 37.5%) of eligible adults held a four-year degree in 2024 and 44.9% (95% CI 44.4% to 45.4%) of voters did. In every presidential election from 1996 to 2024 voters were more likely than eligible adults to hold a degree and less likely to be in the youngest age band, ages 18 to 29 (Table 2). The degree-holding share of eligible adults rose from 22.3% (95% CI 22.0% to 22.6%) in 1996 to 37.1% (95% CI 36.7% to 37.5%) in 2024 and that of voters from 29.4% (95% CI 29.0% to 29.8%) to 44.9% (95% CI 44.4% to 45.4%), a rise of 15.5 (95% CI 14.8 to 16.2) points. A gap between voters and eligible adults at one date is a snapshot and does not split that rise, so the chapter splits it. Had degree holders and other adults kept their 1996 turnout rates, degree holders would have been 46.1% (95% CI 45.5% to 46.7%) of 2024 voters. On that counterfactual the growth of the group among eligible adults accounts for +16.7 (95% CI 16.1 to 17.3) points of the rise and the change in relative turnout for −1.2 (95% CI −1.6 to −0.8) points. Chapter 3.7, Turnout (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/turnout) reports turnout rates by group. Table 2. In every presidential election since 1996 voters were more likely than eligible adults to hold a four-year degree and less likely to be in the youngest age band Party identifiers are a third population. Table 3 compares the 2024 ANES populations, with party identifiers in the lower rows. Degree holders were 50.0% (95% CI 47.0% to 53.0%) of Democratic voters and 43.3% (95% CI 40.5% to 46.1%) of Democratic identifiers, against 27.8% (95% CI 24.8% to 30.9%) of Republican voters and 27.2% (95% CI 24.7% to 29.8%) of Republican identifiers. Among nonvoters the share was 15.7% (95% CI 12.3% to 19.2%), and among independents with no party lean it was 18.2% (95% CI 12.5% to 23.9%). Democratic voters are more likely than Democratic identifiers to hold a degree, and Republican voters and identifiers differ little. A statement about Democrats can refer to any of the Democratic rows, so the chapter says which one it means: voters, except in this figure. Table 3. Democratic voters are more likely than Democratic identifiers to hold a four-year degree, and nonvoters are less likely than voters ### The Democratic coalition gained degree holders and the highest income third In 1976 the Republican coalition had the larger share of voters with a four-year degree, 24.2% (95% CI 20.9% to 27.6%) of Republican voters against 13.8% (95% CI 11.1% to 16.4%) of Democratic voters. It also had the larger share of voters in the highest third of the income distribution, 49.4% (95% CI 45.3% to 53.4%) against 33.5% (95% CI 29.8% to 37.3%). By 2024 both differences had reversed: 50.0% (95% CI 47.0% to 53.0%) of Democratic voters held a degree against 27.8% (95% CI 24.8% to 30.9%) of Republican voters, and 49.7% (95% CI 46.5% to 52.8%) against 39.9% (95% CI 36.4% to 43.4%) were in the highest income third (Table 4). The income measure is relative: the ANES assigns each respondent to a percentile group of household income within the year's sample, and the chapter uses thirds. The thirds are not constant shares of the electorate, and the highest third was 38.6% (95% CI 37.1% to 40.0%) of voters in 1976 to 1988 and 42.9% (95% CI 41.8% to 43.9%) in 2012 to 2024. Chapter 3.3, The income ladder (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder) follows the vote by dollar bracket in the CES. Table 4. The Republican coalition once had the larger shares of degree holders and of high-income voters, and by 2024 the Democratic coalition did The trend figure uses single elections. For comparisons between two periods, the chapter pools four elections at each end, 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024, so that small groups have enough respondents, and it gives each election the same weight. By that comparison the degree-holding share of Democratic voters rose by 24.2 (95% CI 22.0 to 26.4) points and that of Republican voters by 6.2 (95% CI 4.0 to 8.5) points, a smaller rise (Table 5, education view). The highest income third went from 30.9% (95% CI 28.8% to 32.9%) to 42.6% (95% CI 41.1% to 44.0%) of Democratic voters and from 45.1% (95% CI 43.0% to 47.1%) to 43.3% (95% CI 41.7% to 44.8%) of Republican voters. The change in the highest third's share of Democratic voters splits into a group-size term of +3.9 (95% CI 2.3 to 5.5) points and a relative-lean term of +7.8 (95% CI 6.0 to 9.6) points, and for Republican voters into +4.7 (95% CI 2.7 to 6.7) and −6.5 (95% CI −8.2 to −4.8) (Table 7, income views). The CES, which starts in 2008, shows the same direction for Democratic voters: the degree-holding share went from 31.2% (95% CI 30.2% to 32.3%) in 2008 to 47.9% (95% CI 46.9% to 49.0%) in 2024. Whether the Republican share rose or fell since 2008 depends on the survey, a disagreement taken up near the end. Table 5. Four-year degree holders rose from 19.2% to 43.4% of Democratic voters and from 25.2% to 31.4% of Republican voters ### Both coalitions became less white, and both became less Protestant White non-Hispanic voters were 72.7% (95% CI 70.8% to 74.6%) of Democratic voters and 94.8% (95% CI 93.9% to 95.7%) of Republican voters in 1976 to 1988, and 58.0% (95% CI 56.6% to 59.4%) and 85.9% (95% CI 84.8% to 87.0%) in 2012 to 2024. The groups that grew were Hispanic voters and voters of other races, who went from 7.3% (95% CI 6.2% to 8.4%) to 22.1% (95% CI 20.9% to 23.3%) of Democratic voters and from 3.9% (95% CI 3.1% to 4.6%) to 12.5% (95% CI 11.5% to 13.5%) of Republican voters. Black voters were 20.0% (95% CI 18.3% to 21.7%) of Democratic voters in the first period and 19.9% (95% CI 18.7% to 21.0%) in the second, and a small share of Republican voters in both. Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) follows how those groups voted. Protestants were 59.5% (95% CI 57.4% to 61.6%) of Democratic voters in 1976 to 1988 and 36.0% (95% CI 34.5% to 37.6%) in 2012 to 2020, and 68.8% (95% CI 67.0% to 70.7%) and 52.3% (95% CI 50.5% to 54.0%) of Republican voters. The ANES cumulative file cannot separate voters with no religion from those with a religion outside the three it names, and its 2024 religion codes are unusable. The later period therefore ends in 2020, and the last category is Jewish, another religion or none. The CES separates them. Voters with no religion went from 35.7% (95% CI 34.7% to 36.8%) of Democratic voters in 2012 to 45.0% (95% CI 43.9% to 46.0%) in 2024, and from 14.5% (95% CI 13.7% to 15.2%) to 17.7% (95% CI 16.8% to 18.5%) of Republican voters. Chapter 9.1, The god gap in America (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america) covers the gap between frequent and infrequent attenders, and Chapter 9.2, The rise of the nones (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-rise-of-the-nones; planned) covers the religiously unaffiliated. ### The oldest age band grew in both coalitions and women's share fell Voters in the oldest age band, ages 65 and over, rose from 19.0% (95% CI 17.3% to 20.7%) to 22.3% (95% CI 21.1% to 23.5%) of Democratic voters and from 18.5% (95% CI 16.9% to 20.0%) to 25.4% (95% CI 24.0% to 26.8%) of Republican voters. The rise is in step with the aging of the electorate: the CPS puts that band at 15.9% (95% CI 15.7% to 16.0%) of adults in 1976 to 1988 and 21.9% (95% CI 21.8% to 22.1%) in 2012 to 2024. In 1976 to 1988 the two coalitions had a similar age profile, with the youngest band at 19.2% (95% CI 17.6% to 20.9%) of Democratic voters and 18.9% (95% CI 17.4% to 20.5%) of Republican voters. In 2012 to 2024 the shares were 18.5% (95% CI 17.4% to 19.6%) and 13.1% (95% CI 12.0% to 14.2%), so the Republican coalition had become the older of the two. Chapter 3.6, Age and generation (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation) separates age from birth cohort. Women were 58.6% (95% CI 56.5% to 60.7%) of Democratic voters and 53.2% (95% CI 51.2% to 55.2%) of Republican voters in 1976 to 1988 and 55.5% (95% CI 54.0% to 56.9%) and 49.6% (95% CI 48.0% to 51.1%) in 2012 to 2024. Their share of both coalitions fell by about the same amount even though the Democratic share among women rose from 48.4% (95% CI 46.4% to 50.3%) to 56.9% (95% CI 55.5% to 58.4%). The fall is a group-size change: women were 55.7% (95% CI 54.2% to 57.1%) of ANES voters in the earlier window and 52.8% (95% CI 51.7% to 53.8%) in the later one. The CPS, over the same two windows, shows women at 53.1% (95% CI 52.9% to 53.3%) of voters in 1976 to 1988 and 53.3% (95% CI 53.1% to 53.6%) in 2012 to 2024, with no change beyond sampling error. The ANES figure for the earlier window is above the CPS figure, and the ANES fall belongs to that window. Chapter 3.5, The gender gap in attitudes and votes (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap) covers the vote gap between women and men. ### The Democratic share rose most among degree holders Table 6 turns to the other denominator, the Democratic share of each group's voters, for the same two periods. Among degree holders the share rose from 39.2% (95% CI 36.2% to 42.2%) to 62.0% (95% CI 60.6% to 63.5%), a rise of 22.8 (95% CI 19.5 to 26.1) points, and the rise is larger than that of every other group once sampling error is allowed for. Among the highest income third the share went from 36.7% (95% CI 34.3% to 39.0%) to 54.0% (95% CI 52.3% to 55.7%) and among the youngest age band from 46.4% (95% CI 43.0% to 49.7%) to 62.7% (95% CI 59.5% to 65.8%). The lowest income third and Black voters kept nearly the same Democratic share at high levels, 58.3% and 58.5% for the lowest third and 92.8% and 93.7% for Black voters. Education below a degree is not split further, because the cumulative file defines its lower groups differently after 2016. The Democratic share of all voters rose over these years from 45.9% (95% CI 44.5% to 47.4%) to 54.1% (95% CI 53.1% to 55.2%), so a group whose share rose by less than that, as white voters' did, moved toward the Democratic candidate by less than the electorate. The later elections also lean Democratic against the certified counts, as the last section shows. Table 6. The Democratic share rose more among four-year degree holders than in any other group ### A coalition share moves with group size and with relative lean Table 7 splits the change in a coalition share into the two terms of the product and starts with degree holders. Their share of all voters rose from 22.4% (95% CI 21.2% to 23.6%) to 37.9% (95% CI 36.9% to 38.9%). Their Democratic share was 39.2% (95% CI 36.2% to 42.2%) against 45.9% (95% CI 44.4% to 47.3%) for all voters in 1976 to 1988 and 62.0% (95% CI 60.6% to 63.5%) against 54.1% (95% CI 53.1% to 55.2%) in 2012 to 2024. The degree-holding share of Democratic voters rose by 24.2 (95% CI 22.0 to 26.4) points, and the group-size term is +15.5 (95% CI 14.0 to 17.1) points and the relative-lean term +8.8 (95% CI 7.1 to 10.6). Among Republican voters the group-size term is +15.1 (95% CI 13.6 to 16.7), close to the Democratic one, and the lean term is −8.9 (95% CI −10.6 to −7.4). (Note: The terms use the symmetric split of a product: the change in group size times the average relative lean, plus the change in relative lean times the average group size. The split is exact, and its two terms do not depend on which factor is moved first. Kitagawa's standardization of a difference between two rates is built the same way [5]. Intervals come from a bootstrap that resamples respondents within each election.) The group-size term is about the same in both coalitions, and the relative-lean term has opposite signs, positive for Democratic voters and negative for Republican voters. The CES gives the same signs for 2008 to 2024, with a group-size term of +13.1 (95% CI 12.0 to 14.1) points for Democratic voters and +10.8 (95% CI 9.8 to 11.7) for Republican voters and lean terms of +3.5 (95% CI 2.5 to 4.5) and −3.0 (95% CI −4.0 to −1.9). Table 7. Among Democratic voters the degree-holding share rose through group size (+15.5 points) and relative lean (+8.8 points) The split for white voters runs the other way. Their share of Democratic voters fell from 72.7% (95% CI 70.8% to 74.6%) to 58.0% (95% CI 56.6% to 59.4%) and their share of Republican voters from 94.8% (95% CI 93.9% to 95.7%) to 85.9% (95% CI 84.8% to 87.0%), so both coalitions became more diverse and the Democratic coalition changed by the larger amount. White non-Hispanic voters fell from 84.7% (95% CI 83.6% to 85.7%) to 70.8% (95% CI 69.8% to 71.7%) of all voters, which gives a group-size term of −11.6 (95% CI −12.8 to −10.4) points for Democratic voters. Their Democratic share rose, from 39.4% (95% CI 37.8% to 40.9%) to 44.4% (95% CI 43.2% to 45.6%), but by less than the Democratic share of all voters, so their relative lean fell and that term is −3.1 (95% CI −4.6 to −1.5) points. Among Republican voters the group-size term is −16.2 (95% CI −17.8 to −14.5) points and the lean term is +7.3 (95% CI 5.7 to 8.9). A group's share of all voters is its share of adults weighted by its turnout, so the CPS bears on the group-size term. Over the same two windows, 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024, the degree-holding share rose by 18.9 (95% CI 18.6 to 19.2) points among voters and by 17.0 (95% CI 16.8 to 17.2) points among adults aged 18 or older. Growth of the group among adults therefore accounts for most of the rise among voters. Before 1994 the CPS does not record citizenship, so the earlier window counts all residents and the later window counts citizens. ### A change in a group's vote share does not identify persuasion The Democratic share of all voters rose from 45.9% (95% CI 44.5% to 47.4%) to 54.1% (95% CI 53.1% to 55.2%) between the two periods, a rise of 8.2 (95% CI 6.4 to 10.0) points. Table 8 splits that change using cells defined by sex, three racial and ethnic groups and four age bands. The split is an accounting identity under those cells: it divides the change into two parts that sum to it and does not say why either part moved. The mix term, the part that comes from a different make-up of the voters across cells, is +2.9 (95% CI 2.1 to 3.8) points, and the within-cell term is +5.3 (95% CI 3.6 to 6.8) points. The within-cell term is not a measure of persuasion. It includes voters who changed their vote, new voters who replaced those who died, different people voting in the same cell from one election to the next, and changes in how the surveys sampled each cell. Repeated cross-sections cannot separate these. The within-cell term also contains survey lean. The ANES share minus the certified count averaged +0.2 (95% CI −1.3 to 1.6) points over 1976 to 1988 and +3.0 (95% CI 1.9 to 4.0) over 2012 to 2024, a movement of 2.8 (95% CI 1.0 to 4.6) points. The certified Democratic share rose by 5.4 points between the two sets of elections, and the ANES share by 8.2 (95% CI 6.4 to 10.0). As much as 2.8 points of the within-cell term could therefore come from the surveys' lean and not from a change in how people voted. Table 8. The mix of voters accounts for +2.9 points of the change in the Democratic share and change within groups of the same sex, race and age for +5.3 points Inside a narrower group the split can look different. For the rise in the Democratic share among degree holders, the mix term is +1.1 (95% CI −0.1 to 2.9) points and the within-cell term +21.7 (95% CI 18.0 to 24.8), so the sex, race and age make-up of graduates accounts for little of the rise. That does not make the rise persuasion, and the cells do not hold the group's own size fixed: degree holders went from 22.4% to 37.9% of voters. Among voters without a degree the Democratic share barely moved, from 47.8% (95% CI 46.1% to 49.4%) to 49.3% (95% CI 47.9% to 50.8%), and the flat total hides a mix term of +4.7 (95% CI 3.5 to 5.9) points and a within-cell term of −3.2 (95% CI −5.4 to −1.5) points. Turnout enters in two places. The voters here reported voting, so a group's Democratic share can move because more or fewer of its Democratic-leaning members voted, and a group's share of voters moves with its share of eligible adults and its turnout. The surveys hold no vote preference for nonvoters, so the chapter cannot say how the coalitions would look if they had voted. Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened) separates switching from replacement for ideology by following birth cohorts, which these vote questions are too thin to support. ### The surveys differ on levels, and the differences reach the coalition shares Self-reported vote can lean toward one party, and the surveys here do not lean equally. In 2024 the ANES gives a Democratic share of the two-party vote of 54.5% (95% CI 52.3% to 56.7%) and the CES gives 49.0% (95% CI 48.2% to 49.7%), against 49.2% in the certified count. The ANES share minus the count averages +3.0 (95% CI 1.9 to 4.0) points over the four elections from 2012 to 2024 and +0.2 (95% CI −1.3 to 1.6) points over those from 1976 to 1988. The ANES changes in vote shares between the two periods are therefore larger than the change in the count. Comparisons of survey reports with voter records are the usual check on self-reported turnout and vote [6], and neither is available for these files. The composition of voters differs as well (Table 9). In 2024 the CPS gives 44.9% (95% CI 44.4% to 45.4%) of voters with a degree, the ANES 39.9% (95% CI 37.7% to 42.1%) and the CES 41.8% (95% CI 41.1% to 42.5%). The two surveys disagree most about Republican voters. The ANES degree-holding share fell from 36.4% (95% CI 31.6% to 41.1%) in 2008 to 27.8% (95% CI 24.8% to 30.9%) in 2024, a change of −8.5 (95% CI −14.2 to −2.8) points. The CES share rose from 28.2% (95% CI 27.2% to 29.1%) to 35.9% (95% CI 34.9% to 37.0%), a change of +7.8 (95% CI 6.4 to 9.2) points. The ANES mode series show where the fall sits. The 2008 baseline is face to face only. In the web samples the Republican share went from 31.9% (95% CI 28.6% to 35.2%) in 2012 to 30.8% (95% CI 25.9% to 35.7%) in 2024, a change of −1.1 (95% CI −7.0 to 4.8) points whose interval includes zero. In the face-to-face samples it went from 37.9% (95% CI 32.2% to 43.6%) to 25.1% (95% CI 18.2% to 31.9%), a change of −12.8 (95% CI −21.8 to −3.9) points. The fall in the all-mode ANES series is therefore not present in the web samples, which like the CES are collected online, and those samples do not show the CES's rise either. The within-education vote differs too. In 2024 degree holders voted Democratic at 68.2% (95% CI 65.4% to 71.1%) in the ANES and 56.1% (95% CI 55.1% to 57.2%) in the CES, and voters without a degree at 45.3% (95% CI 42.2% to 48.5%) and 43.8% (95% CI 42.8% to 44.9%). If the 2024 ANES voters had the CPS education mix and kept their within-education vote shares, degree holders would be 55.1% (95% CI 53.4% to 57.2%) of Democratic voters and 32.1% (95% CI 29.8% to 34.1%) of Republican voters, against 50.0% and 27.8% unadjusted. The surveys also differ on race. In 2024 white non-Hispanic voters were 72.3% (95% CI 71.6% to 73.0%) of voters in the CES, 70.6% (95% CI 70.1% to 71.1%) in the CPS and 67.4% (95% CI 65.2% to 69.5%) in the ANES, and Black voters were 9.3% (95% CI 8.9% to 9.7%), 11.5% (95% CI 11.1% to 11.8%) and 11.2% (95% CI 9.8% to 12.7%). Table 9. The ANES shows the degree-holding share of Republican voters falling after 2008, the CES shows it rising, and the ANES web samples show no change In the 2024 ANES, degree holders were 54.7% (95% CI 47.8% to 61.7%) of Democratic voters among face-to-face respondents and 51.0% (95% CI 46.2% to 55.8%) among web respondents, and the two intervals overlap. Religion shows a gap too: the 2024 ANES Time Series puts voters with no religion at 34.2% (95% CI 31.1% to 37.2%) of Democratic voters and the CES at 45.0% (95% CI 43.9% to 46.0%). Both surveys show a rise in the degree-holding share of Democratic voters, they disagree about the Republican share, and the levels in either survey are best read as a range. ### What these data cannot show The surveys interview different people in each election, so the chapter compares groups and not individuals. It cannot say whether a voter changed party, how much of a change comes from older voters leaving the electorate and younger ones entering it, or how much comes from different people turning out. The group terms of the decompositions are arithmetic and describe a split of numbers, not a mechanism, and the within-cell term in particular absorbs every change that the cells do not hold fixed. The split is also sensitive to the groups chosen: degree holders were a smaller share of voters in the first period than in the second. Vote and turnout are self-reports. The ANES leans Democratic in its late elections, the CES is an opt-in panel whose weights match it to the adult population and not to voters, and the CPS has no vote choice. No survey here measures a party's voters exactly. Nonvoters have no vote preference in these data, third-party voters are outside the two-party frame, and the CES file used here has no validated turnout. The ANES samples of 2012, 2016 and 2024 mix interview modes and the 2020 study has no mode weights, so a change between those elections can include a change of mode. Intervals are model based and leave out the sample designs; the CPS intervals in particular are narrower than the survey's own design-based errors. Several groups are coarse. Education below a degree is not analysed, because the ANES cumulative file defines its lower groups differently after 2016. The ANES identifies Hispanic respondents from 1966 and has few of them before the 1990s. The early race cells therefore pool Hispanic voters with voters of other races for the coalition shares and drop the other-races group for the vote shares. The relative income thirds do not describe dollar income, and religion in the ANES cumulative file stops at 2020 with four categories. The two periods, 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024, were chosen to give each group enough respondents, and a different choice of years would give different numbers. The chapter does not examine why any group's vote changed, how the parties' candidates, issues or campaigns affected it, or how coalitions differ below the national level. ## Tables ### Table 1. In 2024 white voters leaned Republican and still made up most of the Democratic coalition Two shares for each group of two-party presidential voters in 2024: the Democratic share of the group's voters and the group's share of all Democratic voters, percent; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Dimension | Group | Share | Estimate (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n voters in the denominator | Group's share of all voters (%) | Group's share of Republican voters (%) | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Education | Postgraduate degree | Democratic share of the group's voters | 61.9 | 60.3 | 63.4 | 6,565 | 16.0 | 12.0 | | Education | Postgraduate degree | Group's share of Democratic voters | 20.3 | 19.4 | 21.1 | 23,517 | 16.0 | 12.0 | | Education | College graduate | Democratic share of the group's voters | 52.6 | 51.2 | 53.9 | 10,429 | 25.8 | 24.0 | | Education | College graduate | Group's share of Democratic voters | 27.7 | 26.7 | 28.6 | 23,517 | 25.8 | 24.0 | | Education | Some college | Democratic share of the group's voters | 47.2 | 45.8 | 48.5 | 14,759 | 31.1 | 32.2 | | Education | Some college | Group's share of Democratic voters | 30.0 | 29.0 | 30.9 | 23,517 | 31.1 | 32.2 | | Education | High school or less | Democratic share of the group's voters | 40.0 | 38.3 | 41.6 | 10,255 | 27.1 | 31.8 | | Education | High school or less | Group's share of Democratic voters | 22.1 | 21.2 | 22.9 | 23,517 | 27.1 | 31.8 | | Race and ethnicity | White | Democratic share of the group's voters | 43.5 | 42.7 | 44.4 | 31,857 | 72.3 | 80.0 | | Race and ethnicity | White | Group's share of Democratic voters | 64.3 | 63.3 | 65.3 | 23,517 | 72.3 | 80.0 | | Race and ethnicity | Black | Democratic share of the group's voters | 81.9 | 79.8 | 84.0 | 3,753 | 9.3 | 3.3 | | Race and ethnicity | Black | Group's share of Democratic voters | 15.6 | 14.8 | 16.3 | 23,517 | 9.3 | 3.3 | | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | Democratic share of the group's voters | 54.7 | 51.9 | 57.6 | 3,564 | 10.4 | 9.2 | | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | Group's share of Democratic voters | 11.6 | 11.0 | 12.3 | 23,517 | 10.4 | 9.2 | | Race and ethnicity | Asian | Democratic share of the group's voters | 63.0 | 58.6 | 67.4 | 1,065 | 3.7 | 2.6 | | Race and ethnicity | Asian | Group's share of Democratic voters | 4.7 | 4.3 | 5.1 | 23,517 | 3.7 | 2.6 | | Race and ethnicity | Other | Democratic share of the group's voters | 43.0 | 39.1 | 47.0 | 1,769 | 4.3 | 4.9 | | Race and ethnicity | Other | Group's share of Democratic voters | 3.8 | 3.4 | 4.2 | 23,517 | 4.3 | 4.9 | | Religion | Protestant | Democratic share of the group's voters | 32.9 | 31.8 | 34.1 | 14,201 | 36.9 | 48.5 | | Religion | Protestant | Group's share of Democratic voters | 24.8 | 23.9 | 25.7 | 23,506 | 36.9 | 48.5 | | Religion | Catholic | Democratic share of the group's voters | 43.3 | 41.6 | 45.0 | 7,973 | 18.5 | 20.6 | | Religion | Catholic | Group's share of Democratic voters | 16.4 | 15.6 | 17.1 | 23,506 | 18.5 | 20.6 | | Religion | Jewish | Democratic share of the group's voters | 68.0 | 64.0 | 72.1 | 1,219 | 2.7 | 1.7 | | Religion | Jewish | Group's share of Democratic voters | 3.7 | 3.3 | 4.1 | 23,506 | 2.7 | 1.7 | | Religion | Other religion | Democratic share of the group's voters | 45.7 | 43.1 | 48.2 | 4,287 | 10.9 | 11.5 | | Religion | Other religion | Group's share of Democratic voters | 10.1 | 9.5 | 10.7 | 23,506 | 10.9 | 11.5 | | Religion | No religion | Democratic share of the group's voters | 70.9 | 69.7 | 72.2 | 14,311 | 31.0 | 17.7 | | Religion | No religion | Group's share of Democratic voters | 45.0 | 43.9 | 46.0 | 23,506 | 31.0 | 17.7 | | Age | 18 to 29 | Democratic share of the group's voters | 60.6 | 57.6 | 63.6 | 3,082 | 11.7 | 9.1 | | Age | 18 to 29 | Group's share of Democratic voters | 14.5 | 13.8 | 15.3 | 23,517 | 11.7 | 9.1 | | Age | 30 to 44 | Democratic share of the group's voters | 55.1 | 53.5 | 56.8 | 7,073 | 23.1 | 20.3 | | Age | 30 to 44 | Group's share of Democratic voters | 26.1 | 25.1 | 27.0 | 23,517 | 23.1 | 20.3 | | Age | 45 to 64 | Democratic share of the group's voters | 43.9 | 42.8 | 45.1 | 16,848 | 35.3 | 38.8 | | Age | 45 to 64 | Group's share of Democratic voters | 31.7 | 30.7 | 32.7 | 23,517 | 35.3 | 38.8 | | Age | 65 and over | Democratic share of the group's voters | 45.5 | 44.4 | 46.7 | 15,005 | 29.8 | 31.8 | | Age | 65 and over | Group's share of Democratic voters | 27.7 | 26.8 | 28.6 | 23,517 | 29.8 | 31.8 | | Gender | Women | Democratic share of the group's voters | 50.8 | 49.8 | 51.8 | 21,759 | 50.7 | 48.7 | | Gender | Women | Group's share of Democratic voters | 52.9 | 51.8 | 53.9 | 23,300 | 50.7 | 48.7 | | Gender | Men | Democratic share of the group's voters | 46.6 | 45.5 | 47.8 | 19,998 | 49.3 | 51.3 | | Gender | Men | Group's share of Democratic voters | 47.1 | 46.1 | 48.2 | 23,300 | 49.3 | 51.3 | Note: The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals are model based and do not cover how respondents were recruited. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/two_denominators.json ### Table 2. In every presidential election since 1996 voters were more likely than eligible adults to hold a four-year degree and less likely to be in the youngest age band Share of eligible adults (citizens aged 18 or older) and share of voters in each group, percent, by presidential election; CPS voting supplement; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Election | Dimension | Group | Eligible adults (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n eligible | Voters (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n voters | Voters minus eligible (points) | 95% CI low of difference | 95% CI high of difference | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1996 | Education | Less than high school | 16.2 | 15.9 | 16.4 | 84,090 | 10.7 | 10.4 | 11.0 | 50,025 | −5.4 | −5.7 | −5.2 | | 1996 | Education | High school graduate | 34.4 | 34.1 | 34.8 | 84,090 | 30.5 | 30.0 | 30.9 | 50,025 | −3.9 | −4.2 | −3.6 | | 1996 | Education | Some college | 27.1 | 26.8 | 27.5 | 84,090 | 29.4 | 28.9 | 29.8 | 50,025 | +2.2 | +1.9 | +2.5 | | 1996 | Education | Four-year degree or more | 22.3 | 22.0 | 22.6 | 84,090 | 29.4 | 29.0 | 29.8 | 50,025 | +7.1 | +6.9 | +7.4 | | 1996 | Race and ethnicity | White non-Hispanic | 79.2 | 78.9 | 79.6 | 84,090 | 82.5 | 82.1 | 82.8 | 50,025 | +3.2 | +2.9 | +3.5 | | 1996 | Race and ethnicity | Black non-Hispanic | 11.7 | 11.5 | 11.9 | 84,090 | 10.6 | 10.3 | 10.9 | 50,025 | −1.1 | −1.3 | −0.8 | | 1996 | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 6.2 | 6.0 | 6.4 | 84,090 | 4.7 | 4.5 | 4.9 | 50,025 | −1.5 | −1.7 | −1.4 | | 1996 | Race and ethnicity | Asian or Pacific Islander | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 84,090 | 1.6 | 1.5 | 1.7 | 50,025 | −0.4 | −0.5 | −0.4 | | 1996 | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.8 | 84,090 | 0.6 | 0.5 | 0.7 | 50,025 | −0.2 | −0.2 | −0.1 | | 1996 | Age | 18 to 29 | 22.0 | 21.7 | 22.3 | 84,090 | 14.9 | 14.6 | 15.2 | 50,025 | −7.1 | −7.4 | −6.8 | | 1996 | Age | 30 to 44 | 32.6 | 32.3 | 33.0 | 84,090 | 31.8 | 31.3 | 32.3 | 50,025 | −0.8 | −1.1 | −0.5 | | 1996 | Age | 45 to 64 | 28.2 | 27.9 | 28.6 | 84,090 | 33.0 | 32.5 | 33.4 | 50,025 | +4.7 | +4.5 | +5.0 | | 1996 | Age | 65 and over | 17.2 | 16.9 | 17.4 | 84,090 | 20.3 | 19.9 | 20.7 | 50,025 | +3.2 | +2.9 | +3.4 | | 1996 | Gender | Women | 52.3 | 52.0 | 52.7 | 84,090 | 53.4 | 52.9 | 53.9 | 50,025 | +1.1 | +0.8 | +1.4 | | 1996 | Gender | Men | 47.7 | 47.3 | 48.0 | 84,090 | 46.6 | 46.1 | 47.1 | 50,025 | −1.1 | −1.4 | −0.8 | | 2000 | Education | Less than high school | 14.3 | 14.1 | 14.6 | 82,428 | 9.3 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 50,010 | −5.1 | −5.3 | −4.8 | | 2000 | Education | High school graduate | 33.6 | 33.2 | 33.9 | 82,428 | 29.7 | 29.2 | 30.1 | 50,010 | −3.9 | −4.2 | −3.6 | | 2000 | Education | Some college | 28.2 | 27.8 | 28.5 | 82,428 | 29.9 | 29.5 | 30.4 | 50,010 | +1.8 | +1.5 | +2.0 | | 2000 | Education | Four-year degree or more | 23.9 | 23.6 | 24.3 | 82,428 | 31.2 | 30.7 | 31.6 | 50,010 | +7.2 | +7.0 | +7.5 | | 2000 | Race and ethnicity | White non-Hispanic | 77.3 | 77.0 | 77.6 | 82,428 | 80.6 | 80.2 | 81.0 | 50,010 | +3.3 | +3.0 | +3.6 | | 2000 | Race and ethnicity | Black non-Hispanic | 11.7 | 11.4 | 11.9 | 82,428 | 11.2 | 10.9 | 11.5 | 50,010 | −0.5 | −0.7 | −0.3 | | 2000 | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 7.4 | 7.2 | 7.6 | 82,428 | 5.5 | 5.3 | 5.7 | 50,010 | −1.9 | −2.1 | −1.7 | | 2000 | Race and ethnicity | Asian or Pacific Islander | 2.8 | 2.6 | 2.9 | 82,428 | 2.0 | 1.9 | 2.1 | 50,010 | −0.8 | −0.9 | −0.6 | | 2000 | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 0.9 | 0.8 | 1.0 | 82,428 | 0.7 | 0.6 | 0.8 | 50,010 | −0.2 | −0.2 | −0.1 | | 2000 | Age | 18 to 29 | 20.8 | 20.5 | 21.1 | 82,428 | 14.1 | 13.7 | 14.4 | 50,010 | −6.8 | −7.0 | −6.5 | | 2000 | Age | 30 to 44 | 30.4 | 30.1 | 30.8 | 82,428 | 29.8 | 29.4 | 30.3 | 50,010 | −0.6 | −0.9 | −0.3 | | 2000 | Age | 45 to 64 | 31.5 | 31.1 | 31.8 | 82,428 | 35.8 | 35.4 | 36.3 | 50,010 | +4.4 | +4.1 | +4.7 | | 2000 | Age | 65 and over | 17.3 | 17.0 | 17.6 | 82,428 | 20.3 | 19.9 | 20.6 | 50,010 | +2.9 | +2.7 | +3.2 | | 2000 | Gender | Women | 52.5 | 52.1 | 52.9 | 82,428 | 53.6 | 53.1 | 54.1 | 50,010 | +1.1 | +0.8 | +1.5 | | 2000 | Gender | Men | 47.5 | 47.1 | 47.9 | 82,428 | 46.4 | 45.9 | 46.9 | 50,010 | −1.1 | −1.5 | −0.8 | | 2004 | Education | Less than high school | 13.0 | 12.8 | 13.3 | 96,452 | 8.1 | 7.8 | 8.3 | 63,052 | −5.0 | −5.2 | −4.8 | | 2004 | Education | High school graduate | 32.3 | 32.0 | 32.7 | 96,452 | 28.5 | 28.1 | 29.0 | 63,052 | −3.8 | −4.0 | −3.5 | | 2004 | Education | Some college | 28.7 | 28.3 | 29.0 | 96,452 | 31.0 | 30.5 | 31.4 | 63,052 | +2.3 | +2.0 | +2.5 | | 2004 | Education | Four-year degree or more | 26.0 | 25.6 | 26.3 | 96,452 | 32.4 | 32.0 | 32.9 | 63,052 | +6.5 | +6.2 | +6.7 | | 2004 | Race and ethnicity | White non-Hispanic | 75.2 | 74.9 | 75.5 | 96,452 | 79.2 | 78.8 | 79.6 | 63,052 | +4.0 | +3.7 | +4.2 | | 2004 | Race and ethnicity | Black non-Hispanic | 11.6 | 11.4 | 11.8 | 96,452 | 11.0 | 10.7 | 11.3 | 63,052 | −0.6 | −0.8 | −0.4 | | 2004 | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 8.2 | 8.0 | 8.4 | 96,452 | 6.0 | 5.8 | 6.2 | 63,052 | −2.1 | −2.3 | −2.0 | | 2004 | Race and ethnicity | Asian or Pacific Islander | 3.3 | 3.2 | 3.5 | 96,452 | 2.3 | 2.2 | 2.5 | 63,052 | −1.0 | −1.1 | −0.9 | | 2004 | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 96,452 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 63,052 | −0.2 | −0.3 | −0.2 | | 2004 | Age | 18 to 29 | 20.9 | 20.6 | 21.2 | 96,452 | 16.0 | 15.7 | 16.3 | 63,052 | −4.8 | −5.1 | −4.6 | | 2004 | Age | 30 to 44 | 27.9 | 27.6 | 28.3 | 96,452 | 27.3 | 26.9 | 27.7 | 63,052 | −0.6 | −0.9 | −0.4 | | 2004 | Age | 45 to 64 | 34.1 | 33.8 | 34.4 | 96,452 | 37.6 | 37.2 | 38.1 | 63,052 | +3.5 | +3.3 | +3.8 | | 2004 | Age | 65 and over | 17.1 | 16.8 | 17.4 | 96,452 | 19.0 | 18.7 | 19.4 | 63,052 | +1.9 | +1.7 | +2.1 | | 2004 | Gender | Women | 52.2 | 51.8 | 52.6 | 96,452 | 53.5 | 53.1 | 54.0 | 63,052 | +1.3 | +1.0 | +1.6 | | 2004 | Gender | Men | 47.8 | 47.4 | 48.2 | 96,452 | 46.5 | 46.0 | 46.9 | 63,052 | −1.3 | −1.6 | −1.0 | | 2008 | Education | Less than high school | 11.2 | 10.9 | 11.4 | 92,360 | 6.9 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 59,975 | −4.3 | −4.5 | −4.1 | | 2008 | Education | High school graduate | 31.7 | 31.4 | 32.1 | 92,360 | 27.3 | 26.9 | 27.8 | 59,975 | −4.4 | −4.6 | −4.1 | | 2008 | Education | Some college | 29.6 | 29.3 | 29.9 | 92,360 | 31.6 | 31.2 | 32.1 | 59,975 | +2.0 | +1.8 | +2.3 | | 2008 | Education | Four-year degree or more | 27.5 | 27.2 | 27.9 | 92,360 | 34.1 | 33.7 | 34.6 | 59,975 | +6.6 | +6.4 | +6.8 | | 2008 | Race and ethnicity | White non-Hispanic | 73.4 | 73.1 | 73.8 | 92,360 | 76.3 | 75.9 | 76.7 | 59,975 | +2.9 | +2.6 | +3.1 | | 2008 | Race and ethnicity | Black non-Hispanic | 11.8 | 11.6 | 12.0 | 92,360 | 12.1 | 11.8 | 12.4 | 59,975 | +0.3 | +0.1 | +0.5 | | 2008 | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 9.5 | 9.3 | 9.7 | 92,360 | 7.4 | 7.2 | 7.7 | 59,975 | −2.0 | −2.2 | −1.9 | | 2008 | Race and ethnicity | Asian or Pacific Islander | 3.6 | 3.5 | 3.7 | 92,360 | 2.7 | 2.5 | 2.8 | 59,975 | −0.9 | −1.0 | −0.8 | | 2008 | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 1.7 | 1.6 | 1.8 | 92,360 | 1.5 | 1.4 | 1.6 | 59,975 | −0.2 | −0.2 | −0.1 | | 2008 | Age | 18 to 29 | 21.3 | 21.0 | 21.6 | 92,360 | 17.1 | 16.7 | 17.4 | 59,975 | −4.2 | −4.5 | −4.0 | | 2008 | Age | 30 to 44 | 25.5 | 25.2 | 25.8 | 92,360 | 24.8 | 24.4 | 25.2 | 59,975 | −0.7 | −1.0 | −0.5 | | 2008 | Age | 45 to 64 | 35.6 | 35.3 | 36.0 | 92,360 | 38.7 | 38.2 | 39.1 | 59,975 | +3.1 | +2.8 | +3.3 | | 2008 | Age | 65 and over | 17.6 | 17.3 | 17.9 | 92,360 | 19.5 | 19.1 | 19.8 | 59,975 | +1.8 | +1.6 | +2.0 | | 2008 | Gender | Women | 52.0 | 51.7 | 52.4 | 92,360 | 53.7 | 53.2 | 54.1 | 59,975 | +1.6 | +1.4 | +1.9 | | 2008 | Gender | Men | 48.0 | 47.6 | 48.3 | 92,360 | 46.3 | 45.9 | 46.8 | 59,975 | −1.6 | −1.9 | −1.4 | | 2012 | Education | Less than high school | 10.2 | 9.9 | 10.4 | 94,311 | 6.2 | 6.0 | 6.5 | 59,597 | −3.9 | −4.1 | −3.7 | | 2012 | Education | High school graduate | 30.4 | 30.1 | 30.7 | 94,311 | 25.9 | 25.5 | 26.3 | 59,597 | −4.5 | −4.8 | −4.3 | | 2012 | Education | Some college | 30.1 | 29.8 | 30.5 | 94,311 | 31.3 | 30.9 | 31.7 | 59,597 | +1.2 | +0.9 | +1.4 | | 2012 | Education | Four-year degree or more | 29.3 | 29.0 | 29.7 | 94,311 | 36.6 | 36.2 | 37.0 | 59,597 | +7.3 | +7.0 | +7.5 | | 2012 | Race and ethnicity | White non-Hispanic | 71.1 | 70.7 | 71.4 | 94,311 | 73.7 | 73.3 | 74.1 | 59,597 | +2.7 | +2.4 | +3.0 | | 2012 | Race and ethnicity | Black non-Hispanic | 12.0 | 11.7 | 12.2 | 94,311 | 12.9 | 12.6 | 13.2 | 59,597 | +0.9 | +0.7 | +1.1 | | 2012 | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 10.8 | 10.6 | 11.1 | 94,311 | 8.4 | 8.2 | 8.7 | 59,597 | −2.4 | −2.6 | −2.2 | | 2012 | Race and ethnicity | Asian or Pacific Islander | 4.0 | 3.9 | 4.2 | 94,311 | 3.1 | 2.9 | 3.2 | 59,597 | −1.0 | −1.1 | −0.8 | | 2012 | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.2 | 94,311 | 1.9 | 1.7 | 2.0 | 59,597 | −0.2 | −0.3 | −0.1 | | 2012 | Age | 18 to 29 | 21.2 | 20.9 | 21.5 | 94,311 | 15.4 | 15.1 | 15.8 | 59,597 | −5.8 | −6.0 | −5.5 | | 2012 | Age | 30 to 44 | 24.0 | 23.7 | 24.3 | 94,311 | 23.1 | 22.7 | 23.5 | 59,597 | −0.9 | −1.1 | −0.6 | | 2012 | Age | 45 to 64 | 35.6 | 35.3 | 36.0 | 94,311 | 39.1 | 38.7 | 39.6 | 59,597 | +3.5 | +3.2 | +3.8 | | 2012 | Age | 65 and over | 19.1 | 18.9 | 19.4 | 94,311 | 22.3 | 21.9 | 22.7 | 59,597 | +3.2 | +2.9 | +3.4 | | 2012 | Gender | Women | 52.1 | 51.7 | 52.5 | 94,311 | 53.7 | 53.2 | 54.2 | 59,597 | +1.6 | +1.3 | +1.9 | | 2012 | Gender | Men | 47.9 | 47.5 | 48.3 | 94,311 | 46.3 | 45.8 | 46.8 | 59,597 | −1.6 | −1.9 | −1.3 | | 2016 | Education | Less than high school | 9.1 | 8.9 | 9.3 | 93,794 | 5.1 | 4.9 | 5.3 | 58,533 | −4.0 | −4.2 | −3.8 | | 2016 | Education | High school graduate | 29.2 | 28.9 | 29.6 | 93,794 | 24.6 | 24.2 | 25.0 | 58,533 | −4.7 | −5.0 | −4.4 | | 2016 | Education | Some college | 29.8 | 29.5 | 30.2 | 93,794 | 30.8 | 30.3 | 31.2 | 58,533 | +0.9 | +0.7 | +1.2 | | 2016 | Education | Four-year degree or more | 31.9 | 31.5 | 32.2 | 93,794 | 39.6 | 39.2 | 40.1 | 58,533 | +7.8 | +7.5 | +8.0 | | 2016 | Race and ethnicity | White non-Hispanic | 68.9 | 68.6 | 69.3 | 93,794 | 73.3 | 72.9 | 73.7 | 58,533 | +4.4 | +4.1 | +4.7 | | 2016 | Race and ethnicity | Black non-Hispanic | 12.3 | 12.0 | 12.5 | 93,794 | 11.9 | 11.6 | 12.2 | 58,533 | −0.4 | −0.6 | −0.2 | | 2016 | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 11.9 | 11.7 | 12.1 | 93,794 | 9.2 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 58,533 | −2.7 | −2.9 | −2.5 | | 2016 | Race and ethnicity | Asian or Pacific Islander | 4.7 | 4.6 | 4.9 | 93,794 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 3.9 | 58,533 | −1.0 | −1.1 | −0.8 | | 2016 | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 2.2 | 2.1 | 2.3 | 93,794 | 1.8 | 1.6 | 1.9 | 58,533 | −0.4 | −0.5 | −0.3 | | 2016 | Age | 18 to 29 | 20.9 | 20.6 | 21.2 | 93,794 | 15.7 | 15.4 | 16.1 | 58,533 | −5.2 | −5.5 | −4.9 | | 2016 | Age | 30 to 44 | 23.5 | 23.2 | 23.8 | 93,794 | 22.5 | 22.1 | 22.9 | 58,533 | −1.0 | −1.3 | −0.8 | | 2016 | Age | 45 to 64 | 34.6 | 34.3 | 35.0 | 93,794 | 37.6 | 37.1 | 38.0 | 58,533 | +3.0 | +2.7 | +3.2 | | 2016 | Age | 65 and over | 21.0 | 20.7 | 21.3 | 93,794 | 24.2 | 23.8 | 24.6 | 58,533 | +3.2 | +3.0 | +3.5 | | 2016 | Gender | Women | 52.0 | 51.6 | 52.4 | 93,794 | 53.6 | 53.2 | 54.1 | 58,533 | +1.6 | +1.3 | +1.9 | | 2016 | Gender | Men | 48.0 | 47.6 | 48.4 | 93,794 | 46.4 | 45.9 | 46.8 | 58,533 | −1.6 | −1.9 | −1.3 | | 2020 | Education | Less than high school | 7.6 | 7.4 | 7.8 | 81,898 | 4.6 | 4.4 | 4.8 | 55,170 | −3.0 | −3.2 | −2.8 | | 2020 | Education | High school graduate | 29.2 | 28.8 | 29.5 | 81,898 | 24.2 | 23.8 | 24.6 | 55,170 | −4.9 | −5.2 | −4.7 | | 2020 | Education | Some college | 28.5 | 28.2 | 28.9 | 81,898 | 29.7 | 29.3 | 30.2 | 55,170 | +1.2 | +1.0 | +1.4 | | 2020 | Education | Four-year degree or more | 34.7 | 34.4 | 35.1 | 81,898 | 41.5 | 41.0 | 41.9 | 55,170 | +6.7 | +6.5 | +7.0 | | 2020 | Race and ethnicity | White non-Hispanic | 66.9 | 66.5 | 67.2 | 81,898 | 71.0 | 70.6 | 71.5 | 55,170 | +4.2 | +3.9 | +4.5 | | 2020 | Race and ethnicity | Black non-Hispanic | 12.4 | 12.2 | 12.7 | 81,898 | 11.7 | 11.4 | 12.0 | 55,170 | −0.7 | −0.9 | −0.5 | | 2020 | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 13.2 | 13.0 | 13.5 | 81,898 | 10.6 | 10.4 | 10.9 | 55,170 | −2.6 | −2.8 | −2.4 | | 2020 | Race and ethnicity | Asian or Pacific Islander | 5.1 | 4.9 | 5.2 | 81,898 | 4.5 | 4.3 | 4.7 | 55,170 | −0.6 | −0.7 | −0.4 | | 2020 | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 2.4 | 2.3 | 2.5 | 81,898 | 2.1 | 2.0 | 2.3 | 55,170 | −0.3 | −0.4 | −0.2 | | 2020 | Age | 18 to 29 | 20.3 | 20.0 | 20.6 | 81,898 | 16.5 | 16.1 | 16.8 | 55,170 | −3.9 | −4.1 | −3.6 | | 2020 | Age | 30 to 44 | 24.0 | 23.7 | 24.4 | 81,898 | 23.2 | 22.8 | 23.6 | 55,170 | −0.9 | −1.1 | −0.6 | | 2020 | Age | 45 to 64 | 32.6 | 32.3 | 33.0 | 81,898 | 34.7 | 34.2 | 35.1 | 55,170 | +2.1 | +1.8 | +2.3 | | 2020 | Age | 65 and over | 23.0 | 22.7 | 23.4 | 81,898 | 25.7 | 25.3 | 26.1 | 55,170 | +2.7 | +2.4 | +2.9 | | 2020 | Gender | Women | 51.9 | 51.5 | 52.3 | 81,898 | 53.1 | 52.7 | 53.6 | 55,170 | +1.3 | +1.0 | +1.5 | | 2020 | Gender | Men | 48.1 | 47.7 | 48.5 | 81,898 | 46.9 | 46.4 | 47.3 | 55,170 | −1.3 | −1.5 | −1.0 | | 2024 | Education | Less than high school | 6.9 | 6.7 | 7.1 | 72,590 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 4.0 | 48,387 | −3.1 | −3.2 | −2.9 | | 2024 | Education | High school graduate | 28.6 | 28.3 | 29.0 | 72,590 | 23.0 | 22.6 | 23.5 | 48,387 | −5.6 | −5.9 | −5.3 | | 2024 | Education | Some college | 27.4 | 27.0 | 27.8 | 72,590 | 28.2 | 27.8 | 28.7 | 48,387 | +0.8 | +0.6 | +1.1 | | 2024 | Education | Four-year degree or more | 37.1 | 36.7 | 37.5 | 72,590 | 44.9 | 44.4 | 45.4 | 48,387 | +7.8 | +7.5 | +8.1 | | 2024 | Race and ethnicity | White non-Hispanic | 65.5 | 65.1 | 65.9 | 72,590 | 70.6 | 70.1 | 71.1 | 48,387 | +5.1 | +4.8 | +5.4 | | 2024 | Race and ethnicity | Black non-Hispanic | 12.5 | 12.2 | 12.8 | 72,590 | 11.5 | 11.1 | 11.8 | 48,387 | −1.0 | −1.2 | −0.8 | | 2024 | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 13.9 | 13.6 | 14.2 | 72,590 | 10.7 | 10.4 | 11.1 | 48,387 | −3.1 | −3.4 | −2.9 | | 2024 | Race and ethnicity | Asian or Pacific Islander | 5.6 | 5.4 | 5.8 | 72,590 | 4.9 | 4.7 | 5.2 | 48,387 | −0.7 | −0.8 | −0.5 | | 2024 | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 2.6 | 2.5 | 2.7 | 72,590 | 2.3 | 2.1 | 2.4 | 48,387 | −0.3 | −0.4 | −0.2 | | 2024 | Age | 18 to 29 | 19.6 | 19.3 | 20.0 | 72,590 | 15.3 | 14.9 | 15.6 | 48,387 | −4.4 | −4.7 | −4.1 | | 2024 | Age | 30 to 44 | 24.7 | 24.4 | 25.1 | 72,590 | 23.4 | 23.0 | 23.8 | 48,387 | −1.3 | −1.6 | −1.0 | | 2024 | Age | 45 to 64 | 31.1 | 30.7 | 31.5 | 72,590 | 33.3 | 32.8 | 33.8 | 48,387 | +2.2 | +1.9 | +2.5 | | 2024 | Age | 65 and over | 24.6 | 24.2 | 24.9 | 72,590 | 28.1 | 27.6 | 28.5 | 48,387 | +3.5 | +3.3 | +3.8 | | 2024 | Gender | Women | 51.6 | 51.2 | 52.0 | 72,590 | 52.8 | 52.3 | 53.3 | 48,387 | +1.2 | +0.9 | +1.5 | | 2024 | Gender | Men | 48.4 | 48.0 | 48.8 | 72,590 | 47.2 | 46.7 | 47.7 | 48,387 | −1.2 | −1.5 | −0.9 | Views: 2024 (year = 2024); 2020 (year = 2020); 2016 (year = 2016); 2012 (year = 2012); 2008 (year = 2008); 2004 (year = 2004); 2000 (year = 2000); 1996 (year = 1996). Note: Voters are respondents who said they voted, with the Census convention that a missing turnout answer counts as not voting. The CPS extract has no replicate weights, so the intervals ignore the survey design and are narrower than design-based intervals. Note: The difference and its interval in the table use a Taylor linearization of the voter share minus the eligible share. Source: CPS November voting supplement, 1996 to 2024; weighted (VOSUPPWT); citizens aged 18 or older Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/eligible_vs_voters.json ### Table 3. Democratic voters are more likely than Democratic identifiers to hold a four-year degree, and nonvoters are less likely than voters Share of each ANES population in four groups, percent, 2024 (the buttons show 2020); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Election | Group | Population | Share (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | All respondents | 34.4 | 32.6 | 36.2 | 5,465 | | 2024 | White non-Hispanic | All respondents | 64.3 | 62.4 | 66.1 | 5,454 | | 2024 | Women | All respondents | 51.6 | 49.7 | 53.5 | 5,475 | | 2024 | Age 65 and over | All respondents | 23.5 | 21.8 | 25.1 | 5,242 | | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | Nonvoters | 15.7 | 12.3 | 19.2 | 829 | | 2024 | White non-Hispanic | Nonvoters | 53.8 | 49.0 | 58.5 | 829 | | 2024 | Women | Nonvoters | 51.5 | 46.7 | 56.2 | 832 | | 2024 | Age 65 and over | Nonvoters | 10.4 | 7.5 | 13.3 | 814 | | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | Voters | 39.8 | 37.7 | 42.0 | 4,083 | | 2024 | White non-Hispanic | Voters | 67.1 | 65.1 | 69.2 | 4,076 | | 2024 | Women | Voters | 51.5 | 49.3 | 53.7 | 4,091 | | 2024 | Age 65 and over | Voters | 26.8 | 24.8 | 28.8 | 3,916 | | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 50.0 | 47.0 | 53.0 | 2,178 | | 2024 | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 57.3 | 54.3 | 60.3 | 2,178 | | 2024 | Women | Democratic voters | 55.6 | 52.6 | 58.6 | 2,181 | | 2024 | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 28.6 | 25.8 | 31.4 | 2,104 | | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 27.8 | 24.8 | 30.9 | 1,725 | | 2024 | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 79.5 | 76.7 | 82.2 | 1,719 | | 2024 | Women | Republican voters | 47.3 | 43.9 | 50.7 | 1,730 | | 2024 | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 25.7 | 22.7 | 28.7 | 1,648 | | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | Democratic identifiers | 43.3 | 40.5 | 46.1 | 2,619 | | 2024 | White non-Hispanic | Democratic identifiers | 53.6 | 50.8 | 56.4 | 2,621 | | 2024 | Women | Democratic identifiers | 55.9 | 53.2 | 58.7 | 2,627 | | 2024 | Age 65 and over | Democratic identifiers | 25.1 | 22.6 | 27.5 | 2,543 | | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | Republican identifiers | 27.2 | 24.7 | 29.8 | 2,436 | | 2024 | White non-Hispanic | Republican identifiers | 77.7 | 75.3 | 80.1 | 2,428 | | 2024 | Women | Republican identifiers | 46.3 | 43.5 | 49.2 | 2,440 | | 2024 | Age 65 and over | Republican identifiers | 23.3 | 20.8 | 25.8 | 2,316 | | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | Independents with no party lean | 18.2 | 12.5 | 23.9 | 378 | | 2024 | White non-Hispanic | Independents with no party lean | 53.1 | 45.7 | 60.5 | 375 | | 2024 | Women | Independents with no party lean | 52.3 | 44.9 | 59.7 | 375 | | 2024 | Age 65 and over | Independents with no party lean | 12.4 | 7.3 | 17.4 | 356 | | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | All respondents | 36.7 | 35.2 | 38.1 | 8,149 | | 2020 | White non-Hispanic | All respondents | 65.7 | 64.3 | 67.1 | 8,178 | | 2020 | Women | All respondents | 51.8 | 50.3 | 53.3 | 8,213 | | 2020 | Age 65 and over | All respondents | 22.1 | 20.8 | 23.3 | 7,932 | | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | Nonvoters | 17.2 | 14.1 | 20.3 | 1,022 | | 2020 | White non-Hispanic | Nonvoters | 53.3 | 49.2 | 57.4 | 1,027 | | 2020 | Women | Nonvoters | 49.8 | 45.8 | 53.9 | 1,031 | | 2020 | Age 65 and over | Nonvoters | 9.6 | 7.1 | 12.0 | 1,001 | | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | Voters | 40.5 | 38.8 | 42.2 | 6,311 | | 2020 | White non-Hispanic | Voters | 69.4 | 67.8 | 71.0 | 6,343 | | 2020 | Women | Voters | 52.6 | 50.9 | 54.3 | 6,366 | | 2020 | Age 65 and over | Voters | 22.4 | 20.9 | 23.8 | 6,155 | | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 47.1 | 44.7 | 49.5 | 3,461 | | 2020 | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 58.1 | 55.8 | 60.5 | 3,481 | | 2020 | Women | Democratic voters | 54.4 | 52.0 | 56.8 | 3,490 | | 2020 | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 21.5 | 19.5 | 23.5 | 3,410 | | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 32.0 | 29.5 | 34.5 | 2,526 | | 2020 | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 85.8 | 84.0 | 87.7 | 2,549 | | 2020 | Women | Republican voters | 50.3 | 47.6 | 53.0 | 2,553 | | 2020 | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 24.8 | 22.4 | 27.1 | 2,448 | | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | Democratic identifiers | 42.0 | 39.8 | 44.2 | 3,787 | | 2020 | White non-Hispanic | Democratic identifiers | 52.8 | 50.6 | 55.0 | 3,804 | | 2020 | Women | Democratic identifiers | 56.5 | 54.3 | 58.7 | 3,816 | | 2020 | Age 65 and over | Democratic identifiers | 21.4 | 19.6 | 23.2 | 3,732 | | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | Republican identifiers | 33.6 | 31.6 | 35.7 | 3,394 | | 2020 | White non-Hispanic | Republican identifiers | 82.7 | 81.0 | 84.4 | 3,409 | | 2020 | Women | Republican identifiers | 47.6 | 45.4 | 49.8 | 3,425 | | 2020 | Age 65 and over | Republican identifiers | 24.5 | 22.6 | 26.4 | 3,289 | | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | Independents with no party lean | 26.4 | 22.5 | 30.3 | 943 | | 2020 | White non-Hispanic | Independents with no party lean | 55.3 | 50.9 | 59.6 | 946 | | 2020 | Women | Independents with no party lean | 48.2 | 43.8 | 52.6 | 949 | | 2020 | Age 65 and over | Independents with no party lean | 16.1 | 12.8 | 19.4 | 897 | Views: 2024 (year = 2024); 2020 (year = 2020). Note: Party identifiers include leaners (seven-point party identification, 1 to 3 Democratic, 5 to 7 Republican); independents with no party lean are the midpoint. Note: A Democratic voter or identifier appears in more than one row, because the rows are overlapping populations. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight for all respondents and party identifiers, weight_postelection for voters and nonvoters) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/population_ladder.json ### Table 4. The Republican coalition once had the larger shares of degree holders and of high-income voters, and by 2024 the Democratic coalition did Share of each party's two-party presidential voters who belong to the group, percent, by election, 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Group | Party's voters | Election | Share (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n party voters | n in group | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 1956 | 7.7 | 5.4 | 10.0 | 507 | 39 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 1960 | 9.2 | 6.1 | 12.4 | 444 | 35 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 1964 | 9.5 | 7.4 | 11.6 | 746 | 71 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 1968 | 14.3 | 10.9 | 17.6 | 421 | 60 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 1972 | 19.1 | 15.8 | 22.3 | 566 | 108 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 1976 | 13.8 | 11.1 | 16.4 | 669 | 92 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 1980 | 16.8 | 13.0 | 20.6 | 381 | 64 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 1984 | 22.1 | 18.7 | 25.5 | 571 | 126 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 1988 | 24.8 | 21.2 | 28.4 | 552 | 137 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 1992 | 26.2 | 23.1 | 29.3 | 778 | 208 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 1996 | 24.2 | 20.4 | 28.1 | 599 | 179 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 2000 | 29.3 | 25.2 | 33.4 | 590 | 222 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 2004 | 31.9 | 26.8 | 36.9 | 399 | 143 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 2008 | 30.9 | 27.2 | 34.5 | 1,020 | 244 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 2012 | 33.3 | 30.7 | 35.9 | 2,469 | 841 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 2016 | 43.0 | 39.8 | 46.3 | 1,341 | 691 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 2020 | 47.1 | 44.7 | 49.5 | 3,461 | 1,962 | | Four-year degree or more | Democratic voters | 2024 | 50.0 | 47.0 | 53.0 | 2,178 | 1,316 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1952 | 9.8 | 7.5 | 12.0 | 686 | 67 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1956 | 11.3 | 9.0 | 13.5 | 753 | 85 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1960 | 14.3 | 10.5 | 18.1 | 452 | 65 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1964 | 19.7 | 15.6 | 23.8 | 361 | 71 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1968 | 20.4 | 16.9 | 24.0 | 489 | 100 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1972 | 16.4 | 14.1 | 18.6 | 1,020 | 167 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1976 | 24.2 | 20.9 | 27.6 | 650 | 158 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1980 | 24.1 | 20.4 | 27.9 | 493 | 119 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1984 | 22.5 | 19.6 | 25.4 | 797 | 179 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1988 | 30.2 | 26.6 | 33.8 | 623 | 188 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1992 | 34.8 | 30.8 | 38.9 | 545 | 193 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 1996 | 34.9 | 29.9 | 40.0 | 433 | 181 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 2000 | 31.6 | 27.2 | 35.9 | 528 | 207 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 2004 | 30.7 | 25.8 | 35.5 | 412 | 146 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 2008 | 36.4 | 31.6 | 41.1 | 513 | 156 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 2012 | 34.0 | 31.1 | 36.9 | 1,675 | 630 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 2016 | 31.7 | 28.6 | 34.8 | 1,230 | 479 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 2020 | 32.0 | 29.5 | 34.5 | 2,526 | 1,016 | | Four-year degree or more | Republican voters | 2024 | 27.8 | 24.8 | 30.9 | 1,725 | 691 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1952 | 91.7 | 89.2 | 94.1 | 492 | 451 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1956 | 93.7 | 91.6 | 95.8 | 508 | 476 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1960 | 92.4 | 89.5 | 95.3 | 444 | 413 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1964 | 87.4 | 85.1 | 89.8 | 748 | 654 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1968 | 79.3 | 75.5 | 83.2 | 421 | 334 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1972 | 76.0 | 72.4 | 79.5 | 566 | 430 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1976 | 81.6 | 78.6 | 84.6 | 661 | 542 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1980 | 70.2 | 65.6 | 74.8 | 383 | 269 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1984 | 71.4 | 67.7 | 75.1 | 574 | 410 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1988 | 66.5 | 62.6 | 70.4 | 561 | 373 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1992 | 69.7 | 66.5 | 72.9 | 792 | 551 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 1996 | 68.5 | 64.3 | 72.6 | 598 | 429 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 2000 | 67.9 | 63.7 | 72.2 | 586 | 419 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 2004 | 63.0 | 57.8 | 68.3 | 390 | 247 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 2008 | 58.9 | 55.0 | 62.8 | 1,019 | 352 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 2012 | 58.2 | 55.5 | 60.9 | 2,491 | 1,121 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 2016 | 58.3 | 55.1 | 61.5 | 1,343 | 840 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 2020 | 58.1 | 55.8 | 60.5 | 3,481 | 2,381 | | White non-Hispanic | Democratic voters | 2024 | 57.3 | 54.3 | 60.3 | 2,178 | 1,521 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1952 | 98.5 | 97.6 | 99.4 | 686 | 676 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1956 | 97.6 | 96.5 | 98.7 | 755 | 737 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1960 | 96.9 | 95.1 | 98.8 | 451 | 440 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1964 | 100.0 | 98.9 | 100.0 | 360 | 360 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1968 | 98.4 | 97.2 | 99.5 | 490 | 482 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1972 | 97.1 | 96.0 | 98.1 | 1,021 | 991 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1976 | 97.9 | 96.8 | 99.0 | 650 | 637 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1980 | 95.7 | 94.0 | 97.5 | 494 | 473 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1984 | 93.1 | 91.3 | 94.9 | 796 | 741 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1988 | 92.9 | 90.8 | 94.9 | 630 | 585 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1992 | 90.1 | 87.6 | 92.6 | 561 | 505 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 1996 | 93.5 | 90.9 | 96.1 | 433 | 404 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 2000 | 88.6 | 85.7 | 91.6 | 527 | 472 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 2004 | 86.3 | 82.7 | 90.0 | 410 | 354 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 2008 | 92.6 | 90.0 | 95.3 | 511 | 431 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 2012 | 89.5 | 87.6 | 91.4 | 1,690 | 1,434 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 2016 | 88.6 | 86.5 | 90.8 | 1,232 | 1,105 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 2020 | 85.8 | 84.0 | 87.7 | 2,549 | 2,225 | | White non-Hispanic | Republican voters | 2024 | 79.5 | 76.7 | 82.2 | 1,719 | 1,470 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1952 | 60.2 | 55.8 | 64.5 | 492 | 296 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1956 | 62.0 | 57.8 | 66.2 | 511 | 317 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1960 | 53.8 | 48.3 | 59.3 | 445 | 235 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1964 | 63.6 | 60.2 | 67.0 | 750 | 477 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1968 | 58.9 | 54.2 | 63.6 | 416 | 245 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1972 | 58.9 | 54.9 | 63.0 | 565 | 333 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1976 | 60.7 | 56.9 | 64.5 | 669 | 410 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1980 | 65.3 | 60.5 | 70.1 | 380 | 248 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1984 | 54.2 | 50.1 | 58.3 | 574 | 311 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1988 | 57.5 | 53.5 | 61.6 | 563 | 324 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1992 | 51.4 | 47.9 | 54.9 | 789 | 406 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 1996 | 49.7 | 45.2 | 54.2 | 599 | 301 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 2000 | 49.8 | 45.3 | 54.4 | 586 | 290 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 2004 | 47.3 | 41.9 | 52.7 | 397 | 191 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 2008 | 47.6 | 43.6 | 51.5 | 1,023 | 544 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 2012 | 38.0 | 35.3 | 40.7 | 2,491 | 1,066 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 2016 | 37.8 | 34.6 | 41.0 | 1,349 | 492 | | Protestant | Democratic voters | 2020 | 32.5 | 30.3 | 34.7 | 3,509 | 1,118 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1952 | 76.1 | 72.9 | 79.3 | 685 | 521 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1956 | 75.3 | 72.2 | 78.4 | 753 | 567 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1960 | 90.4 | 87.2 | 93.6 | 452 | 407 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1964 | 79.2 | 75.0 | 83.4 | 361 | 286 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1968 | 80.1 | 76.5 | 83.6 | 487 | 390 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1972 | 71.9 | 69.2 | 74.7 | 1,019 | 733 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1976 | 72.7 | 69.2 | 76.2 | 651 | 477 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1980 | 67.8 | 63.7 | 72.0 | 491 | 333 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1984 | 65.6 | 62.3 | 68.9 | 797 | 523 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1988 | 69.8 | 66.3 | 73.4 | 630 | 440 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1992 | 66.4 | 62.5 | 70.3 | 562 | 374 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 1996 | 61.7 | 56.6 | 66.8 | 434 | 271 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 2000 | 56.5 | 51.8 | 61.1 | 529 | 301 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 2004 | 54.3 | 49.0 | 59.5 | 411 | 222 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 2008 | 62.8 | 58.0 | 67.6 | 514 | 301 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 2012 | 52.6 | 49.5 | 55.7 | 1,692 | 879 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 2016 | 56.0 | 52.7 | 59.3 | 1,238 | 707 | | Protestant | Republican voters | 2020 | 48.0 | 45.3 | 50.6 | 2,567 | 1,295 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1952 | 11.2 | 8.4 | 14.0 | 490 | 55 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1956 | 12.9 | 10.0 | 15.9 | 502 | 65 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1960 | 11.9 | 8.3 | 15.4 | 446 | 58 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1964 | 11.7 | 9.4 | 14.1 | 749 | 88 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1968 | 16.4 | 12.9 | 20.0 | 420 | 69 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1972 | 13.3 | 10.5 | 16.1 | 564 | 75 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1976 | 17.5 | 14.6 | 20.4 | 666 | 118 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1980 | 21.1 | 17.1 | 25.2 | 383 | 81 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1984 | 17.5 | 14.4 | 20.7 | 570 | 100 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1988 | 19.9 | 16.6 | 23.2 | 563 | 112 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1992 | 23.0 | 20.1 | 26.0 | 793 | 178 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 1996 | 21.0 | 17.3 | 24.6 | 598 | 146 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 2000 | 20.2 | 16.5 | 23.8 | 589 | 120 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 2004 | 18.3 | 14.1 | 22.5 | 399 | 76 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 2008 | 15.7 | 12.8 | 18.6 | 1,014 | 169 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 2012 | 19.5 | 17.3 | 21.7 | 2,469 | 507 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 2016 | 19.7 | 17.0 | 22.3 | 1,321 | 320 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 2020 | 21.5 | 19.5 | 23.5 | 3,410 | 1,029 | | Age 65 and over | Democratic voters | 2024 | 28.6 | 25.8 | 31.4 | 2,104 | 767 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1952 | 14.1 | 11.4 | 16.7 | 676 | 95 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1956 | 11.2 | 8.9 | 13.4 | 744 | 83 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1960 | 17.9 | 13.7 | 22.0 | 452 | 90 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1964 | 19.7 | 15.6 | 23.8 | 361 | 71 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1968 | 17.2 | 13.9 | 20.6 | 488 | 84 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1972 | 15.8 | 13.5 | 18.0 | 1,015 | 160 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1976 | 18.8 | 15.7 | 21.8 | 648 | 127 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1980 | 19.1 | 15.6 | 22.6 | 492 | 94 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1984 | 16.8 | 14.2 | 19.4 | 793 | 133 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1988 | 19.3 | 16.3 | 22.4 | 631 | 122 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1992 | 21.3 | 17.9 | 24.7 | 564 | 118 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 1996 | 19.1 | 15.0 | 23.3 | 434 | 102 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 2000 | 18.6 | 14.9 | 22.3 | 528 | 108 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 2004 | 16.7 | 12.8 | 20.6 | 412 | 70 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 2008 | 23.7 | 19.4 | 28.0 | 504 | 125 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 2012 | 25.5 | 22.8 | 28.2 | 1,679 | 476 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 2016 | 25.6 | 22.6 | 28.5 | 1,201 | 359 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 2020 | 24.8 | 22.4 | 27.1 | 2,448 | 854 | | Age 65 and over | Republican voters | 2024 | 25.7 | 22.7 | 28.7 | 1,648 | 623 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1952 | 49.8 | 45.4 | 54.2 | 494 | 246 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1956 | 47.7 | 43.4 | 52.1 | 511 | 244 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1960 | 49.4 | 43.9 | 54.8 | 446 | 220 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1964 | 55.7 | 52.2 | 59.3 | 750 | 418 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1968 | 58.2 | 53.5 | 62.9 | 421 | 245 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1972 | 59.9 | 55.9 | 63.9 | 566 | 339 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1976 | 56.1 | 52.3 | 60.0 | 670 | 378 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1980 | 59.3 | 54.3 | 64.2 | 383 | 227 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1984 | 60.9 | 56.9 | 64.9 | 575 | 350 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1988 | 58.8 | 54.7 | 62.9 | 563 | 331 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1992 | 58.5 | 55.1 | 61.9 | 793 | 462 | | Women | Democratic voters | 1996 | 60.4 | 56.0 | 64.8 | 600 | 360 | | Women | Democratic voters | 2000 | 60.0 | 55.5 | 64.4 | 590 | 357 | | Women | Democratic voters | 2004 | 55.5 | 50.2 | 60.9 | 399 | 229 | | Women | Democratic voters | 2008 | 59.6 | 55.7 | 63.4 | 1,025 | 631 | | Women | Democratic voters | 2012 | 55.1 | 52.4 | 57.8 | 2,496 | 1,355 | | Women | Democratic voters | 2016 | 56.8 | 53.6 | 60.1 | 1,328 | 777 | | Women | Democratic voters | 2020 | 54.4 | 52.0 | 56.8 | 3,490 | 2,003 | | Women | Democratic voters | 2024 | 55.6 | 52.6 | 58.6 | 2,181 | 1,256 | | Women | Republican voters | 1952 | 52.0 | 48.2 | 55.7 | 687 | 357 | | Women | Republican voters | 1956 | 54.2 | 50.6 | 57.7 | 755 | 409 | | Women | Republican voters | 1960 | 54.7 | 49.3 | 60.1 | 452 | 249 | | Women | Republican voters | 1964 | 51.5 | 46.4 | 56.7 | 361 | 186 | | Women | Republican voters | 1968 | 56.3 | 51.9 | 60.7 | 490 | 276 | | Women | Republican voters | 1972 | 52.8 | 49.7 | 55.9 | 1,021 | 539 | | Women | Republican voters | 1976 | 55.9 | 52.0 | 59.8 | 652 | 361 | | Women | Republican voters | 1980 | 51.6 | 47.2 | 56.0 | 494 | 255 | | Women | Republican voters | 1984 | 53.2 | 49.7 | 56.6 | 801 | 426 | | Women | Republican voters | 1988 | 52.4 | 48.5 | 56.3 | 632 | 331 | | Women | Republican voters | 1992 | 52.1 | 48.0 | 56.3 | 564 | 293 | | Women | Republican voters | 1996 | 45.2 | 40.0 | 50.4 | 434 | 204 | | Women | Republican voters | 2000 | 51.2 | 46.5 | 55.9 | 530 | 266 | | Women | Republican voters | 2004 | 48.5 | 43.2 | 53.7 | 412 | 208 | | Women | Republican voters | 2008 | 54.6 | 49.6 | 59.5 | 514 | 282 | | Women | Republican voters | 2012 | 49.9 | 46.8 | 53.0 | 1,692 | 818 | | Women | Republican voters | 2016 | 50.7 | 47.4 | 54.0 | 1,230 | 610 | | Women | Republican voters | 2020 | 50.3 | 47.6 | 53.0 | 2,553 | 1,311 | | Women | Republican voters | 2024 | 47.3 | 43.9 | 50.7 | 1,730 | 825 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1952 | 43.4 | 39.0 | 47.8 | 488 | 212 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1956 | 32.9 | 28.7 | 37.0 | 496 | 163 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1960 | 41.8 | 36.4 | 47.2 | 443 | 191 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1964 | 35.7 | 32.2 | 39.2 | 725 | 259 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1968 | 35.8 | 31.1 | 40.4 | 411 | 147 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1972 | 33.2 | 29.2 | 37.1 | 552 | 183 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1976 | 33.5 | 29.8 | 37.3 | 626 | 217 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1980 | 28.1 | 23.4 | 32.9 | 345 | 97 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1984 | 28.7 | 24.8 | 32.6 | 526 | 151 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1988 | 32.3 | 28.2 | 36.3 | 514 | 166 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1992 | 34.0 | 30.6 | 37.4 | 742 | 256 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 1996 | 31.6 | 27.2 | 36.0 | 549 | 164 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 2000 | 34.0 | 29.4 | 38.6 | 504 | 164 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 2004 | 32.7 | 27.4 | 38.0 | 364 | 111 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 2008 | 24.9 | 21.4 | 28.4 | 958 | 180 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 2012 | 31.7 | 29.1 | 34.3 | 2,429 | 677 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 2016 | 42.2 | 38.9 | 45.4 | 1,330 | 536 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 2020 | 46.7 | 44.3 | 49.1 | 3,451 | 1,240 | | Highest third of income | Democratic voters | 2024 | 49.7 | 46.5 | 52.8 | 2,026 | 817 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1952 | 50.1 | 46.4 | 53.9 | 674 | 338 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1956 | 37.9 | 34.4 | 41.5 | 720 | 273 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1960 | 44.3 | 38.9 | 49.7 | 450 | 208 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1964 | 51.4 | 46.2 | 56.7 | 348 | 179 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1968 | 38.2 | 33.8 | 42.5 | 482 | 184 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1972 | 41.0 | 38.0 | 44.1 | 994 | 408 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1976 | 49.4 | 45.3 | 53.4 | 615 | 308 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1980 | 39.0 | 34.5 | 43.5 | 449 | 175 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1984 | 46.1 | 42.5 | 49.8 | 726 | 335 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1988 | 46.2 | 42.2 | 50.3 | 586 | 271 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1992 | 47.5 | 43.2 | 51.7 | 525 | 251 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 1996 | 45.2 | 39.7 | 50.6 | 394 | 182 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 2000 | 40.9 | 35.9 | 46.0 | 438 | 183 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 2004 | 44.3 | 38.8 | 49.9 | 365 | 150 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 2008 | 42.8 | 37.7 | 47.8 | 487 | 183 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 2012 | 39.5 | 36.4 | 42.5 | 1,650 | 632 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 2016 | 45.0 | 41.6 | 48.3 | 1,210 | 509 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 2020 | 48.6 | 45.9 | 51.3 | 2,494 | 857 | | Highest third of income | Republican voters | 2024 | 39.9 | 36.4 | 43.4 | 1,554 | 493 | Note: Cells need at least 100 voters in the party, a Kish effective sample of at least 100 and at least 30 respondents in the group and party; the Democratic degree cell in 1952 is dropped. Note: The Hispanic respondents of the ANES are identified from 1966, so before then they are counted as white. The Protestant panel ends in 2020 because the 2024 religion codes of the cumulative file are unusable. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, presidential years 1952 to 2024; weighted (weight_postelection where the file has one, else weight); two-party presidential voters Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/composition_trends.json ### Table 5. Four-year degree holders rose from 19.2% to 43.4% of Democratic voters and from 25.2% to 31.4% of Republican voters Make-up of each party's two-party presidential voters, percent, in 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024 (the buttons switch the dimension); pooled elections; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Dimension | Party and period | Group | Share of the party's voters (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n party voters | n in group | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Education | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | No four-year degree | 80.8 | 79.1 | 82.5 | 2,173 | 1,754 | | Education | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | Four-year degree or more | 19.2 | 17.5 | 20.9 | 2,173 | 419 | | Education | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | No four-year degree | 56.6 | 55.2 | 58.0 | 9,449 | 4,639 | | Education | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | Four-year degree or more | 43.4 | 42.0 | 44.8 | 9,449 | 4,810 | | Education | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | No four-year degree | 74.8 | 73.1 | 76.5 | 2,563 | 1,919 | | Education | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | Four-year degree or more | 25.2 | 23.5 | 26.9 | 2,563 | 644 | | Education | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | No four-year degree | 68.6 | 67.2 | 70.1 | 7,156 | 4,340 | | Education | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | Four-year degree or more | 31.4 | 29.9 | 32.8 | 7,156 | 2,816 | | Income | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | Lowest third | 33.5 | 31.4 | 35.6 | 2,011 | 664 | | Income | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | Middle third | 35.7 | 33.5 | 37.8 | 2,011 | 716 | | Income | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | Highest third | 30.9 | 28.8 | 32.9 | 2,011 | 631 | | Income | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | Lowest third | 24.9 | 23.6 | 26.2 | 9,236 | 2,855 | | Income | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | Middle third | 32.5 | 31.2 | 33.9 | 9,236 | 3,111 | | Income | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | Highest third | 42.6 | 41.1 | 44.0 | 9,236 | 3,270 | | Income | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | Lowest third | 20.3 | 18.6 | 21.9 | 2,376 | 474 | | Income | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | Middle third | 34.6 | 32.7 | 36.6 | 2,376 | 813 | | Income | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | Highest third | 45.1 | 43.0 | 47.1 | 2,376 | 1,089 | | Income | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | Lowest third | 21.1 | 19.8 | 22.4 | 6,908 | 1,911 | | Income | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | Middle third | 35.6 | 34.1 | 37.2 | 6,908 | 2,506 | | Income | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | Highest third | 43.3 | 41.7 | 44.8 | 6,908 | 2,491 | | Race and ethnicity | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | White non-Hispanic | 72.7 | 70.8 | 74.6 | 2,179 | 1,594 | | Race and ethnicity | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | Black non-Hispanic | 20.0 | 18.3 | 21.7 | 2,179 | 425 | | Race and ethnicity | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | Hispanic or another race | 7.3 | 6.2 | 8.4 | 2,179 | 160 | | Race and ethnicity | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | White non-Hispanic | 58.0 | 56.6 | 59.4 | 9,493 | 5,863 | | Race and ethnicity | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | Black non-Hispanic | 19.9 | 18.7 | 21.0 | 9,493 | 1,778 | | Race and ethnicity | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | Hispanic or another race | 22.1 | 20.9 | 23.3 | 9,493 | 1,852 | | Race and ethnicity | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | White non-Hispanic | 94.8 | 93.9 | 95.7 | 2,570 | 2,436 | | Race and ethnicity | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | Black non-Hispanic | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.8 | 2,570 | 33 | | Race and ethnicity | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | Hispanic or another race | 3.9 | 3.1 | 4.6 | 2,570 | 101 | | Race and ethnicity | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | White non-Hispanic | 85.9 | 84.8 | 87.0 | 7,190 | 6,234 | | Race and ethnicity | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | Black non-Hispanic | 1.6 | 1.2 | 2.0 | 7,190 | 82 | | Race and ethnicity | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | Hispanic or another race | 12.5 | 11.5 | 13.5 | 7,190 | 874 | | Religion | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | Protestant | 59.5 | 57.4 | 61.6 | 2,186 | 1,293 | | Religion | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | Catholic | 28.0 | 26.0 | 29.9 | 2,186 | 619 | | Religion | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | Jewish, another religion or none | 12.6 | 11.1 | 14.0 | 2,186 | 274 | | Religion | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2020 | Protestant | 36.0 | 34.5 | 37.6 | 7,349 | 2,676 | | Religion | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2020 | Catholic | 21.8 | 20.4 | 23.1 | 7,349 | 1,571 | | Religion | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2020 | Jewish, another religion or none | 42.2 | 40.6 | 43.8 | 7,349 | 3,102 | | Religion | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | Protestant | 68.8 | 67.0 | 70.7 | 2,569 | 1,773 | | Religion | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | Catholic | 23.1 | 21.5 | 24.8 | 2,569 | 595 | | Religion | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | Jewish, another religion or none | 8.0 | 7.0 | 9.1 | 2,569 | 201 | | Religion | Republican voters, 2012 to 2020 | Protestant | 52.3 | 50.5 | 54.0 | 5,497 | 2,881 | | Religion | Republican voters, 2012 to 2020 | Catholic | 22.5 | 21.0 | 24.0 | 5,497 | 1,258 | | Religion | Republican voters, 2012 to 2020 | Jewish, another religion or none | 25.2 | 23.7 | 26.7 | 5,497 | 1,358 | | Age | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | 18 to 29 | 19.2 | 17.6 | 20.9 | 2,182 | 409 | | Age | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | 30 to 44 | 30.6 | 28.6 | 32.6 | 2,182 | 675 | | Age | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | 45 to 64 | 31.2 | 29.2 | 33.1 | 2,182 | 687 | | Age | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | 65 and over | 19.0 | 17.3 | 20.7 | 2,182 | 411 | | Age | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | 18 to 29 | 18.5 | 17.4 | 19.6 | 9,304 | 1,125 | | Age | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | 30 to 44 | 24.6 | 23.4 | 25.9 | 9,304 | 2,255 | | Age | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | 45 to 64 | 34.6 | 33.2 | 35.9 | 9,304 | 3,301 | | Age | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | 65 and over | 22.3 | 21.1 | 23.5 | 9,304 | 2,623 | | Age | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | 18 to 29 | 18.9 | 17.4 | 20.5 | 2,564 | 472 | | Age | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | 30 to 44 | 33.0 | 31.2 | 34.9 | 2,564 | 851 | | Age | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | 45 to 64 | 29.6 | 27.8 | 31.4 | 2,564 | 765 | | Age | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | 65 and over | 18.5 | 16.9 | 20.0 | 2,564 | 476 | | Age | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | 18 to 29 | 13.1 | 12.0 | 14.2 | 6,976 | 548 | | Age | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | 30 to 44 | 21.5 | 20.2 | 22.8 | 6,976 | 1,431 | | Age | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | 45 to 64 | 40.0 | 38.5 | 41.6 | 6,976 | 2,685 | | Age | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | 65 and over | 25.4 | 24.0 | 26.8 | 6,976 | 2,312 | | Gender | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | Women | 58.6 | 56.5 | 60.7 | 2,191 | 1,286 | | Gender | Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | Men | 41.4 | 39.3 | 43.5 | 2,191 | 905 | | Gender | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | Women | 55.5 | 54.0 | 56.9 | 9,495 | 5,391 | | Gender | Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | Men | 44.5 | 43.1 | 46.0 | 9,495 | 4,104 | | Gender | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | Women | 53.2 | 51.2 | 55.2 | 2,579 | 1,373 | | Gender | Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | Men | 46.8 | 44.8 | 48.8 | 2,579 | 1,206 | | Gender | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | Women | 49.6 | 48.0 | 51.1 | 7,205 | 3,564 | | Gender | Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | Men | 50.4 | 48.9 | 52.0 | 7,205 | 3,641 | Views: Education (dimension = Education); Income (dimension = Income); Race and ethnicity (dimension = Race and ethnicity); Religion (dimension = Religion); Age (dimension = Age); Gender (dimension = Gender). Note: Each period pools four elections, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 against 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024, and every election has the same total weight. The religion view ends in 2020 because the 2024 religion codes of the cumulative file are unusable. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Note: Stacked bars carry no whiskers; the interval and the number of voters in the party's denominator are in the tooltip and the table. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024; weighted (weight_postelection where the file has one, else weight; each election has the same total weight); two-party presidential voters Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/composition_stacks.json ### Table 6. The Democratic share rose more among four-year degree holders than in any other group Democratic share of each group's two-party presidential voters, percent, 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024; pooled elections; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Dimension | Group | Earlier period (%) | 95% CI low earlier | 95% CI high earlier | n earlier | Later period (%) | 95% CI low later | 95% CI high later | n later | Change (points) | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Education | No four-year degree | 47.8 | 46.1 | 49.4 | 3,673 | 49.3 | 47.9 | 50.8 | 8,979 | +1.5 | | Education | Four-year degree or more | 39.2 | 36.2 | 42.2 | 1,063 | 62.0 | 60.6 | 63.5 | 7,626 | +22.8 | | Income (relative thirds) | Lowest third | 58.3 | 55.3 | 61.2 | 1,138 | 58.5 | 56.4 | 60.6 | 4,766 | +0.2 | | Income (relative thirds) | Middle third | 46.5 | 44.0 | 49.1 | 1,529 | 52.2 | 50.3 | 54.0 | 5,617 | +5.6 | | Income (relative thirds) | Highest third | 36.7 | 34.3 | 39.0 | 1,720 | 54.0 | 52.3 | 55.7 | 5,761 | +17.3 | | Race and ethnicity | White non-Hispanic | 39.4 | 37.8 | 40.9 | 4,030 | 44.4 | 43.2 | 45.6 | 12,097 | +5.0 | | Race and ethnicity | Black non-Hispanic | 92.8 | 90.4 | 95.2 | 458 | 93.7 | 92.0 | 95.4 | 1,860 | +0.9 | | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 61.7 | 55.0 | 68.5 | 204 | 72.2 | 68.9 | 75.4 | 1,616 | +10.4 | | Religion (later period 2012 to 2020) | Protestant | 42.4 | 40.6 | 44.2 | 3,066 | 44.7 | 42.9 | 46.5 | 5,557 | +2.4 | | Religion (later period 2012 to 2020) | Catholic | 50.7 | 47.8 | 53.6 | 1,214 | 53.2 | 50.7 | 55.7 | 2,829 | +2.5 | | Religion (later period 2012 to 2020) | Jewish, another religion or none | 57.1 | 52.5 | 61.6 | 475 | 66.3 | 64.3 | 68.2 | 4,460 | +9.2 | | Age | 18 to 29 | 46.4 | 43.0 | 49.7 | 881 | 62.7 | 59.5 | 65.8 | 1,673 | +16.3 | | Age | 30 to 44 | 44.1 | 41.5 | 46.6 | 1,526 | 57.8 | 55.6 | 59.9 | 3,686 | +13.7 | | Age | 45 to 64 | 47.3 | 44.6 | 49.9 | 1,452 | 50.7 | 49.0 | 52.4 | 5,986 | +3.4 | | Age | 65 and over | 46.7 | 43.3 | 50.0 | 887 | 51.1 | 49.2 | 53.1 | 4,935 | +4.5 | | Gender | Women | 48.4 | 46.4 | 50.3 | 2,659 | 56.9 | 55.5 | 58.4 | 8,955 | +8.6 | | Gender | Men | 42.9 | 40.7 | 45.0 | 2,111 | 51.0 | 49.5 | 52.6 | 7,745 | +8.2 | Note: Education is split into degree and no degree only: the cumulative file defines its lower education groups differently after 2016. The other-races group has too few respondents in the earlier period to publish (fewer than 100) and has no row. Hispanic respondents are identified in the ANES from 1966. Note: The ANES late-period elections lean Democratic relative to the certified counts (see the last section), so the later dots are higher than a count-based benchmark would give. Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Note: Each period pools four elections, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 against 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024, and every election has the same total weight. The religion rows compare 1976 to 1988 with 2012 to 2020. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024; weighted (weight_postelection where the file has one, else weight; each election has the same total weight); two-party presidential voters Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/group_vote_shares.json ### Table 7. Among Democratic voters the degree-holding share rose through group size (+15.5 points) and relative lean (+8.8 points) Change in a group's share of a party's two-party presidential voters from 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024, split into group size and relative lean, percent and percentage points; ANES; the buttons switch group and party | Group | Party's voters | Step | Value | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Degree holders | Democratic voters | Share of Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | 19.2 | 17.5 | 20.9 | 2,173 | | Degree holders | Democratic voters | Group size | 15.5 | 14.0 | 17.1 | 21,554 | | Degree holders | Democratic voters | Relative lean | 8.8 | 7.1 | 10.6 | 21,554 | | Degree holders | Democratic voters | Share of Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | 43.4 | 42.0 | 44.8 | 9,449 | | Degree holders | Republican voters | Share of Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | 25.2 | 23.5 | 26.9 | 2,563 | | Degree holders | Republican voters | Group size | 15.1 | 13.6 | 16.7 | 21,554 | | Degree holders | Republican voters | Relative lean | −8.9 | −10.6 | −7.4 | 21,554 | | Degree holders | Republican voters | Share of Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | 31.4 | 29.9 | 32.8 | 7,156 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Democratic voters | Share of Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | 72.7 | 70.8 | 74.6 | 2,179 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Democratic voters | Group size | −11.6 | −12.8 | −10.4 | 21,554 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Democratic voters | Relative lean | −3.1 | −4.6 | −1.5 | 21,554 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Democratic voters | Share of Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | 58.0 | 56.6 | 59.4 | 9,493 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Republican voters | Share of Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | 94.8 | 93.9 | 95.7 | 2,570 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Republican voters | Group size | −16.2 | −17.8 | −14.5 | 21,554 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Republican voters | Relative lean | 7.3 | 5.7 | 8.9 | 21,554 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Republican voters | Share of Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | 85.9 | 84.8 | 87.0 | 7,190 | | Highest income third | Democratic voters | Share of Democratic voters, 1976 to 1988 | 30.9 | 28.8 | 32.9 | 2,011 | | Highest income third | Democratic voters | Group size | 3.9 | 2.3 | 5.5 | 21,554 | | Highest income third | Democratic voters | Relative lean | 7.8 | 6.0 | 9.6 | 21,554 | | Highest income third | Democratic voters | Share of Democratic voters, 2012 to 2024 | 42.6 | 41.1 | 44.0 | 9,236 | | Highest income third | Republican voters | Share of Republican voters, 1976 to 1988 | 45.1 | 43.0 | 47.1 | 2,376 | | Highest income third | Republican voters | Group size | 4.7 | 2.7 | 6.7 | 21,554 | | Highest income third | Republican voters | Relative lean | −6.5 | −8.2 | −4.8 | 21,554 | | Highest income third | Republican voters | Share of Republican voters, 2012 to 2024 | 43.3 | 41.7 | 44.8 | 6,908 | Views: Degree holders, Democratic voters (party = Democratic voters, topic = Degree holders); Degree holders, Republican voters (party = Republican voters, topic = Degree holders); White voters, Democratic voters (party = Democratic voters, topic = White non-Hispanic voters); White voters, Republican voters (party = Republican voters, topic = White non-Hispanic voters); Highest income third, Democratic voters (party = Democratic voters, topic = Highest income third); Highest income third, Republican voters (party = Republican voters, topic = Highest income third). Note: The start and end bars carry Kish intervals. The two steps carry percentile intervals from a bootstrap that resamples respondents within each election (400 replicates, seed 12345). Note: The split is symmetric: the change in group size times the average relative lean, plus the change in relative lean times the average group size. Relative lean is the group's Democratic (or Republican) share divided by the party's share of all voters. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024; weighted (weight_postelection where the file has one, else weight; each election has the same total weight); two-party presidential voters Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/size_lean_split.json ### Table 8. The mix of voters accounts for +2.9 points of the change in the Democratic share and change within groups of the same sex, race and age for +5.3 points Change in the Democratic share of two-party presidential voters from 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024, split into the mix of voters across sex, race and age cells and change within cells, percent and percentage points; ANES; the buttons switch the voters | Voters | Step | Value | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All two-party voters | Democratic share, 1976 to 1988 | 45.9 | 44.5 | 47.4 | 4,770 | | All two-party voters | Change in the mix of voters | 2.9 | 2.1 | 3.8 | 21,554 | | All two-party voters | Change within groups of the same sex, race and age | 5.3 | 3.6 | 6.8 | 21,554 | | All two-party voters | Democratic share, 2012 to 2024 | 54.1 | 53.1 | 55.2 | 16,784 | | Voters with a four-year degree | Democratic share, 1976 to 1988 | 39.2 | 36.2 | 42.2 | 1,063 | | Voters with a four-year degree | Change in the mix of voters | 1.1 | −0.1 | 2.9 | 8,689 | | Voters with a four-year degree | Change within groups of the same sex, race and age | 21.7 | 18.0 | 24.8 | 8,689 | | Voters with a four-year degree | Democratic share, 2012 to 2024 | 62.0 | 60.6 | 63.5 | 7,626 | | Voters without a four-year degree | Democratic share, 1976 to 1988 | 47.8 | 46.1 | 49.4 | 3,673 | | Voters without a four-year degree | Change in the mix of voters | 4.7 | 3.5 | 5.9 | 12,652 | | Voters without a four-year degree | Change within groups of the same sex, race and age | −3.2 | −5.4 | −1.5 | 12,652 | | Voters without a four-year degree | Democratic share, 2012 to 2024 | 49.3 | 47.9 | 50.8 | 8,979 | Views: All voters (topic = All two-party voters); Four-year degree (topic = Voters with a four-year degree); No four-year degree (topic = Voters without a four-year degree). Note: The first and last bars carry Kish intervals and the two steps carry bootstrap intervals. The cells combine sex, race and ethnicity (white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic, Hispanic or another race) and four age bands; a respondent with a missing value forms a cell of its own. A cell with no respondents in one period takes the other period's Democratic share, so it adds nothing to the within-cell term. Note: Intervals come from a bootstrap that resamples respondents within each election (400 replicates, seed 12345). The split is symmetric between the mix and the within-cell change. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024; weighted (weight_postelection where the file has one, else weight; each election has the same total weight); two-party presidential voters Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/vote_split.json ### Table 9. The ANES shows the degree-holding share of Republican voters falling after 2008, the CES shows it rising, and the ANES web samples show no change Share of voters with a four-year degree, percent, by presidential election: all voters (CPS, ANES, CES), Democratic voters and Republican voters (ANES, ANES by mode, CES); the buttons show the white and Black shares of voters; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Measure | Voters | Survey | Election | Share (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Four-year degree | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 1996 | 29.4 | 29.0 | 29.8 | 50,025 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2000 | 31.2 | 30.7 | 31.6 | 50,010 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2004 | 32.4 | 32.0 | 32.9 | 63,052 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2008 | 34.1 | 33.7 | 34.6 | 59,975 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2012 | 36.6 | 36.2 | 37.0 | 59,597 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2016 | 39.6 | 39.2 | 40.1 | 58,533 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2020 | 41.5 | 41.0 | 41.9 | 55,170 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2024 | 44.9 | 44.4 | 45.4 | 48,387 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES | 1996 | 28.7 | 25.6 | 31.8 | 1,032 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES | 2000 | 30.4 | 27.4 | 33.4 | 1,118 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES | 2004 | 31.3 | 27.8 | 34.8 | 811 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES | 2008 | 33.3 | 30.4 | 36.3 | 1,533 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES | 2012 | 33.6 | 31.7 | 35.6 | 4,144 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES | 2016 | 37.7 | 35.4 | 39.9 | 2,571 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES | 2020 | 40.4 | 38.7 | 42.2 | 5,987 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES | 2024 | 39.9 | 37.7 | 42.1 | 3,903 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES, face to face | 2008 | 33.3 | 30.3 | 36.2 | 1,533 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES, face to face | 2012 | 35.9 | 32.3 | 39.5 | 1,327 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES, face to face | 2016 | 39.9 | 35.5 | 44.3 | 745 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES, face to face | 2020 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES, face to face | 2024 | 41.1 | 36.0 | 46.2 | 688 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES, web | 2012 | 32.4 | 30.1 | 34.7 | 2,817 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES, web | 2016 | 37.1 | 34.5 | 39.8 | 1,846 | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES, web | 2020 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Four-year degree | All voters | ANES, web | 2024 | 42.5 | 39.0 | 46.0 | 1,357 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CES | 2008 | 29.8 | 29.1 | 30.5 | 23,585 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CES | 2012 | 30.7 | 30.0 | 31.4 | 37,789 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CES | 2016 | 30.9 | 30.3 | 31.5 | 40,891 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CES | 2020 | 38.8 | 38.2 | 39.5 | 43,872 | | Four-year degree | All voters | CES | 2024 | 41.8 | 41.1 | 42.5 | 42,008 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES | 1996 | 24.2 | 20.4 | 28.1 | 599 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES | 2000 | 29.3 | 25.2 | 33.4 | 590 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES | 2004 | 31.9 | 26.8 | 36.9 | 399 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES | 2008 | 30.9 | 27.2 | 34.5 | 1,020 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES | 2012 | 33.3 | 30.7 | 35.9 | 2,469 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES | 2016 | 43.0 | 39.8 | 46.3 | 1,341 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES | 2020 | 47.1 | 44.7 | 49.5 | 3,461 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES | 2024 | 50.0 | 47.0 | 53.0 | 2,178 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES, face to face | 2008 | 30.8 | 27.2 | 34.5 | 1,020 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES, face to face | 2012 | 34.1 | 29.6 | 38.6 | 915 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES, face to face | 2016 | 47.1 | 40.9 | 53.4 | 385 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES, face to face | 2020 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES, face to face | 2024 | 54.7 | 47.8 | 61.7 | 387 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES, web | 2012 | 32.9 | 29.7 | 36.1 | 1,554 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES, web | 2016 | 41.7 | 38.0 | 45.4 | 970 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES, web | 2020 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | ANES, web | 2024 | 51.0 | 46.2 | 55.8 | 786 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | CES | 2008 | 31.2 | 30.2 | 32.3 | 11,519 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | CES | 2012 | 32.9 | 31.9 | 34.0 | 19,048 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | CES | 2016 | 36.1 | 35.2 | 37.0 | 22,136 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | CES | 2020 | 45.8 | 44.9 | 46.6 | 26,179 | | Four-year degree | Democratic voters | CES | 2024 | 47.9 | 46.9 | 49.0 | 23,517 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES | 1996 | 34.9 | 29.9 | 40.0 | 433 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES | 2000 | 31.6 | 27.2 | 35.9 | 528 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES | 2004 | 30.7 | 25.8 | 35.5 | 412 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES | 2008 | 36.4 | 31.6 | 41.1 | 513 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES | 2012 | 34.0 | 31.1 | 36.9 | 1,675 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES | 2016 | 31.7 | 28.6 | 34.8 | 1,230 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES | 2020 | 32.0 | 29.5 | 34.5 | 2,526 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES | 2024 | 27.8 | 24.8 | 30.9 | 1,725 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES, face to face | 2008 | 36.2 | 31.4 | 41.0 | 513 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES, face to face | 2012 | 37.9 | 32.2 | 43.6 | 412 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES, face to face | 2016 | 31.8 | 25.8 | 37.8 | 360 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES, face to face | 2020 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES, face to face | 2024 | 25.1 | 18.2 | 31.9 | 301 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES, web | 2012 | 31.9 | 28.6 | 35.2 | 1,263 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES, web | 2016 | 32.0 | 28.4 | 35.6 | 876 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES, web | 2020 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | ANES, web | 2024 | 30.8 | 25.9 | 35.7 | 571 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | CES | 2008 | 28.2 | 27.2 | 29.1 | 12,066 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | CES | 2012 | 28.1 | 27.2 | 29.1 | 18,741 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | CES | 2016 | 25.6 | 24.8 | 26.4 | 18,755 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | CES | 2020 | 31.2 | 30.4 | 32.0 | 17,693 | | Four-year degree | Republican voters | CES | 2024 | 35.9 | 34.9 | 37.0 | 18,491 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 1996 | 82.5 | 82.1 | 82.8 | 50,025 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2000 | 80.6 | 80.2 | 81.0 | 50,010 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2004 | 79.2 | 78.8 | 79.6 | 63,052 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2008 | 76.3 | 75.9 | 76.7 | 59,975 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2012 | 73.7 | 73.3 | 74.1 | 59,597 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2016 | 73.3 | 72.9 | 73.7 | 58,533 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2020 | 71.0 | 70.6 | 71.5 | 55,170 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2024 | 70.6 | 70.1 | 71.1 | 48,387 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | ANES | 1996 | 78.9 | 76.1 | 81.6 | 1,031 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | ANES | 2000 | 77.8 | 75.1 | 80.6 | 1,113 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | ANES | 2004 | 74.9 | 71.6 | 78.1 | 800 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | ANES | 2008 | 74.1 | 71.4 | 76.9 | 1,530 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | ANES | 2012 | 72.7 | 70.9 | 74.5 | 4,181 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | ANES | 2016 | 72.6 | 70.6 | 74.7 | 2,575 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | ANES | 2020 | 70.4 | 68.8 | 72.0 | 6,030 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | ANES | 2024 | 67.4 | 65.2 | 69.5 | 3,897 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CES | 2008 | 76.5 | 75.8 | 77.2 | 23,585 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CES | 2012 | 78.6 | 78.0 | 79.3 | 37,789 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CES | 2016 | 76.7 | 76.2 | 77.3 | 40,891 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CES | 2020 | 73.1 | 72.6 | 73.7 | 43,872 | | White non-Hispanic voters | All voters | CES | 2024 | 72.3 | 71.6 | 73.0 | 42,008 | | Black voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 1996 | 10.6 | 10.3 | 10.9 | 50,025 | | Black voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2000 | 11.2 | 10.9 | 11.5 | 50,010 | | Black voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2004 | 11.0 | 10.7 | 11.3 | 63,052 | | Black voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2008 | 12.1 | 11.8 | 12.4 | 59,975 | | Black voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2012 | 12.9 | 12.6 | 13.2 | 59,597 | | Black voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2016 | 11.9 | 11.6 | 12.2 | 58,533 | | Black voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2020 | 11.7 | 11.4 | 12.0 | 55,170 | | Black voters | All voters | CPS voting supplement | 2024 | 11.5 | 11.1 | 11.8 | 48,387 | | Black voters | All voters | ANES | 1996 | 9.9 | 7.9 | 12.0 | 1,031 | | Black voters | All voters | ANES | 2000 | 11.2 | 9.2 | 13.3 | 1,113 | | Black voters | All voters | ANES | 2004 | 13.7 | 11.1 | 16.3 | 800 | | Black voters | All voters | ANES | 2008 | 12.1 | 10.0 | 14.1 | 1,530 | | Black voters | All voters | ANES | 2012 | 13.1 | 11.7 | 14.4 | 4,181 | | Black voters | All voters | ANES | 2016 | 11.2 | 9.7 | 12.6 | 2,575 | | Black voters | All voters | ANES | 2020 | 10.5 | 9.4 | 11.6 | 6,030 | | Black voters | All voters | ANES | 2024 | 11.2 | 9.8 | 12.7 | 3,897 | | Black voters | All voters | CES | 2008 | 11.6 | 11.1 | 12.1 | 23,585 | | Black voters | All voters | CES | 2012 | 8.6 | 8.2 | 9.1 | 37,789 | | Black voters | All voters | CES | 2016 | 9.6 | 9.2 | 10.0 | 40,891 | | Black voters | All voters | CES | 2020 | 10.6 | 10.2 | 10.9 | 43,872 | | Black voters | All voters | CES | 2024 | 9.3 | 8.9 | 9.7 | 42,008 | Views: Four-year degree (topic = Four-year degree); White non-Hispanic voters (topic = White non-Hispanic voters); Black voters (topic = Black voters). Note: The ANES 2012, 2016 and 2024 samples mix interview modes and the 2020 study has no mode weights, so the mode lines have no 2020 point; the 2008 study was face to face only. The all-mode ANES line includes panel and paper respondents in 2024. Note: The CES is an opt-in panel and its intervals do not cover how respondents were recruited; the CPS intervals ignore the survey design. Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Source: CPS November voting supplement 1996 to 2024 (weighted, VOSUPPWT); ANES Cumulative Data File 1996 to 2024 (weighted; mode series use weight_ftf and weight_web); CES cumulative file 2008 to 2024 (weighted, weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/survey_check.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (177), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | a18_d0 | 19.2% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are aged 18 to 29 | Democratic two-party presidential voters, aged 18 to 29 | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 17.6% to 20.9% | 2,182 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a18_d1 | 18.5% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are aged 18 to 29 | Democratic two-party presidential voters, aged 18 to 29 | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 17.4% to 19.6% | 9,304 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a18_r0 | 18.9% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are aged 18 to 29 | Republican two-party presidential voters, aged 18 to 29 | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 17.4% to 20.5% | 2,564 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a18_r1 | 13.1% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are aged 18 to 29 | Republican two-party presidential voters, aged 18 to 29 | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 12.0% to 14.2% | 6,976 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a65_d0 | 19.0% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are aged 65 and over | Democratic two-party presidential voters, aged 65 and over | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 17.3% to 20.7% | 2,182 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a65_d1 | 22.3% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are aged 65 and over | Democratic two-party presidential voters, aged 65 and over | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 21.1% to 23.5% | 9,304 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a65_r0 | 18.5% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are aged 65 and over | Republican two-party presidential voters, aged 65 and over | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 16.9% to 20.0% | 2,564 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a65_r1 | 25.4% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are aged 65 and over | Republican two-party presidential voters, aged 65 and over | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 24.0% to 26.8% | 6,976 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | adj_d_24 | 55.1% | percent of Democratic voters | degree share of Democratic voters when voters take the CPS degree share and keep their ANES within-education Democratic shares; seeded bootstrap of ANES respondents | Democratic two-party presidential voters, ANES with the CPS education mix | 2024 | 95% CI 53.4% to 57.2% | 3,903 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) (ANES); CPS share treated as known | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | adj_r_24 | 32.1% | percent of Republican voters | degree share of Republican voters when voters take the CPS degree share and keep their ANES within-education Democratic shares; seeded bootstrap of ANES respondents | Republican two-party presidential voters, ANES with the CPS education mix | 2024 | 95% CI 29.8% to 34.1% | 3,903 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) (ANES); CPS share treated as known | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | age_hi | 29 | years of age | highest age in the youngest band | definition of an age band | all years | | | none (definition) | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | age_lo | 18 | years of age | lowest age in the youngest band | definition of an age band | all years | | | none (definition) | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | age_old | 65 | years of age | lowest age in the oldest band | definition of an age band | all years | | | none (definition) | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | all_d0 | 45.9% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted Democratic share of all two-party voters | two-party presidential voters | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 44.5% to 47.4% | 4,770 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | all_d1 | 54.1% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted Democratic share of all two-party voters | two-party presidential voters | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 53.1% to 55.2% | 16,784 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | all_d_chg | 8.2 | percentage points | later minus earlier Democratic share of all two-party voters; independent periods, standard errors combined | two-party presidential voters | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 6.4 to 10.0 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | blk_d0 | 20.0% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are Black non-Hispanic | Democratic two-party presidential voters, Black non-Hispanic | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 18.3% to 21.7% | 2,179 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | blk_d1 | 19.9% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are Black non-Hispanic | Democratic two-party presidential voters, Black non-Hispanic | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 18.7% to 21.0% | 9,493 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ces_deg_d08 | 31.2% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share with a four-year degree | Democratic two-party presidential voters, with a four-year degree | 2008 | 95% CI 30.2% to 32.3% | 11,519 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_deg_d24 | 47.9% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share with a four-year degree | Democratic two-party presidential voters, with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 46.9% to 49.0% | 23,517 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_lean_d | +3.5 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the degree-holding share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Democratic two-party presidential voters, degree holders | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.5 to 4.5 | 65,593 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_lean_r | −3.0 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the degree-holding share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Republican two-party presidential voters, degree holders | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.0 to −1.9 | 65,593 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_size_d | +13.1 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the degree-holding share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Democratic two-party presidential voters, degree holders | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 12.0 to 14.1 | 65,593 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_size_r | +10.8 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the degree-holding share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Republican two-party presidential voters, degree holders | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 9.8 to 11.7 | 65,593 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chk_anes_24 | 39.9% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share with a four-year degree | two-party presidential voters, with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 37.7% to 42.1% | 3,903 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | chk_b_anes | 11.2% | percent of voters | weighted share of voters in the group | Black non-Hispanic voters among two-party voters | 2024 | 95% CI 9.8% to 12.7% | 3,897 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | chk_b_ces | 9.3% | percent of voters | weighted share of voters in the group | Black voters among two-party voters | 2024 | 95% CI 8.9% to 9.7% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chk_b_cps | 11.5% | percent of voters | weighted share of voters in the group | Black non-Hispanic voters among all voters | 2024 | 95% CI 11.1% to 11.8% | 48,387 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chk_ces_24 | 41.8% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share with a four-year degree | two-party presidential voters, with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 41.1% to 42.5% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chk_cps_24 | 44.9% | percent of voters | weighted share with a four-year degree | voters, citizens aged 18 or older, with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 44.4% to 45.4% | 48,387 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chk_dv_anes | 68.2% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | ANES two-party voters with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 65.4% to 71.1% | 2,007 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | chk_dv_ces | 56.1% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | CES two-party voters with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 55.1% to 57.2% | 16,994 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chk_nv_anes | 45.3% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | ANES two-party voters without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 42.2% to 48.5% | 1,896 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | chk_nv_ces | 43.8% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | CES two-party voters without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 42.8% to 44.9% | 25,014 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chk_r_anes_08 | 36.4% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share with a four-year degree | Republican two-party presidential voters, with a four-year degree | 2008 | 95% CI 31.6% to 41.1% | 513 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | chk_r_anes_24 | 27.8% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share with a four-year degree | Republican two-party presidential voters, with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 24.8% to 30.9% | 1,725 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | chk_r_anes_chg | −8.5 | percentage points | 2024 minus 2008 share; independent elections, standard errors combined | Republican two-party presidential voters, with a four-year degree | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −14.2 to −2.8 | 2,238 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | chk_r_ces_08 | 28.2% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share with a four-year degree | Republican two-party presidential voters, with a four-year degree | 2008 | 95% CI 27.2% to 29.1% | 12,066 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chk_r_ces_24 | 35.9% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share with a four-year degree | Republican two-party presidential voters, with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 34.9% to 37.0% | 18,491 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chk_r_ces_chg | +7.8 | percentage points | 2024 minus 2008 share; independent elections, standard errors combined | Republican two-party presidential voters, with a four-year degree | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 6.4 to 9.2 | 30,557 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chk_w_anes | 67.4% | percent of voters | weighted share of voters in the group | white non-Hispanic voters among two-party voters | 2024 | 95% CI 65.2% to 69.5% | 3,897 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | chk_w_ces | 72.3% | percent of voters | weighted share of voters in the group | white voters among two-party voters | 2024 | 95% CI 71.6% to 73.0% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chk_w_cps | 70.6% | percent of voters | weighted share of voters in the group | white non-Hispanic voters among all voters | 2024 | 95% CI 70.1% to 71.1% | 48,387 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cps_cf_24 | 46.1% | percent of voters | degree-holding share of 2024 voters if degree holders and other adults had kept their 1996 turnout rates; seeded bootstrap within year | voters among citizens aged 18 or older, 2024 with 1996 turnout rates by education | 2024 | 95% CI 45.5% to 46.7% | 156,680 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cps_df_deg_24 | 7.8 | percentage points | voters' degree-holding share minus eligible adults' share; Taylor linearization | citizens aged 18 or older with a turnout answer | 2024 | 95% CI 7.5 to 8.1 | 72,590 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cps_el_deg_24 | 37.1% | percent of eligible adults | weighted share of eligible adults with a four-year degree | citizens aged 18 or older with a turnout answer | 2024 | 95% CI 36.7% to 37.5% | 72,590 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cps_el_deg_96 | 22.3% | percent of eligible adults | weighted share of eligible adults with a four-year degree | citizens aged 18 or older with a turnout answer | 1996 | 95% CI 22.0% to 22.6% | 84,090 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cps_size_term | +16.7 | percentage points | counterfactual share minus the 1996 share: the part of the rise from the growth of the group among eligible adults; seeded bootstrap within year | voters among citizens aged 18 or older | 1996 to 2024 | 95% CI 16.1 to 17.3 | 156,680 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cps_turn_term | −1.2 | percentage points | actual 2024 share minus the counterfactual share: the part of the rise from the change in relative turnout; seeded bootstrap within year | voters among citizens aged 18 or older | 1996 to 2024 | 95% CI −1.6 to −0.8 | 156,680 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cps_vo_chg | 15.5 | percentage points | 2024 minus 1996 degree-holding share of voters; seeded bootstrap within year | voters among citizens aged 18 or older | 1996 to 2024 | 95% CI 14.8 to 16.2 | 156,680 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cps_vo_deg_24 | 44.9% | percent of voters | weighted share of voters with a four-year degree | voters among citizens aged 18 or older | 2024 | 95% CI 44.4% to 45.4% | 48,387 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cps_vo_deg_96 | 29.4% | percent of voters | weighted share of voters with a four-year degree | voters among citizens aged 18 or older | 1996 | 95% CI 29.0% to 29.8% | 50,025 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cps_w_0 | 53.1% | percent of voters | mean over elections of the weighted share of voters who are women | voters among adults aged 18 or older with a turnout answer (all residents before 1994, citizens after) | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 | 95% CI 52.9% to 53.3% | 254,747 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cps_w_1 | 53.3% | percent of voters | mean over elections of the weighted share of voters who are women | voters among adults aged 18 or older with a turnout answer (all residents before 1994, citizens after) | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 53.1% to 53.6% | 221,687 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cpsw_el_chg | 17.0 | percentage points | later minus earlier degree-holding share of adults; mean of the election estimates | adults aged 18 or older with a turnout answer (all residents before 1994, citizens after) | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 16.8 to 17.2 | 754,088 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cpsw_old_0 | 15.9% | percent of adults | mean over elections of the weighted share of adults aged 65 or older | adults aged 18 or older with a turnout answer (all residents before 1994, citizens after) | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 | 95% CI 15.7% to 16.0% | 411,495 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cpsw_old_1 | 21.9% | percent of adults | mean over elections of the weighted share of adults aged 65 or older | adults aged 18 or older with a turnout answer (all residents before 1994, citizens after) | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 21.8% to 22.1% | 342,593 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cpsw_vo_chg | 18.9 | percentage points | later minus earlier degree-holding share of voters; mean of the election estimates | voters among adults aged 18 or older with a turnout answer (all residents before 1994, citizens after) | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 18.6 to 19.2 | 476,434 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | deg_all0 | 45.9% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted Democratic share of two-party voters with a known degree status | two-party presidential voters | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 44.4% to 47.3% | 4,736 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_all1 | 54.1% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted Democratic share of two-party voters with a known degree status | two-party presidential voters | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 53.1% to 55.2% | 16,605 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_d0 | 19.2% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are holders of a four-year degree | Democratic two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 17.5% to 20.9% | 2,173 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_d1 | 43.4% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are holders of a four-year degree | Democratic two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 42.0% to 44.8% | 9,449 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_d24_anes | 50.0% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters in the group | Democratic voters with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 47.0% to 53.0% | 2,178 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_dchg | 24.2 | percentage points | later minus earlier share of Democratic voters; independent periods, standard errors combined | Democratic two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 22.0 to 26.4 | | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_lean_d | +8.8 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Democratic two-party presidential voters, degree holders | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 7.1 to 10.6 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_lean_r | −8.9 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Republican two-party presidential voters, degree holders | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −10.6 to −7.4 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_r0 | 25.2% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are holders of a four-year degree | Republican two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 23.5% to 26.9% | 2,563 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_r1 | 31.4% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are holders of a four-year degree | Republican two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 29.9% to 32.8% | 7,156 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_r24_anes | 27.8% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters in the group | Republican voters with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 24.8% to 30.9% | 1,725 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_rchg | 6.2 | percentage points | later minus earlier share of Republican voters; independent periods, standard errors combined | Republican two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 4.0 to 8.5 | | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_s0 | 22.4% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share of all two-party voters who are holders of a four-year degree | two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 21.2% to 23.6% | 4,736 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_s1 | 37.9% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share of all two-party voters who are holders of a four-year degree | two-party presidential voters, holders of a four-year degree | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 36.9% to 38.9% | 16,605 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_size_d | +15.5 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Democratic two-party presidential voters, degree holders | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 14.0 to 17.1 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_size_r | +15.1 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Republican two-party presidential voters, degree holders | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 13.6 to 16.7 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_v0 | 39.2% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are holders of a four-year degree | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 36.2% to 42.2% | 1,063 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | deg_v1 | 62.0% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are holders of a four-year degree | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 60.6% to 63.5% | 7,626 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | den_black_c | 15.6% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of Democratic two-party voters who are in the group | black, among Democratic two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI 14.8% to 16.3% | 23,517 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | den_black_s | 9.3% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share of all two-party voters who are in the group | black, among two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI 8.9% to 9.7% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | den_black_v | 81.9% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | black two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI 79.8% to 84.0% | 3,753 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | den_white_c | 64.3% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of Democratic two-party voters who are in the group | white, among Democratic two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI 63.3% to 65.3% | 23,517 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | den_white_s | 72.3% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share of all two-party voters who are in the group | white, among two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI 71.6% to 73.0% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | den_white_v | 43.5% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | white two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI 42.7% to 44.4% | 31,857 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gv_age_0 | 46.4% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters in the group 18 to 29 | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 43.0% to 49.7% | 881 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gv_age_1 | 62.7% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters in the group 18 to 29 | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 59.5% to 65.8% | 1,673 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gv_blk_0 | 92.8% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters in the group Black non-Hispanic | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 90.4% to 95.2% | 458 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gv_blk_1 | 93.7% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters in the group Black non-Hispanic | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 92.0% to 95.4% | 1,860 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gv_deg_0 | 39.2% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters in the group Four-year degree or more | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 36.2% to 42.2% | 1,063 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gv_deg_1 | 62.0% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters in the group Four-year degree or more | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 60.6% to 63.5% | 7,626 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gv_deg_chg | 22.8 | percentage points | later minus earlier Democratic share of degree holders; independent periods, standard errors combined | two-party presidential voters with a four-year degree | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 19.5 to 26.1 | 8,689 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gv_inc_0 | 36.7% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters in the group Highest third | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 34.3% to 39.0% | 1,720 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gv_inc_1 | 54.0% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters in the group Highest third | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 52.3% to 55.7% | 5,761 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gv_low_0 | 58.3% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters in the group Lowest third | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 55.3% to 61.2% | 1,138 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gv_low_1 | 58.5% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters in the group Lowest third | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 56.4% to 60.6% | 4,766 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_d0 | 30.9% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are in the highest third of the income distribution | Democratic two-party presidential voters, in the highest third of the income distribution | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 28.8% to 32.9% | 2,011 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_d1 | 42.6% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are in the highest third of the income distribution | Democratic two-party presidential voters, in the highest third of the income distribution | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 41.1% to 44.0% | 9,236 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_lean_d | +7.8 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Democratic two-party presidential voters, the highest income third | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 6.0 to 9.6 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_lean_r | −6.5 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Republican two-party presidential voters, the highest income third | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −8.2 to −4.8 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_r0 | 45.1% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are in the highest third of the income distribution | Republican two-party presidential voters, in the highest third of the income distribution | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 43.0% to 47.1% | 2,376 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_r1 | 43.3% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are in the highest third of the income distribution | Republican two-party presidential voters, in the highest third of the income distribution | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 41.7% to 44.8% | 6,908 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_s0 | 38.6% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share of all two-party voters who are in the highest third of the income distribution | two-party presidential voters, in the highest third of the income distribution | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 37.1% to 40.0% | 4,387 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_s1 | 42.9% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share of all two-party voters who are in the highest third of the income distribution | two-party presidential voters, in the highest third of the income distribution | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 41.8% to 43.9% | 16,144 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_size_d | +3.9 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Democratic two-party presidential voters, the highest income third | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.3 to 5.5 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_size_r | +4.7 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Republican two-party presidential voters, the highest income third | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.7 to 6.7 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lad_di_deg | 43.3% | percent of the population in the row | weighted share with a four-year degree | ANES 2024 respondents: Democratic identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 40.5% to 46.1% | 2,619 | weight (VCF0009z) for all respondents and party identifiers; weight_postelection for voters and nonvoters | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lad_dv_deg | 50.0% | percent of the population in the row | weighted share with a four-year degree | ANES 2024 respondents: Democratic voters | 2024 | 95% CI 47.0% to 53.0% | 2,178 | weight (VCF0009z) for all respondents and party identifiers; weight_postelection for voters and nonvoters | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lad_ind_deg | 18.2% | percent of the population in the row | weighted share with a four-year degree | ANES 2024 respondents: independents who lean toward neither party | 2024 | 95% CI 12.5% to 23.9% | 378 | weight (VCF0009z) for all respondents and party identifiers; weight_postelection for voters and nonvoters | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lad_nv_deg | 15.7% | percent of the population in the row | weighted share with a four-year degree | ANES 2024 respondents: nonvoters (self-reported) | 2024 | 95% CI 12.3% to 19.2% | 829 | weight (VCF0009z) for all respondents and party identifiers; weight_postelection for voters and nonvoters | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lad_ri_deg | 27.2% | percent of the population in the row | weighted share with a four-year degree | ANES 2024 respondents: Republican identifiers, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 24.7% to 29.8% | 2,436 | weight (VCF0009z) for all respondents and party identifiers; weight_postelection for voters and nonvoters | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lad_rv_deg | 27.8% | percent of the population in the row | weighted share with a four-year degree | ANES 2024 respondents: Republican voters | 2024 | 95% CI 24.8% to 30.9% | 1,725 | weight (VCF0009z) for all respondents and party identifiers; weight_postelection for voters and nonvoters | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_d_ftf | 54.7% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share with a four-year degree, mode-specific weight | Democratic two-party voters interviewed face to face | 2024 | 95% CI 47.8% to 61.7% | 387 | weight_ftf or weight_web (VCF0009 mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_d_web | 51.0% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share with a four-year degree, mode-specific weight | Democratic two-party voters interviewed on the web | 2024 | 95% CI 46.2% to 55.8% | 786 | weight_ftf or weight_web (VCF0009 mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rf_12 | 37.9% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share with a four-year degree, mode-specific weight | Republican two-party voters interviewed face to face | 2012 | 95% CI 32.2% to 43.6% | 412 | weight_ftf or weight_web (VCF0009 mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rf_24 | 25.1% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share with a four-year degree, mode-specific weight | Republican two-party voters interviewed face to face | 2024 | 95% CI 18.2% to 31.9% | 301 | weight_ftf or weight_web (VCF0009 mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rf_chg | −12.8 | percentage points | 2024 minus 2012 degree-holding share; independent elections, standard errors combined | Republican two-party voters interviewed face to face | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −21.8 to −3.9 | 713 | weight_ftf or weight_web (VCF0009 mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rw_12 | 31.9% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share with a four-year degree, mode-specific weight | Republican two-party voters interviewed on the web | 2012 | 95% CI 28.6% to 35.2% | 1,263 | weight_ftf or weight_web (VCF0009 mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rw_24 | 30.8% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share with a four-year degree, mode-specific weight | Republican two-party voters interviewed on the web | 2024 | 95% CI 25.9% to 35.7% | 571 | weight_ftf or weight_web (VCF0009 mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rw_chg | −1.1 | percentage points | 2024 minus 2012 degree-holding share; independent elections, standard errors combined | Republican two-party voters interviewed on the web | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −7.0 to 4.8 | 1,834 | weight_ftf or weight_web (VCF0009 mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_voters | 34,423 | respondents | count of respondents with a positive vote weight | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 1952 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_years | 19 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections 1952 to 2024 | 1952 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ces_voters | 188,145 | respondents | count of respondents with a positive weight | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | nat_anes_24 | 54.5% | percent of the two-party vote | weighted Democratic share of two-party voters | two-party presidential voters (ANES) | 2024 | 95% CI 52.3% to 56.7% | 3,933 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nat_cert_24 | 49.2% | percent of the two-party vote | certified Democratic share of the two-party vote | all votes cast for the two major-party candidates | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | State presidential returns | | | nat_cert_chg | 5.4 | percentage points | mean certified Democratic share of the two-party vote in 2012 to 2024 minus the mean in 1976 to 1988 | all votes cast for the two major-party candidates | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | State presidential returns | | | nat_ces_24 | 49.0% | percent of the two-party vote | weighted Democratic share of two-party voters | two-party presidential voters (CES) | 2024 | 95% CI 48.2% to 49.7% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | nat_lean_chg | 2.8 | percentage points | change between the two sets of elections in the mean ANES-minus-certified gap; election errors combined | ANES minus certified count, later mean minus earlier mean | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.0 to 4.6 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nat_lean_early | +0.2 | percentage points | mean over elections of the ANES Democratic share of the two-party vote minus the certified share; election errors combined | ANES minus certified count, mean over the elections | 1976 to 1988 | 95% CI −1.3 to 1.6 | 4,770 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nat_lean_late | +3.0 | percentage points | mean over elections of the ANES Democratic share of the two-party vote minus the certified share; election errors combined | ANES minus certified count, mean over the elections | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.9 to 4.0 | 16,784 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nod_v0 | 47.8% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are without a four-year degree | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 46.1% to 49.4% | 3,673 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | nod_v1 | 49.3% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are without a four-year degree | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 47.9% to 50.8% | 8,979 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | none_d12 | 35.7% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters with no religion | Democratic two-party presidential voters with no religion | 2012 | 95% CI 34.7% to 36.8% | 19,015 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | none_d24 | 45.0% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters with no religion | Democratic two-party presidential voters with no religion | 2024 | 95% CI 43.9% to 46.0% | 23,506 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | none_r12 | 14.5% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters with no religion | Republican two-party presidential voters with no religion | 2012 | 95% CI 13.7% to 15.2% | 18,727 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | none_r24 | 17.7% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters with no religion | Republican two-party presidential voters with no religion | 2024 | 95% CI 16.8% to 18.5% | 18,485 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | oth_d0 | 7.3% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are Hispanic or another race | Democratic two-party presidential voters, Hispanic or another race | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 6.2% to 8.4% | 2,179 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_d1 | 22.1% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are Hispanic or another race | Democratic two-party presidential voters, Hispanic or another race | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 20.9% to 23.3% | 9,493 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_r0 | 3.9% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are Hispanic or another race | Republican two-party presidential voters, Hispanic or another race | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 3.1% to 4.6% | 2,570 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | oth_r1 | 12.5% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are Hispanic or another race | Republican two-party presidential voters, Hispanic or another race | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 11.5% to 13.5% | 7,190 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pro_d0 | 59.5% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are Protestant | Democratic two-party presidential voters, Protestant | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 57.4% to 61.6% | 2,186 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pro_d1 | 36.0% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are Protestant | Democratic two-party presidential voters, Protestant | 2012, 2016 and 2020 pooled | 95% CI 34.5% to 37.6% | 7,349 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pro_r0 | 68.8% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are Protestant | Republican two-party presidential voters, Protestant | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 67.0% to 70.7% | 2,569 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pro_r1 | 52.3% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are Protestant | Republican two-party presidential voters, Protestant | 2012, 2016 and 2020 pooled | 95% CI 50.5% to 54.0% | 5,497 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_deg_d24 | 50.0% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters in the group | Democratic voters with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 47.0% to 53.0% | 2,178 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_deg_d76 | 13.8% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters in the group | Democratic voters with a four-year degree | 1976 | 95% CI 11.1% to 16.4% | 669 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_deg_r24 | 27.8% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters in the group | Republican voters with a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 24.8% to 30.9% | 1,725 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_deg_r76 | 24.2% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters in the group | Republican voters with a four-year degree | 1976 | 95% CI 20.9% to 27.6% | 650 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_inc_d24 | 49.7% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters in the group | Democratic voters in the highest income third | 2024 | 95% CI 46.5% to 52.8% | 2,026 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_inc_d76 | 33.5% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters in the group | Democratic voters in the highest income third | 1976 | 95% CI 29.8% to 37.3% | 626 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_inc_r24 | 39.9% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters in the group | Republican voters in the highest income third | 2024 | 95% CI 36.4% to 43.4% | 1,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_inc_r76 | 49.4% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters in the group | Republican voters in the highest income third | 1976 | 95% CI 45.3% to 53.4% | 615 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ts_none_d | 34.2% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters with no religion (ANES 2024 Time Series summary religion code 9) | Democratic two-party presidential voters who say they are not religious | 2024 | 95% CI 31.1% to 37.2% | 2,004 | w_post (V240107b) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | vs_all_comp | +2.9 | percentage points | change in the Democratic share from the change in the mix of voters across sex, race and age cells; seeded bootstrap | all two-party voters | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.1 to 3.8 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | vs_all_within | +5.3 | percentage points | change in the Democratic share from the change inside sex, race and age cells; seeded bootstrap | all two-party voters | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 3.6 to 6.8 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | vs_deg_comp | +1.1 | percentage points | change in the Democratic share from the change in the mix of voters across sex, race and age cells; seeded bootstrap | two-party voters with a four-year degree | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.1 to 2.9 | 8,689 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | vs_deg_within | +21.7 | percentage points | change in the Democratic share from the change inside sex, race and age cells; seeded bootstrap | two-party voters with a four-year degree | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 18.0 to 24.8 | 8,689 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | vs_nod_comp | +4.7 | percentage points | change in the Democratic share from the change in the mix of voters across sex, race and age cells; seeded bootstrap | two-party voters without a four-year degree | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 3.5 to 5.9 | 12,652 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | vs_nod_within | −3.2 | percentage points | change in the Democratic share from the change inside sex, race and age cells; seeded bootstrap | two-party voters without a four-year degree | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −5.4 to −1.5 | 12,652 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_d0 | 72.7% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are white non-Hispanic | Democratic two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 70.8% to 74.6% | 2,179 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_d1 | 58.0% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are white non-Hispanic | Democratic two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 56.6% to 59.4% | 9,493 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_dchg | 14.7 | percentage points | earlier minus later share of Democratic voters; independent periods, standard errors combined | Democratic two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 12.3 to 17.1 | | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_lean_d | −3.1 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Democratic two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.6 to −1.5 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_lean_r | +7.3 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Republican two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 5.7 to 8.9 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_r0 | 94.8% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are white non-Hispanic | Republican two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 93.9% to 95.7% | 2,570 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_r1 | 85.9% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are white non-Hispanic | Republican two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 84.8% to 87.0% | 7,190 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_s0 | 84.7% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share of all two-party voters who are white non-Hispanic | two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 83.6% to 85.7% | 4,749 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_s1 | 70.8% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share of all two-party voters who are white non-Hispanic | two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 69.8% to 71.7% | 16,683 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_size_d | −11.6 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Democratic two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −12.8 to −10.4 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_size_r | −16.2 | percentage points | group-size or relative-lean term of the change in the group's share of the party's voters; seeded bootstrap within elections | Republican two-party presidential voters, white non-Hispanic | 1976 to 1988 to 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −17.8 to −14.5 | 21,554 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_v0 | 39.4% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are white non-Hispanic | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 37.8% to 40.9% | 4,030 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wh_v1 | 44.4% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are white non-Hispanic | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 43.2% to 45.6% | 12,097 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wom_d0 | 58.6% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are women | Democratic two-party presidential voters, women | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 56.5% to 60.7% | 2,191 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wom_d1 | 55.5% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are women | Democratic two-party presidential voters, women | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 54.0% to 56.9% | 9,495 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wom_r0 | 53.2% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are women | Republican two-party presidential voters, women | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 51.2% to 55.2% | 2,579 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wom_r1 | 49.6% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share of the party's two-party voters who are women | Republican two-party presidential voters, women | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 48.0% to 51.1% | 7,205 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wom_s0 | 55.7% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share of all two-party voters who are women | two-party presidential voters, women | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 54.2% to 57.1% | 4,770 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wom_s1 | 52.8% | percent of all two-party voters | weighted share of all two-party voters who are women | two-party presidential voters, women | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 51.7% to 53.8% | 16,700 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wom_v0 | 48.4% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are women | 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988 pooled | 95% CI 46.4% to 50.3% | 2,659 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wom_v1 | 56.9% | percent of the group's voters voting Democratic | weighted Democratic share of the group's two-party voters | two-party presidential voters who are women | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 55.5% to 58.4% | 8,955 | weight_postelection where the file has one (1996 to 2008, 2016 to 2024), else weight (VCF0009z); pooled periods give each election the same total weight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. ## Methods Sample: ANES Cumulative Data File respondents in the 19 presidential elections from 1952 to 2024 who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican candidate (34,423 respondents with a positive vote weight); CES cumulative file respondents in 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 who reported such a vote (188,145); CPS November voting supplement respondents in the presidential-election years 1996 to 2024 who were citizens aged 18 or older with a positive supplement weight and a turnout answer (eligible adults); for the comparison of the two pooled windows, adults aged 18 or older with a turnout answer in 1976, 1980, 1984, 1988, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 (citizenship is recorded from 1994, so the earlier window counts all residents and the later one citizens). Third-party voters and nonvoters are outside the ANES and CES frame. A coalition is a party's two-party voters. Weights: ANES weight_postelection in the elections where the file has one (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020, 2024), otherwise weight (VCF0009z), the rule used by the gender-gap chapter; CES weight_cumulative; CPS VOSUPPWT. A pooled period (1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988; 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024) divides each election's weights by that election's total vote weight, so every election counts equally. Groups: four-year degree or more against less (ANES college_grad; CES education_4cat College or Post-grad; education below a degree is not split in the ANES because the cumulative file defines its lower groups differently after 2016); relative income thirds (the ANES percentile income groups regrouped into 0 to 33, 34 to 67 and 68 to 100); race and ethnicity from the ANES four-category variable (Hispanic respondents identified from 1966; the other-races group has too few respondents to publish in the earlier period) and the CES five-category variable; religion from the ANES cumulative four-category variable (Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, other or none; the 2024 values are unusable and are not used) and the CES five-category variable (2012 to 2024; the CES religion categories are not comparable between 2008 and 2012, when the Protestant share jumps and the other-religion share falls); age in four bands built from age in years; sex from the survey's two-category variable. Definitions: for a group g, c(g) is the group's share of a party's voters, d(g) the Democratic share of the group's voters, s(g) the group's share of all voters and D the Democratic share of all voters, so that c_D(g) = s(g) d(g) / D and c_R(g) = s(g) (1 - d(g)) / (1 - D). A change in c between two periods splits exactly into a group-size term, (s1 - s0) times the mean of the two relative leans, and a relative-lean term, (r1 - r0) times the mean of the two group shares, with r the relative lean. The vote decomposition splits the change in the Democratic share into a mix term, the sum over cells of sex, race and age (a missing value is its own category) of the change in the cell's weight share times the mean of the two Democratic shares, and a within-cell term, the sum of the change in the cell's Democratic share times the mean of the two weight shares; a cell empty in one period takes the other period's Democratic share. Intervals: 95%. Shares and differences of shares from independent periods use the Kish effective sample size and a normal approximation, with standard errors combined in quadrature; the terms of the two decompositions and the CPS-adjusted degree shares come from a percentile bootstrap that resamples respondents within each election (400 replicates, seed 12345); the CPS voter-minus-eligible difference uses a Taylor linearization with the CPS weights, and the CPS counterfactual (2024 voters with 1996 turnout rates for degree holders and other adults) a bootstrap within year. All intervals are model based. The CES is an opt-in panel and the CPS extract has no replicate weights, so those intervals leave out how respondents were recruited and the survey design. Suppression: a published share needs at least 100 voters in its denominator, a Kish effective sample of at least 100 and at least 30 respondents in the group and party; the other-races vote share in the earlier period (57 respondents) and the 1952 Democratic degree share are dropped. Survey mode: the ANES 2012, 2016 and 2024 samples mix modes and the 2020 study has no mode weights; the text and the survey-check figure report face-to-face and web estimates (2008 is face to face only). Benchmark: the certified two-party share from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab state returns, full counts. ## What these data cannot show - The surveys interview different people in each election, so the chapter compares groups and not individuals. - It cannot say whether a voter changed party, how much of a change comes from older voters leaving the electorate and younger ones entering it, or how much comes from different people turning out. - The group terms of the decompositions are arithmetic and describe a split of numbers, not a mechanism, and the within-cell term in particular absorbs every change that the cells do not hold fixed. - The split is also sensitive to the groups chosen: degree holders were a smaller share of voters in the first period than in the second. - Vote and turnout are self-reports. - The ANES leans Democratic in its late elections, the CES is an opt-in panel whose weights match it to the adult population and not to voters, and the CPS has no vote choice. - No survey here measures a party's voters exactly. - Nonvoters have no vote preference in these data, third-party voters are outside the two-party frame, and the CES file used here has no validated turnout. - The ANES samples of 2012, 2016 and 2024 mix interview modes and the 2020 study has no mode weights, so a change between those elections can include a change of mode. - Intervals are model based and leave out the sample designs; the CPS intervals in particular are narrower than the survey's own design-based errors. - Several groups are coarse. - Education below a degree is not analysed, because the ANES cumulative file defines its lower groups differently after 2016. - The ANES identifies Hispanic respondents from 1966 and has few of them before the 1990s. - The early race cells therefore pool Hispanic voters with voters of other races for the coalition shares and drop the other-races group for the vote shares. - The relative income thirds do not describe dollar income, and religion in the ANES cumulative file stops at 2020 with four categories. - The two periods, 1976 to 1988 and 2012 to 2024, were chosen to give each group enough respondents, and a different choice of years would give different numbers. - The chapter does not examine why any group's vote changed, how the parties' candidates, issues or campaigns affected it, or how coalitions differ below the national level. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Axelrod, Robert (1972). Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, 1952-1968. American Political Science Review 66(1): 11-20. https://doi.org/10.2307/1959275 3. McDonald, Michael P.; Popkin, Samuel L. (2001). The Myth of the Vanishing Voter. American Political Science Review 95(4): 963-974. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400400134 4. Hur, Aram; Achen, Christopher H. (2013). Coding Voter Turnout Responses in the Current Population Survey. Public Opinion Quarterly 77(4): 985-993. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nft042 5. Kitagawa, Evelyn M. (1955). Components of a Difference Between Two Rates. Journal of the American Statistical Association 50(272): 1168-1194. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1955.10501299 6. Ansolabehere, Stephen; Hersh, Eitan (2012). Validation: What Big Data Reveal About Survey Misreporting and the Real Electorate. Political Analysis 20(4): 437-459. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mps023 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/the-two-coalitions/build.py (sha256 4a405eb565123840e36513967d8cb9e22260bb06e9f2678bcf9fe30348b0236e) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes2024_ts/anes_timeseries_2024_spss_20260519.sav | 12,757,094 | 3107c838755f88353d0e3e39b2c3d5f76a2888cf56a179e3acac84ab431335d2 | bb318a018a39b4cf87ccc91b50a5b7c5b41746d28c0226f4a6c176e8c74966d6 | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/state/1976-2024-president.csv | 514,108 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | | C:/Users/Vishal Singh/Box/ipums/analysis/cps/cps_voter.parquet | 94,510,422 | 226363c25c563e5ab8d0dfb30d20a40ab01b72707a0075592ad9bfd8ff06bd36 | dab575569dddeb25cef8623455f2e19702772519e1e50173d364a1b0c81fe3ae | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 9806644aa5fd9370d23b5215904f252db540e5dffe1c219647d588094e4d1ce1 | | figures/composition_stacks.json | c60df06e3c4f80e7a9155b2f64288d8ee823fed78281c9044a00304769448b55 | | figures/composition_trends.json | 712c6afbd202b9ba33edc9c85825c00357b4f724d9cdc9c43ace200b54d8ea5f | | figures/eligible_vs_voters.json | 38124cd03b0abd79e6c3a21827fb1ff847981faec076f451a47fb6d4bcc9da06 | | figures/group_vote_shares.json | 3bc7eae2bd3b601ae9458699ceaadb03925745e49a61ce86eb19ab4911bc5574 | | figures/population_ladder.json | 2b4bafa886ae9484c23658697433d17f45032f712ab47f22bc939f325c3346ce | | figures/size_lean_split.json | cdb4a0697e6da137996056d231bf1dfd604b076f4c60f098053e95fe04c1b895 | | figures/survey_check.json | 625bc47ed63aaa4c64f2a5f38691c046b0eeaefbfa05f0161dce783fe9378e8e | | figures/two_denominators.json | 59c850ae8fa1fa12c664684c59cafc3d1f8e5fddf1aa8d9b55b84a7ddef7d8ed | | figures/vote_split.json | 5437fb4ab5e035bf561ac22c96344b9c33cbc828d7e060ac9c244d09b2aeaff7 | | meta.json | 09b1a95716ca52322acac08dbb40842090ba672edf6e9531837fd607aa77704e | | refs.json | c331ace2daa30d012afb5ae0c9c06603a20463a932823ce5e9bfe92584035768 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/facts.json - Table 1, figure "two_denominators" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/two_denominators.json - Table 2, figure "eligible_vs_voters" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/eligible_vs_voters.json - Table 3, figure "population_ladder" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/population_ladder.json - Table 4, figure "composition_trends" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/composition_trends.json - Table 5, figure "composition_stacks" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/composition_stacks.json - Table 6, figure "group_vote_shares" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/group_vote_shares.json - Table 7, figure "size_lean_split" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/size_lean_split.json - Table 8, figure "vote_split" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/vote_split.json - Table 9, figure "survey_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-two-coalitions/figures/survey_check.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # The diploma divide: report Chapter 3.2 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: The diploma divide - Chapter: 3.2 (Part III, The party coalitions; The great sorting) - Question: On which kinds of issues do college graduates and non-graduates differ, and how did that change? - Dek: In the ANES, college graduates went from voting less Democratic than other voters to voting more Democratic, a gap of +23.3 points of the two-party presidential vote in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1952-2024: presidential vote, party identification, income rank and issue items; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for mode splits - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content 2008-2024: presidential vote and party identification; policy items for 2014 and 2020; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative - General Social Survey. 1993-2024 waves with the raw-file interview mode: issue items by degree; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use - State presidential returns. MIT Election Lab state presidential returns 1976-2024: certified two-party Democratic share for the survey check; years: 1976-2024 (13 elections); weights: none (full counts) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026thediplomadivide ```bibtex @misc{singh2026thediplomadivide, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {The diploma divide}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | +23.3 | 95% CI 19.0 to 27.7 | 3,918 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | v_all_2024 | | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | +12.3 | 95% CI 10.8 to 13.8 | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | cv_all_2024 | | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2012 | −0.8 | 95% CI −5.0 to 3.5 | 4,144 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | v_all_2012 | | count of elections | ANES presidential elections whose graduate gap interval lies below zero | 1956 to 2012 | 8 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_vote_below | | count of elections | ANES presidential elections with a graduate gap estimate | 1956 to 2012 | 14 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_vote_elections | | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | +3.7 | 95% CI 2.2 to 5.2 | 23,585 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | cv_all_2008 | | weighted share with a four-year or postgraduate degree | CES respondents with a known education | 2008 | 24.7% | 95% CI 24.1% to 25.3% | 32,800 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_grad_2008 | | weighted share with a four-year or postgraduate degree | CES respondents with a known education | 2024 | 34.8% | 95% CI 34.1% to 35.4% | 60,000 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_grad_2024 | | weighted share with a college or advanced degree | ANES respondents with a known education | 1952 | 6.4% | 95% CI 5.2% to 7.5% | 1,790 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | grad_share_1952 | | weighted share with a college or advanced degree | ANES respondents with a known education | 2024 | 34.4% | 95% CI 32.6% to 36.2% | 5,465 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | grad_share_2024 | ## Findings In 2024 the graduate gap in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote was +12.3 (95% CI 10.8 to 13.8) points in the Cooperative Election Study (CES) and +23.3 (95% CI 19.0 to 27.7) points in the American National Election Studies (ANES). The gap is the share among voters with a four-year degree minus the share among other voters, so graduates were the more Democratic group in both surveys. The ANES sample of 2024 voters is more Democratic than the certified count, and against the CES the excess is concentrated among graduates (Table 3), so the ANES level of the 2024 gap needs the CES beside it. The ANES gap runs from negative to positive. It was −0.8 (95% CI −5.0 to 3.5) points in 2012, an interval that includes zero, and in 8 of the 14 elections from 1956 to 2012 that have an estimate the interval lies below zero, so graduates were the less Democratic group. The CES gap is above zero in every presidential election since 2008, +3.7 (95% CI 2.2 to 5.2) points in 2008. The differences on issues are older than the difference in the vote. On cultural, racial and immigration items the graduate gap was already present in the ANES studies of 1992 to 2000, and a later section measures it. This chapter compares people with a four-year degree or more, called graduates, with everyone else. A graduate holds a college or advanced degree in the ANES, a four-year or postgraduate degree in the CES (24.7% of respondents in 2008 and 34.8% in 2024) and a bachelor's or graduate degree in the General Social Survey (GSS). An associate degree counts as no four-year degree in all three. Education here is a credential, the highest degree a person holds. Income, which Chapter 3.3, The income ladder (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder) takes up, is a separate measure of household resources, and occupation is not measured in this chapter; a later section checks whether income rank accounts for the vote gap. Graduates are a growing part of the samples, 6.4% (95% CI 5.2% to 7.5%) of ANES respondents in 1952 and 34.4% (95% CI 32.6% to 36.2%) in 2024, so graduates and non-graduates are different slices of the population in different years. Party identification includes leaners, and white means non-Hispanic white. A gap is the value for graduates minus the value for non-graduates; it describes how two groups differ and cannot say what a degree does to a person's politics. Every estimate carries a 95% confidence interval that treats the weighted sample as a random sample; the methods note gives the details. ### In the ANES the graduate gap went from negative to positive Table 1 plots the Democratic share of the two-party vote by degree. The share among non-graduates was above the share among graduates in 12 of the 14 elections from 1956 to 2012 that have an estimate. The gap's interval includes zero in 6 of the 14, and in none does it lie above zero. From 2012 to 2016 the gap rose by +12.7 (95% CI 6.5 to 18.9) points, to +11.9 (95% CI 7.4 to 16.4), and it was +14.9 (95% CI 11.6 to 18.1) in 2020 and +23.3 (95% CI 19.0 to 27.7) in 2024. From 2012 to 2024 the graduate share changed by +16.0 (95% CI 11.5 to 20.5) points and the non-graduate share by −8.2 (95% CI −12.2 to −4.1) points. Table 1. Graduates voted less Democratic than other voters in most elections through 2012 and more Democratic from 2016 The white non-Hispanic view shows the same shape with larger gaps. Among white voters the gap was +6.6 (95% CI 1.7 to 11.6) points in 2012, the first election with an interval above zero, and +28.1 (95% CI 23.2 to 33.0) in 2024; Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) follows the vote of other racial and ethnic groups. The vote is the respondent's report of a major-party choice (32,098 ANES respondents in the elections plotted). Two elections, 1952 and 1960, are left out because the graduate cell has fewer than 100 respondents or a Kish effective sample size [1] under 100. Party identification moved later than the vote. Among ANES respondents who identify with a party, the graduate gap in the Democratic share has an interval below zero in 25 of the 27 studies from 1952 to 2012 that have an estimate. The interval includes zero in the rest. The gap was −5.8 (95% CI −9.7 to −1.9) points in 2012 and +1.6 (95% CI −2.2 to 5.5) in 2016, an interval that includes zero, and then +8.9 (95% CI 5.9 to 11.9) in 2020 and +17.5 (95% CI 13.6 to 21.4) in 2024. Among white respondents the gap was −0.4 (95% CI −5.0 to 4.2) in 2012 and +9.5 (95% CI 5.1 to 13.9) in 2016 (Table 2). Table 2. Graduates became more Democratic than other respondents in vote and party identification, and in the ANES the party-identification gap followed the vote gap ### The CES and the ANES differ outside 2016 and 2020 The CES has 188,145 respondents with a major-party vote in 2008 to 2024, against 0 in the ANES over the same years. Its vote gap among all voters was +3.7 (95% CI 2.2 to 5.2) points in 2008, +12.3 (95% CI 11.1 to 13.5) in 2016, +15.3 (95% CI 14.1 to 16.5) in 2020 and +12.3 (95% CI 10.8 to 13.8) in 2024. Among white voters it was +9.2 (95% CI 7.6 to 10.8) in 2008 and +16.1 (95% CI 14.5 to 17.7) in 2024. Its party-identification gap among all respondents was −1.6 (95% CI −3.0 to −0.2) in 2008, with an interval below zero, and +12.3 (95% CI 11.1 to 13.5) in 2020 and +9.4 (95% CI 8.0 to 10.9) in 2024. The two surveys agree where their intervals overlap, in 2016 and 2020, and disagree before and after. The ANES gap minus the CES gap was −9.7 (95% CI −16.7 to −2.6) points in 2008, −6.4 (95% CI −10.9 to −1.9) in 2012 and +11.0 (95% CI 6.5 to 15.6) in 2024. They also disagree about the latest movement: the ANES gap changed by +8.5 (95% CI 3.1 to 13.9) points from 2020 to 2024, and the CES gap by −3.0 (95% CI −4.8 to −1.1) points. Both surveys record the respondent's own report of a vote. The ANES is a probability sample, and the CES is an opt-in online panel whose weights match it to the population. Certified returns give a benchmark for the level of the Democratic share, though not for the gap (Table 3). In 2024 the ANES voters were 55.3% (95% CI 53.0% to 57.5%) Democratic, the CES voters 49.0% (95% CI 48.2% to 49.7%) and the certified two-party count 49.2%. In 2020 the shares were 56.0% (95% CI 54.3% to 57.7%), 52.5% (95% CI 51.9% to 53.1%) and 52.3%. The ANES share minus the count was +6.0 (95% CI 3.8 to 8.3) points in 2024 and +3.7 (95% CI 2.0 to 5.4) in 2020, while the CES share is within 1.1 points of the count in every election from 2008 to 2024. Against the CES, the ANES Democratic share in 2024 is +12.9 (95% CI 9.8 to 16.0) points higher among graduates (69.0% against 56.1%) and +1.8 (95% CI −1.5 to 5.2) among non-graduates (45.7% against 43.8%). The ANES sample of 2024 voters is therefore more Democratic than the count, and the excess among graduates accounts for most of the ANES-CES difference of +11.0 points in the gap. The count has no breakdown by education, so it cannot show how far either survey's shares for graduates and non-graduates are from the truth. Table 3. The ANES voters were more Democratic than the certified count in 1992, 1996, 2020 and 2024, and the CES voters were within 1.1 points of it in every election The choice of weight matters less than the choice of survey. The ANES 2024 gap uses the full-sample weight, which for 2024 is the pre-election weight, and is +23.3 (95% CI 19.0 to 27.7) points; with the post-election weight it is +22.9 (95% CI 18.7 to 27.2). In the CES the gap is +12.3 in 2016 with the cumulative-file weight and +10.1 (95% CI 8.8 to 11.4) with the post-election weight, and in 2020 +15.3, +12.9 (95% CI 11.6 to 14.2) and, with the validated-vote weight, +16.2 (95% CI 14.9 to 17.5). Within a survey the weights move the gap by at most 3.4 points, less than the +11.0 points between the surveys in 2024. Interview mode is another candidate, and the ANES can speak to it only in part. It interviewed respondents in person and on the web in 2012, 2016 and 2024 and gives each mode its own weight (Table 4), but in 2024 the mode groups cover 2,045 of the 3,918 voters. Panel and paper cases are in neither group, and their gap is +18.5 (95% CI 12.6 to 24.5) points. In both modes the 2012 interval includes zero and the 2016 and 2024 intervals lie above it. The 2024 vote gap was +30.5 (95% CI 20.8 to 40.1) points in person and +20.2 (95% CI 13.5 to 26.9) on the web. The ANES web gap minus the CES gap is +7.9 (95% CI 1.0 to 14.7) points, although the CES is also online, so mode does not account for the difference between the surveys. The web minus in-person difference within the ANES in 2024 is −10.3 (95% CI −22.0 to 1.5) points, an interval that includes zero and reaches past the ANES-CES difference, so the data do not rule out a mode effect. The 2020 ANES was collected without in-person interviews and has no mode weights. Table 4. The vote gap rose after 2012 in both interview modes, and the in-person estimates are the larger ones in 2016 and 2024 ### In the CES the steps between education levels grew A split at the four-year degree hides the steps on either side of it. Table 5 follows four education levels in the CES. In 2008 the step from some college to a four-year degree was −0.1 (95% CI −2.0 to 1.8) points, an interval that includes zero, and the step from a four-year degree to a postgraduate degree, +6.0 (95% CI 3.6 to 8.4) points, had the largest point estimate of the three. By 2024 every step is above zero: +7.2 (95% CI 5.1 to 9.3) points from a high school education or less to some college, +5.4 (95% CI 3.5 to 7.3) from some college to a four-year degree, and +9.3 (95% CI 7.2 to 11.4) from a four-year degree to a postgraduate degree. Postgraduates were 9.0 (95% CI 6.6 to 11.4) points more Democratic than voters with a high school education or less in 2008 and 21.9 (95% CI 19.6 to 24.2) points in 2024. Among white voters the span was 27.0 (95% CI 24.6 to 29.4) points in 2024. The graduate comparison used in the rest of the chapter is a cut of this gradient at the four-year degree. Table 5. In the CES the Democratic share rose at each step of education by 2016, while in 2008 a four-year degree did not differ from some college ### Graduates differ most on cultural, racial and immigration items The differences on issues are older than the difference in the vote. On a cultural index (abortion, gay rights and moral traditionalism), graduates' answers sat +0.30 (95% CI 0.25 to 0.36) standard deviations nearer the liberal end than other respondents' in the ANES studies of 1992 to 2000. In 2016 to 2024, pooling in-person and web interviews, the gap was +0.36 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.39). The racial index gives +0.21 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.27) and +0.31 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.35), and the immigration item +0.36 (95% CI 0.30 to 0.41) and +0.37 (95% CI 0.33 to 0.41). The economic index is the exception, with a gap of −0.32 (95% CI −0.37 to −0.28) in the first period and +0.02 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.06) in the second, an interval that includes zero. Holding party identification fixed shrinks the cultural gap in 2016 to 2024 to +0.26 (95% CI 0.22 to 0.29) and leaves positive gaps on the racial (+0.18 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.21)) and immigration (+0.30 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.34)) items. It turns the economic gap negative (−0.10 (95% CI −0.13 to −0.07)). These are descriptions of how groups differ, and a later section separates the gaps within each party. Table 6 gives the graduate gap on each item in the ANES studies of 1992 to 2000 and of 2016 to 2024. Every item is oriented so that a higher value is the more liberal answer: more government action on the economic and racial items, the more permissive answer on the cultural items, and more immigration. The gap is the weighted mean answer of graduates minus that of other respondents, in standard deviations of the item among all respondents in the period. The racial resentment index is the mean of the items from Kinder and Sanders [2], some worded so that agreement is resentful and the rest so that agreement is sympathetic, which cancels a tendency to agree with any statement. Chapter 5.2, Racial attitudes and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology) defines it. Moral traditionalism is the mean of a pair of items, one worded in each direction. (Note: On the abortion item, a late gap of +0.32 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.36) standard deviations is a difference of +14.9 (95% CI 13.0 to 16.9) points in the share saying abortion should always be allowed, 58.2% of graduates against 43.2% of other respondents. On immigration, 26.4% of graduates and 42.0% of other respondents wanted immigration decreased in 2016 to 2024.) Table 6. The economic gap moved toward zero between 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024, while most cultural, racial and immigration gaps stayed positive The economic items have gaps below zero in 1992 to 2000, between −0.36 and −0.10 standard deviations, so graduates were more conservative than other respondents on guaranteed jobs, health insurance, government services and spending on the poor and on welfare. In 2016 to 2024 their gaps lie between −0.04 and +0.09. Of the cultural, racial and immigration items, all but one have gaps above zero in both periods. Affirmative action is the exception, at −0.06 (95% CI −0.11 to −0.01) in the first period and +0.05 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.09) in the second. The racial resentment index has the largest point estimate in both periods, +0.44 (95% CI 0.38 to 0.50) and +0.48 (95% CI 0.44 to 0.52), and immigration is +0.36 (95% CI 0.30 to 0.41) and +0.37 (95% CI 0.33 to 0.41). The abortion gap went from +0.37 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.42) to +0.32 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.36), a change whose interval includes zero. Not every item was asked in every study of a period. Gay adoption was asked in two of the early studies, job protection in three, immigration in 1992 to 1998, and the resentment items are missing in 1996 and in part of 1998. With only the items asked in every study of both periods (jobs and government services, abortion and moral traditionalism, government help and affirmative action), the economic gap went from −0.30 (95% CI −0.36 to −0.25) to +0.02 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.06). The cultural gap went from +0.27 (95% CI 0.22 to 0.33) to +0.32 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.37) and the racial gap from +0.11 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.17) to +0.19 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.24) (the common-items button of Table 8). The racial level depends on the resentment items, which are not in this check: with them the racial index is +0.21 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.27) and +0.31 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.35). The immigration item has no counterpart because it was not asked in 2000. The late period mixes interview modes, and mode matters for the size of the gaps and, on economic items, for their sign. Respondents interviewed in person in 2016 and 2024 show larger gaps, as point estimates, than respondents interviewed on the web in the same years on every domain. The cultural index gives +0.46 (95% CI 0.35 to 0.57) in person against +0.34 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.41) on the web, the racial index +0.47 (95% CI 0.35 to 0.59) against +0.22 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.29), and the economic index +0.13 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.24) against −0.08 (95% CI −0.15 to −0.02). The late economic gap is therefore above zero in person and below zero on the web, and the pooled value near zero averages the two. The face-to-face view of Table 6 compares in-person studies with in-person samples. In it the cultural index changes by +0.16 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.28), the racial index by +0.24 (95% CI 0.11 to 0.37) and the economic index by +0.46 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.59), and the immigration index by +0.07 (95% CI −0.06 to 0.20). The all-interview change in the cultural index is +0.05 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.12), an interval that includes zero but allows a rise of as much as 40% of the 1992 to 2000 gap. The data therefore do not establish that the cultural gap was constant. In the in-person subsample the cultural and racial gaps are larger in 2016 and 2024 than in the 1990s. The immigration change is +0.02 (95% CI −0.05 to 0.09) for all interviews and +0.07 (95% CI −0.06 to 0.20) in person, intervals that include zero and are wide enough to allow a rise. The GSS and the CES ask other questions (use the buttons on the figure). The GSS agrees in direction on the economic and racial indices: its economic index went from −0.20 (95% CI −0.25 to −0.14) to +0.01 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.07) and its racial index from +0.15 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.20) to +0.29 (95% CI 0.24 to 0.34). Its cultural index went from +0.30 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.35) to +0.23 (95% CI 0.18 to 0.28), a change of −0.07 (95% CI −0.14 to 0.00) that just reaches zero. The item on sex between two adults of the same sex fell the most, +0.44 (95% CI 0.38 to 0.49) to +0.26 (95% CI 0.21 to 0.32), a change of −0.17 (95% CI −0.25 to −0.09), and the items on sex before marriage and on legal marijuana also fell by amounts whose intervals include zero. The CES battery has no racial items after 2014. Its economic, cultural and immigration indices rose from 2014 to 2020, to +0.18 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.21), +0.30 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.32) and +0.18 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.21). The CES economic index is above zero in 2020 while the pooled ANES and GSS estimates are near zero. The CES items (the Affordable Care Act, spending on welfare and on health care) differ from the ANES and GSS items, and the data cannot say whether the difference in level comes from the items or from the sample. The GSS late period includes the 2021 web survey and the mixed 2022 and 2024 surveys. In 2022 and 2024 the GSS gaps in person and on the web differ by at most 0.03 standard deviations on every domain. Each interval for that difference extends at least 0.18 from its estimate, which covers the ANES in-person minus web difference on the cultural index, +0.12 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.25), so the GSS does not rule out a mode difference of that size. ### In the ANES and GSS the economic gap moved to about zero Table 7 follows one long-running item for each domain, so that the item set does not change from year to year. The ANES jobs item (whether the government should guarantee jobs and a good standard of living) has a negative point estimate in every study from 1974 to 2016, and its interval lies below zero in 15 of those 18 studies. The gap was −0.10 (95% CI −0.17 to −0.02) in 2016, +0.05 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.11) in 2020 and +0.07 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.15) in 2024, and the last two intervals include zero. The abortion gap lies between +0.27 and +0.52 in every study since 1980. The gap on government help for Black Americans was +0.04 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.11) in 2012, an interval that includes zero, and +0.25 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.33) in 2024. The immigration gap lies between +0.28 and +0.61 in every study since 1992. Table 7. The graduate gap on guaranteed jobs rose from below zero to about zero by 2020, while the gaps on abortion and immigration stayed positive in every study The GSS agrees through 2022. Its economic anchor (government should improve the standard of living of the poor) went from −0.24 (95% CI −0.38 to −0.10) in 2012 to +0.02 (95% CI −0.11 to 0.15) in 2022, and then to −0.13 (95% CI −0.25 to −0.01) in 2024. The change from 2022 to 2024 is −0.14 (95% CI −0.32 to 0.03) standard deviations, an interval that includes zero, so the data do not show whether the 2024 GSS reading is a reversal or sampling variation. The ANES jobs gap does not fall in 2024. In 2016 and 2024 the web samples show lower economic gaps than the in-person samples, so the pooled ANES values near zero average over groups with different gaps. ### Within party the gaps are largest among Democrats If graduates differed from other respondents only because they had sorted into different parties, the gaps within a party would be zero. Table 8 separates the two. It repeats the early and late comparison on each domain index for all respondents, for Democrats, for Republicans, and net of party identification. The net gap is the graduate coefficient from a weighted regression of the index on a graduate indicator and the seven categories of the party-identification scale. Table 8. Graduate Democrats stay more liberal than other Democrats on cultural, racial and immigration items, and graduate Republicans are more conservative than other Republicans on economic items Among Democrats the ANES gap on the cultural index was +0.67 (95% CI 0.60 to 0.75) in 1992 to 2000 and +0.39 (95% CI 0.35 to 0.43) in 2016 to 2024. Among Republicans it was +0.06 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.13) in the first period, an interval that includes zero, and +0.15 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.21) in the second. The overall cultural gap changed by +0.05 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.12), and the gap within the Democratic Party by −0.28 (95% CI −0.36 to −0.20). The overall gap mixes the two within-party gaps with the difference in party mix between graduates and other respondents, and that difference changed over the same years (Table 2). The racial index shows the same pattern, +0.55 (95% CI 0.47 to 0.64) falling to +0.32 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.38) among Democrats, against +0.05 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.11) among Republicans in the first period, an interval that includes zero, and +0.06 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.10) in the second. On immigration the gap persists in both parties, +0.40 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.45) among Democrats and +0.23 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.29) among Republicans in 2016 to 2024, with no change between the periods whose interval excludes zero in either party. Economic items differ in sign. In 2016 to 2024 the economic gap was +0.09 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.14) among Democrats and −0.27 (95% CI −0.32 to −0.23) among Republicans, so within the Republican Party graduates are more conservative on economic items. The overall economic gap, +0.02 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.06), combines a small positive gap among Democrats, a larger negative gap among Republicans and a difference in party mix. Net of party identification the economic gap is −0.10 (95% CI −0.13 to −0.07), against −0.21 (95% CI −0.25 to −0.16) in 1992 to 2000. Among white respondents net of party identification the late gaps were +0.19 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.23) on the cultural index, +0.27 (95% CI 0.23 to 0.31) on the racial index, +0.34 (95% CI 0.29 to 0.38) on immigration and −0.08 (95% CI −0.12 to −0.05) on economic items. The GSS and the CES give positive cultural gaps net of party, +0.18 (95% CI 0.13 to 0.23) and +0.17 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.19). The CES economic gap net of party is 0.00 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.02). The surveys disagree about the Republican cultural gap. It is +0.15 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.21) in the ANES, −0.04 (95% CI −0.14 to 0.05) in the GSS and −0.07 (95% CI −0.10 to −0.05) in the CES, and the ANES abortion item alone gives +0.11 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.17) among Republicans, against negative gaps on the CES abortion items. The data do not settle whether graduate Republicans are more liberal than other Republicans on cultural items. Party identification is itself shaped by the attitudes in question, so these estimates describe where graduates and non-graduates of the same party stand and do not isolate an effect of education. Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates when party gaps on issues became large, and Chapter 7.2, Economic and cultural dimensions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions) examines the economic and cultural dimensions themselves. ### Income rank accounts for part of the rise in the vote gap The ANES records family income as a percentile group within each year, which sets aside the changing value of the dollar. Table 9 compares the vote gap with the gap from a weighted linear probability model that adds the five income groups, and for all voters adds race. In 2024 the gap was +23.6 (95% CI 19.1 to 28.0) points before the adjustment and +22.1 (95% CI 17.2 to 27.0) after it, and in 2020 +15.1 (95% CI 11.8 to 18.4) and +17.5 (95% CI 13.9 to 21.0). In every one of the 17 elections before 2024 the adjusted gap is higher than the unadjusted gap, by 1.3 to 8.3 points. Among voters with the same income rank, graduates were more Democratic relative to non-graduates than the raw comparison shows. In 1992, for example, the gap was −9.8 (95% CI −15.8 to −3.8) raw and −4.1 (95% CI −10.5 to 2.4) net of income rank. The adjustment lowers the 2024 end of the series and raises the earlier years, so it shrinks the rise. From 2012 to 2024 the gap rose by +24.5 (95% CI 18.3 to 30.7) points unadjusted, +18.6 (95% CI 11.9 to 25.4) net of income rank and +16.9 (95% CI 10.4 to 23.4) net of income rank and race. From 2008 the rise was +30.0 (95% CI 21.6 to 38.4) unadjusted and +20.3 (95% CI 11.4 to 29.2) net of income rank. Table 9. Holding income rank fixed shrinks the rise in the vote gap from 2012 to 2024 from +24.5 to +18.6 points and leaves most of it Income rank as measured here shrinks the rise in the vote gap by 23.9% since 2012 and 32.3% since 2008 and leaves most of it. Chapter 3.3, The income ladder (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder) shows that in the CES the highest income bracket became more Democratic after 2008 and that income and education overlap. A study using European survey data argues that workplace experience shapes political views on redistribution, immigration and abortion [3], and this chapter has no measure of occupation to separate that from the degree. A study of Western democracies finds that higher-educated voters moved toward the left while high-income voters stayed on the right [4]. A book-length account of the American case argues that Democrats became the party of highly educated voters with progressive social views and Republicans the party of white voters without college degrees [5]. Chapter 12.2, The diploma map (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-map) measures the same education gradient across counties, and Chapter 7.6, Education and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-and-ideology; planned) asks how education relates to ideology across countries. ### What these data cannot show Every survey here interviews a new sample each year, so a rising gap can come from people changing their votes, from new voters replacing older ones, or from changes in who has a degree. The graduate share of respondents rose from 6.4% in 1952 to 34.4% in 2024, and the data cannot separate a change in what graduates think from a change in who counts as a graduate. The chapter compares groups and not people. The vote gap is a difference in the Democratic share among voters who chose a major party, and it leaves out nonvoters and third-party voters; Chapter 3.1, The two coalitions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions) takes up the composition of each party's voters. The two vote surveys differ by as much as 11.0 points in the gap in a year. The ANES voters of 2024 are more Democratic than the certified count, with the excess among graduates, and the CES matches the count nationally. The count has no breakdown by degree, so it cannot show which survey is closer on graduates or on the gap, and a national match does not show that the CES is accurate within education groups. The vote is a self-report in both surveys, and no validated vote is available in either file. The ANES mode split has wide intervals, leaves out the panel and paper respondents of 2024 and does not exist for 2020. The in-person ANES samples give larger gaps than the web samples, and the GSS cannot rule out a mode difference of that size. The CES, which is online in every year, has smaller vote gaps than the in-person ANES in 2024. The issue gaps rest on a few items per domain, and the sets differ across surveys and across studies within a period. A standardized gap depends on how answers spread in each period, so the same difference in the share giving an answer can be a different number of standard deviations in two periods. The CES policy battery ends in 2021 and has no racial item after 2014, and the GSS extract has no immigration item, so the ANES is the only survey here that covers all four domains. The orientation of each item comes from its wording, and a check against the party gap in every year can flag a reversed code but cannot detect a change in what Democrats believe. Finally, the within-party results describe partisans who have already sorted. Party identification follows attitudes as well as preceding them, so a gap within a party is not the effect of education on that party's voters. The comparison cannot say whether graduate Democrats held their views before they joined the party or acquired them in it. The chapter holds only party, income rank and race fixed. Age, religion, region, occupation and the kind of place a person lives in go with education and are left free. ## Tables ### Table 1. Graduates voted less Democratic than other voters in most elections through 2012 and more Democratic from 2016 Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by degree, ANES, 1956 to 2024; voters who reported a major-party vote, all voters (the button shows white non-Hispanic voters); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Population | Group | Election | Democratic share (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n voters | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1956 | 31.5 | 23.2 | 39.7 | 124 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 1956 | 41.2 | 38.3 | 44.1 | 1,136 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1964 | 50.0 | 41.7 | 58.3 | 142 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 1964 | 69.9 | 67.1 | 72.8 | 965 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1968 | 37.5 | 30.0 | 45.0 | 160 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 1968 | 48.1 | 44.6 | 51.7 | 750 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1972 | 39.3 | 33.5 | 45.1 | 275 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 1972 | 34.9 | 32.4 | 37.5 | 1,311 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1976 | 37.3 | 31.2 | 43.4 | 250 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 1976 | 54.4 | 51.4 | 57.5 | 1,069 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1980 | 35.0 | 28.0 | 41.9 | 183 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 1980 | 45.9 | 42.2 | 49.6 | 691 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1984 | 41.3 | 35.8 | 46.8 | 305 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 1984 | 41.9 | 38.9 | 44.8 | 1,063 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1988 | 42.2 | 36.8 | 47.5 | 325 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 1988 | 48.8 | 45.5 | 52.2 | 850 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1992 | 51.8 | 46.9 | 56.7 | 401 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 1992 | 61.9 | 58.7 | 65.0 | 922 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 1996 | 49.5 | 44.0 | 55.0 | 360 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 1996 | 62.2 | 58.2 | 66.3 | 672 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2000 | 50.4 | 45.3 | 55.4 | 429 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 2000 | 53.0 | 48.9 | 57.1 | 689 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2004 | 50.3 | 44.2 | 56.5 | 289 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 2004 | 49.7 | 45.0 | 54.4 | 522 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2008 | 50.8 | 45.0 | 56.6 | 400 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 2008 | 56.8 | 53.2 | 60.4 | 1,133 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2012 | 53.0 | 49.6 | 56.4 | 1,471 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 2012 | 53.8 | 51.2 | 56.4 | 2,673 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2016 | 60.4 | 57.2 | 63.6 | 1,175 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 2016 | 48.5 | 45.3 | 51.6 | 1,416 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2020 | 64.9 | 62.8 | 67.0 | 2,993 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 2020 | 50.0 | 47.6 | 52.5 | 3,036 | | All voters | Four-year degree or more | 2024 | 69.0 | 66.1 | 71.9 | 2,013 | | All voters | No four-year degree | 2024 | 45.7 | 42.5 | 48.8 | 1,905 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1956 | 30.6 | 22.3 | 38.8 | 121 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1956 | 40.1 | 37.1 | 43.0 | 1,086 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1964 | 46.6 | 38.1 | 55.1 | 133 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1964 | 67.0 | 63.9 | 70.2 | 877 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1968 | 33.8 | 26.2 | 41.3 | 151 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1968 | 42.6 | 38.9 | 46.4 | 664 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1972 | 34.5 | 28.6 | 40.4 | 252 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1972 | 29.4 | 26.8 | 32.0 | 1,168 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1976 | 36.6 | 30.3 | 42.9 | 237 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1976 | 48.9 | 45.6 | 52.1 | 940 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1980 | 31.5 | 24.4 | 38.6 | 165 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1980 | 37.5 | 33.5 | 41.4 | 574 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1984 | 39.6 | 33.8 | 45.5 | 270 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1984 | 34.4 | 31.3 | 37.5 | 875 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1988 | 38.6 | 32.9 | 44.3 | 280 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1988 | 39.1 | 35.4 | 42.8 | 665 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1992 | 48.0 | 42.7 | 53.4 | 335 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1992 | 54.8 | 51.1 | 58.6 | 693 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 1996 | 46.6 | 40.8 | 52.5 | 318 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 1996 | 53.0 | 48.2 | 57.7 | 514 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2000 | 48.1 | 42.5 | 53.6 | 357 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2000 | 44.6 | 39.9 | 49.2 | 533 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2004 | 45.7 | 38.8 | 52.5 | 233 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2004 | 39.6 | 34.1 | 45.1 | 368 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2008 | 43.3 | 36.5 | 50.0 | 258 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2008 | 43.8 | 39.1 | 48.6 | 523 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2012 | 47.0 | 43.1 | 50.8 | 1,039 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2012 | 40.3 | 37.2 | 43.4 | 1,489 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2016 | 55.2 | 51.6 | 58.8 | 937 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2016 | 34.1 | 30.6 | 37.6 | 1,010 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2020 | 60.2 | 57.8 | 62.6 | 2,339 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2020 | 35.6 | 32.9 | 38.3 | 2,230 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree or more | 2024 | 63.9 | 60.6 | 67.3 | 1,591 | | White non-Hispanic voters | No four-year degree | 2024 | 35.8 | 32.3 | 39.4 | 1,390 | Views: All voters (population = All voters); White non-Hispanic voters (population = White non-Hispanic voters). Note: A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100; cells below that are left out. This leaves out 1952 and 1960, and the line joins the neighboring elections. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; the file gives every respondent the same weight in most studies before 1992) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/vote_by_degree.json ### Table 2. Graduates became more Democratic than other respondents in vote and party identification, and in the ANES the party-identification gap followed the vote gap Democratic share among graduates minus the share among other respondents, points, ANES 1952 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; presidential vote (voters with a major-party vote) and party identification (identifiers, leaners included); all respondents (the button shows white non-Hispanic respondents) | Population | Measure | Survey | Study year | Gap (points) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1956 | −9.7 | −18.4 | −1.1 | 1,260 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1964 | −19.9 | −28.7 | −11.2 | 1,107 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1968 | −10.6 | −19.0 | −2.3 | 910 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1972 | +4.3 | −2.0 | 10.7 | 1,586 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1976 | −17.1 | −24.0 | −10.3 | 1,319 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1980 | −10.9 | −18.8 | −3.0 | 874 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1984 | −0.6 | −6.8 | 5.7 | 1,368 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1988 | −6.7 | −13.0 | −0.3 | 1,175 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1992 | −10.0 | −15.8 | −4.2 | 1,323 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1996 | −12.8 | −19.6 | −5.9 | 1,032 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2000 | −2.6 | −9.1 | 3.9 | 1,118 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2004 | +0.7 | −7.1 | 8.4 | 811 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2008 | −6.0 | −12.9 | 0.9 | 1,533 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2012 | −0.8 | −5.0 | 3.5 | 4,144 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2016 | +11.9 | 7.4 | 16.4 | 2,591 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2020 | +14.9 | 11.6 | 18.1 | 6,029 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2024 | +23.3 | 19.0 | 27.7 | 3,918 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2008 | +3.7 | 2.2 | 5.2 | 23,585 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2012 | +5.6 | 4.1 | 7.1 | 37,789 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2016 | +12.3 | 11.1 | 13.5 | 40,891 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2020 | +15.3 | 14.1 | 16.5 | 43,872 | | All respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2024 | +12.3 | 10.8 | 13.8 | 42,008 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1952 | −18.5 | −28.1 | −8.9 | 1,602 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1956 | −12.0 | −20.9 | −3.0 | 1,528 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1958 | −22.2 | −31.9 | −12.5 | 1,266 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1962 | −8.8 | −17.6 | 0.0 | 1,132 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1964 | −18.1 | −26.3 | −9.9 | 1,407 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1966 | −21.2 | −30.8 | −11.6 | 1,101 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1968 | −22.6 | −30.2 | −14.9 | 1,364 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1970 | −16.2 | −24.4 | −8.0 | 1,290 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1972 | −14.6 | −20.4 | −8.7 | 2,293 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1974 | −12.7 | −21.6 | −3.9 | 1,290 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1976 | −17.9 | −24.1 | −11.7 | 1,869 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1978 | −17.3 | −23.2 | −11.4 | 1,893 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1980 | −12.5 | −19.5 | −5.6 | 1,365 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1982 | −11.5 | −18.6 | −4.5 | 1,216 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1984 | −8.3 | −14.2 | −2.5 | 1,938 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1986 | −8.3 | −13.9 | −2.8 | 1,845 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1988 | −11.3 | −17.0 | −5.5 | 1,751 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1990 | −9.9 | −15.7 | −4.1 | 1,702 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1992 | −11.8 | −16.7 | −6.8 | 2,099 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1994 | −17.8 | −23.8 | −11.8 | 1,555 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1996 | −11.1 | −17.0 | −5.1 | 1,546 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1998 | −8.0 | −14.9 | −1.1 | 1,119 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2000 | −13.3 | −19.0 | −7.6 | 1,566 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2002 | −12.4 | −18.8 | −6.1 | 1,363 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2004 | −2.4 | −9.3 | 4.5 | 1,074 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2008 | −9.3 | −15.6 | −3.0 | 2,006 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2012 | −5.8 | −9.7 | −1.9 | 5,034 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2016 | +1.6 | −2.2 | 5.5 | 3,643 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2020 | +8.9 | 5.9 | 11.9 | 7,181 | | All respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2024 | +17.5 | 13.6 | 21.4 | 5,055 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2008 | −1.6 | −3.0 | −0.2 | 28,600 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2009 | +0.5 | −1.8 | 2.8 | 11,436 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2010 | +1.9 | 0.6 | 3.2 | 47,861 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2011 | +0.2 | −2.1 | 2.4 | 16,696 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2012 | +0.8 | −0.7 | 2.2 | 45,847 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2013 | +0.7 | −1.8 | 3.1 | 12,834 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2014 | +1.5 | 0.2 | 2.8 | 44,776 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2015 | +3.6 | 1.0 | 6.2 | 11,559 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2016 | +4.5 | 3.4 | 5.6 | 51,986 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2017 | +4.8 | 2.5 | 7.2 | 14,360 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2018 | +8.2 | 7.0 | 9.4 | 49,327 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2019 | +9.1 | 7.0 | 11.2 | 14,767 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2020 | +12.3 | 11.1 | 13.5 | 49,769 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2021 | +12.1 | 10.4 | 13.9 | 20,584 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2022 | +11.3 | 10.0 | 12.6 | 49,520 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2023 | +8.9 | 7.0 | 10.7 | 19,715 | | All respondents | Party identification | CES | 2024 | +9.4 | 8.0 | 10.9 | 50,847 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1956 | −9.5 | −18.2 | −0.7 | 1,207 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1964 | −20.4 | −29.5 | −11.4 | 1,010 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1968 | −8.8 | −17.3 | −0.4 | 815 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1972 | +5.2 | −1.3 | 11.6 | 1,420 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1976 | −12.3 | −19.3 | −5.2 | 1,177 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1980 | −5.9 | −14.1 | 2.2 | 739 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1984 | +5.2 | −1.4 | 11.9 | 1,145 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1988 | −0.5 | −7.3 | 6.3 | 945 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1992 | −6.8 | −13.3 | −0.3 | 1,028 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 1996 | −6.3 | −13.8 | 1.2 | 832 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2000 | +3.5 | −3.7 | 10.7 | 890 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2004 | +6.1 | −2.7 | 14.8 | 601 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2008 | −0.6 | −8.8 | 7.7 | 781 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2012 | +6.6 | 1.7 | 11.6 | 2,528 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2016 | +21.1 | 16.1 | 26.1 | 1,947 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2020 | +24.6 | 21.0 | 28.2 | 4,569 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | ANES | 2024 | +28.1 | 23.2 | 33.0 | 2,981 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2008 | +9.2 | 7.6 | 10.8 | 19,889 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2012 | +10.2 | 8.6 | 11.9 | 30,356 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2016 | +18.6 | 17.2 | 20.0 | 30,727 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2020 | +22.7 | 21.5 | 24.0 | 32,857 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Presidential vote | CES | 2024 | +16.1 | 14.5 | 17.7 | 31,857 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1952 | −19.4 | −29.2 | −9.5 | 1,464 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1956 | −12.7 | −21.8 | −3.7 | 1,415 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1958 | −22.6 | −32.6 | −12.6 | 1,164 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1962 | −7.1 | −16.2 | 2.0 | 1,036 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1964 | −16.4 | −24.8 | −7.9 | 1,258 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1966 | −18.6 | −28.3 | −8.9 | 978 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1968 | −21.5 | −29.4 | −13.6 | 1,206 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1970 | −13.8 | −22.2 | −5.4 | 1,148 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1972 | −14.6 | −20.7 | −8.4 | 2,018 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1974 | −9.9 | −19.1 | −0.8 | 1,138 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1976 | −14.7 | −21.1 | −8.2 | 1,607 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1978 | −15.1 | −21.3 | −8.9 | 1,613 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1980 | −11.8 | −19.2 | −4.3 | 1,136 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1982 | −7.8 | −15.3 | −0.4 | 1,031 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1984 | −5.4 | −11.7 | 0.9 | 1,568 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1986 | −4.1 | −10.2 | 1.9 | 1,431 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1988 | −6.3 | −12.5 | −0.1 | 1,321 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1990 | −7.6 | −14.0 | −1.2 | 1,288 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1992 | −8.3 | −13.8 | −2.8 | 1,606 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1994 | −12.4 | −19.0 | −5.8 | 1,200 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1996 | −6.3 | −12.9 | 0.3 | 1,201 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 1998 | −9.3 | −17.1 | −1.5 | 834 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2000 | −9.8 | −16.2 | −3.3 | 1,169 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2002 | −8.3 | −15.3 | −1.2 | 1,065 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2004 | +0.7 | −7.3 | 8.7 | 764 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2008 | −4.7 | −12.3 | 2.8 | 990 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2012 | −0.4 | −5.0 | 4.2 | 2,981 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2016 | +9.5 | 5.1 | 13.9 | 2,636 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2020 | +18.1 | 14.8 | 21.5 | 5,290 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | ANES | 2024 | +23.5 | 19.1 | 27.9 | 3,682 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2008 | +3.8 | 2.3 | 5.3 | 23,608 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2009 | +6.8 | 4.2 | 9.4 | 8,366 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2010 | +8.0 | 6.5 | 9.5 | 35,480 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2011 | +5.6 | 3.1 | 8.2 | 12,698 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2012 | +6.8 | 5.1 | 8.4 | 33,444 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2013 | +7.0 | 4.2 | 9.8 | 9,468 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2014 | +8.1 | 6.6 | 9.6 | 32,357 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2015 | +11.1 | 8.2 | 14.1 | 8,233 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2016 | +11.6 | 10.3 | 12.9 | 36,202 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2017 | +12.2 | 9.5 | 15.0 | 9,458 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2018 | +16.5 | 15.2 | 17.8 | 36,733 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2019 | +16.6 | 14.3 | 18.9 | 10,414 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2020 | +20.8 | 19.5 | 22.1 | 35,942 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2021 | +21.3 | 19.3 | 23.4 | 13,665 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2022 | +18.2 | 16.8 | 19.6 | 34,004 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2023 | +15.6 | 13.5 | 17.8 | 12,444 | | White non-Hispanic respondents | Party identification | CES | 2024 | +14.8 | 13.2 | 16.5 | 34,772 | Views: All respondents (population = All respondents); White non-Hispanic respondents (population = White non-Hispanic respondents). Note: A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100; cells below that are left out. The line joins the neighboring studies where a study is left out. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design. Note: The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals are model based and ignore how respondents came to be in the panel. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; the file gives every respondent the same weight in most studies before 1992); Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, 2008-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/gap_by_survey.json ### Table 3. The ANES voters were more Democratic than the certified count in 1992, 1996, 2020 and 2024, and the CES voters were within 1.1 points of it in every election Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among survey voters minus the certified national share, points, ANES 1976 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; all voters who reported a major-party vote, whether or not education is known (button: the graduate gap under each survey weight); 95% intervals | View | Row | Survey or weight | Difference or gap (points) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | certified | 1976 | ANES | 0.0 | −2.7 | 2.8 | 1,322 | | certified | 1980 | ANES | −1.2 | −4.5 | 2.1 | 877 | | certified | 1984 | ANES | +0.9 | −1.7 | 3.5 | 1,376 | | certified | 1988 | ANES | +0.9 | −1.9 | 3.8 | 1,195 | | certified | 1992 | ANES | +4.9 | 2.3 | 7.5 | 1,357 | | certified | 1996 | ANES | +3.6 | 0.3 | 6.9 | 1,034 | | certified | 2000 | ANES | +1.8 | −1.5 | 5.0 | 1,120 | | certified | 2004 | ANES | +1.1 | −2.6 | 4.9 | 811 | | certified | 2008 | ANES | +1.1 | −2.0 | 4.2 | 1,539 | | certified | 2012 | ANES | +1.6 | −0.4 | 3.6 | 4,188 | | certified | 2016 | ANES | +1.8 | −0.5 | 4.1 | 2,609 | | certified | 2020 | ANES | +3.7 | 2.0 | 5.4 | 6,119 | | certified | 2024 | ANES | +6.0 | 3.8 | 8.3 | 3,948 | | certified | 2008 | CES | +0.1 | −0.7 | 0.9 | 23,585 | | certified | 2012 | CES | +1.1 | 0.3 | 1.8 | 37,789 | | certified | 2016 | CES | −0.2 | −0.8 | 0.5 | 40,891 | | certified | 2020 | CES | +0.3 | −0.4 | 0.9 | 43,872 | | certified | 2024 | CES | −0.3 | −1.0 | 0.5 | 42,008 | | weights | ANES 2016 | Main weight | +11.9 | 7.4 | 16.4 | 2,591 | | weights | ANES 2016 | Post-election weight | +12.0 | 7.5 | 16.5 | 2,571 | | weights | ANES 2020 | Main weight | +14.9 | 11.6 | 18.1 | 6,029 | | weights | ANES 2020 | Post-election weight | +15.4 | 12.1 | 18.8 | 5,987 | | weights | ANES 2024 | Main weight | +23.3 | 19.0 | 27.7 | 3,918 | | weights | ANES 2024 | Post-election weight | +22.9 | 18.7 | 27.2 | 3,903 | | weights | CES 2012 | Main weight | +5.6 | 4.1 | 7.1 | 37,789 | | weights | CES 2012 | Post-election weight | +4.7 | 3.2 | 6.1 | 37,789 | | weights | CES 2016 | Main weight | +12.3 | 11.1 | 13.5 | 40,891 | | weights | CES 2016 | Post-election weight | +10.1 | 8.8 | 11.4 | 40,891 | | weights | CES 2020 | Main weight | +15.3 | 14.1 | 16.5 | 43,872 | | weights | CES 2020 | Post-election weight | +12.9 | 11.6 | 14.2 | 43,871 | | weights | CES 2020 | Validated-vote weight | +16.2 | 14.9 | 17.5 | 35,746 | | weights | CES 2024 | Main weight | +12.3 | 10.8 | 13.8 | 42,008 | | weights | CES 2024 | Validated-vote weight | +12.4 | 10.9 | 14.0 | 32,948 | Views: Against the certified count (panel = certified); Graduate gap by weight (panel = weights). Note: The certified share is the Democratic share of the Democratic and Republican candidates' votes in the state returns, summed over states; it is a full count and has no interval. The survey interval is shifted by the count. Note: ANES 2024 uses the pre-election weight VCF0009z; the weights view shows the post-election weight. The CES weights are the cumulative-file weight, the post-election weight (2012, 2016 and 2020) and the validated-vote weight (2020 and 2024). Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design. Note: The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals are model based and ignore how respondents came to be in the panel. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1976-2024, and CES cumulative file, 2008-2024; weighted (VCF0009z, weight_postelection, weight_cumulative, weight_post and vvweight, as labelled); MIT Election Data and Science Lab state presidential returns, 1976-2024; full counts Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/survey_checks.json ### Table 4. The vote gap rose after 2012 in both interview modes, and the in-person estimates are the larger ones in 2016 and 2024 ANES graduate gap in the vote and in party identification by interview mode, 2012, 2016 and 2024, points (button: issue gaps by mode, standard deviations); 95% intervals | View | Row | Mode | Gap | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | vote | Vote, 2012 | In person | −4.15 | −11.99 | 3.68 | 1,327 | | vote | Vote, 2012 | Web | +1.16 | −3.84 | 6.16 | 2,817 | | vote | Vote, 2016 | In person | +15.94 | 7.16 | 24.72 | 745 | | vote | Vote, 2016 | Web | +10.36 | 5.16 | 15.56 | 1,846 | | vote | Vote, 2024 | In person | +30.45 | 20.77 | 40.14 | 688 | | vote | Vote, 2024 | Web | +20.19 | 13.49 | 26.88 | 1,357 | | vote | Vote, 2024 | Panel and paper | +18.55 | 12.57 | 24.53 | 1,873 | | vote | Party identification, 2012 | In person | −7.86 | −14.84 | −0.88 | 1,800 | | vote | Party identification, 2012 | Web | −4.61 | −9.34 | 0.12 | 3,234 | | vote | Party identification, 2016 | In person | +5.19 | −2.35 | 12.74 | 1,040 | | vote | Party identification, 2016 | Web | +0.38 | −4.04 | 4.79 | 2,603 | | vote | Party identification, 2024 | In person | +24.64 | 16.14 | 33.14 | 963 | | vote | Party identification, 2024 | Web | +15.20 | 9.41 | 20.99 | 1,840 | | vote | Party identification, 2024 | Panel and paper | +12.71 | 7.13 | 18.29 | 2,252 | | issue | Economic index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | In person | +0.13 | 0.01 | 0.24 | 2,196 | | issue | Economic index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | Web | −0.08 | −0.15 | −0.02 | 5,094 | | issue | Cultural index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | In person | +0.46 | 0.35 | 0.57 | 2,195 | | issue | Cultural index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | Web | +0.34 | 0.27 | 0.41 | 5,077 | | issue | Racial index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | In person | +0.47 | 0.35 | 0.59 | 1,936 | | issue | Racial index, ANES 2016 and 2024 | Web | +0.22 | 0.15 | 0.29 | 4,291 | | issue | Immigration item, ANES 2016 and 2024 | In person | +0.43 | 0.31 | 0.54 | 1,934 | | issue | Immigration item, ANES 2016 and 2024 | Web | +0.31 | 0.24 | 0.38 | 4,292 | | issue | Economic index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | In person | −0.03 | −0.18 | 0.13 | 1,724 | | issue | Economic index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | Web | −0.04 | −0.16 | 0.08 | 2,278 | | issue | Cultural index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | In person | +0.11 | −0.02 | 0.25 | 2,541 | | issue | Cultural index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | Web | +0.15 | 0.02 | 0.28 | 1,952 | | issue | Racial index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | In person | +0.29 | 0.15 | 0.44 | 2,177 | | issue | Racial index, GSS 2022 and 2024 | Web | +0.29 | 0.18 | 0.40 | 2,782 | Views: Vote and party identification (panel = vote); Issue gaps (panel = issue). Note: The ANES has no mode weights for 2020, so 2020 has no row. The panel and paper group uses the full-sample weight and appears for 2024 only, because in 2012 and 2016 every respondent is in a mode group. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100; cells below that are left out. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design. Note: In the issue view each mode is standardized within itself, and the GSS in-person and web groups exclude the small residual interview modes. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2012, 2016 and 2024; weighted (mode weights weight_ftf and weight_web); General Social Survey, 2022 and 2024; weighted (weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/mode_check.json ### Table 5. In the CES the Democratic share rose at each step of education by 2016, while in 2008 a four-year degree did not differ from some college Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by highest degree, CES, 2008 to 2024; voters who reported a major-party vote, all voters (the button shows white non-Hispanic voters) | Population | Education | Election | Democratic share (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n voters | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All voters | Four-year degree | 2008 | 54.4 | 53.0 | 55.8 | 5,430 | | All voters | High school or less | 2008 | 51.3 | 49.9 | 52.8 | 8,004 | | All voters | Postgraduate degree | 2008 | 60.4 | 58.4 | 62.3 | 2,680 | | All voters | Some college | 2008 | 54.5 | 53.2 | 55.8 | 7,471 | | All voters | Four-year degree | 2012 | 54.8 | 53.3 | 56.3 | 9,203 | | All voters | High school or less | 2012 | 50.8 | 49.3 | 52.2 | 9,248 | | All voters | Postgraduate degree | 2012 | 60.8 | 59.0 | 62.7 | 5,907 | | All voters | Some college | 2012 | 52.0 | 50.7 | 53.2 | 13,431 | | All voters | Four-year degree | 2016 | 56.8 | 55.7 | 57.9 | 10,205 | | All voters | High school or less | 2016 | 43.9 | 42.5 | 45.3 | 9,580 | | All voters | Postgraduate degree | 2016 | 64.0 | 62.7 | 65.4 | 6,347 | | All voters | Some college | 2016 | 50.7 | 49.7 | 51.7 | 14,759 | | All voters | Four-year degree | 2020 | 58.5 | 57.4 | 59.6 | 11,567 | | All voters | High school or less | 2020 | 43.8 | 42.4 | 45.2 | 10,646 | | All voters | Postgraduate degree | 2020 | 67.3 | 66.0 | 68.6 | 7,301 | | All voters | Some college | 2020 | 49.2 | 48.2 | 50.2 | 14,358 | | All voters | Four-year degree | 2024 | 52.6 | 51.2 | 53.9 | 10,429 | | All voters | High school or less | 2024 | 40.0 | 38.3 | 41.6 | 10,255 | | All voters | Postgraduate degree | 2024 | 61.9 | 60.3 | 63.4 | 6,565 | | All voters | Some college | 2024 | 47.2 | 45.8 | 48.5 | 14,759 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree | 2008 | 49.6 | 48.1 | 51.1 | 4,676 | | White non-Hispanic voters | High school or less | 2008 | 41.9 | 40.4 | 43.4 | 6,826 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Postgraduate degree | 2008 | 58.0 | 55.9 | 60.0 | 2,406 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Some college | 2008 | 45.4 | 44.0 | 46.8 | 5,981 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree | 2012 | 50.8 | 49.1 | 52.5 | 7,351 | | White non-Hispanic voters | High school or less | 2012 | 42.2 | 40.6 | 43.7 | 7,719 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Postgraduate degree | 2012 | 58.9 | 56.9 | 61.0 | 4,867 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Some college | 2012 | 45.0 | 43.6 | 46.4 | 10,419 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree | 2016 | 52.6 | 51.3 | 53.9 | 7,165 | | White non-Hispanic voters | High school or less | 2016 | 33.2 | 31.9 | 34.6 | 7,960 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Postgraduate degree | 2016 | 61.7 | 60.1 | 63.2 | 4,893 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Some college | 2016 | 41.9 | 40.8 | 43.1 | 10,709 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree | 2020 | 54.0 | 52.8 | 55.2 | 8,433 | | White non-Hispanic voters | High school or less | 2020 | 30.1 | 28.8 | 31.3 | 8,684 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Postgraduate degree | 2020 | 64.3 | 62.8 | 65.7 | 5,637 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Some college | 2020 | 39.8 | 38.8 | 40.9 | 10,103 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Four-year degree | 2024 | 48.7 | 47.1 | 50.2 | 7,929 | | White non-Hispanic voters | High school or less | 2024 | 31.8 | 30.1 | 33.6 | 8,226 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Postgraduate degree | 2024 | 58.8 | 57.1 | 60.5 | 4,888 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Some college | 2024 | 40.5 | 39.1 | 41.9 | 10,814 | Views: All voters (population = All voters); White non-Hispanic voters (population = White non-Hispanic voters). Note: The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals are model based and ignore how respondents came to be in the panel. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, 2008-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/ces_education_levels.json ### Table 6. The economic gap moved toward zero between 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024, while most cultural, racial and immigration gaps stayed positive Graduate minus other respondents on each item, standard deviations of the item among all respondents; items oriented so that a higher value is the more liberal answer; ANES studies of 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 (buttons: ANES in person only, GSS, CES); 95% intervals | Survey view | Domain | Item | Early gap (SD) | 95% CI low early | 95% CI high early | n early | Late gap (SD) | 95% CI low late | 95% CI high late | n late | Change (SD) | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES | Economic items | Government should guarantee jobs | −0.23 | −0.28 | −0.18 | 7,299 | +0.03 | −0.02 | 0.07 | 15,657 | +0.25 | | ANES | Economic items | Government health insurance | −0.23 | −0.29 | −0.17 | 6,153 | +0.09 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 15,720 | +0.32 | | ANES | Economic items | More government services and spending | −0.29 | −0.34 | −0.24 | 6,985 | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 15,279 | +0.25 | | ANES | Economic items | More federal spending on the poor | −0.36 | −0.42 | −0.30 | 5,810 | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 17,496 | +0.31 | | ANES | Economic items | More federal spending on welfare | −0.10 | −0.15 | −0.05 | 7,492 | +0.09 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 17,475 | +0.19 | | ANES | Cultural items | Abortion always a personal choice | +0.37 | 0.32 | 0.42 | 8,731 | +0.32 | 0.28 | 0.36 | 16,947 | −0.05 | | ANES | Cultural items | Gay couples may adopt | +0.32 | 0.24 | 0.40 | 3,741 | +0.24 | 0.21 | 0.28 | 17,295 | −0.08 | | ANES | Cultural items | Job protection for gay people | +0.17 | 0.11 | 0.24 | 4,989 | +0.24 | 0.20 | 0.28 | 17,386 | +0.07 | | ANES | Cultural items | Moral traditionalism (two items) | +0.07 | 0.01 | 0.12 | 8,200 | +0.22 | 0.18 | 0.27 | 15,550 | +0.15 | | ANES | Racial items | Government effort to help Black Americans | +0.18 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 7,419 | +0.23 | 0.19 | 0.27 | 15,764 | +0.05 | | ANES | Racial items | Affirmative action in hiring and promotion | −0.06 | −0.11 | −0.01 | 7,977 | +0.05 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 15,261 | +0.11 | | ANES | Racial items | Racial resentment (four items) | +0.44 | 0.38 | 0.50 | 6,692 | +0.48 | 0.44 | 0.52 | 15,748 | +0.04 | | ANES | Immigration | More immigrants admitted | +0.36 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 6,543 | +0.37 | 0.33 | 0.41 | 15,694 | +0.02 | | ANES face to face | Economic items | Government should guarantee jobs | −0.23 | −0.28 | −0.17 | 6,391 | +0.14 | 0.03 | 0.25 | 1,998 | +0.37 | | ANES face to face | Economic items | Government health insurance | −0.24 | −0.30 | −0.18 | 5,219 | +0.21 | 0.10 | 0.33 | 2,058 | +0.45 | | ANES face to face | Economic items | More government services and spending | −0.28 | −0.33 | −0.22 | 6,131 | +0.04 | −0.08 | 0.16 | 1,914 | +0.32 | | ANES face to face | Economic items | More federal spending on the poor | −0.38 | −0.46 | −0.31 | 4,044 | −0.07 | −0.18 | 0.05 | 2,154 | +0.32 | | ANES face to face | Economic items | More federal spending on welfare | −0.10 | −0.16 | −0.04 | 5,723 | +0.20 | 0.09 | 0.32 | 2,149 | +0.30 | | ANES face to face | Cultural items | Abortion always a personal choice | +0.37 | 0.31 | 0.42 | 6,974 | +0.43 | 0.32 | 0.54 | 2,160 | +0.06 | | ANES face to face | Cultural items | Gay couples may adopt | +0.37 | 0.26 | 0.47 | 2,088 | +0.27 | 0.17 | 0.38 | 2,102 | −0.09 | | ANES face to face | Cultural items | Job protection for gay people | +0.20 | 0.12 | 0.27 | 3,519 | +0.29 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 2,132 | +0.10 | | ANES face to face | Cultural items | Moral traditionalism (two items) | +0.07 | 0.01 | 0.13 | 6,659 | +0.31 | 0.18 | 0.43 | 1,952 | +0.24 | | ANES face to face | Racial items | Government effort to help Black Americans | +0.19 | 0.13 | 0.25 | 6,496 | +0.36 | 0.24 | 0.47 | 1,954 | +0.17 | | ANES face to face | Racial items | Affirmative action in hiring and promotion | −0.01 | −0.07 | 0.05 | 6,351 | +0.20 | 0.08 | 0.32 | 1,864 | +0.21 | | ANES face to face | Racial items | Racial resentment (four items) | +0.44 | 0.38 | 0.51 | 5,153 | +0.61 | 0.49 | 0.72 | 1,961 | +0.16 | | ANES face to face | Immigration | More immigrants admitted | +0.36 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 6,543 | +0.43 | 0.31 | 0.54 | 1,934 | +0.07 | | GSS | Economic items | Government should improve the living standards of the poor | −0.22 | −0.27 | −0.17 | 8,451 | −0.01 | −0.06 | 0.05 | 10,473 | +0.21 | | GSS | Economic items | Government should help pay for medical care | −0.12 | −0.17 | −0.06 | 8,483 | −0.01 | −0.06 | 0.05 | 10,496 | +0.11 | | GSS | Economic items | Too little is spent on welfare | −0.03 | −0.09 | 0.03 | 6,221 | +0.06 | 0.00 | 0.12 | 7,822 | +0.09 | | GSS | Cultural items | Legal abortion for any reason | +0.30 | 0.25 | 0.36 | 8,282 | +0.33 | 0.27 | 0.39 | 7,928 | +0.03 | | GSS | Cultural items | Sex between two adults of the same sex is not wrong | +0.44 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 8,101 | +0.26 | 0.21 | 0.32 | 10,267 | −0.17 | | GSS | Cultural items | Sex before marriage is not wrong | +0.13 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 8,425 | +0.09 | 0.04 | 0.15 | 10,480 | −0.04 | | GSS | Cultural items | Marijuana should be legal | +0.11 | 0.05 | 0.16 | 8,268 | +0.06 | −0.02 | 0.14 | 5,266 | −0.04 | | GSS | Racial items | Government has a special obligation to help Black Americans | +0.06 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 8,414 | +0.21 | 0.16 | 0.27 | 10,343 | +0.16 | | GSS | Racial items | Too little is spent on improving conditions of Black Americans | +0.09 | 0.02 | 0.15 | 5,844 | +0.12 | 0.05 | 0.18 | 7,587 | +0.03 | | GSS | Racial items | Preferential hiring and promotion of Black Americans | 0.00 | −0.06 | 0.06 | 6,628 | +0.11 | 0.06 | 0.17 | 10,071 | +0.11 | | GSS | Racial items | Disagree that Black Americans should work up without special favors | +0.39 | 0.33 | 0.46 | 6,980 | +0.49 | 0.43 | 0.54 | 10,528 | +0.09 | | GSS | Racial items | Black-white differences are mainly due to discrimination | 0.00 | −0.05 | 0.06 | 8,212 | +0.23 | 0.17 | 0.28 | 8,114 | +0.22 | | CES | Economic items | Oppose repealing the Affordable Care Act | +0.13 | 0.11 | 0.15 | 55,829 | +0.26 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 60,856 | +0.13 | | CES | Economic items | Increase spending on welfare | −0.01 | −0.03 | 0.02 | 48,648 | +0.12 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 51,547 | +0.12 | | CES | Economic items | Increase spending on health care | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.04 | 48,626 | +0.04 | 0.02 | 0.07 | 51,547 | +0.11 | | CES | Cultural items | Always allow abortion | +0.07 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 55,678 | +0.18 | 0.16 | 0.20 | 60,982 | +0.11 | | CES | Cultural items | Oppose banning abortion after 20 weeks | +0.16 | 0.14 | 0.19 | 55,421 | +0.33 | 0.31 | 0.36 | 60,976 | +0.17 | | CES | Cultural items | Oppose prohibiting public funds for abortion | +0.12 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 55,465 | +0.20 | 0.18 | 0.22 | 60,982 | +0.08 | | CES | Immigration | Conditional legal status for undocumented immigrants | +0.14 | 0.12 | 0.17 | 56,200 | +0.07 | 0.04 | 0.09 | 60,944 | −0.08 | | CES | Immigration | Oppose increasing border security | +0.07 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 56,200 | +0.23 | 0.21 | 0.26 | 60,952 | +0.16 | Views: ANES (view = ANES); ANES, in person only (view = ANES face to face); GSS (view = GSS); CES (view = CES). Note: Positive gaps mean graduates gave the more liberal answer: more government action on economic and racial items, the more permissive answer on cultural items and more immigration. Note: The ANES late period mixes in-person and web interviews and has no mode weights for 2020. The in-person view uses the 1992 to 1998 studies and the in-person samples of 2016 and 2024. The racial resentment index and the moral traditionalism item are averages of four and two standardized items. Note: The CES has no racial item after 2014. The GSS extract has no immigration item. Note: Items were not asked in every study of a window: gay adoption in 1992 and 2000, job protection in 1992, 1996 and 2000, immigration in 1992 to 1998, the health, poor and welfare items in four of the five early studies, and the resentment items in all but 1996 and part of 1998. The common-items view of the within-party figure uses only items asked in every study. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1992-2024, General Social Survey, 1993-2024, and Cooperative Election Study, 2014 and 2020, as the buttons show; weighted (VCF0009z, weight_use and weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/issue_gaps.json ### Table 7. The graduate gap on guaranteed jobs rose from below zero to about zero by 2020, while the gaps on abortion and immigration stayed positive in every study Graduate minus other respondents on one long-running item per domain, standard deviations of the item among all respondents in the study year; ANES 1970 to 2024 (the button shows the GSS); 95% intervals | Survey | Item | Study year | Gap (SD) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1980 | +0.46 | 0.34 | 0.59 | 1,545 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1982 | +0.52 | 0.40 | 0.64 | 1,358 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1984 | +0.44 | 0.34 | 0.55 | 2,164 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1986 | +0.38 | 0.28 | 0.48 | 2,102 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1988 | +0.30 | 0.19 | 0.40 | 1,960 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1990 | +0.44 | 0.34 | 0.54 | 1,904 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1992 | +0.39 | 0.31 | 0.48 | 2,346 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1994 | +0.33 | 0.22 | 0.44 | 1,697 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1996 | +0.37 | 0.26 | 0.48 | 1,676 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 1998 | +0.36 | 0.23 | 0.49 | 1,255 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2000 | +0.38 | 0.27 | 0.48 | 1,757 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2004 | +0.39 | 0.25 | 0.53 | 1,047 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2008 | +0.33 | 0.16 | 0.49 | 1,026 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2012 | +0.27 | 0.20 | 0.34 | 5,787 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2016 | +0.32 | 0.25 | 0.39 | 4,176 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2020 | +0.30 | 0.24 | 0.35 | 7,788 | | ANES | Cultural: abortion always a personal choice | 2024 | +0.35 | 0.28 | 0.43 | 4,983 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1972 | +0.03 | −0.08 | 0.13 | 2,128 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1974 | −0.09 | −0.24 | 0.07 | 1,297 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1976 | −0.11 | −0.22 | 0.00 | 1,784 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1978 | −0.10 | −0.21 | 0.00 | 1,816 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1980 | −0.18 | −0.30 | −0.06 | 1,176 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1982 | −0.23 | −0.35 | −0.10 | 1,209 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1984 | −0.24 | −0.34 | −0.14 | 1,908 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1986 | −0.14 | −0.27 | 0.00 | 1,000 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1988 | −0.20 | −0.30 | −0.10 | 1,690 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1990 | −0.24 | −0.34 | −0.13 | 1,664 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1992 | −0.17 | −0.26 | −0.07 | 2,106 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1994 | −0.32 | −0.43 | −0.20 | 1,616 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1996 | −0.26 | −0.37 | −0.15 | 1,551 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 1998 | −0.20 | −0.33 | −0.08 | 1,118 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2000 | −0.23 | −0.36 | −0.10 | 908 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2004 | −0.11 | −0.24 | 0.01 | 1,103 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2008 | −0.17 | −0.33 | −0.01 | 1,020 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2012 | −0.20 | −0.27 | −0.13 | 5,414 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2016 | −0.10 | −0.17 | −0.02 | 3,742 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2020 | +0.05 | −0.01 | 0.11 | 7,213 | | ANES | Economic: government should guarantee jobs | 2024 | +0.07 | −0.01 | 0.15 | 4,702 | | ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 1992 | +0.28 | 0.18 | 0.38 | 2,113 | | ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 1994 | +0.40 | 0.27 | 0.52 | 1,694 | | ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 1996 | +0.41 | 0.29 | 0.52 | 1,496 | | ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 1998 | +0.36 | 0.23 | 0.49 | 1,240 | | ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2004 | +0.61 | 0.48 | 0.74 | 1,047 | | ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2008 | +0.46 | 0.34 | 0.59 | 2,048 | | ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2012 | +0.39 | 0.31 | 0.46 | 5,333 | | ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2016 | +0.33 | 0.26 | 0.41 | 3,597 | | ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2020 | +0.38 | 0.32 | 0.44 | 7,241 | | ANES | Immigration: more immigrants admitted | 2024 | +0.37 | 0.29 | 0.45 | 4,856 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1970 | +0.24 | 0.09 | 0.39 | 1,346 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1972 | +0.30 | 0.19 | 0.41 | 1,999 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1974 | +0.30 | 0.15 | 0.45 | 1,333 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1976 | +0.25 | 0.14 | 0.36 | 1,845 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1978 | +0.09 | −0.02 | 0.19 | 2,033 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1980 | +0.21 | 0.08 | 0.34 | 1,200 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1982 | +0.29 | 0.17 | 0.42 | 1,194 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1984 | +0.13 | 0.02 | 0.25 | 1,937 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1986 | +0.20 | 0.10 | 0.30 | 1,931 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1988 | +0.11 | 0.01 | 0.21 | 1,748 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1990 | +0.21 | 0.10 | 0.32 | 1,751 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1992 | +0.28 | 0.19 | 0.38 | 2,168 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1994 | +0.13 | 0.02 | 0.25 | 1,618 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1996 | +0.13 | 0.01 | 0.24 | 1,560 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 1998 | +0.16 | 0.03 | 0.29 | 1,150 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2000 | +0.14 | 0.00 | 0.28 | 923 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2004 | +0.20 | 0.07 | 0.34 | 1,073 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2008 | +0.08 | −0.04 | 0.20 | 1,910 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2012 | +0.04 | −0.04 | 0.11 | 5,131 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2016 | +0.15 | 0.07 | 0.22 | 3,724 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2020 | +0.24 | 0.18 | 0.30 | 7,294 | | ANES | Racial: government help for Black Americans | 2024 | +0.25 | 0.17 | 0.33 | 4,746 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1977 | +0.48 | 0.31 | 0.64 | 1,473 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1978 | +0.50 | 0.31 | 0.70 | 1,481 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1980 | +0.53 | 0.36 | 0.70 | 1,402 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1982 | +0.37 | 0.19 | 0.55 | 1,752 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1983 | +0.58 | 0.41 | 0.75 | 1,514 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1984 | +0.53 | 0.37 | 0.69 | 1,417 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1985 | +0.48 | 0.31 | 0.64 | 1,481 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1987 | +0.47 | 0.32 | 0.62 | 1,722 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1988 | +0.62 | 0.44 | 0.81 | 935 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1989 | +0.36 | 0.18 | 0.54 | 983 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1990 | +0.31 | 0.13 | 0.50 | 873 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1991 | +0.44 | 0.26 | 0.61 | 947 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1993 | +0.34 | 0.18 | 0.50 | 1,009 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1994 | +0.24 | 0.13 | 0.36 | 1,931 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1996 | +0.35 | 0.23 | 0.46 | 1,814 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 1998 | +0.29 | 0.16 | 0.41 | 1,773 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2000 | +0.34 | 0.22 | 0.47 | 1,755 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2002 | +0.26 | 0.08 | 0.44 | 899 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2004 | +0.44 | 0.27 | 0.61 | 852 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2006 | +0.36 | 0.23 | 0.48 | 1,939 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2008 | +0.39 | 0.25 | 0.54 | 1,298 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2010 | +0.39 | 0.24 | 0.54 | 1,230 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2012 | +0.45 | 0.30 | 0.59 | 1,248 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2014 | +0.45 | 0.34 | 0.57 | 1,653 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2016 | +0.35 | 0.23 | 0.47 | 1,808 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2018 | +0.38 | 0.24 | 0.51 | 1,524 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2021 | +0.35 | 0.23 | 0.48 | 1,322 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2022 | +0.28 | 0.10 | 0.45 | 1,136 | | GSS | Cultural: legal abortion for any reason | 2024 | +0.28 | 0.16 | 0.40 | 2,138 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1975 | −0.25 | −0.40 | −0.10 | 1,447 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1983 | −0.28 | −0.42 | −0.13 | 1,528 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1984 | −0.27 | −0.41 | −0.13 | 1,407 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1986 | −0.23 | −0.36 | −0.10 | 1,429 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1987 | −0.11 | −0.25 | 0.03 | 1,754 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1988 | −0.05 | −0.21 | 0.11 | 971 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1989 | −0.21 | −0.38 | −0.04 | 997 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1990 | −0.20 | −0.37 | −0.04 | 874 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1991 | −0.29 | −0.45 | −0.12 | 980 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1993 | −0.29 | −0.44 | −0.14 | 1,025 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1994 | −0.26 | −0.37 | −0.15 | 1,933 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1996 | −0.23 | −0.34 | −0.12 | 1,845 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 1998 | −0.19 | −0.31 | −0.07 | 1,836 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2000 | −0.16 | −0.28 | −0.04 | 1,812 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2002 | −0.07 | −0.23 | 0.09 | 888 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2004 | −0.22 | −0.38 | −0.05 | 864 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2006 | −0.14 | −0.26 | −0.02 | 1,958 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2008 | −0.16 | −0.29 | −0.02 | 1,332 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2010 | −0.18 | −0.32 | −0.05 | 1,340 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2012 | −0.24 | −0.38 | −0.10 | 1,294 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2014 | −0.14 | −0.26 | −0.03 | 1,638 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2016 | +0.02 | −0.10 | 0.13 | 1,884 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2018 | +0.03 | −0.10 | 0.17 | 1,519 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2021 | +0.03 | −0.06 | 0.12 | 2,621 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2022 | +0.02 | −0.11 | 0.15 | 2,322 | | GSS | Economic: government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2024 | −0.13 | −0.25 | −0.01 | 2,127 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1975 | +0.27 | 0.11 | 0.43 | 1,447 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1983 | +0.17 | 0.01 | 0.32 | 1,524 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1984 | +0.09 | −0.06 | 0.25 | 1,397 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1986 | +0.25 | 0.11 | 0.40 | 1,426 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1987 | +0.25 | 0.12 | 0.39 | 1,757 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1988 | +0.28 | 0.10 | 0.45 | 963 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1989 | +0.24 | 0.06 | 0.41 | 995 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1990 | +0.30 | 0.16 | 0.43 | 1,318 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1991 | +0.01 | −0.16 | 0.18 | 977 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1993 | −0.07 | −0.22 | 0.08 | 1,017 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1994 | +0.05 | −0.05 | 0.16 | 1,933 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1996 | −0.01 | −0.12 | 0.11 | 1,847 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 1998 | +0.14 | 0.02 | 0.26 | 1,828 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2000 | +0.09 | −0.03 | 0.21 | 1,789 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2002 | +0.14 | −0.03 | 0.31 | 890 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2004 | +0.06 | −0.11 | 0.23 | 858 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2006 | +0.08 | −0.04 | 0.20 | 1,948 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2008 | +0.10 | −0.04 | 0.23 | 1,307 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2010 | −0.06 | −0.20 | 0.08 | 1,322 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2012 | +0.07 | −0.08 | 0.21 | 1,282 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2014 | +0.05 | −0.07 | 0.17 | 1,622 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2016 | +0.16 | 0.04 | 0.28 | 1,872 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2018 | +0.17 | 0.02 | 0.31 | 1,493 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2021 | +0.32 | 0.23 | 0.41 | 2,590 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2022 | +0.31 | 0.18 | 0.44 | 2,283 | | GSS | Racial: government obligation to help Black Americans | 2024 | +0.06 | −0.06 | 0.19 | 2,105 | Views: ANES (source = ANES); GSS (source = GSS). Note: A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100; cells below that are left out. Note: Items are oriented so that a positive gap means graduates gave the more liberal answer. GSS 2021 was collected mostly on the web and GSS 2022 and 2024 mixed in-person and web interviews. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a random sample and ignore the stages of the sample design. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1970-2024; General Social Survey, 1975-2024; weighted (VCF0009z and weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/anchor_gaps.json ### Table 8. Graduate Democrats stay more liberal than other Democrats on cultural, racial and immigration items, and graduate Republicans are more conservative than other Republicans on economic items Graduate minus other respondents on each domain index, standard deviations, for all respondents, Democrats, Republicans and net of party identification; ANES 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 (buttons: white non-Hispanic respondents, in-person samples, items asked in every study, GSS, CES); 95% intervals | Survey view | Index | Group | Early gap (SD) | 95% CI low early | 95% CI high early | n early | Late gap (SD) | 95% CI low late | 95% CI high late | n late | Change (SD) | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES | Economic index | All respondents | −0.32 | −0.37 | −0.28 | 8,626 | +0.02 | −0.02 | 0.06 | 17,568 | +0.34 | | ANES | Economic index | Democrats | 0.00 | −0.07 | 0.06 | 4,308 | +0.09 | 0.04 | 0.14 | 8,237 | +0.09 | | ANES | Economic index | Republicans | −0.41 | −0.48 | −0.35 | 3,316 | −0.27 | −0.32 | −0.23 | 7,419 | +0.14 | | ANES | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.21 | −0.25 | −0.16 | 8,577 | −0.10 | −0.13 | −0.07 | 17,506 | +0.11 | | ANES | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.30 | 0.25 | 0.36 | 8,405 | +0.36 | 0.32 | 0.39 | 17,532 | +0.05 | | ANES | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.67 | 0.60 | 0.75 | 4,181 | +0.39 | 0.35 | 0.43 | 8,234 | −0.28 | | ANES | Cultural index | Republicans | +0.06 | −0.02 | 0.13 | 3,237 | +0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 7,406 | +0.09 | | ANES | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.39 | 0.34 | 0.44 | 8,351 | +0.26 | 0.22 | 0.29 | 17,476 | −0.14 | | ANES | Racial index | All respondents | +0.21 | 0.16 | 0.27 | 7,974 | +0.31 | 0.27 | 0.35 | 15,664 | +0.09 | | ANES | Racial index | Democrats | +0.55 | 0.47 | 0.64 | 3,952 | +0.32 | 0.27 | 0.38 | 7,404 | −0.23 | | ANES | Racial index | Republicans | +0.05 | −0.01 | 0.11 | 3,124 | +0.06 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 6,613 | +0.01 | | ANES | Racial index | Net of party identification | +0.29 | 0.24 | 0.34 | 7,930 | +0.18 | 0.15 | 0.21 | 15,621 | −0.11 | | ANES | Immigration item | All respondents | +0.36 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 6,543 | +0.37 | 0.33 | 0.41 | 15,694 | +0.02 | | ANES | Immigration item | Democrats | +0.49 | 0.41 | 0.58 | 3,282 | +0.40 | 0.34 | 0.45 | 7,418 | −0.10 | | ANES | Immigration item | Republicans | +0.23 | 0.14 | 0.31 | 2,531 | +0.23 | 0.17 | 0.29 | 6,627 | 0.00 | | ANES | Immigration item | Net of party identification | +0.36 | 0.31 | 0.42 | 6,510 | +0.30 | 0.26 | 0.34 | 15,647 | −0.07 | | ANES white | Economic index | All respondents | −0.25 | −0.30 | −0.20 | 6,581 | +0.14 | 0.09 | 0.18 | 12,630 | +0.39 | | ANES white | Economic index | Democrats | +0.10 | 0.02 | 0.18 | 2,911 | +0.18 | 0.12 | 0.24 | 5,197 | +0.08 | | ANES white | Economic index | Republicans | −0.38 | −0.44 | −0.31 | 2,913 | −0.24 | −0.29 | −0.20 | 6,252 | +0.13 | | ANES white | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.16 | −0.20 | −0.11 | 6,545 | −0.08 | −0.12 | −0.05 | 12,602 | +0.07 | | ANES white | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.31 | 0.25 | 0.37 | 6,446 | +0.39 | 0.34 | 0.43 | 12,617 | +0.08 | | ANES white | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.69 | 0.60 | 0.77 | 2,842 | +0.31 | 0.27 | 0.36 | 5,199 | −0.38 | | ANES white | Cultural index | Republicans | +0.08 | 0.00 | 0.16 | 2,859 | +0.14 | 0.07 | 0.21 | 6,248 | +0.06 | | ANES white | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.39 | 0.33 | 0.44 | 6,407 | +0.19 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 12,591 | −0.20 | | ANES white | Racial index | All respondents | +0.35 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 6,173 | +0.47 | 0.43 | 0.52 | 11,396 | +0.12 | | ANES white | Racial index | Democrats | +0.74 | 0.65 | 0.83 | 2,717 | +0.52 | 0.45 | 0.58 | 4,750 | −0.22 | | ANES white | Racial index | Republicans | +0.12 | 0.06 | 0.18 | 2,771 | +0.11 | 0.07 | 0.15 | 5,611 | −0.01 | | ANES white | Racial index | Net of party identification | +0.39 | 0.34 | 0.44 | 6,139 | +0.27 | 0.23 | 0.31 | 11,375 | −0.12 | | ANES white | Immigration item | All respondents | +0.41 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 5,042 | +0.48 | 0.43 | 0.53 | 11,410 | +0.08 | | ANES white | Immigration item | Democrats | +0.58 | 0.49 | 0.67 | 2,245 | +0.46 | 0.39 | 0.53 | 4,752 | −0.12 | | ANES white | Immigration item | Republicans | +0.26 | 0.17 | 0.35 | 2,249 | +0.26 | 0.20 | 0.33 | 5,621 | 0.00 | | ANES white | Immigration item | Net of party identification | +0.41 | 0.34 | 0.47 | 5,018 | +0.34 | 0.29 | 0.38 | 11,386 | −0.07 | | ANES face to face | Economic index | All respondents | −0.34 | −0.39 | −0.28 | 6,858 | +0.13 | 0.01 | 0.24 | 2,196 | +0.46 | | ANES face to face | Economic index | Democrats | +0.01 | −0.06 | 0.08 | 3,435 | +0.20 | 0.07 | 0.34 | 1,047 | +0.20 | | ANES face to face | Economic index | Republicans | −0.43 | −0.50 | −0.36 | 2,651 | −0.28 | −0.40 | −0.15 | 953 | +0.15 | | ANES face to face | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.21 | −0.26 | −0.16 | 6,824 | −0.03 | −0.12 | 0.06 | 2,170 | +0.18 | | ANES face to face | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.30 | 0.24 | 0.36 | 6,629 | +0.46 | 0.35 | 0.57 | 2,195 | +0.16 | | ANES face to face | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.70 | 0.62 | 0.78 | 3,306 | +0.48 | 0.36 | 0.61 | 1,047 | −0.22 | | ANES face to face | Cultural index | Republicans | +0.03 | −0.05 | 0.12 | 2,566 | +0.16 | −0.01 | 0.33 | 953 | +0.13 | | ANES face to face | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.39 | 0.34 | 0.45 | 6,589 | +0.32 | 0.23 | 0.42 | 2,169 | −0.07 | | ANES face to face | Racial index | All respondents | +0.23 | 0.17 | 0.29 | 6,412 | +0.47 | 0.35 | 0.59 | 1,936 | +0.24 | | ANES face to face | Racial index | Democrats | +0.61 | 0.51 | 0.70 | 3,190 | +0.49 | 0.33 | 0.64 | 929 | −0.12 | | ANES face to face | Racial index | Republicans | +0.03 | −0.03 | 0.10 | 2,517 | +0.07 | −0.06 | 0.19 | 844 | +0.03 | | ANES face to face | Racial index | Net of party identification | +0.31 | 0.25 | 0.37 | 6,379 | +0.29 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 1,917 | −0.03 | | ANES face to face | Immigration item | All respondents | +0.36 | 0.30 | 0.41 | 6,543 | +0.43 | 0.31 | 0.54 | 1,934 | +0.07 | | ANES face to face | Immigration item | Democrats | +0.49 | 0.41 | 0.58 | 3,282 | +0.45 | 0.30 | 0.60 | 928 | −0.04 | | ANES face to face | Immigration item | Republicans | +0.23 | 0.14 | 0.31 | 2,531 | +0.21 | 0.04 | 0.37 | 842 | −0.02 | | ANES face to face | Immigration item | Net of party identification | +0.36 | 0.31 | 0.42 | 6,510 | +0.34 | 0.23 | 0.45 | 1,915 | −0.03 | | ANES common items | Economic index | All respondents | −0.30 | −0.36 | −0.25 | 6,540 | +0.02 | −0.02 | 0.06 | 14,092 | +0.32 | | ANES common items | Economic index | Democrats | 0.00 | −0.07 | 0.07 | 3,227 | +0.01 | −0.04 | 0.06 | 6,755 | +0.01 | | ANES common items | Economic index | Republicans | −0.40 | −0.47 | −0.33 | 2,655 | −0.22 | −0.27 | −0.17 | 6,079 | +0.18 | | ANES common items | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.19 | −0.24 | −0.14 | 6,510 | −0.11 | −0.15 | −0.08 | 14,058 | +0.08 | | ANES common items | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.27 | 0.22 | 0.33 | 8,023 | +0.32 | 0.28 | 0.37 | 14,986 | +0.05 | | ANES common items | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.63 | 0.56 | 0.71 | 3,989 | +0.38 | 0.33 | 0.43 | 7,139 | −0.25 | | ANES common items | Cultural index | Republicans | +0.04 | −0.03 | 0.12 | 3,117 | +0.05 | −0.01 | 0.11 | 6,309 | +0.01 | | ANES common items | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.36 | 0.31 | 0.41 | 7,980 | +0.21 | 0.17 | 0.24 | 14,952 | −0.15 | | ANES common items | Racial index | All respondents | +0.11 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 6,714 | +0.19 | 0.15 | 0.24 | 13,651 | +0.08 | | ANES common items | Racial index | Democrats | +0.41 | 0.31 | 0.50 | 3,320 | +0.18 | 0.12 | 0.24 | 6,566 | −0.23 | | ANES common items | Racial index | Republicans | 0.00 | −0.06 | 0.06 | 2,694 | −0.02 | −0.07 | 0.02 | 5,830 | −0.02 | | ANES common items | Racial index | Net of party identification | +0.19 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 6,682 | +0.07 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 13,625 | −0.12 | | GSS | Economic index | All respondents | −0.20 | −0.25 | −0.14 | 8,455 | +0.01 | −0.04 | 0.07 | 10,477 | +0.21 | | GSS | Economic index | Democrats | +0.04 | −0.04 | 0.11 | 3,868 | +0.06 | 0.00 | 0.12 | 4,526 | +0.03 | | GSS | Economic index | Republicans | −0.34 | −0.42 | −0.26 | 3,121 | −0.21 | −0.30 | −0.13 | 3,419 | +0.13 | | GSS | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.14 | −0.19 | −0.09 | 8,253 | −0.09 | −0.14 | −0.05 | 10,100 | +0.04 | | GSS | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.30 | 0.26 | 0.35 | 12,545 | +0.23 | 0.18 | 0.28 | 12,069 | −0.07 | | GSS | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.58 | 0.51 | 0.65 | 5,772 | +0.38 | 0.32 | 0.44 | 5,290 | −0.20 | | GSS | Cultural index | Republicans | +0.11 | 0.04 | 0.18 | 4,579 | −0.04 | −0.14 | 0.05 | 3,920 | −0.15 | | GSS | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.34 | 0.30 | 0.39 | 12,278 | +0.18 | 0.13 | 0.23 | 11,608 | −0.16 | | GSS | Racial index | All respondents | +0.15 | 0.10 | 0.20 | 10,162 | +0.29 | 0.24 | 0.34 | 13,038 | +0.14 | | GSS | Racial index | Democrats | +0.38 | 0.30 | 0.45 | 4,706 | +0.38 | 0.32 | 0.44 | 5,626 | +0.01 | | GSS | Racial index | Republicans | −0.01 | −0.07 | 0.06 | 3,670 | +0.01 | −0.06 | 0.07 | 4,248 | +0.01 | | GSS | Racial index | Net of party identification | +0.19 | 0.14 | 0.24 | 9,957 | +0.18 | 0.14 | 0.22 | 12,564 | −0.01 | | CES | Economic index | All respondents | +0.03 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 48,781 | +0.18 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 51,551 | +0.15 | | CES | Economic index | Democrats | +0.17 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 22,211 | +0.17 | 0.14 | 0.19 | 25,217 | 0.00 | | CES | Economic index | Republicans | −0.16 | −0.19 | −0.14 | 16,996 | −0.15 | −0.18 | −0.12 | 17,944 | +0.01 | | CES | Economic index | Net of party identification | −0.01 | −0.03 | 0.01 | 46,694 | 0.00 | −0.02 | 0.02 | 50,405 | +0.01 | | CES | Cultural index | All respondents | +0.16 | 0.13 | 0.18 | 55,757 | +0.30 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 60,988 | +0.14 | | CES | Cultural index | Democrats | +0.36 | 0.33 | 0.39 | 25,526 | +0.40 | 0.37 | 0.42 | 29,351 | +0.04 | | CES | Cultural index | Republicans | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.04 | 18,935 | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.05 | 20,412 | 0.00 | | CES | Cultural index | Net of party identification | +0.14 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 53,057 | +0.17 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 58,620 | +0.02 | | CES | Immigration item | All respondents | +0.13 | 0.11 | 0.16 | 56,200 | +0.18 | 0.16 | 0.21 | 60,910 | +0.05 | | CES | Immigration item | Democrats | +0.29 | 0.26 | 0.32 | 25,737 | +0.23 | 0.21 | 0.26 | 29,318 | −0.06 | | CES | Immigration item | Republicans | −0.03 | −0.06 | 0.00 | 19,039 | −0.09 | −0.12 | −0.06 | 20,377 | −0.06 | | CES | Immigration item | Net of party identification | +0.12 | 0.10 | 0.14 | 53,459 | +0.06 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 58,543 | −0.06 | Views: ANES (view = ANES); ANES, white non-Hispanic (view = ANES white); ANES, in person only (view = ANES face to face); ANES, items asked in every study (view = ANES common items); GSS (view = GSS); CES (view = CES). Note: Democrats and Republicans include leaners; pure independents are in the all-respondents row and the net row only. Each index is standardized among all respondents in the period before the group is selected. Note: The net row comes from a weighted linear regression with HC3 errors; the other rows use Kish intervals. The CES view compares 2014 with 2020 and has no racial index; the GSS view has no immigration index. Note: The in-person view uses the 1992 to 1998 studies and the in-person samples of 2016 and 2024. The common-items view uses jobs and government services (economic), abortion and moral traditionalism (cultural) and government help and affirmative action (racial), the items asked in every study of both windows; it has no immigration index. Note: A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100; cells below that are left out. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1992-2024, General Social Survey, 1993-2024, and Cooperative Election Study, 2014 and 2020, as the buttons show; weighted (VCF0009z, weight_use and weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/within_party.json ### Table 9. Holding income rank fixed shrinks the rise in the vote gap from 2012 to 2024 from +24.5 to +18.6 points and leaves most of it Graduate minus other voters in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, points, ANES 1956 to 2024, from weighted linear probability models on voters with a reported family income; all voters (the button shows white non-Hispanic voters); 95% HC3 intervals | Population | Specification | Election | Gap (points) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n voters | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1956 | −9.4 | −18.3 | −0.5 | 1,210 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1960 | −12.2 | −24.6 | 0.3 | 891 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1964 | −21.3 | −30.2 | −12.4 | 1,070 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1968 | −9.8 | −18.3 | −1.4 | 892 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1972 | +4.6 | −1.8 | 11.0 | 1,546 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1976 | −15.1 | −22.2 | −8.1 | 1,239 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1980 | −11.8 | −20.0 | −3.6 | 793 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1984 | −1.7 | −8.2 | 4.9 | 1,245 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1988 | −7.5 | −14.0 | −0.9 | 1,082 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1992 | −9.8 | −15.8 | −3.8 | 1,238 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1996 | −11.6 | −18.8 | −4.4 | 941 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2000 | −0.3 | −7.4 | 6.8 | 941 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2004 | +1.3 | −6.8 | 9.5 | 729 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2008 | −6.5 | −13.6 | 0.7 | 1,442 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2012 | −0.9 | −5.2 | 3.4 | 4,040 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2016 | +12.1 | 7.6 | 16.6 | 2,542 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2020 | +15.1 | 11.8 | 18.4 | 5,902 | | All voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2024 | +23.6 | 19.1 | 28.0 | 3,570 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 1956 | −4.4 | −13.8 | 5.0 | 1,210 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 1960 | −8.3 | −21.7 | 5.0 | 891 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 1964 | −16.9 | −26.4 | −7.5 | 1,070 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 1968 | −8.5 | −17.4 | 0.4 | 892 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 1972 | +9.7 | 3.1 | 16.3 | 1,546 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 1976 | −8.3 | −15.6 | −0.9 | 1,239 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 1980 | −5.8 | −14.3 | 2.7 | 793 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 1984 | +5.4 | −1.2 | 12.1 | 1,245 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 1988 | −2.4 | −9.3 | 4.5 | 1,082 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 1992 | −4.1 | −10.5 | 2.4 | 1,238 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 1996 | −5.3 | −13.0 | 2.5 | 941 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 2000 | +5.1 | −2.5 | 12.8 | 941 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 2004 | +7.9 | −0.9 | 16.7 | 729 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 2008 | +1.8 | −5.6 | 9.2 | 1,442 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 2012 | +3.5 | −1.1 | 8.1 | 4,040 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 2016 | +15.3 | 10.4 | 20.1 | 2,542 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 2020 | +17.5 | 13.9 | 21.0 | 5,902 | | All voters | Net of income rank | 2024 | +22.1 | 17.2 | 27.0 | 3,570 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1956 | −4.5 | −13.8 | 4.9 | 1,210 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1960 | −8.0 | −21.5 | 5.4 | 891 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1964 | −17.2 | −26.4 | −8.1 | 1,070 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1968 | −7.5 | −16.0 | 1.0 | 892 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1972 | +9.3 | 3.0 | 15.5 | 1,546 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1976 | −6.6 | −13.9 | 0.7 | 1,239 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1980 | −5.0 | −13.4 | 3.3 | 793 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1984 | +6.3 | −0.3 | 12.9 | 1,245 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1988 | −1.4 | −8.1 | 5.3 | 1,082 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1992 | −3.6 | −10.0 | 2.8 | 1,238 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 1996 | −3.4 | −11.0 | 4.2 | 941 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2000 | +6.4 | −1.2 | 14.1 | 941 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2004 | +10.1 | 1.7 | 18.4 | 729 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2008 | +4.2 | −3.0 | 11.4 | 1,442 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2012 | +5.8 | 1.3 | 10.3 | 4,040 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2016 | +16.8 | 12.1 | 21.5 | 2,542 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2020 | +18.4 | 15.0 | 21.7 | 5,902 | | All voters | Net of income rank and race | 2024 | +22.6 | 17.9 | 27.4 | 3,570 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1956 | −9.1 | −18.1 | −0.2 | 1,158 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1964 | −22.1 | −31.3 | −12.9 | 978 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1968 | −8.3 | −16.8 | 0.3 | 803 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1972 | +5.3 | −1.2 | 11.8 | 1,384 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1976 | −10.5 | −17.8 | −3.2 | 1,108 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1980 | −7.1 | −15.6 | 1.3 | 676 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1984 | +3.8 | −3.1 | 10.8 | 1,043 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1988 | −1.6 | −8.7 | 5.4 | 864 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1992 | −6.7 | −13.4 | 0.0 | 964 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 1996 | −5.2 | −13.2 | 2.7 | 760 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2000 | +6.3 | −1.6 | 14.1 | 751 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2004 | +6.4 | −2.8 | 15.6 | 544 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2008 | −0.7 | −9.1 | 7.7 | 743 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2012 | +6.5 | 1.5 | 11.5 | 2,466 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2016 | +21.6 | 16.5 | 26.7 | 1,910 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2020 | +25.0 | 21.4 | 28.7 | 4,469 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Graduate indicator alone | 2024 | +28.5 | 23.3 | 33.6 | 2,738 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1956 | −4.4 | −13.9 | 5.0 | 1,158 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1964 | −18.9 | −28.6 | −9.1 | 978 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1968 | −8.2 | −17.2 | 0.8 | 803 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1972 | +8.6 | 1.9 | 15.4 | 1,384 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1976 | −5.5 | −13.1 | 2.0 | 1,108 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1980 | −3.6 | −12.4 | 5.3 | 676 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1984 | +8.7 | 1.7 | 15.7 | 1,043 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1988 | +1.4 | −5.9 | 8.8 | 864 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1992 | −2.2 | −9.3 | 5.0 | 964 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 1996 | −1.4 | −9.8 | 7.0 | 760 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2000 | +9.9 | 1.4 | 18.3 | 751 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2004 | +11.1 | 1.3 | 20.9 | 544 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2008 | +6.7 | −1.9 | 15.3 | 743 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2012 | +8.1 | 2.9 | 13.4 | 2,466 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2016 | +21.6 | 16.3 | 27.0 | 1,910 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2020 | +25.4 | 21.5 | 29.4 | 4,469 | | White non-Hispanic voters | Net of income rank | 2024 | +26.7 | 21.1 | 32.4 | 2,738 | Views: All voters (population = All voters); White non-Hispanic voters (population = White non-Hispanic voters). Note: Elections where either education group has fewer than 100 voters with a reported income are left out (1952). Note: Every line comes from the same rows within a view, those with a reported income. Intervals use HC3 robust errors. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; the file gives every respondent the same weight in most studies before 1992) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/gap_net_of_income.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (200), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | abort_max | +0.52 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | largest annual gap | ANES respondents, abortion item | 1980 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | abort_min | +0.27 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest annual gap | ANES respondents, abortion item | 1980 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | aid_2012 | +0.04 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, government help for Black Americans item | 2012 | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.11 | 5,131 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | aid_2024 | +0.25 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, government help for Black Americans item | 2024 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.33 | 4,746 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_abort_r_late | +0.11 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), abortion item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.17 | 7,142 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_cert_diff_2020 | +3.7 | percentage points (ANES share minus certified share) | ANES weighted Democratic share minus the certified two-party share; the interval is the ANES Kish interval | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2020 | 95% CI 2.0 to 5.4 | 6,119 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_cert_diff_2024 | +6.0 | percentage points (ANES share minus certified share) | ANES weighted Democratic share minus the certified two-party share; the interval is the ANES Kish interval | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 3.8 to 8.3 | 3,948 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_post_2024 | +22.9 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, under the post-election weight | 2024 | 95% CI 18.7 to 27.2 | 3,903 | weight_postelection (V240107b) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_share_2020 | 56.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 | 95% CI 54.3% to 57.7% | 6,119 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_share_2024 | 55.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 53.0% to 57.5% | 3,948 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cert_2020 | 52.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | certified Democratic share of the Democratic and Republican state vote totals | all voters in the national count | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | State presidential returns | | | cert_2024 | 49.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | certified Democratic share of the Democratic and Republican state vote totals | all voters in the national count | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | State presidential returns | | | ces_cert_max | 1.1 | percentage points (absolute CES share minus certified share) | largest absolute difference between the CES weighted Democratic share and the certified two-party share | CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_cult_late | +0.30 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents, cultural index | 2020 | 95% CI 0.28 to 0.32 | 60,988 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_cult_net_late | +0.17 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | CES respondents, cultural index, net of seven-category party identification | 2020 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.19 | 58,620 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_cult_r_late | −0.07 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican CES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 2020 | 95% CI −0.10 to −0.05 | 20,412 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_econ_late | +0.18 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents, economic index | 2020 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.21 | 51,551 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_econ_net_late | 0.00 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | CES respondents, economic index, net of seven-category party identification | 2020 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.02 | 50,405 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_grad_2008 | 24.7% | percent of respondents | weighted share with a four-year or postgraduate degree | CES respondents with a known education | 2008 | 95% CI 24.1% to 25.3% | 32,800 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_grad_2024 | 34.8% | percent of respondents | weighted share with a four-year or postgraduate degree | CES respondents with a known education | 2024 | 95% CI 34.1% to 35.4% | 60,000 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_imm_late | +0.18 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents, immigration index | 2020 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.21 | 60,910 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_share_2020 | 52.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 | 95% CI 51.9% to 53.1% | 43,872 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_share_2024 | 49.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 48.2% to 49.7% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ci_cultural_early | +0.27 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, cultural index of the items asked in every study | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.22 to 0.33 | 8,023 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ci_cultural_late | +0.32 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, cultural index of the items asked in every study | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.28 to 0.37 | 14,986 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ci_economic_early | −0.30 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, economic index of the items asked in every study | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.36 to −0.25 | 6,540 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ci_economic_late | +0.02 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, economic index of the items asked in every study | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.06 | 14,092 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ci_racial_early | +0.11 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial index of the items asked in every study | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.17 | 6,714 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ci_racial_late | +0.19 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial index of the items asked in every study | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.24 | 13,651 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cp_all_2008 | −1.6 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2008 | 95% CI −3.0 to −0.2 | 28,600 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cp_all_2020 | +12.3 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2020 | 95% CI 11.1 to 13.5 | 49,769 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cp_all_2024 | +9.4 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 8.0 to 10.9 | 50,847 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_all_2008 | +3.7 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 2.2 to 5.2 | 23,585 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_all_2016 | +12.3 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2016 | 95% CI 11.1 to 13.5 | 40,891 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_all_2020 | +15.3 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 | 95% CI 14.1 to 16.5 | 43,872 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_all_2024 | +12.3 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 10.8 to 13.8 | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_all_grad_2024 | 56.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, graduates | 2024 | 95% CI 55.1% to 57.2% | 16,994 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_all_non_2024 | 43.8% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, non-graduates | 2024 | 95% CI 42.8% to 44.9% | 25,014 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_chg_2024 | −3.0 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap) | gap in 2024 minus gap in 2020; independent samples, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.8 to −1.1 | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_post_2016 | +10.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, under the post-election weight | 2016 | 95% CI 8.8 to 11.4 | 40,891 | weight_post | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_post_2020 | +12.9 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, under the post-election weight | 2020 | 95% CI 11.6 to 14.2 | 43,871 | weight_post | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_vv_2020 | +16.2 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, under the validated-vote weight | 2020 | 95% CI 14.9 to 17.5 | 35,746 | vvweight | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_white_2008 | +9.2 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 7.6 to 10.8 | 19,889 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cv_white_2024 | +16.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 14.5 to 17.7 | 31,857 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | d_cultural_chg | +0.05 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents, cultural index | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.12 | 25,937 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_cultural_early | +0.30 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, cultural index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.36 | 8,405 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_cultural_hi_share | 40% | percent of the 1992 to 2000 cultural gap | upper end of the interval for the change in the cultural gap, as a share of the 1992 to 2000 gap | ANES respondents, cultural index | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_cultural_late | +0.36 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, cultural index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.39 | 17,532 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_economic_early | −0.32 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, economic index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.37 to −0.28 | 8,626 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_economic_late | +0.02 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, economic index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.06 | 17,568 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_immigration_chg | +0.02 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents, immigration item | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.05 to 0.09 | 22,237 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_immigration_early | +0.36 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, immigration item | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.30 to 0.41 | 6,543 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_immigration_late | +0.37 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, immigration item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.41 | 15,694 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_racial_early | +0.21 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.27 | 7,974 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_racial_late | +0.31 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.35 | 15,664 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | diff_2008 | −9.7 | percentage points (ANES graduate gap minus CES graduate gap) | ANES gap minus CES gap; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI −16.7 to −2.6 | 1,533 | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | diff_2012 | −6.4 | percentage points (ANES graduate gap minus CES graduate gap) | ANES gap minus CES gap; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2012 | 95% CI −10.9 to −1.9 | 4,144 | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | diff_2024 | +11.0 | percentage points (ANES graduate gap minus CES graduate gap) | ANES gap minus CES gap; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 6.5 to 15.6 | 3,918 | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | diff_grad_2024 | +12.9 | percentage points (ANES Democratic share minus CES Democratic share) | ANES share minus CES share; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote, graduates | 2024 | 95% CI 9.8 to 16.0 | 19,007 | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | diff_max_abs | 11.0 | percentage points (absolute ANES minus CES graduate gap) | largest absolute difference between the two surveys' gaps | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | largest of 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | diff_non_2024 | +1.8 | percentage points (ANES Democratic share minus CES Democratic share) | ANES share minus CES share; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote, non-graduates | 2024 | 95% CI −1.5 to 5.2 | 26,919 | weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | diff_web_ces_2024 | +7.9 | percentage points (ANES web graduate gap minus CES graduate gap) | ANES web gap minus CES gap; independent surveys, standard errors combined | ANES web respondents and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 1.0 to 14.7 | 43,365 | weight_web (VCF0009y) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_early_max | −0.10 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest or largest of the point estimates across the economic items | ANES respondents, economic items | 1992 to 2000 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_early_min | −0.36 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest or largest of the point estimates across the economic items | ANES respondents, economic items | 1992 to 2000 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_late_max | +0.09 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest or largest of the point estimates across the economic items | ANES respondents, economic items | 2016 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_late_min | −0.04 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest or largest of the point estimates across the economic items | ANES respondents, economic items | 2016 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | floor_n | 100 | respondents | minimum respondents in each group of a plotted or tabled estimate, together with a Kish effective sample size of at least 100 | survey cells in this chapter | all years | | | none (definition) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ftf_cultural_chg | +0.16 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents interviewed in person, cultural | 1992 to 1998 and 2016 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.28 | 8,824 | weight (VCF0009z) before 2008; weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for 2016 and 2024 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ftf_economic_chg | +0.46 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents interviewed in person, economic | 1992 to 1998 and 2016 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.59 | 9,054 | weight (VCF0009z) before 2008; weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for 2016 and 2024 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ftf_immigration_chg | +0.07 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents interviewed in person, immigration | 1992 to 1998 and 2016 and 2024 | 95% CI −0.06 to 0.20 | 8,477 | weight (VCF0009z) before 2008; weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for 2016 and 2024 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ftf_racial_chg | +0.24 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents interviewed in person, racial | 1992 to 1998 and 2016 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.11 to 0.37 | 8,348 | weight (VCF0009z) before 2008; weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for 2016 and 2024 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | grad_share_1952 | 6.4% | percent of respondents | weighted share with a college or advanced degree | ANES respondents with a known education | 1952 | 95% CI 5.2% to 7.5% | 1,790 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | grad_share_2024 | 34.4% | percent of respondents | weighted share with a college or advanced degree | ANES respondents with a known education | 2024 | 95% CI 32.6% to 36.2% | 5,465 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gss_cult_chg | −0.07 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | GSS respondents, cultural index | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.14 to 0.00 | 24,614 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_cult_early | +0.30 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, cultural index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.35 | 12,545 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_cult_late | +0.23 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, cultural index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.18 to 0.28 | 12,069 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_cult_net_late | +0.18 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | GSS respondents, cultural index, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.13 to 0.23 | 11,608 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_cult_r_late | −0.04 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican GSS identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.14 to 0.05 | 3,920 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_econ_early | −0.20 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, economic index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.14 | 8,455 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_econ_late | +0.01 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, economic index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.07 | 10,477 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_help_2012 | −0.24 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2012 | 95% CI −0.38 to −0.10 | 1,294 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_help_2022 | +0.02 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2022 | 95% CI −0.11 to 0.15 | 2,322 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_help_2024 | −0.13 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2024 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.01 | 2,127 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_help_chg | −0.14 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in 2024 minus gap in 2022; independent surveys, standard errors combined | GSS respondents, government should improve the living standards of the poor | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.32 to 0.03 | 4,449 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_homosex_chg | −0.17 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | GSS respondents, item on sex between two adults of the same sex | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.09 | 18,368 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_homosex_early | +0.44 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, item on sex between two adults of the same sex | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.38 to 0.49 | 8,101 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_homosex_late | +0.26 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, item on sex between two adults of the same sex | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.32 | 10,267 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_mode_halfwidth | 0.18 | standard deviations (smallest half-width of a 95% interval for an in-person minus web gap difference) | smallest half-width, across the three indices, of the interval for the in-person gap minus the web gap | GSS respondents, economic, cultural and racial indices | 2022 and 2024 pooled | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_mode_maxdiff | 0.03 | standard deviations (absolute in-person minus web gap) | largest absolute difference between the in-person and web gaps across the three indices | GSS respondents, economic, cultural and racial indices | 2022 and 2024 pooled | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_race_early | +0.15 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, racial index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.20 | 10,162 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_race_late | +0.29 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | GSS respondents, racial index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.24 to 0.34 | 13,038 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | imm_max | +0.61 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | largest annual gap | ANES respondents, immigration item | 1992 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | imm_min | +0.28 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | smallest annual gap | ANES respondents, immigration item | 1992 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_chg_net_0824 | +20.3 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap, from weighted linear probability models) | graduate coefficient in 2024 minus the coefficient in 2008 (income-rank groups added); independent studies, HC3 standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 11.4 to 29.2 | 5,012 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_chg_net_1224 | +18.6 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap, from weighted linear probability models) | graduate coefficient in 2024 minus the coefficient in 2012 (income-rank groups added); independent studies, HC3 standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 11.9 to 25.4 | 7,610 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_chg_netr_1224 | +16.9 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap, from weighted linear probability models) | graduate coefficient in 2024 minus the coefficient in 2012 (income-rank groups and a white indicator added); independent studies, HC3 standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 10.4 to 23.4 | 7,610 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_chg_raw_0824 | +30.0 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap, from weighted linear probability models) | graduate coefficient in 2024 minus the coefficient in 2008 (no other term); independent studies, HC3 standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 21.6 to 38.4 | 5,012 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_chg_raw_1224 | +24.5 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap, from weighted linear probability models) | graduate coefficient in 2024 minus the coefficient in 2012 (no other term); independent studies, HC3 standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 18.3 to 30.7 | 7,610 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_diff_max | 8.3 | percentage points (adjusted minus unadjusted gap) | largest difference | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 1956 to 2020 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_diff_min | 1.3 | percentage points (adjusted minus unadjusted gap) | smallest difference | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 1956 to 2020 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_late_maxdiff | 3.2 | percentage points (absolute adjusted minus unadjusted gap) | largest absolute difference | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_net_1992 | −4.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient with five income-rank groups added; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 1992 | 95% CI −10.5 to 2.4 | 1,238 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_net_2020 | +17.5 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient with five income-rank groups added; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2020 | 95% CI 13.9 to 21.0 | 5,902 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_net_2024 | +22.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient with five income-rank groups added; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2024 | 95% CI 17.2 to 27.0 | 3,570 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_raw_1992 | −9.8 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient, no other term; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 1992 | 95% CI −15.8 to −3.8 | 1,238 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_raw_2020 | +15.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient, no other term; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2020 | 95% CI 11.8 to 18.4 | 5,902 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_raw_2024 | +23.6 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates, from a weighted linear probability model) | graduate coefficient, no other term; HC3 errors | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2024 | 95% CI 19.1 to 28.0 | 3,570 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_shrink_0824 | 32.3% | percent of the unadjusted rise in the graduate gap | one minus the adjusted rise over the unadjusted rise | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2008 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | inc_shrink_1224 | 23.9% | percent of the unadjusted rise in the graduate gap | one minus the adjusted rise over the unadjusted rise | ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a family income | 2012 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_abortion_early | +0.37 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, abortion item | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.42 | 8,731 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_abortion_late | +0.32 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, abortion item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.28 to 0.36 | 16,947 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_affirm_early | −0.06 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, affirmative action item | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.11 to −0.01 | 7,977 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_affirm_late | +0.05 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, affirmative action item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.09 | 15,261 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_immig_early | +0.36 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, immigration item | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.30 to 0.41 | 6,543 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_immig_late | +0.37 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, immigration item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.41 | 15,694 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_resent_early | +0.44 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial resentment index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.38 to 0.50 | 6,692 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_resent_late | +0.48 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, racial resentment index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.44 to 0.52 | 15,748 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | jobs_2016 | −0.10 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, guaranteed jobs item | 2016 | 95% CI −0.17 to −0.02 | 3,742 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | jobs_2020 | +0.05 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, guaranteed jobs item | 2020 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.11 | 7,213 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | jobs_2024 | +0.07 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents, guaranteed jobs item | 2024 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.15 | 4,702 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_abort_gap | +14.9 | percentage points (share among graduates minus share among other respondents) | difference in the weighted share saying abortion should always be allowed | ANES respondents who answered the abortion item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 13.0 to 16.9 | 16,947 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_abort_grad | 58.2% | percent saying abortion should always be allowed | weighted share | ANES respondents who answered the abortion item, graduates | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 56.7% to 59.6% | 7,329 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_abort_non | 43.2% | percent saying abortion should always be allowed | weighted share | ANES respondents who answered the abortion item, non-graduates | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 41.9% to 44.6% | 9,618 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_imm_grad | 26.4% | percent wanting immigration decreased | weighted share answering decreased a little or a lot | ANES respondents who answered the immigration item, graduates | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 25.0% to 27.7% | 7,012 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_imm_non | 42.0% | percent wanting immigration decreased | weighted share answering decreased a little or a lot | ANES respondents who answered the immigration item, non-graduates | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 40.6% to 43.4% | 8,682 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mi_anes_cultural_diff | +0.12 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (in-person gap minus web gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | in-person gap minus web gap; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents, cultural index | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.25 | 7,272 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) and weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mi_anes_cultural_ftf | +0.46 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, cultural index, interviewed in person | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.57 | 2,195 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mi_anes_cultural_web | +0.34 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, cultural index, interviewed on the web | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.41 | 5,077 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mi_anes_economic_ftf | +0.13 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, economic index, interviewed in person | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.24 | 2,196 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mi_anes_economic_web | −0.08 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, economic index, interviewed on the web | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −0.15 to −0.02 | 5,094 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mi_anes_racial_ftf | +0.47 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, racial index, interviewed in person | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.59 | 1,936 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mi_anes_racial_web | +0.22 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature; each mode standardized within itself | ANES respondents, racial index, interviewed on the web | 2016 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.29 | 4,291 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_v_diff_2024 | −10.3 | percentage points (web gap minus in-person gap) | web gap minus in-person gap; independent samples, standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI −22.0 to 1.5 | 2,045 | weight_web (VCF0009y) and weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_v_ftf_2024 | +30.5 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature; face-to-face mode weight | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, interviewed in person | 2024 | 95% CI 20.8 to 40.1 | 688 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_v_other_2024 | +18.5 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature; full-sample weight | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, panel and paper cases with no mode weight | 2024 | 95% CI 12.6 to 24.5 | 1,873 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_v_web_2024 | +20.2 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature; web mode weight | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, interviewed on the web | 2024 | 95% CI 13.5 to 26.9 | 1,357 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_vote | 32,098 | respondents | count of respondents | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote and have a known education, in the elections plotted (1952 and 1960 left out) | 1956 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_vote_0824 | 0 | respondents | count of respondents | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote and have a known education | 2008 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ces_vote | 188,145 | respondents | count of respondents | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_inc_elections | 17 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections with an income-adjusted estimate | 1956 to 2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_jobs_below | 15 | studies | count of studies | ANES studies whose jobs-item gap interval lies below zero | 1974 to 2016 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_jobs_studies | 18 | studies | count of studies | ANES studies with a jobs-item gap estimate | 1974 to 2016 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_mode_2024 | 2,045 | respondents | count of respondents | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote and have a known education, in the in-person or web mode group | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_pid_below | 25 | studies | count of studies | ANES studies whose party-identification gap interval lies below zero | 1952 to 2012 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_pid_studies | 27 | studies | count of studies | ANES studies with a graduate gap estimate in party identification | 1952 to 2012 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_vote_2024 | 3,918 | respondents | count of respondents | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote and have a known education | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_vote_below | 8 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections whose graduate gap interval lies below zero | 1956 to 2012 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_vote_elections | 14 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections with a graduate gap estimate | 1956 to 2012 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_vote_point_below | 12 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections whose graduate gap point estimate is below zero | 1956 to 2012 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_vote_zero | 6 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections whose graduate gap interval includes zero | 1956 to 2012 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | net_cultural_late | +0.26 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, cultural index, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.22 to 0.29 | 17,476 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | net_economic_late | −0.10 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, economic index, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.13 to −0.07 | 17,506 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | net_immigration_late | +0.30 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, immigration item, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.34 | 15,647 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | net_racial_late | +0.18 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, racial index, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.21 | 15,621 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | p_all_2012 | −5.8 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2012 | 95% CI −9.7 to −1.9 | 5,034 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | p_all_2016 | +1.6 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2016 | 95% CI −2.2 to 5.5 | 3,643 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | p_all_2020 | +8.9 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2020 | 95% CI 5.9 to 11.9 | 7,181 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | p_all_2024 | +17.5 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 13.6 to 21.4 | 5,055 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | p_white_2012 | −0.4 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2012 | 95% CI −5.0 to 4.2 | 2,981 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | p_white_2016 | +9.5 | percentage points (Democratic share of party identifiers among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | share of party identifiers who are Democrats among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who identify with a party, leaners included | 2016 | 95% CI 5.1 to 13.9 | 2,636 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_cultural_d_chg | −0.28 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (change in the graduate gap; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | gap in the later period minus gap in the earlier; independent samples, standard errors combined | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 1992 to 2000 and 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.36 to −0.20 | 12,415 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_cultural_d_early | +0.67 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.75 | 4,181 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_cultural_d_late | +0.39 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.43 | 8,234 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_cultural_r_early | +0.06 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.13 | 3,237 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_cultural_r_late | +0.15 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), cultural index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.21 | 7,406 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_economic_d_late | +0.09 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), economic index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.14 | 8,237 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_economic_net_early | −0.21 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, economic index, net of seven-category party identification | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.16 | 8,577 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_economic_net_late | −0.10 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | ANES respondents, economic index, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.13 to −0.07 | 17,506 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_economic_r_late | −0.27 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), economic index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.32 to −0.23 | 7,419 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_immigration_d_late | +0.40 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), immigration item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.45 | 7,418 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_immigration_r_late | +0.23 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), immigration item | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.29 | 6,627 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_racial_d_early | +0.55 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), racial index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI 0.47 to 0.64 | 3,952 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_racial_d_late | +0.32 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Democratic ANES identifiers (leaners included), racial index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.38 | 7,404 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_racial_r_early | +0.05 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), racial index | 1992 to 2000 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.11 | 3,124 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pp_racial_r_late | +0.06 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | weighted mean standardized answer of graduates minus that of non-graduates; standard errors combined in quadrature | Republican ANES identifiers (leaners included), racial index | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.10 | 6,613 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ppw_cultural_net_late | +0.19 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents, cultural, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.23 | 12,591 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ppw_economic_net_late | −0.08 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents, economic, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.12 to −0.05 | 12,602 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ppw_immigration_net_late | +0.34 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents, immigration, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.29 to 0.38 | 11,386 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ppw_racial_net_late | +0.27 | standard deviations of the item or index among all respondents (graduates minus non-graduates; a positive value is a more liberal answer among graduates) | coefficient on a graduate indicator in a weighted regression of the standardized index on the indicator and party-identification categories; HC3 errors | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents, racial, net of seven-category party identification | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.23 to 0.31 | 11,375 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | span_2008 | 9.0 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Post-grad minus HS or less); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 6.6 to 11.4 | 10,684 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | span_2024 | 21.9 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Post-grad minus HS or less); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 19.6 to 24.2 | 16,820 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | span_white_2024 | 27.0 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Post-grad minus HS or less); weighted shares, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 24.6 to 29.4 | 13,114 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | step_col_sc_2008 | −0.1 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (College minus Some college); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI −2.0 to 1.8 | 12,901 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | step_col_sc_2024 | +5.4 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (College minus Some college); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 3.5 to 7.3 | 25,188 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | step_pg_col_2008 | +6.0 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Post-grad minus College); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 3.6 to 8.4 | 8,110 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | step_pg_col_2024 | +9.3 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Post-grad minus College); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 7.2 to 11.4 | 16,994 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | step_sc_hs_2024 | +7.2 | percentage points (difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote) | Democratic share at the higher education level minus the share at the lower level (Some college minus HS or less); weighted shares, standard errors combined | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 5.1 to 9.3 | 25,014 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | v_all_2012 | −0.8 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2012 | 95% CI −5.0 to 3.5 | 4,144 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | v_all_2016 | +11.9 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2016 | 95% CI 7.4 to 16.4 | 2,591 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | v_all_2020 | +14.9 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 | 95% CI 11.6 to 18.1 | 6,029 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | v_all_2024 | +23.3 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 19.0 to 27.7 | 3,918 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | v_all_chg_1216 | +12.7 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap) | gap in 2016 minus gap in 2012; independent studies, standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 6.5 to 18.9 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | v_all_chg_2024 | +8.5 | percentage points (change in the graduate gap) | gap in 2024 minus gap in 2020; independent studies, standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 3.1 to 13.9 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | v_all_grad_2024 | 69.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, graduates | 2024 | 95% CI 66.1% to 71.9% | 2,013 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | v_all_non_2024 | 45.7% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, non-graduates | 2024 | 95% CI 42.5% to 48.8% | 1,905 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | v_grad_chg | +16.0 | percentage points (change in the Democratic share) | share in 2024 minus share in 2012; independent studies, standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, graduates | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 11.5 to 20.5 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | v_non_chg | −8.2 | percentage points (change in the Democratic share) | share in 2024 minus share in 2012; independent studies, standard errors combined | ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, non-graduates | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −12.2 to −4.1 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | v_white_2012 | +6.6 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2012 | 95% CI 1.7 to 11.6 | 2,528 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | v_white_2024 | +28.1 | percentage points (Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates) | Democratic share among graduates minus the share among non-graduates; weighted shares, standard errors combined in quadrature | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 23.2 to 33.0 | 2,981 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | weight_spread_max | 3.4 | percentage points (largest minus smallest graduate gap across the weights of one survey and year) | largest spread of the graduate gap across the weights defined for a survey and year | ANES and CES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z), weight_postelection, weight_cumulative, weight_post and vvweight | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Racial resentment: A survey scale, developed by Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders, that measures moral judgments about the work ethic and deservingness of Black Americans. Higher scores mean more resentment. - Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors. ## Methods Sample: three surveys. The American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative Data File, 1952 to 2024: 34,173 respondents with a Democratic or Republican presidential vote and a known education, and 63,120 respondents with a party identification and a known education. The Cooperative Election Study (CES) cumulative file: 188,145 respondents with a Democratic or Republican presidential vote in 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024, and 540,578 respondents with a party identification in 2008 to 2024; the policy items are used for 2014 and 2020 only, because the CES policy battery ends in 2021 and the items used here were asked in both years. The General Social Survey (GSS), 1993 to 2024, with the interview mode joined from the raw file; it supplies issue items only. Education: ANES college_grad, a college or advanced degree (VCF0110 = 4); CES education_4cat, with College and Post-grad as graduates; GSS degree of 3 (bachelor's) or 4 (graduate). A graduate is a respondent with a four-year degree or more; everyone else, an associate degree included, is a non-graduate. Party: ANES pid_7pt, CES pid7_num and GSS partyid, with 1 to 3 (0 to 2 in the GSS) Democratic and 5 to 7 (4 to 6) Republican, leaners included; pure independents are in neither party. White: ANES race_4cat White non-Hispanic and CES race5 White (non-Hispanic); the ANES codes Hispanic origin only where the studies asked it, and the GSS is not split by race. Vote: the share of respondents reporting a Democratic vote among those reporting a Democratic or Republican presidential vote (self-reported; third-party voters and nonvoters excluded). Party identification: the Democratic share of respondents who are Democrats or Republicans. Weights: ANES weight (VCF0009z; the cumulative file gives every respondent a weight of one in most studies before 1992, so those studies are unweighted), weight_ftf (VCF0009x) and weight_web (VCF0009y) for the mode splits of 2012, 2016 and 2024; CES weight_cumulative; GSS weight_use. The ANES 2020 study has no mode weights. For 2024 the ANES weight VCF0009z is the pre-election weight (V240107a), although the vote is a post-election item; the post-election weight (weight_postelection, V240107b) is reported as a sensitivity for 2016, 2020 and 2024, together with the CES post-election weight (2012, 2016 and 2020) and the validated-vote weight (2020 and 2024). In the ANES mode splits the face-to-face and web groups use their mode weights; in 2024 they cover respondents in neither group (panel and paper cases), who are reported separately with the full-sample weight. Certified benchmark: the Democratic share of Democratic plus Republican votes in the MIT Election Data and Science Lab state presidential returns, summed over states (full counts, no interval); the survey share uses every respondent with a major-party vote, whether or not education is known, and the interval is the survey Kish interval shifted by the count. Issue items: every item is oriented so that a higher value is the more liberal answer (more government action on economic and racial items, the more permissive answer on cultural items, more immigration). The direction is a coding fact. The ANES directions were read from the value labels stored next to each item in the cumulative file, and each clean column was checked against its raw VCF code. The GSS directions were read from the question text in the GSS dictionary and the CES directions from the variable descriptions. Each item was then checked against the Democratic-minus-Republican gap, in standard deviations, in every study year in which it was asked: 181 ANES item-years, 320 GSS item-years and 65 CES item-years, and the build refuses any item-year below 0.25 standard deviations. The smallest was −0.09 standard deviations (ANES abortion, 1982) and −0.16 in the GSS (abany, 1983) and +0.52 in the CES; 4 ANES, 7 GSS and 0 CES item-years have a negative point estimate and 0 ANES, 2 GSS and 0 CES have an interval wholly below zero, all of them early studies of items that cut across the parties. A separate scan of all 52 CES policy items in the cumulative file, by year and with the 2014 ACA recode applied, found a sign change in 3 items (spending_vs_tax_0_100, support_gay_marriage_ban, support_raise_fuel_eff) and a level shift of more than 0.4 standard deviations between adjacent years in 5 items (incometax_vs_salestax_0_100, spending_vs_tax_0_100, support_gay_marriage_ban, support_raise_fuel_eff, support_tariff_china); this chapter uses none of them, and NOTES.md lists the years. Standardized gaps: an item or index is standardized as a weighted z-score among all respondents of the survey in the same unit (a study year, or a pooled window of studies); the gap is the weighted mean z of graduates minus that of non-graduates. Items were asked in different studies within a window (gay adoption in 1992 and 2000, job protection in 1992, 1996 and 2000, immigration in 1992 to 1998, the health, poor and welfare items in four of five early studies, the resentment items in all early studies but 1996 and part of 1998); a check uses only the items asked in every study of both windows (jobs and government services, abortion and moral traditionalism, government help and affirmative action). The windows are the ANES and GSS studies of 1992 to 2000 and of 2016 to 2024 (for the in-person view, the 1992 to 1998 studies and the in-person samples of 2016 and 2024), and the CES years 2014 and 2020; windows pool studies with their weights as given. Group restrictions (Democrats, Republicans, white respondents) are applied after standardizing. Indices: the mean of a domain's standardized items for respondents who answered at least two of them (one for the immigration item), standardized again. The racial resentment index is the mean of four standardized items (VCF9039 to VCF9042, two in each direction) for respondents who answered at least two, and moral traditionalism the mean of two items (VCF0852 and VCF0853) for respondents who answered both. Net of party identification: the graduate coefficient from a weighted linear regression of the index on a graduate indicator and the seven party-identification categories (HC3 errors). Intervals: 95%. Shares, means and gaps use the Kish effective sample size and a normal approximation, with the standard errors of independent groups combined in quadrature; changes between studies or windows combine the two gap standard errors in quadrature. The net-of-party rows and the income models are weighted regressions with HC3 robust errors. All intervals are model based: the weighted sample is treated as a random sample and the stages of each sample design are ignored. The CES is an opt-in panel, so its intervals ignore how respondents came to be in the panel. Income: the ANES family income percentile group within the study year (VCF0114, five groups) as a categorical control. Suppression: a cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample size of at least 100, and a gap needs both cells to clear it; this leaves out the ANES vote gap in 1952 and 1960 and the party-identification gap in 1954 and 1960. Rounding: displays round half up from the unrounded estimate and differences are computed before rounding. Survey mode: the ANES has in-person and web interviews in 2012, 2016 and 2024 and web, telephone and video interviews in 2020; the GSS has in-person and web interviews in 2022 and 2024 and a mostly web sample in 2021; the CES is online in every year. ## What these data cannot show - Every survey here interviews a new sample each year, so a rising gap can come from people changing their votes, from new voters replacing older ones, or from changes in who has a degree. - The graduate share of respondents rose from 6.4% in 1952 to 34.4% in 2024, and the data cannot separate a change in what graduates think from a change in who counts as a graduate. - The chapter compares groups and not people. - The vote gap is a difference in the Democratic share among voters who chose a major party, and it leaves out nonvoters and third-party voters; Chapter 3.1, The two coalitions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions) takes up the composition of each party's voters. - The two vote surveys differ by as much as 11.0 points in the gap in a year. - The ANES voters of 2024 are more Democratic than the certified count, with the excess among graduates, and the CES matches the count nationally. - The count has no breakdown by degree, so it cannot show which survey is closer on graduates or on the gap, and a national match does not show that the CES is accurate within education groups. - The vote is a self-report in both surveys, and no validated vote is available in either file. - The ANES mode split has wide intervals, leaves out the panel and paper respondents of 2024 and does not exist for 2020. - The in-person ANES samples give larger gaps than the web samples, and the GSS cannot rule out a mode difference of that size. - The CES, which is online in every year, has smaller vote gaps than the in-person ANES in 2024. - The issue gaps rest on a few items per domain, and the sets differ across surveys and across studies within a period. - A standardized gap depends on how answers spread in each period, so the same difference in the share giving an answer can be a different number of standard deviations in two periods. - The CES policy battery ends in 2021 and has no racial item after 2014, and the GSS extract has no immigration item, so the ANES is the only survey here that covers all four domains. - The orientation of each item comes from its wording, and a check against the party gap in every year can flag a reversed code but cannot detect a change in what Democrats believe. - Finally, the within-party results describe partisans who have already sorted. - Party identification follows attitudes as well as preceding them, so a gap within a party is not the effect of education on that party's voters. - The comparison cannot say whether graduate Democrats held their views before they joined the party or acquired them in it. - The chapter holds only party, income rank and race fixed. - Age, religion, region, occupation and the kind of place a person lives in go with education and are left free. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Kinder, Donald R.; Sanders, Lynn M. (1996). Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. University of Chicago Press. 3. Kitschelt, Herbert; Rehm, Philipp (2014). Occupations as a Site of Political Preference Formation. Comparative Political Studies 47(12): 1670-1706. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414013516066 4. Gethin, Amory; Martínez-Toledano, Clara; Piketty, Thomas (2022). Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020. Quarterly Journal of Economics 137(1): 1-48. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab036 5. Grossmann, Matt; Hopkins, David A. (2024). Polarized by Degrees: How the Diploma Divide and the Culture War Transformed American Politics. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009057141 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/the-diploma-divide/build.py (sha256 6af5fbba4ec0be32fa86dabb813b4cf6e124d1bce92ca8a9bbb99b4ce39b4d9a) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 | | data/state/1976-2024-president.csv | 514,108 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | d4ea61c843d7fab76dd1c133028e7847bdd43b7355de79ee8dde88d1d4ff60c6 | | figures/anchor_gaps.json | e07531ad26974f298cf4d522ac6a8e06887195b55441a7bab0c1a429dbd80256 | | figures/ces_education_levels.json | bacaac704829f9d5251c44ea4cfe977d0495c7f1ac81ea2bf832d8b5e08e51cf | | figures/gap_by_survey.json | 193f70e3fa1adf417bf473c7fd750fa6457cd0e71098867722c13cebc805b11c | | figures/gap_net_of_income.json | 0210adac1ec678a1c087ad3f8c8652e48eb20de7f0712be267366976d36a2b80 | | figures/issue_gaps.json | 82d7e8126eb995ed4b1f0383cb2955e22a4c1dda55b961846b28e433706db9cc | | figures/mode_check.json | 4ea694247f2fb2735df7385ec769b8546b4baf28cba48e962aaaacc682a2e584 | | figures/survey_checks.json | a6dc431a90d18379092fc8a3eb7e91f37aff230c7dbf28bffc0aa411e3b664e5 | | figures/vote_by_degree.json | 4cd54f14884c535c501dc1d0ec5f54080bf09424fb0bc7530b4916a3c646531a | | figures/within_party.json | b19e624e80b2fda6ff5c50b429256db9d1a7903cc8036f05a2411b783590cf59 | | meta.json | 313062ee983b0d3c595b09225fedda8839bb319b4054e66d1509181ffc8b0e0b | | refs.json | 4b63b57b041259145f13aeca794dad0e2281cbebd17905fd3127e129e51dd304 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/facts.json - Table 1, figure "vote_by_degree" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/vote_by_degree.json - Table 2, figure "gap_by_survey" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/gap_by_survey.json - Table 3, figure "survey_checks" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/survey_checks.json - Table 4, figure "mode_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/mode_check.json - Table 5, figure "ces_education_levels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/ces_education_levels.json - Table 6, figure "issue_gaps" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/issue_gaps.json - Table 7, figure "anchor_gaps" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/anchor_gaps.json - Table 8, figure "within_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/within_party.json - Table 9, figure "gap_net_of_income" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-divide/figures/gap_net_of_income.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # The income ladder: report Chapter 3.3 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: The income ladder - Chapter: 3.3 (Part III, The party coalitions; The great sorting) - Question: How did the relationship between household income and the presidential vote change between 2008 and 2024? - Dek: In the CES the highest household-income bracket's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote minus the lowest bracket's went from −9.1 points in 2008 to +5.7 in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative - State presidential returns. State presidential returns 1976-2024, used only for the certified national two-party share; years: 1976-2024 (13 elections); weights: none (full counts) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026theincomeladder ```bibtex @misc{singh2026theincomeladder, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {The income ladder}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | −9.1 | 95% CI −12.9 to −5.4 | 5,534 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | gap_2008 | | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | +5.7 | 95% CI 1.1 to 10.3 | 12,281 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | gap_2024 | | change in the highest-minus-lowest gap (difference in differences), weighted, state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | +14.8 | 95% CI 10.8 to 18.9 | 17,815 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | did_w | | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 62.4% | 95% CI 60.5% to 64.4% | 3,900 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | sh_b1_2008 | | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 51.5% | 95% CI 49.4% to 53.6% | 7,449 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | sh_b1_2024 | | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 53.3% | 95% CI 50.4% to 56.1% | 1,634 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | sh_b5_2008 | | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 57.2% | 95% CI 55.2% to 59.1% | 4,832 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | sh_b5_2024 | | weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, voters without a four-year degree in those brackets | 2024 | −3.3 | 95% CI −9.3 to 2.7 | 7,437 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | gapn_2024 | | weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, voters with a four-year degree or more in those brackets | 2024 | +0.4 | 95% CI −5.2 to 6.0 | 4,844 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | gapd_2024 | | definition of a bracket edge | edge of an income bracket | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | $30,000 | | | none (definition) | Cooperative Election Study | floor_30 | | definition of a bracket edge | edge of an income bracket | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | $150,000 | | | none (definition) | Cooperative Election Study | floor_150 | | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | lowest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | +4.0 | 95% CI 1.7 to 6.3 | 33,761 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | pm_2024 | | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | highest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | +9.7 | 95% CI 7.5 to 11.8 | 31,144 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | rm_2024 | | count of respondents | respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 188,145 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_votes | | count of respondents | two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 170,053 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_income | | definition of a bracket edge | edge of an income bracket | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | $60,000 | | | none (definition) | Cooperative Election Study | floor_60 | | definition of a bracket edge | edge of an income bracket | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | $100,000 | | | none (definition) | Cooperative Election Study | floor_100 | ## Findings In the Cooperative Election Study (CES), the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote in the highest of five household-income brackets minus the share in the lowest was −9.1 (95% CI −12.9 to −5.4) points in 2008 and +5.7 (95% CI 1.1 to 10.3) in 2024. That is a change of +14.8 (95% CI 10.8 to 18.9) points, larger than sampling error. In 2008 the lowest bracket was the most Democratic of the five, and in 2024 the highest was. The Democratic share in the lowest bracket fell from 62.4% in 2008 to 51.5% in 2024, while the share in the highest bracket rose from 53.3% to 57.2%. Within education groups the 2024 gap is −3.3 (95% CI −9.3 to 2.7) points among voters without a degree and +0.4 (95% CI −5.2 to 6.0) among degree holders, intervals that include zero (Table 4), so the reversal combines income and education. The 2024 profile is U-shaped. The three brackets between the ends, which cover household incomes from $30,000 to $150,000, are less Democratic than either end when pooled. The lowest bracket's share minus that of the middle three is +4.0 (95% CI 1.7 to 6.3) points, and the same difference for the highest bracket is +9.7 (95% CI 7.5 to 11.8) points. The CES is an online panel survey fielded by YouGov around each election. This chapter uses the presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024: 188,145 respondents who reported voting for one of the two major-party candidates, of whom 170,053 also reported household income. (Note: Except where a figure says otherwise, estimates use the cumulative-file survey weight, the one weight the file defines for all five elections. Intervals come from the Kish effective sample size [1] or from standard errors clustered by state, and each figure subtitle says which; the methods note in the appendix gives the rule.) The file groups the twelve income bands of the questionnaire into five brackets in nominal dollars: under $30,000, $30,000 to $60,000, $60,000 to $100,000, $100,000 to $150,000, and $150,000 or more. High income means the highest bracket everywhere in this chapter. The Democratic share is the weighted share of these voters who reported a Democratic vote, and the gap is the Democratic share in one group minus that in another. ### The most Democratic bracket went from lowest to highest Table 1 compares the two elections bracket by bracket. In 2008 the Democratic share fell with income, from 62.4% (95% CI 60.5% to 64.4%) in the lowest bracket to 54.1%, 50.4% and 50.0% in the next three, and then rose to 53.3% in the highest. The rise at the top was small. The highest bracket was +1.3 (95% CI −1.7 to 4.3) points more Democratic than the three middle brackets pooled, and that interval includes zero. Table 1. The most Democratic income bracket in 2008 was the lowest, and in 2024 it was the highest In 2024 the five shares, from the lowest bracket to the highest, were 51.5%, 46.9%, 46.9%, 49.3% and 57.2%. Between the two elections the Democratic share changed by −10.9 points in the lowest bracket and by −7.2, −3.5 and −0.7 in the next three, the last with an interval that includes zero. In the highest bracket it changed by +3.9 (95% CI 0.4 to 7.3) points, toward the Democratic candidate. Among all two-party voters in the survey, whether or not they reported income, the Democratic share changed by −4.9 (95% CI −6.0 to −3.9) points over the same years. The highest bracket therefore moved toward the Democratic candidate while the survey's voters as a whole moved away. Work that covers a longer period found that Democratic candidates began winning a growing share of affluent voters in the 1990s, a trend concentrated among, but not limited to, college-educated voters and visible only in larger metropolitan areas [2]. The CES covers the recent end of that history. The next sections ask whether the recent change is a reversal of the income ladder or a different shape. ### By 2024 both ends voted more Democratic than the middle Table 2 breaks the change into two arms. The highest bracket's edge over the pooled middle three brackets rose from +1.3 points in 2008 to +8.2 in 2016 and +9.7 (95% CI 7.5 to 11.8) in 2024. The lowest bracket's edge over the same middle brackets fell from +10.4 to +4.0 (95% CI 1.7 to 6.3) and stayed above zero. The fourth bracket taken alone is not distinguishable from the lowest, with a difference of +2.2 (95% CI −0.5 to 5.0) points, so the U shape rests on the two pooled contrasts and not on every bracket. A ladder turned upside down would have the Democratic share rise steadily with income. In 2024 it does not, because the lowest bracket is more Democratic than the middle three. The reversal applies only to the comparison of the two end brackets. Table 2. The highest bracket's edge over the middle three rose from +1.3 to +9.7 points, while the lowest bracket's fell from +10.4 to +4.0 Dollar brackets are one way to describe income. A voter's rank in the year's income distribution gives a summary that does not depend on dollar cutoffs. The slope of the Democratic share on that rank, from the lowest rank to the highest, was −15.6 (95% CI −19.1 to −12.0) points in 2008 and +3.4 (95% CI −1.2 to 7.9) in 2024. The 2008 slope is clearly negative, and the 2024 slope has an interval that includes zero. A straight line summarizes a U poorly, so a single slope hides the shape that the brackets show. ### The 2024 U shape within education groups Degree holders make up a larger part of the highest bracket than of the lowest, and the difference has grown. In 2008 61.0% (95% CI 58.2% to 63.8%) of voters in the highest bracket held a four-year degree, against 12.0% (95% CI 10.7% to 13.4%) in the lowest bracket. In 2024 the shares were 74.5% (95% CI 72.8% to 76.2%) and 16.2% (95% CI 14.6% to 17.7%). Degree holders also vote more Democratic than other voters, by +4.2 (95% CI 2.7 to 5.8) points in 2008 and +12.6 (95% CI 11.0 to 14.1) in 2024 among all voters. A comparison of the highest and lowest brackets therefore mixes a difference in income with a difference in education. Table 3 draws the profile inside each education group. Among degree holders in 2024 the lowest and highest brackets stand at 60.4% (95% CI 56.1% to 64.8%) and 60.8% (95% CI 58.7% to 62.9%), against 54.2% (95% CI 52.2% to 56.3%) in the third bracket. Among voters without a degree they stand at 49.7% (95% CI 47.4% to 52.1%) and 46.5% (95% CI 42.2% to 50.7%), against 41.2% (95% CI 39.1% to 43.4%) in the third. Against the pooled middle three brackets, the lowest bracket differs by +5.4 (95% CI 0.8 to 9.9) points and the highest by +5.7 (95% CI 3.3 to 8.2) among degree holders, and both intervals are above zero. Among voters without a degree the lowest bracket differs from the pooled middle by +7.7 (95% CI 5.0 to 10.4) points, an interval above zero, and the highest by +4.4 (95% CI 0.0 to 8.9), an interval that reaches zero. The two highest-bracket differences are close and their intervals overlap, so the data do not show that the right side of the U is weaker among voters without a degree. The shape appears inside each education group, so mixing two groups with different average votes does not produce it. Table 3. Among all voters in 2024 the lowest bracket is more Democratic than the middle three in both education groups, and the highest is too among degree holders The button labeled 2024, white voters in Table 3 restricts the sample to white voters. Among white voters without a degree the highest bracket voted 43.4% (95% CI 38.7% to 48.1%) Democratic in 2024, against 35.1% (95% CI 32.9% to 37.3%) in the third bracket, so income still separates these voters at the top of the range. In this view the highest bracket differs from the pooled middle brackets by +6.5 (95% CI 3.8 to 9.3) points among degree holders and +8.3 (95% CI 3.4 to 13.2) among the others, and both intervals are above zero. The lowest bracket differs by +4.4 (95% CI 1.4 to 7.5) points among white voters without a degree and by +3.5 (95% CI −2.0 to 9.1) among white degree holders, an interval that includes zero. The left side of the U is therefore clear in one white group and not in the other. ### Net of education, the 2024 gap includes zero Table 4 gives the highest-minus-lowest gap for all voters, within each education group, and net of education, which compares voters with the same education and comes from a linear probability model. The model uses four education levels, so its coefficient is not an average of the two within-group rows. Among voters without a degree the gap moved from −12.2 (95% CI −17.4 to −7.0) in 2008 to −3.3 (95% CI −9.3 to 2.7) in 2024, and among degree holders from −12.5 (95% CI −19.8 to −5.1) to +0.4 (95% CI −5.2 to 6.0). Both 2024 intervals include zero. That means the data cannot tell either within-group gap from zero, not that the gap is zero. Net of education the gap is −13.7 (95% CI −17.6 to −9.8) in 2008 and −4.5 (95% CI −9.1 to 0.1) in 2024, and net of education together with race and ethnicity the 2024 gap is −1.9 (95% CI −6.2 to 2.3). Table 4. Net of education the 2024 gap is −4.5 points against +5.7 for all voters, and its interval includes zero The gap still rises. The change is +8.9 (95% CI 2.2 to 15.6) points among voters without a degree, +12.9 (95% CI 3.9 to 21.8) among degree holders, +9.2 (95% CI 4.9 to 13.4) net of education and +7.8 (95% CI 3.7 to 11.9) net of education with race and ethnicity, against +14.8 (95% CI 10.8 to 18.9) for all voters. Holding education and race fixed removes part of the change in the gap and leaves the rest. The positive 2024 gap for all voters combines a difference in income with a difference in education. This is a description of shared variation and not a causal decomposition, since income, education and race are each tied to where people live, what work they do and whom they know. A study of Western democracies from 1948 to 2020 found education and income separating: by the 2010s higher-educated voters voted for the left while high-income voters continued to vote for the right [3]. In the 2024 CES, net of education, the highest bracket is still more Democratic than the middle three brackets, by +4.1 (95% CI 1.6 to 6.6) points, against +8.6 (95% CI 5.6 to 11.6) for the lowest bracket. Net of education the profile remains U-shaped, with both end brackets above the middle. The comparison does not test the study's claims, which cover other countries, measures and years. A book-length account of the education divide in American politics is [4], and Chapter 3.2, The diploma divide (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide) takes up the issues on which graduates and non-graduates differ. Chapter 7.3, Class, church and the two axes (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/class-church-and-the-two-axes; planned) sets income and education against church attendance on the economic and cultural dimensions. ### Among high-income voters, the education gap widened through 2020 The highest bracket is now a larger part of the electorate, so its composition matters. Table 5 splits it by education. Among voters in the highest bracket with a four-year degree, the Democratic share was 55.7% (95% CI 52.6% to 58.8%) in 2008, 63.9% (95% CI 62.0% to 65.9%) in 2020 and 60.8% (95% CI 58.7% to 62.9%) in 2024, and it changed by −3.1 (95% CI −6.0 to −0.3) points from 2020 to 2024. Among voters in the highest bracket without a degree the shares were 49.4% (95% CI 43.9% to 54.9%), 46.4% (95% CI 42.4% to 50.3%) and 46.5% (95% CI 42.2% to 50.7%), with intervals that overlap. The gap between the two groups was +6.3 (95% CI 0.0 to 12.6) points in 2008, +17.6 (95% CI 13.2 to 22.0) in 2020 and +14.4 (95% CI 9.6 to 19.1) in 2024. It changed by +11.3 (95% CI 3.6 to 19.0) points from 2008 to 2020 and by −3.2 (95% CI −9.7 to 3.3) from 2020 to 2024, an interval that includes zero. Table 5. In the highest bracket, degree holders were 55.7% Democratic in 2008 and 63.9% in 2020, and voters without a degree were 49.4% and 46.4% The gap is lower in 2024 than in 2020 by an amount within sampling error. The share among degree holders was lower in 2024, and the share among voters without a degree changed by +0.1 (95% CI −5.7 to 5.9) points over the same years, so the decline among degree holders accounts for the difference in the point estimates. Voters without a degree in the highest bracket stayed within sampling error of their 2008 level in every later election, including 2024, when the change from 2008 was −3.0 (95% CI −9.9 to 4.0) points. One election cannot say whether the 2024 decline among degree holders lasts. ### The timing of the crossing depends on the weight The crossing of the highest-minus-lowest gap cannot be assigned to one election. The vote question is asked after the election, and the CES file carries several weights. The cumulative-file weight used in the rest of the chapter is defined for all five elections. A post-election weight, built for the respondents who completed the post-election interview, exists for 2012, 2016 and 2020, and a validated-vote weight, for respondents whose turnout was checked against voter records, exists for 2020 and 2024. Neither exists for 2008. Table 6 plots the gap by election under each weight, with intervals clustered by state. With the cumulative-file weight the gap is −3.4 (95% CI −7.6 to 0.8) in 2012, +3.4 (95% CI −0.1 to 6.9) in 2016 and +2.6 (95% CI −1.0 to 6.2) in 2020, and each interval includes zero, so only 2008 and 2024 differ clearly from zero. With the post-election weight the gap is −6.9 (95% CI −10.9 to −3.0) in 2012, an interval below zero, and +2.0 (95% CI −1.7 to 5.6) in 2016 and +0.7 (95% CI −3.1 to 4.6) in 2020, whose intervals include zero. The 2024 gap is above zero under both weights defined for it, at +5.7 (95% CI 1.1 to 10.3) with the cumulative-file weight and +4.2 (95% CI 0.2 to 8.2) with the validated-vote weight. Table 6. Under every weight the 2024 gap is above zero and the 2016 and 2020 gaps include zero The change in the gap since 2008 is above zero by 2016 under the cumulative-file weight, at +12.5 (95% CI 8.0 to 17.0) points, and under the post-election weight, at +11.1 (95% CI 6.4 to 15.8). By 2012 it is above zero only under the cumulative-file weight, at +5.7 (95% CI 1.0 to 10.4) points against +2.2 (95% CI −2.5 to 6.9) with the post-election weight. Under the validated-vote weight the change from 2008 to 2024 is +13.3 (95% CI 8.9 to 17.8) points. The data therefore do not place the start of the movement before 2016. The 2008 and 2024 gaps keep their signs under every weight available for them. ### The change holds under five other definitions The change in the highest-minus-lowest gap between 2008 and 2024, a difference in differences (the change in the gap between two elections), is +14.8 (95% CI 10.8 to 18.9) points, with a state-clustered standard error of 2.1 points. Without the survey weights it is +11.4 (95% CI 8.5 to 14.3). Dollar brackets raise a further question. The highest bracket held 6.7% (95% CI 6.3% to 7.1%) of the voters who reported income in 2008 and 13.3% (95% CI 12.8% to 13.9%) in 2024, so the highest bracket in 2024 is a broader group than the one in 2008. Table 7 repeats the estimate under five other definitions, which its notes describe. All six intervals are above zero, and the change is largest, at +20.6 (95% CI 16.4 to 24.8) points, with both cutoffs held constant in real dollars, so nominal dollars do not account for it. The two real-dollar groups are not equal in size across years: the top group holds 19.8% of voters in 2008 and 13.3% in 2024, and the bottom group holds 10.8% and 17.8%. Table 7. The gap between higher and lower incomes rose under all six definitions, by +10.2 to +20.6 points in the five comparisons of two groups ### The highest bracket's share of each party's voters The highest bracket made up 6.6% (95% CI 6.0% to 7.2%) of Democratic voters in 2008 and 15.4% (95% CI 14.6% to 16.2%) in 2024, and 6.9% (95% CI 6.3% to 7.4%) and 11.3% (95% CI 10.6% to 12.0%) of Republican voters, so the increase is larger among Democratic voters. Part of the increase comes from the growth of the bracket among all voters, so the comparison of the two parties is more informative than either series alone. Chapter 3.1, The two coalitions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions) breaks each party's voters down by education, income, race, religion, age and gender, and Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) follows the vote of three racial and ethnic groups. Table 8. The highest bracket's share of Democratic voters rose from 6.6% in 2008 to 15.4% in 2024, and of Republican voters from 6.9% to 11.3% ### What these data cannot show The CES interviews different respondents in each election, so the chapter compares groups and not people. It cannot say whether any voter changed their vote as income or education changed, or how much of the change comes from migration, aging and the entry of new voters. The vote is self-reported, and an online survey could lean toward one party by an amount that varies with income. The check available here is coarse. Table 9 compares the CES national Democratic share with the certified count in each election. The largest difference is 1.1 (95% CI 0.3 to 1.8) points, in 2012 with the survey above the count, and in that election the certified share lies outside the survey interval. The difference is −0.3 (95% CI −1.0 to 0.5) points in 2024. With the post-election weight the 2012 difference is +0.3 (95% CI −0.4 to 1.1) points, so the 2012 discrepancy depends on the weight. A lean of constant size would leave the differences between brackets intact, but agreement at the national level cannot show that the survey is accurate inside income brackets. Table 9. In every election the survey's Democratic share is within 1.1 points of the certified national result Income is household income in bands and is missing for 6.3% of two-party voters in 2008 and 11.2% in 2012, and for 8.2% in 2024. The Democratic share among voters who skipped the income question minus the share among those who answered was −6.5 (95% CI −9.3 to −3.6) points in 2024, so the ladder leaves out a group whose vote differs. Brackets are nominal dollars for households of any size. The chapter has no data on wealth, occupation or individual earnings. The design cannot separate income from the things that go with it. Education and race are the only two adjustments, and place of residence, occupation, homeownership and age are not held fixed. The chapter describes where the Democratic share is higher and how that changed, and it says nothing about why, since the file holds no measures of candidates, campaigns or policy positions. Five elections are a short series, and the 2024 result for degree holders in the highest bracket is one observation. Income relates to the vote differently in different places. An analysis of survey and state data found that the association between income and Republican voting was stronger in poorer states than in richer ones [5], and this chapter pools voters across states without estimating the ladder for each. A pattern across places also need not match a pattern across households, which is the problem of ecological inference. Chapter 12.3, Income and the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/income-and-the-county-vote; planned) compares counties with different incomes once education is held constant, and Chapter 12.4, Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote) looks at wage and capital income in ZIP codes. ## Tables ### Table 1. The most Democratic income bracket in 2008 was the lowest, and in 2024 it was the highest Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by household-income bracket, 2008 and 2024 (the buttons show other elections); two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Later election | Income bracket | Share 2008 (%) | 95% CI low 2008 | 95% CI high 2008 | n 2008 | Share later (%) | 95% CI low later | 95% CI high later | n later | Change (points) | 95% CI low change | 95% CI high change | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2024 | $150k or more | 53.3 | 50.4 | 56.1 | 1,634 | 57.2 | 55.2 | 59.1 | 4,832 | +3.9 | 0.4 | 7.3 | | 2024 | $100k to $150k | 50.0 | 48.0 | 51.9 | 3,244 | 49.3 | 47.5 | 51.0 | 6,416 | −0.7 | −3.3 | 2.0 | | 2024 | $60k to $100k | 50.4 | 49.0 | 51.8 | 6,261 | 46.9 | 45.4 | 48.4 | 9,646 | −3.5 | −5.6 | −1.4 | | 2024 | $30k to $60k | 54.1 | 52.7 | 55.4 | 7,172 | 46.9 | 45.3 | 48.4 | 10,250 | −7.2 | −9.3 | −5.1 | | 2024 | Under $30k | 62.4 | 60.5 | 64.4 | 3,900 | 51.5 | 49.4 | 53.6 | 7,449 | −10.9 | −13.8 | −8.1 | | 2020 | $150k or more | 53.3 | 50.4 | 56.1 | 1,634 | 59.3 | 57.5 | 61.0 | 3,908 | +6.0 | 2.6 | 9.4 | | 2020 | $100k to $150k | 50.0 | 48.0 | 51.9 | 3,244 | 53.7 | 52.2 | 55.2 | 6,062 | +3.8 | 1.3 | 6.2 | | 2020 | $60k to $100k | 50.4 | 49.0 | 51.8 | 6,261 | 50.3 | 49.1 | 51.5 | 10,534 | −0.1 | −2.0 | 1.7 | | 2020 | $30k to $60k | 54.1 | 52.7 | 55.4 | 7,172 | 51.6 | 50.4 | 52.9 | 11,283 | −2.4 | −4.3 | −0.6 | | 2020 | Under $30k | 62.4 | 60.5 | 64.4 | 3,900 | 56.6 | 55.0 | 58.2 | 7,867 | −5.8 | −8.3 | −3.3 | | 2016 | $150k or more | 53.3 | 50.4 | 56.1 | 1,634 | 58.4 | 56.2 | 60.7 | 2,739 | +5.1 | 1.5 | 8.8 | | 2016 | $100k to $150k | 50.0 | 48.0 | 51.9 | 3,244 | 52.8 | 51.2 | 54.5 | 5,428 | +2.9 | 0.3 | 5.5 | | 2016 | $60k to $100k | 50.4 | 49.0 | 51.8 | 6,261 | 50.4 | 49.1 | 51.6 | 10,089 | −0.1 | −2.0 | 1.8 | | 2016 | $30k to $60k | 54.1 | 52.7 | 55.4 | 7,172 | 49.1 | 47.9 | 50.4 | 11,291 | −4.9 | −6.8 | −3.1 | | 2016 | Under $30k | 62.4 | 60.5 | 64.4 | 3,900 | 55.1 | 53.4 | 56.8 | 7,025 | −7.4 | −10.0 | −4.8 | | 2012 | $150k or more | 53.3 | 50.4 | 56.1 | 1,634 | 56.2 | 53.1 | 59.3 | 2,206 | +2.9 | −1.3 | 7.1 | | 2012 | $100k to $150k | 50.0 | 48.0 | 51.9 | 3,244 | 52.0 | 49.8 | 54.2 | 4,300 | +2.0 | −0.9 | 5.0 | | 2012 | $60k to $100k | 50.4 | 49.0 | 51.8 | 6,261 | 50.7 | 49.1 | 52.2 | 8,686 | +0.2 | −1.9 | 2.3 | | 2012 | $30k to $60k | 54.1 | 52.7 | 55.4 | 7,172 | 53.8 | 52.4 | 55.2 | 10,959 | −0.3 | −2.3 | 1.7 | | 2012 | Under $30k | 62.4 | 60.5 | 64.4 | 3,900 | 59.6 | 57.9 | 61.4 | 6,872 | −2.8 | −5.4 | −0.2 | Views: 2008 and 2024 (comparison = 2024); 2008 and 2020 (comparison = 2020); 2008 and 2016 (comparison = 2016); 2008 and 2012 (comparison = 2012). Note: Brackets are in the nominal dollars of each survey year; the lowest and highest brackets hold a different share of voters in different years. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/ladder_2008_vs_later.json ### Table 2. The highest bracket's edge over the middle three rose from +1.3 to +9.7 points, while the lowest bracket's fell from +10.4 to +4.0 Difference in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote between an end bracket and the pooled middle three brackets, percentage points, by presidential election; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Contrast | Election | Difference (points) | 95% CI low (Kish) | 95% CI high (Kish) | 95% CI low (clustered by state) | 95% CI high (clustered by state) | n voters | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Highest bracket minus the middle three | 2008 | +1.3 | −1.7 | 4.3 | −1.3 | 3.9 | 18,311 | | Highest bracket minus the middle three | 2012 | +3.8 | 0.6 | 7.0 | 0.2 | 7.4 | 26,151 | | Highest bracket minus the middle three | 2016 | +8.2 | 5.8 | 10.5 | 5.6 | 10.7 | 29,547 | | Highest bracket minus the middle three | 2020 | +7.7 | 5.7 | 9.6 | 5.2 | 10.2 | 31,787 | | Highest bracket minus the middle three | 2024 | +9.7 | 7.5 | 11.8 | 6.9 | 12.4 | 31,144 | | Lowest bracket minus the middle three | 2008 | +10.4 | 8.3 | 12.6 | 8.4 | 12.5 | 20,577 | | Lowest bracket minus the middle three | 2012 | +7.2 | 5.2 | 9.2 | 4.7 | 9.7 | 30,817 | | Lowest bracket minus the middle three | 2016 | +4.8 | 2.9 | 6.7 | 2.6 | 6.9 | 33,833 | | Lowest bracket minus the middle three | 2020 | +5.1 | 3.3 | 6.8 | 3.1 | 7.1 | 35,746 | | Lowest bracket minus the middle three | 2024 | +4.0 | 1.7 | 6.3 | 0.9 | 7.0 | 33,761 | Note: Brackets are in the nominal dollars of each survey year; the lowest and highest brackets hold a different share of voters in different years. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Note: The bands use the Kish effective sample size. The last two columns of the table give intervals from standard errors clustered by state, which are wider. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_contrasts.json ### Table 3. Among all voters in 2024 the lowest bracket is more Democratic than the middle three in both education groups, and the highest is too among degree holders Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by household-income bracket and education, 2024 by default; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Sample | Election | Education | Income bracket | Democratic share (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n voters | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All voters | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | $150k or more | 60.8 | 58.7 | 62.9 | 3,569 | | All voters | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | $100k to $150k | 54.8 | 52.7 | 57.0 | 3,769 | | All voters | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | $60k to $100k | 54.2 | 52.2 | 56.3 | 4,160 | | All voters | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | $30k to $60k | 56.8 | 54.1 | 59.5 | 2,755 | | All voters | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | Under $30k | 60.4 | 56.1 | 64.8 | 1,275 | | All voters | 2024 | No four-year degree | $150k or more | 46.5 | 42.2 | 50.7 | 1,263 | | All voters | 2024 | No four-year degree | $100k to $150k | 40.9 | 38.0 | 43.9 | 2,647 | | All voters | 2024 | No four-year degree | $60k to $100k | 41.2 | 39.1 | 43.4 | 5,486 | | All voters | 2024 | No four-year degree | $30k to $60k | 43.1 | 41.2 | 45.0 | 7,495 | | All voters | 2024 | No four-year degree | Under $30k | 49.7 | 47.4 | 52.1 | 6,174 | | All voters | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | $150k or more | 63.9 | 62.0 | 65.9 | 2,965 | | All voters | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | $100k to $150k | 61.1 | 59.3 | 62.9 | 3,883 | | All voters | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | $60k to $100k | 61.6 | 60.0 | 63.1 | 5,066 | | All voters | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | $30k to $60k | 63.0 | 61.0 | 65.0 | 3,567 | | All voters | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | Under $30k | 67.7 | 64.8 | 70.5 | 1,526 | | All voters | 2020 | No four-year degree | $150k or more | 46.4 | 42.4 | 50.3 | 943 | | All voters | 2020 | No four-year degree | $100k to $150k | 42.6 | 40.0 | 45.2 | 2,179 | | All voters | 2020 | No four-year degree | $60k to $100k | 41.2 | 39.5 | 42.9 | 5,468 | | All voters | 2020 | No four-year degree | $30k to $60k | 47.1 | 45.6 | 48.6 | 7,716 | | All voters | 2020 | No four-year degree | Under $30k | 54.5 | 52.7 | 56.4 | 6,341 | | All voters | 2016 | Four-year degree or more | $150k or more | 62.4 | 60.0 | 64.8 | 2,003 | | All voters | 2016 | Four-year degree or more | $100k to $150k | 59.5 | 57.5 | 61.4 | 3,342 | | All voters | 2016 | Four-year degree or more | $60k to $100k | 60.6 | 59.0 | 62.3 | 4,723 | | All voters | 2016 | Four-year degree or more | $30k to $60k | 60.6 | 58.6 | 62.5 | 3,378 | | All voters | 2016 | Four-year degree or more | Under $30k | 62.6 | 59.4 | 65.9 | 1,313 | | All voters | 2016 | No four-year degree | $150k or more | 51.0 | 46.4 | 55.6 | 736 | | All voters | 2016 | No four-year degree | $100k to $150k | 45.4 | 42.6 | 48.1 | 2,086 | | All voters | 2016 | No four-year degree | $60k to $100k | 44.1 | 42.3 | 45.8 | 5,366 | | All voters | 2016 | No four-year degree | $30k to $60k | 46.0 | 44.5 | 47.5 | 7,913 | | All voters | 2016 | No four-year degree | Under $30k | 54.1 | 52.2 | 55.9 | 5,712 | | All voters | 2012 | Four-year degree or more | $150k or more | 59.8 | 56.4 | 63.3 | 1,607 | | All voters | 2012 | Four-year degree or more | $100k to $150k | 56.1 | 53.3 | 59.0 | 2,663 | | All voters | 2012 | Four-year degree or more | $60k to $100k | 55.3 | 53.1 | 57.6 | 4,054 | | All voters | 2012 | Four-year degree or more | $30k to $60k | 59.3 | 56.8 | 61.8 | 3,359 | | All voters | 2012 | Four-year degree or more | Under $30k | 63.7 | 59.8 | 67.5 | 1,401 | | All voters | 2012 | No four-year degree | $150k or more | 49.7 | 43.7 | 55.7 | 599 | | All voters | 2012 | No four-year degree | $100k to $150k | 47.3 | 43.9 | 50.7 | 1,637 | | All voters | 2012 | No four-year degree | $60k to $100k | 47.9 | 45.8 | 50.0 | 4,632 | | All voters | 2012 | No four-year degree | $30k to $60k | 52.1 | 50.4 | 53.7 | 7,600 | | All voters | 2012 | No four-year degree | Under $30k | 58.9 | 57.0 | 60.8 | 5,471 | | All voters | 2008 | Four-year degree or more | $150k or more | 55.7 | 52.6 | 58.8 | 1,094 | | All voters | 2008 | Four-year degree or more | $100k to $150k | 54.0 | 51.5 | 56.5 | 1,709 | | All voters | 2008 | Four-year degree or more | $60k to $100k | 56.6 | 54.5 | 58.7 | 2,425 | | All voters | 2008 | Four-year degree or more | $30k to $60k | 58.0 | 55.5 | 60.4 | 1,768 | | All voters | 2008 | Four-year degree or more | Under $30k | 68.2 | 64.2 | 72.2 | 595 | | All voters | 2008 | No four-year degree | $150k or more | 49.4 | 43.9 | 54.9 | 540 | | All voters | 2008 | No four-year degree | $100k to $150k | 46.1 | 43.1 | 49.1 | 1,535 | | All voters | 2008 | No four-year degree | $60k to $100k | 46.9 | 45.1 | 48.8 | 3,836 | | All voters | 2008 | No four-year degree | $30k to $60k | 52.9 | 51.3 | 54.6 | 5,404 | | All voters | 2008 | No four-year degree | Under $30k | 61.6 | 59.5 | 63.8 | 3,305 | | White voters | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | $150k or more | 58.1 | 55.8 | 60.5 | 2,774 | | White voters | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | $100k to $150k | 51.3 | 48.9 | 53.7 | 2,979 | | White voters | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | $60k to $100k | 51.0 | 48.7 | 53.3 | 3,143 | | White voters | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | $30k to $60k | 53.1 | 50.0 | 56.2 | 1,985 | | White voters | 2024 | Four-year degree or more | Under $30k | 55.1 | 49.8 | 60.5 | 854 | | White voters | 2024 | No four-year degree | $150k or more | 43.4 | 38.7 | 48.1 | 1,004 | | White voters | 2024 | No four-year degree | $100k to $150k | 35.4 | 32.4 | 38.4 | 2,134 | | White voters | 2024 | No four-year degree | $60k to $100k | 35.1 | 32.9 | 37.3 | 4,345 | | White voters | 2024 | No four-year degree | $30k to $60k | 34.9 | 33.0 | 36.9 | 5,709 | | White voters | 2024 | No four-year degree | Under $30k | 39.5 | 36.7 | 42.3 | 4,344 | | White voters | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | $150k or more | 61.3 | 59.2 | 63.5 | 2,291 | | White voters | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | $100k to $150k | 58.0 | 56.0 | 60.0 | 2,975 | | White voters | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | $60k to $100k | 57.7 | 55.9 | 59.5 | 3,790 | | White voters | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | $30k to $60k | 57.3 | 55.1 | 59.6 | 2,570 | | White voters | 2020 | Four-year degree or more | Under $30k | 63.4 | 60.0 | 66.7 | 1,057 | | White voters | 2020 | No four-year degree | $150k or more | 39.6 | 35.4 | 43.7 | 727 | | White voters | 2020 | No four-year degree | $100k to $150k | 36.5 | 33.8 | 39.1 | 1,724 | | White voters | 2020 | No four-year degree | $60k to $100k | 33.0 | 31.3 | 34.6 | 4,293 | | White voters | 2020 | No four-year degree | $30k to $60k | 35.0 | 33.5 | 36.5 | 5,780 | | White voters | 2020 | No four-year degree | Under $30k | 38.9 | 37.0 | 40.8 | 4,432 | | White voters | 2016 | Four-year degree or more | $150k or more | 59.7 | 56.9 | 62.5 | 1,466 | | White voters | 2016 | Four-year degree or more | $100k to $150k | 56.7 | 54.6 | 58.9 | 2,524 | | White voters | 2016 | Four-year degree or more | $60k to $100k | 57.1 | 55.2 | 59.0 | 3,463 | | White voters | 2016 | Four-year degree or more | $30k to $60k | 56.2 | 53.9 | 58.4 | 2,402 | | White voters | 2016 | Four-year degree or more | Under $30k | 58.1 | 54.2 | 62.0 | 867 | | White voters | 2016 | No four-year degree | $150k or more | 45.6 | 40.5 | 50.8 | 569 | | White voters | 2016 | No four-year degree | $100k to $150k | 38.0 | 35.1 | 41.0 | 1,625 | | White voters | 2016 | No four-year degree | $60k to $100k | 37.3 | 35.4 | 39.1 | 4,236 | | White voters | 2016 | No four-year degree | $30k to $60k | 36.6 | 35.0 | 38.1 | 6,080 | | White voters | 2016 | No four-year degree | Under $30k | 39.7 | 37.7 | 41.8 | 4,128 | | White voters | 2012 | Four-year degree or more | $150k or more | 57.1 | 53.4 | 60.9 | 1,357 | | White voters | 2012 | Four-year degree or more | $100k to $150k | 53.4 | 50.2 | 56.5 | 2,172 | | White voters | 2012 | Four-year degree or more | $60k to $100k | 52.3 | 49.8 | 54.8 | 3,310 | | White voters | 2012 | Four-year degree or more | $30k to $60k | 54.7 | 51.8 | 57.6 | 2,625 | | White voters | 2012 | Four-year degree or more | Under $30k | 60.6 | 56.1 | 65.1 | 1,061 | | White voters | 2012 | No four-year degree | $150k or more | 47.0 | 40.2 | 53.8 | 492 | | White voters | 2012 | No four-year degree | $100k to $150k | 42.7 | 38.9 | 46.4 | 1,354 | | White voters | 2012 | No four-year degree | $60k to $100k | 41.6 | 39.4 | 43.8 | 3,854 | | White voters | 2012 | No four-year degree | $30k to $60k | 44.5 | 42.7 | 46.3 | 6,074 | | White voters | 2012 | No four-year degree | Under $30k | 47.9 | 45.6 | 50.1 | 4,077 | | White voters | 2008 | Four-year degree or more | $150k or more | 53.2 | 50.0 | 56.5 | 978 | | White voters | 2008 | Four-year degree or more | $100k to $150k | 50.4 | 47.8 | 53.0 | 1,514 | | White voters | 2008 | Four-year degree or more | $60k to $100k | 52.9 | 50.7 | 55.1 | 2,116 | | White voters | 2008 | Four-year degree or more | $30k to $60k | 52.9 | 50.3 | 55.5 | 1,504 | | White voters | 2008 | Four-year degree or more | Under $30k | 64.5 | 60.2 | 68.9 | 514 | | White voters | 2008 | No four-year degree | $150k or more | 43.9 | 38.1 | 49.8 | 462 | | White voters | 2008 | No four-year degree | $100k to $150k | 39.6 | 36.4 | 42.8 | 1,307 | | White voters | 2008 | No four-year degree | $60k to $100k | 40.3 | 38.3 | 42.2 | 3,242 | | White voters | 2008 | No four-year degree | $30k to $60k | 42.5 | 40.8 | 44.2 | 4,446 | | White voters | 2008 | No four-year degree | Under $30k | 50.3 | 47.9 | 52.7 | 2,643 | Views: 2024, all voters (population = All voters, year = 2024); 2016, all voters (population = All voters, year = 2016); 2008, all voters (population = All voters, year = 2008); 2024, white voters (population = White voters, year = 2024); 2008, white voters (population = White voters, year = 2008). Note: Brackets are in the nominal dollars of each survey year; the lowest and highest brackets hold a different share of voters in different years. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Note: Cells with fewer than 100 respondents or a Kish effective sample below 100 are not shown; none met that condition. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/profile_by_degree.json ### Table 4. Net of education the 2024 gap is −4.5 points against +5.7 for all voters, and its interval includes zero Democratic share in the highest bracket minus the lowest, percentage points, 2008 and 2024, for all voters, within education groups, and net of education and race and ethnicity; 95% intervals clustered by state | Comparison | Gap 2008 (points) | 95% CI low 2008 | 95% CI high 2008 | n 2008 | Gap 2024 (points) | 95% CI low 2024 | 95% CI high 2024 | n 2024 | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All voters | −9.1 | −12.9 | −5.4 | 5,534 | +5.7 | 1.1 | 10.3 | 12,281 | | No degree | −12.2 | −17.4 | −7.0 | 3,845 | −3.3 | −9.3 | 2.7 | 7,437 | | Degree | −12.5 | −19.8 | −5.1 | 1,689 | +0.4 | −5.2 | 6.0 | 4,844 | | Net of education | −13.7 | −17.6 | −9.8 | 5,534 | −4.5 | −9.1 | 0.1 | 12,281 | | Net of education and race | −9.7 | −13.2 | −6.2 | 5,534 | −1.9 | −6.2 | 2.3 | 12,281 | Note: Model rows use only the highest and lowest brackets. Education has four levels: high school or less, some college, a four-year degree, and postgraduate study. Note: Intervals use standard errors clustered by state (the states and the District of Columbia) and a normal approximation; they are model based. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_net_of_education.json ### Table 5. In the highest bracket, degree holders were 55.7% Democratic in 2008 and 63.9% in 2020, and voters without a degree were 49.4% and 46.4% Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among voters in the highest household-income bracket, by education, 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Education | Election | Democratic share (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | Gap, degree minus no degree (points) | Gap 95% CI low | Gap 95% CI high | n voters | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Degree | 2008 | 55.7 | 52.6 | 58.8 | +6.3 | 0.0 | 12.6 | 1,094 | | No degree | 2008 | 49.4 | 43.9 | 54.9 | +6.3 | 0.0 | 12.6 | 540 | | Degree | 2012 | 59.8 | 56.4 | 63.3 | +10.2 | 3.2 | 17.1 | 1,607 | | No degree | 2012 | 49.7 | 43.7 | 55.7 | +10.2 | 3.2 | 17.1 | 599 | | Degree | 2016 | 62.4 | 60.0 | 64.8 | +11.3 | 6.1 | 16.5 | 2,003 | | No degree | 2016 | 51.0 | 46.4 | 55.6 | +11.3 | 6.1 | 16.5 | 736 | | Degree | 2020 | 63.9 | 62.0 | 65.9 | +17.6 | 13.2 | 22.0 | 2,965 | | No degree | 2020 | 46.4 | 42.4 | 50.3 | +17.6 | 13.2 | 22.0 | 943 | | Degree | 2024 | 60.8 | 58.7 | 62.9 | +14.4 | 9.6 | 19.1 | 3,569 | | No degree | 2024 | 46.5 | 42.2 | 50.7 | +14.4 | 9.6 | 19.1 | 1,263 | Note: Brackets are in the nominal dollars of each survey year; the lowest and highest brackets hold a different share of voters in different years. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/high_income_by_degree.json ### Table 6. Under every weight the 2024 gap is above zero and the 2016 and 2020 gaps include zero Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote in the highest bracket minus the lowest, percentage points, by election and survey weight; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals clustered by state | Election | Weight | Gap (points) | 95% CI low (clustered by state) | 95% CI high (clustered by state) | 95% CI low (Kish) | 95% CI high (Kish) | n voters | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2008 | Cumulative-file weight | −9.1 | −12.9 | −5.4 | −12.6 | −5.7 | 5,534 | | 2012 | Cumulative-file weight | −3.4 | −7.6 | 0.8 | −7.0 | 0.1 | 9,078 | | 2016 | Cumulative-file weight | +3.4 | −0.1 | 6.9 | 0.5 | 6.2 | 9,764 | | 2020 | Cumulative-file weight | +2.6 | −1.0 | 6.2 | 0.2 | 5.0 | 11,775 | | 2024 | Cumulative-file weight | +5.7 | 1.1 | 10.3 | 2.8 | 8.5 | 12,281 | | 2012 | Post-election weight | −6.9 | −10.9 | −3.0 | −10.5 | −3.4 | 9,078 | | 2016 | Post-election weight | +2.0 | −1.7 | 5.6 | −1.1 | 5.1 | 9,764 | | 2020 | Post-election weight | +0.7 | −3.1 | 4.6 | −1.9 | 3.4 | 11,775 | | 2020 | Validated-vote weight | +2.8 | −1.0 | 6.7 | 0.2 | 5.4 | 9,585 | | 2024 | Validated-vote weight | +4.2 | 0.2 | 8.2 | 1.3 | 7.1 | 9,405 | Note: The post-election weight is not available for 2008 or 2024, and the validated-vote weight only for 2020 and 2024. Intervals use standard errors clustered by state (the states and the District of Columbia) and a normal approximation; they are model based. Note: The table also gives the interval from the Kish effective sample size, which is narrower; under the cumulative-file weight it is above zero for both 2016 and 2020. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative, weight_post or vvweight, as labelled); two-party presidential voters who reported household income Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_by_weight.json ### Table 7. The gap between higher and lower incomes rose under all six definitions, by +10.2 to +20.6 points in the five comparisons of two groups Change from 2008 to 2024 in the Democratic share of the higher-income group minus that of the lower-income group, percentage points; two-party voters who reported income; 95% intervals clustered by state | Estimate | Change (points) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n observations | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Main: highest vs lowest | +14.8 | 10.8 | 18.9 | 17,815 | | Unweighted | +11.4 | 8.5 | 14.3 | 17,815 | | Top 2 vs bottom 2 | +10.2 | 7.9 | 12.4 | 44,897 | | Top group, fixed share | +16.3 | 12.6 | 20.0 | 19,225 | | Real-dollar cutoffs | +20.6 | 16.4 | 24.8 | 18,933 | | Rank slope (other scale) | +18.9 | 15.3 | 22.6 | 60,804 | Note: Each row is a difference in differences, the change in the gap between two elections, estimated by weighted least squares with standard errors clustered by state (the states and the District of Columbia). Note: Unweighted: the same estimate without the survey weights. Top 2 vs bottom 2: each group is two brackets. Note: Top group, fixed share: in each election the top group's income cutoff is set so that the group holds about the same share of voters as the highest bracket does in 2024; the comparison group is the lowest bracket. Note: Real-dollar cutoffs: both cutoffs are held constant in real dollars with the consumer price index, at the income band edges nearest the 2024 cutoffs deflated to each election. Note: Rank slope: the vote is regressed on each voter's income rank within the election, so no dollar cutoffs are used. The estimate is the change in the difference between the lowest and the highest rank, and it does not compare two groups of voters. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_definitions.json ### Table 8. The highest bracket's share of Democratic voters rose from 6.6% in 2008 to 15.4% in 2024, and of Republican voters from 6.9% to 11.3% Share of each party's two-party presidential voters who live in a household in the highest income bracket, percent, 2008 and 2024; voters who reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Party's voters | Share 2008 (%) | 95% CI low 2008 | 95% CI high 2008 | n 2008 | Share 2024 (%) | 95% CI low 2024 | 95% CI high 2024 | n 2024 | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Democratic voters | 6.6 | 6.0 | 7.2 | 10,942 | 15.4 | 14.6 | 16.2 | 21,814 | | Republican voters | 6.9 | 6.3 | 7.4 | 11,269 | 11.3 | 10.6 | 12.0 | 16,779 | Note: Brackets are in the nominal dollars of each survey year; the lowest and highest brackets hold a different share of voters in different years. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters who reported household income Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/top_bracket_by_party.json ### Table 9. In every election the survey's Democratic share is within 1.1 points of the certified national result Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, CES respondents minus the certified national count, percentage points, by election; two-party voters whether or not they reported income; 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Election | CES (%) | Certified (%) | Difference (points) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n voters | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2008 | 53.9 | 53.8 | +0.1 | −0.7 | +0.9 | 23,585 | | 2012 | 53.1 | 52.0 | +1.1 | +0.3 | +1.8 | 37,789 | | 2016 | 51.0 | 51.2 | −0.2 | −0.8 | +0.5 | 40,891 | | 2020 | 52.5 | 52.3 | +0.3 | −0.4 | +0.9 | 43,872 | | 2024 | 49.0 | 49.2 | −0.3 | −1.0 | +0.5 | 42,008 | Note: The certified share is a full count and has no sampling interval; the interval shown is the survey's. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, 2008-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative). MIT Election Data and Science Lab state presidential returns, 1976-2024; full counts (unweighted) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/survey_vs_certified.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (116), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | bench_diff_2024 | −0.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | CES weighted Democratic share minus the certified national two-party share | all two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI −1.0 to 0.5 | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | bench_max | 1.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | largest absolute difference between the CES weighted Democratic share and the certified national two-party share in the five elections | all two-party presidential voters | 2012 | 95% CI 0.3 to 1.8 | 37,789 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | The largest difference is in 2012. | | bench_post_2012 | +0.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | CES Democratic share with the post-election weight minus the certified national two-party share | all two-party presidential voters | 2012 | 95% CI −0.4 to 1.1 | 37,789 | weight_post | Cooperative Election Study | | | chg_b1 | −10.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined | the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −13.8 to −8.1 | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chg_b2 | −7.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined | the second bracket ($30,000 to $60,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −9.3 to −5.1 | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chg_b3 | −3.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined | the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −5.6 to −1.4 | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chg_b4 | −0.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined | the fourth bracket ($100,000 to $150,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −3.3 to 2.0 | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chg_b5 | +3.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined | the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.4 to 7.3 | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chg_deg | +12.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the highest-minus-lowest gap among voters with a four-year degree or more; difference in differences, state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 3.9 to 21.8 | 6,533 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chg_edu | +9.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the highest-minus-lowest gap net of education; difference in differences, state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 4.9 to 13.4 | 17,815 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chg_er | +7.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the highest-minus-lowest gap net of education and of race and ethnicity; difference in differences, state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 3.7 to 11.9 | 17,815 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chg_nodeg | +8.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the highest-minus-lowest gap among voters without a four-year degree; difference in differences, state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.2 to 15.6 | 11,282 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | degree_gap_2008 | +4.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | difference in weighted Democratic shares; independent groups, standard errors combined | two-party presidential voters who reported household income, degree holders minus others | 2008 | 95% CI 2.7 to 5.8 | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | degree_gap_2024 | +12.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | difference in weighted Democratic shares; independent groups, standard errors combined | two-party presidential voters who reported household income, degree holders minus others | 2024 | 95% CI 11.0 to 14.1 | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dem_b5_2008 | 6.6% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share living in a household in the highest bracket | Democratic presidential voters who reported income | 2008 | 95% CI 6.0% to 7.2% | 10,942 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dem_b5_2024 | 15.4% | percent of Democratic voters | weighted share living in a household in the highest bracket | Democratic presidential voters who reported income | 2024 | 95% CI 14.6% to 16.2% | 21,814 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | did_2012 | +5.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the highest-minus-lowest gap since 2008, weighted, state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI 1.0 to 10.4 | 14,612 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | did_2016 | +12.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the highest-minus-lowest gap since 2008, weighted, state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI 8.0 to 17.0 | 15,298 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | did_post_2012 | +2.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the highest-minus-lowest gap since 2008 (2008 with the cumulative-file weight, 2012 with weight_post), state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −2.5 to 6.9 | 14,612 | weight_cumulative for 2008, weight_post for 2012 | Cooperative Election Study | | | did_post_2016 | +11.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the highest-minus-lowest gap since 2008 (2008 with the cumulative-file weight, 2016 with weight_post), state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI 6.4 to 15.8 | 15,298 | weight_cumulative for 2008, weight_post for 2016 | Cooperative Election Study | | | did_rank | +18.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the slope of Democratic share on income rank, state-clustered standard errors | slope on within-year income rank, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 15.3 to 22.6 | 60,804 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | did_real | +20.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the gap between a top group and a bottom group whose cutoffs are the band edges nearest the 2024 cutoffs deflated with the CPI-U, state-clustered standard errors | top and bottom groups with income cutoffs held constant in real dollars, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 16.4 to 24.8 | 18,933 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | Cutoffs: $100,000 and $20,000 in 2008; $150,000 and $30,000 in 2024. Deflator: BLS CPI-U annual averages, series CUUR0000SA0. | | did_se | 2.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | state-clustered standard error of the change in the gap | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | did_u | +11.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the gap, unweighted, state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 8.5 to 14.3 | 17,815 | none (unweighted) | Cooperative Election Study | | | did_vv_2024 | +13.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the highest-minus-lowest gap since 2008 (2008 with the cumulative-file weight, 2024 with vvweight), state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 8.9 to 17.8 | 17,815 | weight_cumulative for 2008, vvweight for 2024 | Cooperative Election Study | | | did_w | +14.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the highest-minus-lowest gap (difference in differences), weighted, state-clustered standard errors | highest and lowest brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 10.8 to 18.9 | 17,815 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | did_wide | +10.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the gap between the two highest and the two lowest brackets, state-clustered standard errors | top two brackets against bottom two, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI 7.9 to 12.4 | 44,897 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | floor_100 | $100,000 | dollars of annual household income | definition of a bracket edge | edge of an income bracket | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (definition) | Cooperative Election Study | | | floor_150 | $150,000 | dollars of annual household income | definition of a bracket edge | edge of an income bracket | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (definition) | Cooperative Election Study | | | floor_30 | $30,000 | dollars of annual household income | definition of a bracket edge | edge of an income bracket | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (definition) | Cooperative Election Study | | | floor_60 | $60,000 | dollars of annual household income | definition of a bracket edge | edge of an income bracket | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (definition) | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_2008 | −9.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI −12.9 to −5.4 | 5,534 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_2012 | −3.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2012 | 95% CI −7.6 to 0.8 | 9,078 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_2016 | +3.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2016 | 95% CI −0.1 to 6.9 | 9,764 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_2020 | +2.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2020 | 95% CI −1.0 to 6.2 | 11,775 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_2024 | +5.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 1.1 to 10.3 | 12,281 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_edu_2008 | −13.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | weighted linear probability model coefficient for the highest bracket against the lowest, net of education (four levels); state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI −17.6 to −9.8 | 5,534 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_edu_2024 | −4.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | weighted linear probability model coefficient for the highest bracket against the lowest, net of education (four levels); state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI −9.1 to 0.1 | 12,281 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_er_2024 | −1.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | weighted linear probability model coefficient for the highest bracket against the lowest, net of education and of race and ethnicity; state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI −6.2 to 2.3 | 12,281 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_post_2012 | −6.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest, with the post-election weight; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2012 | 95% CI −10.9 to −3.0 | 9,078 | weight_post | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_post_2016 | +2.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest, with the post-election weight; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2016 | 95% CI −1.7 to 5.6 | 9,764 | weight_post | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_post_2020 | +0.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest, with the post-election weight; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2020 | 95% CI −3.1 to 4.6 | 11,775 | weight_post | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_vv_2020 | +2.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest, with the validated-vote weight; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2020 | 95% CI −1.0 to 6.7 | 9,585 | vvweight | Cooperative Election Study | | | gap_vv_2024 | +4.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest, with the validated-vote weight; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 0.2 to 8.2 | 9,405 | vvweight | Cooperative Election Study | | | gapd_2008 | −12.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, voters with a four-year degree or more in those brackets | 2008 | 95% CI −19.8 to −5.1 | 1,689 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gapd_2024 | +0.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, voters with a four-year degree or more in those brackets | 2024 | 95% CI −5.2 to 6.0 | 4,844 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gapn_2008 | −12.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, voters without a four-year degree in those brackets | 2008 | 95% CI −17.4 to −7.0 | 3,845 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gapn_2024 | −3.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | weighted difference in Democratic share, state-clustered standard errors | highest minus lowest bracket, voters without a four-year degree in those brackets | 2024 | 95% CI −9.3 to 2.7 | 7,437 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_deg_2008 | 55.7% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | voters in the highest bracket with a four-year degree or more | 2008 | 95% CI 52.6% to 58.8% | 1,094 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_deg_2020 | 63.9% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | voters in the highest bracket with a four-year degree or more | 2020 | 95% CI 62.0% to 65.9% | 2,965 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_deg_2024 | 60.8% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | voters in the highest bracket with a four-year degree or more | 2024 | 95% CI 58.7% to 62.9% | 3,569 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_deg_chg | −3.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus that in 2020; independent cycles, standard errors combined | voters in the highest bracket with a four-year degree or more | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −6.0 to −0.3 | 6,534 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_gap_2008 | +6.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | difference in weighted Democratic shares; independent groups, standard errors combined | voters in the highest bracket, degree holders minus others | 2008 | 95% CI 0.0 to 12.6 | 1,634 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_gap_2020 | +17.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | difference in weighted Democratic shares; independent groups, standard errors combined | voters in the highest bracket, degree holders minus others | 2020 | 95% CI 13.2 to 22.0 | 3,908 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_gap_2024 | +14.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | difference in weighted Democratic shares; independent groups, standard errors combined | voters in the highest bracket, degree holders minus others | 2024 | 95% CI 9.6 to 19.1 | 4,832 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_gap_chg_2020 | +11.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the difference between the Democratic shares of degree holders and others; independent cycles, standard errors combined | voters in the highest bracket, degree holders minus others | 2008 to 2020 | 95% CI 3.6 to 19.0 | 5,542 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_gap_chg_2024 | −3.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the difference between the Democratic shares of degree holders and others; independent cycles, standard errors combined | voters in the highest bracket, degree holders minus others | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −9.7 to 3.3 | 8,740 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_nod_2008 | 49.4% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | voters in the highest bracket without a four-year degree | 2008 | 95% CI 43.9% to 54.9% | 540 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_nod_2020 | 46.4% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | voters in the highest bracket without a four-year degree | 2020 | 95% CI 42.4% to 50.3% | 943 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_nod_2024 | 46.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | voters in the highest bracket without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 42.2% to 50.7% | 1,263 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_nod_chg | +0.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus that in 2020; independent cycles, standard errors combined | voters in the highest bracket without a four-year degree | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −5.7 to 5.9 | 2,206 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | hi_nod_chg_0824 | −3.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus that in 2008; independent cycles, standard errors combined | voters in the highest bracket without a four-year degree | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −9.9 to 4.0 | 1,803 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | mix_b1_2008 | 12.0% | percent of voters in the bracket | weighted share holding a four-year degree or more | the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI 10.7% to 13.4% | 3,900 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | mix_b1_2024 | 16.2% | percent of voters in the bracket | weighted share holding a four-year degree or more | the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 14.6% to 17.7% | 7,449 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | mix_b5_2008 | 61.0% | percent of voters in the bracket | weighted share holding a four-year degree or more | the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI 58.2% to 63.8% | 1,634 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | mix_b5_2024 | 74.5% | percent of voters in the bracket | weighted share holding a four-year degree or more | the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 72.8% to 76.2% | 4,832 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_income | 170,053 | respondents | count of respondents | two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_votes | 188,145 | respondents | count of respondents | respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | nat_swing | −4.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | CES weighted Democratic share in 2024 minus that in 2008 | all two-party presidential voters (income reported or not) | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −6.0 to −3.9 | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | net_pm_2024 | +8.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | weighted linear probability model coefficient for the lowest bracket against the three middle brackets, net of education (four levels); state-clustered standard errors | lowest bracket against the pooled middle three brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 5.6 to 11.6 | 38,593 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | net_rm_2024 | +4.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | weighted linear probability model coefficient for the highest bracket against the three middle brackets, net of education (four levels); state-clustered standard errors | highest bracket against the pooled middle three brackets, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 1.6 to 6.6 | 38,593 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | nonrep_gap_2024 | −6.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters who did not report income minus that among voters who did; independent groups, standard errors combined | all two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI −9.3 to −3.6 | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | nonresp_2008 | 6.3% | percent of two-party voters | weighted share who did not report household income | all two-party presidential voters | 2008 | 95% CI 6.0% to 6.7% | 23,585 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | nonresp_2012 | 11.2% | percent of two-party voters | weighted share who did not report household income | all two-party presidential voters | 2012 | 95% CI 10.7% to 11.6% | 37,789 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | nonresp_2024 | 8.2% | percent of two-party voters | weighted share who did not report household income | all two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI 7.8% to 8.6% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | p4_2024 | +2.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the lowest bracket minus that in the fourth; independent groups, standard errors combined | lowest bracket minus the fourth bracket ($100,000 to $150,000), two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI −0.5 to 5.0 | 13,865 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_deg_b1 | 60.4% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the lowest bracket (under $30,000), voters with a four-year degree or more | 2024 | 95% CI 56.1% to 64.8% | 1,275 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_deg_b3 | 54.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000), voters with a four-year degree or more | 2024 | 95% CI 52.2% to 56.3% | 4,160 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_deg_b5 | 60.8% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the highest bracket ($150,000 or more), voters with a four-year degree or more | 2024 | 95% CI 58.7% to 62.9% | 3,569 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_hm_deg | +5.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined | highest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, voters with a four-year degree or more | 2024 | 95% CI 3.3 to 8.2 | 14,253 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_hm_nod | +4.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined | highest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, voters without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 0.0 to 8.9 | 16,891 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_hm_wdeg | +6.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined | highest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, white voters with a four-year degree or more | 2024 | 95% CI 3.8 to 9.3 | 10,881 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_hm_wnod | +8.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined | highest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, white voters without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 3.4 to 13.2 | 13,192 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_lm_deg | +5.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined | lowest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, voters with a four-year degree or more | 2024 | 95% CI 0.8 to 9.9 | 11,959 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_lm_nod | +7.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined | lowest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, voters without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 5.0 to 10.4 | 21,802 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_lm_wdeg | +3.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined | lowest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, white voters with a four-year degree or more | 2024 | 95% CI −2.0 to 9.1 | 8,961 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_lm_wnod | +4.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the pooled second group; independent groups, standard errors combined | lowest bracket minus the pooled middle three brackets, white voters without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 1.4 to 7.5 | 16,532 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_nod_b1 | 49.7% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the lowest bracket (under $30,000), voters without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 47.4% to 52.1% | 6,174 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_nod_b3 | 41.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000), voters without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 39.1% to 43.4% | 5,486 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_nod_b5 | 46.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the highest bracket ($150,000 or more), voters without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 42.2% to 50.7% | 1,263 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_white_nod_b3 | 35.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000), white voters without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 32.9% to 37.3% | 4,345 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pf_white_nod_b5 | 43.4% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the highest bracket ($150,000 or more), white voters without a four-year degree | 2024 | 95% CI 38.7% to 48.1% | 1,004 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pm_2008 | +10.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | lowest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI 8.3 to 12.6 | 20,577 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pm_2024 | +4.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | lowest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 1.7 to 6.3 | 33,761 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rank_2008 | −15.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | weighted least squares slope on the income rank (0 to 1) with state-clustered standard errors | slope of Democratic share on within-year income rank, from lowest to highest rank, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI −19.1 to −12.0 | 22,211 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rank_2024 | +3.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | weighted least squares slope on the income rank (0 to 1) with state-clustered standard errors | slope of Democratic share on within-year income rank, from lowest to highest rank, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI −1.2 to 7.9 | 38,593 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | real_bot_2008 | 10.8% | percent of voters | weighted share of two-party voters who reported income | voters with income under $20,000 | 2008 | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | real_bot_2024 | 17.8% | percent of voters | weighted share of two-party voters who reported income | voters with income under $30,000 | 2024 | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | real_top_2008 | 19.8% | percent of voters | weighted share of two-party voters who reported income | voters with income of $100,000 or more | 2008 | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rep_b5_2008 | 6.9% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share living in a household in the highest bracket | Republican presidential voters who reported income | 2008 | 95% CI 6.3% to 7.4% | 11,269 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rep_b5_2024 | 11.3% | percent of Republican voters | weighted share living in a household in the highest bracket | Republican presidential voters who reported income | 2024 | 95% CI 10.6% to 12.0% | 16,779 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rm_2008 | +1.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | highest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI −1.7 to 4.3 | 18,311 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rm_2016 | +8.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | highest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2016 | 95% CI 5.8 to 10.5 | 29,547 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rm_2024 | +9.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the first group minus that in the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | highest bracket minus the middle three, two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 7.5 to 11.8 | 31,144 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | sh_b1_2008 | 62.4% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI 60.5% to 64.4% | 3,900 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | sh_b1_2024 | 51.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the lowest bracket (under $30,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 49.4% to 53.6% | 7,449 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | sh_b2_2008 | 54.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the second bracket ($30,000 to $60,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI 52.7% to 55.4% | 7,172 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | sh_b2_2024 | 46.9% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the second bracket ($30,000 to $60,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 45.3% to 48.4% | 10,250 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | sh_b3_2008 | 50.4% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI 49.0% to 51.8% | 6,261 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | sh_b3_2024 | 46.9% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the third bracket ($60,000 to $100,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 45.4% to 48.4% | 9,646 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | sh_b4_2008 | 50.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the fourth bracket ($100,000 to $150,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI 48.0% to 51.9% | 3,244 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | sh_b4_2024 | 49.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the fourth bracket ($100,000 to $150,000) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 47.5% to 51.0% | 6,416 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | sh_b5_2008 | 53.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI 50.4% to 56.1% | 1,634 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | sh_b5_2024 | 57.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | the highest bracket ($150,000 or more) among two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 55.2% to 59.1% | 4,832 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | topshare_2008 | 6.7% | percent of voters | weighted share of voters in the highest bracket, nominal dollars | two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2008 | 95% CI 6.3% to 7.1% | 22,211 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | topshare_2024 | 13.3% | percent of voters | weighted share of voters in the highest bracket, nominal dollars | two-party presidential voters who reported household income | 2024 | 95% CI 12.8% to 13.9% | 38,593 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. - Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors. - Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them. ## Methods Sample: respondents in the Cooperative Election Study cumulative file for the five presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate (188,145 respondents), of whom 170,053 also reported household income. Outcome: the Democratic share of the two-party vote as reported by the respondent in the post-election interview; third-party and other votes are excluded. Weights: weight_cumulative, the cumulative-file weight for pooled years, in every estimate except the row marked unweighted and the weight sensitivity figure. Within each election it is a constant multiple of the single-wave weight, and it is the only weight defined for all five elections. A post-election weight (weight_post), built for the respondents who completed the post-election interview, exists for 2012, 2016 and 2020, and a validated-vote weight (vvweight), for respondents whose turnout was checked against voter records, exists for 2020 and 2024; neither exists for 2008. The weight sensitivity figure re-estimates the highest-minus-lowest gap with each of them and gives state-clustered intervals, and the chapter quotes the change in the gap under them where a conclusion depends on the weight. Income: the file's five brackets, built from twelve reported income bands, in nominal dollars (under $30,000; $30,000 to $60,000; $60,000 to $100,000; $100,000 to $150,000; $150,000 or more). High income means the highest bracket everywhere in the chapter. Education: a four-year degree or more against all other levels. Estimators: a share is a weighted mean of the 0/1 Democratic vote; a gap is the difference of two weighted means; a change in a gap between two elections is a difference in differences (the change in the gap between two elections) fitted by weighted least squares; the net-of-education rows, which compare voters with the same education, are coefficients from a weighted linear probability model on the two end brackets, and the contrasts against the middle three brackets use the same model on all five brackets. Intervals: 95%. Shares, contrasts between groups within one election (the differences against the pooled middle three brackets, the education differences among voters in the highest bracket and the contrasts inside education groups) and changes in one share between two elections use the Kish effective sample size and a normal approximation, and combine the standard errors of independent groups in quadrature. The highest-minus-lowest gap in each election, a change in a gap between two elections and every regression coefficient use standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters, the states and the District of Columbia) with normal critical values; a t critical value with 50 degrees of freedom (2.01 in place of 1.96) would widen each clustered interval by about 2.5% and would not move zero in or out of any of the 84 clustered intervals in the chapter. State-clustered intervals for the 25 bracket-by-election shares are 1.3 to 3.0 times as wide as the Kish intervals (median 2.1), because between-state differences in the vote count as sampling error, so the Kish intervals on levels leave out that variation. The tables under the figure of the two contrasts against the middle three and under the figure of the gap by weight give the state-clustered interval beside the Kish interval for every one-election estimate they show. All intervals are model based: the CES is an opt-in panel, so an interval treats the weighted sample as a random sample and ignores how respondents came to be in the panel. Suppression: a cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample of at least 100, and no cell was suppressed. Rounding: displays round half up from the unrounded estimate, and differences are computed before rounding, so a printed difference can differ by 0.1 from the difference of two printed shares. Income rank: the weighted midpoint percentile of the respondent's income band among all respondents who reported income in that election. Top group held near a constant share: in each election the income cutoff among the twelve bands whose group share of voters is closest to the 2024 share of the highest bracket (income of $120,000 or more in 2008); the comparison group is the lowest bracket. Constant real dollars: the 2024 cutoffs ($150,000 and $30,000) deflated to each election with the BLS CPI-U annual average (series CUUR0000SA0; the 2024 price level is 1.457 times the 2008 level) and moved to the nearest band edge ($100,000 and $20,000 in 2008); the top group is the bands at or above the top edge and the bottom group the bands at or below the bottom edge. Benchmark: the certified national two-party share from the state presidential returns of the MIT Election Data and Science Lab, full counts. Survey mode: the CES is an online panel in every year, so there is no mode break in the series. ## What these data cannot show - The CES interviews different respondents in each election, so the chapter compares groups and not people. - It cannot say whether any voter changed their vote as income or education changed, or how much of the change comes from migration, aging and the entry of new voters. - The vote is self-reported, and an online survey could lean toward one party by an amount that varies with income. - The check available here is coarse. - Table 9 compares the CES national Democratic share with the certified count in each election. - The largest difference is 1.1 (95% CI 0.3 to 1.8) points, in 2012 with the survey above the count, and in that election the certified share lies outside the survey interval. - The difference is −0.3 (95% CI −1.0 to 0.5) points in 2024. - With the post-election weight the 2012 difference is +0.3 (95% CI −0.4 to 1.1) points, so the 2012 discrepancy depends on the weight. - A lean of constant size would leave the differences between brackets intact, but agreement at the national level cannot show that the survey is accurate inside income brackets. - Table 9. - In every election the survey's Democratic share is within 1.1 points of the certified national result - Income is household income in bands and is missing for 6.3% of two-party voters in 2008 and 11.2% in 2012, and for 8.2% in 2024. - The Democratic share among voters who skipped the income question minus the share among those who answered was −6.5 (95% CI −9.3 to −3.6) points in 2024, so the ladder leaves out a group whose vote differs. - Brackets are nominal dollars for households of any size. - The chapter has no data on wealth, occupation or individual earnings. - The design cannot separate income from the things that go with it. - Education and race are the only two adjustments, and place of residence, occupation, homeownership and age are not held fixed. - The chapter describes where the Democratic share is higher and how that changed, and it says nothing about why, since the file holds no measures of candidates, campaigns or policy positions. - Five elections are a short series, and the 2024 result for degree holders in the highest bracket is one observation. - Income relates to the vote differently in different places. - An analysis of survey and state data found that the association between income and Republican voting was stronger in poorer states than in richer ones [5], and this chapter pools voters across states without estimating the ladder for each. - A pattern across places also need not match a pattern across households, which is the problem of ecological inference. - Chapter 12.3, Income and the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/income-and-the-county-vote; planned) compares counties with different incomes once education is held constant, and Chapter 12.4, Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote) looks at wage and capital income in ZIP codes. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Zacher, Sam (2024). Polarization of the Rich: The New Democratic Allegiance of Affluent Americans and the Politics of Redistribution. Perspectives on Politics 22(2): 338-356. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592722003310 3. Gethin, Amory; Martínez-Toledano, Clara; Piketty, Thomas (2022). Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020. Quarterly Journal of Economics 137(1): 1-48. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab036 4. Grossmann, Matt; Hopkins, David A. (2024). Polarized by Degrees: How the Diploma Divide and the Culture War Transformed American Politics. Cambridge University Press. 5. Gelman, Andrew; Shor, Boris; Bafumi, Joseph; Park, David (2008). Rich State, Poor State, Red State, Blue State: What's the Matter with Connecticut?. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2(4): 345-367. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00006026 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/the-income-ladder/build.py (sha256 f9b1d4414cde9f5d3f157f9e8290e8d48a805771b17da5cb520fb5440d34f3d0) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/dime/cpi_u_annual.csv | 930 | 8e420e70de42064ef8822e4d86435b238afb69b3b92ad8364c933e48fc5fb6d7 | 8e420e70de42064ef8822e4d86435b238afb69b3b92ad8364c933e48fc5fb6d7 | | data/state/1976-2024-president.csv | 514,108 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 94b439d32d17779b39b3c43a576350de23cb090efde900a2f824a170506c9a37 | | figures/gap_by_weight.json | b54496864d50383cbf9e82757bf7fa4cfa71135115b00a2752d7645a8e88a63f | | figures/gap_contrasts.json | c36c7efab21f3733475e3f0b29b71df6b0bc144810c1531dfd58d71a00162637 | | figures/gap_definitions.json | a1339efa436331d1c774c915095ff5312c96815d2c82746635e04c5d29b33191 | | figures/gap_net_of_education.json | 95b6c2699aaf5f47e7097770020b23e284a4fa774f642e471b658b048418bd70 | | figures/high_income_by_degree.json | 311669b69d2e24ec5dd1c0d998f56060f83404474be1820c21badefc13cfb49d | | figures/ladder_2008_vs_later.json | 9ce725424f49201523d74aacfb77f56526c5b3e2d6a94d25ea13b15eb1b5c2b1 | | figures/profile_by_degree.json | f68ef9793d2e854442d5a8d0960ec6747995f2181a2550e987dcf214fbb63187 | | figures/survey_vs_certified.json | 51a97dee9f77407efc0ce56e75d04873ed7077c73de5dfadc016cfe24a4733bd | | figures/top_bracket_by_party.json | 1a5545ad970bc9fa43ad65f5308dbe15aead6935eafe2ba2e2206bc38dab1a10 | | meta.json | 6fdeb172d26fd2689c0db1c4e2f05937d3c3e17c5b6ca10ea768235a7988fb7c | | refs.json | 9cc7a1224e62f4d93a79a67301f21d1c59a0912f56a96b769fb48efa5c39eb40 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/facts.json - Table 1, figure "ladder_2008_vs_later" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/ladder_2008_vs_later.json - Table 2, figure "gap_contrasts" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_contrasts.json - Table 3, figure "profile_by_degree" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/profile_by_degree.json - Table 4, figure "gap_net_of_education" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_net_of_education.json - Table 5, figure "high_income_by_degree" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/high_income_by_degree.json - Table 6, figure "gap_by_weight" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_by_weight.json - Table 7, figure "gap_definitions" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/gap_definitions.json - Table 8, figure "top_bracket_by_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/top_bracket_by_party.json - Table 9, figure "survey_vs_certified" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-income-ladder/figures/survey_vs_certified.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # The gender gap in attitudes and votes: report Chapter 3.5 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: The gender gap in attitudes and votes - Chapter: 3.5 (Part III, The party coalitions; The great sorting) - Question: How large are gender gaps in gender-role attitudes and in the vote, and are they larger among the young? - Dek: In 2024 women gave the Democratic presidential candidate more of the two-party vote than men did, by 8.1 points in the ANES. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File, presidential vote 1952-2024 and feminist thermometer 1988-2024; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: post-election weight where available, else VCF0009z - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative File, presidential vote 2008-2024 and party identification 2006-2024; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative; vvweight for the matched-weight rows (2024) - General Social Survey. 1977-2024, gender-role item fefam, with interview mode from the raw file; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use - World Values Survey and EVS. United States, wave 7 (2017); years: 1981-2023 (7 unified waves); weights: weight (S017) - Nationscape. Weekly waves, July 2019 to February 2021; years: 2019-07-18 to 2021-04-15 (85 weekly waves); weights: weight; errors clustered on the weekly wave - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026thegendergap ```bibtex @misc{singh2026thegendergap, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {The gender gap in attitudes and votes}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2024 | 8.1 | 95% CI 3.6 to 12.6 | 3,943 | post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise the full-sample weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_gap_2024 | | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2024 | 4.1 | 95% CI 2.6 to 5.7 | 41,757 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_gap_2024 | | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate and were matched to voter-file records | 2024 | 8.0 | 95% CI 6.3 to 9.6 | 32,776 | vvweight (respondents matched to voter-file records) | Cooperative Election Study | ces_vv_gap_2024 | | gap among ages 18 to 29 minus gap among ages 30 and older, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2024 | +2.6 | 95% CI −3.8 to 8.9 | 41,757 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | diff_2024 | | count of surveys where the party gap minus the gender gap has a 95% interval above zero | GSS 2024, ANES 2024, WVS United States 2017, Nationscape 2019-2021 | latest window of each survey | 3 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_party_larger | | count of surveys compared | GSS 2024, ANES 2024, WVS United States 2017, Nationscape 2019-2021 | latest window of each survey | 4 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_instruments | | difference in weighted shares, Republicans (party identification 4 to 6) minus Democrats (0 to 2), leaners included; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item who are Democrats or Republicans, leaners included | 2024 | 25.8 | 95% CI 19.6 to 31.9 | 1,548 | weight_use | General Social Survey | gss_party_gap_2024 | | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | 2024 | 4.4 | 95% CI −1.1 to 9.9 | 2,153 | weight_use | General Social Survey | gss_gender_gap_2024 | | party gap minus gender gap, ignoring how the two gaps move together on the same respondents; item: agree that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce | WVS United States respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded party (or left-right side) and sex | 2017 | 0.3 | 95% CI −2.9 to 3.5 | 5,125 | weight (S017) | World Values Survey and EVS | wvs_party_minus_gender | ## Findings In 2024 women gave the Democratic presidential candidate more of the two-party vote than men did, by 8.1 (95% CI 3.6 to 12.6) points in the American National Election Studies (ANES) and by 4.1 (95% CI 2.6 to 5.7) in the Cooperative Election Study (CES). With the CES weight for respondents matched to voter-file records (lists of registered voters) the CES gap is 8.0 (95% CI 6.3 to 9.6), so the size of the gap depends on the weight as well as on the survey. The CES gap among voters under thirty minus the gap among voters thirty and older is +2.6 (95% CI −3.8 to 8.9), and its confidence interval includes zero, so a larger gap among the young is not shown. Party separates gender-role attitudes more than gender does in 3 of 4 surveys, each measured on one item chosen for this chapter. In the 2024 General Social Survey (GSS) the share giving the traditional answer on the roles of men and women is higher among Republicans than among Democrats by 25.8 (95% CI 19.6 to 31.9) and higher among men than among women by 4.4 (95% CI −1.1 to 9.9). The World Values Survey (WVS) is the exception, and it compares ideological groups instead of parties. The file has no party variable for the United States, so the left and right sides of its left-right scale stand in for Democrats and Republicans. The gap between the right side and the left side minus the gender gap is 0.3 (95% CI −2.9 to 3.5), an interval that includes zero. Every gap in this chapter is a difference between two percentages, in points. The vote gap and the party-identification gap are women minus men, so a positive value means women were more Democratic. The attitude gender gap is men minus women and the attitude party gap is Republicans minus Democrats, so a positive value means men or Republicans were more likely to take the traditional or hostile position. The chapter measures the vote gap from 1952 and the attitude gaps as far back as each survey allows, and compares each gap among the young with the gap among older adults. The estimates come from cross-sections of respondents in the United States, so they compare groups within a survey and do not follow individuals. For the parties' coalitions as a whole, see Chapter 3.1, The two coalitions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions). ### The ANES vote gap estimate has been positive since 1964 Table 1 plots the ANES gap from 1952 to 2024. The estimate is negative in the three elections before 1964, and only the 1956 interval, −6.2 (95% CI −11.6 to −0.8), lies below zero. From 1964 the estimate is positive in 16 of 16 elections, and the interval lies above zero in 11 of them and includes zero in the other 5. (Note: The ANES vote estimates use the post-election interview and its weight where the file has one. Every interval in this chapter is a 95% interval on the Kish effective sample size [1], and it treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample, which leaves out the survey's strata and clusters and can move an interval either way. Nationscape is the exception, and its intervals are described in the attitudes section.) The highest estimate is 14.9 (95% CI 8.4 to 21.3) in 1996. The change from 1996 to 2024 is −6.8 (95% CI −14.6 to 1.1), an interval that includes zero. Table 1. The ANES vote gap estimate has been positive since 1964 and peaked at 14.9 points in 1996 Work covering 1952 to 1996 traced the gap to a change in the partisanship of men [2]. A time-series study of 1979 to 2000 tied the growth of the partisan gender gap to a more conservative political climate, a weaker economy and a larger share of economically vulnerable single women [3]. The estimates here describe the gap and do not test either account. ### The ANES and CES disagree about 2020 to 2024 The CES has more respondents than the ANES (41,757 voters against 3,943 in 2024), and its intervals are narrower at every election from 2008 to 2024. (Note: The CES is an online survey of opt-in panel members whose weights match them to the electorate, so it is not a random sample of adults. Its intervals, like the ANES ones, describe sampling noise and not who joined the panel.) The two surveys' intervals overlap at every election from 2008 to 2024, yet the difference between the CES gap and the ANES gap has an interval above zero in 2020, when the CES gap exceeds the ANES gap by +4.5 (95% CI 0.8 to 8.2). From 2020 to 2024 the ANES gap changed by +4.0 (95% CI −1.7 to 9.7) and the CES gap by −4.5 (95% CI −6.4 to −2.5). The two changes differ by −8.5 (95% CI −14.5 to −2.5), so the surveys point in opposite directions for the latest change and the difference between them excludes zero. The CES weight for respondents matched to voter-file records gives 8.0 (95% CI 6.3 to 9.6) in 2024, against 4.1 with the standard weight. On the same matched respondents the standard weight gives 3.6 (95% CI 2.0 to 5.2) and the matched weight gives 8.0, a difference of +4.3 (95% CI 2.9 to 5.5). The level of the 2024 CES gap therefore depends on the weight, and the age comparisons below report both. (Note: The matched weight is the CES weight for validated registered voters, the respondents whose registration the survey could match to voter-file records. The file holds it for 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024. In 2020 it is the standard weight multiplied by the same number for every respondent, so the two weights give the same gap for the matched respondents, and this chapter compares them in 2024 only. The interval on the difference between the two weights resamples respondents, which keeps both weights on the same people.) The ANES added web interviews in 2012, so its series mixes survey modes after 2008. The face-to-face gap is smaller than the web gap in 2012 and in 2024, but each face-to-face interval includes zero and overlaps the web interval. A difference of mode therefore cannot be separated from sampling noise (the estimates are in the notes to Table 1). The file has no mode weights for 2020, so the change from 2020 to 2024 cannot be split by mode. ### Voters under thirty against older voters In 2024 the CES gap is 6.5 (95% CI 0.4 to 12.7) among voters under thirty and 3.9 (95% CI 2.4 to 5.4) among voters thirty and older. Between 2020 and 2024 the under-thirty gap minus the older gap moved by +8.6 (95% CI 1.0 to 16.1). The older gap changed by −5.2 (95% CI −7.2 to −3.2), and the under-thirty gap changed by +3.4 (95% CI −3.9 to 10.7), an interval that includes zero. Table 2 shows the same pattern for four age groups: the gap fell in each of the three older groups, and the youngest group's change is not distinguishable from zero. Table 2. In the CES the vote gap fell after 2020 in every age group except the youngest Table 3 compares the two age groups election by election. In 3 of the 4 earlier elections (2008, 2012 and 2020) the under-thirty gap was smaller than the gap among older voters, with an interval below zero, and in 2016 the difference reached above zero by a small margin. In 2024 the difference is +2.6 (95% CI −3.8 to 8.9), which includes zero, so a larger youth gap is not shown. The interval of the change since 2020 excludes zero by a small margin, and the intervals assume a simple random sample, so intervals that allowed for the survey design could include zero. The evidence that the age pattern changed rests on this one survey. Table 3. The under-thirty vote gap was smaller than the older gap in 2008, 2012 and 2020 and not in 2024 The under-thirty estimate is imprecise. In 2024 the smaller of the women and men groups has an effective sample of 434 among voters under thirty, against 7,955 among voters thirty and older, because the CES holds few voters under thirty and their weights vary. The matched weight gives a larger under-thirty gap, 11.6 (95% CI 3.8 to 19.3), and an older-voter gap of 7.3 (95% CI 5.8 to 8.9). The difference of +4.2 (95% CI −3.7 to 12.1) again includes zero, so the level of the youth gap depends on the weight used. The second tab of Table 2 plots the 2024 gap for four age groups under both weights. With the standard weight the oldest group's gap exceeds that of ages thirty to forty-four by +6.3 (95% CI 2.2 to 10.3), and the youngest group's gap exceeds it by +5.5 (95% CI −1.5 to 12.6), an interval that includes zero. The youngest group's interval covers the estimates of both middle groups, and with the matched weight the estimates for the youngest and the oldest group each fall inside the other's interval. ### Race-by-gender groups are mostly too small Whether the youth gap sits mainly among voters of color needs enough respondents in each race-by-gender group (for example Hispanic women under thirty in 2024), and the CES has few. This chapter draws a group only when its women and its men each number at least 100 respondents and have an effective sample of at least 100, a floor that leaves out every group below it. Table 4 shows the groups that clear the floor. In 2024 only white women and white men under thirty clear it, and the effective samples of the Black, Hispanic and Asian groups run from 23 to 82. Combining the 2020 and 2024 samples brings the Hispanic groups over the floor. The combined-sample gap is 11.2 (95% CI 1.0 to 21.4) among Hispanic voters under thirty and 2.3 (95% CI −2.5 to 7.1) among white voters under thirty. The difference of +8.9 (95% CI −2.4 to 20.2) includes zero, so a larger gap among Hispanic voters is neither shown nor ruled out. Pooling can also lower an effective sample, when the weights in one year vary a lot. Among Asian voters under thirty the smaller group has an effective sample of 101 in 2020, which clears the floor, and 64 in the combined sample, which does not. Black voters under thirty also stay below the floor in the combined sample. The estimates of the gap for the pooled Black and Asian groups are positive, and the sign is given only to show that leaving them out reflects the number of respondents and not the estimate. Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) looks at these groups across all ages. Table 4. Among voters under thirty, few race-by-gender groups are large enough to compare ### The Democratic share fell among young women and young men Table 5 plots the Democratic share of the two-party vote among voters under thirty in 2020 and 2024. The share changed by −6.3 (95% CI −10.9 to −1.6) for women and by −9.7 (95% CI −15.2 to −4.1) for men. The gap between the two changes is +3.4 (95% CI −3.9 to 10.7), so a faster move by men cannot be separated from a move shared by both. Among white voters under thirty the changes are −2.1 (95% CI −8.0 to 3.8) for women and −5.1 (95% CI −12.1 to 1.9) for men, and both intervals include zero. Table 5. Both young women and young men gave Democrats a smaller share in 2024 than in 2020 ### Party identification among adults under thirty Party identification is observed in every even-numbered year from 2006, and it covers all young respondents who identify with a party, voters and nonvoters alike. Table 6 plots the under-thirty gap in Democratic identification, women minus men. It was 9.5 (95% CI 5.5 to 13.6) in 2006, the highest estimate of those years, 8.5 (95% CI 4.9 to 12.1) in 2020 and 3.1 (95% CI −2.5 to 8.7) in 2024. The 2006 gap minus the 2020 gap is +1.1 (95% CI −4.3 to 6.5) and the change from 2020 to 2024 is −5.4 (95% CI −12.1 to 1.3), and both intervals include zero. The highest estimate therefore does not stand out from the later years, and the fall to 2024 is not distinguishable from zero. The under-thirty vote gap changed by +3.4 (95% CI −3.9 to 10.7) over the same years, an interval that also includes zero, so the two series do not show party identification and the vote moving apart after 2020. The identification measure counts Democrats and Republicans only, so it rests on a different base from the vote. Table 6. The under-thirty party-identification gap was 9.5 in 2006 and 3.1 in 2024, and the 2024 interval includes zero ### Party separates attitudes more than gender does, except in the WVS Four surveys ask about gender roles in ways that cannot be merged into one scale, so each is analyzed alone, and each contributes one item chosen for this chapter. | Survey and year | Item | Counted as the traditional or hostile position | | --- | --- | --- | | GSS 2024 | Whether it is better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family | Agree or strongly agree | | ANES 2024 | Rating of feminists on the feeling thermometer | A rating below fifty | | WVS United States 2017 | Whether men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce | Agree | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021 | Whether women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve | Agree | The GSS and WVS items concern roles, the ANES item concerns feeling toward feminists and the Nationscape item concerns hostility toward women who report harassment, so the four gaps measure related but different things. Each item is coded so that a higher share means the traditional or hostile position. The party gap compares Republicans with Democrats and leaves out independents, whereas the gender gap compares men with women among all respondents with an answer. The WVS file used here has no party variable for the United States, so the left and right sides of its left-right scale stand in for party. Table 7 plots the party gap and the gender gap, the gender gap within each party, and the share for women and men within each party. (Note: Nationscape interviewed people weekly from July 2019 to early February 2021 through an opt-in market-research panel [4]. Like the CES, it is not a random sample of adults, and estimates from such panels can be off because of who joins the panel, which no interval measures [5]. Its intervals allow for correlation among respondents interviewed in the same week (clustered standard errors), which makes them wider than intervals that treat respondents as independent. Its party identification leaves out leaners, unlike the GSS and ANES, so its party gap is not comparable in size to theirs.) Table 7. Party, or left-right group in the WVS, separates the traditional answer more than gender does in 3 of 4 surveys The party gap is 25.8 in the GSS, 31.6 in the ANES and 19.2 in Nationscape, against gender gaps of 4.4, 8.8 and 9.6. The party gap minus the gender gap has an interval above zero in each of the three, and in the WVS it is 0.3 (95% CI −2.9 to 3.5), which includes zero. Restricting the gender gap to Democrats and Republicans, the same respondents as the party gap, leaves the count at 3 of 4 surveys. Within a party, men give the traditional answer more often than women in every group by the estimate. The interval of the men-minus-women difference excludes zero in both parties in the ANES and Nationscape and on the left side of the WVS scale. It includes zero in both parties in the GSS and on the right side of the WVS scale, so the GSS is the survey where the difference is not distinguishable from zero in either party. Table 8 follows the two gaps over time. In the GSS the party gap in the traditional answer was −2.0 (95% CI −8.0 to 4.0) in 1977, an interval that includes zero, and 11.3 (95% CI 4.9 to 17.8) in 2018. The estimated gender gap did not exceed 12.1 (95% CI 5.6 to 18.6) in any of the 24 survey years. The GSS moved partly online after 2018, so its later estimates mix modes. In 2024 the party gap is 19.1 (95% CI 8.5 to 29.6) among face-to-face respondents and 32.3 (95% CI 24.4 to 40.2) among web respondents. The face-to-face estimate is above the 2018 estimate, but the intervals overlap, so growth after 2018 and the change of mode cannot be told apart. Table 8. The GSS party gap went from −2.0 in 1977 to 11.3 in 2018, and the estimated gender gap never exceeded 12.1 The ANES has a different history. Its party gap in rating feminists as cold was already 20.6 (95% CI 16.0 to 25.2) in 1988 and is 31.6 (95% CI 28.3 to 34.9) in 2024. Its gender gap went from 1.0 in 1988 to 8.8 in 2024, a change of +7.8 (95% CI 2.2 to 13.3). The gender gap estimates run from 0.9 to 1.7 through 2000 and from 6.0 to 9.4 from 2004 on. The change from 2000 to 2004 alone is +6.5 (95% CI −1.1 to 14.1), an interval that includes zero, so the estimates show a higher range from 2004 without dating the rise to a single election. Table 9 compares the gender gap in these attitudes among the young with the gap among older adults in each survey. In Nationscape the gap among adults under thirty exceeds the gap among older adults by +6.5 (95% CI 5.3 to 7.7), an interval that excludes zero. In the ANES the difference is −9.3 (95% CI −19.3 to 0.7) and in the WVS +1.5 (95% CI −4.4 to 7.3), and both intervals include zero, with the young estimate the smaller in the ANES and the larger in the WVS. The GSS groups under thirty fall below the floor, and the gap among older adults there is 2.4 (95% CI −3.5 to 8.3). Only Nationscape's difference excludes zero, and it is the opt-in panel. Table 9. Only Nationscape shows a larger attitude gender gap among adults under thirty ### What these data cannot show The estimates describe groups in each year and cannot show that any person changed. A rise in the under-thirty gap between two elections compares different people, so age cannot be separated from generation here, which Chapter 3.6, Age and generation (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation) takes up. The vote gaps use self-reported votes, and the two surveys and the two CES weights differ on the 2024 level and on the change since 2020, so the data cannot say which estimate is closest to the electorate. Both the CES and Nationscape are opt-in online panels, so their intervals leave out the error that comes from who joined the panel. The CES intervals also treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample, so allowing for the survey design could widen or narrow them. Results whose interval ends close to zero, such as the under-thirty gap in 2024 and the change in the age difference since 2020, could include zero if the intervals were wider. Most race-by-gender groups are too small to estimate, and a gap that is not distinguishable from zero in a small group is not evidence that the gap is zero. The attitude items differ in wording, scale and window, and their levels cannot be compared across surveys or merged into one index. Each survey contributes one item chosen for this chapter, so the count of surveys in which the party gap exceeds the gender gap describes these items, and a different item could change it. Within a survey, the comparisons of party with gender and of young with old are informative, and the party gap minus the gender gap ignores how the two gaps move together, because both are computed on the same respondents. All the data are from the United States. A widely read Financial Times analysis described a gender divide among the young in several countries [6], and a comparative study of gender attitudes examined many societies [7], but nothing here tests either claim outside the United States. The files record two genders, so nonbinary respondents cannot be examined. Finally, the data hold no measure of why the gaps arise. They cannot separate differences in policy attitudes from differences in the salience of issues, in candidates or in party strategy, and Chapter 9.5, Two moralities (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/two-moralities; planned) places gender-role attitudes among other cultural attitudes. ## Tables ### Table 1. The ANES vote gap estimate has been positive since 1964 and peaked at 14.9 points in 1996 Women's minus men's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, points, among voters for a major-party candidate; ANES 1952 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals | Election | Survey | Gap (points) | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Voters | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1952 | ANES | −2.1 | −7.7 | 3.5 | 1,181 | | 1956 | ANES | −6.2 | −11.6 | −0.8 | 1,266 | | 1960 | ANES | −5.4 | −13.1 | 2.3 | 898 | | 1964 | ANES | 3.7 | −1.8 | 9.3 | 1,111 | | 1968 | ANES | 4.6 | −1.4 | 10.7 | 1,027 | | 1972 | ANES | 6.6 | 1.9 | 11.3 | 1,587 | | 1976 | ANES | 0.2 | −5.3 | 5.8 | 1,322 | | 1980 | ANES | 6.9 | 0.7 | 13.1 | 958 | | 1984 | ANES | 7.6 | 2.4 | 12.8 | 1,376 | | 1988 | ANES | 6.5 | 0.8 | 12.2 | 1,195 | | 1992 | ANES | 10.1 | 5.3 | 14.9 | 1,658 | | 1996 | ANES | 14.9 | 8.4 | 21.3 | 1,116 | | 2000 | ANES | 8.9 | 2.4 | 15.4 | 1,120 | | 2004 | ANES | 7.1 | −0.4 | 14.6 | 811 | | 2008 | ANES | 5.0 | −1.2 | 11.3 | 1,539 | | 2012 | ANES | 5.2 | 1.1 | 9.3 | 4,188 | | 2016 | ANES | 6.0 | 1.3 | 10.7 | 2,579 | | 2020 | ANES | 4.1 | 0.6 | 7.6 | 6,183 | | 2024 | ANES | 8.1 | 3.6 | 12.6 | 3,943 | | 2008 | CES | 6.4 | 4.8 | 7.9 | 23,585 | | 2012 | CES | 5.3 | 3.7 | 6.8 | 37,789 | | 2016 | CES | 8.2 | 6.9 | 9.5 | 40,891 | | 2020 | CES | 8.6 | 7.4 | 9.9 | 43,872 | | 2024 | CES | 4.1 | 2.6 | 5.7 | 41,757 | Note: The ANES added web interviews in 2012. The gap is 0.2 among face-to-face respondents and 7.8 among web respondents in 2012, and 1.8 and 8.4 in 2024; each face-to-face interval includes zero. The file has no mode weights for 2020. Note: In 2024 the CES weight for respondents matched to voter-file records gives 8.0, and the standard weight on the same respondents gives 3.6. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2024, and CES Cumulative File, 2008-2024; weighted with each survey's survey weights (the ANES post-election weight where the file has one) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/vote_gap_long_run.json ### Table 2. In the CES the vote gap fell after 2020 in every age group except the youngest Women's minus men's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, points, by age group; CES 2020 and 2024; 95% intervals #### Table 2.1. Change since 2020 Change in the gap from 2020 to 2024 2024 gap minus 2020 gap, points, by age group; standard weight | Age group | Gap in 2020 | Gap in 2024 | Change (points) | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Voters | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Ages 18 to 29 | 3.2 | 6.5 | 3.4 | −3.9 | 10.7 | 7,338 | | Ages 30 to 44 | 7.2 | 1.0 | −6.2 | −10.4 | −2.0 | 16,863 | | Ages 45 to 64 | 9.1 | 3.5 | −5.6 | −8.6 | −2.6 | 34,547 | | Ages 65 and over | 11.3 | 7.2 | −4.0 | −7.4 | −0.7 | 26,881 | #### Table 2.2. Gap in 2024 by weight The 2024 gap under two weights Gap in 2024, points, by age group; the open dot is the standard weight and the filled dot the matched weight | Age group | Standard weight | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Voters | Matched weight | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Voters | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Ages 18 to 29 | 6.5 | 0.4 | 12.7 | 2,978 | 11.6 | 3.8 | 19.3 | 1,348 | | Ages 30 to 44 | 1.0 | −2.4 | 4.4 | 6,993 | 5.1 | 1.5 | 8.7 | 5,152 | | Ages 45 to 64 | 3.5 | 1.2 | 5.8 | 16,800 | 6.1 | 3.9 | 8.3 | 13,593 | | Ages 65 and over | 7.2 | 5.0 | 9.5 | 14,986 | 11.1 | 8.6 | 13.6 | 12,683 | Source: CES Cumulative File, 2020-2024; weighted (survey weights; the weight for respondents matched to voter-file records in the matched-weight rows) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/vote_gap_by_age.json ### Table 3. The under-thirty vote gap was smaller than the older gap in 2008, 2012 and 2020 and not in 2024 Women's minus men's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, points, by age group and election; CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals #### Table 3.1. The two gaps The two gaps, election by election Gap by age group, points; the open dot is the gap at 30 and over and the filled dot the gap under 30 | Election | Weight | Gap, 30 and over | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Gap, under 30 | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Under 30 minus 30 and over | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2008 | Standard weight | 8.3 | 6.7 | 9.9 | −0.6 | −4.6 | 3.4 | −8.9 | −13.2 | −4.6 | | 2012 | Standard weight | 6.2 | 4.7 | 7.8 | 0.3 | −4.6 | 5.1 | −6.0 | −11.1 | −0.9 | | 2016 | Standard weight | 8.3 | 6.9 | 9.7 | 4.4 | 0.2 | 8.5 | −4.0 | −8.3 | 0.4 | | 2020 | Standard weight | 9.1 | 7.8 | 10.4 | 3.2 | −0.7 | 7.0 | −6.0 | −10.1 | −1.9 | | 2024 | Standard weight | 3.9 | 2.4 | 5.4 | 6.5 | 0.4 | 12.7 | 2.6 | −3.8 | 8.9 | | 2024, matched | Matched weight | 7.3 | 5.8 | 8.9 | 11.6 | 3.8 | 19.3 | 4.2 | −3.7 | 12.1 | #### Table 3.2. The difference The difference between the two gaps Under-30 gap minus the gap at 30 and over, points, with the 95% interval of the difference; below zero means a smaller youth gap | Election | Weight | Difference (points) | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Voters | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2008 | Standard weight | −8.9 | −13.2 | −4.6 | 23,585 | | 2012 | Standard weight | −6.0 | −11.1 | −0.9 | 37,789 | | 2016 | Standard weight | −4.0 | −8.3 | 0.4 | 40,891 | | 2020 | Standard weight | −6.0 | −10.1 | −1.9 | 43,872 | | 2024 | Standard weight | 2.6 | −3.8 | 8.9 | 41,757 | | 2024, matched | Matched weight | 4.2 | −3.7 | 12.1 | 32,776 | Note: Each gap has its own interval, and the interval of the difference combines the two standard errors as if the two age groups were independent samples. Source: CES Cumulative File, 2008-2024; weighted (survey weights; the weight for respondents matched to voter-file records in the matched-weight rows) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/youth_vs_older_gap.json ### Table 4. Among voters under thirty, few race-by-gender groups are large enough to compare Women's minus men's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, points, voters aged 18 to 29, by race; single elections and 2020 and 2024 pooled; 95% intervals | Group and period | Gap (points) | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Voters | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All voters, pooled | 5.4 | 1.5 | 9.2 | 7,338 | | White, 2016 | 1.5 | −3.8 | 6.7 | 2,601 | | White, 2020 | 0.5 | −4.4 | 5.5 | 2,861 | | White, 2024 | 3.5 | −4.2 | 11.2 | 1,800 | | White, pooled | 2.3 | −2.5 | 7.1 | 4,661 | | Hispanic, 2016 | 10.2 | 0.8 | 19.6 | 645 | | Hispanic, 2020 | 8.1 | −1.7 | 17.9 | 588 | | Hispanic, pooled | 11.2 | 1.0 | 21.4 | 1,092 | | Asian, 2020 | 4.0 | −5.6 | 13.6 | 344 | Note: Black groups miss the floor in every election, Asian groups clear it only in 2020, and Hispanic groups clear it in 2016 and 2020 but not in 2024, when the effective samples of the Black, Hispanic and Asian groups run from 23 to 82. Note: Pooling two elections can lower a group's effective sample when the weights in one year vary a lot: among Asian voters the smaller group has an effective sample of 101 in 2020 and 64 pooled, so the pooled Asian estimate is not drawn. Groups that miss the floor are left out, not shown with wider intervals. Source: CES Cumulative File, 2016-2024; weighted (survey weights) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/youth_gap_by_race.json ### Table 5. Both young women and young men gave Democrats a smaller share in 2024 than in 2020 Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, percent, voters aged 18 to 29; CES 2020 and 2024; 95% intervals | Group | 2020 share | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | 2024 share | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Women | 69.3 | 66.9 | 71.6 | 63.0 | 59.0 | 67.0 | | Men | 66.1 | 63.1 | 69.2 | 56.5 | 51.8 | 61.1 | | White women | 60.9 | 57.8 | 64.0 | 58.8 | 53.8 | 63.8 | | White men | 60.3 | 56.6 | 64.1 | 55.2 | 49.4 | 61.1 | Source: CES Cumulative File, 2020-2024; weighted (survey weights) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/youth_shift_2020_2024.json ### Table 6. The under-thirty party-identification gap was 9.5 in 2006 and 3.1 in 2024, and the 2024 interval includes zero Women's minus men's Democratic share of respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans, points, ages 18 to 29, even years 2006 to 2024; CES; 95% intervals | Year | Gap (points) | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Respondents | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2006 | 9.5 | 5.5 | 13.6 | 2,726 | | 2008 | 2.4 | −1.4 | 6.3 | 3,737 | | 2010 | 4.2 | −0.5 | 9.0 | 3,271 | | 2012 | 1.6 | −2.9 | 6.0 | 4,737 | | 2014 | 2.6 | −1.4 | 6.5 | 5,507 | | 2016 | 3.9 | 0.8 | 7.0 | 6,611 | | 2018 | 7.0 | 3.5 | 10.6 | 7,098 | | 2020 | 8.5 | 4.9 | 12.1 | 6,537 | | 2022 | 7.1 | 3.2 | 11.1 | 5,285 | | 2024 | 3.1 | −2.5 | 8.7 | 5,162 | Source: CES Cumulative File, 2006-2024; weighted (survey weights) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/pid_gap_under30.json ### Table 7. Party, or left-right group in the WVS, separates the traditional answer more than gender does in 3 of 4 surveys Points and percent taking the traditional or hostile position on the one item each survey asks; most recent wave of each survey; 95% intervals #### Table 7.1. Party gap and gender gap Party gap, gender gap and their difference in each survey Party gap is Republicans minus Democrats (right side minus left side in the WVS) and gender gap is men minus women; points | Survey | Measure | Points | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | Party gap | 25.8 | 19.6 | 31.9 | 1,548 | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | Gender gap | 4.4 | −1.1 | 9.9 | 2,153 | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | Party gap minus gender gap | 21.3 | 13.1 | 29.6 | 3,701 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | Party gap | 31.6 | 28.3 | 34.9 | 5,103 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | Gender gap | 8.8 | 5.5 | 12.1 | 5,475 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | Party gap minus gender gap | 22.8 | 18.1 | 27.5 | 10,578 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | Party gap | 3.2 | 0.8 | 5.5 | 2,534 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | Gender gap | 2.9 | 0.7 | 5.0 | 2,591 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | Party gap minus gender gap | 0.3 | −2.9 | 3.5 | 5,125 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | Party gap | 19.2 | 18.4 | 20.0 | 317,051 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | Gender gap | 9.6 | 9.1 | 10.1 | 480,535 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | Party gap minus gender gap | 9.6 | 8.7 | 10.5 | 797,586 | #### Table 7.2. Gender gap within party The gender gap within each party Men minus women in the traditional or hostile position, points, among all respondents and within each party (left or right side of the scale in the WVS) | Survey | Group | Points | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | All respondents | 4.4 | −1.1 | 9.9 | 2,153 | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | Democrats | 7.5 | −0.1 | 15.2 | 806 | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | Republicans | 2.0 | −7.7 | 11.7 | 741 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | All respondents | 8.8 | 5.5 | 12.1 | 5,475 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | Democrats | 5.7 | 2.2 | 9.2 | 2,627 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | Republicans | 6.2 | 0.5 | 11.8 | 2,440 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | All respondents | 2.9 | 0.7 | 5.0 | 2,591 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | Left side | 4.0 | 1.5 | 6.6 | 1,510 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | Right side | 0.7 | −3.3 | 4.8 | 1,024 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | All respondents | 9.6 | 9.1 | 10.1 | 480,535 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | Democrats | 11.1 | 10.4 | 11.8 | 170,756 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | Republicans | 7.9 | 7.1 | 8.8 | 146,295 | #### Table 7.3. Share by party and gender Share taking the traditional or hostile position, by party and gender Percent, by party (left or right side of the left-right scale in the WVS) and gender | Survey | Group | Percent | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | Democratic women | 15.5 | 10.8 | 20.2 | 475 | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | Democratic men | 23.0 | 17.0 | 29.1 | 331 | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | Republican women | 43.5 | 36.7 | 50.3 | 379 | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | Republican men | 45.5 | 38.5 | 52.5 | 362 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | Democratic women | 7.2 | 5.4 | 9.1 | 1,547 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | Democratic men | 12.9 | 10.0 | 15.8 | 1,080 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | Republican women | 38.3 | 34.3 | 42.4 | 1,158 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | Republican men | 44.5 | 40.5 | 48.4 | 1,282 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | Left side, women | 2.2 | 0.8 | 3.6 | 763 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | Left side, men | 6.2 | 4.1 | 8.4 | 747 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | Right side, women | 6.8 | 3.6 | 9.9 | 403 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | Right side, men | 7.5 | 5.0 | 10.0 | 621 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | Democratic women | 15.2 | 14.7 | 15.6 | 104,987 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | Democratic men | 26.3 | 25.5 | 27.0 | 65,769 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | Republican women | 34.9 | 34.2 | 35.6 | 76,535 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | Republican men | 42.8 | 42.1 | 43.5 | 69,760 | Note: GSS: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family. ANES: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer. WVS: agree that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce. Nationscape: agree that women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve. Note: Nationscape is an opt-in online panel, not a random sample of adults. Its intervals allow for correlation within the weekly wave, which widens them, and still describe sampling noise among panel members and not who joins the panel. Source: GSS 2024, ANES 2024, WVS United States 2017 and Nationscape 2019-2021; weighted (survey weights; Nationscape intervals cluster on the weekly wave) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/attitudes_by_gender_party.json ### Table 8. The GSS party gap went from −2.0 in 1977 to 11.3 in 2018, and the estimated gender gap never exceeded 12.1 Gap in the share taking the traditional or hostile position, points: Republicans minus Democrats (party gap) and men minus women (gender gap); GSS 1977 to 2024 and ANES 1988 to 2024; 95% intervals | Survey | Gap | Year | Gap (points) | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | GSS | Party gap | 1977 | −2.0 | −8.0 | 4.0 | 1,319 | | GSS | Gender gap | 1977 | 4.8 | −0.6 | 10.2 | 1,503 | | GSS | Party gap | 1985 | 1.6 | −5.1 | 8.3 | 1,340 | | GSS | Gender gap | 1985 | 7.3 | 0.9 | 13.6 | 1,502 | | GSS | Party gap | 1986 | 1.4 | −4.8 | 7.6 | 1,252 | | GSS | Gender gap | 1986 | 1.9 | −3.8 | 7.7 | 1,444 | | GSS | Party gap | 1988 | 5.7 | −1.9 | 13.2 | 835 | | GSS | Gender gap | 1988 | 6.4 | −0.6 | 13.3 | 964 | | GSS | Party gap | 1989 | 0.9 | −6.7 | 8.4 | 846 | | GSS | Gender gap | 1989 | 4.7 | −2.3 | 11.7 | 977 | | GSS | Party gap | 1990 | 0.5 | −7.1 | 8.2 | 792 | | GSS | Gender gap | 1990 | 7.8 | 0.5 | 15.0 | 901 | | GSS | Party gap | 1991 | 0.5 | −6.9 | 7.9 | 866 | | GSS | Gender gap | 1991 | 1.2 | −6.0 | 8.4 | 996 | | GSS | Party gap | 1993 | 5.4 | −1.6 | 12.4 | 907 | | GSS | Gender gap | 1993 | 5.8 | −0.8 | 12.3 | 1,054 | | GSS | Party gap | 1994 | 5.8 | 0.5 | 11.2 | 1,622 | | GSS | Gender gap | 1994 | 5.4 | 0.5 | 10.4 | 1,916 | | GSS | Party gap | 1996 | 8.6 | 3.7 | 13.5 | 1,951 | | GSS | Gender gap | 1996 | 6.2 | 1.7 | 10.6 | 2,353 | | GSS | Party gap | 1998 | 6.9 | 1.3 | 12.5 | 1,472 | | GSS | Gender gap | 1998 | 2.9 | −2.2 | 8.0 | 1,818 | | GSS | Party gap | 2000 | 9.8 | 3.9 | 15.7 | 1,393 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2000 | 3.2 | −2.0 | 8.4 | 1,804 | | GSS | Party gap | 2002 | 11.2 | 2.6 | 19.8 | 696 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2002 | 6.2 | −1.5 | 13.8 | 898 | | GSS | Party gap | 2004 | 7.5 | −0.8 | 15.8 | 739 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2004 | 2.1 | −5.5 | 9.7 | 894 | | GSS | Party gap | 2006 | 10.9 | 5.1 | 16.6 | 1,553 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2006 | 4.7 | −0.4 | 9.8 | 1,968 | | GSS | Party gap | 2008 | 14.0 | 7.0 | 21.0 | 1,080 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2008 | 5.2 | −1.1 | 11.4 | 1,308 | | GSS | Party gap | 2010 | 11.3 | 4.2 | 18.4 | 1,132 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2010 | 7.7 | 1.4 | 13.9 | 1,418 | | GSS | Party gap | 2012 | 18.5 | 11.0 | 26.0 | 1,004 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2012 | 12.1 | 5.6 | 18.6 | 1,285 | | GSS | Party gap | 2014 | 12.4 | 6.3 | 18.5 | 1,276 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2014 | 2.8 | −2.5 | 8.2 | 1,655 | | GSS | Party gap | 2016 | 15.4 | 9.9 | 21.0 | 1,501 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2016 | 0.2 | −4.8 | 5.2 | 1,872 | | GSS | Party gap | 2018 | 11.3 | 4.9 | 17.8 | 1,186 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2018 | 5.0 | −0.6 | 10.7 | 1,545 | | GSS | Party gap | 2021 | 20.8 | 16.3 | 25.3 | 2,054 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2021 | 5.6 | 1.6 | 9.5 | 2,647 | | GSS | Party gap | 2022 | 17.1 | 10.6 | 23.6 | 1,710 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2022 | 9.9 | 4.3 | 15.4 | 2,335 | | GSS | Party gap | 2024 | 25.8 | 19.6 | 31.9 | 1,548 | | GSS | Gender gap | 2024 | 4.4 | −1.1 | 9.9 | 2,153 | | ANES | Party gap | 1988 | 20.6 | 16.0 | 25.2 | 1,448 | | ANES | Gender gap | 1988 | 1.0 | −3.4 | 5.5 | 1,627 | | ANES | Party gap | 1992 | 27.0 | 22.9 | 31.1 | 1,834 | | ANES | Gender gap | 1992 | 0.9 | −3.0 | 4.8 | 2,085 | | ANES | Party gap | 2000 | 18.4 | 13.1 | 23.7 | 1,255 | | ANES | Gender gap | 2000 | 1.7 | −3.3 | 6.7 | 1,427 | | ANES | Party gap | 2002 | 20.0 | 13.9 | 26.0 | 1,166 | | ANES | Gender gap | 2002 | 4.7 | −1.4 | 10.7 | 1,276 | | ANES | Party gap | 2004 | 25.1 | 19.2 | 31.0 | 917 | | ANES | Gender gap | 2004 | 8.2 | 2.5 | 13.9 | 1,028 | | ANES | Party gap | 2008 | 21.4 | 16.2 | 26.5 | 1,723 | | ANES | Gender gap | 2008 | 8.2 | 3.5 | 12.8 | 1,972 | | ANES | Party gap | 2012 | 28.5 | 24.9 | 32.0 | 4,657 | | ANES | Gender gap | 2012 | 9.4 | 6.1 | 12.8 | 5,376 | | ANES | Party gap | 2016 | 29.8 | 26.2 | 33.5 | 3,098 | | ANES | Gender gap | 2016 | 6.0 | 2.4 | 9.6 | 3,537 | | ANES | Party gap | 2020 | 34.2 | 31.5 | 36.9 | 6,453 | | ANES | Gender gap | 2020 | 7.1 | 4.3 | 9.8 | 7,279 | | ANES | Party gap | 2024 | 31.6 | 28.3 | 34.9 | 5,103 | | ANES | Gender gap | 2024 | 8.8 | 5.5 | 12.1 | 5,475 | Views: GSS (instrument = GSS); ANES (instrument = ANES). Note: GSS item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family. ANES item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer. Note: The GSS 2021, 2022 and 2024 samples mix interview modes; the ANES has web interviews from 2012. Lines are not drawn across the years in which the item was not asked (GSS 1978 to 1984 and 2019 to 2020, ANES 1996), so the GSS 1977 estimate stands alone; its interval is in the tooltip and the data table. Source: GSS 1977-2024, weighted (survey weights); ANES Cumulative Data File, 1988-2024, weighted (survey weights) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/attitude_gap_trends.json ### Table 9. Only Nationscape shows a larger attitude gender gap among adults under thirty Men's minus women's share taking the traditional or hostile position, points, by age group, and the difference between the two age groups; most recent wave of each survey; 95% intervals | Survey | Age group | Gap (points) | Lower 95% | Upper 95% | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | All adults | 4.4 | −1.1 | 9.9 | 2,153 | | GSS 2024: man the achiever, woman at home | 30 and over | 2.4 | −3.5 | 8.3 | 1,798 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | All adults | 8.8 | 5.5 | 12.1 | 5,475 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | Under 30 | 1.4 | −8.0 | 10.7 | 545 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | 30 and over | 10.7 | 7.1 | 14.2 | 4,672 | | ANES 2024: feminists rated below 50 | Under 30 minus 30 and over | −9.3 | −19.3 | 0.7 | 5,217 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | All adults | 2.9 | 0.7 | 5.0 | 2,591 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | Under 30 | 4.3 | −1.1 | 9.6 | 630 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | 30 and over | 2.8 | 0.5 | 5.2 | 1,961 | | WVS 2017: men first when jobs are scarce | Under 30 minus 30 and over | 1.5 | −4.4 | 7.3 | 2,591 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | All adults | 9.6 | 9.1 | 10.1 | 480,535 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | Under 30 | 14.8 | 13.7 | 16.0 | 106,828 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | 30 and over | 8.3 | 7.8 | 8.8 | 373,707 | | Nationscape 2019 to 2021: harassment complaints | Under 30 minus 30 and over | 6.5 | 5.3 | 7.7 | 480,535 | Note: Nationscape is an opt-in online panel; its intervals allow for correlation within the weekly wave and describe sampling noise among panel members only. Source: GSS 2024, ANES 2024, WVS United States 2017 and Nationscape 2019-2021; weighted (survey weights; Nationscape intervals cluster on the weekly wave) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/attitude_gender_gap_by_age.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (120), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | anes_1996_2024_diff | −6.8 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | 2024 gap minus 1996 gap, independent samples | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 1996 and 2024 | 95% CI −14.6 to 1.1 | 5,059 | post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise the full-sample weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_age_diff | −9.3 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men-minus-women gap among ages 18 to 29 minus the gap among ages 30 and older; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating with a recorded sex and age | 2024 | 95% CI −19.3 to 0.7 | 5,217 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_change_2020_2024 | +4.0 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | 2024 gap minus 2020 gap, independent samples | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI −1.7 to 9.7 | 10,126 | post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise the full-sample weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ftf_gap_2012 | 0.2 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, face-to-face interviews | 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −7.3 to 7.6 | 1,336 | mode weight (weight_ftf or weight_web) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ftf_gap_2024 | 1.8 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, face-to-face interviews | 2024, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −8.6 to 12.3 | 688 | mode weight (weight_ftf or weight_web) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1956 | −6.2 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 1956 | 95% CI −11.6 to −0.8 | 1,266 | post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise the full-sample weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1976 | 0.2 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 1976 | 95% CI −5.3 to 5.8 | 1,322 | post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise the full-sample weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1996 | 14.9 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 1996 | 95% CI 8.4 to 21.3 | 1,116 | post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise the full-sample weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2024 | 8.1 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 3.6 to 12.6 | 3,943 | post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise the full-sample weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_change_1988_2024 | +7.8 | percentage points | 2024 gender gap minus 1988 gender gap, independent samples | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating and a recorded sex | 1988 and 2024 | 95% CI 2.2 to 13.3 | 7,102 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_change_2000_2004 | +6.5 | percentage points | 2004 gender gap minus 2000 gender gap, independent samples | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating and a recorded sex | 2000 and 2004 | 95% CI −1.1 to 14.1 | 2,455 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_dem | 5.7 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women among Democrats; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating who are Democrats | 2024 | 95% CI 2.2 to 9.2 | 2,627 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_gap_1988 | 1.0 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating and a recorded sex | 1988 | 95% CI −3.4 to 5.5 | 1,627 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_gap_2024 | 8.8 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating and a recorded sex | 2024 | 95% CI 5.5 to 12.1 | 5,475 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_max_from_2004 | 9.4 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | largest estimate of the men-minus-women gap among the survey years 2004 to 2024; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating and a recorded sex | 2004 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_max_to_2000 | 1.7 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | largest estimate of the men-minus-women gap among the survey years 1988 to 2000; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating and a recorded sex | 1988 to 2000 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_min_from_2004 | 6.0 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | smallest estimate of the men-minus-women gap among the survey years 2004 to 2024; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating and a recorded sex | 2004 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_min_to_2000 | 0.9 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | smallest estimate of the men-minus-women gap among the survey years 1988 to 2000; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating and a recorded sex | 1988 to 2000 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_o30 | 10.7 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating and a recorded sex | 2024, ages 30 and older | 95% CI 7.1 to 14.2 | 4,672 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_rep | 6.2 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women among Republicans; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating who are Republicans | 2024 | 95% CI 0.5 to 11.8 | 2,440 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gender_u30 | 1.4 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating and a recorded sex | 2024, ages 18 to 29 | 95% CI −8.0 to 10.7 | 545 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_party_gap_1988 | 20.6 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, Republicans minus Democrats, leaners included; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating who are Democrats or Republicans, leaners included | 1988 | 95% CI 16.0 to 25.2 | 1,448 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_party_gap_2024 | 31.6 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, Republicans minus Democrats, leaners included; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating who are Democrats or Republicans, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 28.3 to 34.9 | 5,103 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_party_minus_gender | 22.8 | percentage points | party gap minus gender gap, ignoring how the two gaps move together on the same respondents; item: rating feminists below 50 on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | ANES respondents with a feminist thermometer rating and a recorded party (or left-right side) and sex | 2024 | 95% CI 18.1 to 27.5 | 10,578 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_web_gap_2012 | 7.8 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, web interviews | 2012, web interviews | 95% CI 3.0 to 12.7 | 2,852 | mode weight (weight_ftf or weight_web) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_web_gap_2024 | 8.4 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, web interviews | 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 1.4 to 15.5 | 1,364 | mode weight (weight_ftf or weight_web) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | asian_neff_2020 | 101 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | smaller of the effective sample sizes of the women cell and the men cell | Asian women and men ages 18 to 29 who voted | 2020 | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | asian_neff_pooled | 64 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | smaller of the effective sample sizes of the women cell and the men cell | Asian women and men ages 18 to 29 who voted | 2020 and 2024 pooled | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | band_diff_18_29_30_44 | +5.5 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | gap among ages 18 to 29 minus gap among ages 30 to 44, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2024 | 95% CI −1.5 to 12.6 | 9,971 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | band_diff_65p_30_44 | +6.3 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | gap among ages 65 and older minus gap among ages 30 to 44, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 2.2 to 10.3 | 21,979 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | band_gap_2024_30_44 | 1.0 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, ages 30 to 44 | 2024 | 95% CI −2.4 to 4.4 | 6,993 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | band_gap_2024_45_64 | 3.5 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, ages 45 to 64 | 2024 | 95% CI 1.2 to 5.8 | 16,800 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | band_gap_2024_65p | 7.2 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, ages 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI 5.0 to 9.5 | 14,986 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cell_floor | 100 | respondents | minimum number of respondents and minimum Kish effective sample size for a published cell | each race-by-gender cell | 2016-2024 | | | none (constant) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_anes_change_diff | −8.5 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | change in the CES gap from 2020 to 2024 minus the change in the ANES gap, independent samples | CES and ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI −14.5 to −2.5 | 95,755 | CES weight_cumulative; ANES post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise the full-sample weight (VCF0009z) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_anes_diff_2020 | +4.5 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | CES gap minus ANES gap in 2020, independent samples | CES and ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2020 | 95% CI 0.8 to 8.2 | 50,055 | CES weight_cumulative; ANES post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise the full-sample weight (VCF0009z) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_change_2020_2024 | −4.5 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | 2024 gap minus 2020 gap, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI −6.4 to −2.5 | 85,629 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2024 | 4.1 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 2.6 to 5.7 | 41,757 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_std_matched_2024 | 3.6 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men, standard weight on the matched respondents | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate and were matched to voter-file records | 2024 | 95% CI 2.0 to 5.2 | 32,776 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_vv_gap_2024 | 8.0 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate and were matched to voter-file records | 2024 | 95% CI 6.3 to 9.6 | 32,776 | vvweight (respondents matched to voter-file records) | Cooperative Election Study | | | diff_2008 | −8.9 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | gap among ages 18 to 29 minus gap among ages 30 and older, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2008 | 95% CI −13.2 to −4.6 | 23,585 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | diff_2012 | −6.0 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | gap among ages 18 to 29 minus gap among ages 30 and older, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2012 | 95% CI −11.1 to −0.9 | 37,789 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | diff_2016 | −4.0 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | gap among ages 18 to 29 minus gap among ages 30 and older, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2016 | 95% CI −8.3 to 0.4 | 40,891 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | diff_2020 | −6.0 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | gap among ages 18 to 29 minus gap among ages 30 and older, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2020 | 95% CI −10.1 to −1.9 | 43,872 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | diff_2024 | +2.6 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | gap among ages 18 to 29 minus gap among ages 30 and older, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2024 | 95% CI −3.8 to 8.9 | 41,757 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | diff_change_2020_2024 | +8.6 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | change from 2020 to 2024 in the under-30 gap minus the 30-and-older gap | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 1.0 to 16.1 | 85,629 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gss_dem_men | 23.0% | percent taking the traditional or hostile position | weighted share agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | Democratic men, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 17.0% to 29.1% | 331 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_gender_dem | 7.5 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women among Democrats; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item who are Democrats | 2024 | 95% CI −0.1 to 15.2 | 806 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_gender_gap_1977 | 4.8 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | 1977 | 95% CI −0.6 to 10.2 | 1,503 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_gender_gap_2024 | 4.4 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | 2024 | 95% CI −1.1 to 9.9 | 2,153 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_gender_max | 12.1 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | 2012 | 95% CI 5.6 to 18.6 | 1,285 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_gender_min | 0.2 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | 2016 | 95% CI −4.8 to 5.2 | 1,872 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_gender_o30 | 2.4 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | 2024, ages 30 and older | 95% CI −3.5 to 8.3 | 1,798 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_gender_rep | 2.0 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women among Republicans; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item who are Republicans | 2024 | 95% CI −7.7 to 11.7 | 741 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_party_ftf_2024 | 19.1 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, Republicans (party identification 4 to 6) minus Democrats (0 to 2), leaners included; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item who are Democrats or Republicans, leaners included | 2024, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 8.5 to 29.6 | 538 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_party_gap_1977 | −2.0 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, Republicans (party identification 4 to 6) minus Democrats (0 to 2), leaners included; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item who are Democrats or Republicans, leaners included | 1977 | 95% CI −8.0 to 4.0 | 1,319 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_party_gap_2018 | 11.3 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, Republicans (party identification 4 to 6) minus Democrats (0 to 2), leaners included; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item who are Democrats or Republicans, leaners included | 2018 | 95% CI 4.9 to 17.8 | 1,186 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_party_gap_2024 | 25.8 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, Republicans (party identification 4 to 6) minus Democrats (0 to 2), leaners included; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item who are Democrats or Republicans, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 19.6 to 31.9 | 1,548 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_party_minus_gender | 21.3 | percentage points | party gap minus gender gap, ignoring how the two gaps move together on the same respondents; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded party (or left-right side) and sex | 2024 | 95% CI 13.1 to 29.6 | 3,701 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_party_web_2024 | 32.3 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, Republicans (party identification 4 to 6) minus Democrats (0 to 2), leaners included; item: agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | GSS respondents with an answer to the item who are Democrats or Republicans, leaners included | 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 24.4 to 40.2 | 824 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_rep_women | 43.5% | percent taking the traditional or hostile position | weighted share agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home | Republican women, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 36.7% to 50.3% | 379 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | n_anes_2024 | 3,943 | voters | count of respondents behind the 2024 gap | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_ci_pos | 11 | count | count of elections where the 95% interval of the gap lies above zero | ANES presidential elections 1964 to 2024 | 1964-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_ci_zero | 5 | count | count of elections where the 95% interval of the gap includes zero | ANES presidential elections 1964 to 2024 | 1964-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_elections | 16 | count | count of presidential elections | ANES presidential elections 1964 to 2024 | 1964-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_pos | 16 | count | count of elections with a positive estimate of the gap | ANES presidential elections 1964 to 2024 | 1964-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ces_2024 | 41,757 | voters | count of respondents behind the 2024 gap | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate | 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_diff_below_zero | 3 | count | count of elections where the 95% interval of the under-30 minus 30-and-older difference lies below zero | presidential elections 2008 to 2020 | 2008-2020 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_earlier_elections | 4 | count | count of elections | presidential elections 2008 to 2020 | 2008-2020 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_gss_gender_ci_pos | 8 | count | count of survey years where the 95% interval of the gender gap lies above zero | GSS survey years with the gender-role item, 1977 to 2024 | 1977-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_gss_years | 24 | count | count of survey years with a published gender gap | GSS survey years with the gender-role item, 1977 to 2024 | 1977-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_instruments | 4 | count | count of surveys compared | GSS 2024, ANES 2024, WVS United States 2017, Nationscape 2019-2021 | latest window of each survey | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_party_larger | 3 | count | count of surveys where the party gap minus the gender gap has a 95% interval above zero | GSS 2024, ANES 2024, WVS United States 2017, Nationscape 2019-2021 | latest window of each survey | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_party_larger_partisans | 3 | count | count of surveys where the party gap minus the gender gap, with the gender gap restricted to Democrats and Republicans (or the left and right sides of the WVS scale), has a 95% interval above zero | GSS 2024, ANES 2024, WVS United States 2017, Nationscape 2019-2021 | latest window of each survey | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | neff_o30_2024 | 7,955 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | smaller of the effective sample sizes of the women cell and the men cell | CES voters ages 30 and older | 2024 | | 38,779 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | neff_u30_2024 | 434 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | smaller of the effective sample sizes of the women cell and the men cell | CES voters ages 18 to 29 | 2024 | | 2,978 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ns_age_diff | +6.5 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men-minus-women gap among ages 18 to 29 minus the gap among ages 30 and older; item: agree that women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve | Nationscape respondents with an answer to the item with a recorded sex and age | July 2019 to February 2021 | 95% CI 5.3 to 7.7 | 480,535 | weight, cluster-robust interval on the weekly wave | Nationscape | | | ns_gender_dem | 11.1 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women among Democrats; item: agree that women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve | Nationscape respondents with an answer to the item who are Democrats | July 2019 to February 2021 | 95% CI 10.4 to 11.8 | 170,756 | weight, cluster-robust interval on the weekly wave | Nationscape | | | ns_gender_gap | 9.6 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree that women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve | Nationscape respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | July 2019 to February 2021 | 95% CI 9.1 to 10.1 | 480,535 | weight, cluster-robust interval on the weekly wave | Nationscape | | | ns_gender_o30 | 8.3 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree that women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve | Nationscape respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | July 2019 to February 2021, ages 30 and older | 95% CI 7.8 to 8.8 | 373,707 | weight, cluster-robust interval on the weekly wave | Nationscape | | | ns_gender_rep | 7.9 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women among Republicans; item: agree that women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve | Nationscape respondents with an answer to the item who are Republicans | July 2019 to February 2021 | 95% CI 7.1 to 8.8 | 146,295 | weight, cluster-robust interval on the weekly wave | Nationscape | | | ns_gender_u30 | 14.8 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree that women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve | Nationscape respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | July 2019 to February 2021, ages 18 to 29 | 95% CI 13.7 to 16.0 | 106,828 | weight, cluster-robust interval on the weekly wave | Nationscape | | | ns_party_gap | 19.2 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, Republicans minus Democrats, party identification without leaners; item: agree that women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve | Nationscape respondents with an answer to the item who are Democrats or Republicans, leaners not included | July 2019 to February 2021 | 95% CI 18.4 to 20.0 | 317,051 | weight, cluster-robust interval on the weekly wave | Nationscape | | | ns_party_minus_gender | 9.6 | percentage points | party gap minus gender gap, ignoring how the two gaps move together on the same respondents; item: agree that women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve | Nationscape respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded party (or left-right side) and sex | July 2019 to February 2021 | 95% CI 8.7 to 10.5 | 797,586 | weight, cluster-robust interval on the weekly wave | Nationscape | | | o30_change_2020_2024 | −5.2 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | 2024 gap minus 2020 gap, ages 30 and older, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, ages 30 and older | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI −7.2 to −3.2 | 78,291 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | o30_gap_2024 | 3.9 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, ages 30 and older | 2024 | 95% CI 2.4 to 5.4 | 38,779 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pid_change_2020_2024 | −5.4 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of two-party identifiers | 2024 gap minus 2020 gap, independent samples | CES respondents ages 18 to 29 who identify as Democrats or Republicans (leaners not included) | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI −12.1 to 1.3 | 11,699 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pid_diff_2006_2020 | +1.1 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of two-party identifiers | 2006 gap minus 2020 gap, independent samples | CES respondents ages 18 to 29 who identify as Democrats or Republicans (leaners not included) | 2006 and 2020 | 95% CI −4.3 to 6.5 | 9,263 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pid_gap_2006 | 9.5 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of two-party identifiers | difference in weighted Democratic shares of party identifiers, women minus men | CES respondents ages 18 to 29 who identify as Democrats or Republicans (leaners not included) | 2006 | 95% CI 5.5 to 13.6 | 2,726 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pid_gap_2020 | 8.5 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of two-party identifiers | difference in weighted Democratic shares of party identifiers, women minus men | CES respondents ages 18 to 29 who identify as Democrats or Republicans (leaners not included) | 2020 | 95% CI 4.9 to 12.1 | 6,537 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pid_gap_2024 | 3.1 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of two-party identifiers | difference in weighted Democratic shares of party identifiers, women minus men | CES respondents ages 18 to 29 who identify as Democrats or Republicans (leaners not included) | 2024 | 95% CI −2.5 to 8.7 | 5,162 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pooled_gap_hispanic | 11.2 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, ages 18 to 29, Hispanic | 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 1.0 to 21.4 | 1,092 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pooled_gap_white | 2.3 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, ages 18 to 29, white | 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −2.5 to 7.1 | 4,661 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | pooled_race_diff | +8.9 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Hispanic gap minus white gap, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, ages 18 to 29 | 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −2.4 to 20.2 | 5,753 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | race_neff_max_2024 | 82 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | largest cell effective sample size | Black, Hispanic and Asian women and men ages 18 to 29 who voted | 2024 | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | race_neff_min_2024 | 23 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | smallest cell effective sample size | Black, Hispanic and Asian women and men ages 18 to 29 who voted | 2024 | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shift_m_2020 | 66.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES men ages 18 to 29 who voted for a major-party candidate | 2020 | 95% CI 63.1% to 69.2% | 1,440 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shift_m_2024 | 56.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES men ages 18 to 29 who voted for a major-party candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 51.8% to 61.1% | 1,209 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shift_m_change | −9.7 | percentage points | 2024 share minus 2020 share, independent samples | CES men ages 18 to 29 who voted for a major-party candidate | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI −15.2 to −4.1 | 2,649 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shift_w_2020 | 69.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES women ages 18 to 29 who voted for a major-party candidate | 2020 | 95% CI 66.9% to 71.6% | 2,920 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shift_w_2024 | 63.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote | CES women ages 18 to 29 who voted for a major-party candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 59.0% to 67.0% | 1,769 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shift_w_change | −6.3 | percentage points | 2024 share minus 2020 share, independent samples | CES women ages 18 to 29 who voted for a major-party candidate | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI −10.9 to −1.6 | 4,689 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shift_wm_change | −5.1 | percentage points | 2024 share minus 2020 share, independent samples | CES white men ages 18 to 29 who voted for a major-party candidate | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI −12.1 to 1.9 | 1,621 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shift_ww_change | −2.1 | percentage points | 2024 share minus 2020 share, independent samples | CES white women ages 18 to 29 who voted for a major-party candidate | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI −8.0 to 3.8 | 3,040 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | u30_change_2020_2024 | +3.4 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | 2024 gap minus 2020 gap, ages 18 to 29, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, ages 18 to 29 | 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI −3.9 to 10.7 | 7,338 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | u30_gap_2024 | 6.5 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate, ages 18 to 29 | 2024 | 95% CI 0.4 to 12.7 | 2,978 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | vv_band_gap_2024_18_29 | 11.6 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate and were matched to voter-file records, ages 18 to 29 | 2024 | 95% CI 3.8 to 19.3 | 1,348 | vvweight (respondents matched to voter-file records) | Cooperative Election Study | | | vv_band_gap_2024_65p | 11.1 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate and were matched to voter-file records, ages 65 and older | 2024 | 95% CI 8.6 to 13.6 | 12,683 | vvweight (respondents matched to voter-file records) | Cooperative Election Study | | | vv_diff_2024 | +4.2 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | gap among ages 18 to 29 minus gap among ages 30 and older, independent samples | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate and were matched to voter-file records | 2024 | 95% CI −3.7 to 12.1 | 32,776 | vvweight (respondents matched to voter-file records) | Cooperative Election Study | | | vv_minus_std_2024 | +4.3 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | matched-weight gap minus standard-weight gap on the same matched respondents; interval from a seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents, 400 replicates | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate and were matched to voter-file records | 2024 | 95% CI 2.9 to 5.5 | 32,776 | vvweight and weight_cumulative on the same respondents | Cooperative Election Study | | | vv_o30_gap_2024 | 7.3 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate and were matched to voter-file records, ages 30 and older | 2024 | 95% CI 5.8 to 8.9 | 31,428 | vvweight (respondents matched to voter-file records) | Cooperative Election Study | | | vv_u30_gap_2024 | 11.6 | percentage points, women minus men, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | difference in weighted Democratic shares, women minus men | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican candidate and were matched to voter-file records, ages 18 to 29 | 2024 | 95% CI 3.8 to 19.3 | 1,348 | vvweight (respondents matched to voter-file records) | Cooperative Election Study | | | wvs_age_diff | +1.5 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men-minus-women gap among ages 18 to 29 minus the gap among ages 30 and older; item: agree that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce | WVS United States respondents with an answer to the item with a recorded sex and age | 2017 | 95% CI −4.4 to 7.3 | 2,591 | weight (S017) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_gender_gap | 2.9 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce | WVS United States respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | 2017 | 95% CI 0.7 to 5.0 | 2,591 | weight (S017) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_gender_left | 4.0 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women among the left side (1 to 5); item: agree that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce | WVS United States respondents with an answer to the item who are in the left side (1 to 5) | 2017 | 95% CI 1.5 to 6.6 | 1,510 | weight (S017) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_gender_o30 | 2.8 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce | WVS United States respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | 2017, ages 30 and older | 95% CI 0.5 to 5.2 | 1,961 | weight (S017) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_gender_right | 0.7 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women among the right side (6 to 10); item: agree that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce | WVS United States respondents with an answer to the item who are in the right side (6 to 10) | 2017 | 95% CI −3.3 to 4.8 | 1,024 | weight (S017) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_gender_u30 | 4.3 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, men minus women, all respondents; item: agree that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce | WVS United States respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded sex | 2017, ages 18 to 29 | 95% CI −1.1 to 9.6 | 630 | weight (S017) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_party_gap | 3.2 | percentage points (share taking the traditional or hostile position) | difference in weighted shares, right side (left-right 6 to 10) minus left side (1 to 5), because the file used has no party variable for the United States; item: agree that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce | WVS United States respondents with an answer to the item who placed themselves on the left-right scale | 2017 | 95% CI 0.8 to 5.5 | 2,534 | weight (S017) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_party_minus_gender | 0.3 | percentage points | party gap minus gender gap, ignoring how the two gaps move together on the same respondents; item: agree that men should have more right to a job than women when jobs are scarce | WVS United States respondents with an answer to the item and a recorded party (or left-right side) and sex | 2017 | 95% CI −2.9 to 3.5 | 5,125 | weight (S017) | World Values Survey and EVS | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Feeling thermometer: A 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. ## Methods Samples: the vote gap uses respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate. ANES Cumulative Data File, presidential elections 1952 to 2024 (post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise the full-sample weight VCF0009z); CES Cumulative File, 2008 to 2024 (weight_cumulative). The CES is an online survey of opt-in panel members whose weights match them to the electorate, so it is not a random sample of adults. The matched-weight rows use vvweight, the weight for respondents matched to voter-file records, which the file holds for 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024; in 2020 it is a constant multiple of weight_cumulative, so the matched weight is compared with the standard weight in 2024 only. Party identification in the CES uses even years 2006 to 2024 and counts Democrats and Republicans only, leaners excluded, among all respondents and not only voters. Attitude items, one per survey and chosen by the author: GSS agree or strongly agree that it is much better if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family (1977 to 2024, weight_use, party and sex from the subset); ANES feminist feeling thermometer below 50 (1988 to 2024, VCF0009z); WVS United States wave 7 (2017, weight S017), agreement that men should have more right to a job when jobs are scarce, with the left side (1 to 5) and right side (6 to 10) of the left-right scale standing in for party because the cleaned file has no party variable; Nationscape (weekly waves from July 2019 to early February 2021, plus four later interviews in the file, weight), agreement that women who complain about harassment often cause more problems than they solve, party identification without leaners. Party is Democrat or Republican with leaners included in the GSS and ANES; the party gap therefore leaves out independents (and, in Nationscape, leaners), while the gender gap uses all respondents with an answer, and a check restricts the gender gap to Democrats and Republicans. Gender is the two-category variable in each file; ANES respondents coded Other (11) are dropped. Age groups are 18 to 29, 30 to 44, 45 to 64 and 65 and over. Estimands: a gap is a difference of two weighted shares, women minus men for the vote and for party identification, men minus women and Republicans minus Democrats for the attitude items; a change is a difference of two gaps from different samples. Intervals: 95% normal intervals on the Kish effective sample size, model based, treating the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignoring clustering; differences of independent estimates combine the two standard errors in quadrature (the party gap minus the gender gap ignores how the two gaps move together, because they are computed on overlapping respondents). The difference between the matched-weight and standard-weight gaps for the same 2024 respondents is a percentile bootstrap over respondents (400 replicates, seed 12345), because the two gaps share people. Nationscape estimates are weighted regressions with errors clustered on the 85 weekly waves, wider than the Kish interval, and still describe sampling noise among opt-in panel members. Suppression: a race, age or party cell needs 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100 (subgroup-by-year floor); timeline cells built on one item need 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100; a gap is published only when both cells clear the floor. Pooling two elections can lower a cell's effective sample when the weights in one year vary a lot (among Asian voters under thirty the smaller cell has 101 in 2020 and 64 pooled), so a pooled group can miss the floor that its 2020 cells clear. Modes: the ANES mode split uses weight_ftf and weight_web (2012, 2016 and 2024; the file has no mode weights for 2020); the GSS mode split uses the interview mode from the raw file (2022 and 2024 mix in-person and web interviews, 2021 is mostly web). ## What these data cannot show - The estimates describe groups in each year and cannot show that any person changed. - A rise in the under-thirty gap between two elections compares different people, so age cannot be separated from generation here, which Chapter 3.6, Age and generation (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation) takes up. - The vote gaps use self-reported votes, and the two surveys and the two CES weights differ on the 2024 level and on the change since 2020, so the data cannot say which estimate is closest to the electorate. - Both the CES and Nationscape are opt-in online panels, so their intervals leave out the error that comes from who joined the panel. - The CES intervals also treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample, so allowing for the survey design could widen or narrow them. - Results whose interval ends close to zero, such as the under-thirty gap in 2024 and the change in the age difference since 2020, could include zero if the intervals were wider. - Most race-by-gender groups are too small to estimate, and a gap that is not distinguishable from zero in a small group is not evidence that the gap is zero. - The attitude items differ in wording, scale and window, and their levels cannot be compared across surveys or merged into one index. - Each survey contributes one item chosen for this chapter, so the count of surveys in which the party gap exceeds the gender gap describes these items, and a different item could change it. - Within a survey, the comparisons of party with gender and of young with old are informative, and the party gap minus the gender gap ignores how the two gaps move together, because both are computed on the same respondents. - All the data are from the United States. - A widely read Financial Times analysis described a gender divide among the young in several countries [6], and a comparative study of gender attitudes examined many societies [7], but nothing here tests either claim outside the United States. - The files record two genders, so nonbinary respondents cannot be examined. - Finally, the data hold no measure of why the gaps arise. - They cannot separate differences in policy attitudes from differences in the salience of issues, in candidates or in party strategy, and Chapter 9.5, Two moralities (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/two-moralities; planned) places gender-role attitudes among other cultural attitudes. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Kaufmann, Karen M.; Petrocik, John R. (1999). The Changing Politics of American Men: Understanding the Sources of the Gender Gap. American Journal of Political Science 43(3): 864-887. https://doi.org/10.2307/2991838 3. Box-Steffensmeier, Janet M.; De Boef, Suzanna; Lin, Tse-min (2004). The Dynamics of the Partisan Gender Gap. American Political Science Review 98(3): 515-528. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404001315 4. Tausanovitch, Chris; Vavreck, Lynn (2021). Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape Project (version 20211215). Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CQFP3Z 5. Mercer, Andrew W.; Kreuter, Frauke; Keeter, Scott; Stuart, Elizabeth A. (2017). Theory and Practice in Nonprobability Surveys: Parallels between Causal Inference and Survey Inference. Public Opinion Quarterly 81(S1): 250-271. https://academic.oup.com/poq/article/81/S1/250/3749176 6. Burn-Murdoch, John (2024). A new global gender divide is emerging. Financial Times, 26 January 2024. 7. Inglehart, Ronald; Norris, Pippa (2003). Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World. Cambridge University Press. ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/the-gender-gap/build.py (sha256 e153f4a58f9349d05b60723d8dda0508da6ce5c672768f23877a55c7ca25beec) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 | | data/nationscape/nationscape_clean.parquet | 43,528,088 | 6a7904b0ca979052a375585356a3e4fb85129f4902770bee653b54e95fc936e4 | 8dc1daf282a9fa90033abf3be0312eb5d1bf351a6a0b719c43204c904af86a44 | | data/wvs/wvs_clean.parquet | 71,974,374 | cef4479481f8a48d6c765d39dc5438d31daa32fcecee3f181aaaf8e257f41f0b | 59a8e3c369176b7e1a2cb37fc10b87985ed79b02fab2eae1cca08e7a972db061 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 731d9847d89ffaabe6ccb029ed2cc49104a8baa205255eacf77c60c83a8fdb52 | | figures/attitude_gap_trends.json | f0b4dea1b1b9b998eeb0036fcc2328cda34c026e22bbb8449d22c731bd1653db | | figures/attitude_gender_gap_by_age.json | f3edf0c7192f2834a06ebbd5be2c86bf40513954ad1312401619a649a1a96a16 | | figures/attitudes_by_gender_party.json | 85d6819360e2c77b6fd370c9b54d309d206d7e920e97b65ccb56d99973bbd829 | | figures/pid_gap_under30.json | 6fb42e50edff5ba22c8c90cd7546aea2216155f20fdf819b3e0184c8bd1cc712 | | figures/vote_gap_by_age.json | e55aa73b49d9195e6818a73fc232698e5f752bdf57dd7e55fbd70ece565aa49e | | figures/vote_gap_long_run.json | 865d9a712c30eea262167f96d535b5cf1ed1fecf47a1e086dee05cd3b7eefe5e | | figures/youth_gap_by_race.json | 3b98c257cca83056eb38e9d9be4513069df7debb8cf8ed65d1d838a9ca642cd4 | | figures/youth_shift_2020_2024.json | da472b2e622a81f2821185e8a78810eff91f4e6bfe000796b233f59bdd362c22 | | figures/youth_vs_older_gap.json | 83f6af3dfc64ce8de87b701e66dcd53139b7b87eab03df4c952e3641a07766aa | | meta.json | 1fac64defac0be3e92e7cde54984155d00f9ebbd6155d11fcdcd124abdad5502 | | refs.json | 1508e30ad784b5631010b1983a94d2fb1208de7d0dd3509b829d6c5bcca6c560 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/facts.json - Table 1, figure "vote_gap_long_run" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/vote_gap_long_run.json - Table 2, figure "vote_gap_by_age" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/vote_gap_by_age.json - Table 3, figure "youth_vs_older_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/youth_vs_older_gap.json - Table 4, figure "youth_gap_by_race" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/youth_gap_by_race.json - Table 5, figure "youth_shift_2020_2024" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/youth_shift_2020_2024.json - Table 6, figure "pid_gap_under30" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/pid_gap_under30.json - Table 7, figure "attitudes_by_gender_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/attitudes_by_gender_party.json - Table 8, figure "attitude_gap_trends" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/attitude_gap_trends.json - Table 9, figure "attitude_gender_gap_by_age" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-gender-gap/figures/attitude_gender_gap_by_age.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Age and generation: report Chapter 3.6 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Age and generation - Chapter: 3.6 (Part III, The party coalitions; The great sorting) - Question: How do age and birth cohort relate to party support, and what can repeated surveys separate? - Dek: In the CES, two-party presidential voters under thirty were more Democratic than those sixty-five and older by +22.2 points in 2020 and +15.0 in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File: presidential vote, party identification, age and birth cohort, presidential elections 1952-2024; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: post-election weight where available, otherwise VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for interview-mode estimates - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content: presidential vote 2008-2024 and party identification 2006-2024; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative; weight_post (2012, 2016, 2020) and vvweight for sensitivity rows - State presidential returns. State presidential returns 1976-2024, used only for the certified national two-party share; years: 1976-2024 (13 elections); weights: none (full counts) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026ageandgeneration ```bibtex @misc{singh2026ageandgeneration, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Age and generation}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 | +22.2 | 95% CI 19.9 to 24.4 | 16,255 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_gap_2020 | | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2024 | +15.0 | 95% CI 11.8 to 18.3 | 18,087 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_gap_2024 | | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 | 2008 | 67.2% | 95% CI 65.2% to 69.2% | 3,327 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_young_2008 | | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters aged 65 and over | 2008 | 42.7% | 95% CI 41.0% to 44.5% | 4,477 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_old_2008 | | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2008 | +24.5 | 95% CI 21.8 to 27.1 | 7,804 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_gap_2008 | | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters whose registration was matched to voter-file records, aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2024 | +23.0 | 95% CI 19.1 to 26.9 | 14,103 | vvweight (validated-voter weight, for respondents whose registration was matched to voter-file records) | Cooperative Election Study | ces_vv_gap_2024 | | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters (age may be missing) | 2024 | 54.5% | 95% CI 52.3% to 56.7% | 3,933 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_share_2024 | | certified Democratic share of the two-party vote | ballots counted for the two major-party candidates | 2024 | 49.2% | | | none (full counts) | State presidential returns | cert_share_2024 | | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 49.0% | 95% CI 48.2% to 49.7% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_share_2024 | | count of respondents | two-party presidential voters with a known age | presidential elections 1952 to 2024 | 33,768 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_voters | | count of elections | ANES presidential election studies | presidential elections 1952 to 2024 | 19 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_elections | | count of respondents | two-party presidential voters with a known age | presidential elections 2008 to 2024 | 188,145 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_ces_voters | | definition of the suppression floor | floor for a published survey cell | all years | 100 | | | none (definition) | ANES Cumulative Data File | floor_n | ## Findings In the Cooperative Election Study (CES), 67.2% (95% CI 65.2% to 69.2%) of two-party voters under thirty and 42.7% (95% CI 41.0% to 44.5%) of two-party voters sixty-five and older voted for the Democratic presidential candidate in 2008, a gap of +24.5 (95% CI 21.8 to 27.1) points. The gap was +22.2 (95% CI 19.9 to 24.4) in 2020 and +15.0 (95% CI 11.8 to 18.3) in 2024. Among CES voters whose registration was matched to voter-file records the 2024 gap is +23.0 (95% CI 19.1 to 26.9), so the size of the recent fall depends on which voters are counted. The American National Election Studies (ANES) are the second survey, and their 2024 sample leans Democratic. Its two-party Democratic share, 54.5% (95% CI 52.3% to 56.7%), is above the certified count of 49.2%, while the CES share, 49.0% (95% CI 48.2% to 49.7%), is close to it, so the ANES age gaps are read beside the CES in the section on 2024. A difference between age groups mixes three things. Age is what happens to a person as they get older. Period is what happens to every voter at one election, such as a landslide or a recession. Birth cohort is what people born in the same years share, such as the events of their teenage years, and a cohort is the group born in those years. The three are tied by arithmetic, because birth year equals election year minus age. A survey that records age and the election year already holds birth year, and no repeated survey can separate all three effects without an assumption [1] [2]. This chapter reports the age gap in the vote and in party identification from two surveys, follows birth cohorts from election to election, and then shows in the same data how far an estimated age effect moves with the assumption chosen. The ANES Cumulative Data File supplies the vote of 33,768 respondents in 19 presidential elections from 1952 to 2024 who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican candidate and gave an age of eighteen or older. The CES, an online panel, supplies 188,145 such respondents in the elections from 2008 to 2024. Such a respondent is a two-party voter, and a Democratic share is the share of two-party voters who reported a Democratic vote. Party identification counts Democrats and Republicans, with leaners included. The age groups are eighteen to twenty-nine, thirty to forty-four, forty-five to sixty-four and sixty-five and older, the bands that Chapter 3.1, The two coalitions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions) uses for the age make-up of each party's voters. (Note: Every interval is a 95% confidence interval from the Kish effective sample size [3] on the survey weights, and it treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample. The CES is an opt-in panel, so its intervals leave out how respondents joined the panel. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100 to be shown, and smaller cells are left blank. ANES vote shares use the post-election weight in the elections where the file has one (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024) and the full-sample weight otherwise, which includes 2012. CES shares use the cumulative-file weight, which is proportional within each election to the pre-election weight and is the one weight defined for every election. The vote is a post-election item, and the 2024 section checks the choice against the post-election weight. The methods note in the appendix names the weight of each estimate.) ### Three comparisons, and what each can say A repeated survey offers three ways to compare voters, and each holds a different quantity fixed. Comparing age groups inside one election holds the period fixed, and it mixes age with birth cohort, because the older voters in an election were also born earlier. Comparing one age group across elections holds age fixed, and it mixes period with birth cohort, because the voters under thirty in two elections were born in different years. Following a birth cohort from one election to the next holds the cohort fixed, and it mixes age with period, because the cohort grows older and the election changes. Each comparison is the sum of two of the three effects, and none isolates one of them. The estimates of all three come near the end of the chapter (Table 8 and Table 9), after the descriptive evidence that uses them. ### The youngest voters were more Democratic than the oldest from 2008 to 2020 Table 1 plots the Democratic share of the two-party vote in each ANES election by age group. Before 2004 the sign of the gap between the youngest and oldest groups (Table 3) varies from one election to the next. The gap was +2.9 (95% CI −5.9 to 11.8) points in 1992. Its interval is above zero in 1964, in 1972 and in every election from 2004 to 2020, which is 7 of the 16 elections with enough voters under thirty to publish, and it includes zero in the rest. In 3 elections (1960, 1996 and 2000) the youngest group has too few respondents for a published cell. The gap was +22.6 (95% CI 12.2 to 33.0) in 2008 and +17.0 (95% CI 11.0 to 23.1) in 2020. In 2024 the youngest group, at 56.3% (95% CI 48.9% to 63.6%), is within about a point of the oldest, at 57.4% (95% CI 53.7% to 61.1%), and the interval for the gap, −1.1 (95% CI −9.4 to 7.1), includes zero. Table 1. The ANES age gap in the Democratic vote was above zero in every election from 2004 to 2020 and included zero in 2024 Table 2 gives the same comparison in the CES, whose larger samples of young voters allow five age bands. In 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020 the band aged thirty to forty-four is more Democratic than the band forty-five to sixty-four, which is more Democratic than the band sixty-five and older. Every interval for those two differences excludes zero. The two youngest bands are not always separated from their neighbors. In 2012 the band eighteen to twenty-four differs from the band twenty-five to twenty-nine by +0.5 (95% CI −4.3 to 5.2) points, and the band twenty-five to twenty-nine differs from the band thirty to forty-four by +2.9 (95% CI −0.9 to 6.7). The gap between the two end groups was between +18.7 and +24.5 points in those four elections, each with an interval above zero, and it was +15.0 (95% CI 11.8 to 18.3) in 2024. In 2024 the order of the two oldest bands is not settled: the band forty-five to sixty-four differs from the band sixty-five and older by −1.6 (95% CI −3.2 to 0.0) points. The two youngest bands differ by +0.5 to +5.0 points across the five elections, so the gap between the end groups is not mainly a difference between the very youngest voters and the rest. Table 2. In every CES election from 2008 to 2020 the Democratic share was lower among voters forty-five to sixty-four than among voters thirty to forty-four, and lower again among voters sixty-five and older Both figures compare age groups inside each election and follow one age group across elections, so both mix age with birth year. The voters under thirty in 2008 and in 2024 were born in different years, and so were the voters sixty-five and older. ### The 2024 CES fall is not detectable among voters matched to registration records Between 2020 and 2024 the CES gap changed by −7.1 (95% CI −11.1 to −3.2) points among all voters. The ANES gap changed by −18.2 (95% CI −28.4 to −7.9) points, from +17.0 (95% CI 11.0 to 23.1) in 2020 to −1.1 (95% CI −9.4 to 7.1) in 2024, an interval that includes zero. The CES file also holds a weight, called the validated-voter weight, for voters whose registration could be matched to a voter-file record, which this chapter calls matched voters. Among them the gap was +22.8 (95% CI 20.1 to 25.4) in 2020 and +23.0 (95% CI 19.1 to 26.9) in 2024, a change of +0.2 (95% CI −4.5 to 4.9) points. With the standard weight on the same matched voters the 2024 gap is +22.2 (95% CI 17.9 to 26.5) and its change from 2020 is −0.6 (95% CI −5.6 to 4.5) points (Table 3). Both intervals extend below zero by several points, so the data show no detectable fall among matched voters and do not show that none occurred. The change among all voters minus the change among matched voters is −6.6 (95% CI −10.2 to −2.8) points with the standard weight and −7.3 (95% CI −11.8 to −3.0) with the validated-voter weight (bootstrap intervals), so the two changes differ by more than sampling error. For the age gap, the difference between the estimates is associated with the sample and not with the weight. On the same matched voters the validated-voter weight moves the 2024 gap by +0.8 (95% CI −3.0 to 4.8) points, an interval that includes zero. The gap among matched voters is above the gap among all voters by +7.2 (95% CI 3.8 to 10.6) points (bootstrap intervals). Chapter 3.5, The gender gap in attitudes and votes (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap) finds that the weight matters on the same respondents for the gender gap. The share of voters under thirty who could be matched fell from 66.9% in 2020 to 45.5% in 2024, and the share among voters sixty-five and older was 87.4% and 84.6%. In 2024 matched voters under thirty were 68.2% (95% CI 64.1% to 72.4%) Democratic and unmatched voters under thirty 54.5% (95% CI 50.2% to 58.8%), a difference of +13.8 (95% CI 7.8 to 19.7) points. In 2020 the difference was +3.0 (95% CI −1.1 to 7.1) points, an interval that includes zero. The data cannot say why the unmatched young voters of 2024 were less Democratic. Some may be voters whose records the match missed, and some may be respondents who said they voted and did not. The standard CES weight is proportional to the pre-election weight, and the vote is a post-election item. The post-election weight exists for 2012, 2016 and 2020 and gives age gaps of +19.9, +22.4 and +20.4 (95% CI 17.9 to 22.9), against +18.7, +22.9 and +22.2 with the standard weight. It does not exist for 2024, so the change from 2020 with the post-election weight to 2024 with the standard weight mixes two weights. That change is −5.3 (95% CI −9.4 to −1.2) points, smaller in size than the −7.1 with the standard weight, and its interval excludes zero. The fall among all voters therefore does not depend on this choice, and its size does. The ANES gives no cleaner reading, because its 2024 sample leans Democratic. Its two-party Democratic share was 54.5% (95% CI 52.3% to 56.7%) against 49.2% in the certified count and 49.0% (95% CI 48.2% to 49.7%) in the CES. The ANES exceeds the count by +5.3 (95% CI 3.0 to 7.5) points, and the CES differs from it by −0.3 (95% CI −1.0 to 0.5). The ANES also exceeded the count in 2020, by +3.5 (95% CI 1.7 to 5.2) points. The excess is largest among voters sixty-five and older, where the ANES share, 57.4% (95% CI 53.7% to 61.1%), is above the CES share by +11.9 (95% CI 8.0 to 15.7) points and above the CES share among matched voters of that age, 46.0% (95% CI 44.8% to 47.2%). It is also positive among voters forty-five to sixty-four, at +7.8 (95% CI 3.8 to 11.9) points. Among voters under thirty the ANES is below the CES by −4.3 (95% CI −12.3 to 3.6) points, an interval that includes zero. The near-zero ANES gap in 2024 therefore comes mostly from its oldest group. No official count gives the vote by age, so which survey is closer within an age group cannot be tested here. Split by interview mode, the 2024 ANES cells for voters under thirty have effective sample sizes of 86 in the web sample and 31 in the face-to-face sample, below the floor. The ANES therefore cannot show whether the fall depends on mode. In the web sample the gap was +12.8 (95% CI 4.2 to 21.5) in 2012 and +19.3 (95% CI 10.0 to 28.7) in 2016, and in the face-to-face sample it was +21.7 (95% CI 9.2 to 34.3) in 2012 (the second button of Table 3). In 2024 1,884 of the 3,933 two-party voters (48%) are panel or paper cases with no mode weight and fall outside every mode cell, and the 2020 study has no mode weights. Table 3. Between 2020 and 2024 the CES age gap in the vote changed by −7.1 points among all voters and by −0.6, an interval that includes zero, among matched voters ### Whether the party-identification gap fell by 2024 depends on the baseline wave Party identification is asked of every respondent, voters or not, and it does not depend on the two candidates of one election, so it offers a check on the vote comparison. Table 4 plots the Democratic share of party identifiers by age group. In the CES the gap between the youngest and oldest groups was between +13.9 and +21.3 points in each of the 10 even-year waves from 2006 to 2024, with every interval above zero, and 2024 is the lowest of the ten. It was +14.9 (95% CI 12.9 to 17.0) in 2020 and +13.9 (95% CI 11.2 to 16.5) in 2024, a change of −1.1 (95% CI −4.4 to 2.3) points that includes zero. The baseline matters. The gap was +17.2 (95% CI 15.1 to 19.3) in 2018, a change to 2024 of −3.3 (95% CI −6.7 to 0.1) points that includes zero, and +21.1 (95% CI 19.0 to 23.3) in 2022, a change to 2024 of −7.3 (95% CI −10.6 to −3.9) points. The ANES gap fell from +14.5 (95% CI 9.2 to 19.8) to +1.9 (95% CI −4.7 to 8.6), a change of −12.6 (95% CI −21.1 to −4.0) points, and the web sample alone gives +1.1 (95% CI −8.9 to 11.2) in 2024, while the face-to-face sample has too few respondents under thirty to publish. Table 4. Among party identifiers in the CES the youngest group was more Democratic than the oldest in every wave from 2006 to 2024 The CES therefore shows no detectable fall in party identification against 2020 or 2018, and a fall against 2022. The CES gap moved by several points between adjacent waves, so a fall measured against one wave is not a trend. The ANES shows a fall in both the vote and party identification against 2020, from a sample whose oldest group leans Democratic relative to the CES, as the previous section reports. An account in which party attachment strengthens with the years a person has held it gives age a role of its own in party identification [4], and this chapter does not test it. ### Two cohorts' early Democratic leads were smaller by 2024 A birth cohort follows the same group of people as far as a survey can. Table 5 follows each cohort of the ANES cumulative file, in the sixteen-year birth groups that Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened) uses, through the elections in which the cohort has enough voters. It plots the cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election. The subtraction removes anything that moves all voters together in one election, such as a landslide, and it leaves age and the changing make-up of the other voters in place. Cohort cells include every voter with a known cohort, whether or not the age is known. The cohort born 1975 to 1990 voted 66.0% (95% CI 57.3% to 74.7%) Democratic in 2004, +19.7 (95% CI 10.1 to 29.3) points above other voters, and 55.6% (95% CI 51.3% to 60.0%) in 2024, +1.5 (95% CI −3.7 to 6.6) points above them, a change in its lead of −18.2 (95% CI −29.1 to −7.3) points. The cohort born 1943 to 1958 led by +15.6 (95% CI 10.1 to 21.2) points in 1972 and by +2.7 (95% CI −2.1 to 7.5) in 2024, a change of −12.9 (95% CI −20.3 to −5.5) points (Table 6). The CES, which starts in 2008, shows the same direction for the 1975 to 1990 cohort. Its share fell from 66.3% (95% CI 64.6% to 68.0%) in 2008 to 54.6% (95% CI 53.0% to 56.2%) in 2024, and its lead was +16.6 (95% CI 14.7 to 18.5) points in 2008 and +7.5 (95% CI 5.7 to 9.3) in 2024, a change of −9.1 (95% CI −11.7 to −6.5) points. Table 5. The cohorts born 1943 to 1958 and 1975 to 1990 began with a Democratic lead over other voters in the ANES and held a smaller one in 2024 The pattern is not general. The cohort born 1927 to 1942 was below other voters in the ANES in every election from 2008 to 2020, and its 2024 lead, +4.6 (95% CI −5.3 to 14.6) points, is above them. Its change between 1956 and 2024 is +2.5 (95% CI −10.2 to 15.1) points, an interval that includes zero. In the CES the same cohort's 2024 lead is −13.9 (95% CI −17.5 to −10.2) points, so the two surveys disagree about the oldest voters, as the 2024 section reports. The cohort born 1911 to 1926 led other voters by +7.8 (95% CI 2.0 to 13.6) points in 1952 and by +6.5 (95% CI −2.4 to 15.3) in 1996, a change of −1.4 (95% CI −11.9 to 9.2) points. That interval does not show a loss of the cohort's lead between 1952 and 1996, and its lower end is close to the change for the 1943 to 1958 cohort. The cohort born 1959 to 1974 began near the average, at +0.6 (95% CI −7.7 to 9.0) points in 1984, and ended below it, at −5.5 (95% CI −10.5 to −0.5) in 2024. In the CES the lead of that cohort changed by −7.3 (95% CI −9.6 to −5.1) points between 2008 and 2024 and the lead of the cohort born 1943 to 1958 by +0.8 (95% CI −1.5 to 3.0). The lead of the cohort born 1991 or later changed by −10.5 (95% CI −21.7 to 0.6) points in the ANES between 2016 and 2024, an interval that includes zero. In the CES it changed by +5.9 (95% CI 0.1 to 11.7) points between 2012 and 2024, from a first cell that holds only voters aged eighteen to twenty-one. Party identification moves in the CES, where the cohort samples are large. The party-identification leads of 4 of the 5 cohorts changed by more than sampling error between their first and last waves. The changes are −9.6 (95% CI −13.6 to −5.6) points for the cohort born 1927 to 1942, −7.2 (95% CI −9.2 to −5.2) for 1959 to 1974, −4.8 (95% CI −7.2 to −2.4) for 1975 to 1990 and −7.3 (95% CI −13.9 to −0.7) for 1991 or later. The change for the cohort born 1943 to 1958, −1.7 (95% CI −3.8 to 0.3), includes zero. The cohort born 1991 or later therefore lost party-identification lead while its CES vote lead rose, and the two measures do not agree. No ANES cohort's lead in party identification changed by more than sampling error, and those intervals are wide. Table 6. The vote lead of the 1975 to 1990 cohort over other voters changed by −18.2 points in the ANES between 2004 and 2024 and by −9.1 in the CES between 2008 and 2024 These comparisons follow a cohort, so they mix age with period. A cohort that is more Democratic than other voters when young and closer to them when older fits an age effect, in which people become more like other voters as they age. It fits equally well a cohort effect that fades. It also fits a gap between the first cell, which holds only the cohort's members old enough to vote, and the last cell, which holds all of them, and an election in which the young moved more than the old. Ghitza, Gelman and Auerbach model presidential voting as the cumulative impression of political events, which count most in a voter's teenage and early adult years, and divide voters into five generations [5]. The model needs a measured series of events, the Gallup presidential approval series, and an assumed profile of impressionability by age, and this chapter supplies neither. ### The age gap by gender and race Table 7 splits the CES age gap by gender and race, pooling 2008 with 2012 and 2020 with 2024 so that every cell clears the floor. The gap among men fell from +27.0 (95% CI 24.1 to 29.8) to +19.9 (95% CI 16.6 to 23.1) points, a change of −7.1 (95% CI −11.4 to −2.8), and the gap among women went from +17.3 (95% CI 14.9 to 19.7) to +16.1 (95% CI 13.4 to 18.7), a change of −1.3 (95% CI −4.9 to 2.3) that includes zero. The gap among women minus the gap among men was −9.6 (95% CI −13.4 to −5.9) points in the earlier period and −3.8 (95% CI −8.0 to 0.4) in the later one, so men's age gap was larger in 2008 and 2012 and is no longer clearly larger. Chapter 3.5, The gender gap in attitudes and votes (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap) compares women and men within the youngest group of voters, and this chapter compares young and old within each gender. Race separates the age gaps more than gender does. Among white voters the gap was +20.2 (95% CI 17.7 to 22.7) points in 2020 and 2024 pooled. Among Black voters it was −12.3 (95% CI −17.7 to −6.8) points, so older Black voters were more Democratic than younger Black voters, and the white gap minus the Black gap is +32.5 (95% CI 26.5 to 38.5) points. Among Hispanic voters the gap fell from +22.1 (95% CI 12.9 to 31.2) to +5.3 (95% CI −1.7 to 12.3) points, a change of −16.8 (95% CI −28.3 to −5.2), and the later interval includes zero. Asian voters under thirty are too few to publish a gap for 2008 and 2012, and for 2020 and 2024 pooled the gap is +12.9 (95% CI 2.5 to 23.4) points, from 142 effective respondents under thirty. In 2024 alone the effective sample of Black voters under thirty is 95, below the floor, so the pooled estimates are the ones reported. Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) follows how each of these groups voted, and this chapter compares the young and old within each. Table 7. In 2020 and 2024 the age gap in the vote was +20.2 points among white voters and −12.3 among Black voters ### The estimated age effect depends on which of three assumptions holds Table 8 estimates the three comparisons as straight-line slopes, in points of Democratic vote share per decade, on voters aged eighteen to seventy-three. In the CES, one decade of age within an election goes with −4.3 (95% CI −4.6 to −4.1) points, one decade of time at a fixed age with −1.2 (95% CI −1.8 to −0.5), and one decade along a cohort with −5.2 (95% CI −5.9 to −4.6). In the ANES the slopes are −2.2 (95% CI −2.6 to −1.7), +1.6 (95% CI 1.3 to 1.9) and +0.3 (95% CI −0.3 to 0.8), and only the first two intervals exclude zero. When the effects are straight lines the third slope equals the sum of the first two. The sum of the first two minus the third is −0.8 (95% CI −1.0 to −0.6) in the ANES and −0.3 (95% CI −0.5 to −0.1) in the CES (bootstrap intervals), and both intervals exclude zero, so the data do not support effects that are exactly straight lines. Table 8. In the CES the vote moved by −4.3 points per decade of age within an election, −1.2 per decade at a fixed age and −5.2 along a cohort If the effects are straight lines, each assumption turns these slopes into an age slope. If birth cohorts have no trend, the age slope is the first slope, −4.3 points per decade in the CES. If elections have no trend, the age slope is the third slope, −5.2 in the CES and +0.3 in the ANES. If age has no trend, the age slope is zero, and the whole difference between older and younger voters inside an election is a difference between birth cohorts. The age slope in the ANES therefore runs between −2.2 and +0.3 points per decade depending on the assumption, and in the CES between −5.2 and zero. A model that gives every age band, election and birth cohort its own effect shows the same dependence in full (Table 9). It is a linear probability model that gives each of 14 four-year age bands, each presidential election and each four-year birth cohort an effect on the Democratic share, fitted to the share in every age-by-election cell. It cannot be estimated without a constraint, because adding a straight line to the age effects and to the cohort effects, and subtracting a straight line from the election effects, leaves every fitted share unchanged. Three constraints, each setting the straight-line trend of one set of effects to zero, give profiles that fit the data identically and differ only by a tilt. The span of a profile is the effect of the oldest band minus the effect of the youngest. It combines the slope with the bends in the profile, so a profile whose age slope is zero still has a span that is not exactly zero. In the CES the span is −22.2 (95% CI −25.0 to −19.2) points if birth cohorts have no trend, −27.3 (95% CI −31.5 to −23.3) if elections have none and +1.0 (95% CI −0.8 to 3.1) if ages have none. In the ANES the three spans are −13.3 (95% CI −18.5 to −8.7), −4.8 (95% CI −10.3 to 0.0) and −3.8 (95% CI −7.8 to −0.2). Where each profile bends is the same under all three constraints and is identified from the data, and the overall slope is not. Table 9. In the CES the age effect from the youngest to the oldest band is −22.2 points if birth years carry no trend, −27.3 if elections carry none and +1.0 if ages carry none Which constraint to use is a question for theory, and the data do not settle it. Fosse and Winship review the methods that give a point estimate by adding a restriction, among them equality constraints, Moore-Penrose estimators (the minimum-norm fit used here as the base solution) and multilevel models. They also describe an approach that reports bounds and sensitivity to the restriction instead [6]. This chapter takes the second course. It reports the range of the age effect across three constraints and does not choose among them. ### These shares describe voters Every vote share here is a share of respondents who reported voting for a major-party candidate, so an age gap in the vote is a gap among voters. It says nothing about the adults who did not vote. Turnout differs by age group, and Chapter 3.7, Turnout (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/turnout) reports it by age and by other characteristics in the Current Population Survey. The gap among voters can change because preferences change or because different people vote, and these surveys cannot separate the two. Chapter 3.1, The two coalitions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions) reports the age make-up of each party's voters. The comparison of matched and unmatched voters above is a reminder that who is counted affects the estimate even among voters. ### What these data cannot show The surveys interview different people in each election, so a cohort line does not follow anyone. It mixes people who changed, people who joined or left the sample (a cohort is smaller at older ages and its youngest members enter as they turn eighteen), and the effects of age and election. A panel study that re-interviews the same voters separates a person's change from the replacement of cohorts, and it still cannot separate the effect of age from the effect of the election in which the person is re-interviewed. The ANES 2024 Time Series holds a sample interviewed in 2016, 2020 and 2024 and the CES has panel files, but the earlier waves of both are not in the data store, so no panel evidence appears here. The chapter chooses no constraint for the age-period-cohort model and reports the range. A model with more structure can give a narrower answer only by assuming that structure, and the surveys do not test it. The generation labels in the literature summarize cohort differences, and they do not explain why those differences arise. The data hold no measure of the events, campaigns or candidates that might have shaped any cohort. The vote is the respondent's report, restricted to two-party voters. The ANES Democratic share exceeds the certified count in 2020 and 2024 by more than its interval, and the excess is largest among voters sixty-five and older. Its age gaps therefore rest on a sample that departs from the count most in the oldest group. The CES share is close to the count in 2024. Neither survey can be checked against an official count by age group. The two surveys disagree about 2024, and the explanations offered here, who is matched to voter records and interview mode, cannot be settled with these files. The ANES youngest-group cells are small, 3 elections have none to publish, 649 two-party voters have no recorded age and fall outside every age cell, and age is top-coded at eighty in 2020 and 2024. The 2012, 2016 and 2024 ANES samples mix modes and 2020 has no mode weights, so a change between those elections can include a change of mode. The CES is an opt-in panel and its intervals leave out how respondents joined it. The ANES intervals ignore clustering and stratification, so they can be too narrow or too wide. The chapter reports many comparisons, and no interval is adjusted for that. Cohorts are sixteen-year groups, and a finer grouping could show movements that these groups average away. ## Tables ### Table 1. The ANES age gap in the Democratic vote was above zero in every election from 2004 to 2020 and included zero in 2024 Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by age group (18 to 29, 30 to 44, 45 to 64 and 65 and over), ANES 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals | Interviews | Election | Age group | Democratic share (%) | 95% interval low | 95% interval high | Voters | | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | all | 1952 | 18 to 29 | 42.3 | 35.1 | 49.5 | 182 | | all | 1956 | 18 to 29 | 42.1 | 34.9 | 49.4 | 178 | | all | 1960 | 18 to 29 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | all | 1964 | 18 to 29 | 72.3 | 65.5 | 79.1 | 166 | | all | 1968 | 18 to 29 | 44.9 | 36.6 | 53.3 | 138 | | all | 1972 | 18 to 29 | 47.3 | 42.4 | 52.2 | 402 | | all | 1976 | 18 to 29 | 52.5 | 46.5 | 58.5 | 272 | | all | 1980 | 18 to 29 | 41.2 | 33.8 | 48.6 | 170 | | all | 1984 | 18 to 29 | 43.2 | 37.1 | 49.3 | 257 | | all | 1988 | 18 to 29 | 47.8 | 40.5 | 55.1 | 182 | | all | 1992 | 18 to 29 | 63.4 | 56.5 | 70.2 | 192 | | all | 1996 | 18 to 29 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | all | 2000 | 18 to 29 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | all | 2004 | 18 to 29 | 66.0 | 57.3 | 74.7 | 137 | | all | 2008 | 18 to 29 | 67.5 | 59.8 | 75.2 | 222 | | all | 2012 | 18 to 29 | 62.6 | 56.8 | 68.4 | 501 | | all | 2016 | 18 to 29 | 61.9 | 54.9 | 68.8 | 299 | | all | 2020 | 18 to 29 | 69.7 | 64.5 | 74.9 | 588 | | all | 2024 | 18 to 29 | 56.3 | 48.9 | 63.6 | 285 | | all | 1952 | 30 to 44 | 46.9 | 42.1 | 51.6 | 429 | | all | 1956 | 30 to 44 | 41.8 | 37.4 | 46.2 | 486 | | all | 1960 | 30 to 44 | 51.2 | 44.8 | 57.6 | 327 | | all | 1964 | 30 to 44 | 68.7 | 64.0 | 73.4 | 377 | | all | 1968 | 30 to 44 | 52.1 | 46.3 | 58.0 | 282 | | all | 1972 | 30 to 44 | 34.2 | 29.6 | 38.8 | 415 | | all | 1976 | 30 to 44 | 48.5 | 43.2 | 53.9 | 352 | | all | 1980 | 30 to 44 | 41.3 | 35.3 | 47.3 | 259 | | all | 1984 | 30 to 44 | 40.7 | 36.3 | 45.1 | 482 | | all | 1988 | 30 to 44 | 46.4 | 41.7 | 51.1 | 433 | | all | 1992 | 30 to 44 | 56.1 | 51.6 | 60.6 | 474 | | all | 1996 | 30 to 44 | 54.0 | 48.3 | 59.6 | 352 | | all | 2000 | 30 to 44 | 46.2 | 40.5 | 51.9 | 354 | | all | 2004 | 30 to 44 | 44.5 | 37.1 | 52.0 | 196 | | all | 2008 | 30 to 44 | 58.4 | 52.4 | 64.5 | 411 | | all | 2012 | 30 to 44 | 55.7 | 51.4 | 59.9 | 904 | | all | 2016 | 30 to 44 | 61.9 | 57.3 | 66.6 | 568 | | all | 2020 | 30 to 44 | 58.8 | 55.4 | 62.3 | 1,373 | | all | 2024 | 30 to 44 | 55.0 | 50.3 | 59.6 | 841 | | all | 1952 | 45 to 64 | 38.8 | 34.0 | 43.5 | 405 | | all | 1956 | 45 to 64 | 36.6 | 32.1 | 41.2 | 434 | | all | 1960 | 45 to 64 | 50.2 | 44.1 | 56.2 | 356 | | all | 1964 | 45 to 64 | 69.1 | 64.6 | 73.6 | 408 | | all | 1968 | 45 to 64 | 42.4 | 37.1 | 47.7 | 335 | | all | 1972 | 45 to 64 | 29.8 | 25.9 | 33.7 | 527 | | all | 1976 | 45 to 64 | 53.3 | 48.5 | 58.0 | 445 | | all | 1980 | 45 to 64 | 46.1 | 40.2 | 52.1 | 271 | | all | 1984 | 45 to 64 | 41.7 | 36.8 | 46.6 | 391 | | all | 1988 | 45 to 64 | 47.2 | 42.0 | 52.5 | 345 | | all | 1992 | 45 to 64 | 57.5 | 52.6 | 62.3 | 395 | | all | 1996 | 45 to 64 | 59.2 | 53.4 | 65.0 | 331 | | all | 2000 | 45 to 64 | 53.1 | 47.8 | 58.4 | 416 | | all | 2004 | 45 to 64 | 45.0 | 39.1 | 50.9 | 332 | | all | 2008 | 45 to 64 | 52.3 | 47.3 | 57.2 | 591 | | all | 2012 | 45 to 64 | 52.3 | 49.2 | 55.4 | 1,760 | | all | 2016 | 45 to 64 | 48.4 | 44.7 | 52.2 | 976 | | all | 2020 | 45 to 64 | 50.6 | 47.6 | 53.6 | 2,014 | | all | 2024 | 45 to 64 | 51.8 | 47.9 | 55.7 | 1,236 | | all | 1952 | 65 and over | 36.7 | 28.9 | 44.4 | 150 | | all | 1956 | 65 and over | 43.9 | 35.9 | 51.9 | 148 | | all | 1960 | 65 and over | 39.2 | 29.9 | 48.4 | 148 | | all | 1964 | 65 and over | 55.3 | 47.6 | 63.1 | 159 | | all | 1968 | 65 and over | 45.1 | 37.2 | 53.0 | 153 | | all | 1972 | 65 and over | 31.9 | 25.9 | 37.9 | 235 | | all | 1976 | 65 and over | 49.4 | 43.0 | 55.8 | 245 | | all | 1980 | 65 and over | 46.3 | 38.9 | 53.7 | 175 | | all | 1984 | 65 and over | 42.9 | 36.5 | 49.3 | 233 | | all | 1988 | 65 and over | 47.9 | 41.4 | 54.3 | 234 | | all | 1992 | 65 and over | 60.4 | 54.8 | 66.0 | 296 | | all | 1996 | 65 and over | 60.6 | 54.0 | 67.3 | 248 | | all | 2000 | 65 and over | 54.2 | 47.0 | 61.4 | 228 | | all | 2004 | 65 and over | 52.1 | 43.2 | 61.0 | 146 | | all | 2008 | 65 and over | 44.9 | 37.9 | 52.0 | 294 | | all | 2012 | 65 and over | 46.9 | 42.7 | 51.0 | 983 | | all | 2016 | 65 and over | 46.4 | 41.9 | 50.8 | 679 | | all | 2020 | 65 and over | 52.7 | 49.6 | 55.8 | 1,883 | | all | 2024 | 65 and over | 57.4 | 53.7 | 61.1 | 1,390 | | ftf | 2012 | 18 to 29 | 63.2 | 53.8 | 72.6 | 225 | | ftf | 2012 | 30 to 44 | 58.0 | 51.0 | 65.0 | 376 | | ftf | 2016 | 30 to 44 | 68.4 | 59.7 | 77.2 | 144 | | ftf | 2012 | 45 to 64 | 51.7 | 45.6 | 57.9 | 474 | | ftf | 2016 | 45 to 64 | 51.0 | 43.8 | 58.3 | 281 | | ftf | 2024 | 45 to 64 | 45.8 | 37.0 | 54.7 | 224 | | ftf | 2012 | 65 and over | 41.5 | 33.1 | 49.9 | 221 | | ftf | 2016 | 65 and over | 45.2 | 36.9 | 53.5 | 216 | | ftf | 2024 | 65 and over | 54.9 | 46.6 | 63.2 | 255 | | web | 2012 | 18 to 29 | 62.3 | 55.0 | 69.6 | 276 | | web | 2016 | 18 to 29 | 66.7 | 58.9 | 74.5 | 210 | | web | 2012 | 30 to 44 | 54.4 | 49.1 | 59.7 | 528 | | web | 2016 | 30 to 44 | 59.7 | 54.3 | 65.1 | 426 | | web | 2024 | 30 to 44 | 55.4 | 48.4 | 62.4 | 314 | | web | 2012 | 45 to 64 | 52.6 | 49.0 | 56.1 | 1,286 | | web | 2016 | 45 to 64 | 47.6 | 43.3 | 51.9 | 703 | | web | 2024 | 45 to 64 | 57.6 | 51.3 | 63.9 | 410 | | web | 2012 | 65 and over | 49.5 | 44.8 | 54.1 | 762 | | web | 2016 | 65 and over | 47.4 | 42.3 | 52.5 | 473 | | web | 2024 | 65 and over | 59.8 | 53.4 | 66.2 | 407 | Views: All interviews (mode = all); Face to face (mode = ftf); Web (mode = web). Note: A cell is plotted only when it has 100 or more respondents and a Kish effective sample size (the sample size after weighting) of 100 or more, the floor of this chapter. A blank cell leaves a gap in the line. The youngest group falls below the floor in 3 elections (1960, 1996 and 2000). Note: The mode views use the face-to-face weight on face-to-face respondents and the web weight on web respondents. The 2020 study has no interview-mode weights and no in-person interviews, so the mode views leave 2020 open, and many youngest-group cells fall below the floor within a mode. Note: Age is top-coded at 80 in the 2020 and 2024 files, 649 two-party voters with no recorded age are outside every cell, and respondents under 18 (a handful in the file) are left out. Intervals are model based: they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering and stratification. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, presidential elections 1952-2024; weighted (post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise VCF0009z); two-party presidential voters Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/vote_by_age_anes.json ### Table 2. In every CES election from 2008 to 2020 the Democratic share was lower among voters forty-five to sixty-four than among voters thirty to forty-four, and lower again among voters sixty-five and older Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by age band (18 to 24, 25 to 29, 30 to 44, 45 to 64 and 65 and over), CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals | Weight | Election | Age band | Democratic share (%) | 95% interval low | 95% interval high | Voters | | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | standard | 2008 | 18 to 24 | 69.3 | 66.5 | 72.1 | 1,641 | | standard | 2012 | 18 to 24 | 62.2 | 58.8 | 65.6 | 1,633 | | standard | 2016 | 18 to 24 | 67.7 | 64.8 | 70.7 | 1,569 | | standard | 2020 | 18 to 24 | 70.5 | 67.6 | 73.4 | 1,795 | | standard | 2024 | 18 to 24 | 63.4 | 58.7 | 68.2 | 1,478 | | standard | 2008 | 25 to 29 | 64.3 | 61.7 | 67.0 | 1,686 | | standard | 2012 | 25 to 29 | 61.7 | 58.4 | 65.0 | 1,919 | | standard | 2016 | 25 to 29 | 64.0 | 61.5 | 66.6 | 2,449 | | standard | 2020 | 25 to 29 | 65.9 | 63.4 | 68.5 | 2,565 | | standard | 2024 | 25 to 29 | 58.5 | 54.5 | 62.4 | 1,604 | | standard | 2008 | 30 to 44 | 56.4 | 54.9 | 57.9 | 5,702 | | standard | 2012 | 30 to 44 | 58.8 | 56.9 | 60.7 | 4,370 | | standard | 2016 | 30 to 44 | 57.5 | 56.2 | 58.9 | 8,868 | | standard | 2020 | 30 to 44 | 61.5 | 60.2 | 62.7 | 9,870 | | standard | 2024 | 30 to 44 | 55.1 | 53.5 | 56.8 | 7,073 | | standard | 2008 | 45 to 64 | 50.6 | 49.4 | 51.7 | 10,079 | | standard | 2012 | 45 to 64 | 51.3 | 50.3 | 52.2 | 18,715 | | standard | 2016 | 45 to 64 | 47.4 | 46.5 | 48.3 | 18,133 | | standard | 2020 | 45 to 64 | 49.2 | 48.3 | 50.2 | 17,747 | | standard | 2024 | 45 to 64 | 43.9 | 42.8 | 45.1 | 16,848 | | standard | 2008 | 65 and over | 42.7 | 41.0 | 44.5 | 4,477 | | standard | 2012 | 65 and over | 43.2 | 41.9 | 44.6 | 11,152 | | standard | 2016 | 65 and over | 42.8 | 41.3 | 44.3 | 9,872 | | standard | 2020 | 65 and over | 45.6 | 44.4 | 46.8 | 11,895 | | standard | 2024 | 65 and over | 45.5 | 44.4 | 46.7 | 15,005 | | validated | 2020 | 18 to 24 | 70.4 | 67.0 | 73.9 | 1,180 | | validated | 2024 | 18 to 24 | 68.7 | 62.9 | 74.6 | 530 | | validated | 2020 | 25 to 29 | 67.9 | 64.8 | 70.9 | 1,736 | | validated | 2024 | 25 to 29 | 62.3 | 57.5 | 67.0 | 873 | | validated | 2020 | 30 to 44 | 62.8 | 61.4 | 64.1 | 7,532 | | validated | 2024 | 30 to 44 | 57.0 | 55.2 | 58.7 | 5,208 | | validated | 2020 | 45 to 64 | 48.7 | 47.7 | 49.7 | 14,897 | | validated | 2024 | 45 to 64 | 45.9 | 44.8 | 47.0 | 13,637 | | validated | 2020 | 65 and over | 46.1 | 44.8 | 47.4 | 10,401 | | validated | 2024 | 65 and over | 41.6 | 40.4 | 42.9 | 12,700 | Views: Standard weight, all voters (weight = standard); Validated-voter weight, matched voters (weight = validated). Note: The CES holds far more young voters than the ANES, so no cell falls below the floor. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals describe sampling variation among panel members and leave out how respondents joined the panel. Note: Intervals are model based: they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering and stratification. Source: CES Cumulative File, presidential elections 2008-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/vote_by_age_ces.json ### Table 3. Between 2020 and 2024 the CES age gap in the vote changed by −7.1 points among all voters and by −0.6, an interval that includes zero, among matched voters Democratic share of two-party voters aged 18 to 29 minus the share among voters aged 65 and over, ANES 1952 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals | Measure | Survey and weight | Year | Gap (points) | 95% interval low | 95% interval high | Respondents in the two groups | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | vote | ANES | 1952 | +5.6 | −4.9 | +16.2 | 332 | | vote | ANES | 1956 | −1.8 | −12.6 | +9.0 | 326 | | vote | ANES | 1960 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | vote | ANES | 1964 | +16.9 | +6.6 | +27.3 | 325 | | vote | ANES | 1968 | −0.2 | −11.7 | +11.3 | 291 | | vote | ANES | 1972 | +15.3 | +7.6 | +23.1 | 637 | | vote | ANES | 1976 | +3.1 | −5.7 | +11.9 | 517 | | vote | ANES | 1980 | −5.1 | −15.6 | +5.4 | 345 | | vote | ANES | 1984 | +0.3 | −8.5 | +9.1 | 490 | | vote | ANES | 1988 | −0.1 | −9.8 | +9.6 | 416 | | vote | ANES | 1992 | +2.9 | −5.9 | +11.8 | 488 | | vote | ANES | 1996 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | vote | ANES | 2000 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | vote | ANES | 2004 | +13.9 | +1.4 | +26.3 | 283 | | vote | ANES | 2008 | +22.6 | +12.2 | +33.0 | 516 | | vote | ANES | 2012 | +15.7 | +8.6 | +22.8 | 1,484 | | vote | ANES | 2016 | +15.5 | +7.2 | +23.7 | 978 | | vote | ANES | 2020 | +17.0 | +11.0 | +23.1 | 2,471 | | vote | ANES | 2024 | −1.1 | −9.4 | +7.1 | 1,675 | | vote | CES | 2008 | +24.5 | +21.8 | +27.1 | 7,804 | | vote | CES | 2012 | +18.7 | +16.0 | +21.4 | 14,704 | | vote | CES | 2016 | +22.9 | +20.4 | +25.3 | 13,890 | | vote | CES | 2020 | +22.2 | +19.9 | +24.4 | 16,255 | | vote | CES | 2024 | +15.0 | +11.8 | +18.3 | 18,087 | | vote | CES, matched voters, validated-voter weight | 2020 | +22.8 | +20.1 | +25.4 | 13,317 | | vote | CES, matched voters, validated-voter weight | 2024 | +23.0 | +19.1 | +26.9 | 14,103 | | mode | ANES, all interviews | 2008 | +22.6 | +12.2 | +33.0 | 516 | | mode | ANES, all interviews | 2012 | +15.7 | +8.6 | +22.8 | 1,484 | | mode | ANES, all interviews | 2016 | +15.5 | +7.2 | +23.7 | 978 | | mode | ANES, all interviews | 2020 | +17.0 | +11.0 | +23.1 | 2,471 | | mode | ANES, all interviews | 2024 | −1.1 | −9.4 | +7.1 | 1,675 | | mode | ANES, face to face | 2012 | +21.7 | +9.2 | +34.3 | 446 | | mode | ANES, web | 2012 | +12.8 | +4.2 | +21.5 | 1,038 | | mode | ANES, web | 2016 | +19.3 | +10.0 | +28.7 | 683 | | weight | CES, standard weight | 2008 | +24.5 | +21.8 | +27.1 | 7,804 | | weight | CES, standard weight | 2012 | +18.7 | +16.0 | +21.4 | 14,704 | | weight | CES, standard weight | 2016 | +22.9 | +20.4 | +25.3 | 13,890 | | weight | CES, standard weight | 2020 | +22.2 | +19.9 | +24.4 | 16,255 | | weight | CES, standard weight | 2024 | +15.0 | +11.8 | +18.3 | 18,087 | | weight | CES, post-election weight | 2012 | +19.9 | +17.2 | +22.6 | 14,704 | | weight | CES, post-election weight | 2016 | +22.4 | +19.7 | +25.0 | 13,890 | | weight | CES, post-election weight | 2020 | +20.4 | +17.9 | +22.9 | 16,254 | | weight | CES, matched voters, validated-voter weight | 2020 | +22.8 | +20.1 | +25.4 | 13,317 | | weight | CES, matched voters, validated-voter weight | 2024 | +23.0 | +19.1 | +26.9 | 14,103 | | pid | ANES | 1952 | +10.2 | +1.4 | +19.0 | 486 | | pid | ANES | 1956 | +8.5 | −0.9 | +18.0 | 438 | | pid | ANES | 1960 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | pid | ANES | 1964 | +17.7 | +9.0 | +26.3 | 472 | | pid | ANES | 1968 | +0.2 | −8.6 | +9.1 | 469 | | pid | ANES | 1972 | +7.5 | +1.2 | +13.8 | 973 | | pid | ANES | 1976 | +7.1 | +0.3 | +13.9 | 825 | | pid | ANES | 1980 | −2.6 | −10.6 | +5.4 | 588 | | pid | ANES | 1984 | +4.8 | −2.1 | +11.7 | 815 | | pid | ANES | 1988 | −5.3 | −12.6 | +2.1 | 704 | | pid | ANES | 1992 | −6.1 | −12.8 | +0.7 | 832 | | pid | ANES | 1996 | +0.6 | −8.6 | +9.8 | 548 | | pid | ANES | 2000 | +1.7 | −7.8 | +11.1 | 505 | | pid | ANES | 2004 | +8.9 | −1.8 | +19.6 | 393 | | pid | ANES | 2008 | +13.1 | +4.1 | +22.0 | 711 | | pid | ANES | 2012 | +7.0 | +0.9 | +13.2 | 1,853 | | pid | ANES | 2016 | +10.2 | +3.8 | +16.6 | 1,395 | | pid | ANES | 2020 | +14.5 | +9.2 | +19.8 | 2,883 | | pid | ANES | 2024 | +1.9 | −4.7 | +8.6 | 2,110 | | pid | CES | 2006 | +16.3 | +14.2 | +18.4 | 9,392 | | pid | CES | 2008 | +19.9 | +17.6 | +22.3 | 9,848 | | pid | CES | 2010 | +21.3 | +18.7 | +23.9 | 15,016 | | pid | CES | 2012 | +17.5 | +15.2 | +19.7 | 17,855 | | pid | CES | 2014 | +14.5 | +12.1 | +16.9 | 17,157 | | pid | CES | 2016 | +14.3 | +12.3 | +16.4 | 18,625 | | pid | CES | 2018 | +17.2 | +15.1 | +19.3 | 20,577 | | pid | CES | 2020 | +14.9 | +12.9 | +17.0 | 20,364 | | pid | CES | 2022 | +21.1 | +19.0 | +23.3 | 20,148 | | pid | CES | 2024 | +13.9 | +11.2 | +16.5 | 22,842 | Views: Vote (group = vote); CES vote by weight (group = weight); ANES vote by interview mode (group = mode); Party identification (group = pid). Note: A cell is plotted only when it has 100 or more respondents and a Kish effective sample size (the sample size after weighting) of 100 or more, the floor of this chapter. A blank cell leaves a gap in the line. Three ANES elections (1960, 1996 and 2000) have too few voters under thirty for a published gap and show a break in the line. Note: The matched-voter series uses voters with a validated-voter weight, the CES weight for voters whose registration was matched to voter-file records (validated registered voters), which exists for 2018 to 2024 in the file. In 2020 it is a constant multiple of the standard weight. The post-election weight exists for 2012, 2016 and 2020. Note: In the mode view the face-to-face gap for 2016 and the face-to-face and web gaps for 2024 fall below the floor and are not drawn. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals describe sampling variation among panel members and leave out how respondents joined the panel. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, presidential elections 1952-2024; weighted (post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise VCF0009z); two-party presidential voters; CES weighted (weight_cumulative; vvweight for the matched-voter series) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/age_gap.json ### Table 4. Among party identifiers in the CES the youngest group was more Democratic than the oldest in every wave from 2006 to 2024 Democratic share of party identifiers (leaners included) by age group, CES even-year waves 2006 to 2024; the ANES view covers presidential-election years 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals | Survey | Year | Age group | Democratic share (%) | 95% interval low | 95% interval high | Identifiers | | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ces | 2006 | 18 to 29 | 63.9 | 62.3 | 65.5 | 3,805 | | ces | 2008 | 18 to 29 | 67.1 | 65.4 | 68.8 | 4,827 | | ces | 2010 | 18 to 29 | 63.9 | 61.8 | 65.9 | 4,218 | | ces | 2012 | 18 to 29 | 65.8 | 64.0 | 67.7 | 6,229 | | ces | 2014 | 18 to 29 | 59.1 | 57.4 | 60.8 | 7,389 | | ces | 2016 | 18 to 29 | 62.8 | 61.5 | 64.2 | 8,667 | | ces | 2018 | 18 to 29 | 61.9 | 60.3 | 63.5 | 9,327 | | ces | 2020 | 18 to 29 | 60.3 | 58.7 | 61.9 | 8,824 | | ces | 2022 | 18 to 29 | 63.8 | 62.1 | 65.5 | 7,083 | | ces | 2024 | 18 to 29 | 60.3 | 57.9 | 62.7 | 7,167 | | ces | 2006 | 30 to 44 | 52.7 | 51.6 | 53.9 | 8,096 | | ces | 2008 | 30 to 44 | 58.2 | 56.8 | 59.6 | 7,118 | | ces | 2010 | 30 to 44 | 56.5 | 55.0 | 58.0 | 8,104 | | ces | 2012 | 30 to 44 | 63.6 | 62.0 | 65.2 | 6,253 | | ces | 2014 | 30 to 44 | 57.3 | 55.8 | 58.8 | 7,695 | | ces | 2016 | 30 to 44 | 60.7 | 59.6 | 61.8 | 13,395 | | ces | 2018 | 30 to 44 | 60.2 | 59.0 | 61.5 | 11,724 | | ces | 2020 | 30 to 44 | 59.2 | 58.0 | 60.4 | 11,969 | | ces | 2022 | 30 to 44 | 59.6 | 58.3 | 60.9 | 11,526 | | ces | 2024 | 30 to 44 | 57.8 | 56.2 | 59.4 | 9,128 | | ces | 2006 | 45 to 64 | 50.1 | 49.2 | 51.0 | 14,304 | | ces | 2008 | 45 to 64 | 53.8 | 52.7 | 54.9 | 11,634 | | ces | 2010 | 45 to 64 | 52.5 | 51.6 | 53.4 | 24,741 | | ces | 2012 | 45 to 64 | 56.0 | 55.1 | 56.9 | 21,739 | | ces | 2014 | 45 to 64 | 51.5 | 50.5 | 52.5 | 19,924 | | ces | 2016 | 45 to 64 | 52.6 | 51.7 | 53.5 | 19,966 | | ces | 2018 | 45 to 64 | 50.2 | 49.1 | 51.2 | 17,026 | | ces | 2020 | 45 to 64 | 49.6 | 48.6 | 50.6 | 17,436 | | ces | 2022 | 45 to 64 | 48.8 | 47.8 | 49.8 | 17,846 | | ces | 2024 | 45 to 64 | 45.4 | 44.2 | 46.5 | 18,877 | | ces | 2006 | 65 and over | 47.6 | 46.2 | 49.0 | 5,587 | | ces | 2008 | 65 and over | 47.2 | 45.5 | 48.9 | 5,021 | | ces | 2010 | 65 and over | 42.6 | 40.9 | 44.2 | 10,798 | | ces | 2012 | 65 and over | 48.4 | 47.0 | 49.7 | 11,626 | | ces | 2014 | 65 and over | 44.6 | 42.9 | 46.3 | 9,768 | | ces | 2016 | 65 and over | 48.5 | 47.0 | 50.0 | 9,958 | | ces | 2018 | 65 and over | 44.7 | 43.4 | 46.1 | 11,250 | | ces | 2020 | 65 and over | 45.3 | 44.0 | 46.6 | 11,540 | | ces | 2022 | 65 and over | 42.6 | 41.4 | 43.9 | 13,065 | | ces | 2024 | 65 and over | 46.4 | 45.2 | 47.6 | 15,675 | | anes | 1952 | 18 to 29 | 65.1 | 59.6 | 70.7 | 284 | | anes | 1956 | 18 to 29 | 60.8 | 54.8 | 66.7 | 260 | | anes | 1960 | 18 to 29 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | anes | 1964 | 18 to 29 | 70.9 | 65.3 | 76.5 | 254 | | anes | 1968 | 18 to 29 | 61.7 | 55.4 | 68.0 | 230 | | anes | 1972 | 18 to 29 | 63.0 | 59.1 | 66.9 | 589 | | anes | 1976 | 18 to 29 | 65.1 | 60.7 | 69.5 | 461 | | anes | 1980 | 18 to 29 | 59.8 | 54.5 | 65.0 | 333 | | anes | 1984 | 18 to 29 | 56.3 | 51.8 | 60.9 | 458 | | anes | 1988 | 18 to 29 | 50.7 | 45.6 | 55.7 | 375 | | anes | 1992 | 18 to 29 | 54.4 | 49.5 | 59.3 | 399 | | anes | 1996 | 18 to 29 | 60.1 | 53.1 | 67.2 | 225 | | anes | 2000 | 18 to 29 | 61.7 | 54.6 | 68.8 | 225 | | anes | 2004 | 18 to 29 | 66.4 | 59.3 | 73.5 | 212 | | anes | 2008 | 18 to 29 | 66.1 | 59.7 | 72.4 | 342 | | anes | 2012 | 18 to 29 | 57.5 | 52.7 | 62.2 | 774 | | anes | 2016 | 18 to 29 | 59.9 | 54.9 | 64.9 | 540 | | anes | 2020 | 18 to 29 | 63.9 | 59.4 | 68.4 | 841 | | anes | 2024 | 18 to 29 | 55.9 | 50.3 | 61.6 | 493 | | anes | 1952 | 30 to 44 | 67.4 | 63.6 | 71.2 | 589 | | anes | 1956 | 30 to 44 | 61.4 | 57.4 | 65.3 | 590 | | anes | 1960 | 30 to 44 | 62.4 | 56.6 | 68.3 | 363 | | anes | 1964 | 30 to 44 | 68.2 | 63.9 | 72.6 | 444 | | anes | 1968 | 30 to 44 | 65.5 | 60.8 | 70.1 | 411 | | anes | 1972 | 30 to 44 | 58.9 | 54.9 | 63.0 | 565 | | anes | 1976 | 30 to 44 | 58.9 | 54.2 | 63.5 | 453 | | anes | 1980 | 30 to 44 | 61.8 | 57.0 | 66.7 | 380 | | anes | 1984 | 30 to 44 | 50.7 | 46.7 | 54.6 | 606 | | anes | 1988 | 30 to 44 | 52.5 | 48.5 | 56.4 | 612 | | anes | 1992 | 30 to 44 | 56.0 | 52.4 | 59.6 | 748 | | anes | 1996 | 30 to 44 | 55.9 | 51.3 | 60.4 | 548 | | anes | 2000 | 30 to 44 | 53.0 | 48.3 | 57.7 | 519 | | anes | 2004 | 30 to 44 | 49.8 | 43.4 | 56.2 | 273 | | anes | 2008 | 30 to 44 | 58.4 | 53.1 | 63.8 | 540 | | anes | 2012 | 30 to 44 | 55.0 | 51.3 | 58.8 | 1,142 | | anes | 2016 | 30 to 44 | 60.5 | 56.7 | 64.4 | 876 | | anes | 2020 | 30 to 44 | 55.3 | 52.3 | 58.3 | 1,739 | | anes | 2024 | 30 to 44 | 51.7 | 47.6 | 55.7 | 1,190 | | anes | 1952 | 45 to 64 | 58.4 | 54.1 | 62.7 | 510 | | anes | 1956 | 45 to 64 | 52.0 | 47.6 | 56.5 | 488 | | anes | 1960 | 45 to 64 | 57.4 | 51.6 | 63.1 | 388 | | anes | 1964 | 45 to 64 | 69.5 | 65.4 | 73.6 | 495 | | anes | 1968 | 45 to 64 | 61.6 | 57.2 | 65.9 | 484 | | anes | 1972 | 45 to 64 | 60.9 | 57.4 | 64.4 | 739 | | anes | 1976 | 45 to 64 | 60.9 | 56.9 | 65.0 | 588 | | anes | 1980 | 45 to 64 | 61.9 | 57.1 | 66.7 | 399 | | anes | 1984 | 45 to 64 | 59.8 | 55.5 | 64.0 | 507 | | anes | 1988 | 45 to 64 | 55.5 | 50.9 | 60.0 | 456 | | anes | 1992 | 45 to 64 | 57.6 | 53.5 | 61.6 | 574 | | anes | 1996 | 45 to 64 | 56.4 | 51.4 | 61.4 | 451 | | anes | 2000 | 45 to 64 | 58.0 | 53.4 | 62.6 | 536 | | anes | 2004 | 45 to 64 | 50.9 | 45.6 | 56.2 | 408 | | anes | 2008 | 45 to 64 | 55.6 | 51.2 | 60.1 | 730 | | anes | 2012 | 45 to 64 | 53.6 | 50.7 | 56.5 | 2,052 | | anes | 2016 | 45 to 64 | 49.5 | 46.3 | 52.7 | 1,306 | | anes | 2020 | 45 to 64 | 47.5 | 44.9 | 50.1 | 2,399 | | anes | 2024 | 45 to 64 | 48.9 | 45.3 | 52.4 | 1,559 | | anes | 1952 | 65 and over | 55.0 | 48.1 | 61.8 | 202 | | anes | 1956 | 65 and over | 52.2 | 44.9 | 59.6 | 178 | | anes | 1960 | 65 and over | 49.6 | 41.2 | 58.1 | 184 | | anes | 1964 | 65 and over | 53.2 | 46.6 | 59.8 | 218 | | anes | 1968 | 65 and over | 61.5 | 55.3 | 67.7 | 239 | | anes | 1972 | 65 and over | 55.5 | 50.5 | 60.4 | 384 | | anes | 1976 | 65 and over | 57.9 | 52.8 | 63.1 | 364 | | anes | 1980 | 65 and over | 62.4 | 56.4 | 68.3 | 255 | | anes | 1984 | 65 and over | 51.5 | 46.3 | 56.7 | 357 | | anes | 1988 | 65 and over | 55.9 | 50.6 | 61.3 | 329 | | anes | 1992 | 65 and over | 60.5 | 55.9 | 65.1 | 433 | | anes | 1996 | 65 and over | 59.5 | 53.7 | 65.3 | 323 | | anes | 2000 | 65 and over | 60.0 | 53.7 | 66.3 | 280 | | anes | 2004 | 65 and over | 57.5 | 49.5 | 65.5 | 181 | | anes | 2008 | 65 and over | 53.0 | 46.7 | 59.3 | 369 | | anes | 2012 | 65 and over | 50.4 | 46.5 | 54.4 | 1,079 | | anes | 2016 | 65 and over | 49.7 | 45.8 | 53.7 | 855 | | anes | 2020 | 65 and over | 49.4 | 46.5 | 52.3 | 2,042 | | anes | 2024 | 65 and over | 54.0 | 50.5 | 57.5 | 1,617 | Views: CES (survey = ces); ANES (survey = anes). Note: A cell is plotted only when it has 100 or more respondents and a Kish effective sample size (the sample size after weighting) of 100 or more, the floor of this chapter. A blank cell leaves a gap in the line. Party identification counts Democrats and Republicans with leaners included and leaves out pure independents. Note: The ANES estimates for 2012, 2016 and 2024 mix face-to-face and web interviews and the 2020 study has no interview-mode weights. In 2024 the web sample alone gives a gap of +1.1. Note: The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals describe sampling variation among panel members and leave out how respondents joined the panel. Intervals are model based: they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering and stratification. Source: CES Cumulative File, even-year waves 2006-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); party identifiers, leaners included; the ANES view: ANES Cumulative Data File, presidential-election years 1952-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); party identifiers, leaners included Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/pid_by_age.json ### Table 5. The cohorts born 1943 to 1958 and 1975 to 1990 began with a Democratic lead over other voters in the ANES and held a smaller one in 2024 Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among voters in each birth cohort minus the share among voters born in other years, points, ANES 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals; the buttons switch survey and measure | Survey | Birth cohort | Election | Democratic share (%) | 95% interval low | 95% interval high | Lead over other voters (points) | 95% interval low (lead) | 95% interval high (lead) | Voters | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | anes | Born 1895 to 1910 | 1952 | 38.9 | 33.9 | 43.8 | −4.6 | −10.7 | +1.4 | 373 | | anes | Born 1895 to 1910 | 1956 | 39.3 | 34.2 | 44.4 | −1.4 | −7.5 | +4.6 | 354 | | anes | Born 1895 to 1910 | 1960 | 49.5 | 42.4 | 56.6 | +0.4 | −8.1 | +8.9 | 261 | | anes | Born 1895 to 1910 | 1964 | 65.9 | 60.1 | 71.7 | −2.1 | −8.6 | +4.5 | 261 | | anes | Born 1895 to 1910 | 1968 | 46.1 | 39.0 | 53.2 | −0.2 | −8.2 | +7.7 | 191 | | anes | Born 1895 to 1910 | 1972 | 32.0 | 26.3 | 37.8 | −4.5 | −10.8 | +1.9 | 253 | | anes | Born 1895 to 1910 | 1976 | 52.3 | 45.2 | 59.3 | +1.4 | −6.3 | +9.0 | 202 | | anes | Born 1895 to 1910 | 1980 | 50.0 | 40.2 | 59.8 | +7.1 | −3.3 | +17.4 | 102 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1952 | 46.8 | 42.2 | 51.4 | +7.8 | +2.0 | +13.6 | 453 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1956 | 41.1 | 36.8 | 45.3 | +1.4 | −4.2 | +6.9 | 516 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1960 | 51.2 | 45.2 | 57.1 | +3.3 | −4.6 | +11.1 | 372 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1964 | 68.6 | 64.0 | 73.1 | +1.7 | −4.0 | +7.4 | 401 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1968 | 43.1 | 37.6 | 48.6 | −4.8 | −11.6 | +2.0 | 313 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1972 | 29.6 | 25.3 | 33.9 | −8.4 | −13.6 | −3.3 | 432 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1976 | 53.1 | 47.9 | 58.4 | +2.7 | −3.4 | +8.9 | 363 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1980 | 46.9 | 40.3 | 53.4 | +4.2 | −3.4 | +11.7 | 224 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1984 | 44.4 | 38.5 | 50.2 | +3.2 | −3.4 | +9.8 | 275 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1988 | 44.3 | 37.8 | 50.8 | −3.5 | −10.7 | +3.7 | 228 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1992 | 61.9 | 55.7 | 68.1 | +4.1 | −2.8 | +11.0 | 237 | | anes | Born 1911 to 1926 | 1996 | 64.0 | 56.0 | 72.0 | +6.5 | −2.4 | +15.3 | 163 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 1956 | 42.1 | 34.9 | 49.4 | +2.2 | −5.7 | +10.0 | 178 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 1960 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 1964 | 70.5 | 65.6 | 75.3 | +4.3 | −1.6 | +10.2 | 342 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 1968 | 50.4 | 44.5 | 56.2 | +6.0 | −1.0 | +13.0 | 284 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 1972 | 34.8 | 30.3 | 39.2 | −1.4 | −6.6 | +3.8 | 446 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 1976 | 47.2 | 41.9 | 52.6 | −5.3 | −11.5 | +1.0 | 351 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 1980 | 38.4 | 32.0 | 44.8 | −7.2 | −14.7 | +0.2 | 224 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 1984 | 40.4 | 35.0 | 45.8 | −1.8 | −8.0 | +4.4 | 319 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 1988 | 48.9 | 43.0 | 54.8 | +2.3 | −4.4 | +9.1 | 276 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 1992 | 56.0 | 50.3 | 61.8 | −3.2 | −9.6 | +3.3 | 289 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 1996 | 55.9 | 49.0 | 62.9 | −3.1 | −11.0 | +4.8 | 230 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2000 | 48.4 | 41.2 | 55.6 | −4.7 | −12.8 | +3.4 | 226 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2004 | 50.5 | 42.3 | 58.8 | +0.9 | −8.4 | +10.1 | 170 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2008 | 41.2 | 33.1 | 49.2 | −16.4 | −25.1 | −7.7 | 224 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2012 | 43.8 | 38.1 | 49.4 | −11.2 | −17.3 | −5.2 | 520 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2016 | 40.9 | 33.4 | 48.3 | −13.3 | −21.1 | −5.4 | 256 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2020 | 47.5 | 40.9 | 54.2 | −9.2 | −16.1 | −2.3 | 415 | | anes | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2024 | 59.0 | 49.3 | 68.6 | +4.6 | −5.3 | +14.6 | 204 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1972 | 47.4 | 42.5 | 52.3 | +15.6 | +10.1 | +21.2 | 403 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1976 | 53.0 | 47.8 | 58.1 | +2.7 | −3.4 | +8.8 | 378 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1980 | 41.3 | 35.5 | 47.1 | −3.6 | −10.7 | +3.5 | 276 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1984 | 41.0 | 36.8 | 45.2 | −1.3 | −6.7 | +4.1 | 529 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1988 | 47.0 | 42.4 | 51.6 | −0.2 | −6.0 | +5.7 | 449 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1992 | 58.5 | 53.9 | 63.0 | −0.1 | −5.6 | +5.5 | 453 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 1996 | 58.0 | 52.2 | 63.9 | −0.5 | −7.7 | +6.6 | 336 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2000 | 53.3 | 47.8 | 58.8 | +1.6 | −5.3 | +8.4 | 380 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2004 | 44.0 | 37.3 | 50.7 | −8.3 | −16.4 | −0.2 | 259 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2008 | 53.5 | 47.8 | 59.3 | −2.2 | −9.0 | +4.7 | 451 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2012 | 50.6 | 47.2 | 54.1 | −4.3 | −8.5 | 0.0 | 1,481 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2016 | 48.1 | 44.0 | 52.2 | −6.8 | −11.8 | −1.8 | 802 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2020 | 53.9 | 50.7 | 57.1 | −3.1 | −6.9 | +0.8 | 1,835 | | anes | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2024 | 56.7 | 52.7 | 60.7 | +2.7 | −2.1 | +7.5 | 1,155 | | anes | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1984 | 42.4 | 34.5 | 50.3 | +0.6 | −7.7 | +9.0 | 151 | | anes | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1988 | 48.3 | 40.9 | 55.7 | +1.4 | −6.6 | +9.4 | 176 | | anes | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1992 | 58.5 | 53.1 | 63.8 | −0.1 | −6.2 | +6.1 | 330 | | anes | Born 1959 to 1974 | 1996 | 57.6 | 51.0 | 64.2 | −1.1 | −8.8 | +6.6 | 263 | | anes | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2000 | 46.5 | 40.6 | 52.4 | −8.2 | −15.2 | −1.1 | 328 | | anes | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2004 | 45.2 | 38.0 | 52.4 | −6.5 | −14.9 | +2.0 | 211 | | anes | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2008 | 55.7 | 50.0 | 61.3 | +0.8 | −6.0 | +7.6 | 462 | | anes | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2012 | 53.9 | 50.1 | 57.7 | +0.4 | −4.1 | +4.9 | 1,171 | | anes | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2016 | 49.8 | 45.3 | 54.2 | −4.4 | −9.7 | +0.8 | 664 | | anes | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2020 | 50.2 | 46.9 | 53.6 | −8.5 | −12.4 | −4.5 | 1,561 | | anes | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2024 | 50.6 | 46.4 | 54.8 | −5.5 | −10.5 | −0.5 | 1,061 | | anes | Born 1975 to 1990 | 2004 | 66.0 | 57.3 | 74.7 | +19.7 | +10.1 | +29.3 | 137 | | anes | Born 1975 to 1990 | 2008 | 64.9 | 58.5 | 71.4 | +13.1 | +5.7 | +20.4 | 337 | | anes | Born 1975 to 1990 | 2012 | 60.0 | 55.5 | 64.6 | +8.5 | +3.4 | +13.5 | 827 | | anes | Born 1975 to 1990 | 2016 | 62.8 | 58.2 | 67.4 | +12.7 | +7.4 | +18.1 | 604 | | anes | Born 1975 to 1990 | 2020 | 58.4 | 55.1 | 61.8 | +2.9 | −1.0 | +6.9 | 1,454 | | anes | Born 1975 to 1990 | 2024 | 55.6 | 51.3 | 60.0 | +1.5 | −3.7 | +6.6 | 964 | | anes | Born 1991 or later | 2016 | 62.9 | 54.2 | 71.6 | +11.2 | +2.1 | +20.2 | 177 | | anes | Born 1991 or later | 2020 | 69.6 | 64.3 | 74.9 | +15.9 | +10.4 | +21.5 | 573 | | anes | Born 1991 or later | 2024 | 55.1 | 49.0 | 61.1 | +0.7 | −5.9 | +7.2 | 452 | | ces | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2008 | 42.2 | 40.3 | 44.0 | −13.8 | −15.8 | −11.7 | 3,830 | | ces | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2012 | 40.7 | 38.9 | 42.5 | −13.8 | −15.8 | −11.8 | 5,912 | | ces | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2016 | 38.0 | 35.6 | 40.5 | −14.1 | −16.7 | −11.6 | 3,561 | | ces | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2020 | 36.8 | 34.2 | 39.4 | −16.6 | −19.3 | −14.0 | 2,320 | | ces | Born 1927 to 1942 | 2024 | 35.4 | 31.8 | 39.0 | −13.9 | −17.5 | −10.2 | 1,150 | | ces | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2008 | 50.8 | 49.5 | 52.1 | −4.3 | −5.9 | −2.7 | 7,691 | | ces | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2012 | 49.2 | 48.2 | 50.2 | −5.9 | −7.3 | −4.4 | 17,779 | | ces | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2016 | 46.4 | 45.2 | 47.5 | −6.9 | −8.3 | −5.5 | 13,874 | | ces | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2020 | 48.1 | 46.9 | 49.3 | −6.4 | −7.8 | −5.0 | 12,855 | | ces | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2024 | 46.3 | 45.1 | 47.6 | −3.5 | −5.1 | −2.0 | 12,790 | | ces | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2008 | 52.7 | 51.4 | 54.1 | −1.7 | −3.3 | 0.0 | 7,281 | | ces | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2012 | 53.4 | 51.9 | 54.8 | +0.4 | −1.3 | +2.1 | 8,300 | | ces | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2016 | 48.2 | 47.0 | 49.3 | −3.9 | −5.3 | −2.5 | 12,150 | | ces | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2020 | 48.9 | 47.8 | 49.9 | −5.3 | −6.6 | −4.0 | 13,938 | | ces | Born 1959 to 1974 | 2024 | 42.9 | 41.7 | 44.1 | −9.0 | −10.5 | −7.5 | 15,336 | | ces | Born 1975 to 1990 | 2008 | 66.3 | 64.6 | 68.0 | +16.6 | +14.7 | +18.5 | 4,555 | | ces | Born 1975 to 1990 | 2012 | 62.5 | 60.6 | 64.4 | +12.4 | +10.3 | +14.4 | 4,875 | | ces | Born 1975 to 1990 | 2016 | 60.3 | 59.0 | 61.6 | +12.2 | +10.7 | +13.7 | 9,329 | | ces | Born 1975 to 1990 | 2020 | 61.3 | 60.1 | 62.5 | +11.3 | +9.9 | +12.7 | 10,393 | | ces | Born 1975 to 1990 | 2024 | 54.6 | 53.0 | 56.2 | +7.5 | +5.7 | +9.3 | 8,460 | | ces | Born 1991 or later | 2012 | 58.8 | 53.8 | 63.9 | +6.0 | +0.9 | +11.2 | 758 | | ces | Born 1991 or later | 2016 | 67.7 | 65.0 | 70.4 | +18.0 | +15.2 | +20.8 | 1,925 | | ces | Born 1991 or later | 2020 | 67.8 | 65.9 | 69.7 | +16.9 | +14.8 | +18.9 | 4,360 | | ces | Born 1991 or later | 2024 | 59.0 | 56.5 | 61.6 | +11.9 | +9.3 | +14.6 | 4,272 | Views: ANES, lead over other voters (panel = anes); ANES, Democratic share (panel = anes); CES, lead over other voters (panel = ces); CES, Democratic share (panel = ces). Note: Cohorts are the 16-year birth groups of the ANES cumulative file, and the CES uses the same groups from reported birth year. Cohort cells include every voter with a known cohort, whether or not the age is known. A cell is plotted only when it has 100 or more respondents and a Kish effective sample size (the sample size after weighting) of 100 or more, the floor of this chapter. A blank cell leaves a gap in the line. Note: The comparison group is every other voter in the same election with a known cohort, so the cohort and the comparison group are different respondents. The measure removes anything that moves all voters together in an election, and it does not remove the effect of age or the changing make-up of the comparison group. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals describe sampling variation among panel members and leave out how respondents joined the panel. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, presidential elections 1952-2024; weighted (post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise VCF0009z); two-party presidential voters; CES view: CES Cumulative File, presidential elections 2008-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/cohort_lines.json ### Table 6. The vote lead of the 1975 to 1990 cohort over other voters changed by −18.2 points in the ANES between 2004 and 2024 and by −9.1 in the CES between 2008 and 2024 Democratic share of a cohort's two-party voters minus the share among voters born in other years, first and last cell with enough voters; ANES presidential elections 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals; the buttons switch survey and measure | Measure | Birth cohort and cells | Lead in first cell (points) | 95% interval low (first) | 95% interval high (first) | Lead in last cell (points) | 95% interval low (last) | 95% interval high (last) | Change (points) | Respondents, first cell | Respondents, last cell | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | anes_vote | Born 1895 to 1910 (1952 to 1980) | −4.6 | −10.7 | +1.4 | +7.1 | −3.3 | +17.4 | +11.7 | 373 | 102 | | anes_vote | Born 1911 to 1926 (1952 to 1996) | +7.8 | +2.0 | +13.6 | +6.5 | −2.4 | +15.3 | −1.4 | 453 | 163 | | anes_vote | Born 1927 to 1942 (1956 to 2024) | +2.2 | −5.7 | +10.0 | +4.6 | −5.3 | +14.6 | +2.5 | 178 | 204 | | anes_vote | Born 1943 to 1958 (1972 to 2024) | +15.6 | +10.1 | +21.2 | +2.7 | −2.1 | +7.5 | −12.9 | 403 | 1,155 | | anes_vote | Born 1959 to 1974 (1984 to 2024) | +0.6 | −7.7 | +9.0 | −5.5 | −10.5 | −0.5 | −6.1 | 151 | 1,061 | | anes_vote | Born 1975 to 1990 (2004 to 2024) | +19.7 | +10.1 | +29.3 | +1.5 | −3.7 | +6.6 | −18.2 | 137 | 964 | | anes_vote | Born 1991 or later (2016 to 2024) | +11.2 | +2.1 | +20.2 | +0.7 | −5.9 | +7.2 | −10.5 | 177 | 452 | | ces_vote | Born 1927 to 1942 (2008 to 2024) | −13.8 | −15.8 | −11.7 | −13.9 | −17.5 | −10.2 | −0.1 | 3,830 | 1,150 | | ces_vote | Born 1943 to 1958 (2008 to 2024) | −4.3 | −5.9 | −2.7 | −3.5 | −5.1 | −2.0 | +0.8 | 7,691 | 12,790 | | ces_vote | Born 1959 to 1974 (2008 to 2024) | −1.7 | −3.3 | 0.0 | −9.0 | −10.5 | −7.5 | −7.3 | 7,281 | 15,336 | | ces_vote | Born 1975 to 1990 (2008 to 2024) | +16.6 | +14.7 | +18.5 | +7.5 | +5.7 | +9.3 | −9.1 | 4,555 | 8,460 | | ces_vote | Born 1991 or later (2012 to 2024) | +6.0 | +0.9 | +11.2 | +11.9 | +9.3 | +14.6 | +5.9 | 758 | 4,272 | | anes_pid | Born 1895 to 1910 (1952 to 1988) | −1.7 | −6.9 | +3.5 | −0.5 | −10.6 | +9.6 | +1.2 | 484 | 100 | | anes_pid | Born 1911 to 1926 (1952 to 2000) | +6.7 | +1.8 | +11.5 | +11.2 | +2.2 | +20.3 | +4.6 | 625 | 141 | | anes_pid | Born 1927 to 1942 (1952 to 2024) | +5.9 | −2.4 | +14.2 | +4.6 | −4.7 | +13.9 | −1.3 | 134 | 240 | | anes_pid | Born 1943 to 1958 (1968 to 2024) | +4.6 | −4.2 | +13.4 | +1.2 | −3.3 | +5.7 | −3.4 | 121 | 1,339 | | anes_pid | Born 1959 to 1974 (1984 to 2024) | −0.2 | −6.5 | +6.1 | −5.9 | −10.4 | −1.4 | −5.7 | 285 | 1,324 | | anes_pid | Born 1975 to 1990 (2000 to 2024) | +8.6 | −0.8 | +18.0 | −0.3 | −4.8 | +4.3 | −8.8 | 135 | 1,301 | | anes_pid | Born 1991 or later (2012 to 2024) | +10.2 | +0.7 | +19.6 | +4.2 | −1.0 | +9.4 | −6.0 | 189 | 765 | | ces_pid | Born 1927 to 1942 (2006 to 2024) | −6.2 | −7.7 | −4.7 | −15.8 | −19.5 | −12.0 | −9.6 | 5,626 | 1,178 | | ces_pid | Born 1943 to 1958 (2006 to 2024) | −3.4 | −4.7 | −2.1 | −5.2 | −6.7 | −3.6 | −1.7 | 11,395 | 13,339 | | ces_pid | Born 1959 to 1974 (2006 to 2024) | −2.6 | −3.9 | −1.3 | −9.8 | −11.3 | −8.2 | −7.2 | 9,611 | 16,895 | | ces_pid | Born 1975 to 1990 (2006 to 2024) | +12.1 | +10.5 | +13.7 | +7.3 | +5.5 | +9.0 | −4.8 | 4,631 | 10,549 | | ces_pid | Born 1991 or later (2010 to 2024) | +18.7 | +12.4 | +25.0 | +11.4 | +9.2 | +13.6 | −7.3 | 302 | 8,886 | Views: ANES vote (panel = anes_vote); CES vote (panel = ces_vote); ANES party identification (panel = anes_pid); CES party identification (panel = ces_pid). Note: A cohort's first cell holds only the members old enough to vote at that election, and the first cell of an older cohort is often long after it entered the electorate. The row label gives the years of the two cells. Note: The two ends of a row are different respondents, and the interval of the change combines their standard errors. Intervals are model based: they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering and stratification. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, presidential elections 1952-2024; weighted (post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise VCF0009z); two-party presidential voters; other views: CES and party identification as named on the buttons Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/cohort_first_last.json ### Table 7. In 2020 and 2024 the age gap in the vote was +20.2 points among white voters and −12.3 among Black voters Democratic share of two-party voters aged 18 to 29 minus the share among voters aged 65 and over, by gender and race, CES 2008 and 2012 pooled and 2020 and 2024 pooled; 95% intervals | Voters | Gap 2008 and 2012 (points) | 95% interval low | 95% interval high | Respondents, early | Gap 2020 and 2024 (points) | 95% interval low (late) | 95% interval high (late) | Respondents, late | Change (points) | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All voters | +21.6 | +19.7 | +23.5 | 22,508 | +18.1 | +16.0 | +20.2 | 34,342 | −3.5 | | Women | +17.3 | +14.9 | +19.7 | 11,936 | +16.1 | +13.4 | +18.7 | 18,877 | −1.3 | | Men | +27.0 | +24.1 | +29.8 | 10,572 | +19.9 | +16.6 | +23.1 | 15,342 | −7.1 | | White | +18.0 | +15.9 | +20.2 | 19,158 | +20.2 | +17.7 | +22.7 | 26,464 | +2.1 | | Black | +0.6 | −2.8 | +4.0 | 1,153 | −12.3 | −17.7 | −6.8 | 3,055 | −12.9 | | Hispanic | +22.1 | +12.9 | +31.2 | 1,208 | +5.3 | −1.7 | +12.3 | 2,555 | −16.8 | Note: Pooling two elections gives every cell the floor of 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100. Asian voters fall below it in the earlier period and are left out. In 2020 and 2024 pooled their gap is +12.9. Note: Race is the CES single-race category with Hispanic voters of any race as a separate group, and the groups overlap with the gender rows. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals describe sampling variation among panel members and leave out how respondents joined the panel. Intervals are model based: they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering and stratification. Source: CES Cumulative File, presidential elections 2008-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters; elections pooled in two groups Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/age_gap_groups.json ### Table 8. In the CES the vote moved by −4.3 points per decade of age within an election, −1.2 per decade at a fixed age and −5.2 along a cohort Change in the Democratic share of the two-party vote per decade, three straight-line comparisons, voters aged 18 to 73, ANES 1952 to 2024 and CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals (HC3) | Comparison | Survey | Change (points per decade) | 95% interval low | 95% interval high | Voters aged 18 to 73 | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | One decade older, same election (age and birth year) | ANES 1952 to 2024 | −2.2 | −2.6 | −1.7 | 30,571 | | One decade older, same election (age and birth year) | CES 2008 to 2024 | −4.3 | −4.6 | −4.1 | 169,858 | | One decade later, same age (election and birth year) | ANES 1952 to 2024 | +1.6 | +1.3 | +1.9 | 30,571 | | One decade later, same age (election and birth year) | CES 2008 to 2024 | −1.2 | −1.8 | −0.5 | 169,858 | | One decade later, same birth cohort (age and election) | ANES 1952 to 2024 | +0.3 | −0.3 | +0.8 | 30,571 | | One decade later, same birth cohort (age and election) | CES 2008 to 2024 | −5.2 | −5.9 | −4.6 | 169,858 | Note: Cross-section: weighted regression of the 0/1 Democratic vote on age in decades with a fixed effect for each election. Same age: regression on election year in decades with a fixed effect for each 4-year age band. Same cohort: regression on election year in decades with a fixed effect for each 4-year birth band. Voters aged 18 to 73 only, so the age and birth bands share one grid. Note: The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals describe sampling variation among panel members and leave out how respondents joined the panel. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, presidential elections 1952-2024; weighted (post-election weight where the file has one, otherwise VCF0009z); two-party presidential voters; CES Cumulative File, presidential elections 2008-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters; weighted regression coefficients Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/three_comparisons.json ### Table 9. In the CES the age effect from the youngest to the oldest band is −22.2 points if birth years carry no trend, −27.3 if elections carry none and +1.0 if ages carry none Age effect on the Democratic share of the two-party vote, points, 4-year age bands from 18 to 73, from a model with an effect for every age band, election and birth cohort, under three constraints; 95% bootstrap intervals | Survey | Constraint | Age band midpoint (years) | Age effect (points) | 95% bootstrap interval low | 95% bootstrap interval high | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ces | No trend across birth years | 19.5 | +11.9 | +9.5 | +14.2 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 23.5 | +11.5 | +9.5 | +13.4 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 27.5 | +8.1 | +6.3 | +9.8 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 31.5 | +6.8 | +5.1 | +8.5 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 35.5 | +3.9 | +2.3 | +5.6 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 39.5 | +2.1 | +0.6 | +3.5 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 43.5 | +0.8 | −0.6 | +2.2 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 47.5 | −1.5 | −2.8 | −0.2 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 51.5 | −4.6 | −5.8 | −3.3 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 55.5 | −6.0 | −7.2 | −4.7 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 59.5 | −7.0 | −8.3 | −5.8 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 63.5 | −7.7 | −9.0 | −6.4 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 67.5 | −8.0 | −9.7 | −6.6 | | ces | No trend across birth years | 71.5 | −10.3 | −11.8 | −8.6 | | ces | No trend across elections | 19.5 | +14.5 | +11.6 | +17.3 | | ces | No trend across elections | 23.5 | +13.6 | +11.5 | +15.8 | | ces | No trend across elections | 27.5 | +9.8 | +7.9 | +11.8 | | ces | No trend across elections | 31.5 | +8.1 | +6.4 | +10.0 | | ces | No trend across elections | 35.5 | +4.9 | +3.3 | +6.6 | | ces | No trend across elections | 39.5 | +2.7 | +1.1 | +4.1 | | ces | No trend across elections | 43.5 | +1.0 | −0.4 | +2.3 | | ces | No trend across elections | 47.5 | −1.7 | −3.0 | −0.4 | | ces | No trend across elections | 51.5 | −5.2 | −6.6 | −3.8 | | ces | No trend across elections | 55.5 | −7.0 | −8.3 | −5.6 | | ces | No trend across elections | 59.5 | −8.4 | −9.7 | −7.0 | | ces | No trend across elections | 63.5 | −9.4 | −10.9 | −8.0 | | ces | No trend across elections | 67.5 | −10.2 | −12.1 | −8.6 | | ces | No trend across elections | 71.5 | −12.8 | −14.7 | −10.8 | | ces | No trend across ages | 19.5 | +0.3 | −1.6 | +2.2 | | ces | No trend across ages | 23.5 | +1.6 | 0.0 | +3.2 | | ces | No trend across ages | 27.5 | 0.0 | −1.4 | +1.4 | | ces | No trend across ages | 31.5 | +0.5 | −0.9 | +2.0 | | ces | No trend across ages | 35.5 | −0.6 | −2.0 | +0.9 | | ces | No trend across ages | 39.5 | −0.6 | −2.0 | +0.8 | | ces | No trend across ages | 43.5 | −0.1 | −1.5 | +1.3 | | ces | No trend across ages | 47.5 | −0.6 | −1.9 | +0.7 | | ces | No trend across ages | 51.5 | −1.9 | −3.1 | −0.7 | | ces | No trend across ages | 55.5 | −1.5 | −2.5 | −0.4 | | ces | No trend across ages | 59.5 | −0.8 | −1.8 | +0.2 | | ces | No trend across ages | 63.5 | +0.4 | −0.5 | +1.3 | | ces | No trend across ages | 67.5 | +1.8 | +0.6 | +2.8 | | ces | No trend across ages | 71.5 | +1.3 | +0.1 | +2.7 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 19.5 | +10.4 | +6.8 | +14.2 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 23.5 | +4.2 | +1.4 | +7.2 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 27.5 | +3.1 | +0.5 | +5.9 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 31.5 | +0.8 | −1.6 | +3.2 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 35.5 | +0.1 | −2.1 | +2.4 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 39.5 | −2.8 | −5.0 | −0.7 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 43.5 | −1.1 | −3.4 | +1.2 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 47.5 | −0.2 | −2.6 | +2.2 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 51.5 | −0.7 | −3.2 | +1.5 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 55.5 | −3.3 | −5.7 | −1.1 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 59.5 | −2.5 | −5.0 | −0.2 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 63.5 | −3.3 | −5.7 | −0.9 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 67.5 | −1.9 | −4.6 | +0.6 | | anes | No trend across birth years | 71.5 | −2.9 | −5.6 | −0.1 | | anes | No trend across elections | 19.5 | +6.2 | +2.4 | +10.3 | | anes | No trend across elections | 23.5 | +0.6 | −2.2 | +3.6 | | anes | No trend across elections | 27.5 | +0.2 | −2.3 | +2.9 | | anes | No trend across elections | 31.5 | −1.5 | −3.9 | +1.0 | | anes | No trend across elections | 35.5 | −1.5 | −3.7 | +0.7 | | anes | No trend across elections | 39.5 | −3.8 | −5.9 | −1.6 | | anes | No trend across elections | 43.5 | −1.4 | −3.7 | +0.9 | | anes | No trend across elections | 47.5 | +0.2 | −2.3 | +2.6 | | anes | No trend across elections | 51.5 | +0.3 | −2.2 | +2.5 | | anes | No trend across elections | 55.5 | −1.7 | −4.1 | +0.6 | | anes | No trend across elections | 59.5 | −0.2 | −2.5 | +2.0 | | anes | No trend across elections | 63.5 | −0.4 | −2.7 | +2.1 | | anes | No trend across elections | 67.5 | +1.6 | −1.1 | +4.2 | | anes | No trend across elections | 71.5 | +1.3 | −1.6 | +4.1 | | anes | No trend across ages | 19.5 | +5.7 | +2.5 | +9.0 | | anes | No trend across ages | 23.5 | +0.2 | −2.3 | +2.8 | | anes | No trend across ages | 27.5 | −0.2 | −2.5 | +2.5 | | anes | No trend across ages | 31.5 | −1.8 | −4.2 | +0.6 | | anes | No trend across ages | 35.5 | −1.7 | −3.8 | +0.5 | | anes | No trend across ages | 39.5 | −3.9 | −6.1 | −1.7 | | anes | No trend across ages | 43.5 | −1.4 | −3.7 | +0.8 | | anes | No trend across ages | 47.5 | +0.2 | −2.2 | +2.6 | | anes | No trend across ages | 51.5 | +0.4 | −2.0 | +2.5 | | anes | No trend across ages | 55.5 | −1.5 | −3.7 | +0.7 | | anes | No trend across ages | 59.5 | 0.0 | −2.2 | +2.3 | | anes | No trend across ages | 63.5 | 0.0 | −2.4 | +2.3 | | anes | No trend across ages | 67.5 | +2.1 | −0.2 | +4.4 | | anes | No trend across ages | 71.5 | +1.8 | −0.5 | +4.1 | Views: CES 2008 to 2024 (panel = ces); ANES 1952 to 2024 (panel = anes). Note: The model gives each 4-year age band from 18 to 73, each presidential election and each 4-year birth cohort an effect on the Democratic share, and is fitted by weighted least squares to the cell means (the linear probability model). Because birth year equals election year minus age, the three sets of effects are not identified: adding a straight line to the age effects and the cohort effects and subtracting one from the election effects leaves every fitted cell unchanged. The profile shown is the minimum-norm fit shifted by the straight line that gives the stated constraint. Note: The fitted shares in every cell are identical under the three constraints, to within floating-point rounding. Voters aged 74 and over fall outside the 4-year grid. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals describe sampling variation among panel members and leave out how respondents joined the panel. Source: CES Cumulative File, presidential elections 2008-2024; weighted (weight_cumulative); two-party presidential voters; weighted least squares on the age-by-election grid, seeded respondent bootstrap Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/apc_profiles.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (150), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | anes_chg_2024 | −18.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | age gap in 2024 minus age gap in 2020; different respondents, standard errors combined | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −28.4 to −7.9 | 4,146 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ftf_gap_2012 | +21.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 9.2 to 34.3 | 446 | weight_ftf (face-to-face) and weight_web (web) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1992 | +2.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 1992 | 95% CI −5.9 to 11.8 | 488 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2008 | +22.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2008 | 95% CI 12.2 to 33.0 | 516 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2020 | +17.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 | 95% CI 11.0 to 23.1 | 2,471 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2024 | −1.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI −9.4 to 7.1 | 1,675 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_lean_2020 | +3.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | ANES Democratic share minus the certified Democratic share of the two-party vote | two-party presidential voters | 2020 | 95% CI 1.7 to 5.2 | 6,076 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_lean_2024 | +5.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | ANES Democratic share minus the certified Democratic share of the two-party vote | two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI 3.0 to 7.5 | 3,933 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_minus_ces_mid_2024 | +7.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | ANES Democratic share minus CES Democratic share in the same age group; independent surveys | two-party presidential voters aged 45 to 64 | 2024 | 95% CI 3.8 to 11.9 | 18,084 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_minus_ces_old_2024 | +11.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | ANES Democratic share minus CES Democratic share in the same age group; independent surveys | two-party presidential voters aged 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI 8.0 to 15.7 | 16,395 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_minus_ces_young_2024 | −4.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | ANES Democratic share minus CES Democratic share in the same age group; independent surveys | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 | 2024 | 95% CI −12.3 to 3.6 | 3,367 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) and weight_cumulative | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_neff_ftf_2024 | 31 | respondents | Kish effective sample size | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29, face-to-face interviews | 2024 | | 64 | weight_ftf (face-to-face) and weight_web (web) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_neff_web_2024 | 86 | respondents | Kish effective sample size | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29, web interviews | 2024 | | 156 | weight_ftf (face-to-face) and weight_web (web) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_nomode_2024 | 1,884 | respondents | count of respondents | two-party presidential voters with no interview-mode weight (panel and paper cases) | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_nomode_share_2024 | 48% | share of respondents | share with no interview-mode weight, unweighted count | two-party presidential voters with a positive vote weight | 2024 | | 3,933 | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_old_2008 | 44.9% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters aged 65 and over | 2008 | 95% CI 37.9% to 52.0% | 294 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_old_2024 | 57.4% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters aged 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI 53.7% to 61.1% | 1,390 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_pid_chg | −12.6 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | age gap in 2024 minus age gap in 2020; different respondents | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −21.1 to −4.0 | 4,993 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_pid_gap_2020 | +14.5 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | Democratic share of identifiers aged 18 to 29 minus that of identifiers aged 65 and over | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 | 95% CI 9.2 to 19.8 | 2,883 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_pid_gap_2024 | +1.9 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | Democratic share of identifiers aged 18 to 29 minus that of identifiers aged 65 and over | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI −4.7 to 8.6 | 2,110 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_pid_web_gap_2024 | +1.1 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | Democratic share of identifiers aged 18 to 29 minus that of identifiers aged 65 and over | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2024, web interviews | 95% CI −8.9 to 11.2 | 734 | weight_ftf (face-to-face) and weight_web (web) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_share_2024 | 54.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters (age may be missing) | 2024 | 95% CI 52.3% to 56.7% | 3,933 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_web_gap_2012 | +12.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2012, web interviews | 95% CI 4.2 to 21.5 | 1,038 | weight_ftf (face-to-face) and weight_web (web) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_web_gap_2016 | +19.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2016, web interviews | 95% CI 10.0 to 28.7 | 683 | weight_ftf (face-to-face) and weight_web (web) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_young_2008 | 67.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 | 2008 | 95% CI 59.8% to 75.2% | 222 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_young_2024 | 56.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 | 2024 | 95% CI 48.9% to 63.6% | 285 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | apc_anes_span_age | −3.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | oldest age band's effect minus youngest age band's effect under the constraint of no straight-line trend in age; seeded percentile bootstrap | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73, 4-year age bands | elections 1952 to 2024 | 95% CI −7.8 to −0.2 | 30,571 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | apc_anes_span_cohort | −13.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | oldest age band's effect minus youngest age band's effect under the constraint of no straight-line trend in cohort; seeded percentile bootstrap | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73, 4-year age bands | elections 1952 to 2024 | 95% CI −18.5 to −8.7 | 30,571 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | apc_anes_span_period | −4.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | oldest age band's effect minus youngest age band's effect under the constraint of no straight-line trend in period; seeded percentile bootstrap | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73, 4-year age bands | elections 1952 to 2024 | 95% CI −10.3 to 0.0 | 30,571 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | apc_bands | 14 | age bands | count of age bands in the grid model | 4-year age bands from 18 to 73 | all | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | apc_ces_span_age | +1.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | oldest age band's effect minus youngest age band's effect under the constraint of no straight-line trend in age; seeded percentile bootstrap | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73, 4-year age bands | elections 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.8 to 3.1 | 169,858 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | apc_ces_span_cohort | −22.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | oldest age band's effect minus youngest age band's effect under the constraint of no straight-line trend in cohort; seeded percentile bootstrap | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73, 4-year age bands | elections 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −25.0 to −19.2 | 169,858 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | apc_ces_span_period | −27.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | oldest age band's effect minus youngest age band's effect under the constraint of no straight-line trend in period; seeded percentile bootstrap | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73, 4-year age bands | elections 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −31.5 to −23.3 | 169,858 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | apc_reps | 1,000 | replicates | count of bootstrap replicates | bootstrap replicates | all | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cert_share_2024 | 49.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | certified Democratic share of the two-party vote | ballots counted for the two major-party candidates | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | State presidential returns | | | ces_45_65_2024 | −1.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 45 to 64 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 45 to 64 and aged 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI −3.2 to 0.0 | 31,853 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_band_1824_2529_2012 | +0.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the younger band minus the share in the next older band | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 24 and aged 25 to 29 | 2012 | 95% CI −4.3 to 5.2 | 3,552 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_band_2529_3044_2012 | +2.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in the younger band minus the share in the next older band | two-party presidential voters aged 25 to 29 and aged 30 to 44 | 2012 | 95% CI −0.9 to 6.7 | 6,289 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_chg_2024 | −7.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | age gap in 2024 minus age gap in 2020; different respondents, standard errors combined | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −11.1 to −3.2 | 34,342 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2008 | +24.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2008 | 95% CI 21.8 to 27.1 | 7,804 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2012 | +18.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2012 | 95% CI 16.0 to 21.4 | 14,704 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2016 | +22.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2016 | 95% CI 20.4 to 25.3 | 13,890 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2020 | +22.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 | 95% CI 19.9 to 24.4 | 16,255 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2024 | +15.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI 11.8 to 18.3 | 18,087 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_max_0820 | +24.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | highest age gap among the four elections | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020 (highest) | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_min_0820 | +18.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | lowest age gap among the four elections | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020 (lowest) | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_lean_2024 | −0.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | CES Democratic share minus the certified Democratic share of the two-party vote | two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI −1.0 to 0.5 | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_matched_gap_2020 | +22.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters whose registration was matched to voter-file records, aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 | 95% CI 20.1 to 25.4 | 13,317 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_matched_old_2024 | 46.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters aged 65 and over whose registration was matched to voter-file records | 2024 | 95% CI 44.8% to 47.2% | 12,700 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_matched_std_chg | −0.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | age gap in 2024 minus age gap in 2020 among matched respondents, standard weight | two-party presidential voters whose registration was matched to voter-file records, aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −5.6 to 4.5 | 27,420 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_matched_std_gap_2024 | +22.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters whose registration was matched to voter-file records, aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI 17.9 to 26.5 | 14,103 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_old_2008 | 42.7% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters aged 65 and over | 2008 | 95% CI 41.0% to 44.5% | 4,477 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_pid_chg | −1.1 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | age gap in 2024 minus age gap in 2020; different respondents | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.4 to 2.3 | 43,206 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_pid_chg_2018_2024 | −3.3 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | age gap at the later wave minus age gap at the earlier wave; different respondents | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2018 to 2024 | 95% CI −6.7 to 0.1 | 43,419 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_pid_chg_2022_2024 | −7.3 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | age gap at the later wave minus age gap at the earlier wave; different respondents | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI −10.6 to −3.9 | 42,990 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_pid_gap_2018 | +17.2 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | Democratic share of identifiers aged 18 to 29 minus that of identifiers aged 65 and over | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2018 | 95% CI 15.1 to 19.3 | 20,577 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_pid_gap_2020 | +14.9 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | Democratic share of identifiers aged 18 to 29 minus that of identifiers aged 65 and over | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 | 95% CI 12.9 to 17.0 | 20,364 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_pid_gap_2022 | +21.1 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | Democratic share of identifiers aged 18 to 29 minus that of identifiers aged 65 and over | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2022 | 95% CI 19.0 to 23.3 | 20,148 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_pid_gap_2024 | +13.9 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | Democratic share of identifiers aged 18 to 29 minus that of identifiers aged 65 and over | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI 11.2 to 16.5 | 22,842 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_pid_gap_max | +21.3 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | highest party-identification age gap among ten waves | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | even years 2006 to 2024 (highest) | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_pid_gap_min | +13.9 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | lowest party-identification age gap among ten waves | party identifiers (leaners included) aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | even years 2006 to 2024 (lowest) | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_post_chg_2024 | −5.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | age gap in 2024 (weight_cumulative) minus age gap in 2020 (weight_post); the post-election weight does not exist for 2024 | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −9.4 to −1.2 | 34,341 | weight_cumulative and weight_post | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_post_gap_2012 | +19.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2012 | 95% CI 17.2 to 22.6 | 14,704 | weight_post (post-election weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_post_gap_2016 | +22.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2016 | 95% CI 19.7 to 25.0 | 13,890 | weight_post (post-election weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_post_gap_2020 | +20.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 | 95% CI 17.9 to 22.9 | 16,254 | weight_post (post-election weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_share_2024 | 49.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters | 2024 | 95% CI 48.2% to 49.7% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_split_max | +5.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 24 minus that among voters aged 25 to 29 | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 24 and aged 25 to 29 | 2008 to 2024 (largest of five elections) | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_split_min | +0.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 24 minus that among voters aged 25 to 29 | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 24 and aged 25 to 29 | 2008 to 2024 (smallest of five elections) | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_vv_chg | +0.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | age gap in 2024 minus age gap in 2020 among matched respondents, validated-voter weight | two-party presidential voters whose registration was matched to voter-file records, aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.5 to 4.9 | 27,420 | vvweight (validated-voter weight, for respondents whose registration was matched to voter-file records) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_vv_gap_2024 | +23.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters whose registration was matched to voter-file records, aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI 19.1 to 26.9 | 14,103 | vvweight (validated-voter weight, for respondents whose registration was matched to voter-file records) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_young_2008 | 67.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 | 2008 | 95% CI 65.2% to 69.2% | 3,327 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | diff_in_changes_std | −6.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the age gap among all voters minus the change among matched respondents (standard weight); seeded percentile bootstrap resampling respondents within each year | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −10.2 to −2.8 | 34,342 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | diff_in_changes_vv | −7.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the age gap among all voters minus the change among matched respondents (validated-voter weight); seeded percentile bootstrap resampling respondents within each year | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −11.8 to −3.0 | 34,342 | vvweight (validated-voter weight, for respondents whose registration was matched to voter-file records) and weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | diff_white_black_late | +32.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | age gap among white voters minus age gap among Black voters | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 26.5 to 38.5 | 29,519 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | diff_women_men_early | −9.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | age gap among women minus age gap among men | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2008 and 2012 pooled | 95% CI −13.4 to −5.9 | 22,508 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | diff_women_men_late | −3.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | age gap among women minus age gap among men | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −8.0 to 0.4 | 34,219 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_anes_vote_1911_1926_chg | −1.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | two-party presidential voters born 1911 to 1926 | 1952 to 1996 | 95% CI −11.9 to 9.2 | 616 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1911_1926_first | +7.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1911 to 1926 | 1952 | 95% CI 2.0 to 13.6 | 453 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1911_1926_last | +6.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1911 to 1926 | 1996 | 95% CI −2.4 to 15.3 | 163 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1927_1942_chg | +2.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | two-party presidential voters born 1927 to 1942 | 1956 to 2024 | 95% CI −10.2 to 15.1 | 382 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1927_1942_last | +4.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1927 to 1942 | 2024 | 95% CI −5.3 to 14.6 | 204 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1943_1958_chg | −12.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | two-party presidential voters born 1943 to 1958 | 1972 to 2024 | 95% CI −20.3 to −5.5 | 1,558 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1943_1958_first | +15.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1943 to 1958 | 1972 | 95% CI 10.1 to 21.2 | 403 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1943_1958_last | +2.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1943 to 1958 | 2024 | 95% CI −2.1 to 7.5 | 1,155 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1959_1974_first | +0.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1959 to 1974 | 1984 | 95% CI −7.7 to 9.0 | 151 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1959_1974_last | −5.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1959 to 1974 | 2024 | 95% CI −10.5 to −0.5 | 1,061 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1975_1990_chg | −18.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | two-party presidential voters born 1975 to 1990 | 2004 to 2024 | 95% CI −29.1 to −7.3 | 1,101 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1975_1990_first | +19.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1975 to 1990 | 2004 | 95% CI 10.1 to 29.3 | 137 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1975_1990_last | +1.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1975 to 1990 | 2024 | 95% CI −3.7 to 6.6 | 964 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_anes_vote_1991_present_chg | −10.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | two-party presidential voters born 1991 to or later | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −21.7 to 0.6 | 629 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fl_ces_pid_1927_1942_chg | −9.6 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | party identifiers (leaners included) born 1927 to 1942 | 2006 to 2024 | 95% CI −13.6 to −5.6 | 6,804 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_ces_pid_1943_1958_chg | −1.7 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | party identifiers (leaners included) born 1943 to 1958 | 2006 to 2024 | 95% CI −3.8 to 0.3 | 24,734 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_ces_pid_1959_1974_chg | −7.2 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | party identifiers (leaners included) born 1959 to 1974 | 2006 to 2024 | 95% CI −9.2 to −5.2 | 26,506 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_ces_pid_1975_1990_chg | −4.8 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | party identifiers (leaners included) born 1975 to 1990 | 2006 to 2024 | 95% CI −7.2 to −2.4 | 15,180 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_ces_pid_1991_present_chg | −7.3 | percentage points of the Democratic share of party identifiers | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | party identifiers (leaners included) born 1991 to or later | 2010 to 2024 | 95% CI −13.9 to −0.7 | 9,188 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_ces_vote_1927_1942_last | −13.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1927 to 1942 | 2024 | 95% CI −17.5 to −10.2 | 1,150 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_ces_vote_1943_1958_chg | +0.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | two-party presidential voters born 1943 to 1958 | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −1.5 to 3.0 | 20,481 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_ces_vote_1959_1974_chg | −7.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | two-party presidential voters born 1959 to 1974 | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −9.6 to −5.1 | 22,617 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_ces_vote_1975_1990_chg | −9.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | two-party presidential voters born 1975 to 1990 | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −11.7 to −6.5 | 13,015 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_ces_vote_1975_1990_first | +16.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1975 to 1990 | 2008 | 95% CI 14.7 to 18.5 | 4,555 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_ces_vote_1975_1990_last | +7.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | cohort's Democratic share minus the share among voters born in other years in the same election | two-party presidential voters born 1975 to 1990 | 2024 | 95% CI 5.7 to 9.3 | 8,460 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fl_ces_vote_1991_present_chg | +5.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | last cell's lead over other voters minus first cell's lead; different respondents | two-party presidential voters born 1991 to or later | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.1 to 11.7 | 5,030 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | floor_n | 100 | respondents | definition of the suppression floor | floor for a published survey cell | all years | | | none (definition) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fs_anes_vote_1975_1990_first | 66.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters born 1975 to 1990 | 2004 | 95% CI 57.3% to 74.7% | 137 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fs_anes_vote_1975_1990_last | 55.6% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters born 1975 to 1990 | 2024 | 95% CI 51.3% to 60.0% | 964 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fs_ces_vote_1975_1990_first | 66.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters born 1975 to 1990 | 2008 | 95% CI 64.6% to 68.0% | 4,555 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fs_ces_vote_1975_1990_last | 54.6% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters born 1975 to 1990 | 2024 | 95% CI 53.0% to 56.2% | 8,460 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_asian_late | +12.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, Asian | 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 2.5 to 23.4 | 883 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_black_late | −12.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, black | 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −17.7 to −6.8 | 3,055 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_hisp_chg | −16.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | late-period age gap minus early-period age gap; different respondents | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, hispanic | 2008 and 2012 pooled to 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −28.3 to −5.2 | 3,763 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_hisp_early | +22.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, hispanic | 2008 and 2012 pooled | 95% CI 12.9 to 31.2 | 1,208 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_hisp_late | +5.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, hispanic | 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −1.7 to 12.3 | 2,555 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_men_chg | −7.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | late-period age gap minus early-period age gap; different respondents | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, men | 2008 and 2012 pooled to 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −11.4 to −2.8 | 25,914 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_men_early | +27.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, men | 2008 and 2012 pooled | 95% CI 24.1 to 29.8 | 10,572 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_men_late | +19.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, men | 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 16.6 to 23.1 | 15,342 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_white_late | +20.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, white | 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 17.7 to 22.7 | 26,464 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_women_chg | −1.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | late-period age gap minus early-period age gap; different respondents | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, women | 2008 and 2012 pooled to 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −4.9 to 2.3 | 30,813 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_women_early | +17.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, women | 2008 and 2012 pooled | 95% CI 14.9 to 19.7 | 11,936 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | grp_women_late | +16.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among voters aged 18 to 29 minus Democratic share among voters aged 65 and over | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over, women | 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 13.4 to 18.7 | 18,877 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | match_old_2020 | 87.4% | share of respondents | share with a positive validated-voter weight (registration matched to a voter-file record), unweighted count | two-party presidential voters aged 65 and over | 2020 | | 11,895 | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | match_old_2024 | 84.6% | share of respondents | share with a positive validated-voter weight (registration matched to a voter-file record), unweighted count | two-party presidential voters aged 65 and over | 2024 | | 15,005 | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | match_young_2020 | 66.9% | share of respondents | share with a positive validated-voter weight (registration matched to a voter-file record), unweighted count | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 | 2020 | | 4,360 | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | match_young_2024 | 45.5% | share of respondents | share with a positive validated-voter weight (registration matched to a voter-file record), unweighted count | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 | 2024 | | 3,082 | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | matched_minus_all | +7.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | age gap among matched respondents minus age gap among all respondents, standard weight; seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI 3.8 to 10.6 | 18,087 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_anes_elections | 19 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential election studies | presidential elections 1952 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_gap_pos | 7 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections whose age-gap interval is above zero | presidential elections 1952 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_gap_pub | 16 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections with both age cells above the floor | presidential elections 1952 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_noage | 649 | respondents | count of respondents | two-party presidential voters with no recorded age | presidential elections 1952 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_voters | 33,768 | respondents | count of respondents | two-party presidential voters with a known age | presidential elections 1952 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_voters_2024 | 3,933 | respondents | count of respondents | two-party presidential voters with a positive vote weight | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ces_pid_cohort_sig | 4 | cohorts | count of cohorts | CES birth cohorts whose party-identification lead has an interval for its change that excludes zero | 2006 to 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_ces_pid_cohorts | 5 | cohorts | count of cohorts | CES birth cohorts | 2006 to 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_ces_pid_waves | 10 | waves | count of waves | CES even-year waves | 2006 to 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_ces_voters | 188,145 | respondents | count of respondents | two-party presidential voters with a known age | presidential elections 2008 to 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_young_suppressed | 3 | elections | count of elections | ANES presidential elections whose youngest or oldest age cell is below the floor | presidential elections 1952 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | neff_asian_late_young | 142 | respondents | Kish effective sample size | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29, Asian | 2020 and 2024 pooled | | 569 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | neff_black_young_2024 | 95 | respondents | Kish effective sample size | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29, Black | 2024 | | 298 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | three_anes_cross_section | −2.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share per decade | slope of the Democratic share on age (per decade), election fixed effects; weighted least squares, HC3 errors | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73 | elections 1952 to 2024 | 95% CI −2.6 to −1.7 | 30,571 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | three_anes_same_age | +1.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share per decade | slope of the Democratic share on election year (per decade), fixed effect for each 4-year age band; weighted least squares, HC3 errors | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73 | elections 1952 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.3 to 1.9 | 30,571 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | three_anes_same_cohort | +0.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share per decade | slope of the Democratic share on election year (per decade), fixed effect for each 4-year birth band; weighted least squares, HC3 errors | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73 | elections 1952 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.3 to 0.8 | 30,571 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | three_anes_sumdiff | −0.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share per decade | cross-section slope plus same-age slope minus same-cohort slope; seeded respondent bootstrap interval | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73 | elections 1952 to 2024 | 95% CI −1.0 to −0.6 | 30,571 | weight_postelection where the file has one, otherwise weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | three_ces_cross_section | −4.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share per decade | slope of the Democratic share on age (per decade), election fixed effects; weighted least squares, HC3 errors | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73 | elections 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.6 to −4.1 | 169,858 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | three_ces_same_age | −1.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share per decade | slope of the Democratic share on election year (per decade), fixed effect for each 4-year age band; weighted least squares, HC3 errors | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73 | elections 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −1.8 to −0.5 | 169,858 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | three_ces_same_cohort | −5.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share per decade | slope of the Democratic share on election year (per decade), fixed effect for each 4-year birth band; weighted least squares, HC3 errors | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73 | elections 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −5.9 to −4.6 | 169,858 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | three_ces_sumdiff | −0.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share per decade | cross-section slope plus same-age slope minus same-cohort slope; seeded respondent bootstrap interval | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 73 | elections 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.5 to −0.1 | 169,858 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | weight_effect | +0.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | age gap with the validated-voter weight minus age gap with the standard weight on the same matched respondents; seeded percentile bootstrap | two-party presidential voters whose registration was matched to voter-file records, aged 18 to 29 and aged 65 and over | 2024 | 95% CI −3.0 to 4.8 | 18,087 | vvweight (validated-voter weight, for respondents whose registration was matched to voter-file records) and weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | young_match_gap_2020 | +3.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among matched respondents minus Democratic share among unmatched respondents | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 | 2020 | 95% CI −1.1 to 7.1 | 4,360 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | young_match_gap_2024 | +13.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among matched respondents minus Democratic share among unmatched respondents | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29 | 2024 | 95% CI 7.8 to 19.7 | 3,082 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | young_matched_2024 | 68.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29, registration matched to voter-file records | 2024 | 95% CI 64.1% to 72.4% | 1,403 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | young_unmatched_2024 | 54.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share | two-party presidential voters aged 18 to 29, registration unmatched to voter-file records | 2024 | 95% CI 50.2% to 58.8% | 1,679 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Cohort: People born in the same period, such as the same decade. Comparing cohorts shows whether a difference comes from when people were born, as distinct from their age or the year they were surveyed. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors. ## Methods Samples: ANES Cumulative Data File respondents in the 19 presidential elections from 1952 to 2024 who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican candidate (two-party voters) and have a recorded age of 18 or older (33,768 respondents; 649 other two-party voters have no age and are outside every age cell but inside the cohort cells when their cohort is known; a handful of 17-year-olds are left out), and party identifiers in the same presidential-election years (44,932 respondents with a known age); CES cumulative file respondents who reported such a vote in 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 (188,145) and party identifiers in the even-year waves 2006 to 2024 (450,325). voted_dem_pres equal to 0 in the ANES also holds third-party voters, so the vote is built from voted_dem_pres equal to 1 and voted_rep_pres equal to 1. Weights: ANES vote shares use weight_postelection in the years where the file has one (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020, 2024), otherwise weight (VCF0009z), the rule used by the two-coalitions and gender-gap chapters; ANES party identification uses weight (VCF0009z); the ANES interview-mode estimates use weight_ftf on face-to-face respondents and weight_web on web respondents (2012, 2016 and 2024; the 2020 study has no mode weights and no in-person interviews); CES estimates use weight_cumulative, the cumulative-file weight defined for all five elections, which is proportional within each election to the single-wave pre-election weight; the vote is a post-election item, and the post-election weight (weight_post), which exists for 2012, 2016 and 2020 only, is used for a sensitivity check; the matched-voter rows use vvweight, the weight for validated registered voters (respondents whose registration was matched to a voter-file record, not whose vote was validated), which the file holds for 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024 and which equals a constant multiple of weight_cumulative in 2020. ANES 2012 uses the full-sample weight because the file has no post-election weight for that study; in 2024, a share of respondents (panel and paper cases) have no interview-mode weight and are outside the mode cells. Groups: age 18 to 29, 30 to 44, 45 to 64 and 65 and over from age in years (the CES vote figure splits the youngest group at 24 and 25); birth cohort is the ANES cohort variable (16-year groups; cohort cells include every voter with a known cohort) and, in the CES, the same groups from reported birth year; party identification is Democratic (pid7 or pid_7pt 1 to 3) against Republican (5 to 7), pure independents excluded. Estimands: a share is a weighted mean of a 0/1 outcome; the age gap is the share among the youngest group minus the share among the oldest; a cohort's lead is its share minus the share among all other voters with a known cohort in the same election (a disjoint group, so the two shares are independent); a change is a difference of two independent estimates from different elections. Intervals: 95%. Shares and differences within one election use the Kish effective sample size and a normal approximation, and combine the standard errors of independent groups in quadrature. The 2024 CES difference between the gap among matched respondents and the gap among all voters, the difference between the two weights on the same matched respondents, and the difference between the change in the gap from 2020 to 2024 among all voters and the same change among matched respondents are seeded percentile bootstraps over respondents, resampling within each year (1,000 replicates, seed 12345), because those estimates share respondents. The certified benchmark is the two-party share of the state presidential returns (full counts). Three comparisons: weighted least squares with HC3 errors on voters aged 18 to 73 (ANES 30,571, CES 169,858 respondents): the vote on age in decades with election fixed effects; on election year in decades with fixed effects for 4-year age bands; and on election year in decades with fixed effects for 4-year birth bands. The sum of the first two slopes minus the third has a seeded respondent bootstrap interval that recomputes the three slopes on each resample. Age-period-cohort model: voters aged 18 to 73 are grouped into 14 age bands of 4 years and the presidential elections (4 years apart, so birth cohort is the election index minus the age-band index); the 0/1 vote is regressed on an effect for every age band, election and cohort by weighted least squares on the cell means (the linear probability model), taking the minimum-norm solution. Adding a straight line to the age and cohort effects and subtracting one from the election effects leaves every fitted cell unchanged, and each constraint chooses the shift that sets the straight-line component of one effect to zero (no trend across birth years, across elections or across ages). The largest difference in fitted cell means across the three constraints is 2.2e-14 percentage points in the ANES and 1.1e-14 in the CES. Intervals for the model are percentile intervals from 1,000 respondent-level bootstrap replicates (seed 12345). Suppression: a published cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample of at least 100; a suppressed cell is a row with no value, so no line is drawn across it. All intervals are model based. The CES is an opt-in panel, so its intervals leave out how respondents joined the panel, and the ANES intervals ignore clustering and stratification. Survey mode: the ANES mixes face-to-face and web interviews in 2012, 2016 and 2024 and used no in-person interviews in 2020; the CES is an online panel in every year. ## What these data cannot show - The surveys interview different people in each election, so a cohort line does not follow anyone. - It mixes people who changed, people who joined or left the sample (a cohort is smaller at older ages and its youngest members enter as they turn eighteen), and the effects of age and election. - A panel study that re-interviews the same voters separates a person's change from the replacement of cohorts, and it still cannot separate the effect of age from the effect of the election in which the person is re-interviewed. - The ANES 2024 Time Series holds a sample interviewed in 2016, 2020 and 2024 and the CES has panel files, but the earlier waves of both are not in the data store, so no panel evidence appears here. - The chapter chooses no constraint for the age-period-cohort model and reports the range. - A model with more structure can give a narrower answer only by assuming that structure, and the surveys do not test it. - The generation labels in the literature summarize cohort differences, and they do not explain why those differences arise. - The data hold no measure of the events, campaigns or candidates that might have shaped any cohort. - The vote is the respondent's report, restricted to two-party voters. - The ANES Democratic share exceeds the certified count in 2020 and 2024 by more than its interval, and the excess is largest among voters sixty-five and older. - Its age gaps therefore rest on a sample that departs from the count most in the oldest group. - The CES share is close to the count in 2024. - Neither survey can be checked against an official count by age group. - The two surveys disagree about 2024, and the explanations offered here, who is matched to voter records and interview mode, cannot be settled with these files. - The ANES youngest-group cells are small, 3 elections have none to publish, 649 two-party voters have no recorded age and fall outside every age cell, and age is top-coded at eighty in 2020 and 2024. - The 2012, 2016 and 2024 ANES samples mix modes and 2020 has no mode weights, so a change between those elections can include a change of mode. - The CES is an opt-in panel and its intervals leave out how respondents joined it. - The ANES intervals ignore clustering and stratification, so they can be too narrow or too wide. - The chapter reports many comparisons, and no interval is adjusted for that. - Cohorts are sixteen-year groups, and a finer grouping could show movements that these groups average away. ## References 1. Glenn, Norval D. (1976). Cohort Analysts' Futile Quest: Statistical Attempts to Separate Age, Period and Cohort Effects. American Sociological Review 41(5): 900-904. https://doi.org/10.2307/2094738 2. Mason, Karen Oppenheim; Mason, William M.; Winsborough, H. H.; Poole, W. Kenneth (1973). Some Methodological Issues in Cohort Analysis of Archival Data. American Sociological Review 38(2): 242-258. https://doi.org/10.2307/2094398 3. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 4. Converse, Philip E. (1969). Of Time and Partisan Stability. Comparative Political Studies 2(2): 139-171. https://doi.org/10.1177/001041406900200201 5. Ghitza, Yair; Gelman, Andrew; Auerbach, Jonathan (2023). The Great Society, Reagan's Revolution, and Generations of Presidential Voting. American Journal of Political Science 67(3): 520-537. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12713 6. Fosse, Ethan; Winship, Christopher (2019). Analyzing Age-Period-Cohort Data: A Review and Critique. Annual Review of Sociology 45: 467-492. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-soc-073018-022616 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/age-and-generation/build.py (sha256 464249535298f8468d0e6afdbf15063a7e12b1dd4df6b14cca097b2c4e42cb18) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/state/1976-2024-president.csv | 514,108 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 128cdd0930f6ed19eed41a33480562b059c792bc19df2d79f574ea54a0db8b1c | | figures/age_gap.json | 5c68dc790d174e40b5942167ed4877fd5c9860875e0866b601acd7b692378c48 | | figures/age_gap_groups.json | a6fbbeeaf3da525999e56335a984b3f2d371fcbff9d85c9104d419e5a0ec0768 | | figures/apc_profiles.json | 50df509c6ca3b0a747dbd8f0da1df52fd89b337f7bea9d9e184de30285f7ffed | | figures/cohort_first_last.json | 9ca8506539efb9b69832503d93a8dc15123be4a838855dbfada9c9ec6746bf17 | | figures/cohort_lines.json | df49170b05b6c3bf340df6523aa466ffc631fa9a43ddfa99dab21324e18f37c0 | | figures/pid_by_age.json | d04a402e6c42b7bf46a06eca297e4a68fb1a60990bdd39f7a1bb0d59b2fddea6 | | figures/three_comparisons.json | d9608a4eb7f3a817e25f6da4ff406f6ecb169622f1262abf789eacdbf68dc350 | | figures/vote_by_age_anes.json | 1efb7cd1caa19e1fe4b012835f766c10c860ce2bb86636d9fe590adadf8094e0 | | figures/vote_by_age_ces.json | f1c1b73367fc98556f978d4c772bf5b321a5fd0dac89cede73616bb224ed007f | | meta.json | 0483e6a8787119c2001a886b95bbd41d2fb3e8613df60a304b2b15a2fa0523d9 | | refs.json | 705f7576b3fa58e7bc681fea08d82f7e611c2ac14d08129cf76cc82b716f2e08 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/facts.json - Table 1, figure "vote_by_age_anes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/vote_by_age_anes.json - Table 2, figure "vote_by_age_ces" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/vote_by_age_ces.json - Table 3, figure "age_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/age_gap.json - Table 4, figure "pid_by_age" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/pid_by_age.json - Table 5, figure "cohort_lines" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/cohort_lines.json - Table 6, figure "cohort_first_last" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/cohort_first_last.json - Table 7, figure "age_gap_groups" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/age_gap_groups.json - Table 8, figure "three_comparisons" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/three_comparisons.json - Table 9, figure "apc_profiles" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/age-and-generation/figures/apc_profiles.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Turnout: report Chapter 3.7 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/turnout. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Turnout - Chapter: 3.7 (Part III, The party coalitions; The great sorting) - Question: Who votes, and how does turnout differ by age, race, education and income? - Dek: In the November 2024 Current Population Survey, 79.6% of citizens aged twenty-five and older with a bachelor's degree reported voting, against 39.1% of those without a high school diploma. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - CPS Voting and Registration Supplement. IPUMS-CPS November Voting and Registration Supplement, 25 biennial supplements 1976-2024; citizens from 1994; years: 1976-2024 (25 November samples, biennial, even years); weights: VOSUPPWT (supplement person weight) - State presidential returns. State presidential returns 1976-2024, used only for the certified national total of ballots counted for president; years: 1976-2024 (13 elections); weights: none (full counts) - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1976-2024, self-reported turnout in presidential years, as a comparison of levels; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight_postelection (VCF9999) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/turnout - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/turnout/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/turnout/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026turnout ```bibtex @misc{singh2026turnout, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Turnout}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/turnout}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more | 2024 presidential election | 79.6% | 95% CI 79.0% to 80.2% | 25,742 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | v_ba_2024 | | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 25 and older without a high school diploma | 2024 presidential election | 39.1% | 95% CI 37.4% to 40.8% | 4,008 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | v_lths_2024 | | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 65.3% | 95% CI 64.9% to 65.7% | 72,590 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | cit_2024 | | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2020 presidential election | 66.8% | 95% CI 66.4% to 67.1% | 81,898 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | cit_2020 | | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 1996 presidential election | 58.4% | 95% CI 58.0% to 58.7% | 84,090 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | cit_1996 | | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration (symmetric split of the product of the registered share and turnout among the registered), citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more and without a high school diploma | 2024 | 70% | 95% CI 67% to 73% | 29,750 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | regshare_educ_2024 | | count of person records | adults 18 and older with a positive supplement weight | 1976 to 2024 | 2,494,218 | | | none (count of records) | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | n_adults | | count of person records | citizens 18 and older | 1994 to 2024 | 1,422,311 | | | none (count of records) | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | n_citizens | | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | citizens 18 and older | 2004 | 10.8% | | 96,452 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | nr_2004 | | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | citizens 18 and older | 2018 | 17.7% | | 88,749 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | nr_2018 | | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | citizens 18 and older | 2024 | 14.1% | | 72,590 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | nr_2024 | | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2004 presidential election | 63.8% | 95% CI 63.5% to 64.2% | 96,452 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | cit_2004 | | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2008 presidential election | 63.6% | 95% CI 63.3% to 64.0% | 92,360 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | cit_2008 | ## Findings In the November 2024 Current Population Survey (CPS), 65.3% (95% CI 64.9% to 65.7%) of citizens reported voting, against 66.8% in 2020 and 58.4% in 1996, the first presidential year in which the extract identifies citizens. In 2024 turnout rose with age, education and family income. Among citizens twenty-five and older, 79.6% of those with a bachelor's degree voted, against 39.1% of those without a high school diploma. Registration accounts for most of the 2024 gaps by age, education, income and ethnicity. About 70% (95% CI 67% to 73%) of the education gap in turnout arises at registration rather than in voting among the registered (Table 2). The share for the White-Black gap depends on how nonresponse is coded. Turnout here is the share of a group who report voting, and the default group is citizens eighteen and older. The data are the Voting and Registration Supplement, a November addition to the Census Bureau's monthly household survey, in the harmonized IPUMS extract. The extract holds 2,494,218 adults from the biennial supplements of 1976 to 2024, of whom 1,422,311 are citizens interviewed from 1994, the first year the extract records citizenship. Respondents say whether they voted, and no report is checked against a record. A person who does not answer counts as not voting, the Census Bureau's convention. The share who do not answer rose from 10.8% of citizens in 2004 to 17.7% in 2018 and was 14.1% in 2024. Hur and Achen attribute an apparent fall in 2008 relative to 2004 to this coding and to rising nonresponse [1]. In the series here, turnout among citizens was 63.8% in 2004 and 63.6% in 2008. Wolfinger and Rosenstone's study of who votes analyzed the 1972 and 1974 supplements [2]. (Note: Estimates are weighted with the supplement person weight, a survey weight. Intervals are 95% confidence intervals from the Kish effective sample size [3], which treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. The extract has no replicate weights, so the intervals leave out the clustering and stratification of the CPS design and are narrower than design-based intervals by an unknown factor.) ### Turnout in 2018 to 2024 was the highest of its type since 1994 Table 1 plots turnout in every election from 1994. In presidential years it was 58.4% in 1996, 63.8% in 2004 and 63.6% in 2008, then 61.8% in 2012 and 61.4% in 2016, and 66.8% in 2020 and 65.3% in 2024. In midterm years it stayed between 41.9% in 2014 and 48.4% in 1994 until the 2018 midterm, at 53.4%, and the 2022 midterm, at 52.2%. The presidential year exceeded the next midterm by 19.9 (95% CI 19.4 to 20.4) points in 2012, by 7.9 (95% CI 7.4 to 8.5) in 2016 and by 14.6 (95% CI 14.0 to 15.1) in 2020, against 13.1 (95% CI 12.5 to 13.6) in 1996. Table 1. Turnout among citizens in 2018 to 2024 was higher than in any election of its type from 1994 to 2016 The citizens series starts in 1994 because the extract records citizenship only from that year, and a rate with all adults in the denominator behaves differently. The second button of Table 1 shows it. Counting noncitizens as not voting, presidential-year turnout was 59.2% in 1976, 54.2% in 1996 and 59.3% in 2024. The two series differ because noncitizens, who count as not voting in the second, were 6.8% (95% CI 6.7% to 7.0%) of adults in 1994 and 9.3% (95% CI 9.1% to 9.5%) in 2024. McDonald and Popkin showed that a denominator which includes people who cannot vote misreads a trend in turnout [4]. Before 1994 the extract has no citizenship item. The supplement did not ask the voting question of 32.2% of Hispanic adults in 1980 and 40.2% in 1992, against 1.7% and 1.9% of White non-Hispanic adults, a pattern that matches the noncitizen shares of 1994 (40.8% and 1.8%). The Census Bureau counts these adults as not voting in its total-population series, and so does the all-residents view, which is the only series that runs from 1976 on one definition. The gradients below cover citizens from 1994. The Census Bureau's own tables give a citizen series for earlier years from an item that the extract lacks, and the last section says what that series shows. ### Registration accounts for most of the 2024 turnout gaps Table 2 shows three rates for the same groups: the share who voted, the share who were registered, and the share of the registered who voted. A citizen counts as registered if the person voted or said they were registered. The differences in turnout in 2024 were 23.9 (95% CI 22.7 to 25.2) points between citizens aged sixty-five and older and those aged eighteen to twenty-nine, and 40.5 (95% CI 38.7 to 42.4) between a bachelor's degree and no high school diploma. They were 20.2 (95% CI 19.3 to 21.1) between the highest and lowest third of family income, 10.4 (95% CI 9.0 to 11.8) between White and Black citizens and 19.9 (95% CI 18.6 to 21.2) between White and Hispanic citizens. The education difference is the largest of the five. Table 2. In 2024 turnout rose with age, education and family income, and Hispanic citizens had the lowest turnout of the racial and ethnic groups Writing the turnout rate as the registered share times the share of the registered who vote splits each difference into two parts, and the methods note gives the formula. The split depends on which part is changed first, so the text reports the symmetric midpoint, the range across the two orders for education, and a bootstrap interval that omits the design effect. In 2024 the registered share differed more across groups than the share of the registered who vote. For education the registered share of citizens ran from 51.4% among those without a high school diploma to 84.5% among those with a bachelor's degree, while the share of the registered who voted ran only from 76.1% to 94.2%. The registered shares thus differed by 33.2 (95% CI 31.3 to 35.0) points and the shares of the registered who voted by 18.1 (95% CI 16.0 to 20.2). The registration part of the turnout difference was 68% (95% CI 65% to 71%) for age, 70% (95% CI 67% to 73%) for education, 69% (95% CI 67% to 71%) for income, 62% (95% CI 55% to 68%) for White and Black citizens and 70% (95% CI 67% to 74%) for White and Hispanic citizens. For education the two orders of the split give 62% and 77%. In the 2020 presidential election it ran from 72% for age to 83% for White and Black citizens. In the 2022 midterm it ran from 48% for age to 62% for income, nearer an even split, since voting among the registered differed more across groups. The age difference among the registered was 28.2 (95% CI 26.7 to 29.6) points in 2022 against 10.8 (95% CI 9.7 to 11.9) in 2024. A person who does not answer the voting question counts as not voting, and as not registered unless the person reported being registered, and nonresponse differs by group. In 2024 it was 18.0% of citizens aged eighteen to twenty-nine against 12.1% of those sixty-five and older, and 17.6% of Black and 17.0% of Hispanic citizens against 12.6% of White citizens. Part of the registration component therefore reflects who answers the survey. Among respondents only, the registration part of the White-Black difference was 44% in 2024, 61% in 2020 and 38% in 2022, against 62%, 83% and 53% under the Census convention. It is the only 2024 share that falls below an even split; among respondents the other four stay above it, at 67% for education, 65% for age, 65% for income and 67% for ethnicity. Dropping the nonrespondents also changes some turnout differences. The White minus Black difference was 7.7 (95% CI 6.3 to 9.1) points among respondents against 10.4 under the Census convention, and the education difference was 42.9 (95% CI 40.9 to 44.9) against 40.5. The age, Hispanic and income differences were 23.0, 19.6 and 20.7, close to their Census-convention values. ### Age: the gap between the oldest and youngest narrowed from 1996 to 2008 Table 3 follows the four age groups. The oldest group voted most and the youngest least in every election. In presidential years the gap between citizens aged sixty-five and older and those aged eighteen to twenty-nine fell from 29.5 (95% CI 28.4 to 30.7) points in 1996 to 19.3 (95% CI 18.1 to 20.4) in 2008, a change of −10.3 (95% CI −11.9 to −8.7) points. It rose to 27.0 in 2012, was 20.4 (95% CI 19.2 to 21.5) in 2020 and was 23.9 (95% CI 22.7 to 25.2) in 2024, when citizens aged sixty-five and older reported voting at 74.7% and those aged eighteen to twenty-nine at 50.7%. The narrowing between 1996 and 2008 came from the youngest group, whose turnout rose from 39.6% to 51.1%, while the oldest group's moved from 69.1% to 70.3%. Table 3. Turnout was highest in the oldest and lowest in the youngest age group in every election, and the gap between them fell from 29.5 points in 1996 to 19.3 in 2008 In midterm years the gap was 37.1 points in 1994, 39.5 (95% CI 38.5 to 40.5) in 2014 and 30.6 (95% CI 29.4 to 31.7) in 2018, a change of −9.0 (95% CI −10.5 to −7.5) points from 2014, and it was 35.7 in 2022, up by +5.1 (95% CI 3.5 to 6.7) points from 2018. A cross-section cannot say whether the narrowing means that young adults vote more than earlier young adults did, because each survey interviews different people and the age groups differ in other ways too. Chapter 3.6, Age and generation (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation) separates age and birth cohort where the data allow it, and panel studies that follow the same young adults over time are the usual tool for how voting habits form [5]. ### Race and ethnicity: Black turnout fell below White turnout after 2012 Table 4 compares four groups with White non-Hispanic citizens. In 2024 White non-Hispanic citizens voted at 70.5%, Black citizens at 60.1%, Asian citizens at 57.6% and Hispanic citizens at 50.6%. The White minus Black difference was 7.7 (95% CI 6.5 to 9.0) points in 1996 and 0.9 (95% CI −0.3 to 2.1) in 2008, an interval that includes zero. In 2012 Black turnout was above White turnout, and the difference was −2.5 (95% CI −3.6 to −1.4) points. It was then 5.7 in 2016, 8.1 (95% CI 6.9 to 9.4) in 2020 and 10.4 (95% CI 9.0 to 11.8) in 2024, a change of +12.9 (95% CI 11.1 to 14.7) points from 2012. The White minus Hispanic difference was 16.8 points in 1996 and 19.9 (95% CI 18.6 to 21.2) in 2024, a change of +3.1 (95% CI 1.0 to 5.2) points. The White minus Asian difference went from 22.5 (95% CI 20.3 to 24.7) points in 2004 to 11.6 (95% CI 9.8 to 13.4) in 2020 and 12.9 (95% CI 11.0 to 14.7) in 2024, a change of −9.6 (95% CI −12.5 to −6.8) points since 2004. Table 4. Black turnout went from above White turnout in 2012 to below it in 2024, and Hispanic turnout stayed below White turnout in every election The buttons for all residents count noncitizens as not voting. Noncitizens were 30.3% of Hispanic adults and 27.3% of Asian adults in 2024, against 1.8% of White non-Hispanic adults, so the denominator moves the Hispanic and Asian lines far more than the White line. The White minus Hispanic difference was 34.0 (95% CI 32.9 to 35.0) points among all residents in 2024 against 19.9 among citizens. Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) takes up how the three groups voted. The race groups are single-race and non-Hispanic, except for the Hispanic group of any race, and the survey allowed respondents to report more than one race from 2003. ### Education: the degree-to-no-diploma gap was wider in 2024 than in 1996 Education is measured for citizens twenty-five and older, and Table 5 shows four levels. The order of the levels is the same in every election. In presidential years the gap between a bachelor's degree and no high school diploma was 36.1 (95% CI 34.9 to 37.3) points in 1996, 37.7 in 2008, 36.3 (95% CI 34.6 to 37.9) in 2020 and 40.5 (95% CI 38.7 to 42.4) in 2024. The change from 1996 to 2024 was +4.5 (95% CI 2.3 to 6.6) points, and the change from 2020 to 2024 was +4.3 (95% CI 1.8 to 6.7) points. The gap between a bachelor's degree and a high school diploma changed less, from 22.9 (95% CI 21.9 to 23.8) points in 1996 to 24.3 (95% CI 23.3 to 25.3) in 2024, a change of +1.4 (95% CI 0.1 to 2.8) points. Table 5. The turnout gap between citizens with a bachelor's degree and those without a high school diploma was wider in 2024 than in 1996 In midterm years the gap was 29.1 points in 1998, 32.5 in 2014 and 38.4 (95% CI 36.7 to 40.1) in 2022. Chapter 3.2, The diploma divide (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide) covers the issues on which graduates and non-graduates differ. ### Family income: turnout rose with income, and the gap changed little after 2012 Family income is reported in brackets that differ across decades: fourteen through 2002 and sixteen from 2004, with different dollar limits. A fixed dollar scale would compare different parts of the distribution, so the groups here are within-year thirds. In each year the brackets are laid out along the distribution of citizens, a bracket that straddles a cut-off is split in proportion, and each group holds the same weighted number of citizens. Table 6 shows the result. Turnout rose with income in every election. Table 6. Turnout rose with family income in every election, and the highest third voted at rates about the same distance above the lowest third in 2012 and 2024 The highest third voted 23.8 (95% CI 22.9 to 24.7) points above the lowest in 1996, 20.9 (95% CI 20.0 to 21.8) in 2008, 20.1 (95% CI 19.2 to 20.9) in 2012 and 20.2 (95% CI 19.3 to 21.1) in 2024, when the highest third voted at 74.5% and the lowest third at 54.3%. The line breaks between 2008 and 2010 because the treatment of missing income changes. Through 2008 citizens who did not report a bracket are outside the thirds. The share who did not report rose from 11.4% of citizens in 1996 to 20.6% in 2008, and in 2008 they voted at 47.3% against 67.9% for citizens who reported income. From 2010 the Census Bureau allocates missing family income, so the thirds include allocated values. The two segments are not comparable in level. The change within the first, from 1996 to 2008, was −2.9 (95% CI −4.2 to −1.6) points, and the change within the second, from 2012 to 2024, was +0.2 (95% CI −1.1 to 1.4) points, an interval that includes zero. In midterm years the gap was 19.1 points in 1998, 17.7 in 2014, 19.7 in 2018 and 19.7 in 2022. Chapter 3.3, The income ladder (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder) takes up how income relates to the choice of party among those who vote. ### Adjustment shrinks the White-Black difference and not the White-Asian one The groups overlap: older citizens differ from younger ones in education, and White citizens differ from Black and Hispanic citizens in education and income. Table 7 compares each difference with one characteristic in a linear probability model against the same difference with age, race and ethnicity, education and family income in the model together. The models cover citizens twenty-five and older. Table 7. Net of age, education and family income, the White-Black turnout difference was 3.4 points in 2024 and the Asian-White difference did not shrink In 2024 the White minus Black difference fell from 9.7 (95% CI 7.6 to 11.8) points to 3.4 (95% CI 1.6 to 5.3), and the White minus Hispanic difference from 18.8 (95% CI 16.5 to 21.2) to 10.5 (95% CI 8.1 to 12.9). In 2020 the adjusted White minus Black difference was 0.9 (95% CI −1.0 to 2.9) points, an interval that includes zero, and in 2016 it was −2.6 (95% CI −5.2 to −0.1), with Black citizens above White citizens in the point estimate. The education and income differences shrank proportionally less: the bachelor's degree minus no diploma difference went from 40.5 (95% CI 36.5 to 44.6) points to 34.5 (95% CI 30.8 to 38.2), and the highest minus lowest third of income from 20.3 (95% CI 18.6 to 22.0) to 13.6 (95% CI 12.3 to 14.9). The White minus Asian difference was 13.1 (95% CI 11.4 to 14.8) alone and 14.6 (95% CI 13.0 to 16.1) with the other characteristics, and the difference between citizens sixty-five and older and those aged twenty-five to forty-four grew from 14.5 (95% CI 13.2 to 15.7) to 18.2 (95% CI 17.0 to 19.5). These are associations in a descriptive model, and they do not show that education or income changes anyone's probability of voting. ### In 2020 and 2024 most voters voted by mail or early in person The supplement asks every person who reports voting how they voted, in person or by mail, from 1996, and from 2004 whether they voted on Election Day or before it. Table 8 plots the shares. In 2004, 79.0% of voters voted in person on Election Day, 12.9% by mail and 7.8% in person before Election Day. By 2016 the shares were 59.5%, 20.9% and 18.9%. In 2020 only 30.4% voted in person on Election Day, while 43.0% voted by mail and 26.0% in person before Election Day, and mail or early in-person voting together accounted for 69.0%. In 2024 the shares were 39.6%, 29.0% and 30.7%, and mail or early in-person voting together accounted for 59.7%. Table 8. Voting by mail rose to 43.0% of voters in 2020 and fell to 29.0% in 2024, while voting in person before Election Day reached 30.7% From 2020 to 2024 the mail share fell from 43.0% to 29.0%, the early in-person share rose from 26.0% to 30.7% and the Election Day share rose from 30.4% to 39.6%. Election Day voting in 2024 was still below its 2016 level of 59.5%. In the 2022 midterm 31.8% of voters used the mail, against 23.1% in 2018, and 18.0% voted in person before Election Day. Older voters used the mail more: 53.6% of voters aged sixty-five and older voted by mail in 2020 against 39.9% of those aged eighteen to twenty-four, and 36.8% against 26.3% in 2024. The Census Bureau's report on 2020 describes the rise as a response to changes in election procedures during the pandemic [6]. The Election Assistance Commission's tabulation of administrative records agrees with the survey on the mail and Election Day shares for 2020 [7], but the Commission publishes higher early in-person shares than the survey in both 2020 and 2024 [8]. Its percentages are computed state by state and sum to more than the whole. Its counts of early in-person ballots agree closely with the survey's weighted counts and show the same rise from 2020 to 2024. The survey's split between early and Election Day voting in 2024 should therefore be read as approximate (the methods note gives the figures). The checks on these items are a tabulation of codes and universes by year, which shows that only persons who reported voting have an answer in every supplement. The second check is a match of the 2018 to 2024 shares to the Census Bureau's published tables. ### Reported voters exceeded ballots counted through 2000 and were close from 2004 Surveys of reported turnout are known to run above official turnout, and over-reporting is more common among some groups than others [9]. The rates here are not benchmarked to the voting-eligible population, the usual denominator for official turnout, because that series was not available. Table 9 compares counts and sets the weighted number of adults who reported voting against the ballots counted for president in each presidential year. Table 9. The CPS count of reported voters exceeded the ballots counted for president by 6.0% to 11.6% through 2000 and was within 3% of them from 2004 to 2024 Relative to the count of ballots for president, the CPS count was 6.0% to 11.6% higher in the seven elections from 1976 to 2000. It was +2.8% (95% CI 2.2% to 3.4%) in 2004 and within 3% of the count in every election from 2004 to 2024, with −2.5% (95% CI −3.0% to −1.9%) in 2020, below the count. Two things push in opposite directions. Reporting voting when one did not raises the count. Counting a nonrespondent as not voting lowers it, and nonresponse rose from 10.8% of citizens in 2004 to 13.8% in 2008 and 15.7% in 2020. That rise is consistent with the narrowing of the count, but the data do not test it. Dropping the nonrespondents gives turnout of 79.2% in 2020 against 66.8% under the Census convention, and 76.1% in 2024 against 65.3%. The ANES, a different survey of a different sample, gives 77.3% (95% CI 75.9% to 78.6%) for 2020 and 78.9% (95% CI 77.3% to 80.5%) for 2024 with its post-election weight. Both are above the CPS rate under the Census convention, and the ANES is below the respondents-only CPS rate in 2020 and above it in 2024. The count comparison does not test the CPS denominator, the civilian noninstitutional population. ### What these data cannot show The CPS reports what respondents say, and the extract has no validated vote. The validated-vote study cited above found over-reporting more common among more educated respondents and found that using reported instead of verified voting inflates the effect of variables tied to over-reporting [9]. The education gradient and the registered shares of the better educated may therefore be overstated here by an amount the data do not give. Nonresponse is also tied to the characteristics studied, and the Census convention's treatment of it changes some differences: the White minus Black difference in 2024 is smaller among respondents than under the convention. The supplements are repeated cross-sections. They interview different people each time, so they cannot say whether a group's turnout changed because its members changed their behavior or because its composition changed, for example as the share of citizens with a bachelor's degree grew. A gap between age groups mixes age, period and birth cohort. Chapter 3.1, The two coalitions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions) takes up who the voters are compared with all eligible adults, a different question from the turnout rates here. The headline comparison starts in 1994, and citizen turnout was higher earlier on the Census Bureau's own series. Its historical table of reported voting gives 67.7% for 1992, above the 66.8% of 2020 and the 65.3% of 2024, from a citizenship item that the extract lacks. The finding that 2018 to 2024 exceeded earlier elections of their type therefore covers 1994 to 2016 only. Citizens are also not the same as eligible voters. The citizen count includes citizens who cannot vote because of a criminal conviction or residence rules and leaves out citizens in institutions and abroad, and the extract has no measure of either. The CPS identifies roughly three hundred large counties, which supports no county or small-area estimate, and no state estimates are made, because state rates would need the benchmark that was not available here. The intervals omit the CPS design effect, so every interval is too narrow by an unknown factor, and a result whose interval lies close to zero should be read with that in mind. The change in the gap between a bachelor's degree and a high school diploma from 1996 to 2024, +1.4 (95% CI 0.1 to 2.8), is an example. Family income is a householder-family bracket with allocated values from 2010, so it measures neither wealth nor individual earnings, and the thirds before and after 2010 are not on one footing. The race groups are broad, with all Asian citizens in one group and Hispanic citizens of every origin in another. The adjusted differences describe a model with four characteristics and do not identify why any group votes at a different rate. The method and timing items are self-reports. They match the Census Bureau tables, but the administrative tabulation gives higher early in-person shares, so the split between early and Election Day voting should be read as approximate. ## Tables ### Table 1. Turnout among citizens in 2018 to 2024 was higher than in any election of its type from 1994 to 2016 Percent of citizens 18 and older who reported voting, presidential and midterm elections, 1994 to 2024 (the second button counts all residents, 1976 to 2024); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Year | Election type | Universe | Turnout (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1994 | Midterm years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 48.4 | 48.0 | 48.8 | 95,272 | | 1998 | Midterm years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 45.3 | 44.9 | 45.7 | 84,076 | | 2002 | Midterm years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 46.1 | 45.8 | 46.5 | 98,638 | | 2006 | Midterm years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 47.8 | 47.4 | 48.2 | 94,095 | | 2010 | Midterm years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 45.5 | 45.2 | 45.9 | 94,208 | | 2014 | Midterm years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 41.9 | 41.6 | 42.3 | 96,267 | | 2018 | Midterm years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 53.4 | 53.1 | 53.8 | 88,749 | | 2022 | Midterm years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 52.2 | 51.8 | 52.6 | 73,083 | | 1996 | Presidential years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 58.4 | 58.0 | 58.7 | 84,090 | | 2000 | Presidential years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 59.5 | 59.1 | 59.8 | 82,428 | | 2004 | Presidential years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 63.8 | 63.5 | 64.2 | 96,452 | | 2008 | Presidential years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 63.6 | 63.3 | 64.0 | 92,360 | | 2012 | Presidential years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 61.8 | 61.5 | 62.2 | 94,311 | | 2016 | Presidential years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 61.4 | 61.0 | 61.7 | 93,794 | | 2020 | Presidential years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 66.8 | 66.4 | 67.1 | 81,898 | | 2024 | Presidential years | Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 | 65.3 | 64.9 | 65.7 | 72,590 | | 1978 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 45.9 | 45.6 | 46.2 | 104,870 | | 1982 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 48.5 | 48.2 | 48.9 | 112,372 | | 1986 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 45.8 | 45.4 | 46.1 | 108,410 | | 1990 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 44.5 | 44.1 | 44.8 | 108,987 | | 1994 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 45.0 | 44.7 | 45.4 | 101,630 | | 1998 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 41.9 | 41.6 | 42.3 | 89,989 | | 2002 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 42.3 | 41.9 | 42.6 | 105,682 | | 2006 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 43.6 | 43.2 | 43.9 | 101,640 | | 2010 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 41.8 | 41.4 | 42.1 | 101,338 | | 2014 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 38.5 | 38.1 | 38.8 | 103,323 | | 2018 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 49.0 | 48.6 | 49.3 | 95,154 | | 2022 | Midterm years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 47.7 | 47.3 | 48.1 | 78,597 | | 1976 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 59.2 | 58.8 | 59.5 | 89,090 | | 1980 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 59.0 | 58.7 | 59.4 | 123,591 | | 1984 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 59.7 | 59.3 | 60.0 | 110,115 | | 1988 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 57.1 | 56.8 | 57.5 | 102,945 | | 1992 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 60.7 | 60.4 | 61.1 | 105,987 | | 1996 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 54.2 | 53.9 | 54.6 | 89,609 | | 2000 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 54.4 | 54.1 | 54.8 | 88,884 | | 2004 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 58.3 | 57.9 | 58.6 | 103,696 | | 2008 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 58.2 | 57.8 | 58.5 | 99,556 | | 2012 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 56.5 | 56.2 | 56.9 | 101,568 | | 2016 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 56.0 | 55.7 | 56.4 | 100,946 | | 2020 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 61.3 | 60.9 | 61.7 | 87,589 | | 2024 | Presidential years | All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024 | 59.3 | 58.9 | 59.7 | 78,650 | Views: Citizens, 1994 to 2024 (basis = Citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024); All residents, 1976 to 2024 (basis = All residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024). Note: Turnout follows the Census Bureau convention: a respondent who did not answer the voting question counts as not voting. Note: The all-residents view counts adults whom the supplement did not ask the voting question (mostly noncitizens) as not voting, the Census total-population convention. In 1976 the supplement asked every adult, so almost no one is outside the question universe that year. The values match the Census Bureau's published total-population series to the printed decimal from 1994 except in 2000, and sit slightly below it in 1984 to 1992 and in 2000; the methods note gives the differences. Note: The citizens view starts in 1994, the first year the extract records citizenship. The Census Bureau's own tables give a citizen series for earlier years from an item that the extract does not carry. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and leave out the clustering and stratification of the CPS design, so they are narrower than design-based intervals by an unknown factor. Source: Current Population Survey, November Voting and Registration Supplement (IPUMS-CPS), 1976 to 2024 (citizens from 1994); weighted (VOSUPPWT) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/turnout_trend.json ### Table 2. In 2024 turnout rose with age, education and family income, and Hispanic citizens had the lowest turnout of the racial and ethnic groups Percent of citizens who voted, who were registered, and who voted among the registered, by age, race and ethnicity, education and family income, 2024 (buttons show other elections); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Year | Measure | Dimension | Group | Percent | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents | | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 65.3 | 64.9 | 65.7 | 72,590 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 50.7 | 49.7 | 51.8 | 12,303 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 61.9 | 61.0 | 62.7 | 16,754 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 70.0 | 69.3 | 70.6 | 22,628 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 74.7 | 74.0 | 75.4 | 20,905 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 70.5 | 70.0 | 70.9 | 52,237 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 60.1 | 58.7 | 61.4 | 6,636 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 50.6 | 49.4 | 51.8 | 8,064 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 57.6 | 55.9 | 59.4 | 3,853 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 57.3 | 54.5 | 60.2 | 1,800 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 39.1 | 37.4 | 40.8 | 4,008 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 55.3 | 54.4 | 56.1 | 18,383 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 69.2 | 68.4 | 70.0 | 17,338 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 79.6 | 79.0 | 80.2 | 25,742 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 54.3 | 53.6 | 55.0 | 26,368 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 67.2 | 66.6 | 67.8 | 35,210 | | 2024 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 74.5 | 73.9 | 75.1 | 28,984 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 73.6 | 73.3 | 74.0 | 72,590 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 61.7 | 60.7 | 62.7 | 12,303 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 71.9 | 71.2 | 72.7 | 16,754 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 77.2 | 76.6 | 77.8 | 22,628 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 80.3 | 79.7 | 80.9 | 20,905 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 77.7 | 77.2 | 78.1 | 52,237 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 70.3 | 69.1 | 71.6 | 6,636 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 61.5 | 60.3 | 62.6 | 8,064 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 66.2 | 64.5 | 67.8 | 3,853 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 68.9 | 66.2 | 71.5 | 1,800 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 51.4 | 49.6 | 53.1 | 4,008 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 65.8 | 65.0 | 66.6 | 18,383 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 78.2 | 77.5 | 78.9 | 17,338 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 84.5 | 84.0 | 85.0 | 25,742 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 65.1 | 64.4 | 65.8 | 26,368 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 74.8 | 74.2 | 75.4 | 35,210 | | 2024 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 81.0 | 80.4 | 81.5 | 28,984 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | All citizens | All citizens | 88.8 | 88.5 | 89.1 | 54,231 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 82.2 | 81.2 | 83.2 | 7,627 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 86.0 | 85.3 | 86.7 | 12,233 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 90.6 | 90.1 | 91.1 | 17,491 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 93.0 | 92.6 | 93.5 | 16,880 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | White | 90.7 | 90.4 | 91.1 | 40,754 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 85.4 | 84.3 | 86.5 | 4,698 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 82.3 | 81.1 | 83.4 | 5,000 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 87.1 | 85.6 | 88.6 | 2,546 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 83.2 | 80.7 | 85.8 | 1,233 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 76.1 | 74.0 | 78.2 | 2,115 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 84.0 | 83.3 | 84.7 | 12,334 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 88.5 | 87.9 | 89.1 | 13,658 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 94.2 | 93.8 | 94.6 | 21,949 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Lowest third | 83.4 | 82.8 | 84.1 | 17,698 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Middle third | 89.8 | 89.4 | 90.3 | 26,950 | | 2024 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Highest third | 92.0 | 91.6 | 92.5 | 23,573 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 52.2 | 51.8 | 52.6 | 73,083 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 31.2 | 30.3 | 32.1 | 12,305 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 46.9 | 46.1 | 47.8 | 16,909 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 58.3 | 57.5 | 59.0 | 23,378 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 66.8 | 66.1 | 67.6 | 20,491 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 57.6 | 57.2 | 58.1 | 52,569 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 45.6 | 44.3 | 47.0 | 7,247 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 37.9 | 36.7 | 39.0 | 7,741 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 40.2 | 38.5 | 42.0 | 3,755 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 42.9 | 40.0 | 45.7 | 1,771 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 29.2 | 27.7 | 30.8 | 4,251 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 43.9 | 43.1 | 44.7 | 18,919 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 55.8 | 55.0 | 56.6 | 17,609 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 67.7 | 67.0 | 68.3 | 25,233 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 41.8 | 41.1 | 42.5 | 29,857 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 53.3 | 52.7 | 54.0 | 35,033 | | 2022 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 61.5 | 60.8 | 62.2 | 25,708 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 69.1 | 68.7 | 69.5 | 73,083 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 53.5 | 52.5 | 54.5 | 12,305 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 68.0 | 67.2 | 68.8 | 16,909 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 73.4 | 72.8 | 74.0 | 23,378 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 77.4 | 76.7 | 78.0 | 20,491 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 73.2 | 72.8 | 73.6 | 52,569 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 64.6 | 63.4 | 65.9 | 7,247 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 57.8 | 56.6 | 59.0 | 7,741 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 59.8 | 58.0 | 61.5 | 3,755 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 63.7 | 60.9 | 66.4 | 1,771 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 48.7 | 47.0 | 50.4 | 4,251 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 62.2 | 61.4 | 63.0 | 18,919 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 74.7 | 73.9 | 75.4 | 17,609 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 80.3 | 79.8 | 80.9 | 25,233 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 60.2 | 59.5 | 60.8 | 29,857 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 70.9 | 70.2 | 71.5 | 35,033 | | 2022 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 76.3 | 75.7 | 76.9 | 25,708 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | All citizens | All citizens | 75.5 | 75.1 | 76.0 | 51,451 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 58.3 | 56.9 | 59.6 | 6,584 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 69.0 | 68.0 | 70.0 | 11,601 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 79.4 | 78.7 | 80.1 | 17,266 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 86.4 | 85.8 | 87.0 | 16,000 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | White | 78.7 | 78.3 | 79.2 | 38,831 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 70.6 | 69.1 | 72.1 | 4,840 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 65.5 | 64.0 | 67.0 | 4,424 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 67.3 | 65.1 | 69.5 | 2,232 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 67.3 | 63.9 | 70.7 | 1,124 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 60.0 | 57.6 | 62.4 | 2,106 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 70.6 | 69.7 | 71.6 | 12,050 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 74.7 | 73.9 | 75.6 | 13,339 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 84.2 | 83.7 | 84.8 | 20,514 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Lowest third | 69.5 | 68.7 | 70.3 | 18,956 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Middle third | 75.3 | 74.6 | 75.9 | 25,614 | | 2022 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Highest third | 80.5 | 79.9 | 81.2 | 19,807 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 66.8 | 66.4 | 67.1 | 81,898 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 54.1 | 53.2 | 55.0 | 14,347 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 64.4 | 63.6 | 65.1 | 19,144 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 71.0 | 70.4 | 71.6 | 27,161 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 74.5 | 73.8 | 75.1 | 21,246 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 70.9 | 70.5 | 71.4 | 59,555 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 62.8 | 61.6 | 64.0 | 8,419 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 53.7 | 52.6 | 54.9 | 8,163 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 59.3 | 57.6 | 61.1 | 3,860 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 58.7 | 55.9 | 61.5 | 1,901 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 43.7 | 42.1 | 45.2 | 5,000 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 58.0 | 57.3 | 58.8 | 21,412 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 71.1 | 70.4 | 71.8 | 20,091 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 80.0 | 79.4 | 80.5 | 27,130 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 56.1 | 55.5 | 56.8 | 30,319 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 67.7 | 67.1 | 68.3 | 33,174 | | 2020 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 76.5 | 75.9 | 77.1 | 36,140 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 72.7 | 72.3 | 73.0 | 81,898 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 62.5 | 61.6 | 63.4 | 14,347 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 71.5 | 70.8 | 72.2 | 19,144 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 75.7 | 75.1 | 76.3 | 27,161 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 78.6 | 77.9 | 79.2 | 21,246 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 76.5 | 76.1 | 76.9 | 59,555 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 69.1 | 68.0 | 70.2 | 8,419 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 61.1 | 60.0 | 62.3 | 8,163 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 63.5 | 61.8 | 65.2 | 3,860 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 68.7 | 66.1 | 71.3 | 1,901 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 53.1 | 51.6 | 54.7 | 5,000 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 65.5 | 64.8 | 66.3 | 21,412 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 77.0 | 76.4 | 77.7 | 20,091 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 83.1 | 82.6 | 83.6 | 27,130 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 64.3 | 63.7 | 65.0 | 30,319 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 73.4 | 72.8 | 73.9 | 33,174 | | 2020 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 80.3 | 79.8 | 80.9 | 36,140 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | All citizens | All citizens | 91.9 | 91.6 | 92.1 | 59,993 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 86.6 | 85.8 | 87.4 | 8,900 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 90.0 | 89.4 | 90.6 | 13,745 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 93.7 | 93.4 | 94.1 | 20,600 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 94.8 | 94.4 | 95.2 | 16,748 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | White | 92.8 | 92.5 | 93.0 | 45,350 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 90.9 | 90.0 | 91.7 | 5,894 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 87.9 | 87.0 | 88.9 | 4,970 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 93.5 | 92.4 | 94.6 | 2,476 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 85.5 | 83.1 | 87.8 | 1,303 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 82.2 | 80.6 | 83.9 | 2,686 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 88.5 | 87.9 | 89.1 | 14,188 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 92.3 | 91.8 | 92.7 | 15,568 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 96.2 | 95.9 | 96.5 | 22,666 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Lowest third | 87.2 | 86.7 | 87.8 | 19,967 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Middle third | 92.3 | 91.9 | 92.7 | 24,506 | | 2020 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Highest third | 95.2 | 94.9 | 95.5 | 28,675 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 53.4 | 53.1 | 53.8 | 88,749 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 35.6 | 34.7 | 36.4 | 15,758 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 48.8 | 48.0 | 49.6 | 20,821 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 59.5 | 58.8 | 60.1 | 30,528 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 66.1 | 65.4 | 66.8 | 21,642 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 57.5 | 57.0 | 57.9 | 64,983 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 51.4 | 50.2 | 52.6 | 8,773 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 40.4 | 39.3 | 41.5 | 8,745 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 40.4 | 38.7 | 42.1 | 4,100 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 45.5 | 42.9 | 48.2 | 2,148 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 30.0 | 28.7 | 31.3 | 6,074 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 44.9 | 44.2 | 45.6 | 23,004 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 57.7 | 56.9 | 58.4 | 22,009 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 69.5 | 68.9 | 70.1 | 28,734 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 43.3 | 42.6 | 43.9 | 34,941 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 54.1 | 53.5 | 54.7 | 35,374 | | 2018 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 62.9 | 62.3 | 63.5 | 36,649 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 66.9 | 66.5 | 67.2 | 88,749 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 52.9 | 52.0 | 53.8 | 15,758 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 64.3 | 63.6 | 65.1 | 20,821 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 71.4 | 70.8 | 72.0 | 30,528 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 76.0 | 75.3 | 76.6 | 21,642 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 71.0 | 70.6 | 71.4 | 64,983 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 64.5 | 63.3 | 65.6 | 8,773 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 53.7 | 52.6 | 54.9 | 8,745 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 52.6 | 50.8 | 54.3 | 4,100 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 62.0 | 59.4 | 64.5 | 2,148 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 47.2 | 45.8 | 48.6 | 6,074 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 60.3 | 59.5 | 61.0 | 23,004 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 72.2 | 71.5 | 72.9 | 22,009 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 78.7 | 78.2 | 79.2 | 28,734 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 59.1 | 58.4 | 59.7 | 34,941 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 67.2 | 66.6 | 67.8 | 35,374 | | 2018 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 74.4 | 73.9 | 75.0 | 36,649 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | All citizens | All citizens | 79.9 | 79.5 | 80.3 | 60,349 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 67.2 | 66.0 | 68.3 | 8,298 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 75.9 | 75.0 | 76.7 | 13,571 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 83.3 | 82.7 | 83.8 | 21,897 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 87.1 | 86.5 | 87.6 | 16,583 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | White | 80.9 | 80.5 | 81.3 | 46,399 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 79.7 | 78.5 | 80.9 | 5,775 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 75.2 | 73.8 | 76.5 | 4,687 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 76.8 | 74.8 | 78.8 | 2,151 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 73.5 | 70.6 | 76.4 | 1,337 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 63.6 | 61.6 | 65.6 | 2,930 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 74.5 | 73.7 | 75.3 | 14,108 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 79.9 | 79.2 | 80.6 | 16,064 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 88.3 | 87.8 | 88.8 | 22,907 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Lowest third | 73.3 | 72.5 | 74.0 | 21,328 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Middle third | 80.5 | 80.0 | 81.1 | 24,401 | | 2018 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Highest third | 84.6 | 84.0 | 85.1 | 27,344 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 61.4 | 61.0 | 61.7 | 93,794 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 46.1 | 45.3 | 47.0 | 17,431 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 58.8 | 58.0 | 59.5 | 21,923 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 66.6 | 66.1 | 67.2 | 33,170 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 70.9 | 70.2 | 71.6 | 21,270 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 65.3 | 64.9 | 65.7 | 69,164 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 59.6 | 58.5 | 60.7 | 9,556 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 47.6 | 46.4 | 48.7 | 8,703 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 48.9 | 47.2 | 50.7 | 4,079 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 50.2 | 47.6 | 52.7 | 2,292 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 37.3 | 36.0 | 38.6 | 6,908 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 53.9 | 53.2 | 54.6 | 24,702 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 66.0 | 65.3 | 66.7 | 23,525 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 77.1 | 76.6 | 77.7 | 28,684 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 50.2 | 49.6 | 50.8 | 32,737 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 62.5 | 61.9 | 63.1 | 42,544 | | 2016 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 71.4 | 70.9 | 72.0 | 35,668 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 70.3 | 70.0 | 70.7 | 93,794 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 58.5 | 57.6 | 59.3 | 17,431 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 68.6 | 67.9 | 69.3 | 21,923 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 74.0 | 73.5 | 74.5 | 33,170 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 78.0 | 77.4 | 78.7 | 21,270 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 73.9 | 73.5 | 74.3 | 69,164 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 69.6 | 68.5 | 70.6 | 9,556 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 57.3 | 56.1 | 58.4 | 8,703 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 56.5 | 54.8 | 58.3 | 4,079 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 63.0 | 60.5 | 65.5 | 2,292 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 49.2 | 47.8 | 50.5 | 6,908 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 64.6 | 64.0 | 65.3 | 24,702 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 75.0 | 74.4 | 75.6 | 23,525 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 82.5 | 82.0 | 83.0 | 28,684 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 61.9 | 61.2 | 62.5 | 32,737 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 71.1 | 70.5 | 71.6 | 42,544 | | 2016 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 78.1 | 77.6 | 78.6 | 35,668 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | All citizens | All citizens | 87.3 | 87.0 | 87.6 | 66,881 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 78.9 | 78.0 | 79.8 | 10,241 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 85.6 | 85.0 | 86.3 | 15,171 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 90.0 | 89.6 | 90.4 | 24,684 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 90.9 | 90.4 | 91.3 | 16,785 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | White | 88.3 | 88.0 | 88.7 | 51,372 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 85.6 | 84.7 | 86.6 | 6,810 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 83.1 | 81.9 | 84.2 | 5,015 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 86.6 | 85.0 | 88.2 | 2,262 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 79.6 | 77.0 | 82.2 | 1,422 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 75.9 | 74.3 | 77.5 | 3,498 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 83.4 | 82.7 | 84.0 | 16,166 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 88.0 | 87.5 | 88.6 | 17,825 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 93.5 | 93.2 | 93.9 | 23,854 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Lowest third | 81.2 | 80.6 | 81.8 | 20,718 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Middle third | 87.9 | 87.5 | 88.4 | 30,683 | | 2016 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Highest third | 91.5 | 91.1 | 91.9 | 27,965 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 61.8 | 61.5 | 62.2 | 94,311 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 45.0 | 44.2 | 45.9 | 17,998 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 59.5 | 58.8 | 60.3 | 22,680 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 67.9 | 67.3 | 68.4 | 34,382 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 72.0 | 71.3 | 72.7 | 19,251 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 64.1 | 63.7 | 64.5 | 71,460 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 66.6 | 65.6 | 67.7 | 9,232 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 48.0 | 46.7 | 49.2 | 7,812 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 47.1 | 45.2 | 49.0 | 3,640 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 55.3 | 52.8 | 57.9 | 2,167 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 41.2 | 40.0 | 42.5 | 7,512 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 56.0 | 55.3 | 56.7 | 25,733 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 67.6 | 66.9 | 68.3 | 23,322 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 77.8 | 77.3 | 78.4 | 27,231 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 51.6 | 51.0 | 52.3 | 31,102 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 62.1 | 61.5 | 62.7 | 37,036 | | 2012 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 71.7 | 71.1 | 72.3 | 41,910 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 71.2 | 70.9 | 71.5 | 94,311 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 57.8 | 57.0 | 58.7 | 17,998 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 70.2 | 69.5 | 70.9 | 22,680 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 75.4 | 74.9 | 75.9 | 34,382 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 79.4 | 78.8 | 80.1 | 19,251 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 73.7 | 73.4 | 74.1 | 71,460 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 73.2 | 72.2 | 74.2 | 9,232 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 58.7 | 57.5 | 59.9 | 7,812 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 56.1 | 54.3 | 58.0 | 3,640 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 67.9 | 65.5 | 70.3 | 2,167 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 54.5 | 53.2 | 55.7 | 7,512 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 66.9 | 66.2 | 67.5 | 25,733 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 76.9 | 76.2 | 77.5 | 23,322 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 83.4 | 82.9 | 83.9 | 27,231 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 63.3 | 62.7 | 63.9 | 31,102 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 71.3 | 70.8 | 71.9 | 37,036 | | 2012 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 78.9 | 78.4 | 79.5 | 41,910 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | All citizens | All citizens | 86.8 | 86.5 | 87.1 | 68,167 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 77.9 | 77.0 | 78.8 | 10,464 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 84.8 | 84.1 | 85.4 | 16,044 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 90.0 | 89.6 | 90.4 | 26,196 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 90.6 | 90.1 | 91.2 | 15,463 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | White | 87.0 | 86.7 | 87.3 | 53,258 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 91.0 | 90.3 | 91.8 | 6,847 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 81.7 | 80.5 | 82.9 | 4,547 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 83.9 | 82.1 | 85.7 | 2,054 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 81.5 | 79.1 | 84.0 | 1,461 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 75.7 | 74.3 | 77.2 | 4,129 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 83.8 | 83.1 | 84.4 | 17,415 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 87.9 | 87.4 | 88.5 | 18,059 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 93.3 | 92.9 | 93.7 | 22,925 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Lowest third | 81.5 | 80.9 | 82.1 | 20,020 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Middle third | 87.0 | 86.6 | 87.5 | 26,583 | | 2012 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Highest third | 90.8 | 90.4 | 91.2 | 32,994 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 63.6 | 63.3 | 64.0 | 92,360 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 51.1 | 50.2 | 51.9 | 17,867 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 61.8 | 61.1 | 62.5 | 23,057 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 69.2 | 68.6 | 69.7 | 34,266 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 70.3 | 69.5 | 71.1 | 17,170 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 66.1 | 65.7 | 66.5 | 71,497 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 65.2 | 64.1 | 66.3 | 8,607 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 49.9 | 48.6 | 51.1 | 6,925 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 47.2 | 45.3 | 49.2 | 3,349 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 57.5 | 54.7 | 60.2 | 1,982 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 41.6 | 40.4 | 42.8 | 8,467 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 57.0 | 56.3 | 57.7 | 26,066 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 70.6 | 69.9 | 71.3 | 22,758 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 79.3 | 78.7 | 79.9 | 24,625 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 57.0 | 56.3 | 57.7 | 27,450 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 68.7 | 68.0 | 69.3 | 26,322 | | 2008 | Voted (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 77.9 | 77.3 | 78.5 | 33,247 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | All citizens | All citizens | 71.0 | 70.7 | 71.3 | 92,360 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 61.1 | 60.3 | 61.9 | 17,867 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 69.4 | 68.7 | 70.1 | 23,057 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 74.9 | 74.4 | 75.4 | 34,266 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 77.4 | 76.7 | 78.1 | 17,170 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | White | 73.5 | 73.1 | 73.9 | 71,497 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 70.1 | 69.1 | 71.2 | 8,607 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 59.4 | 58.2 | 60.7 | 6,925 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 55.0 | 53.0 | 56.9 | 3,349 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 67.7 | 65.1 | 70.2 | 1,982 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 53.3 | 52.1 | 54.5 | 8,467 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 66.1 | 65.4 | 66.7 | 26,066 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 77.1 | 76.4 | 77.7 | 22,758 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 83.0 | 82.4 | 83.5 | 24,625 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Lowest third | 67.6 | 66.9 | 68.3 | 27,450 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Middle third | 76.5 | 75.9 | 77.1 | 26,322 | | 2008 | Registered (share of citizens) | Family income | Highest third | 83.4 | 82.8 | 83.9 | 33,247 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | All citizens | All citizens | 89.6 | 89.4 | 89.9 | 66,700 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 18 to 29 | 83.5 | 82.8 | 84.3 | 10,951 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 30 to 44 | 89.1 | 88.5 | 89.6 | 16,222 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 45 to 64 | 92.4 | 92.0 | 92.7 | 26,021 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Age | Ages 65 and older | 90.8 | 90.3 | 91.4 | 13,506 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | White | 90.0 | 89.7 | 90.2 | 53,301 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Black | 93.0 | 92.2 | 93.7 | 6,119 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic | 84.0 | 82.8 | 85.2 | 4,090 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Asian | 85.9 | 84.1 | 87.7 | 1,883 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Race and ethnicity | Other or multiple races | 84.9 | 82.5 | 87.3 | 1,307 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Less than high school | 78.1 | 76.7 | 79.4 | 4,586 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | High school graduate | 86.3 | 85.8 | 86.9 | 17,531 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Some college | 91.6 | 91.2 | 92.1 | 17,689 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Education (25 and older) | Bachelor's degree or more | 95.6 | 95.3 | 95.9 | 20,803 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Lowest third | 84.4 | 83.7 | 85.0 | 18,906 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Middle third | 89.8 | 89.3 | 90.3 | 20,261 | | 2008 | Voted (share of the registered) | Family income | Highest third | 93.5 | 93.1 | 93.9 | 27,640 | Views: 2024 (year = 2024); 2020 (year = 2020); 2016 (year = 2016); 2012 (year = 2012); 2008 (year = 2008); 2022 (year = 2022); 2018 (year = 2018). Note: Turnout follows the Census Bureau convention: a respondent who did not answer the voting question counts as not voting. Note: Education is shown for citizens 25 and older and is missing for younger adults. Income groups are within-year thirds of the family-income bracket distribution of citizens. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and leave out the clustering and stratification of the CPS design, so they are narrower than design-based intervals by an unknown factor. Note: The 2022 and 2018 buttons show midterm elections and the others show presidential elections. Source: Current Population Survey, November Voting and Registration Supplement (IPUMS-CPS), 2024, 2022, 2020, 2018, 2016, 2012 and 2008; weighted (VOSUPPWT) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/turnout_by_group.json ### Table 3. Turnout was highest in the oldest and lowest in the youngest age group in every election, and the gap between them fell from 29.5 points in 1996 to 19.3 in 2008 Percent of citizens who reported voting, by age group, presidential years 1996 to 2024 (the second button shows midterm years, 1994 to 2022); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Year | Election type | Group | Turnout (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1996 | Presidential | Ages 18 to 29 | 39.6 | 38.8 | 40.4 | 17,234 | | 2000 | Presidential | Ages 18 to 29 | 40.2 | 39.3 | 41.0 | 15,924 | | 2004 | Presidential | Ages 18 to 29 | 49.0 | 48.1 | 49.8 | 18,315 | | 2008 | Presidential | Ages 18 to 29 | 51.1 | 50.2 | 51.9 | 17,867 | | 2012 | Presidential | Ages 18 to 29 | 45.0 | 44.2 | 45.9 | 17,998 | | 2016 | Presidential | Ages 18 to 29 | 46.1 | 45.3 | 47.0 | 17,431 | | 2020 | Presidential | Ages 18 to 29 | 54.1 | 53.2 | 55.0 | 14,347 | | 2024 | Presidential | Ages 18 to 29 | 50.7 | 49.7 | 51.8 | 12,303 | | 1996 | Presidential | Ages 30 to 44 | 56.9 | 56.2 | 57.5 | 27,397 | | 2000 | Presidential | Ages 30 to 44 | 58.4 | 57.7 | 59.0 | 25,111 | | 2004 | Presidential | Ages 30 to 44 | 62.4 | 61.8 | 63.1 | 26,906 | | 2008 | Presidential | Ages 30 to 44 | 61.8 | 61.1 | 62.5 | 23,057 | | 2012 | Presidential | Ages 30 to 44 | 59.5 | 58.8 | 60.3 | 22,680 | | 2016 | Presidential | Ages 30 to 44 | 58.8 | 58.0 | 59.5 | 21,923 | | 2020 | Presidential | Ages 30 to 44 | 64.4 | 63.6 | 65.1 | 19,144 | | 2024 | Presidential | Ages 30 to 44 | 61.9 | 61.0 | 62.7 | 16,754 | | 1996 | Presidential | Ages 45 to 64 | 68.2 | 67.5 | 68.8 | 24,383 | | 2000 | Presidential | Ages 45 to 64 | 67.8 | 67.1 | 68.4 | 26,634 | | 2004 | Presidential | Ages 45 to 64 | 70.4 | 69.9 | 71.0 | 34,070 | | 2008 | Presidential | Ages 45 to 64 | 69.2 | 68.6 | 69.7 | 34,266 | | 2012 | Presidential | Ages 45 to 64 | 67.9 | 67.3 | 68.4 | 34,382 | | 2016 | Presidential | Ages 45 to 64 | 66.6 | 66.1 | 67.2 | 33,170 | | 2020 | Presidential | Ages 45 to 64 | 71.0 | 70.4 | 71.6 | 27,161 | | 2024 | Presidential | Ages 45 to 64 | 70.0 | 69.3 | 70.6 | 22,628 | | 1996 | Presidential | Ages 65 and older | 69.1 | 68.3 | 70.0 | 15,076 | | 2000 | Presidential | Ages 65 and older | 69.6 | 68.8 | 70.4 | 14,759 | | 2004 | Presidential | Ages 65 and older | 71.0 | 70.2 | 71.8 | 17,161 | | 2008 | Presidential | Ages 65 and older | 70.3 | 69.5 | 71.1 | 17,170 | | 2012 | Presidential | Ages 65 and older | 72.0 | 71.3 | 72.7 | 19,251 | | 2016 | Presidential | Ages 65 and older | 70.9 | 70.2 | 71.6 | 21,270 | | 2020 | Presidential | Ages 65 and older | 74.5 | 73.8 | 75.1 | 21,246 | | 2024 | Presidential | Ages 65 and older | 74.7 | 74.0 | 75.4 | 20,905 | | 1994 | Midterm | Ages 18 to 29 | 26.2 | 25.5 | 26.9 | 20,018 | | 1998 | Midterm | Ages 18 to 29 | 22.3 | 21.6 | 23.0 | 16,580 | | 2002 | Midterm | Ages 18 to 29 | 22.4 | 21.7 | 23.1 | 18,524 | | 2006 | Midterm | Ages 18 to 29 | 25.5 | 24.8 | 26.2 | 17,898 | | 2010 | Midterm | Ages 18 to 29 | 23.9 | 23.2 | 24.7 | 18,176 | | 2014 | Midterm | Ages 18 to 29 | 19.9 | 19.2 | 20.5 | 18,215 | | 2018 | Midterm | Ages 18 to 29 | 35.6 | 34.7 | 36.4 | 15,758 | | 2022 | Midterm | Ages 18 to 29 | 31.2 | 30.3 | 32.1 | 12,305 | | 1994 | Midterm | Ages 30 to 44 | 46.5 | 45.8 | 47.1 | 30,988 | | 1998 | Midterm | Ages 30 to 44 | 41.8 | 41.2 | 42.5 | 26,396 | | 2002 | Midterm | Ages 30 to 44 | 42.0 | 41.3 | 42.6 | 28,955 | | 2006 | Midterm | Ages 30 to 44 | 43.0 | 42.3 | 43.7 | 24,768 | | 2010 | Midterm | Ages 30 to 44 | 40.4 | 39.6 | 41.1 | 22,958 | | 2014 | Midterm | Ages 30 to 44 | 35.6 | 34.9 | 36.3 | 22,709 | | 2018 | Midterm | Ages 30 to 44 | 48.8 | 48.0 | 49.6 | 20,821 | | 2022 | Midterm | Ages 30 to 44 | 46.9 | 46.1 | 47.8 | 16,909 | | 1994 | Midterm | Ages 45 to 64 | 59.9 | 59.2 | 60.5 | 26,899 | | 1998 | Midterm | Ages 45 to 64 | 56.5 | 55.8 | 57.1 | 25,933 | | 2002 | Midterm | Ages 45 to 64 | 56.1 | 55.5 | 56.7 | 33,729 | | 2006 | Midterm | Ages 45 to 64 | 57.6 | 57.0 | 58.1 | 34,368 | | 2010 | Midterm | Ages 45 to 64 | 54.4 | 53.8 | 55.0 | 35,039 | | 2014 | Midterm | Ages 45 to 64 | 49.6 | 49.0 | 50.2 | 34,444 | | 2018 | Midterm | Ages 45 to 64 | 59.5 | 58.8 | 60.1 | 30,528 | | 2022 | Midterm | Ages 45 to 64 | 58.3 | 57.5 | 59.0 | 23,378 | | 1994 | Midterm | Ages 65 and older | 63.3 | 62.5 | 64.1 | 17,367 | | 1998 | Midterm | Ages 65 and older | 61.3 | 60.5 | 62.2 | 15,167 | | 2002 | Midterm | Ages 65 and older | 62.7 | 61.9 | 63.5 | 17,430 | | 2006 | Midterm | Ages 65 and older | 62.5 | 61.7 | 63.4 | 17,061 | | 2010 | Midterm | Ages 65 and older | 60.8 | 60.0 | 61.6 | 18,035 | | 2014 | Midterm | Ages 65 and older | 59.4 | 58.6 | 60.2 | 20,899 | | 2018 | Midterm | Ages 65 and older | 66.1 | 65.4 | 66.8 | 21,642 | | 2022 | Midterm | Ages 65 and older | 66.8 | 66.1 | 67.6 | 20,491 | Views: Presidential years (election = Presidential); Midterm years (election = Midterm). Note: Presidential years and midterm years are separate views; the default is presidential years. Note: Turnout rises with age in every election in the point estimates; the intervals of the two oldest groups overlap in 1996, 2004 and 2008. Turnout follows the Census Bureau convention: a respondent who did not answer the voting question counts as not voting. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and leave out the clustering and stratification of the CPS design, so they are narrower than design-based intervals by an unknown factor. Source: Current Population Survey, November Voting and Registration Supplement (IPUMS-CPS), 1994 to 2024; weighted (VOSUPPWT) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/age_trend.json ### Table 4. Black turnout went from above White turnout in 2012 to below it in 2024, and Hispanic turnout stayed below White turnout in every election Percent of citizens who reported voting, by race and ethnicity, presidential years 1996 to 2024 (other buttons show midterm years and all residents, noncitizens counted as not voting); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Year | Election type | Universe | Group | Turnout (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents | | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1996 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | White | 60.7 | 60.3 | 61.1 | 68,779 | | 2000 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | White | 62.0 | 61.6 | 62.4 | 65,881 | | 2004 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | White | 67.2 | 66.8 | 67.6 | 76,209 | | 2008 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | White | 66.1 | 65.7 | 66.5 | 71,497 | | 2012 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | White | 64.1 | 63.7 | 64.5 | 71,460 | | 2016 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | White | 65.3 | 64.9 | 65.7 | 69,164 | | 2020 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | White | 70.9 | 70.5 | 71.4 | 59,555 | | 2024 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | White | 70.5 | 70.0 | 70.9 | 52,237 | | 1996 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Black | 53.0 | 51.8 | 54.2 | 8,035 | | 2000 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Black | 57.1 | 55.9 | 58.2 | 8,285 | | 2004 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Black | 60.3 | 59.2 | 61.5 | 8,882 | | 2008 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Black | 65.2 | 64.1 | 66.3 | 8,607 | | 2012 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Black | 66.6 | 65.6 | 67.7 | 9,232 | | 2016 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Black | 59.6 | 58.5 | 60.7 | 9,556 | | 2020 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Black | 62.8 | 61.6 | 64.0 | 8,419 | | 2024 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Black | 60.1 | 58.7 | 61.4 | 6,636 | | 1996 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Hispanic | 44.0 | 42.4 | 45.6 | 4,308 | | 2000 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Hispanic | 44.3 | 42.8 | 45.8 | 5,100 | | 2004 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Hispanic | 47.2 | 45.8 | 48.5 | 6,089 | | 2008 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Hispanic | 49.9 | 48.6 | 51.1 | 6,925 | | 2012 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Hispanic | 48.0 | 46.7 | 49.2 | 7,812 | | 2016 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Hispanic | 47.6 | 46.4 | 48.7 | 8,703 | | 2020 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Hispanic | 53.7 | 52.6 | 54.9 | 8,163 | | 2024 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Hispanic | 50.6 | 49.4 | 51.8 | 8,064 | | 1996 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Asian | 45.8 | 43.3 | 48.3 | 1,950 | | 2000 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Asian | 43.2 | 40.8 | 45.6 | 2,174 | | 2004 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Asian | 44.7 | 42.6 | 46.9 | 2,909 | | 2008 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Asian | 47.2 | 45.3 | 49.2 | 3,349 | | 2012 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Asian | 47.1 | 45.2 | 49.0 | 3,640 | | 2016 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Asian | 48.9 | 47.2 | 50.7 | 4,079 | | 2020 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Asian | 59.3 | 57.6 | 61.1 | 3,860 | | 2024 | Presidential | Presidential Citizens | Asian | 57.6 | 55.9 | 59.4 | 3,853 | | 1994 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | White | 51.0 | 50.6 | 51.4 | 78,425 | | 1998 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | White | 47.4 | 47.0 | 47.8 | 68,228 | | 2002 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | White | 49.1 | 48.7 | 49.5 | 79,499 | | 2006 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | White | 51.6 | 51.2 | 52.0 | 73,383 | | 2010 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | White | 48.6 | 48.2 | 49.0 | 72,006 | | 2014 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | White | 45.8 | 45.3 | 46.2 | 71,723 | | 2018 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | White | 57.5 | 57.0 | 57.9 | 64,983 | | 2022 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | White | 57.6 | 57.2 | 58.1 | 52,569 | | 1994 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Black | 39.0 | 37.9 | 40.1 | 9,512 | | 1998 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Black | 41.8 | 40.7 | 43.0 | 7,993 | | 2002 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Black | 42.7 | 41.6 | 43.8 | 9,310 | | 2006 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Black | 41.3 | 40.1 | 42.4 | 8,671 | | 2010 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Black | 44.0 | 42.9 | 45.1 | 9,097 | | 2014 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Black | 40.6 | 39.5 | 41.7 | 9,912 | | 2018 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Black | 51.4 | 50.2 | 52.6 | 8,773 | | 2022 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Black | 45.6 | 44.3 | 47.0 | 7,247 | | 1994 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Hispanic | 34.4 | 32.8 | 35.9 | 4,343 | | 1998 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Hispanic | 32.8 | 31.4 | 34.3 | 4,707 | | 2002 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Hispanic | 30.4 | 29.1 | 31.7 | 5,872 | | 2006 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Hispanic | 32.3 | 31.1 | 33.5 | 6,558 | | 2010 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Hispanic | 31.2 | 30.1 | 32.4 | 7,522 | | 2014 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Hispanic | 27.0 | 26.0 | 28.0 | 8,243 | | 2018 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Hispanic | 40.4 | 39.3 | 41.5 | 8,745 | | 2022 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Hispanic | 37.9 | 36.7 | 39.0 | 7,741 | | 1994 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Asian | 40.0 | 37.4 | 42.5 | 1,820 | | 1998 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Asian | 32.3 | 30.1 | 34.6 | 2,163 | | 2002 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Asian | 31.0 | 29.0 | 33.1 | 2,779 | | 2006 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Asian | 32.0 | 30.1 | 33.9 | 3,189 | | 2010 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Asian | 31.3 | 29.6 | 33.1 | 3,592 | | 2014 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Asian | 27.6 | 26.0 | 29.1 | 4,076 | | 2018 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Asian | 40.4 | 38.7 | 42.1 | 4,100 | | 2022 | Midterm | Midterm Citizens | Asian | 40.2 | 38.5 | 42.0 | 3,755 | | 1996 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | White | 59.6 | 59.2 | 60.0 | 70,039 | | 2000 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | White | 60.6 | 60.2 | 61.1 | 67,287 | | 2004 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | White | 65.8 | 65.4 | 66.1 | 77,710 | | 2008 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | White | 64.8 | 64.4 | 65.2 | 72,783 | | 2012 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | White | 63.0 | 62.6 | 63.4 | 72,615 | | 2016 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | White | 64.1 | 63.7 | 64.5 | 70,249 | | 2020 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | White | 69.8 | 69.3 | 70.2 | 60,390 | | 2024 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | White | 69.2 | 68.8 | 69.7 | 53,001 | | 1996 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Black | 50.9 | 49.7 | 52.1 | 8,374 | | 2000 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Black | 54.2 | 53.1 | 55.4 | 8,698 | | 2004 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Black | 57.2 | 56.1 | 58.3 | 9,322 | | 2008 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Black | 61.7 | 60.6 | 62.8 | 9,100 | | 2012 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Black | 63.5 | 62.4 | 64.5 | 9,696 | | 2016 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Black | 56.5 | 55.4 | 57.6 | 10,002 | | 2020 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Black | 59.5 | 58.4 | 60.7 | 8,817 | | 2024 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Black | 56.1 | 54.8 | 57.5 | 7,056 | | 1996 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Hispanic | 26.7 | 25.6 | 27.9 | 6,969 | | 2000 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Hispanic | 26.7 | 25.7 | 27.7 | 8,382 | | 2004 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Hispanic | 28.0 | 27.0 | 28.9 | 10,174 | | 2008 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Hispanic | 31.6 | 30.6 | 32.5 | 10,871 | | 2012 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Hispanic | 31.8 | 30.9 | 32.7 | 11,846 | | 2016 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Hispanic | 32.5 | 31.6 | 33.4 | 12,622 | | 2020 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Hispanic | 38.8 | 37.8 | 39.7 | 11,259 | | 2024 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Hispanic | 35.2 | 34.3 | 36.2 | 11,556 | | 1996 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Asian | 25.9 | 24.2 | 27.6 | 3,200 | | 2000 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Asian | 25.1 | 23.5 | 26.7 | 3,515 | | 2004 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Asian | 30.5 | 28.8 | 32.1 | 4,104 | | 2008 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Asian | 32.1 | 30.6 | 33.6 | 4,779 | | 2012 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Asian | 31.8 | 30.3 | 33.2 | 5,217 | | 2016 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Asian | 34.1 | 32.7 | 35.5 | 5,752 | | 2020 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Asian | 42.7 | 41.2 | 44.2 | 5,206 | | 2024 | Presidential | Presidential All residents | Asian | 41.9 | 40.4 | 43.4 | 5,207 | | 1994 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | White | 50.1 | 49.7 | 50.5 | 79,878 | | 1998 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | White | 46.5 | 46.1 | 46.9 | 69,529 | | 2002 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | White | 48.0 | 47.6 | 48.4 | 81,060 | | 2006 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | White | 50.5 | 50.1 | 50.9 | 74,748 | | 2010 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | White | 47.8 | 47.4 | 48.2 | 73,169 | | 2014 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | White | 45.0 | 44.6 | 45.4 | 72,831 | | 2018 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | White | 56.5 | 56.1 | 56.9 | 65,927 | | 2022 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | White | 56.6 | 56.1 | 57.1 | 53,341 | | 1994 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Black | 37.4 | 36.3 | 38.5 | 9,945 | | 1998 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Black | 40.0 | 38.9 | 41.2 | 8,365 | | 2002 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Black | 40.4 | 39.3 | 41.5 | 9,803 | | 2006 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Black | 39.2 | 38.1 | 40.3 | 9,119 | | 2010 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Black | 41.6 | 40.5 | 42.7 | 9,650 | | 2014 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Black | 38.6 | 37.5 | 39.7 | 10,387 | | 2018 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Black | 48.8 | 47.6 | 50.0 | 9,190 | | 2022 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Black | 43.4 | 42.2 | 44.7 | 7,574 | | 1994 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Hispanic | 20.2 | 19.1 | 21.2 | 7,222 | | 1998 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Hispanic | 20.0 | 19.1 | 21.0 | 7,656 | | 2002 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Hispanic | 18.9 | 18.0 | 19.7 | 9,416 | | 2006 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Hispanic | 19.3 | 18.5 | 20.1 | 10,912 | | 2010 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Hispanic | 20.5 | 19.7 | 21.3 | 11,500 | | 2014 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Hispanic | 18.4 | 17.7 | 19.2 | 12,156 | | 2018 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Hispanic | 28.5 | 27.6 | 29.4 | 12,237 | | 2022 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Hispanic | 26.7 | 25.8 | 27.6 | 10,928 | | 1994 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Asian | 21.8 | 20.2 | 23.4 | 3,258 | | 1998 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Asian | 19.2 | 17.7 | 20.6 | 3,439 | | 2002 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Asian | 19.2 | 17.9 | 20.6 | 4,207 | | 2006 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Asian | 21.7 | 20.3 | 23.0 | 4,533 | | 2010 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Asian | 21.8 | 20.5 | 23.2 | 5,006 | | 2014 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Asian | 19.5 | 18.4 | 20.7 | 5,606 | | 2018 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Asian | 28.8 | 27.5 | 30.2 | 5,621 | | 2022 | Midterm | Midterm All residents | Asian | 29.7 | 28.3 | 31.1 | 4,957 | Views: Presidential years, citizens (view = Presidential Citizens); Midterm years, citizens (view = Midterm Citizens); Presidential years, all residents (view = Presidential All residents); Midterm years, all residents (view = Midterm All residents). Note: Presidential years and midterm years are separate views; the default is presidential years. Note: Persons of another or multiple races are left out of the lines; they appear in the earlier figure. Turnout follows the Census Bureau convention: a respondent who did not answer the voting question counts as not voting. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and leave out the clustering and stratification of the CPS design, so they are narrower than design-based intervals by an unknown factor. Source: Current Population Survey, November Voting and Registration Supplement (IPUMS-CPS), 1994 to 2024; weighted (VOSUPPWT) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/race_trend.json ### Table 5. The turnout gap between citizens with a bachelor's degree and those without a high school diploma was wider in 2024 than in 1996 Percent of citizens 25 and older who reported voting, by educational attainment, presidential years 1996 to 2024 (the second button shows midterm years); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Year | Election type | Group | Turnout (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1996 | Presidential | Less than high school | 41.9 | 41.0 | 42.9 | 11,692 | | 2000 | Presidential | Less than high school | 42.0 | 41.0 | 43.1 | 9,858 | | 2004 | Presidential | Less than high school | 42.2 | 41.1 | 43.3 | 10,233 | | 2008 | Presidential | Less than high school | 41.6 | 40.4 | 42.8 | 8,467 | | 2012 | Presidential | Less than high school | 41.2 | 40.0 | 42.5 | 7,512 | | 2016 | Presidential | Less than high school | 37.3 | 36.0 | 38.6 | 6,908 | | 2020 | Presidential | Less than high school | 43.7 | 42.1 | 45.2 | 5,000 | | 2024 | Presidential | Less than high school | 39.1 | 37.4 | 40.8 | 4,008 | | 1996 | Presidential | High school graduate | 55.1 | 54.5 | 55.8 | 25,825 | | 2000 | Presidential | High school graduate | 56.0 | 55.3 | 56.7 | 24,610 | | 2004 | Presidential | High school graduate | 59.0 | 58.3 | 59.6 | 28,012 | | 2008 | Presidential | High school graduate | 57.0 | 56.3 | 57.7 | 26,066 | | 2012 | Presidential | High school graduate | 56.0 | 55.3 | 56.7 | 25,733 | | 2016 | Presidential | High school graduate | 53.9 | 53.2 | 54.6 | 24,702 | | 2020 | Presidential | High school graduate | 58.0 | 57.3 | 58.8 | 21,412 | | 2024 | Presidential | High school graduate | 55.3 | 54.4 | 56.1 | 18,383 | | 1996 | Presidential | Some college | 67.0 | 66.3 | 67.8 | 18,879 | | 2000 | Presidential | Some college | 67.3 | 66.6 | 68.0 | 19,364 | | 2004 | Presidential | Some college | 71.6 | 70.9 | 72.3 | 22,991 | | 2008 | Presidential | Some college | 70.6 | 69.9 | 71.3 | 22,758 | | 2012 | Presidential | Some college | 67.6 | 66.9 | 68.3 | 23,322 | | 2016 | Presidential | Some college | 66.0 | 65.3 | 66.7 | 23,525 | | 2020 | Presidential | Some college | 71.1 | 70.4 | 71.8 | 20,091 | | 2024 | Presidential | Some college | 69.2 | 68.4 | 70.0 | 17,338 | | 1996 | Presidential | Bachelor's degree or more | 78.0 | 77.4 | 78.7 | 18,076 | | 2000 | Presidential | Bachelor's degree or more | 78.1 | 77.5 | 78.8 | 19,070 | | 2004 | Presidential | Bachelor's degree or more | 80.3 | 79.7 | 80.9 | 24,193 | | 2008 | Presidential | Bachelor's degree or more | 79.3 | 78.7 | 79.9 | 24,625 | | 2012 | Presidential | Bachelor's degree or more | 77.8 | 77.3 | 78.4 | 27,231 | | 2016 | Presidential | Bachelor's degree or more | 77.1 | 76.6 | 77.7 | 28,684 | | 2020 | Presidential | Bachelor's degree or more | 80.0 | 79.4 | 80.5 | 27,130 | | 2024 | Presidential | Bachelor's degree or more | 79.6 | 79.0 | 80.2 | 25,742 | | 1994 | Midterm | Less than high school | 34.1 | 33.2 | 34.9 | 14,134 | | 1998 | Midterm | Less than high school | 33.4 | 32.4 | 34.4 | 10,963 | | 2002 | Midterm | Less than high school | 31.0 | 30.0 | 32.0 | 10,837 | | 2006 | Midterm | Less than high school | 30.4 | 29.3 | 31.4 | 9,376 | | 2010 | Midterm | Less than high school | 28.3 | 27.2 | 29.5 | 8,070 | | 2014 | Midterm | Less than high school | 25.1 | 24.0 | 26.2 | 7,697 | | 2018 | Midterm | Less than high school | 30.0 | 28.7 | 31.3 | 6,074 | | 2022 | Midterm | Less than high school | 29.2 | 27.7 | 30.8 | 4,251 | | 1994 | Midterm | High school graduate | 46.7 | 46.1 | 47.4 | 29,451 | | 1998 | Midterm | High school graduate | 42.7 | 42.0 | 43.4 | 25,556 | | 2002 | Midterm | High school graduate | 43.4 | 42.7 | 44.0 | 29,364 | | 2006 | Midterm | High school graduate | 43.9 | 43.3 | 44.6 | 27,085 | | 2010 | Midterm | High school graduate | 41.3 | 40.6 | 42.0 | 26,354 | | 2014 | Midterm | High school graduate | 37.2 | 36.6 | 37.9 | 25,791 | | 2018 | Midterm | High school graduate | 44.9 | 44.2 | 45.6 | 23,004 | | 2022 | Midterm | High school graduate | 43.9 | 43.1 | 44.7 | 18,919 | | 1994 | Midterm | Some college | 56.9 | 56.2 | 57.7 | 21,201 | | 1998 | Midterm | Some college | 53.6 | 52.8 | 54.4 | 19,236 | | 2002 | Midterm | Some college | 53.2 | 52.5 | 54.0 | 23,691 | | 2006 | Midterm | Some college | 54.4 | 53.7 | 55.2 | 22,620 | | 2010 | Midterm | Some college | 50.7 | 50.0 | 51.4 | 23,320 | | 2014 | Midterm | Some college | 46.5 | 45.8 | 47.2 | 23,955 | | 2018 | Midterm | Some college | 57.7 | 56.9 | 58.4 | 22,009 | | 2022 | Midterm | Some college | 55.8 | 55.0 | 56.6 | 17,609 | | 1994 | Midterm | Bachelor's degree or more | 68.9 | 68.1 | 69.6 | 19,319 | | 1998 | Midterm | Bachelor's degree or more | 62.5 | 61.8 | 63.3 | 18,893 | | 2002 | Midterm | Bachelor's degree or more | 64.5 | 63.8 | 65.2 | 23,619 | | 2006 | Midterm | Bachelor's degree or more | 65.3 | 64.7 | 66.0 | 24,389 | | 2010 | Midterm | Bachelor's degree or more | 62.3 | 61.6 | 63.0 | 25,857 | | 2014 | Midterm | Bachelor's degree or more | 57.6 | 57.0 | 58.3 | 28,265 | | 2018 | Midterm | Bachelor's degree or more | 69.5 | 68.9 | 70.1 | 28,734 | | 2022 | Midterm | Bachelor's degree or more | 67.7 | 67.0 | 68.3 | 25,233 | Views: Presidential years (election = Presidential); Midterm years (election = Midterm). Note: Presidential years and midterm years are separate views; the default is presidential years. Note: Attainment is defined for adults 25 and older. Turnout follows the Census Bureau convention: a respondent who did not answer the voting question counts as not voting. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and leave out the clustering and stratification of the CPS design, so they are narrower than design-based intervals by an unknown factor. Source: Current Population Survey, November Voting and Registration Supplement (IPUMS-CPS), 1994 to 2024; weighted (VOSUPPWT) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/education_trend.json ### Table 6. Turnout rose with family income in every election, and the highest third voted at rates about the same distance above the lowest third in 2012 and 2024 Percent of citizens who reported voting, by within-year third of family income, presidential years 1996 to 2024 (the second button shows midterm years); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Year | Election type | Group | Turnout (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1996 | Presidential | Lowest third of family income | 48.0 | 47.3 | 48.7 | 25,451 | | 2000 | Presidential | Lowest third of family income | 49.5 | 48.8 | 50.2 | 27,793 | | 2004 | Presidential | Lowest third of family income | 54.9 | 54.2 | 55.6 | 28,685 | | 2008 | Presidential | Lowest third of family income | 57.0 | 56.3 | 57.7 | 27,450 | | 2012 | Presidential | Lowest third of family income | 51.6 | 51.0 | 52.3 | 31,102 | | 2016 | Presidential | Lowest third of family income | 50.2 | 49.6 | 50.8 | 32,737 | | 2020 | Presidential | Lowest third of family income | 56.1 | 55.5 | 56.8 | 30,319 | | 2024 | Presidential | Lowest third of family income | 54.3 | 53.6 | 55.0 | 26,368 | | 1996 | Presidential | Middle third | 59.2 | 58.5 | 59.9 | 37,994 | | 2000 | Presidential | Middle third | 63.0 | 62.3 | 63.7 | 29,923 | | 2004 | Presidential | Middle third | 67.9 | 67.3 | 68.5 | 34,409 | | 2008 | Presidential | Middle third | 68.7 | 68.0 | 69.3 | 26,322 | | 2012 | Presidential | Middle third | 62.1 | 61.5 | 62.7 | 37,036 | | 2016 | Presidential | Middle third | 62.5 | 61.9 | 63.1 | 42,544 | | 2020 | Presidential | Middle third | 67.7 | 67.1 | 68.3 | 33,174 | | 2024 | Presidential | Middle third | 67.2 | 66.6 | 67.8 | 35,210 | | 1996 | Presidential | Highest third | 71.8 | 71.2 | 72.4 | 24,604 | | 2000 | Presidential | Highest third | 72.7 | 72.1 | 73.4 | 22,500 | | 2004 | Presidential | Highest third | 78.2 | 77.6 | 78.7 | 30,412 | | 2008 | Presidential | Highest third | 77.9 | 77.3 | 78.5 | 33,247 | | 2012 | Presidential | Highest third | 71.7 | 71.1 | 72.3 | 41,910 | | 2016 | Presidential | Highest third | 71.4 | 70.9 | 72.0 | 35,668 | | 2020 | Presidential | Highest third | 76.5 | 75.9 | 77.1 | 36,140 | | 2024 | Presidential | Highest third | 74.5 | 73.9 | 75.1 | 28,984 | | 1994 | Midterm | Lowest third of family income | 37.6 | 37.0 | 38.2 | 32,705 | | 1998 | Midterm | Lowest third of family income | 36.9 | 36.3 | 37.6 | 27,133 | | 2002 | Midterm | Lowest third of family income | 37.9 | 37.3 | 38.6 | 30,713 | | 2006 | Midterm | Lowest third of family income | 39.6 | 38.9 | 40.3 | 25,387 | | 2010 | Midterm | Lowest third of family income | 35.8 | 35.2 | 36.4 | 32,675 | | 2014 | Midterm | Lowest third of family income | 32.7 | 32.1 | 33.2 | 35,868 | | 2018 | Midterm | Lowest third of family income | 43.3 | 42.6 | 43.9 | 34,941 | | 2022 | Midterm | Lowest third of family income | 41.8 | 41.1 | 42.5 | 29,857 | | 1994 | Midterm | Middle third | 48.9 | 48.3 | 49.5 | 36,492 | | 1998 | Midterm | Middle third | 46.5 | 45.8 | 47.1 | 31,286 | | 2002 | Midterm | Middle third | 48.2 | 47.5 | 48.8 | 35,262 | | 2006 | Midterm | Middle third | 51.9 | 51.2 | 52.6 | 31,974 | | 2010 | Midterm | Middle third | 45.7 | 45.1 | 46.3 | 37,807 | | 2014 | Midterm | Middle third | 42.9 | 42.3 | 43.4 | 43,489 | | 2018 | Midterm | Middle third | 54.1 | 53.5 | 54.7 | 35,374 | | 2022 | Midterm | Middle third | 53.3 | 52.7 | 54.0 | 35,033 | | 1994 | Midterm | Highest third | 60.8 | 60.2 | 61.5 | 34,235 | | 1998 | Midterm | Highest third | 56.0 | 55.3 | 56.7 | 27,870 | | 2002 | Midterm | Highest third | 57.3 | 56.7 | 58.0 | 29,617 | | 2006 | Midterm | Highest third | 60.2 | 59.6 | 60.9 | 32,257 | | 2010 | Midterm | Highest third | 55.1 | 54.5 | 55.7 | 39,511 | | 2014 | Midterm | Highest third | 50.3 | 49.7 | 50.9 | 33,852 | | 2018 | Midterm | Highest third | 62.9 | 62.3 | 63.5 | 36,649 | | 2022 | Midterm | Highest third | 61.5 | 60.8 | 62.2 | 25,708 | Views: Presidential years (election = Presidential); Midterm years (election = Midterm). Note: Presidential years and midterm years are separate views; the default is presidential years. Note: Thirds are formed within each year from the family-income brackets of citizens; a bracket that straddles a cut-off is split in proportion. Brackets change across decades, so no fixed dollar groups are used. Turnout follows the Census Bureau convention: a respondent who did not answer the voting question counts as not voting. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and leave out the clustering and stratification of the CPS design, so they are narrower than design-based intervals by an unknown factor. Source: Current Population Survey, November Voting and Registration Supplement (IPUMS-CPS), 1994 to 2024; weighted (VOSUPPWT) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/income_trend.json ### Table 7. Net of age, education and family income, the White-Black turnout difference was 3.4 points in 2024 and the Asian-White difference did not shrink Difference in turnout between the higher-turnout and lower-turnout group, percentage points, citizens 25 and older, 2024 (buttons show other elections); one characteristic alone against all four together; 95% intervals from standard errors clustered by state | Year | Contrast | One characteristic alone (points) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | All four together (points) | 95% CI low (adjusted) | 95% CI high (adjusted) | n respondents | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2024 | Ages 65 and older minus ages 25 to 44 | +14.5 | 13.2 | 15.7 | +18.2 | 17.0 | 19.5 | 65,471 | | 2024 | White minus Black | +9.7 | 7.6 | 11.8 | +3.4 | 1.6 | 5.3 | 65,471 | | 2024 | White minus Hispanic | +18.8 | 16.5 | 21.2 | +10.5 | 8.1 | 12.9 | 65,471 | | 2024 | White minus Asian | +13.1 | 11.4 | 14.8 | +14.6 | 13.0 | 16.1 | 65,471 | | 2024 | Bachelor's degree minus less than high school | +40.5 | 36.5 | 44.6 | +34.5 | 30.8 | 38.2 | 65,471 | | 2024 | Bachelor's degree minus high school graduate | +24.3 | 22.7 | 26.0 | +20.8 | 19.1 | 22.4 | 65,471 | | 2024 | Highest minus lowest third of family income | +20.3 | 18.6 | 22.0 | +13.6 | 12.3 | 14.9 | 65,471 | | 2020 | Ages 65 and older minus ages 25 to 44 | +11.9 | 10.1 | 13.7 | +15.5 | 13.8 | 17.1 | 73,633 | | 2020 | White minus Black | +7.4 | 5.2 | 9.7 | +0.9 | −1.0 | 2.9 | 73,633 | | 2020 | White minus Hispanic | +15.9 | 14.4 | 17.5 | +7.6 | 6.0 | 9.1 | 73,633 | | 2020 | White minus Asian | +12.5 | 9.9 | 15.2 | +14.1 | 11.8 | 16.4 | 73,633 | | 2020 | Bachelor's degree minus less than high school | +36.3 | 33.6 | 38.9 | +30.8 | 27.8 | 33.8 | 73,633 | | 2020 | Bachelor's degree minus high school graduate | +21.9 | 20.1 | 23.8 | +18.7 | 16.9 | 20.5 | 73,633 | | 2020 | Highest minus lowest third of family income | +20.1 | 18.7 | 21.5 | +13.2 | 12.0 | 14.4 | 73,633 | | 2016 | Ages 65 and older minus ages 25 to 44 | +14.4 | 12.9 | 16.0 | +19.2 | 18.0 | 20.5 | 83,819 | | 2016 | White minus Black | +5.0 | 2.5 | 7.6 | −2.6 | −5.2 | −0.1 | 83,819 | | 2016 | White minus Hispanic | +16.7 | 13.6 | 19.8 | +7.2 | 4.9 | 9.5 | 83,819 | | 2016 | White minus Asian | +17.1 | 13.9 | 20.2 | +18.1 | 15.7 | 20.4 | 83,819 | | 2016 | Bachelor's degree minus less than high school | +39.8 | 37.4 | 42.2 | +35.0 | 32.2 | 37.9 | 83,819 | | 2016 | Bachelor's degree minus high school graduate | +23.3 | 21.9 | 24.6 | +20.6 | 19.3 | 21.8 | 83,819 | | 2016 | Highest minus lowest third of family income | +21.6 | 20.5 | 22.7 | +13.9 | 12.9 | 14.8 | 83,819 | | 2022 | Ages 65 and older minus ages 25 to 44 | +22.6 | 20.8 | 24.4 | +26.9 | 25.2 | 28.6 | 66,012 | | 2022 | White minus Black | +11.6 | 9.1 | 14.0 | +3.9 | 1.3 | 6.6 | 66,012 | | 2022 | White minus Hispanic | +18.7 | 16.3 | 21.1 | +8.8 | 6.2 | 11.5 | 66,012 | | 2022 | White minus Asian | +17.9 | 14.7 | 21.1 | +19.4 | 17.0 | 21.7 | 66,012 | | 2022 | Bachelor's degree minus less than high school | +38.4 | 35.4 | 41.5 | +34.1 | 31.1 | 37.0 | 66,012 | | 2022 | Bachelor's degree minus high school graduate | +23.8 | 21.9 | 25.7 | +21.0 | 19.3 | 22.7 | 66,012 | | 2022 | Highest minus lowest third of family income | +19.9 | 18.2 | 21.7 | +13.9 | 12.6 | 15.2 | 66,012 | Views: 2024 (year = 2024); 2020 (year = 2020); 2016 (year = 2016); 2022 (year = 2022). Note: Weighted linear probability models of voting (0 or 1) with the Census convention, one model per election and specification, on citizens 25 and older with family income. Income enters as thirds, with a bracket that straddles a cut-off entered as two rows with fractional weights. Intervals are normal approximations with standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters) and omit the within-state design effect. Note: The age contrast is ages 65 and older against ages 25 to 44; adults under 25 are not in the sample because attainment is defined from 25. Note: The size column counts persons; the models use more rows because a person whose income bracket straddles a cut-off enters as two rows. Source: Current Population Survey, November Voting and Registration Supplement (IPUMS-CPS), 2024, 2020, 2016 and 2022; weighted (VOSUPPWT); weighted linear probability models Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/adjusted_gaps.json ### Table 8. Voting by mail rose to 43.0% of voters in 2020 and fell to 29.0% in 2024, while voting in person before Election Day reached 30.7% Percent of persons who reported voting, by method and timing, presidential years 1996 to 2024 (the second button shows midterm years); 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size | Year | Election type | Method | Share of voters (%) | 95% CI low | 95% CI high | n respondents | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2004 | Presidential | In person on Election Day | 79.0 | 78.7 | 79.4 | 63,052 | | 2008 | Presidential | In person on Election Day | 68.9 | 68.5 | 69.3 | 59,975 | | 2012 | Presidential | In person on Election Day | 66.8 | 66.4 | 67.2 | 59,597 | | 2016 | Presidential | In person on Election Day | 59.5 | 59.1 | 60.0 | 58,533 | | 2020 | Presidential | In person on Election Day | 30.4 | 29.9 | 30.8 | 55,170 | | 2024 | Presidential | In person on Election Day | 39.6 | 39.1 | 40.1 | 48,387 | | 2004 | Presidential | In person before Election Day | 7.8 | 7.5 | 8.0 | 63,052 | | 2008 | Presidential | In person before Election Day | 14.2 | 13.9 | 14.6 | 59,975 | | 2012 | Presidential | In person before Election Day | 14.2 | 13.9 | 14.5 | 59,597 | | 2016 | Presidential | In person before Election Day | 18.9 | 18.6 | 19.3 | 58,533 | | 2020 | Presidential | In person before Election Day | 26.0 | 25.6 | 26.4 | 55,170 | | 2024 | Presidential | In person before Election Day | 30.7 | 30.3 | 31.2 | 48,387 | | 1996 | Presidential | By mail | 7.8 | 7.6 | 8.1 | 50,025 | | 2000 | Presidential | By mail | 10.1 | 9.8 | 10.4 | 50,010 | | 2004 | Presidential | By mail | 12.9 | 12.6 | 13.2 | 63,052 | | 2008 | Presidential | By mail | 16.4 | 16.0 | 16.7 | 59,975 | | 2012 | Presidential | By mail | 18.5 | 18.1 | 18.8 | 59,597 | | 2016 | Presidential | By mail | 20.9 | 20.5 | 21.3 | 58,533 | | 2020 | Presidential | By mail | 43.0 | 42.5 | 43.4 | 55,170 | | 2024 | Presidential | By mail | 29.0 | 28.5 | 29.4 | 48,387 | | 2006 | Midterm | In person on Election Day | 80.1 | 79.7 | 80.5 | 47,175 | | 2010 | Midterm | In person on Election Day | 73.0 | 72.5 | 73.5 | 44,802 | | 2014 | Midterm | In person on Election Day | 68.4 | 67.9 | 68.9 | 42,559 | | 2018 | Midterm | In person on Election Day | 59.6 | 59.1 | 60.1 | 48,337 | | 2022 | Midterm | In person on Election Day | 49.5 | 48.9 | 50.1 | 39,280 | | 2006 | Midterm | In person before Election Day | 5.8 | 5.6 | 6.0 | 47,175 | | 2010 | Midterm | In person before Election Day | 8.3 | 8.0 | 8.6 | 44,802 | | 2014 | Midterm | In person before Election Day | 10.2 | 9.9 | 10.5 | 42,559 | | 2018 | Midterm | In person before Election Day | 16.6 | 16.2 | 17.0 | 48,337 | | 2022 | Midterm | In person before Election Day | 18.0 | 17.6 | 18.5 | 39,280 | | 1998 | Midterm | By mail | 8.4 | 8.1 | 8.7 | 39,512 | | 2002 | Midterm | By mail | 10.6 | 10.3 | 10.9 | 47,897 | | 2006 | Midterm | By mail | 13.7 | 13.4 | 14.1 | 47,175 | | 2010 | Midterm | By mail | 18.1 | 17.7 | 18.5 | 44,802 | | 2014 | Midterm | By mail | 20.8 | 20.4 | 21.3 | 42,559 | | 2018 | Midterm | By mail | 23.1 | 22.7 | 23.6 | 48,337 | | 2022 | Midterm | By mail | 31.8 | 31.2 | 32.3 | 39,280 | Views: Presidential years (election = Presidential); Midterm years (election = Midterm). Note: Presidential years and midterm years are separate views; the default is presidential years. Note: The shares for 2020 and 2024 match the Census Bureau tabulations of the same supplement to the printed decimal; the checks are listed in the methods note. The Election Assistance Commission publishes administrative percentages that do not sum to the whole and give higher early in-person shares than the survey in 2020 and 2024, while its counts of early in-person ballots agree with the survey's weighted counts within a few percent; the methods note gives both. Note: Intervals are model based (Kish effective sample size, normal approximation) and leave out the clustering and stratification of the CPS design, so they are narrower than design-based intervals by an unknown factor. Source: Current Population Survey, November Voting and Registration Supplement (IPUMS-CPS), 1996 to 2024 (timing from 2004); weighted (VOSUPPWT) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/vote_method.json ### Table 9. The CPS count of reported voters exceeded the ballots counted for president by 6.0% to 11.6% through 2000 and was within 3% of them from 2004 to 2024 Millions of persons: ballots counted for president against the CPS weighted number of adults 18 and older who reported voting, presidential years 1976 to 2024; the CPS interval is the 95% interval from the Kish effective sample size | Election | Ballots counted for president (millions) | CPS reported voters (millions) | 95% CI low (millions) | 95% CI high (millions) | n respondents | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1976 | 81.6 | 86.7 | 86.2 | 87.2 | 89,090 | | 1980 | 86.5 | 94.8 | 94.3 | 95.3 | 123,591 | | 1984 | 92.7 | 101.9 | 101.3 | 102.4 | 110,115 | | 1988 | 91.6 | 102.2 | 101.6 | 102.9 | 102,945 | | 1992 | 104.6 | 113.4 | 112.8 | 114.0 | 105,987 | | 1996 | 96.4 | 105.0 | 104.3 | 105.7 | 89,609 | | 2000 | 105.6 | 111.9 | 111.2 | 112.7 | 88,884 | | 2004 | 122.3 | 125.7 | 125.0 | 126.5 | 103,696 | | 2008 | 131.4 | 131.1 | 130.4 | 131.9 | 99,556 | | 2012 | 129.1 | 132.9 | 132.1 | 133.8 | 101,568 | | 2016 | 136.8 | 137.5 | 136.7 | 138.4 | 100,946 | | 2020 | 158.5 | 154.6 | 153.7 | 155.6 | 87,589 | | 2024 | 155.4 | 154.3 | 153.3 | 155.3 | 78,650 | Note: The ballots counted for president are full counts and have no interval. The CPS interval treats the adult population total as fixed and uses the Kish interval on the share who voted. Note: The election column names the presidential election year. Source: Current Population Survey, November Voting and Registration Supplement (IPUMS-CPS), 1976 to 2024, weighted (VOSUPPWT); MIT Election Data and Science Lab state presidential returns, 1976 to 2024, full counts Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/cps_vs_certified.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (192), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | adj_age65_2024 | 18.2 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with age, race and ethnicity, education and family income together: Ages 65 and older minus ages 25 to 44 | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 17.0 to 19.5 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons. | | adj_asian_2024 | 14.6 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with age, race and ethnicity, education and family income together: White minus Asian | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 13.0 to 16.1 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons. | | adj_ba_lths_2024 | 34.5 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with age, race and ethnicity, education and family income together: Bachelor's degree minus less than high school | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 30.8 to 38.2 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons. | | adj_black_2016 | −2.6 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with age, race and ethnicity, education and family income together: White minus Black | citizens 25 and older | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI −5.2 to −0.1 | 83,819 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons. | | adj_black_2020 | 0.9 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with age, race and ethnicity, education and family income together: White minus Black | citizens 25 and older | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −1.0 to 2.9 | 73,633 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons. | | adj_black_2024 | 3.4 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with age, race and ethnicity, education and family income together: White minus Black | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 1.6 to 5.3 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons. | | adj_hisp_2024 | 10.5 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with age, race and ethnicity, education and family income together: White minus Hispanic | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 8.1 to 12.9 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons. | | adj_inc_2024 | 13.6 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with age, race and ethnicity, education and family income together: Highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 12.3 to 14.9 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons. | | amgdiff_age_2022 | 28.2 | percentage points | difference in the weighted share of the registered who voted: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens aged 65 and older and citizens aged 18 to 29 who were registered | 2022 | 95% CI 26.7 to 29.6 | 22,584 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | amgdiff_age_2024 | 10.8 | percentage points | difference in the weighted share of the registered who voted: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens aged 65 and older and citizens aged 18 to 29 who were registered | 2024 | 95% CI 9.7 to 11.9 | 24,507 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | amgdiff_educ_2024 | 18.1 | percentage points | difference in the weighted share of the registered who voted: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more and without a high school diploma who were registered | 2024 | 95% CI 16.0 to 20.2 | 24,064 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | anes_2020 | 77.3% | percent | weighted share who reported voting | ANES respondents who answered the turnout item and have a post-election weight | 2020 | 95% CI 75.9% to 78.6% | 7,446 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_2024 | 78.9% | percent | weighted share who reported voting | ANES respondents who answered the turnout item and have a post-election weight | 2024 | 95% CI 77.3% to 80.5% | 4,954 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | censuscit_1992 | 67.7% | percent | published weighted share who reported voting (Census Bureau Table A-1), nonresponse counted as not voting | citizens 18 and older, as the Census Bureau defines them from the supplement's own citizenship item | 1992 presidential election | | | VOSUPPWT, as published by the Census Bureau | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | A published figure with no interval; the extract has no citizenship item before 1994 and cannot reproduce it. | | chg_age_1996_2008 | −10.3 | percentage points | change in the turnout gap between the two years (difference of two differences), gap = citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 1996 to 2008 | 95% CI −11.9 to −8.7 | 67,347 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chg_age_2014_2018 | −9.0 | percentage points | change in the turnout gap between the two years (difference of two differences), gap = citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 2014 to 2018 | 95% CI −10.5 to −7.5 | 76,514 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chg_age_2018_2022 | +5.1 | percentage points | change in the turnout gap between the two years (difference of two differences), gap = citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 2018 to 2022 | 95% CI 3.5 to 6.7 | 70,196 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chg_asian_2004_2024 | −9.6 | percentage points | change in the turnout gap between the two years (difference of two differences), gap = White non-Hispanic minus Asian or Pacific Islander non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 2004 to 2024 | 95% CI −12.5 to −6.8 | 135,208 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chg_ba_hs_1996_2024 | +1.4 | percentage points | change in the turnout gap between the two years (difference of two differences), gap = bachelor's degree or more minus high school diploma only | citizens 25 and older | 1996 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.1 to 2.8 | 88,026 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chg_ba_lths_1996_2024 | +4.5 | percentage points | change in the turnout gap between the two years (difference of two differences), gap = bachelor's degree or more minus no high school diploma | citizens 25 and older | 1996 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.3 to 6.6 | 59,518 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chg_ba_lths_2020_2024 | +4.3 | percentage points | change in the turnout gap between the two years (difference of two differences), gap = bachelor's degree or more minus no high school diploma | citizens 25 and older | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.8 to 6.7 | 61,880 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chg_black_2012_2024 | +12.9 | percentage points | change in the turnout gap between the two years (difference of two differences), gap = White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 11.1 to 14.7 | 139,565 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chg_hisp_1996_2024 | +3.1 | percentage points | change in the turnout gap between the two years (difference of two differences), gap = White non-Hispanic minus Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 1996 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.0 to 5.2 | 133,388 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chg_inc_1996_2008 | −2.9 | percentage points | change in the turnout gap between the two years (difference of two differences), gap = highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 18 and older | 1996 to 2008 | 95% CI −4.2 to −1.6 | 110,752 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | chg_inc_2012_2024 | +0.2 | percentage points | change in the turnout gap between the two years (difference of two differences), gap = highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 18 and older | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI −1.1 to 1.4 | 128,364 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cit_1994 | 48.4% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 1994 midterm election | 95% CI 48.0% to 48.8% | 95,272 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cit_1996 | 58.4% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 1996 presidential election | 95% CI 58.0% to 58.7% | 84,090 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cit_2004 | 63.8% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2004 presidential election | 95% CI 63.5% to 64.2% | 96,452 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cit_2008 | 63.6% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2008 presidential election | 95% CI 63.3% to 64.0% | 92,360 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cit_2012 | 61.8% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2012 presidential election | 95% CI 61.5% to 62.2% | 94,311 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cit_2014 | 41.9% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2014 midterm election | 95% CI 41.6% to 42.3% | 96,267 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cit_2016 | 61.4% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI 61.0% to 61.7% | 93,794 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cit_2018 | 53.4% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2018 midterm election | 95% CI 53.1% to 53.8% | 88,749 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cit_2020 | 66.8% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 66.4% to 67.1% | 81,898 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cit_2022 | 52.2% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2022 midterm election | 95% CI 51.8% to 52.6% | 73,083 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | cit_2024 | 65.3% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 64.9% to 65.7% | 72,590 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | early_2004 | 7.8% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (in person before election day) | persons who voted | 2004 presidential election | 95% CI 7.5% to 8.0% | 63,052 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | early_2016 | 18.9% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (in person before election day) | persons who voted | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI 18.6% to 19.3% | 58,533 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | early_2020 | 26.0% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (in person before election day) | persons who voted | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 25.6% to 26.4% | 55,170 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | early_2022 | 18.0% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (in person before election day) | persons who voted | 2022 midterm election | 95% CI 17.6% to 18.5% | 39,280 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | early_2024 | 30.7% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (in person before election day) | persons who voted | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 30.3% to 31.2% | 48,387 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | ed_2004 | 79.0% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (in person on election day) | persons who voted | 2004 presidential election | 95% CI 78.7% to 79.4% | 63,052 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | ed_2016 | 59.5% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (in person on election day) | persons who voted | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI 59.1% to 60.0% | 58,533 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | ed_2020 | 30.4% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (in person on election day) | persons who voted | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 29.9% to 30.8% | 55,170 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | ed_2024 | 39.6% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (in person on election day) | persons who voted | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 39.1% to 40.1% | 48,387 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_age_1994 | 37.1 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 1994 midterm election | 95% CI 36.0 to 38.2 | 37,385 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_age_1996 | 29.5 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 1996 presidential election | 95% CI 28.4 to 30.7 | 32,310 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_age_2008 | 19.3 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 2008 presidential election | 95% CI 18.1 to 20.4 | 35,037 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_age_2012 | 27.0 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 2012 presidential election | 95% CI 25.9 to 28.1 | 37,249 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_age_2014 | 39.5 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 2014 midterm election | 95% CI 38.5 to 40.5 | 39,114 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_age_2018 | 30.6 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 2018 midterm election | 95% CI 29.4 to 31.7 | 37,400 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_age_2020 | 20.4 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 19.2 to 21.5 | 35,593 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_age_2022 | 35.7 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 2022 midterm election | 95% CI 34.5 to 36.8 | 32,796 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_age_2024 | 23.9 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 22.7 to 25.2 | 33,208 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_asian_2004 | 22.5 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Asian or Pacific Islander non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 2004 presidential election | 95% CI 20.3 to 24.7 | 79,118 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_asian_2020 | 11.6 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Asian or Pacific Islander non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 9.8 to 13.4 | 63,415 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_asian_2024 | 12.9 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Asian or Pacific Islander non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 11.0 to 14.7 | 56,090 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_ba_hs_1996 | 22.9 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree minus those with a high school diploma only | citizens 25 and older | 1996 presidential election | 95% CI 21.9 to 23.8 | 43,901 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_ba_hs_2024 | 24.3 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree minus those with a high school diploma only | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 23.3 to 25.3 | 44,125 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_ba_lths_1996 | 36.1 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older | 1996 presidential election | 95% CI 34.9 to 37.3 | 29,768 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_ba_lths_1998 | 29.1 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older | 1998 midterm election | 95% CI 27.9 to 30.4 | 29,856 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_ba_lths_2008 | 37.7 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older | 2008 presidential election | 95% CI 36.4 to 39.0 | 33,092 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_ba_lths_2014 | 32.5 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older | 2014 midterm election | 95% CI 31.3 to 33.8 | 35,962 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_ba_lths_2020 | 36.3 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 34.6 to 37.9 | 32,130 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_ba_lths_2022 | 38.4 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older | 2022 midterm election | 95% CI 36.7 to 40.1 | 29,484 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_ba_lths_2024 | 40.5 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 38.7 to 42.4 | 29,750 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_black_1996 | 7.7 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 1996 presidential election | 95% CI 6.5 to 9.0 | 76,814 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_black_2008 | 0.9 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 2008 presidential election | 95% CI −0.3 to 2.1 | 80,104 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_black_2012 | −2.5 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 2012 presidential election | 95% CI −3.6 to −1.4 | 80,692 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_black_2016 | 5.7 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI 4.5 to 6.9 | 78,720 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_black_2020 | 8.1 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 6.9 to 9.4 | 67,974 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_black_2024 | 10.4 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 9.0 to 11.8 | 58,873 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_hisp_1996 | 16.8 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 1996 presidential election | 95% CI 15.1 to 18.4 | 73,087 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_hisp_2024 | 19.9 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 18.6 to 21.2 | 60,301 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_hisp_res_2024 | 34.0 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout, White non-Hispanic minus Hispanic residents (noncitizens counted as not voting) | all residents 18 and older | 2024 | 95% CI 32.9 to 35.0 | 64,557 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_inc_1996 | 23.8 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 18 and older | 1996 presidential election | 95% CI 22.9 to 24.7 | 50,055 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_inc_1998 | 19.1 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 18 and older | 1998 midterm election | 95% CI 18.1 to 20.0 | 55,003 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_inc_2008 | 20.9 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 18 and older | 2008 presidential election | 95% CI 20.0 to 21.8 | 60,697 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_inc_2012 | 20.1 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 18 and older | 2012 presidential election | 95% CI 19.2 to 20.9 | 73,012 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_inc_2014 | 17.7 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 18 and older | 2014 midterm election | 95% CI 16.8 to 18.5 | 69,720 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_inc_2018 | 19.7 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 18 and older | 2018 midterm election | 95% CI 18.8 to 20.5 | 71,590 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_inc_2022 | 19.7 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 18 and older | 2022 midterm election | 95% CI 18.7 to 20.7 | 55,565 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | gap_inc_2024 | 20.2 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 19.3 to 21.1 | 55,352 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | inc_nonrep_1996 | 11.4% | percent | weighted share who did not report a family-income bracket | citizens 18 and older | 1996 | | 84,090 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | inc_nonrep_2008 | 20.6% | percent | weighted share who did not report a family-income bracket | citizens 18 and older | 2008 | | 92,360 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | inc_turn_nonrep_2008 | 47.3% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older who did not report family income | 2008 | | 18,033 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | inc_turn_rep_2008 | 67.9% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older who reported family income | 2008 | | 74,327 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | mail_1996 | 7.8% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by mail | persons who voted | 1996 presidential election | 95% CI 7.6% to 8.1% | 50,025 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | mail_2004 | 12.9% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (by mail) | persons who voted | 2004 presidential election | 95% CI 12.6% to 13.2% | 63,052 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | mail_2016 | 20.9% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (by mail) | persons who voted | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI 20.5% to 21.3% | 58,533 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | mail_2018 | 23.1% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (by mail) | persons who voted | 2018 midterm election | 95% CI 22.7% to 23.6% | 48,337 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | mail_2020 | 43.0% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (by mail) | persons who voted | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 42.5% to 43.4% | 55,170 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | mail_2022 | 31.8% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (by mail) | persons who voted | 2022 midterm election | 95% CI 31.2% to 32.3% | 39,280 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | mail_2024 | 29.0% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by method (by mail) | persons who voted | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 28.5% to 29.4% | 48,387 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | mail_a1824_2020 | 39.9% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by mail | persons aged 18 to 24 who voted | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 38.2% to 41.6% | 4,190 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | mail_a1824_2024 | 26.3% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by mail | persons aged 18 to 24 who voted | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 24.7% to 28.0% | 3,419 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | mail_a65_2020 | 53.6% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by mail | persons aged 65 and older who voted | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 52.7% to 54.5% | 15,856 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | mail_a65_2024 | 36.8% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by mail | persons aged 65 and older who voted | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 35.9% to 37.6% | 15,714 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | n_adults | 2,494,218 | respondents | count of person records | adults 18 and older with a positive supplement weight | 1976 to 2024 | | | none (count of records) | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | n_citizens | 1,422,311 | respondents | count of person records | citizens 18 and older | 1994 to 2024 | | | none (count of records) | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | noncit_1994 | 6.8% | percent | weighted share who are not US citizens | adults 18 and older | 1994 | 95% CI 6.7% to 7.0% | 101,630 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | noncit_2024 | 9.3% | percent | weighted share who are not US citizens | adults 18 and older | 2024 | 95% CI 9.1% to 9.5% | 78,650 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | noncit_asian_2024 | 27.3% | percent | weighted share who are not US citizens | Asian or Pacific Islander non-Hispanic adults 18 and older | 2024 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | noncit_hisp_1994 | 40.8% | percent | weighted share who are not US citizens | Hispanic adults 18 and older | 1994 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | noncit_hisp_2024 | 30.3% | percent | weighted share who are not US citizens | Hispanic adults 18 and older | 2024 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | noncit_white_1994 | 1.8% | percent | weighted share who are not US citizens | White non-Hispanic adults 18 and older | 1994 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | noncit_white_2024 | 1.8% | percent | weighted share who are not US citizens | White non-Hispanic adults 18 and older | 2024 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nr_2004 | 10.8% | percent | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | citizens 18 and older | 2004 | | 96,452 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nr_2008 | 13.8% | percent | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | citizens 18 and older | 2008 | | 92,360 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nr_2018 | 17.7% | percent | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | citizens 18 and older | 2018 | | 88,749 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nr_2020 | 15.7% | percent | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | citizens 18 and older | 2020 | | 81,898 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nr_2024 | 14.1% | percent | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | citizens 18 and older | 2024 | | 72,590 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nr_a1829_2024 | 18.0% | percent | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | citizens aged 18 to 29 | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 17.3% to 18.8% | 12,303 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nr_a65_2024 | 12.1% | percent | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | citizens aged 65 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 11.6% to 12.6% | 20,905 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nr_black_2024 | 17.6% | percent | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | Black non-Hispanic citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 16.5% to 18.6% | 6,636 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nr_hisp_2024 | 17.0% | percent | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | Hispanic citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 16.1% to 17.9% | 8,064 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nr_white_2024 | 12.6% | percent | weighted share who did not answer the voting question (refused, did not know, no response) | White non-Hispanic citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 12.2% to 12.9% | 52,237 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nt_2020 | 69.0% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by mail or in person before Election Day | persons who voted | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 68.5% to 69.4% | 55,170 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | nt_2024 | 59.7% | percent | weighted share of all persons who reported voting, by mail or in person before Election Day | persons who voted | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 59.2% to 60.2% | 48,387 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | over_1988 | +11.6% | percent of ballots counted for president | CPS weighted count of persons who reported voting, relative to the certified presidential total | voters in the CPS estimate, all residents 18 and older | 1988 | 95% CI 10.9% to 12.3% | 102,945 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | The interval treats the adult population total as fixed and uses the Kish interval on the share who voted. | | over_2004 | +2.8% | percent of ballots counted for president | CPS weighted count of persons who reported voting, relative to the certified presidential total | voters in the CPS estimate, all residents 18 and older | 2004 | 95% CI 2.2% to 3.4% | 103,696 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | The interval treats the adult population total as fixed and uses the Kish interval on the share who voted. | | over_2020 | −2.5% | percent of ballots counted for president | CPS weighted count of persons who reported voting, relative to the certified presidential total | voters in the CPS estimate, all residents 18 and older | 2020 | 95% CI −3.0% to −1.9% | 87,589 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | The interval treats the adult population total as fixed and uses the Kish interval on the share who voted. | | over_absmax_0424 | 3% | percent of ballots counted for president | largest absolute difference between the CPS count of reported voters and the certified presidential total | voters in the CPS estimate, all residents 18 and older | 2004 to 2024 presidential elections | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | over_max_7600 | 11.6% | percent of ballots counted for president | largest excess of the CPS count over the certified presidential total | voters in the CPS estimate, all residents 18 and older | 1976 to 2000 presidential elections | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | over_min_7600 | 6.0% | percent of ballots counted for president | smallest excess of the CPS count over the certified presidential total | voters in the CPS estimate, all residents 18 and older | 1976 to 2000 presidential elections | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | pm_1996 | 13.1 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout, presidential year minus the next midterm | citizens 18 and older | 1996 presidential minus 1998 midterm | 95% CI 12.5 to 13.6 | 168,166 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | pm_2012 | 19.9 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout, presidential year minus the next midterm | citizens 18 and older | 2012 presidential minus 2014 midterm | 95% CI 19.4 to 20.4 | 190,578 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | pm_2016 | 7.9 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout, presidential year minus the next midterm | citizens 18 and older | 2016 presidential minus 2018 midterm | 95% CI 7.4 to 8.5 | 182,543 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | pm_2020 | 14.6 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout, presidential year minus the next midterm | citizens 18 and older | 2020 presidential minus 2022 midterm | 95% CI 14.0 to 15.1 | 154,981 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | pre_na_hisp_1980 | 32.2% | percent | weighted share of adults outside the voting-question universe | Hispanic adults 18 and older | 1980 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | pre_na_hisp_1992 | 40.2% | percent | weighted share of adults outside the voting-question universe | Hispanic adults 18 and older | 1992 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | pre_na_white_1980 | 1.7% | percent | weighted share of adults outside the voting-question universe | White non-Hispanic adults 18 and older | 1980 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | pre_na_white_1992 | 1.9% | percent | weighted share of adults outside the voting-question universe | White non-Hispanic adults 18 and older | 1992 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | raw_age65_2024 | 14.5 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with this characteristic alone: Ages 65 and older minus ages 25 to 44 | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 13.2 to 15.7 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons; the models use more rows because a person whose income bracket straddles a cut-off enters as two rows with fractional weights. | | raw_asian_2024 | 13.1 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with this characteristic alone: White minus Asian | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 11.4 to 14.8 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons; the models use more rows because a person whose income bracket straddles a cut-off enters as two rows with fractional weights. | | raw_ba_lths_2024 | 40.5 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with this characteristic alone: Bachelor's degree minus less than high school | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 36.5 to 44.6 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons; the models use more rows because a person whose income bracket straddles a cut-off enters as two rows with fractional weights. | | raw_black_2024 | 9.7 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with this characteristic alone: White minus Black | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 7.6 to 11.8 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons; the models use more rows because a person whose income bracket straddles a cut-off enters as two rows with fractional weights. | | raw_hisp_2024 | 18.8 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with this characteristic alone: White minus Hispanic | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 16.5 to 21.2 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons; the models use more rows because a person whose income bracket straddles a cut-off enters as two rows with fractional weights. | | raw_inc_2024 | 20.3 | percentage points | difference in turnout from a weighted linear probability model with this characteristic alone: Highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 25 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 18.6 to 22.0 | 65,471 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Interval from standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters), a normal approximation. The size is the number of persons; the models use more rows because a person whose income bracket straddles a cut-off enters as two rows with fractional weights. | | reg_ba_2024 | 84.5% | percent | weighted share registered (voted, or reported being registered; nonresponse counted as not registered) | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 84.0% to 85.0% | 25,742 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | reg_lths_2024 | 51.4% | percent | weighted share registered (voted, or reported being registered; nonresponse counted as not registered) | citizens 25 and older without a high school diploma | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 49.6% to 53.1% | 4,008 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | regdiff_educ_2024 | 33.2 | percentage points | difference in the weighted registered share: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more and without a high school diploma | 2024 | 95% CI 31.3 to 35.0 | 29,750 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | regorder_hi_educ_2024 | 77% | percent of the turnout difference | upper end of the registration share across the two orders of the split, citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more and without a high school diploma | 2024 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | regorder_lo_educ_2024 | 62% | percent of the turnout difference | lower end of the registration share across the two orders of the split, citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more and without a high school diploma | 2024 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | regshare_age_2020 | 72% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration (symmetric split of the product of the registered share and turnout among the registered), citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens aged 65 and older and citizens aged 18 to 29 | 2020 | 95% CI 69% to 74% | 35,593 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents (500 replicates); it omits the CPS design effect and is too narrow by an unknown factor. The share depends on the order of the split and on how nonresponse is coded. | | regshare_age_2022 | 48% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration (symmetric split of the product of the registered share and turnout among the registered), citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens aged 65 and older and citizens aged 18 to 29 | 2022 | 95% CI 46% to 50% | 32,796 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents (500 replicates); it omits the CPS design effect and is too narrow by an unknown factor. The share depends on the order of the split and on how nonresponse is coded. | | regshare_age_2024 | 68% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration (symmetric split of the product of the registered share and turnout among the registered), citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens aged 65 and older and citizens aged 18 to 29 | 2024 | 95% CI 65% to 71% | 33,208 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents (500 replicates); it omits the CPS design effect and is too narrow by an unknown factor. The share depends on the order of the split and on how nonresponse is coded. | | regshare_black_2020 | 83% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration (symmetric split of the product of the registered share and turnout among the registered), White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | White and Black non-Hispanic citizens | 2020 | 95% CI 76% to 91% | 67,974 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents (500 replicates); it omits the CPS design effect and is too narrow by an unknown factor. The share depends on the order of the split and on how nonresponse is coded. | | regshare_black_2022 | 53% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration (symmetric split of the product of the registered share and turnout among the registered), White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | White and Black non-Hispanic citizens | 2022 | 95% CI 47% to 60% | 59,816 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents (500 replicates); it omits the CPS design effect and is too narrow by an unknown factor. The share depends on the order of the split and on how nonresponse is coded. | | regshare_black_2024 | 62% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration (symmetric split of the product of the registered share and turnout among the registered), White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | White and Black non-Hispanic citizens | 2024 | 95% CI 55% to 68% | 58,873 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents (500 replicates); it omits the CPS design effect and is too narrow by an unknown factor. The share depends on the order of the split and on how nonresponse is coded. | | regshare_educ_2024 | 70% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration (symmetric split of the product of the registered share and turnout among the registered), citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more and without a high school diploma | 2024 | 95% CI 67% to 73% | 29,750 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents (500 replicates); it omits the CPS design effect and is too narrow by an unknown factor. The share depends on the order of the split and on how nonresponse is coded. | | regshare_hisp_2024 | 70% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration (symmetric split of the product of the registered share and turnout among the registered), White non-Hispanic minus Hispanic citizens | White non-Hispanic and Hispanic citizens | 2024 | 95% CI 67% to 74% | 60,301 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents (500 replicates); it omits the CPS design effect and is too narrow by an unknown factor. The share depends on the order of the split and on how nonresponse is coded. | | regshare_inc_2022 | 62% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration (symmetric split of the product of the registered share and turnout among the registered), highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens in the highest and lowest thirds of family income | 2022 | 95% CI 59% to 64% | 55,565 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents (500 replicates); it omits the CPS design effect and is too narrow by an unknown factor. The share depends on the order of the split and on how nonresponse is coded. | | regshare_inc_2024 | 69% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration (symmetric split of the product of the registered share and turnout among the registered), highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens in the highest and lowest thirds of family income | 2024 | 95% CI 67% to 71% | 55,352 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | Seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents (500 replicates); it omits the CPS design effect and is too narrow by an unknown factor. The share depends on the order of the split and on how nonresponse is coded. | | regshare_sr_age_2024 | 65% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration among respondents only (nonrespondents dropped from the registered share and from turnout), citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens aged 65 and older and citizens aged 18 to 29 who answered the voting question | 2024 | | 28,718 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | A point estimate without an interval. | | regshare_sr_black_2020 | 61% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration among respondents only (nonrespondents dropped from the registered share and from turnout), White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | White and Black non-Hispanic citizens who answered the voting question | 2020 | | 57,946 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | A point estimate without an interval. | | regshare_sr_black_2022 | 38% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration among respondents only (nonrespondents dropped from the registered share and from turnout), White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | White and Black non-Hispanic citizens who answered the voting question | 2022 | | 50,856 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | A point estimate without an interval. | | regshare_sr_black_2024 | 44% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration among respondents only (nonrespondents dropped from the registered share and from turnout), White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | White and Black non-Hispanic citizens who answered the voting question | 2024 | | 51,535 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | A point estimate without an interval. | | regshare_sr_educ_2024 | 67% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration among respondents only (nonrespondents dropped from the registered share and from turnout), citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more and without a high school diploma who answered the voting question | 2024 | | 26,343 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | A point estimate without an interval. | | regshare_sr_hisp_2024 | 67% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration among respondents only (nonrespondents dropped from the registered share and from turnout), White non-Hispanic minus Hispanic citizens | White non-Hispanic and Hispanic citizens who answered the voting question | 2024 | | 52,800 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | A point estimate without an interval. | | regshare_sr_inc_2024 | 65% | percent of the turnout difference | share of the turnout difference that arises at registration among respondents only (nonrespondents dropped from the registered share and from turnout), highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens in the highest and lowest thirds of family income who answered the voting question | 2024 | | 48,044 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | A point estimate without an interval. | | res_1976 | 59.2% | percent | weighted share who reported voting; persons outside the voting-question universe count as not voting | all residents 18 and older | 1976 | 95% CI 58.8% to 59.5% | 89,090 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | res_1996 | 54.2% | percent | weighted share who reported voting; persons outside the voting-question universe count as not voting | all residents 18 and older | 1996 | 95% CI 53.9% to 54.6% | 89,609 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | res_2024 | 59.3% | percent | weighted share who reported voting; persons outside the voting-question universe count as not voting | all residents 18 and older | 2024 | 95% CI 58.9% to 59.7% | 78,650 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | sr_2020 | 79.2% | percent | weighted share who reported voting; nonresponse excluded (self-report convention) | citizens 18 and older who answered the voting question | 2020 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | sr_2024 | 76.1% | percent | weighted share who reported voting; nonresponse excluded (self-report convention) | citizens 18 and older who answered the voting question | 2024 | | | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | srgap_age_2024 | 23.0 | percentage points | difference in the weighted share who reported voting among respondents (self-report convention): citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens 18 and older who answered the voting question | 2024 | 95% CI 21.8 to 24.3 | 28,718 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | srgap_black_2024 | 7.7 | percentage points | difference in the weighted share who reported voting among respondents (self-report convention): White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older who answered the voting question | 2024 | 95% CI 6.3 to 9.1 | 51,535 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | srgap_educ_2024 | 42.9 | percentage points | difference in the weighted share who reported voting among respondents (self-report convention): bachelor's degree or more minus no high school diploma | citizens 25 and older who answered the voting question | 2024 | 95% CI 40.9 to 44.9 | 26,343 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | srgap_hisp_2024 | 19.6 | percentage points | difference in the weighted share who reported voting among respondents (self-report convention): White non-Hispanic minus Hispanic citizens | citizens 18 and older who answered the voting question | 2024 | 95% CI 18.3 to 21.0 | 52,800 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | srgap_inc_2024 | 20.7 | percentage points | difference in the weighted share who reported voting among respondents (self-report convention): highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens 18 and older who answered the voting question | 2024 | 95% CI 19.8 to 21.6 | 48,044 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | totdiff_age_2024 | 23.9 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 65 and older minus citizens 18 to 29 | citizens aged 65 and older and citizens aged 18 to 29 | 2024 | 95% CI 22.7 to 25.2 | 33,208 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | totdiff_black_2024 | 10.4 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Black non-Hispanic citizens | White and Black non-Hispanic citizens | 2024 | 95% CI 9.0 to 11.8 | 58,873 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | totdiff_educ_2024 | 40.5 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more minus those without a high school diploma | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more and without a high school diploma | 2024 | 95% CI 38.7 to 42.4 | 29,750 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | totdiff_hisp_2024 | 19.9 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: White non-Hispanic minus Hispanic citizens | White non-Hispanic and Hispanic citizens | 2024 | 95% CI 18.6 to 21.2 | 60,301 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | totdiff_inc_2024 | 20.2 | percentage points | difference in weighted turnout: highest minus lowest third of family income | citizens in the highest and lowest thirds of family income | 2024 | 95% CI 19.3 to 21.1 | 55,352 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | treg_ba_2024 | 94.2% | percent | weighted share of the registered who voted | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more who were registered | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 93.8% to 94.6% | 21,949 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | treg_lths_2024 | 76.1% | percent | weighted share of the registered who voted | citizens 25 and older without a high school diploma who were registered | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 74.0% to 78.2% | 2,115 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_a1829_1996 | 39.6% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens aged 18 to 29 | 1996 presidential election | 95% CI 38.8% to 40.4% | 17,234 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_a1829_2008 | 51.1% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens aged 18 to 29 | 2008 presidential election | 95% CI 50.2% to 51.9% | 17,867 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_a1829_2024 | 50.7% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens aged 18 to 29 | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 49.7% to 51.8% | 12,303 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_a65_1996 | 69.1% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens aged 65 and older | 1996 presidential election | 95% CI 68.3% to 70.0% | 15,076 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_a65_2008 | 70.3% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens aged 65 and older | 2008 presidential election | 95% CI 69.5% to 71.1% | 17,170 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_a65_2024 | 74.7% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens aged 65 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 74.0% to 75.4% | 20,905 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_asian_2024 | 57.6% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | Asian or Pacific Islander non-Hispanic citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 55.9% to 59.4% | 3,853 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_ba_2024 | 79.6% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 79.0% to 80.2% | 25,742 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_black_2024 | 60.1% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | Black non-Hispanic citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 58.7% to 61.4% | 6,636 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_hisp_2024 | 50.6% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | Hispanic citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 49.4% to 51.8% | 8,064 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_inc_hi_2024 | 74.5% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older in the highest third of family income that year | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 73.9% to 75.1% | 28,984 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_inc_lo_2024 | 54.3% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 18 and older in the lowest third of family income that year | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 53.6% to 55.0% | 26,368 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_lths_2024 | 39.1% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | citizens 25 and older without a high school diploma | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 37.4% to 40.8% | 4,008 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | | v_white_2024 | 70.5% | percent | weighted share who reported voting (Census convention: nonresponse counted as not voting) | White non-Hispanic citizens 18 and older | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 70.0% to 70.9% | 52,237 | VOSUPPWT | CPS Voting and Registration Supplement | | ## Definitions - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Cohort: People born in the same period, such as the same decade. Comparing cohorts shows whether a difference comes from when people were born, as distinct from their age or the year they were surveyed. - Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors. ## Methods Sample: the IPUMS-CPS extract of the Census Bureau's November Voting and Registration Supplement, 25 biennial supplements from 1976 to 2024. The analysis uses adults 18 and older with a positive supplement weight (2,494,218 person records), and from 1994, the first year the extract records citizenship, the citizens among them (1,422,311). Weight: VOSUPPWT, the supplement person weight. Outcome: voted_census, the Census Bureau convention, in which a respondent who refused, did not know or did not respond counts as not voting; from 2022 citizens whom IPUMS codes not in universe on the voting item but who carry a positive weight (the supplement nonrespondents) also count as not voting. The share of citizens who did not answer rose from 6.2% in 1994 to 17.7% in 2018 and was 14.1% in 2024. Two universes: citizens 18 and older, 1994 to 2024 (the headline), and all residents 18 and older, 1976 to 2024, in which every adult outside the voting-question universe counts as not voting, the Census total-population convention. From 1978 to 1992 the voting question was not asked of 3.5% to 6.8% of adults (40.2% of Hispanic adults in 1992, against 1.9% of White non-Hispanic adults), a pattern that matches the noncitizen shares from 1994 (in 1976 the supplement asked every adult but a handful). The extract has no citizenship item before 1994, so it can give no citizen series for 1976 to 1992. Published-figure match: the loader asserts that weighted turnout of citizens equals the published Census figure to one decimal in each of 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024. Further checks against the Census Bureau tables of the same supplement (Table A-1, voting and registration by age, race and ethnicity for all residents and citizens; Table A-2, voting by education; Table 14, method of voting, 2018, 2020, 2022 and 2024): 314 of 314 percentages from 1996 to 2024 (1996 and 1998, then 2002 to 2024) match to the printed decimal, the largest difference being 0.05 points; in 1994 17 of 19 match (the largest difference is 0.4), in 2000 3 of 19 (largest 0.8) and in 1976 to 1992 58 of 115 (largest 0.6); all 176 percentages and all 44 totals of Table 14 match. Registration follows the Census convention: registered if the person voted or said they were registered, and everyone else, including a person who did not answer the voting question and did not report being registered, counts as not registered. Age groups are 18 to 29, 30 to 44, 45 to 64 and 65 and older. Race and ethnicity is the extract's five-group variable: Hispanic of any race, and White, Black, Asian or Pacific Islander, and another or multiple races, all non-Hispanic; respondents could report more than one race from 2003. Education is the extract's four levels for adults 25 and older. Family income is the householder's family income in the brackets of the basic monthly survey, which differ across decades (14 brackets to 2003, 16 from 2004). Income groups are within-year thirds: the brackets are laid out along the weighted distribution of citizens with a bracket, and a bracket that straddles a cut-off is split between the two groups in proportion, so each third holds one third of weighted citizens in every year. Up to 2008 citizens who did not report a bracket (9.1% of citizens in 1994, 11.4% in 1996 and 20.6% in 2008) are outside the thirds; from January 2010 the Census Bureau allocates missing family income (IPUMS notes an allocation rate of about 20 percent), so the thirds from 2010 include allocated values and the series is broken between 2008 and 2010. Intervals: 95%. Shares and differences between independent groups use the Kish effective sample size and a normal approximation, combining standard errors in quadrature; changes in a gap combine four independent estimates. These intervals treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. The extract has no strata, primary sampling units or replicate weights, so they omit the clustering and stratification of the CPS design and are narrower than design-based intervals by an unknown factor; the generalized variance parameters in the Census Bureau's source-and-accuracy statement were not applied. The adjusted differences use weighted linear probability models fitted separately for each election with standard errors clustered by state (51 clusters, the states and the District of Columbia) and normal critical values; they leave out the within-state design effect. Suppression: a published cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample of at least 100, and 0 were suppressed; the smallest published cell has 985 respondents. Method and timing: VOTEHOW (1996 onward) and VOTEWHEN (2004 onward) are asked only of persons who reported voting (no person who did not vote has an answer in any of the 25 supplements); codes are in person or by mail, and on Election Day or before it, with refused, don't know and no response under one percent of voters. Shares use all persons who voted in the denominator, with don't know or refused as a fourth category, as Table 14 does; in person before Election Day is in person and before, and by mail is by mail whatever the timing. For 2020 the supplement gives 43.0% by mail and 30.4% in person on Election Day, against 43.1% and 30.5% in the Election Assistance Commission's administrative tabulation; for 2024 the supplement gives 30.7% in person before Election Day and 39.6% in person on Election Day against 35.2% and 37.4% there. Benchmarks: ballots counted for president are the sum of the state totals in the MEDSL returns (full counts); the CPS count is the weighted number of adults who reported voting, and its interval takes the adult total as fixed. The voting-eligible-population turnout series was not available, so no benchmark of the turnout rates is applied. ANES self-reported turnout, a post-election item, uses the post-election weight (weight_postelection, VCF9999), and the CES is not used because the universe of its self-reported item changes across years. Survey mode: the extract has no interview-mode variable, so no mode split is made; the CPS is interviewer-administered, by telephone and in person. The ANES 2020 study was collected online, by telephone or by video and has no mode weights, and the 2024 study mixes face-to-face and web samples, so the ANES values are shown only as levels of a different instrument and not as a trend. The Census Bureau's statement that 69.4 percent of 2020 voters used a nontraditional method (mail, or in person before Election Day) uses the voters with a reported method as the denominator, and the same denominator gives 69.4% here. The all-residents series matches the total-population figures of Table A-1 within 0.05 points in every year from 1994 except 2000, where it is 0.27 points below, and sits 0.2 to 0.6 points below them in 1984 to 1992; the 1976 value is on a slightly different footing because the supplement asked every adult that year. Table A-1 also publishes a citizen series from 1978 (64.0% in 1980 and 67.7% in 1992, the latter above the 66.8% of 2020 and the 65.3% of 2024 in this extract); the extract has no citizenship item before 1994 and cannot reproduce it. Registration split: with V the turnout rate, R the registered share and T the share of the registered who voted, V = R x T, and for a higher-turnout group a and a lower-turnout group b, V_a - V_b = (R_a - R_b)(T_a + T_b)/2 + (T_a - T_b)(R_a + R_b)/2 exactly. The first term is the part that arises at registration and the second the part among the registered. The split depends on the order in which R and T are changed: changing R first at the lower group's T, or at the higher group's T, gives the two ends of a range (for education in 2024, 62% to 77%), and the split used in the text is the symmetric one, the midpoint. Its interval is a seeded percentile bootstrap over respondents (500 replicates, seed 12345; for income over the stacked rows) and omits the design effect, so it is too narrow by an unknown factor. The share also depends on how nonresponse is coded: among respondents only (nonrespondents dropped from the registered share as well as from turnout) the White minus Black share in 2024 is 44% against 62% under the Census convention, and the education share is 67% against 70%. Administrative comparison for 2024: the Election Assistance Commission reports early in-person shares of 30.6% for 2020 and 35.2% for 2024 against 26.0% and 30.7% in the supplement, but its percentages are computed state by state with casewise deletion and sum to 104.2% in 2020 and 102.9% in 2024, so they are not comparable with shares that sum to 100%. Counts compare better: the Commission reports 41,415,710 early in-person ballots for 2020 (41,266,229 in its 2020 report) and 48,872,528 for 2024, an increase of 18.0%, and the weighted counts of CPS voters who voted in person before Election Day are 40.2 million and 47.4 million, an increase of 17.9%. ## What these data cannot show - The CPS reports what respondents say, and the extract has no validated vote. - The validated-vote study cited above found over-reporting more common among more educated respondents and found that using reported instead of verified voting inflates the effect of variables tied to over-reporting [9]. - The education gradient and the registered shares of the better educated may therefore be overstated here by an amount the data do not give. - Nonresponse is also tied to the characteristics studied, and the Census convention's treatment of it changes some differences: the White minus Black difference in 2024 is smaller among respondents than under the convention. - The supplements are repeated cross-sections. - They interview different people each time, so they cannot say whether a group's turnout changed because its members changed their behavior or because its composition changed, for example as the share of citizens with a bachelor's degree grew. - A gap between age groups mixes age, period and birth cohort. - Chapter 3.1, The two coalitions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-two-coalitions) takes up who the voters are compared with all eligible adults, a different question from the turnout rates here. - The headline comparison starts in 1994, and citizen turnout was higher earlier on the Census Bureau's own series. - Its historical table of reported voting gives 67.7% for 1992, above the 66.8% of 2020 and the 65.3% of 2024, from a citizenship item that the extract lacks. - The finding that 2018 to 2024 exceeded earlier elections of their type therefore covers 1994 to 2016 only. - Citizens are also not the same as eligible voters. - The citizen count includes citizens who cannot vote because of a criminal conviction or residence rules and leaves out citizens in institutions and abroad, and the extract has no measure of either. - The CPS identifies roughly three hundred large counties, which supports no county or small-area estimate, and no state estimates are made, because state rates would need the benchmark that was not available here. - The intervals omit the CPS design effect, so every interval is too narrow by an unknown factor, and a result whose interval lies close to zero should be read with that in mind. - The change in the gap between a bachelor's degree and a high school diploma from 1996 to 2024, +1.4 (95% CI 0.1 to 2.8), is an example. - Family income is a householder-family bracket with allocated values from 2010, so it measures neither wealth nor individual earnings, and the thirds before and after 2010 are not on one footing. - The race groups are broad, with all Asian citizens in one group and Hispanic citizens of every origin in another. - The adjusted differences describe a model with four characteristics and do not identify why any group votes at a different rate. - The method and timing items are self-reports. - They match the Census Bureau tables, but the administrative tabulation gives higher early in-person shares, so the split between early and Election Day voting should be read as approximate. ## References 1. Hur, Aram; Achen, Christopher H. (2013). Coding Voter Turnout Responses in the Current Population Survey. Public Opinion Quarterly 77(4): 985-993. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nft042 2. Wolfinger, Raymond E.; Rosenstone, Steven J. (1980). Who Votes?. Yale University Press. 3. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 4. McDonald, Michael P.; Popkin, Samuel L. (2001). The Myth of the Vanishing Voter. American Political Science Review 95(4): 963-974. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055400400134 5. Plutzer, Eric (2002). Becoming a Habitual Voter: Inertia, Resources, and Growth in Young Adulthood. American Political Science Review 96(1): 41-56. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055402004227 6. Fabina, Jacob; Scherer, Zach (2022). Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2020. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Reports P20-585. https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2022/demo/p20-585.html 7. U.S. Election Assistance Commission (2021). Election Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Report. A Report from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission to the 117th Congress. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/document_library/files/2020_EAVS_Report_Final_508c.pdf 8. U.S. Election Assistance Commission (2025). Election Administration and Voting Survey 2024 Comprehensive Report. A Report from the U.S. Election Assistance Commission to the 119th Congress. https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2025-07/2024_EAVS_Report_508.pdf 9. Bernstein, Robert; Chadha, Anita; Montjoy, Robert (2001). Overreporting Voting: Why It Happens and Why It Matters. Public Opinion Quarterly 65(1): 22-44. https://doi.org/10.1086/320036 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/turnout/build.py (sha256 f83f1ddeb6735213cb202d6e2f8ab3e741c4e6f3378c9aaac751ff36ff2a6435) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | book3/chapters/turnout/census_published.json | 206,983 | 5864bc7bb99afdb1f3279ca9272bc85ae38cc7c34b962735c763f25bbf418a6f | 5864bc7bb99afdb1f3279ca9272bc85ae38cc7c34b962735c763f25bbf418a6f | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/state/1976-2024-president.csv | 514,108 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | | C:/Users/Vishal Singh/Box/ipums/analysis/cps/cps_voter.parquet | 94,510,422 | 226363c25c563e5ab8d0dfb30d20a40ab01b72707a0075592ad9bfd8ff06bd36 | dab575569dddeb25cef8623455f2e19702772519e1e50173d364a1b0c81fe3ae | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | a9eedc6791ddcad54b741d037eebe05896b11bb77a2881c7c5bf741a1c9870de | | figures/adjusted_gaps.json | 4469237dc677c4e841ce900d0758250677da01752c98dbb9c9c5e5d2a5089898 | | figures/age_trend.json | 83bfca7b502aac3c7c2c70a6e79a0a2ef816d84daed171f5aacf490ee6b31b54 | | figures/cps_vs_certified.json | f85f715b8dc2a08354303fc30e8b8f1f9dee3219d884a905bd7dfe6e0279cd4b | | figures/education_trend.json | d98ede92d8041b509af3701d6a99ae808a9d9846ce8c588b386d92246da8f40a | | figures/income_trend.json | 77a0fd34b6c2b36fff1209f7f806e0ca64c2cbbeafc8251d50f98ae1a16ffcb8 | | figures/race_trend.json | 10c1342c9efd9d5554e1770eb7834ffc0562f7cfe7a9b8e905b24f0a8732dc21 | | figures/turnout_by_group.json | 189f11c2d08d4edd04a8baab4f5f9fa5708b607444c94c08cdf8cfc0d4f592fd | | figures/turnout_trend.json | 2d46d2bb16b341ba06180003498be4b476accf9530290e1d857b766070ec0263 | | figures/vote_method.json | fdd063ef7d2e53a2f5adb098194ed3c574d0926d9cdd8940c0feb546093d358d | | meta.json | c46858298c06de6e6c1c45798a1e685940f312f646079000da76084d889adeea | | refs.json | fadec0e6bc9a7fab4cd8e2e2fd8a0c4397864b2174201cbc823f378adbae37ba | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/turnout/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/turnout/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/facts.json - Table 1, figure "turnout_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/turnout_trend.json - Table 2, figure "turnout_by_group" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/turnout_by_group.json - Table 3, figure "age_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/age_trend.json - Table 4, figure "race_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/race_trend.json - Table 5, figure "education_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/education_trend.json - Table 6, figure "income_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/income_trend.json - Table 7, figure "adjusted_gaps" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/adjusted_gaps.json - Table 8, figure "vote_method" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/vote_method.json - Table 9, figure "cps_vs_certified" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/turnout/figures/cps_vs_certified.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # The abortion sort: report Chapter 4.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: The abortion sort - Chapter: 4.1 (Part IV, Issue by issue; The great sorting) - Question: How did abortion move from a cross-cutting issue to a partisan divide? - Dek: In the American National Election Studies, the share saying abortion should always be allowed was 3.5 points higher among Democrats than Republicans in 1980 and 52.3 points higher in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024, four-category abortion item (VCF0838) in the 17 studies from 1980 to 2024; mode weights for 2012, 2016 and 2024; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z, which equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990); weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode split - ANES 2024 Time Series. 2024 Time Series, attendance items V241439 and V241440, used for the 2024 attendance groups; years: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews); weights: V240107a, the pre-election weight that the cumulative file uses for 2024 - General Social Survey. Cumulative data 1972-2024, abany asked in 29 surveys from 1977 to 2024; interview mode joined from the raw file; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026theabortionsort ```bibtex @misc{singh2026theabortionsort, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {The abortion sort}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1980 | 3.5 | 95% CI −1.8 to 8.8 | 1,313 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_gap_1980 | | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2024 | 52.3 | 95% CI 48.8 to 55.9 | 4,666 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_gap_2024 | | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2024 | 73.7% | 95% CI 71.2% to 76.2% | 2,459 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_dem_2024 | | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2024 | 21.4% | 95% CI 18.9% to 23.8% | 2,207 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_rep_2024 | | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1980 | 37.3% | 95% CI 34.0% to 40.7% | 801 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_dem_1980 | | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1980 | 33.8% | 95% CI 29.7% to 37.9% | 512 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_rep_1980 | | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 1980 | 2.5 | 95% CI −4.6 to 9.5 | 1,165 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | gss_gap_1980 | | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 2024 | 47.5 | 95% CI 41.4 to 53.5 | 1,534 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | gss_gap_2024 | | count of respondents who answered the question in the 17 studies that asked it | ANES respondents who answered the abortion question | 1980-2024 | 45,017 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_item | | count of ANES study years with the item | ANES studies that asked the abortion question | 1980-2024 | 17 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_waves | | count of respondents who answered abany | GSS respondents who answered the abany question | 1977-2024 | 41,398 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_gss_item | | count of GSS survey years with the item | GSS survey years that asked abany | 1977-2024 | 29 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_gss_waves | ## Findings In the American National Election Studies (ANES), 73.7% of Democrats and 21.4% of Republicans said in 2024 that abortion should always be allowed as a matter of personal choice, a gap of 52.3 points. In 1980 the two shares were 37.3% and 33.8%, a gap of 3.5 points that is too small to distinguish from zero, so the gap between the parties widened over these years. The General Social Survey (GSS) asks a different question, whether a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason, and shows the same widening. Its gap was 2.5 points in 1980, also too small to distinguish from zero, and 47.5 points in 2024. Both surveys ask for a position on legal abortion, and this chapter counts the most permissive answer in each: "always allowed" in the ANES and "yes" in the GSS. (Note: The ANES question asks which of four statements comes closest to the respondent's view, from "abortion should never be permitted by law" to "a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter of personal choice." The GSS question is one of seven about circumstances in which a legal abortion should be possible, and "any reason" is the most permissive.) A gap is the Democratic share minus the Republican share, in points, so a positive gap means that Democrats were more likely than Republicans to give the permissive answer. Party includes leaners, and every interval is a 95% confidence interval. The change is one case of party sorting, in which an opinion that once cut across the parties comes to line up with them. (Note: Shares use the survey weights and cover respondents who answered the question: 45,017 in 17 ANES studies from 1980 to 2024 and 41,398 in 29 GSS surveys from 1977 to 2024. The ANES cumulative file gives every respondent the same weight from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted. Intervals use the Kish effective sample size [1] and treat the weighted sample as if respondents had been drawn at random one by one. Both surveys draw respondents in stages, area by area, and the intervals ignore that, which can make them narrower or wider.) Political scientists call the path by which a new issue becomes part of the party system issue evolution [2]. Adams applied the account to abortion with congressional roll calls and General Social Survey data from 1972 to 1994 [3]. O'Brian finds that by 1970 opposition to abortion among ordinary voters correlated with conservative views on other issues, and by 1972 with the Republican presidential vote [4]. The two surveys used here begin in 1977 and 1980 and follow the question through 2024. ### The gap opened in the early 1990s Table 1 plots the gap in every survey year. In the ANES studies from 1980 to 1990 the interval includes zero in 5 of 6; the exception is 1984, at 6.6 (95% CI 2.3 to 10.9) points. From 1992 on, every ANES interval lies above zero. The GSS interval includes zero in 9 of the 12 surveys from 1977 to 1991. In 1977 and 1983 it lies below zero, so Republicans were more likely than Democrats to say yes, and in 1988 it lies above zero. (Note: The 1977 GSS interval treats respondents as drawn one by one. With the stages of the sample design taken into account, the 1977 gap is −6.5 (95% CI −13.6 to 0.7) points and its interval includes zero, so whether 1977 lies below zero depends on the interval method.) From 1993 on the GSS interval stays above zero. The two surveys agree that there was no consistent party gap in the 1980s and that one appeared in the early 1990s. That dating takes the first survey from which every later interval lies above zero. Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates the same gap by a threshold on a standardized scale, with one rule for every attitude. Table 1. Democrats and Republicans grew apart on legal abortion in both surveys From 1992 to 2000 the ANES gap was between 12.3 and 16.2 points in every study, and no step between adjacent studies in those years has an interval that excludes zero. From 2000 to 2016 the estimate rises in each study, by 16.7 (95% CI 10.2 to 23.2) points in all, but the change between adjacent studies has an interval that includes zero in 5 of the 6 steps from 2000 to 2024. The exception is the step from 2016 to 2020, taken up below. In the GSS the gap was lower in 2024 than in 2022 by 6.0 (95% CI −4.7 to 16.7) points, a difference whose interval includes zero. The GSS estimates from 1993 to 2016 fall as well as rise between adjacent surveys, and no step between them has an interval that excludes zero. ### The 2016 to 2020 rise coincides with a mode change The largest change between adjacent ANES studies is the one from 2016 to 2020, when the gap rose by 15.2 (95% CI 10.6 to 19.8) points, from 32.9 to 48.1. The step from 1990 to 1992, 9.4 (95% CI 3.0 to 15.8) points, is the only other one whose interval excludes zero, and the two intervals overlap, so the data do not rank the two steps. The 2020 study also changed how people were interviewed. The ANES interviewed respondents mainly in person through 2008 and added a web sample next to the in-person sample in 2012, 2016 and 2024, with separate weights for each mode. The 2020 study conducted no in-person interviews, and answers were collected online, by telephone or by video [5]. A change of survey mode can change answers, and the 2020 study has no separate weights by mode, so the ANES cannot separate the mode change from a change in opinion on its own. Four checks bear on the step (Table 2). Three compare respondents interviewed in the same mode. The first sets ANES web respondents in 2016 against the 2020 study, which was collected mostly online. The other two set GSS in-person and web respondents before 2022 against the 2022 and 2024 surveys combined, when the GSS kept in-person interviewing next to a web sample. The GSS web comparison starts in 2021, the first GSS survey conducted mostly on the web (89.2% of respondents who answered the question, counted without weights). The gap rose in each of the three, by between 14.1 and 16.9 points, and each interval lies above zero. The fourth check is the 2000 ANES, which interviewed part of its sample by telephone [6]; its gap of 16.2 (95% CI 10.8 to 21.5) points lies between the 1998 gap of 15.5 points and the 2004 gap of 18.9 points. Table 2. The party gap rose by similar amounts within each mode The direct comparison of web and in-person respondents in the same study, in the lower panel, changes sign across the ANES years and has an interval that includes zero in every row. The intervals are wide: their ends run from −14.3 to +16.8 points, so they do not rule out a mode difference of the size of the step. These checks do not rule out a mode effect that appears only in 2020. They show that the gap also rose by similar amounts among respondents interviewed in the same mode. ### The GSS rise in 2022 and the Dobbs decision In June 2022 the Supreme Court decided *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization*, which overturned *Roe v. Wade* [7]. The two surveys place the last increase differently around it. The ANES gap was already 48.1 (95% CI 45.3 to 50.9) points in 2020 and rose by a further 4.2 (95% CI −0.3 to 8.7) points to 2024, an interval that includes zero. The GSS gap rose by 16.7 (95% CI 5.3 to 28.1) points between 2021 and 2022 (Table 1). Weighted, 89.2% (95% CI 86.4% to 91.9%) of the 2022 respondents who answered the question were interviewed on or after the day of the decision (82.6% without weights). That rise mixes a change from a mostly online survey to one that combined in-person and web interviews with any change in opinion, so the same-mode comparisons above are the firmer evidence. Two studies of the period look at other outcomes. Lockhart, Gerber and Huber report, from a large panel that spans the decision, that partisans whose abortion preferences did not match their party were more likely to change their party identification afterward [8]. Cassese, Ondercin and Randall report a shift in the link between partisanship and the intensity of abortion preferences [9]. The data used here cannot observe either change, because they have no panel and no measure of intensity. ### Democratic support rose by more than Republican support fell A gap can widen because one party moves, the other moves or both do. Table 3 shows the shares behind it. In the ANES the Democratic share rose by 36.4 (95% CI 32.2 to 40.6) points between 1980 and 2024 and the Republican share fell by 12.4 (95% CI 7.6 to 17.2) points. The GSS series starts in 1977, before the ANES series, when its gap was −6.5 (95% CI −12.7 to −0.3) points. In the GSS the Democratic share rose by 45.3 (95% CI 40.0 to 50.7) points between 1977 and 2024, from 35.2% to 80.6%. The Republican share fell by 8.6 (95% CI 1.8 to 15.4) points over the same years, from 41.7% to 33.1%. Most of that GSS Republican fall came before 1998: the share was 31.1% in 1998 and has been between 28.7% and 35.0% in every GSS survey since. The questions differ, so the GSS levels are not the ANES levels, and the comparison is of direction and timing. (Note: Among all respondents who answered, including independents who lean toward neither party, the share rose by 12.1 (95% CI 9.0 to 15.3) points in the ANES and 20.6 (95% CI 16.5 to 24.6) points in the GSS, less than the Democratic share rose in each survey.) Table 3. Democratic support for legal abortion rose while Republican support fell ### The gap widened within every attendance, education and birth-cohort group A widening gap in the whole electorate could come from one kind of voter. Table 4 splits the gap by group and compares the 1980s with the 2020s. Among all ANES party identifiers the gap was 3.6 (95% CI 1.5 to 5.7) points in the 1980s and 49.8 (95% CI 47.6 to 52.0) points in the 2020s, and in every group of either survey the 2020s interval lies above the 1980s interval. Table 4. The party gap widened in every group The 2020s gap is not distinguishable between frequent and infrequent attenders in either survey: the difference between the two groups is −3.5 (95% CI −8.8 to 1.7) points in the ANES and +7.8 (95% CI −3.4 to 19.1) points in the GSS. Attendance relates to the level of support in both parties. (Note: In the 2020s 48.3% of Democrats and 6.2% of Republicans who attend weekly or almost weekly said abortion should always be allowed, against 79.3% and 33.6% among people who attend a few times a year or never.) In the 1980s the GSS gap among infrequent attenders was −5.7 (95% CI −9.3 to −2.0) points, so Republicans were slightly more likely than Democrats to say yes. Chapter 9.1, The god gap in America (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america) takes up the political gap between frequent and infrequent worshippers. Education starts from a different point. College graduates already differed by party in the 1980s, with a gap of 20.7 (95% CI 15.8 to 25.6) points, while the gap among people with a high school education or less was −2.1 (95% CI −4.9 to 0.7) points, an interval that includes zero. The GSS splits at a bachelor's degree and gives the same order in both periods. Birth cohorts that were adults in both periods show a similar widening, and Table 5 follows each cohort year by year. Comparing cohorts two at a time within a survey year, the difference has an interval that excludes zero in 3 of 52 comparisons. Each of them involves the cohort born 1927 to 1942, which had the smaller gap in 1986, 1988 and 1994. From 2012 on, the difference between any two cohorts drawn in the same year has an interval that includes zero. The cohorts born 1975 to 1990 and 1991 or later are drawn from 2012 and 2020, because their earlier cells are too small to plot. In the 2020s their gaps are 48.6 (95% CI 44.4 to 52.9) and 50.4 (95% CI 44.3 to 56.5) points, and both intervals overlap those of the older cohorts. Table 5. Birth cohorts have similar party gaps in each year ### Few Democrats now say abortion should never be permitted The shares of people out of step with their party fell on both sides. The share of Democrats who said abortion should never be permitted fell from 12.4% (95% CI 10.1% to 14.6%) in 1980 to 1.4% (95% CI 0.7% to 2.0%) in 2024, and the share of Republicans who said it should always be allowed fell from 33.8% to 21.4% (Table 6). In points the two falls were 11.0 (95% CI 8.6 to 13.4) and 12.4 (95% CI 7.6 to 17.2), and their intervals overlap. The Democratic share was 9.7% (95% CI 6.6% to 12.7%) in 2008, so most of its fall came after that year. Killian and Wilcox followed panel respondents from 1982 to 1997 and found that pro-life Democrats and pro-choice Republicans were more likely than other partisans to switch parties over that period [10]. Table 6. Each party's out-of-step share fell, to near zero for Democrats ### Abortion views came to track the presidential vote Among ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate, the correlation between the four-category abortion answer and a Democratic vote was −0.05 (95% CI −0.11 to 0.02) in 1980 and +0.59 (95% CI 0.56 to 0.62) in 2024 (Table 7). Zero means no straight-line relationship and one a perfect one. The correlation does not say what share of votes the abortion answer predicts, and party identification and ideology also move with the vote, so it does not separate the abortion answer from them. Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) compares when abortion and other attitudes became partisan, and Chapter 9.5, Two moralities (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/two-moralities; planned) asks whether abortion, gay rights and gender roles form one dimension. Table 7. The correlation of abortion views with the vote rose to +0.59 ### What these data cannot show Each ANES and GSS study interviews a new sample, so the gap between the parties can widen because people change their view, change their party or are replaced by new adults. The surveys cannot say which, and the panel studies cited above [10] [8] address that question with other data; Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened) describes ideology by birth cohort, which cannot separate switching from replacement. The estimates of change between studies treat each study as a new sample of people, although the 2020 and 2024 ANES studies re-interviewed some earlier respondents, which makes those intervals conservative. Timing is a second limit. The ANES file used here has no study between 2020 and 2024, none measured before and after the Dobbs decision within one design, and no separate weights by mode for 2020, so the chapter cannot say how much of the 2016 to 2020 change came from the change of mode. The 2022 GSS survey was mostly conducted after the decision but changed mode from 2021, and its samples within each mode are small. Its interviews before the decision were mostly on the web (86.9% of respondents who answered) and those on or after it were less so (39.9%), so a comparison of 2022 respondents before and after the decision mixes timing and mode. Both questions measure the most permissive position. The ANES answers "permitted only in case of rape, incest or danger to the woman's life" and "permitted for other reasons once need is established" are not plotted, and neither question measures how much respondents care about the issue, which Cassese, Ondercin and Randall study [9]. The data begin in 1977 and 1980, so they cannot say when the divide started; O'Brian dates the link between abortion opposition and conservative views to 1970 [4]. The chapter splits no group by sex, and Chapter 3.5, The gender gap in attitudes and votes (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap) compares women and men on gender-role attitudes and the vote. The group results combine years, so they describe the 1980s and the 2020s rather than any single year. The associations here do not show that abortion opinion changed party loyalty or that party loyalty changed abortion opinion. ## Tables ### Table 1. Democrats and Republicans grew apart on legal abortion in both surveys Democratic minus Republican share saying abortion should always be allowed (ANES) or legal for any reason (GSS), party identifiers including leaners, 1977 to 2024; 95% intervals | Survey | Year | Gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES | 1980 | 3.5 | −1.8 | 8.8 | 1,313 | | ANES | 1982 | −0.1 | −5.8 | 5.6 | 1,173 | | ANES | 1984 | 6.6 | 2.3 | 10.9 | 1,888 | | ANES | 1986 | 2.7 | −1.8 | 7.3 | 1,818 | | ANES | 1988 | 3.5 | −0.9 | 8.0 | 1,751 | | ANES | 1990 | 4.7 | −0.1 | 9.4 | 1,692 | | ANES | 1992 | 14.1 | 9.8 | 18.3 | 2,097 | | ANES | 1994 | 12.4 | 7.1 | 17.8 | 1,537 | | ANES | 1996 | 12.3 | 6.8 | 17.9 | 1,521 | | ANES | 1998 | 15.5 | 9.2 | 21.7 | 1,106 | | ANES | 2000 | 16.2 | 10.8 | 21.5 | 1,532 | | ANES | 2004 | 18.9 | 12.2 | 25.5 | 931 | | ANES | 2008 | 21.7 | 13.8 | 29.7 | 893 | | ANES | 2012 | 30.0 | 26.4 | 33.5 | 5,068 | | ANES | 2016 | 32.9 | 29.2 | 36.6 | 3,630 | | ANES | 2020 | 48.1 | 45.3 | 50.9 | 7,002 | | ANES | 2024 | 52.3 | 48.8 | 55.9 | 4,666 | | GSS | 1977 | −6.5 | −12.7 | −0.3 | 1,299 | | GSS | 1978 | −3.8 | −10.6 | 3.0 | 1,263 | | GSS | 1980 | 2.5 | −4.6 | 9.5 | 1,165 | | GSS | 1982 | −0.9 | −7.7 | 5.9 | 1,532 | | GSS | 1983 | −7.4 | −14.0 | −0.8 | 1,322 | | GSS | 1984 | −4.7 | −11.7 | 2.2 | 1,245 | | GSS | 1985 | 1.9 | −4.6 | 8.5 | 1,322 | | GSS | 1987 | −2.4 | −8.7 | 3.8 | 1,527 | | GSS | 1988 | 9.2 | 1.8 | 16.5 | 817 | | GSS | 1989 | 4.5 | −2.9 | 11.9 | 861 | | GSS | 1990 | 6.4 | −1.6 | 14.3 | 766 | | GSS | 1991 | 2.7 | −4.9 | 10.3 | 816 | | GSS | 1993 | 15.3 | 7.9 | 22.7 | 872 | | GSS | 1994 | 8.6 | 3.2 | 14.1 | 1,647 | | GSS | 1996 | 11.3 | 5.8 | 16.8 | 1,513 | | GSS | 1998 | 14.5 | 8.9 | 20.1 | 1,449 | | GSS | 2000 | 12.2 | 6.5 | 17.9 | 1,378 | | GSS | 2002 | 19.0 | 10.8 | 27.1 | 719 | | GSS | 2004 | 17.4 | 9.2 | 25.7 | 700 | | GSS | 2006 | 19.9 | 13.9 | 25.8 | 1,486 | | GSS | 2008 | 11.9 | 4.8 | 19.0 | 1,051 | | GSS | 2010 | 19.2 | 11.6 | 26.8 | 968 | | GSS | 2012 | 23.9 | 16.3 | 31.5 | 966 | | GSS | 2014 | 23.5 | 17.2 | 29.7 | 1,290 | | GSS | 2016 | 21.5 | 15.3 | 27.7 | 1,465 | | GSS | 2018 | 31.0 | 23.9 | 38.0 | 1,189 | | GSS | 2021 | 36.8 | 29.6 | 44.0 | 1,044 | | GSS | 2022 | 53.5 | 44.7 | 62.3 | 831 | | GSS | 2024 | 47.5 | 41.4 | 53.5 | 1,534 | Note: The 2012 and 2016 ANES studies combined in-person and web samples, and the 2020 study had no in-person interviews. Note: GSS interviews were mostly in person through 2018, mostly on the web in 2021, and a mix of in-person and web in 2022 and 2024. Note: The GSS question was first asked in 1977. The 2008 ANES asked the question of fewer respondents than any other study, so its interval is wider; its estimate lies between those of 2004 and 2012, and this chapter treats 2008 as an ordinary year. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024, and General Social Survey, 1977-2024; weighted (VCF0009z, which equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990; weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/gap_by_year.json ### Table 2. The party gap rose by similar amounts within each mode Democratic minus Republican gap in saying yes: change within one interview mode (top) and web minus in-person difference in the same study (bottom); leaners included; 95% intervals | Panel | Comparison | Gaps compared | First gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Second gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Second minus first (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Change in the party gap within one mode | ANES 2016 to 2020 | 2016 (all respondents), then 2020 | 32.9 | 29.2 | 36.6 | 48.1 | 45.3 | 50.9 | 15.2 | 10.6 | 19.8 | 10,632 | | Change in the party gap within one mode | ANES web only | 2016 (web respondents), then 2020 (all respondents) | 31.2 | 26.9 | 35.5 | 48.1 | 45.3 | 50.9 | 16.9 | 11.7 | 22.0 | 9,602 | | Change in the party gap within one mode | GSS in person | 2018 (in person), then 2022 and 2024 combined (in person) | 31.6 | 24.2 | 39.0 | 46.4 | 38.1 | 54.8 | 14.9 | 3.7 | 26.0 | 1,954 | | Change in the party gap within one mode | GSS web | 2021 (web), then 2022 and 2024 combined (web) | 38.5 | 30.9 | 46.1 | 52.6 | 46.0 | 59.3 | 14.1 | 4.1 | 24.2 | 2,148 | | Web minus in-person party gap, same study | ANES 2012 | In person, then web | 26.0 | 19.8 | 32.1 | 32.2 | 27.9 | 36.5 | 6.3 | −1.3 | 13.8 | 5,068 | | Web minus in-person party gap, same study | ANES 2016 | In person, then web | 37.3 | 30.4 | 44.3 | 31.2 | 26.9 | 35.5 | −6.1 | −14.3 | 2.1 | 3,630 | | Web minus in-person party gap, same study | ANES 2024 | In person, then web | 52.3 | 44.8 | 59.7 | 53.8 | 48.6 | 59.1 | 1.6 | −7.5 | 10.7 | 2,714 | | Web minus in-person party gap, same study | GSS 2022 and 2024 | In person, then web | 46.4 | 38.1 | 54.8 | 52.6 | 46.0 | 59.3 | 6.2 | −4.5 | 16.8 | 2,102 | Note: The 2020 ANES study has no separate weights by mode, so it has no row in the bottom panel. Note: The GSS rows combine 2022 and 2024 because one year alone leaves too few in-person or web respondents in each party. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024, and General Social Survey, 2018 to 2024; weighted (weight_ftf and weight_web, the ANES weights for each mode; weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/mode_check.json ### Table 3. Democratic support for legal abortion rose while Republican support fell Share saying abortion should always be allowed (ANES) or legal for any reason (GSS), by party identification including leaners; 95% intervals | Survey and item | Group | Year | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 1980 | 37.3 | 34.0 | 40.7 | 801 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 1982 | 36.0 | 32.6 | 39.5 | 741 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 1984 | 39.4 | 36.5 | 42.4 | 1,032 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 1986 | 40.9 | 37.9 | 43.9 | 1,061 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 1988 | 37.0 | 33.9 | 40.1 | 938 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 1990 | 43.3 | 40.2 | 46.4 | 993 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 1992 | 52.8 | 49.9 | 55.6 | 1,201 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 1994 | 46.4 | 42.5 | 50.2 | 810 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 1996 | 46.1 | 42.4 | 49.8 | 879 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 1998 | 47.2 | 43.0 | 51.4 | 647 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 2000 | 47.2 | 43.5 | 50.9 | 868 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 2004 | 44.6 | 39.7 | 49.4 | 498 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 2008 | 51.0 | 45.9 | 56.2 | 600 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 2012 | 59.0 | 56.5 | 61.4 | 3,081 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 2016 | 60.4 | 57.7 | 63.0 | 1,915 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 2020 | 72.1 | 70.1 | 74.1 | 3,713 | | ANES: always allowed | Democrats | 2024 | 73.7 | 71.2 | 76.2 | 2,459 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 1980 | 33.8 | 29.7 | 37.9 | 512 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 1982 | 36.1 | 31.6 | 40.6 | 432 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 1984 | 32.8 | 29.7 | 36.0 | 856 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 1986 | 38.2 | 34.7 | 41.6 | 757 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 1988 | 33.5 | 30.2 | 36.7 | 813 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 1990 | 38.6 | 35.0 | 42.2 | 699 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 1992 | 38.7 | 35.5 | 41.9 | 896 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 1994 | 33.9 | 30.1 | 37.7 | 727 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 1996 | 33.7 | 29.6 | 37.9 | 642 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 1998 | 31.7 | 27.1 | 36.4 | 459 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 2000 | 31.0 | 27.2 | 34.9 | 664 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 2004 | 25.7 | 21.3 | 30.2 | 433 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 2008 | 29.3 | 23.3 | 35.3 | 293 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 2012 | 29.0 | 26.4 | 31.6 | 1,987 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 2016 | 27.5 | 24.9 | 30.0 | 1,715 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 2020 | 24.0 | 22.1 | 25.9 | 3,289 | | ANES: always allowed | Republicans | 2024 | 21.4 | 18.9 | 23.8 | 2,207 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1977 | 35.2 | 31.6 | 38.9 | 852 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1978 | 32.1 | 28.0 | 36.2 | 781 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1980 | 40.7 | 36.3 | 45.2 | 725 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1982 | 40.4 | 36.5 | 44.4 | 1,052 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1983 | 30.5 | 26.3 | 34.6 | 810 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1984 | 36.2 | 31.9 | 40.6 | 731 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1985 | 39.2 | 34.6 | 43.7 | 725 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1987 | 40.2 | 36.3 | 44.1 | 990 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1988 | 41.6 | 36.6 | 46.6 | 464 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1989 | 41.3 | 36.2 | 46.5 | 459 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1990 | 46.3 | 40.5 | 52.1 | 364 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1991 | 43.9 | 38.4 | 49.4 | 407 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1993 | 52.6 | 47.5 | 57.7 | 473 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1994 | 50.3 | 46.7 | 54.0 | 925 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1996 | 49.3 | 45.4 | 53.2 | 830 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 1998 | 45.6 | 41.8 | 49.4 | 846 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2000 | 43.4 | 39.4 | 47.3 | 785 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2002 | 48.8 | 43.0 | 54.6 | 397 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2004 | 48.9 | 42.9 | 54.8 | 376 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2006 | 49.8 | 45.6 | 54.0 | 834 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2008 | 47.0 | 42.1 | 51.8 | 614 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2010 | 51.1 | 45.9 | 56.2 | 560 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2012 | 52.6 | 47.7 | 57.6 | 580 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2014 | 56.2 | 52.0 | 60.3 | 775 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2016 | 56.3 | 52.1 | 60.4 | 877 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2018 | 65.4 | 60.8 | 69.9 | 689 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2021 | 70.9 | 66.4 | 75.3 | 637 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2022 | 83.3 | 78.3 | 88.2 | 476 | | GSS: any reason | Democrats | 2024 | 80.6 | 76.7 | 84.5 | 810 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1977 | 41.7 | 36.7 | 46.8 | 447 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1978 | 36.0 | 30.5 | 41.4 | 482 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1980 | 38.3 | 32.8 | 43.7 | 440 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1982 | 41.3 | 35.8 | 46.8 | 480 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1983 | 37.9 | 32.7 | 43.1 | 512 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1984 | 41.0 | 35.6 | 46.4 | 514 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1985 | 37.2 | 32.5 | 42.0 | 597 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1987 | 42.7 | 37.7 | 47.6 | 537 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1988 | 32.4 | 27.1 | 37.8 | 353 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1989 | 36.8 | 31.6 | 42.1 | 402 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1990 | 39.9 | 34.5 | 45.3 | 402 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1991 | 41.2 | 35.9 | 46.4 | 409 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1993 | 37.3 | 31.9 | 42.7 | 399 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1994 | 41.7 | 37.7 | 45.7 | 722 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1996 | 38.0 | 34.0 | 42.0 | 683 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 1998 | 31.1 | 27.0 | 35.3 | 603 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2000 | 31.2 | 27.1 | 35.3 | 593 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2002 | 29.8 | 24.1 | 35.6 | 322 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2004 | 31.4 | 25.7 | 37.1 | 324 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2006 | 30.0 | 25.8 | 34.2 | 652 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2008 | 35.0 | 29.8 | 40.3 | 437 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2010 | 31.8 | 26.3 | 37.4 | 408 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2012 | 28.7 | 23.0 | 34.5 | 386 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2014 | 32.7 | 28.1 | 37.3 | 515 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2016 | 34.8 | 30.1 | 39.4 | 588 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2018 | 34.4 | 29.1 | 39.8 | 500 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2021 | 34.1 | 28.4 | 39.7 | 407 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2022 | 29.8 | 22.5 | 37.1 | 355 | | GSS: any reason | Republicans | 2024 | 33.1 | 28.5 | 37.7 | 724 | Views: ANES: always allowed (instrument = ANES: always allowed); GSS: any reason (instrument = GSS: any reason). Note: Shaded band: the ANES mode change from 2016 to 2020 in the ANES view, and the GSS move from in-person to web interviews between 2018 and 2021 in the GSS view. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024, and General Social Survey, 1977-2024; weighted (VCF0009z, which equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990; weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/share_by_party.json ### Table 4. The party gap widened in every group Democratic minus Republican share saying yes, 1980s against 2020s, by group; party identifiers including leaners; 95% intervals | Survey and item | Group | 1980s gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | 2020s gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES: always allowed | All partisans | 3.6 | 1.5 | 5.7 | 7,943 | 49.8 | 47.6 | 52.0 | 11,668 | | ANES: always allowed | Weekly attenders | 3.8 | 0.9 | 6.6 | 3,018 | 42.1 | 37.7 | 46.6 | 3,119 | | ANES: always allowed | Monthly attenders | −0.1 | −6.0 | 5.8 | 1,060 | 43.8 | 36.0 | 51.5 | 986 | | ANES: always allowed | Yearly or never | 2.8 | −0.4 | 6.1 | 3,777 | 45.7 | 42.8 | 48.5 | 7,502 | | ANES: always allowed | High school or less | −2.1 | −4.9 | 0.7 | 4,431 | 37.9 | 33.1 | 42.7 | 2,406 | | ANES: always allowed | Some college | 10.0 | 5.6 | 14.4 | 1,913 | 51.8 | 48.0 | 55.7 | 3,798 | | ANES: always allowed | College graduate | 20.7 | 15.8 | 25.6 | 1,544 | 56.0 | 53.0 | 59.0 | 5,343 | | ANES: always allowed | Born 1927 to 1942 | 0.7 | −3.9 | 5.3 | 1,706 | 50.8 | 42.0 | 59.6 | 675 | | ANES: always allowed | Born 1943 to 1958 | 8.1 | 4.4 | 11.7 | 2,899 | 49.3 | 45.2 | 53.5 | 3,123 | | ANES: always allowed | Born 1959 to 1974 | 10.1 | 4.5 | 15.7 | 1,165 | 49.8 | 45.6 | 54.0 | 3,016 | | GSS: any reason | All partisans | −0.4 | −2.8 | 2.0 | 9,791 | 45.5 | 41.3 | 49.7 | 3,409 | | GSS: any reason | Weekly attenders | 3.3 | −0.3 | 6.9 | 3,032 | 46.0 | 36.1 | 55.8 | 648 | | GSS: any reason | Monthly attenders | 1.8 | −3.4 | 6.9 | 2,193 | 42.6 | 32.2 | 53.0 | 573 | | GSS: any reason | Yearly or less | −5.7 | −9.3 | −2.0 | 4,539 | 38.1 | 32.7 | 43.6 | 2,165 | | GSS: any reason | No bachelor's degree | −1.1 | −3.7 | 1.6 | 8,074 | 38.0 | 32.4 | 43.6 | 1,947 | | GSS: any reason | Bachelor's or higher | 10.8 | 5.2 | 16.4 | 1,694 | 56.1 | 49.9 | 62.4 | 1,457 | | GSS: any reason | Born 1943 to 1958 | 2.7 | −1.3 | 6.7 | 3,495 | 47.4 | 39.4 | 55.5 | 834 | | GSS: any reason | Born 1959 to 1974 | 3.1 | −3.3 | 9.5 | 1,420 | 42.9 | 35.0 | 50.7 | 914 | Views: ANES: always allowed (instrument = ANES: always allowed); GSS: any reason (instrument = GSS: any reason). Note: The 1980s are the ANES studies of 1980 to 1988 and the GSS surveys of 1980 to 1989; the 2020s are the ANES studies of 2020 and 2024 and the GSS surveys of 2021, 2022 and 2024. Note: ANES attendance groups: weekly or nearly weekly, monthly, and a few times a year or never. The 2024 attendance answers come from the ANES 2024 Time Series because the cumulative file's 2024 attendance leaves out people who said they never attend. Note: GSS attendance groups: weekly or more, monthly to nearly weekly, and a few times a year or less. The GSS degree question has no category for some college without a degree, so the GSS view splits at a bachelor's degree. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024, with 2024 attendance from the ANES 2024 Time Series; weighted (VCF0009z, which equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990); General Social Survey, 1980-2024, weighted (weight_use); years combined after rescaling each year's weights to average one Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/gap_within_groups.json ### Table 5. Birth cohorts have similar party gaps in each year ANES Democratic minus Republican share saying abortion should always be allowed, by birth cohort (years of birth); party identifiers including leaners; 95% intervals in the data table | Birth cohort | Year | Gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1927-42 | 1980 | 14.1 | 3.5 | 24.8 | 315 | | 1927-42 | 1982 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | 1927-42 | 1984 | 0.0 | −9.4 | 9.5 | 405 | | 1927-42 | 1986 | −2.0 | −12.2 | 8.2 | 372 | | 1927-42 | 1988 | −3.4 | −13.2 | 6.4 | 367 | | 1927-42 | 1990 | 4.8 | −5.7 | 15.3 | 323 | | 1927-42 | 1992 | 9.2 | −0.4 | 18.8 | 395 | | 1927-42 | 1994 | 3.5 | −7.8 | 14.7 | 318 | | 1927-42 | 1996 | 12.3 | 1.2 | 23.5 | 305 | | 1927-42 | 1998 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | 1927-42 | 2000 | 19.3 | 7.6 | 31.1 | 274 | | 1927-42 | 2004 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | 1927-42 | 2008 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | 1927-42 | 2012 | 29.9 | 20.0 | 39.7 | 576 | | 1927-42 | 2016 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | 1927-42 | 2020 | 49.0 | 38.2 | 59.8 | 456 | | 1943-58 | 1980 | 11.4 | 2.3 | 20.6 | 465 | | 1943-58 | 1982 | 0.0 | −10.0 | 10.1 | 420 | | 1943-58 | 1984 | 9.8 | 2.4 | 17.2 | 688 | | 1943-58 | 1986 | 6.9 | −0.5 | 14.3 | 696 | | 1943-58 | 1988 | 9.1 | 1.6 | 16.6 | 630 | | 1943-58 | 1990 | 5.1 | −3.6 | 13.8 | 537 | | 1943-58 | 1992 | 18.5 | 11.1 | 26.0 | 688 | | 1943-58 | 1994 | 9.9 | 0.0 | 19.7 | 468 | | 1943-58 | 1996 | 19.8 | 9.9 | 29.6 | 467 | | 1943-58 | 1998 | 25.3 | 14.3 | 36.2 | 358 | | 1943-58 | 2000 | 20.6 | 11.0 | 30.3 | 481 | | 1943-58 | 2004 | 24.5 | 12.2 | 36.8 | 274 | | 1943-58 | 2008 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | 1943-58 | 2012 | 31.4 | 25.3 | 37.5 | 1,650 | | 1943-58 | 2016 | 35.5 | 28.7 | 42.3 | 1,001 | | 1943-58 | 2020 | 49.6 | 44.5 | 54.8 | 1,912 | | 1943-58 | 2024 | 48.8 | 41.8 | 55.8 | 1,211 | | 1959-74 | 1984 | 11.6 | 0.2 | 22.9 | 278 | | 1959-74 | 1986 | 15.4 | 4.9 | 25.9 | 328 | | 1959-74 | 1988 | 3.2 | −7.0 | 13.3 | 365 | | 1959-74 | 1990 | 4.8 | −4.0 | 13.6 | 485 | | 1959-74 | 1992 | 17.1 | 9.2 | 25.0 | 611 | | 1959-74 | 1994 | 23.3 | 13.7 | 32.9 | 472 | | 1959-74 | 1996 | 15.9 | 5.8 | 26.0 | 464 | | 1959-74 | 1998 | 12.6 | 1.1 | 24.1 | 317 | | 1959-74 | 2000 | 23.1 | 13.8 | 32.5 | 491 | | 1959-74 | 2004 | 16.1 | 3.2 | 29.1 | 252 | | 1959-74 | 2008 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | 1959-74 | 2012 | 25.4 | 18.6 | 32.2 | 1,391 | | 1959-74 | 2016 | 29.3 | 22.2 | 36.5 | 936 | | 1959-74 | 2020 | 48.0 | 42.7 | 53.3 | 1,789 | | 1959-74 | 2024 | 52.6 | 45.9 | 59.4 | 1,227 | | 1975-90 | 2012 | 31.6 | 24.3 | 38.9 | 1,174 | | 1975-90 | 2016 | 35.0 | 27.9 | 42.2 | 942 | | 1975-90 | 2020 | 44.9 | 39.5 | 50.3 | 1,782 | | 1975-90 | 2024 | 53.6 | 46.8 | 60.4 | 1,212 | | After 1990 | 2020 | 46.9 | 38.0 | 55.8 | 801 | | After 1990 | 2024 | 53.6 | 45.2 | 62.1 | 697 | Note: Intervals are not drawn because five overlapping bands cannot be read; the 95% confidence intervals are in the data table. Note: Cohort-year cells are drawn only where each party has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100, so the cohort born 1975 to 1990 begins in 2012 and the cohort born 1991 or later in 2020. A line breaks where a cohort's cell was left out. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z, which equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/gap_by_cohort.json ### Table 6. Each party's out-of-step share fell, to near zero for Democrats ANES share of Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted and of Republicans saying it should always be allowed; leaners included; 95% intervals | Series | Group and answer counted | Year | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 1980 | 12.4 | 10.1 | 14.6 | 801 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 1982 | 14.8 | 12.3 | 17.4 | 741 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 1984 | 11.7 | 9.8 | 13.7 | 1,032 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 1986 | 14.2 | 12.1 | 16.3 | 1,061 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 1988 | 13.4 | 11.2 | 15.6 | 938 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 1990 | 11.6 | 9.6 | 13.6 | 993 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 1992 | 9.7 | 8.0 | 11.3 | 1,201 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 1994 | 14.0 | 11.3 | 16.6 | 810 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 1996 | 12.0 | 9.6 | 14.4 | 879 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 1998 | 9.7 | 7.2 | 12.2 | 647 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 2000 | 11.5 | 9.1 | 13.9 | 868 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 2004 | 10.9 | 7.8 | 13.9 | 498 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 2008 | 9.7 | 6.6 | 12.7 | 600 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 2012 | 6.5 | 5.3 | 7.7 | 3,081 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 2016 | 8.4 | 6.9 | 9.9 | 1,915 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 2020 | 4.6 | 3.7 | 5.6 | 3,713 | | Dem. never | Democrats saying abortion should never be permitted | 2024 | 1.4 | 0.7 | 2.0 | 2,459 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 1980 | 33.8 | 29.7 | 37.9 | 512 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 1982 | 36.1 | 31.6 | 40.6 | 432 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 1984 | 32.8 | 29.7 | 36.0 | 856 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 1986 | 38.2 | 34.7 | 41.6 | 757 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 1988 | 33.5 | 30.2 | 36.7 | 813 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 1990 | 38.6 | 35.0 | 42.2 | 699 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 1992 | 38.7 | 35.5 | 41.9 | 896 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 1994 | 33.9 | 30.1 | 37.7 | 727 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 1996 | 33.7 | 29.6 | 37.9 | 642 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 1998 | 31.7 | 27.1 | 36.4 | 459 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 2000 | 31.0 | 27.2 | 34.9 | 664 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 2004 | 25.7 | 21.3 | 30.2 | 433 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 2008 | 29.3 | 23.3 | 35.3 | 293 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 2012 | 29.0 | 26.4 | 31.6 | 1,987 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 2016 | 27.5 | 24.9 | 30.0 | 1,715 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 2020 | 24.0 | 22.1 | 25.9 | 3,289 | | Rep. always | Republicans saying abortion should always be allowed | 2024 | 21.4 | 18.9 | 23.8 | 2,207 | Note: The Republican series is the same as the Republican line in the ANES view of the earlier figure on party shares. Shaded band: the ANES mode change from 2016 to 2020. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z, which equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/cross_pressured.json ### Table 7. The correlation of abortion views with the vote rose to +0.59 Correlation between the four-category abortion answer (higher = more permissive) and a Democratic rather than Republican presidential vote, ANES presidential-election years, 95% intervals | Year | Correlation | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1980 | −0.05 | −0.11 | 0.02 | 920 | | 1984 | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.16 | 1,341 | | 1988 | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.17 | 1,182 | | 1992 | 0.17 | 0.12 | 0.22 | 1,615 | | 1996 | 0.23 | 0.16 | 0.29 | 1,096 | | 2000 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.30 | 1,092 | | 2004 | 0.26 | 0.18 | 0.33 | 796 | | 2008 | 0.32 | 0.24 | 0.40 | 754 | | 2012 | 0.37 | 0.33 | 0.40 | 4,168 | | 2016 | 0.42 | 0.38 | 0.46 | 2,577 | | 2020 | 0.51 | 0.49 | 0.54 | 5,977 | | 2024 | 0.59 | 0.56 | 0.62 | 3,630 | Note: Respondents who reported a vote for a candidate other than the two major-party candidates are left out. Shaded band: the ANES mode change from 2016 to 2020. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z, which equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/vote_correlation.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (95), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | all_1980s | 3.6 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share within the group; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question, within the group | 1980s (ANES 1980 to 1988) | 95% CI 1.5 to 5.7 | 7,943 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | all_2020s | 49.8 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share within the group; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question, within the group | 2020s (ANES 2020 and 2024) | 95% CI 47.6 to 52.0 | 11,668 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_all_chg | 12.1 | percentage points | increase in the weighted all-respondent share, 2024 minus 1980 (two separate samples) | ANES respondents who answered the abortion question | 1980 to 2024 | 95% CI 9.0 to 15.3 | 6,568 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_dem_1980 | 37.3% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1980 | 95% CI 34.0% to 40.7% | 801 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_dem_2024 | 73.7% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2024 | 95% CI 71.2% to 76.2% | 2,459 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_dem_chg | 36.4 | percentage points | increase in the weighted Democratic share, 2024 minus 1980 (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1980 to 2024 | 95% CI 32.2 to 40.6 | 3,260 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1980 | 3.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1980 | 95% CI −1.8 to 8.8 | 1,313 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1984 | 6.6 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1984 | 95% CI 2.3 to 10.9 | 1,888 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1992 | 14.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1992 | 95% CI 9.8 to 18.3 | 2,097 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1998 | 15.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1998 | 95% CI 9.2 to 21.7 | 1,106 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2000 | 16.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2000 | 95% CI 10.8 to 21.5 | 1,532 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2004 | 18.9 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2004 | 95% CI 12.2 to 25.5 | 931 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2016 | 32.9 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2016 | 95% CI 29.2 to 36.6 | 3,630 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2020 | 48.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2020 | 95% CI 45.3 to 50.9 | 7,002 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2024 | 52.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2024 | 95% CI 48.8 to 55.9 | 4,666 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_plateau_hi | 16.2 | percentage points | highest of the yearly weighted party gaps in the five ANES studies from 1992 to 2000 | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1992 to 2000 | | | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_plateau_lo | 12.3 | percentage points | lowest of the yearly weighted party gaps in the five ANES studies from 1992 to 2000 | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1992 to 2000 | | | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_rep_1980 | 33.8% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1980 | 95% CI 29.7% to 37.9% | 512 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_rep_2024 | 21.4% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2024 | 95% CI 18.9% to 23.8% | 2,207 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_rep_chg | 12.4 | percentage points | decrease in the weighted Republican share, 1980 minus 2024 (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1980 to 2024 | 95% CI 7.6 to 17.2 | 2,719 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_settled_year | 1992 | year | first study year from which the 95% interval of the party gap lies above zero in every later study | ANES studies | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | att_diff_2020s | −3.5 | percentage points | party gap among people who attend weekly or nearly weekly minus the gap among people who attend a few times a year or never (independent groups) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2020s (ANES 2020 and 2024) | 95% CI −8.8 to 1.7 | 10,621 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | att_often_dem_2020s | 48.3% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who attend weekly or nearly and answered the ANES abortion question | 2020s (ANES 2020 and 2024) | 95% CI 44.1% to 52.5% | 1,140 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | att_often_rep_2020s | 6.2% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who attend weekly or nearly and answered the ANES abortion question | 2020s (ANES 2020 and 2024) | 95% CI 4.7% to 7.7% | 1,979 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | att_rarely_dem_2020s | 79.3% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who attend a few times a year or never and answered the ANES abortion question | 2020s (ANES 2020 and 2024) | 95% CI 77.6% to 80.9% | 4,538 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | att_rarely_rep_2020s | 33.6% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who attend a few times a year or never and answered the ANES abortion question | 2020s (ANES 2020 and 2024) | 95% CI 31.3% to 35.9% | 2,964 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coh_7590_2020s | 48.6 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share within the group; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question, within the group | 2020s (ANES 2020 and 2024) | 95% CI 44.4 to 52.9 | 2,994 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coh_91_2020s | 50.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share within the group; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question, within the group | 2020s (ANES 2020 and 2024) | 95% CI 44.3 to 56.5 | 1,498 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coh_y_4358_2020 | 49.6 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share within the birth cohort; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question, born 1943 to 1958 | 2020 | 95% CI 44.5 to 54.8 | 1,912 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | coh_y_91_2020 | 46.9 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share within the birth cohort; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question, born 1991 to or later | 2020 | 95% CI 38.0 to 55.8 | 801 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | corr_1980 | −0.05 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the four-category abortion answer (higher = more permissive) and a Democratic vote (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective n) | ANES respondents who answered the abortion question and reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 1980 | 95% CI −0.11 to 0.02 | 920 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | corr_1984 | +0.11 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the four-category abortion answer (higher = more permissive) and a Democratic vote (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective n) | ANES respondents who answered the abortion question and reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 1984 | 95% CI 0.06 to 0.16 | 1,341 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | corr_2024 | +0.59 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the four-category abortion answer (higher = more permissive) and a Democratic vote (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective n) | ANES respondents who answered the abortion question and reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 0.56 to 0.62 | 3,630 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_col_1980s | 20.7 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share within the group; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question, within the group | 1980s (ANES 1980 to 1988) | 95% CI 15.8 to 25.6 | 1,544 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | edu_hs_1980s | −2.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share within the group; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice' | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question, within the group | 1980s (ANES 1980 to 1988) | 95% CI −4.9 to 0.7 | 4,431 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | grp_hi_1980s | 20.7 | percentage points | highest of the weighted party gaps in the groups drawn in the groups figure | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) within each plotted group, ANES and GSS views together | 1980s (ANES 1980 to 1988, GSS 1980 to 1989) | | | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | grp_hi_2020s | 56.1 | percentage points | highest of the weighted party gaps in the groups drawn in the groups figure | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) within each plotted group, ANES and GSS views together | 2020s (ANES 2020 and 2024, GSS 2021, 2022 and 2024) | | | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | grp_lo_1980s | −5.7 | percentage points | lowest of the weighted party gaps in the groups drawn in the groups figure | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) within each plotted group, ANES and GSS views together | 1980s (ANES 1980 to 1988, GSS 1980 to 1989) | | | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | grp_lo_2020s | 37.9 | percentage points | lowest of the weighted party gaps in the groups drawn in the groups figure | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) within each plotted group, ANES and GSS views together | 2020s (ANES 2020 and 2024, GSS 2021, 2022 and 2024) | | | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990), rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gss_after_dobbs | 89.2% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share interviewed on or after 24 June 2022, the date of the Dobbs decision | GSS respondents who answered the abany question in 2022 | 2022 | 95% CI 86.4% to 91.9% | 1,136 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_after_dobbs_unw | 82.6% | percent of respondents who answered the question | unweighted share interviewed on or after 24 June 2022 (respondent count) | GSS respondents who answered the abany question in 2022 | 2022 | | 1,136 | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | gss_all_chg | 20.6 | percentage points | increase in the weighted all-respondent share, 2024 minus 1977 (two separate samples) | GSS respondents who answered the abany question | 1977 to 2024 | 95% CI 16.5 to 24.6 | 3,619 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_att_diff_2020s | +7.8 | percentage points | party gap among people who attend weekly or more minus the gap among people who attend a few times a year or less (independent groups) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 2020s (GSS 2021, 2022 and 2024) | 95% CI −3.4 to 19.1 | 2,813 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | General Social Survey | | | gss_att_rarely_1980s | −5.7 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share within the group; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question, within the group | 1980s (GSS 1980 to 1989) | 95% CI −9.3 to −2.0 | 4,539 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | General Social Survey | | | gss_dem_1977 | 35.2% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 1977 | 95% CI 31.6% to 38.9% | 852 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_dem_2024 | 80.6% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 2024 | 95% CI 76.7% to 84.5% | 810 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_dem_chg | 45.3 | percentage points | increase in the weighted Democratic share, 2024 minus 1977 (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 1977 to 2024 | 95% CI 40.0 to 50.7 | 1,662 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_fall_2224 | 6.0 | percentage points | decrease in the weighted party gap, 2022 minus 2024 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.7 to 16.7 | 2,365 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_gap_1977 | −6.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 1977 | 95% CI −12.7 to −0.3 | 1,299 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_gap_1977_design | −6.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes; interval from a Taylor linearisation that uses the survey strata (vstrat) and primary sampling units (vpsu) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 1977 | 95% CI −13.6 to 0.7 | 1,299 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_gap_1980 | 2.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 1980 | 95% CI −4.6 to 9.5 | 1,165 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_gap_2022 | 53.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 2022 | 95% CI 44.7 to 62.3 | 831 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_gap_2024 | 47.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 2024 | 95% CI 41.4 to 53.5 | 1,534 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_rep_1977 | 41.7% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 1977 | 95% CI 36.7% to 46.7% | 447 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_rep_1998 | 31.1% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 1998 | 95% CI 27.0% to 35.3% | 603 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_rep_2024 | 33.1% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 2024 | 95% CI 28.5% to 37.7% | 724 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_rep_chg | 8.6 | percentage points | decrease in the weighted Republican share, 1977 minus 2024 (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 1977 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.8 to 15.4 | 1,171 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_rep_late_hi | 35.0% | percent of respondents who answered the question | highest of the yearly weighted Republican shares in the 14 GSS surveys from 1998 to 2024; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 1998 to 2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_rep_late_lo | 28.7% | percent of respondents who answered the question | lowest of the yearly weighted Republican shares in the 14 GSS surveys from 1998 to 2024; the GSS abany question (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 1998 to 2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gss_settled_year | 1993 | year | first survey year from which the 95% interval of the party gap lies above zero in every later survey | GSS surveys | 1977-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | gss_web_post_dobbs | 39.9% | percent of respondents who answered the question | share interviewed on the web (unweighted respondent count) | GSS respondents who answered the abany question in 2022, interviewed on or after 24 June | 2022 | | 938 | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | gss_web_pre_dobbs | 86.9% | percent of respondents who answered the question | share interviewed on the web (unweighted respondent count) | GSS respondents who answered the abany question in 2022, interviewed before 24 June | 2022 | | 198 | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | gss_web_share_2021 | 89.2% | percent of respondents who answered the question | share of respondents interviewed on the web (unweighted count) | GSS respondents who answered the abany question in 2021 | 2021 | | 1,328 | none (unweighted count) | General Social Survey | | | mode_ci_high_max | +16.8 | percentage points | highest upper end of the four 95% intervals for web minus in-person party gaps | ANES (2012, 2016, 2024) and GSS (2022 and 2024 combined) Democratic and Republican identifiers | 2012 to 2024 | | | weight_web and weight_ftf; weight_use | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_ci_low_min | −14.3 | percentage points | lowest lower end of the four 95% intervals for web minus in-person party gaps | ANES (2012, 2016, 2024) and GSS (2022 and 2024 combined) Democratic and Republican identifiers | 2012 to 2024 | | | weight_web and weight_ftf; weight_use | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_diff_2012 | +6.3 | percentage points | web respondents' weighted party gap minus in-person respondents' gap (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2012 | 95% CI −1.3 to 13.8 | 5,068 | weight_web and weight_ftf (VCF0009z mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_diff_2016 | −6.1 | percentage points | web respondents' weighted party gap minus in-person respondents' gap (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2016 | 95% CI −14.3 to 2.1 | 3,630 | weight_web and weight_ftf (VCF0009z mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_diff_2024 | +1.6 | percentage points | web respondents' weighted party gap minus in-person respondents' gap (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2024 | 95% CI −7.5 to 10.7 | 2,714 | weight_web and weight_ftf (VCF0009z mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_diff_gss | +6.2 | percentage points | web respondents' weighted party gap minus in-person respondents' gap (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 2022 and 2024 combined | 95% CI −4.5 to 16.8 | 2,102 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | General Social Survey | | | mode_rise_hi | 16.9 | percentage points | highest of the three rises in the weighted party gap within one interview mode: ANES web respondents in 2016 against all respondents in 2020, GSS in-person respondents in 2018 against 2022 and 2024 combined, GSS web respondents in 2021 against 2022 and 2024 combined | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) interviewed in one mode | 2016 to 2020 (ANES web respondents in 2016), 2018 to 2022 and 2024 (GSS in person), 2021 to 2022 and 2024 (GSS web) | | | weight_web and VCF0009z (ANES); weight_use (GSS) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_rise_lo | 14.1 | percentage points | lowest of the three rises in the weighted party gap within one interview mode: ANES web respondents in 2016 against all respondents in 2020, GSS in-person respondents in 2018 against 2022 and 2024 combined, GSS web respondents in 2021 against 2022 and 2024 combined | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) interviewed in one mode | 2016 to 2020 (ANES web respondents in 2016), 2018 to 2022 and 2024 (GSS in person), 2021 to 2022 and 2024 (GSS web) | | | weight_web and VCF0009z (ANES); weight_use (GSS) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_early | 6 | studies | count of ANES study years from 1980 to 1990 with the item | ANES studies from 1980 to 1990 | 1980-1990 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_early_zero | 5 | studies | count of study years in which the 95% interval of the party gap includes zero | ANES studies from 1980 to 1990 | 1980-1990 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_item | 45,017 | respondents | count of respondents who answered the question in the 17 studies that asked it | ANES respondents who answered the abortion question | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_steps_post2000 | 6 | steps | count of steps between adjacent ANES studies from 2000 to 2024 (2000 to 2004, 2004 to 2008, 2008 to 2012, 2012 to 2016, 2016 to 2020, 2020 to 2024) | adjacent ANES study pairs from 2000 to 2024 | 2000-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_steps_post2000_zero | 5 | steps | count of those steps in which the 95% interval of the change in the party gap includes zero | adjacent ANES study pairs from 2000 to 2024 | 2000-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_waves | 17 | studies | count of ANES study years with the item | ANES studies that asked the abortion question | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_coh_pairs | 52 | comparisons | count of pairs of cohorts (born 1927 to 1942, 1943 to 1958, 1959 to 1974, 1975 to 1990, 1991 or later) with a plotted party gap in the same study | pairs of birth cohorts drawn in the same ANES survey year | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_coh_pairs_excl | 3 | comparisons | count of those pairs in which the 95% interval of the difference between the two cohorts' party gaps excludes zero | pairs of birth cohorts drawn in the same ANES survey year | 1980-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_gss_early | 12 | surveys | count of GSS survey years from 1977 to 1991 with the item | GSS surveys from 1977 to 1991 | 1977-1991 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_gss_early_zero | 9 | surveys | count of survey years in which the 95% interval of the party gap includes zero | GSS surveys from 1977 to 1991 | 1977-1991 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_gss_item | 41,398 | respondents | count of respondents who answered abany | GSS respondents who answered the abany question | 1977-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_gss_waves | 29 | surveys | count of GSS survey years with the item | GSS survey years that asked abany | 1977-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | prolife_dem_1980 | 12.4% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the ANES answer 'by law, abortion should never be permitted' | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1980 | 95% CI 10.1% to 14.6% | 801 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | prolife_dem_2008 | 9.7% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the ANES answer 'by law, abortion should never be permitted' | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2008 | 95% CI 6.6% to 12.7% | 600 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | prolife_dem_2024 | 1.4% | percent of respondents who answered the question | weighted share; the ANES answer 'by law, abortion should never be permitted' | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2024 | 95% CI 0.7% to 2.0% | 2,459 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | prolife_dem_chg | 11.0 | percentage points | decrease in the weighted share answering 'never permitted', 1980 minus 2024 (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1980 to 2024 | 95% CI 8.6 to 13.4 | 3,260 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | step_anes_0016 | 16.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2016 minus 2000 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2000 to 2016 | 95% CI 10.2 to 23.2 | 5,162 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | step_anes_1620 | 15.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2020 minus 2016 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 10.6 to 19.8 | 10,632 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | step_anes_2024 | 4.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2024 minus 2020 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.3 to 8.7 | 11,668 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | step_anes_9092 | 9.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 1992 minus 1990 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 1990 to 1992 | 95% CI 3.0 to 15.8 | 3,789 | weight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | step_anes_web16_20 | 16.9 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2020 (all respondents, mostly online) minus 2016 (web respondents only) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion question | 2016 (web respondents) to 2020 | 95% CI 11.7 to 22.0 | 9,602 | weight_web (VCF0009z web weight) for 2016 web respondents; weight (VCF0009z) for 2020 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | step_gss_2122 | 16.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2022 minus 2021, all modes (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 2021 to 2022 | 95% CI 5.3 to 28.1 | 1,875 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | step_gss_ftf | 14.9 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap among in-person respondents (two separate samples) | in-person GSS respondents, Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 2018 to 2022 and 2024 combined | 95% CI 3.7 to 26.0 | 1,954 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | General Social Survey | | | step_gss_web | 14.1 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap among web respondents (two separate samples) | web GSS respondents, Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS abany question | 2021 to 2022 and 2024 combined | 95% CI 4.1 to 24.2 | 2,148 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before combining | General Social Survey | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Party sorting: The alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Cohort: People born in the same period, such as the same decade. Comparing cohorts shows whether a difference comes from when people were born, as distinct from their age or the year they were surveyed. - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. ## Methods Sample. ANES Cumulative Data File respondents who answered the four-category abortion question (VCF0838: 1 abortion never permitted, 2 only for rape, incest or danger to the woman's life, 3 for other reasons once need is established, 4 always allowed as a matter of personal choice; the 'other' answer is missing): 45,017 respondents in 17 studies from 1980 to 2024, of whom 39,618 name or lean toward a party. GSS respondents who answered abany (a legal abortion should be possible if the woman wants it for any reason; asked from 1977 to 2024 and absent from the file before 1977): 41,398 respondents in 29 surveys, 34,037 of them Democratic or Republican identifiers. Party and estimand. Leaners count with their party (ANES pid_7pt 1 to 3 Democratic and 5 to 7 Republican; GSS partyid 0 to 2 and 4 to 6). Independents who lean toward neither party and members of other parties are left out of the party lines and the gap and are counted only in the all-respondent changes given in the text. In each survey year the estimand is the weighted share choosing the most permissive answer (ANES 'always allowed', GSS yes) among Democrats and among Republicans; the party gap is the Democratic share minus the Republican share, in percentage points, which is minus the Republican coefficient in a weighted linear probability model of the answer on a Republican indicator, the form used in earlier versions of this analysis. Weights. ANES weight VCF0009z, which equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so the 1980 endpoint and the 1980s groups are unweighted; GSS weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before). Mode. ANES mode-specific estimates use weight_ftf and weight_web, the weights for in-person and web respondents, which exist for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024 (2008 was a single-mode in-person study; 2020 has no separate weights by mode). The 2024 mode groups are the newly recruited in-person and web samples (the ANES calls them fresh samples), 1,017 in person and 1,955 on the web of the 5,021 item respondents; the panel and paper respondents are in neither. The GSS interview mode (in person, telephone, web or other) is joined from the raw file. Intervals. 95% intervals come from the Kish effective sample size with a normal approximation, which treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignores the strata and clusters of the sampling design. For one estimate, the GSS 1977 gap, a design-based interval (Taylor linearisation with the GSS strata vstrat and primary sampling units vpsu) is also reported, because the two methods disagree about whether it lies below zero. Differences between two independent estimates (party gaps, changes over time, mode differences) combine the two standard errors in quadrature. Adjacent ANES studies are treated as independent although the 2020 and 2024 studies re-interviewed some earlier respondents, which makes those intervals conservative. Correlations use Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size. Suppression. A party cell in a yearly series needs at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. A party cell in a group, mode or cohort estimate needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100, and a gap needs both cells to clear the floor. Periods and groups. The 1980s combine ANES 1980 to 1988 and GSS 1980 to 1989, and the 2020s combine ANES 2020 and 2024 and GSS 2021, 2022 and 2024, after rescaling each year's weights to average one so that years count in proportion to their respondents. Attendance has three categories (ANES weekly or almost weekly, once or twice a month, a few times a year or never; GSS attend 7 and 8, 4 to 6, and 0 to 3), with the 2024 ANES values rebuilt from the 2024 Time Series (V241439, V241440) because the cumulative file leaves out respondents who said they never attend. Education has three ANES categories and two GSS categories (a bachelor's degree or higher, or not). Birth cohort uses the ANES cohort categories and, for the GSS, survey year minus age. Vote. The weighted Pearson correlation between the four-category answer and a Democratic rather than Republican presidential vote, in presidential-election years. GSS 2022 interview date. The month and day are in dateintv, which has no year, so the interviews dated in January (5 of the respondents who answered the abortion question) are counted as before the decision; counting them as after it changes the weighted share by less than one point. ## What these data cannot show - Each ANES and GSS study interviews a new sample, so the gap between the parties can widen because people change their view, change their party or are replaced by new adults. - The surveys cannot say which, and the panel studies cited above [10] [8] address that question with other data; Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened) describes ideology by birth cohort, which cannot separate switching from replacement. - The estimates of change between studies treat each study as a new sample of people, although the 2020 and 2024 ANES studies re-interviewed some earlier respondents, which makes those intervals conservative. - Timing is a second limit. - The ANES file used here has no study between 2020 and 2024, none measured before and after the Dobbs decision within one design, and no separate weights by mode for 2020, so the chapter cannot say how much of the 2016 to 2020 change came from the change of mode. - The 2022 GSS survey was mostly conducted after the decision but changed mode from 2021, and its samples within each mode are small. - Its interviews before the decision were mostly on the web (86.9% of respondents who answered) and those on or after it were less so (39.9%), so a comparison of 2022 respondents before and after the decision mixes timing and mode. - Both questions measure the most permissive position. - The ANES answers "permitted only in case of rape, incest or danger to the woman's life" and "permitted for other reasons once need is established" are not plotted, and neither question measures how much respondents care about the issue, which Cassese, Ondercin and Randall study [9]. - The data begin in 1977 and 1980, so they cannot say when the divide started; O'Brian dates the link between abortion opposition and conservative views to 1970 [4]. - The chapter splits no group by sex, and Chapter 3.5, The gender gap in attitudes and votes (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-gender-gap) compares women and men on gender-role attitudes and the vote. - The group results combine years, so they describe the 1980s and the 2020s rather than any single year. - The associations here do not show that abortion opinion changed party loyalty or that party loyalty changed abortion opinion. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Carmines, Edward G.; Stimson, James A. (1989). Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics. Princeton University Press. 3. Adams, Greg D. (1997). Abortion: Evidence of an Issue Evolution. American Journal of Political Science 41(3): 718-737. 4. O'Brian, Neil A. (2020). Before Reagan: The Development of Abortion's Partisan Divide. Perspectives on Politics 18(4): 1031-1047. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592719003840 5. American National Election Studies (2021). ANES 2020 Time Series Study Full Release: User Guide and Codebook. Stanford University and the University of Michigan. https://electionstudies.org/data-center/2020-time-series-study/ 6. Burns, Nancy; Kinder, Donald R.; Rosenstone, Steven J.; Sapiro, Virginia; American National Election Studies (2001). ANES 2000 Time Series Study. Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research, ICPSR 3131. https://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR03131.v1 7. Supreme Court of the United States (2022). Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215. Decided 24 June 2022. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf 8. Lockhart, Mackenzie; Gerber, Alan S.; Huber, Gregory A. (2024). Policy Shapes Partisan Identification: How Dobbs made pre-existing abortion policy preferences relevant to partisanship. Working paper, Yale University. https://huber.research.yale.edu/writings.html 9. Cassese, Erin C.; Ondercin, Heather L.; Randall, Jordan (2025). Abortion Attitudes and Polarization in the American Electorate. Elements in Gender and Politics, Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009533119 10. Killian, Mitchell; Wilcox, Clyde (2008). Do Abortion Attitudes Lead to Party Switching?. Political Research Quarterly 61(4): 561-573. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912907312981 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/the-abortion-sort/build.py (sha256 9dbc60b7d81e3a7c873ba2e0dc4f8fc642024dd93e53e95dcbdc596e085d466c) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes2024_ts/anes_timeseries_2024_spss_20260519.sav | 12,757,094 | 3107c838755f88353d0e3e39b2c3d5f76a2888cf56a179e3acac84ab431335d2 | bb318a018a39b4cf87ccc91b50a5b7c5b41746d28c0226f4a6c176e8c74966d6 | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 62a3b6209ea71c08e6ecf9a8592b9341b23d44b0436da177e44fa33287dfc045 | | figures/cross_pressured.json | 7db1d0286d05e3a708e689e2bbdc8ebbdd5fd80b6e76b8fd1890ac67610a18b3 | | figures/gap_by_cohort.json | 99198a3ac8eb3e03de01df6b0a5c8552741b151a0c14ea1548affa9bda192729 | | figures/gap_by_year.json | 509da791a54c12e9d1ee0a88daa02896c6b6a7a11571b16548ee6269e812af64 | | figures/gap_within_groups.json | d4302a019a1c82018810e8c13ab51d4e5750013706a86d06a7cb4187cda98b43 | | figures/mode_check.json | 548f996565158cf4f54b3387f837549bb399160f15e60076139acc0c15e4762c | | figures/share_by_party.json | b158a2138c04b08a4608ceeedc089fe9ed726c76cbec8dd468e0c3e23934f7f9 | | figures/vote_correlation.json | 302ef79d46ab9cc5df3a4289d99a795d1f1e3bf69e66f2bd4fb9debb144fdcb8 | | meta.json | a29cb7718eab432f0bcc49274fd98cc237c5069ffe8eb9bff118646d6dc13806 | | refs.json | 1d254ad9dffb2b12ac05645f204cb07b207f900fcd2ee97d62ef585450db0d46 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/facts.json - Table 1, figure "gap_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/gap_by_year.json - Table 2, figure "mode_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/mode_check.json - Table 3, figure "share_by_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/share_by_party.json - Table 4, figure "gap_within_groups" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/gap_within_groups.json - Table 5, figure "gap_by_cohort" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/gap_by_cohort.json - Table 6, figure "cross_pressured" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/cross_pressured.json - Table 7, figure "vote_correlation" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-abortion-sort/figures/vote_correlation.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Immigration: report Chapter 4.2 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Immigration - Chapter: 4.2 (Part IV, Issue by issue; The great sorting) - Question: How have immigration attitudes moved, and how sharply do they divide the parties? - Dek: In the American National Election Studies, the share wanting fewer immigrants was 3.3 points higher among Republicans than Democrats in 1992 and 28.3 points higher in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024, immigration level item (VCF0879, VCF0879a) in 11 studies from 1992 to 2024 and thermometers (VCF0233, VCF0217); mode weights for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode split - ANES 2024 Time Series. 2024 Time Series, ten immigration items (V241386, V241387, V241390, V241393, V242227 to V242229, V242232, V242235, V242236); years: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews); weights: V240107b (post-election); V240101b and V240102b for the mode views - General Social Survey. Raw file 1994-2024: letin1a (2004-2024), the earlier forms letin and letin1, and the immigration module items immjobs, immcrime and immameco; interview mode from the raw file; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative CES, nine immigration policy items 2007-2021; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (single-wave weight) - Nationscape. Weekly waves July 2019 to February 2021, four immigration policy items; years: 2019-07-18 to 2021-04-15 (85 weekly waves); weights: weight - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026immigration ```bibtex @misc{singh2026immigration, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Immigration}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 | 3.3 | 95% CI −1.2 to 7.9 | 1,898 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | a_gap_1992 | | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 28.3 | 95% CI 24.3 to 32.4 | 4,560 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | a_gap_2024 | | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 57.6% | 95% CI 54.6% to 60.6% | 2,170 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | a_dec_r_2024 | | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 29.2% | 95% CI 26.6% to 31.9% | 2,390 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | a_dec_d_2024 | | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 | 50.1% | 95% CI 46.7% to 53.5% | 818 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | a_dec_r_1992 | | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 | 46.8% | 95% CI 43.8% to 49.8% | 1,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | a_dec_d_1992 | | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2004 | 10.3 | 95% CI 1.8 to 18.8 | 735 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | g_gap_2004 | | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2024 | 47.5 | 95% CI 42.5 to 52.5 | 2,301 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | g_gap_2024 | | count of respondents with a usable answer (increased, same or decreased) | ANES respondents who answered the question on the number of immigrants | 1992-2024 | 32,751 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_item | | count of study years with the item | ANES studies that asked the question | 1992-2024 | 11 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_waves | | count of respondents with a usable answer to letin1a | GSS respondents who answered the question on the number of immigrants nowadays | 2004-2024 | 21,070 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_gss_item | | count of survey years with the item | GSS survey years that asked letin1a | 2004-2024 | 11 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_gss_waves | | count of item-years with a Republican minus Democratic gap | CES immigration policy items | 2007-2021 | 57 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_ces_itemyears | ## Findings In the American National Election Studies (ANES), 57.6% of Republicans and 29.2% of Democrats said in 2024 that the number of immigrants allowed to come to the United States should be decreased, a gap of 28.3 (95% CI 24.3 to 32.4) points. In 1992 the two shares were 50.1% and 46.8%, a gap of 3.3 (95% CI −1.2 to 7.9) points that is too small to distinguish from zero. The General Social Survey (GSS) words its question differently and shows the same widening, from 10.3 (95% CI 1.8 to 18.8) points in 2004 to 47.5 (95% CI 42.5 to 52.5) in 2024. Each question is scored for its restrictive answer: wanting fewer immigrants, favoring a restrictive policy or saying that immigrants have a bad effect. A gap is the Republican share minus the Democratic share of that answer, in points, so a positive gap means that Republicans were more likely to give it. Party includes leaners, and independents are the respondents who lean toward neither party. Nationscape asks only the three-category party question, so its Democrats and Republicans exclude leaners and its independents include them. Every interval is a 95% confidence interval. Democratic, independent and Republican shares are reported separately, because a gap can widen when either party moves. (Note: Shares use the survey weights and cover respondents who answered the item: 32,751 in 11 ANES studies from 1992 to 2024 and 21,070 in 11 GSS surveys from 2004 to 2024 for the questions on the number of immigrants. Answers of don't know are left out. Intervals use the Kish effective sample size [1] and treat the weighted sample as if respondents had been drawn one by one, which ignores the stages of the sample design. The CES and Nationscape are opt-in panels, so their intervals rest on a model and say nothing about who chose to join.) Each survey asks in its own words (Table 1), so a level in one survey is not comparable with a level in another and no line in this chapter joins two surveys. The Cooperative Election Study (CES), Nationscape and the 2024 ANES ask about specific policies, and on each of them Republicans were more restrictive than Democrats in every year it was asked, including all 57 item-years of the CES. Hainmueller and Hopkins review research on attitudes toward immigration and report that they are only weakly related to a person's own economic circumstances and are shaped more by concern about cultural effects on the nation than by concern about economic effects [2]. Abrajano and Hajnal argue that fears about immigration moved white Americans from the Democratic to the Republican Party [3]. This chapter describes the party divide in the answers themselves and does not test either account. Table 1. Each survey asks about immigration in its own words and on its own scale ### The ANES gap opened between 2008 and 2016 Table 2 plots the gap in each survey year. In the ANES the interval includes zero in 6 of the 7 studies from 1992 to 2008. The exception is 2000, at 8.0 (95% CI 2.4 to 13.6) points. The gap was 15.1 (95% CI 11.2 to 18.9) points in 2012, and every ANES interval from that year on lies above zero. It reached 34.3 (95% CI 30.4 to 38.3) points in 2016 and was 30.6 (95% CI 27.7 to 33.4) in 2020 and 28.3 (95% CI 24.3 to 32.4) in 2024. The change from 2020 to 2024 is −2.2 (95% CI −7.2 to 2.7) points, an interval that includes zero and excludes a change as large as the rise of 19.3 (95% CI 13.8 to 24.8) points from 2012 to 2016. These estimates use the cumulative file weight. With the post-election weight, which the file has for 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 but not for the other studies with this question, the 2020 gap is 29.3 (95% CI 26.4 to 32.3) and the 2024 gap is 28.9 (95% CI 25.0 to 32.9), and the change between them is −0.4 (95% CI −5.4 to 4.6) points. The all-respondent gaps also combine interview modes. Among in-person respondents the gap was 5.6 (95% CI −0.3 to 11.5) points in 2008, 31.2 (95% CI 23.8 to 38.6) in 2016 and 20.3 (95% CI 11.5 to 29.1) in 2024, so the opening and the high 2024 level appear in person too, and the mode section compares them. The date of the opening depends on the test, as Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) shows for other attitudes. That chapter calls a party gap large when it passes 0.25 standard deviations (SD) of the answers and dates the passage by the first study from which the gap stays above the mark. Applied to the five-category version of this question, which runs from increased a lot to decreased a lot, the point estimate passes the mark in 2012 and the lower end of the interval passes it in 2016. The lower end in 2012 is 0.248 SD, just under the mark, and it is 0.2500 SD when the answers are standardized among party identifiers only, so the lower-bound date turns on how the answers are standardized. The 2012 gap is 0.237 (95% CI 0.102 to 0.372) SD among in-person respondents, under the mark, and 0.372 (95% CI 0.280 to 0.464) among web respondents, so the 2012 point date rests on web respondents. The intervals ignore the stages of the sample design and may be wider. The ANES fields a study only in election years, so the data cannot place the opening more closely than the span from 2008 to 2016. The GSS asked about the number of immigrants nowadays in 11 surveys from 2004 to 2024, with none in 2020. Its gap was 10.3 (95% CI 1.8 to 18.8) points in 2004 and 12.8 (95% CI 4.8 to 20.7) in 2012. It rose to 34.4 (95% CI 28.5 to 40.2) in 2016 and reached 41.6 (95% CI 35.9 to 47.2) in 2022 and 47.5 (95% CI 42.5 to 52.5) in 2024. The GSS interval lies above zero in every survey, and the ANES interval does not until 2012. Before 2004 the GSS asked earlier forms of the question in 1994, 1996 and 2000, drawn as open points. The gaps there were 6.5 (95% CI 0.3 to 12.6), 6.5 (95% CI −0.3 to 13.4) and 3.3 (95% CI −3.5 to 10.1) points, small again. The GSS asked both the form used in 1996 and the form used from 2004 in 2004, 2014 and 2024, and the two gaps differ by at most 7.2 points in those years. In 2004 the two forms went to different respondents, and the difference between their gaps is 1.3 (95% CI −10.1 to 12.7) points. In 2014 and 2024, 65% and 99% of the respondents who answered the earlier form also answered the later one. Table 2. Republicans and Democrats grew apart on wanting fewer immigrants in both surveys ### The Democratic share fell in every view The Democratic share fell in every view, and the Republican path depends on the survey and the interview mode. Table 3 shows the shares behind the gaps in three views. The all-interview ANES line combines modes. Web respondents were none of the 2008 respondents with a party and 70% of the 2016 respondents, so a change in an all-respondent share partly reflects who was interviewed. The in-person view is the like-for-like series. Among in-person respondents the Democratic share fell from 42.3% in 2008 to 23.0% in 2016, a change of −19.3 (95% CI −25.2 to −13.4) points. Among the same in-person respondents the Republican share rose from 47.9% to 54.2%, a change of 6.3 (95% CI −1.0 to 13.7) points, an interval that includes zero. For all respondents the two changes are −13.9 (95% CI −18.4 to −9.5) and 14.8 (95% CI 9.3 to 20.3) points. From 1992 to 2024 the in-person Democratic share changed by −22.7 (95% CI −29.0 to −16.3) points and the in-person Republican share by −5.7 (95% CI −13.3 to 2.0), an interval that includes zero, against −17.6 (95% CI −21.6 to −13.6) and 7.5 (95% CI 2.9 to 12.1) for all respondents. The 2020 study has no mode split. Both party shares were lower in 2020 than in any other study, at 14.0% and 44.6%, and both rose from 2020 to 2024, by 15.2 (95% CI 12.1 to 18.3) and 13.0 (95% CI 9.2 to 16.8) points. Wanting more immigrants moved on the Democratic side as well. The share of Democrats who said the number should be increased was 10.2% in 1992, 46.5% in 2020 and 24.4% in 2024, against 11.3% of Republicans in 2020. Among all respondents the share wanting fewer immigrants was 48.7% in 1992, 28.4% in 2020 and 42.9% in 2024. The GSS shows the Democratic fall in one mode for most of its series. The Democratic share was 51.2% in 2008 and 26.9% in 2016, a change of −24.3 (95% CI −30.2 to −18.3) points, and it changed by a further −9.1 (95% CI −13.9 to −4.3) points to 2022. The Republican share changed by 2.4 (95% CI −4.7 to 9.6) points from 2008 to 2016, an interval that includes zero and allows a rise of up to 9.6 points. It changed by −1.9 (95% CI −8.5 to 4.6) points from 2016 to 2022, with a change of −8.9 (95% CI −16.3 to −1.6) points from 2016 to 2018. From 2022 to 2024 both shares rose, the Republican share by 17.0 (95% CI 11.2 to 22.9) points to 76.4% and the Democratic share by 11.1 (95% CI 6.4 to 15.9) points to 28.9%. In the GSS, then, the gap opened on the Democratic side through 2022, and the 2024 rise came from both parties. The two surveys agree on the Democratic fall and, within mode, on the lack of a reliable Republican change from 2008 to 2016. The ANES all-respondent change in the Republican share differs from the GSS change by 12.4 (95% CI 3.3 to 21.4) points, and the in-person ANES change differs from it by 3.9 (95% CI −6.4 to 14.2) points, an interval that includes zero. They disagree after 2016. The in-person ANES Republican share changed by −9.8 (95% CI −18.6 to −0.9) points to 2024 and the GSS Republican share by 15.1 (95% CI 9.4 to 20.8) points. The Republican level in 2024 is 57.6% among all ANES respondents and 44.4% in person, against 76.4% in the GSS and 78.0% in person. The questions differ, so the comparison across surveys is one of direction and timing. Independent estimates sit between the party estimates in all 3 ANES studies from 2016 to 2024 and in 9 of the 10 GSS surveys that have a reliable independent estimate. Before 2016 the ANES independent estimate is above both party estimates in 5 of the 7 studies with an independent estimate, as in 2008, when it was 50.1% against 47.9% for Republicans and 42.3% for Democrats. No independent minus Republican interval in those studies excludes zero; in 2008 the difference is 2.2 (95% CI −7.2 to 11.6) points. Table 3. The Democratic share wanting fewer immigrants fell in every view, and the Republican path differs by survey and interview mode ### The opening holds within each interview mode The ANES interviewed mainly in person through 2008, then added a web sample next to the in-person sample in 2012, 2016 and 2024, with separate weights for each. The 2020 study had no in-person interviews and no weights by mode [4]. The GSS interviewed mainly in person through 2018, mostly on the web in 2021 (88% of respondents who answered the question, counted without weights) and in both modes in 2022 and 2024. Interview mode can change answers, and Table 4 compares the modes. The ANES gap rose between 2012 and 2016 by 21.4 (95% CI 11.4 to 31.4) points among in-person respondents and by 18.0 (95% CI 11.4 to 24.6) among web respondents, so the opening does not depend on mode. The web gap is larger than the in-person gap in every year by the estimates, by 8.2 (95% CI 0.0 to 16.4), 4.8 (95% CI −3.9 to 13.5) and 14.2 (95% CI 3.4 to 25.0) points in 2012, 2016 and 2024. The 2016 interval includes zero and allows a difference of up to 13.5 points, and the 2012 interval begins at zero. The 2024 all-respondent gap of 28.3 points lies between the in-person gap of 20.3 and the web gap of 34.5. The difference comes from Republicans, of whom 44.4% wanted fewer immigrants when interviewed in person and 63.8% when interviewed on the web, a difference of 19.3 (95% CI 11.1 to 27.5) points. The GSS Republican rise to 2024 does not depend on mode. Among in-person respondents the Republican share rose from 54.8% in 2022 to 78.0% in 2024, by 23.3 (95% CI 14.2 to 32.3) points, and among web respondents it rose by 10.2 (95% CI 2.3 to 18.1) points. In 2024 the Republican shares in the two modes differ by −0.4 (95% CI −7.7 to 6.9) points, an interval that excludes a difference as large as the ANES difference. The GSS web gap is higher than the in-person gap by the estimates in both years, by 13.5 (95% CI 2.0 to 25.0) points in 2022 and 7.6 (95% CI −3.2 to 18.4) in 2024, an interval that includes zero. The 2020 ANES cannot be split by mode, and the earlier mode differences do not account for its fall. Both party shares fell from 2016 to 2020, by −14.3 (95% CI −17.4 to −11.2) points among Democrats and −18.1 (95% CI −21.8 to −14.3) among Republicans, and the gap changed by −3.8 (95% CI −8.6 to 1.1) points, an interval that includes zero and reaches −8.6 points. In the other years web respondents gave the restrictive answer more often than in-person respondents, by 9.3, 12.1 and 19.3 points among Republicans and by 1.1, 7.3 and 5.1 among Democrats. The 2020 study had no in-person interviews, so a mode effect of that sign predicts a rise, and the shares fell. The 2020 modes (web, video and telephone) differ from the modes of the other years, so the data cannot say what a 2020 mode effect would be, and the chapter reports the 2020 fall without interpreting it. Table 4. The ANES gap opened within each interview mode, and ANES web respondents were more restrictive than in-person respondents ### Warmth toward illegal immigrants split by party more than warmth toward Hispanics The ANES asks respondents to rate groups on a feeling thermometer that runs from cold to warm. The rating of illegal immigrants is in 9 studies from 1988, before the question on the number of immigrants begins. Democrats rated the group 39.7 in 1988 and 56.8 in 2024, a change of 17.1 (95% CI 14.8 to 19.3) points. Republicans rated it 32.0 and 26.9, a change of −5.2 (95% CI −7.4 to −2.9) points. Among in-person respondents the change is −3.6 (95% CI −7.2 to 0.0) points, an interval that includes zero, and the Republican series is not steady, at 35.0 in 2004 and 33.7 in 2020. The warmth gap, Democrats minus Republicans, was 7.7 (95% CI 5.3 to 10.1) points in 1988 and 29.9 (95% CI 27.8 to 32.0) in 2024, a widening of 22.2 (95% CI 19.0 to 25.4) points. Warmth runs opposite to a restrictive answer, so this series is signed the other way, and a positive value means that Democrats were warmer. Ratings of Hispanics changed less (Table 5). The warmth gap was 5.4 (95% CI 3.3 to 7.5) points in 1988 and 7.3 (95% CI 5.4 to 9.2) in 2024, above zero in both years, a widening of 1.9 (95% CI −0.9 to 4.7) points. Both parties rated Hispanics warmer in 2024 than in 1988, Democrats by 14.2 (95% CI 12.2 to 16.1) points and Republicans by 12.2 (95% CI 10.2 to 14.2). The item for illegal immigrants is labelled illegal aliens in the cumulative file and illegal immigrants in the 2020 and 2024 studies, so a change of label could have moved ratings between studies. Table 5. The party gap in warmth toward illegal immigrants widened more than the gap toward Hispanics ### The GSS items show the gap opening after 2004 The GSS asked 4 immigration questions in 1996, 2004, 2014 and 2024: whether the number of immigrants should be reduced, and whether immigrants take jobs away from people born in America, increase crime rates and are good for America's economy. The jobs and crime questions were repeated in 2022. Table 6 shows the shares by party. In 1996 the gap on every item was within sampling error of zero. In 2004 the intervals for jobs and the economy still include zero, while those for reducing the number (11.6 (95% CI 4.0 to 19.3) points) and for crime (6.5 (95% CI 0.1 to 12.9)) lie above it. By 2014 every interval was above zero, and in 2024 the gaps were 48.8 (95% CI 41.5 to 56.1) points on reducing the number, 35.1 (95% CI 29.3 to 40.8) on jobs, 43.0 (95% CI 37.2 to 48.9) on crime and 22.3 (95% CI 16.2 to 28.4) on the economy. The parties moved differently on different items. On jobs the Democratic share agreeing fell from 49.3% in 1996 to 11.5% in 2024 while the Republican share was 46.1% and 46.5%. On crime the Democratic share fell from 37.4% to 11.8% and the Republican share rose from 32.6% to 54.9%. Table 6. Democratic and Republican answers were close on four GSS items in 1996 and far apart in 2024 ### Republicans were more restrictive on every CES item in every year The CES asked 9 immigration policy questions between 2007 and 2021, and no question was asked in every year (Table 7). The gap has the same sign in all 57 item-years, with the Republican share of the restrictive answer higher and an interval above zero. The independent estimate lies between the party estimates in all of them. The independent share is above the Democratic share with an interval above zero in 56 item-years and the Republican share is above the independent share with an interval above zero in 57. The CES changed format in 2018. Through 2017 the items were part of a check-all-that-apply list, in which a respondent who skips an item cannot be told from one who opposes it, and from 2018 the guide to the cumulative policy file words them as support or oppose for each item [5]. The figure breaks between 2017 and 2019, and this section compares levels and gaps only within a format. The wording of several items also changes by year, as the wording table shows. Within the check-all format the gap on more border patrols rose from 28.9 (95% CI 26.1 to 31.8) points in 2007 to 46.2 (95% CI 44.1 to 48.3) in 2017. The gap on legal status for long-term residents (counting opposition) rose from 27.2 (95% CI 24.4 to 29.9) to 44.0 (95% CI 41.9 to 46.2) over the same years. Under the later format the border patrol gap was 45.5 (95% CI 43.8 to 47.1) points in 2019 and 45.2 (95% CI 43.8 to 46.6) in 2021, and the legal status gap was 43.4 (95% CI 41.6 to 45.2) and 48.0 (95% CI 46.5 to 49.6). The Democratic share moved more than the Republican share on the border patrol item in the check-all years. Democrats supporting more border patrols fell from 39.8% in 2007 to 26.1% in 2017, a change of −13.7 (95% CI −16.1 to −11.3) points, while the Republican share changed by 3.5 (95% CI 0.9 to 6.1) points. In every year it was asked the wall question has the largest gap of the items asked that year, at 70.7 (95% CI 69.8 to 71.6) points in 2018 and 69.5 (95% CI 68.6 to 70.4) in 2020, which share a wording and a format. The 2017 and 2021 questions are worded differently, as the wording table shows, and are not compared with those years. In 2021 15.4% of Democrats and 85.6% of Republicans were in favor. Table 7. Republicans were more restrictive than Democrats on every CES item in every year, with independents between them ### Nationscape shows large gaps that narrowed in 2020 Nationscape interviewed adults every week from July 2019 [6] and asked four of the immigration policy questions in 77 weeks through December 2020. It asks respondents whether they agree or disagree with each policy. Pooled over those weeks, the share agreeing with building a wall on the southern border was 15.8% among Democrats, 38.3% among independents and 81.2% among Republicans, a gap of 65.4 (95% CI 64.9 to 65.8) points. The gap on deporting all undocumented immigrants was 47.3 (95% CI 46.8 to 47.9) points, on disagreeing with a path to citizenship for all undocumented immigrants 37.1 (95% CI 36.6 to 37.7) and on disagreeing with a path for those brought here as children 22.0 (95% CI 21.5 to 22.5). The last item has the smallest gap, with 9.4% of Democrats and 31.4% of Republicans disagreeing. The weekly wall gap stayed between 57.4 and 74.3 points in every week (Table 8). It changed by −6.5 (95% CI −7.6 to −5.3) points between late 2019 and late 2020, and the gap on deportation by −6.1 (95% CI −7.5 to −4.7). Over the same periods the Democratic share agreeing with the wall item rose from 14.2% to 17.3% and the Republican share fell from 82.8% to 79.4%. Four weeks of January and February 2021 are drawn as open points and left out of every pooled estimate. In the week of 18 January 2021 the Democratic share agreeing with the wall item was 39.3% against 17.3% in late 2020, and the Republican share disagreeing with a path to citizenship for all was 44.2% against 52.5%. The file does not say why. Because Nationscape's Democrats and Republicans exclude leaners, its gaps are not comparable with the CES gaps. Table 8. Nationscape respondents divided by party on every immigration item in every week of 2019 and 2020 ### The size of the 2024 ANES gap depends on the item The 2024 ANES time series asked 10 immigration questions, and Table 9 compares them. Every item has a positive gap in all three views (all respondents, in-person and web). The gap runs from 19.7 (95% CI 16.8 to 22.7) points on whether children brought illegally should be sent back to 60.9 (95% CI 57.6 to 64.3) on the border wall. Among all respondents the largest gaps are on the wall, on whether illegal immigration increases crime (54.2 (95% CI 50.8 to 57.6)) and on whether immigration is likely to take jobs (39.9 (95% CI 36.3 to 43.6)). The smallest are on children brought illegally, on opposing a path to citizenship (23.1 (95% CI 19.8 to 26.3)) and on saying immigrants are bad for the economy (24.6 (95% CI 21.5 to 27.8)), although the interval for ending birthright citizenship (25.9 (95% CI 22.3 to 29.6)) overlaps those of the last two. A gap in points is limited by how many people give the answer, and 4.9% of Democrats and 24.6% of Republicans said children brought illegally should be sent back. The question on the number of immigrants, the one asked since 1992, gives a gap of 28.9 (95% CI 25.0 to 32.9) points among all respondents when weighted with the post-election weight, 19.4 (95% CI 10.4 to 28.4) in person and 33.9 (95% CI 27.7 to 40.2) on the web. On the other items the largest difference between the in-person and web gaps is 11.0 (95% CI 4.1 to 17.8) points. The items asked before the election are weighted here with the post-election weight, and with the pre-election weight their gaps differ from these by at most 0.3 points. Independent estimates sit between the party estimates on every item. Table 9. Republicans were more restrictive than Democrats on every 2024 ANES immigration item, most on the border wall ### What these data cannot show Each survey interviews a new sample, so a change in a party's share can come from people changing their view, changing their party or being replaced by new adults, and these data cannot separate them. Party identification is itself an answer, and people may change it because of their views on immigration or change their views because of their party. Abrajano and Hajnal [3] argue for the first order, and these data can neither support nor reject it. The party lines also combine people of every origin, so changes in who belongs to each party are not separated from changes in what they say. Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) is planned to follow group differences in the vote. Levels cannot be compared across surveys. The ANES and the GSS differ by 18.8 (95% CI 14.2 to 23.4) points in the Republican share wanting fewer immigrants in 2024, and by 33.6 (95% CI 24.7 to 42.4) points among in-person respondents in each, and the chapter does not say which is closer to the truth. The ANES question has five answers that the chapter collapses to decreased against the rest, the GSS question has five answers collapsed the same way, and the CES, Nationscape and 2024 ANES policy items measure different things on different scales. The mode checks are limited to the years that have mode weights or a mode variable. The 2020 ANES levels and the 2021 GSS, which was mostly web, cannot be split, and the cumulative file has no post-election mode weights, so the in-person and web ANES estimates use the full-sample mode weights. The CES changes format and wording across years, so changes that cross 2018 are not read, and the Nationscape file has no leaner question for most weeks. The chapter has no measure of behavior, of elite positions or of the size of the foreign-born population. It does not ask whether the American gap is unusual. The European Social Survey has immigration questions in many countries but no party vote in the file used for this book, and a comparison on left-right placement would need an American question that matches theirs. Chapter 15.2, Immigration and local context (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration-and-local-context; planned) is planned to take up the local foreign-born share. No result here shows that immigration attitudes changed party loyalty or that party loyalty changed attitudes. ## Tables ### Table 1. Each survey asks about immigration in its own words and on its own scale Question wording or file label, answers offered, years used and the restrictive answer counted, by survey and item | Survey | Item | Question wording or file label | Answers | Years used | Restrictive answer counted | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | ANES cumulative file | Number of immigrants (VCF0879, VCF0879a) | Do you think the number of immigrants from foreign countries who are permitted to come to the United States to live should be increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, or decreased a lot? | Five answers; the 2000 study is coded to three (increased, same, decreased) | 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020, 2024 | Decreased, a little or a lot | | ANES cumulative file | Feeling thermometer, illegal immigrants (therm_illegal_aliens, from VCF0233) | Rating of illegal aliens (cumulative file label) or illegal immigrants (2020 and 2024 studies); the cleaned file recodes the cumulative code 97, which stands for 97 to 100 degrees, to 100 | 0 (cold) to 100 (warm) | 1988, 1992, 1994, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020, 2024 | Mean rating | | ANES cumulative file | Feeling thermometer, Hispanics (therm_hispanics, from VCF0217) | Rating of Hispanics (file label: Chicanos or Hispanics); the cleaned file recodes the code 97 to 100 as above | 0 (cold) to 100 (warm) | 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020, 2024 | Mean rating | | GSS | Number of immigrants, form used from 2004 (letin1a) | Number of immigrants nowadays should be: increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, reduced a lot (file label and answers; the stem is not checked) | Five answers | 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022, 2024 | Reduced, a little or a lot | | GSS | Number of immigrants, earlier forms (letin, letin1) | letin: increase or decrease immigrants to the US (left the same as it is now); letin1: Do you think the number of immigrants to America nowadays should be increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little, or reduced a lot? (the ARDA documentation of the GSS item) | Five answers | letin 1994 and 2000; letin1 1996, 2004, 2014, 2024 | Decreased or reduced, a little or a lot | | GSS | Immigrants take jobs away (immjobs, file label) | Immigrants take jobs away from people born in America (file label: immigrants take jobs away) | Agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly | 1996, 2004, 2014, 2022, 2024 | Agree or agree strongly | | GSS | Immigrants increase crime rates (immcrime, file label) | Immigrants increase crime rates (file label) | Agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly | 1996, 2004, 2014, 2022, 2024 | Agree or agree strongly | | GSS | Immigrants good for America (immameco, file label) | Immigrants are good for America's economy (file label: immigrants good for america) | Agree strongly, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, disagree strongly | 1996, 2004, 2014, 2024 | Disagree or disagree strongly | | CES | Stem, 2007 to 2017 | What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply. (The 2007 stem names Congress and the President; the 2014 stem says the government.) | Check each item that applies | 2007 to 2017 | Item checked (support) or not checked (oppose) | | CES | Stem, 2018 | What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Do you support or oppose each of the following? (The guide lists no stem for 2019 to 2021.) | Support or oppose each item | 2018 to 2021 | Support or oppose each item | | CES | More border patrols (immig_border) | Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border (2011: increase border presence; 2014: increase Border Patrols along the US-Mexico border) | Support, oppose | 2007, 2010 to 2017, 2019 to 2021 | Support | | CES | Legal status for long-term residents (immig_legalize) | Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes (2011: amnesty for long term residents) | Support, oppose | 2007, 2010 to 2017, 2019 to 2021 | Oppose | | CES | Fines for employers (immig_employer) | Fine U.S. businesses that hire illegal immigrants (2010: fine businesses) | Support, oppose | 2007, 2010, 2012 to 2017 | Support | | CES | Police questioning (immig_police) | Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally (2011: police question those reasonably suspected of being illegal) | Support, oppose | 2010 to 2015, 2017 | Support | | CES | Identify and deport (immig_deport) | Identify and deport illegal immigrants | Support, oppose | 2014 to 2017 | Support | | CES | Bar services (immig_services) | Prohibit illegal immigrants from using emergency hospital care and public schools | Support, oppose | 2012, 2013 | Support | | CES | Reduce legal immigration (immig_reduce) | 2018: reduce legal immigration by eliminating the visa lottery and ending family-based migration; 2019: reduce legal immigration by 50 percent; 2020: reduce legal immigration by 50 percent over the next 10 years by eliminating the visa lottery and ending family-based migration | Support, oppose | 2018 to 2020 | Support | | CES | Police must report (immig_report) | 2017: require local police departments to report to the federal government anyone they identify as an illegal immigrant; 2018 to 2021: withhold federal funds from any local police department that does not report to the federal government anyone they identify as an illegal immigrant | Support, oppose | 2017 to 2021 | Support | | CES | Border wall (immig_wall) | 2017 and 2021: build a wall between the U.S. and Mexico; 2018 and 2020: increase spending on border security by 25 billion dollars, including building a wall between the U.S. and Mexico | Support, oppose | 2017, 2018, 2020, 2021 | Support | | Nationscape | Stem | We'd like to know whether you agree or disagree with each of the following policies: | Agree, disagree, not sure | July 2019 to February 2021 | Agree, or disagree for the path to citizenship items | | Nationscape | Border wall (wall) | Build a wall on the southern US border | Agree, disagree, not sure | Every week, July 2019 to December 2020 | Agree | | Nationscape | Deportation (deportation) | Deport all undocumented immigrants | Agree, disagree, not sure | Every week, July 2019 to December 2020 | Agree | | Nationscape | Path to citizenship for all (path_to_citizenship) | Create a path to citizenship for all undocumented immigrants | Agree, disagree, not sure | Every week, July 2019 to December 2020 | Disagree | | Nationscape | Path for those brought as children (dreamers) | Create a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants brought here as children | Agree, disagree, not sure | Every week, July 2019 to December 2020 | Disagree | | ANES 2024 | Border wall (V241393) | Favor or oppose building a wall on border with Mexico (file label) | Favor, oppose, neither favor nor oppose | 2024 | Favor | | ANES 2024 | Birthright citizenship (V241387) | Favor or oppose ending birthright citizenship (file label) | Favor, oppose, neither favor nor oppose | 2024 | Favor ending it | | ANES 2024 | Children brought illegally (V241390) | Should children brought illegally be sent back or allowed to stay (file label) | Should be sent back; should be allowed to live and work in the US | 2024 | Should be sent back | | ANES 2024 | Policy toward unauthorized immigrants (V241386) | US government policy toward unauthorized immigrants (file label) | Make felons and send them back; guest worker program; remain and qualify for citizenship if requirements are met; remain and qualify for citizenship without penalties | 2024 | Make felons and send them back | | ANES 2024 | Path to citizenship (V242232) | Favor or oppose providing path to citizenship (file label) | Favor, oppose, neither favor nor oppose | 2024 | Oppose | | ANES 2024 | Immigration levels (V242227) | What should immigration levels be (file label) | Increased a lot, increased a little, left the same as it is now, decreased a little, decreased a lot | 2024 | Decreased, a little or a lot | | ANES 2024 | Illegal immigration and crime (V242229) | Effect of illegal immigration on crime rate (file label) | Increase, decrease, have no effect | 2024 | Increase | | ANES 2024 | Immigration and jobs (V242228) | How likely immigration will take away jobs (file label) | Extremely likely, very likely, somewhat likely, not at all likely | 2024 | Extremely or very likely | | ANES 2024 | Immigrants and the economy (V242235) | Are immigrants generally good or bad for America's economy (file label) | Seven answers from extremely good to extremely bad | 2024 | Slightly, moderately or extremely bad | | ANES 2024 | Adapting to customs (V242236) | How important is it for immigrants to adapt to customs and traditions of the US (file label) | Five answers from not at all important to extremely important | 2024 | Very or extremely important | Note: The ANES wording is as documented for the 2000, 2004 and 2008 studies; small wording differences in other studies are noted in the ANES cumulative file documentation and are not tested here. Note: CES wording is quoted from the guide to the Cumulative CES Policy Preferences file; the file's own item labels are shorter. Nationscape wording is from the week 1 codebook. ANES 2024 rows give the file label because the full question text was not checked. Note: Each item's restrictive answer is the one counted in every figure. The CES wording changes by year for the border patrol, legal status, police questioning, fines, reduce, report and wall items as shown. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File and 2024 Time Series, General Social Survey, CES cumulative policy preferences guide and Nationscape codebook; question wording only, no weights apply Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/wording.json ### Table 2. Republicans and Democrats grew apart on wanting fewer immigrants in both surveys Republican minus Democratic share wanting the number of immigrants decreased (ANES) or reduced (GSS), party identifiers including leaners, 1992 to 2024; 95% intervals | Survey | Year | Earlier GSS form | Gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES | 1992 | no | 3.3 | −1.2 | 7.9 | 1,898 | | ANES | 1994 | no | 1.9 | −3.3 | 7.1 | 1,545 | | ANES | 1996 | no | 4.9 | −1.0 | 10.8 | 1,367 | | ANES | 1998 | no | 1.0 | −5.5 | 7.5 | 1,094 | | ANES | 2000 | no | 8.0 | 2.4 | 13.6 | 1,515 | | ANES | 2004 | no | 4.2 | −2.8 | 11.3 | 933 | | ANES | 2008 | no | 5.6 | −0.3 | 11.5 | 1,799 | | ANES | 2012 | no | 15.1 | 11.2 | 18.9 | 4,664 | | ANES | 2016 | no | 34.3 | 30.4 | 38.3 | 3,140 | | ANES | 2020 | no | 30.6 | 27.7 | 33.4 | 6,486 | | ANES | 2024 | no | 28.3 | 24.3 | 32.4 | 4,560 | | ANES in person | 2008 | no | 5.6 | −0.3 | 11.5 | 1,799 | | ANES in person | 2012 | no | 9.8 | 3.1 | 16.5 | 1,632 | | ANES in person | 2016 | no | 31.2 | 23.8 | 38.6 | 930 | | ANES in person | 2020 | no | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES in person | 2024 | no | 20.3 | 11.5 | 29.1 | 849 | | GSS | 2004 | no | 10.3 | 1.8 | 18.8 | 735 | | GSS | 2006 | no | 16.3 | 10.4 | 22.2 | 1,550 | | GSS | 2008 | no | 7.7 | 0.4 | 14.9 | 1,074 | | GSS | 2010 | no | 18.6 | 11.4 | 25.8 | 1,119 | | GSS | 2012 | no | 12.8 | 4.8 | 20.7 | 994 | | GSS | 2014 | no | 21.9 | 15.5 | 28.4 | 1,261 | | GSS | 2016 | no | 34.4 | 28.5 | 40.2 | 1,479 | | GSS | 2018 | no | 32.3 | 25.4 | 39.2 | 1,175 | | GSS | 2021 | no | 39.7 | 34.9 | 44.4 | 2,038 | | GSS | 2022 | no | 41.6 | 35.9 | 47.2 | 2,511 | | GSS | 2024 | no | 47.5 | 42.5 | 52.5 | 2,301 | | GSS earlier forms | 1994 | yes | 6.5 | 0.3 | 12.6 | 1,174 | | GSS earlier forms | 1996 | yes | 6.5 | −0.3 | 13.4 | 958 | | GSS earlier forms | 2000 | yes | 3.3 | −3.5 | 10.1 | 1,027 | Note: The in-person ANES line uses the mode weights of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024 and has no 2020 point because the 2020 study had no in-person interviews; all-respondent ANES estimates from 2012 combine in-person and web samples. Note: Open GSS points before 2004 use two earlier GSS variables with the same five answers: letin in 1994 and 2000 and letin1 in 1996. The GSS asked both letin1 and letin1a in 2004, 2014 and 2024; the text compares the two forms in those years. Note: GSS interviews were mostly in person through 2018, mostly on the web in 2021, and in both modes in 2022 and 2024. A party cell needs at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100; a gap needs both parties to clear that floor. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1992-2024, and General Social Survey, 1994-2024; weighted (weight, VCF0009z; weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/gap_by_year.json ### Table 3. The Democratic share wanting fewer immigrants fell in every view, and the Republican path differs by survey and interview mode Share wanting the number of immigrants decreased (ANES) or reduced (GSS), by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; all respondents dashed; 95% intervals | Survey and answer | Group | Year | Earlier GSS form | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | All respondents | 1992 | no | 48.7 | 46.6 | 50.8 | 2,168 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | All respondents | 1994 | no | 66.4 | 64.0 | 68.9 | 1,730 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | All respondents | 1996 | no | 58.9 | 56.1 | 61.7 | 1,499 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | All respondents | 1998 | no | 50.7 | 47.7 | 53.7 | 1,245 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | All respondents | 2000 | no | 47.0 | 44.4 | 49.6 | 1,742 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | All respondents | 2004 | no | 47.7 | 44.4 | 51.0 | 1,047 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | All respondents | 2008 | no | 45.3 | 42.6 | 47.9 | 2,061 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | All respondents | 2012 | no | 44.4 | 42.6 | 46.2 | 5,390 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | All respondents | 2016 | no | 43.8 | 41.8 | 45.7 | 3,621 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | All respondents | 2020 | no | 28.4 | 27.0 | 29.8 | 7,350 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | All respondents | 2024 | no | 42.9 | 40.9 | 45.0 | 4,898 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Democrats | 1992 | no | 46.8 | 43.8 | 49.8 | 1,080 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Democrats | 1994 | no | 65.3 | 61.7 | 68.9 | 813 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Democrats | 1996 | no | 56.7 | 52.8 | 60.6 | 785 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Democrats | 1998 | no | 49.8 | 45.6 | 54.0 | 639 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Democrats | 2000 | no | 42.9 | 39.2 | 46.7 | 857 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Democrats | 2004 | no | 44.4 | 39.5 | 49.3 | 494 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Democrats | 2008 | no | 42.3 | 38.7 | 45.9 | 1,203 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Democrats | 2012 | no | 36.5 | 34.1 | 39.0 | 2,837 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Democrats | 2016 | no | 28.3 | 25.7 | 31.0 | 1,664 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Democrats | 2020 | no | 14.0 | 12.4 | 15.6 | 3,443 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Democrats | 2024 | no | 29.2 | 26.6 | 31.9 | 2,390 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Independents | 1992 | no | 52.4 | 46.3 | 58.5 | 261 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Independents | 1994 | no | 68.2 | 60.6 | 75.9 | 175 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Independents | 1996 | no | 60.6 | 51.0 | 70.1 | 129 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Independents | 1998 | no | 53.8 | 44.7 | 62.8 | 140 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Independents | 2000 | no | 52.4 | 44.8 | 59.9 | 215 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Independents | 2008 | no | 50.1 | 41.9 | 58.2 | 227 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Independents | 2012 | no | 51.0 | 46.1 | 55.8 | 708 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Independents | 2016 | no | 42.1 | 36.7 | 47.4 | 465 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Independents | 2020 | no | 26.5 | 22.4 | 30.6 | 844 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Independents | 2024 | no | 45.2 | 37.2 | 53.3 | 318 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Republicans | 1992 | no | 50.1 | 46.7 | 53.5 | 818 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Republicans | 1994 | no | 67.2 | 63.4 | 70.9 | 732 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Republicans | 1996 | no | 61.6 | 57.2 | 66.0 | 582 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Republicans | 1998 | no | 50.8 | 45.8 | 55.8 | 455 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Republicans | 2000 | no | 50.9 | 46.8 | 55.1 | 658 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Republicans | 2004 | no | 48.7 | 43.6 | 53.7 | 439 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Republicans | 2008 | no | 47.9 | 43.2 | 52.5 | 596 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Republicans | 2012 | no | 51.6 | 48.7 | 54.5 | 1,827 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Republicans | 2016 | no | 62.7 | 59.7 | 65.6 | 1,476 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Republicans | 2020 | no | 44.6 | 42.3 | 46.9 | 3,043 | | ANES: decreased (all interviews) | Republicans | 2024 | no | 57.6 | 54.6 | 60.6 | 2,170 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | All respondents | 1992 | no | 48.7 | 46.6 | 50.8 | 2,168 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | All respondents | 1994 | no | 66.4 | 64.0 | 68.9 | 1,730 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | All respondents | 1996 | no | 58.9 | 56.1 | 61.7 | 1,499 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | All respondents | 1998 | no | 50.7 | 47.7 | 53.7 | 1,245 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | All respondents | 2000 | no | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES: decreased (in person) | All respondents | 2004 | no | 47.7 | 44.4 | 51.0 | 1,047 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | All respondents | 2008 | no | 45.3 | 42.6 | 47.9 | 2,061 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | All respondents | 2012 | no | 41.0 | 37.9 | 44.1 | 1,842 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | All respondents | 2016 | no | 38.1 | 34.4 | 41.8 | 1,042 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | All respondents | 2020 | no | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES: decreased (in person) | All respondents | 2024 | no | 33.9 | 29.6 | 38.3 | 904 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Democrats | 1992 | no | 46.8 | 43.8 | 49.8 | 1,080 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Democrats | 1994 | no | 65.3 | 61.7 | 68.9 | 813 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Democrats | 1996 | no | 56.7 | 52.8 | 60.6 | 785 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Democrats | 1998 | no | 49.8 | 45.6 | 54.0 | 639 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Democrats | 2000 | no | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Democrats | 2004 | no | 44.4 | 39.5 | 49.3 | 494 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Democrats | 2008 | no | 42.3 | 38.7 | 45.9 | 1,203 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Democrats | 2012 | no | 35.8 | 31.7 | 39.9 | 1,123 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Democrats | 2016 | no | 23.0 | 18.3 | 27.7 | 475 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Democrats | 2020 | no | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Democrats | 2024 | no | 24.1 | 18.5 | 29.8 | 460 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Independents | 1992 | no | 52.4 | 46.3 | 58.5 | 261 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Independents | 1994 | no | 68.2 | 60.6 | 75.9 | 175 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Independents | 1996 | no | 60.6 | 51.0 | 70.1 | 129 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Independents | 1998 | no | 53.8 | 44.7 | 62.8 | 140 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Independents | 2000 | no | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Independents | 2008 | no | 50.1 | 41.9 | 58.2 | 227 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Independents | 2012 | no | 47.6 | 38.0 | 57.2 | 194 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Independents | 2020 | no | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Republicans | 1992 | no | 50.1 | 46.7 | 53.5 | 818 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Republicans | 1994 | no | 67.2 | 63.4 | 70.9 | 732 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Republicans | 1996 | no | 61.6 | 57.2 | 66.0 | 582 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Republicans | 1998 | no | 50.8 | 45.8 | 55.8 | 455 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Republicans | 2000 | no | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Republicans | 2004 | no | 48.7 | 43.6 | 53.7 | 439 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Republicans | 2008 | no | 47.9 | 43.2 | 52.5 | 596 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Republicans | 2012 | no | 45.6 | 40.3 | 51.0 | 509 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Republicans | 2016 | no | 54.2 | 48.5 | 59.9 | 455 | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Republicans | 2020 | no | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | ANES: decreased (in person) | Republicans | 2024 | no | 44.4 | 37.6 | 51.3 | 389 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 1994 | yes | 64.2 | 61.4 | 67.1 | 1,397 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 1996 | yes | 64.1 | 60.9 | 67.2 | 1,141 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2000 | yes | 43.2 | 40.2 | 46.2 | 1,318 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2004 | no | 51.5 | 47.6 | 55.4 | 890 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2006 | no | 52.6 | 49.9 | 55.3 | 1,945 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2008 | no | 52.7 | 49.4 | 56.0 | 1,294 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2010 | no | 48.3 | 45.0 | 51.5 | 1,393 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2012 | no | 46.1 | 42.7 | 49.6 | 1,262 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2014 | no | 44.5 | 41.7 | 47.4 | 1,624 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2016 | no | 41.1 | 38.4 | 43.9 | 1,845 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2018 | no | 34.2 | 31.1 | 37.3 | 1,520 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2021 | no | 31.5 | 29.3 | 33.7 | 2,670 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2022 | no | 35.9 | 33.3 | 38.4 | 3,440 | | GSS: reduced | All respondents | 2024 | no | 49.7 | 47.2 | 52.1 | 3,187 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 1994 | yes | 62.8 | 58.6 | 67.0 | 656 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 1996 | yes | 60.4 | 55.7 | 65.1 | 531 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2000 | yes | 41.9 | 37.4 | 46.4 | 581 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2004 | no | 47.4 | 41.4 | 53.3 | 389 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2006 | no | 46.3 | 42.3 | 50.3 | 895 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2008 | no | 51.2 | 46.5 | 55.9 | 641 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2010 | no | 41.8 | 37.0 | 46.7 | 658 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2012 | no | 40.8 | 36.1 | 45.6 | 607 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2014 | no | 35.3 | 31.2 | 39.4 | 746 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2016 | no | 26.9 | 23.2 | 30.5 | 862 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2018 | no | 20.0 | 16.2 | 23.9 | 662 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2021 | no | 15.1 | 12.6 | 17.7 | 1,220 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2022 | no | 17.8 | 14.7 | 20.9 | 1,408 | | GSS: reduced | Democrats | 2024 | no | 28.9 | 25.3 | 32.5 | 1,212 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 1994 | yes | 59.9 | 52.1 | 67.8 | 183 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 1996 | yes | 65.1 | 56.4 | 73.8 | 160 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 2000 | yes | 42.5 | 35.5 | 49.5 | 263 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 2006 | no | 48.4 | 42.0 | 54.7 | 358 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 2008 | no | 43.9 | 35.6 | 52.2 | 194 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 2010 | no | 43.9 | 36.0 | 51.7 | 231 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 2012 | no | 47.3 | 38.9 | 55.6 | 231 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 2014 | no | 42.7 | 36.3 | 49.1 | 311 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 2016 | no | 38.9 | 32.0 | 45.9 | 307 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 2018 | no | 30.5 | 23.6 | 37.4 | 276 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 2021 | no | 32.3 | 27.5 | 37.1 | 546 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 2022 | no | 30.2 | 25.2 | 35.2 | 797 | | GSS: reduced | Independents | 2024 | no | 41.3 | 36.4 | 46.2 | 778 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 1994 | yes | 69.3 | 64.8 | 73.8 | 518 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 1996 | yes | 66.9 | 62.0 | 71.9 | 427 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2000 | yes | 45.2 | 40.2 | 50.3 | 446 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2004 | no | 57.7 | 51.6 | 63.8 | 346 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2006 | no | 62.6 | 58.2 | 66.9 | 655 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2008 | no | 58.8 | 53.3 | 64.4 | 433 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2010 | no | 60.4 | 55.0 | 65.8 | 461 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2012 | no | 53.6 | 47.2 | 60.0 | 387 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2014 | no | 57.2 | 52.2 | 62.2 | 515 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2016 | no | 61.3 | 56.7 | 65.8 | 617 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2018 | no | 52.3 | 46.5 | 58.1 | 513 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2021 | no | 54.8 | 50.7 | 58.9 | 818 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2022 | no | 59.3 | 54.6 | 64.0 | 1,103 | | GSS: reduced | Republicans | 2024 | no | 76.4 | 72.9 | 79.8 | 1,089 | Views: ANES, all interviews (instrument = ANES: decreased (all interviews)); ANES, in person (instrument = ANES: decreased (in person)); GSS (instrument = GSS: reduced). Note: Shaded band: the ANES mode change from 2016 to 2020 in the ANES views, and the GSS move from in-person to web interviews between 2018 and 2021 in the GSS view. The in-person ANES view has no 2000 point (a study that mixed in-person and telephone interviews) and no 2020 point (no in-person interviews). Note: An independent cell is drawn only where it has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100, so some independent points are missing. Note: The ANES asks five answers (three in 2000) and the chapter counts decreased, a little or a lot, against increased or left the same; the GSS counts reduced a little and reduced a lot against the other three answers. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1992-2024, and General Social Survey, 1994-2024; weighted (weight, VCF0009z; weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/share_by_party.json ### Table 4. The ANES gap opened within each interview mode, and ANES web respondents were more restrictive than in-person respondents Changes in the Republican minus Democratic gap within one mode, and web minus in-person differences in the gap and in the Republican share; leaners included; 95% intervals | Panel | Comparison | Estimate (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Change in the gap within one mode | ANES in person, 2012 to 2016 | 21.4 | 11.4 | 31.4 | 2,562 | | Change in the gap within one mode | ANES web, 2012 to 2016 | 18.0 | 11.4 | 24.6 | 5,242 | | Change in the gap within one mode | GSS in person, 2022 to 2024 | 6.6 | −5.5 | 18.6 | 1,909 | | Change in the gap within one mode | GSS web, 2022 to 2024 | 0.7 | −9.6 | 10.9 | 2,389 | | Web minus in-person gap, same year | ANES 2012 | 8.2 | 0.0 | 16.4 | 4,664 | | Web minus in-person gap, same year | ANES 2016 | 4.8 | −3.9 | 13.5 | 3,140 | | Web minus in-person gap, same year | ANES 2024 | 14.2 | 3.4 | 25.0 | 2,432 | | Web minus in-person gap, same year | GSS 2022 | 13.5 | 2.0 | 25.0 | 2,266 | | Web minus in-person gap, same year | GSS 2024 | 7.6 | −3.2 | 18.4 | 2,032 | | Web minus in-person Republican share, same year | ANES 2012 | 9.3 | 3.0 | 15.7 | 1,827 | | Web minus in-person Republican share, same year | ANES 2016 | 12.1 | 5.5 | 18.7 | 1,476 | | Web minus in-person Republican share, same year | ANES 2024 | 19.3 | 11.1 | 27.5 | 1,125 | | Web minus in-person Republican share, same year | GSS 2022 | 12.6 | 3.0 | 22.2 | 996 | | Web minus in-person Republican share, same year | GSS 2024 | −0.4 | −7.7 | 6.9 | 972 | Note: The 2020 ANES study has no separate weights by mode, so it has no row. The 2024 ANES mode groups are the fresh in-person and fresh web samples; the panel and paper respondents are in neither. Note: The GSS rows compare 2022 or 2024 in-person with web respondents; the 2021 survey was mostly web and has no in-person comparison. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2012, 2016 and 2024, and General Social Survey, 2022 and 2024; weighted (weight_ftf and weight_web, the ANES weights for each mode; weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/mode_check.json ### Table 5. The party gap in warmth toward illegal immigrants widened more than the gap toward Hispanics Mean ANES feeling thermometer rating from 0 (cold) to 100 (warm), by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; all respondents dashed; 95% intervals | Group rated | Party | Year | Mean rating | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Hispanics | All respondents | 1988 | 57.0 | 56.0 | 58.0 | 1,629 | | Hispanics | All respondents | 1992 | 61.0 | 60.2 | 61.9 | 2,127 | | Hispanics | All respondents | 1994 | 61.1 | 59.9 | 62.3 | 1,674 | | Hispanics | All respondents | 1996 | 63.8 | 62.7 | 64.8 | 1,465 | | Hispanics | All respondents | 2000 | 63.8 | 62.6 | 65.1 | 1,438 | | Hispanics | All respondents | 2002 | 63.0 | 61.6 | 64.4 | 1,255 | | Hispanics | All respondents | 2004 | 67.7 | 66.4 | 69.0 | 1,037 | | Hispanics | All respondents | 2008 | 65.2 | 64.1 | 66.4 | 2,050 | | Hispanics | All respondents | 2012 | 63.5 | 62.7 | 64.3 | 5,449 | | Hispanics | All respondents | 2016 | 68.1 | 67.2 | 68.9 | 3,572 | | Hispanics | All respondents | 2020 | 71.8 | 71.2 | 72.5 | 7,109 | | Hispanics | All respondents | 2024 | 69.9 | 68.9 | 70.8 | 4,684 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 1988 | 59.7 | 58.2 | 61.2 | 763 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 1992 | 63.1 | 62.0 | 64.3 | 1,041 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 1994 | 63.1 | 61.3 | 64.9 | 783 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 1996 | 65.5 | 64.0 | 67.0 | 765 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 2000 | 65.1 | 63.3 | 66.9 | 701 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 2002 | 63.8 | 61.9 | 65.8 | 582 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 2004 | 68.0 | 66.0 | 70.0 | 489 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 2008 | 67.7 | 66.1 | 69.2 | 1,193 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 2012 | 67.1 | 65.9 | 68.2 | 2,859 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 2016 | 72.3 | 71.1 | 73.6 | 1,638 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 2020 | 75.6 | 74.6 | 76.5 | 3,326 | | Hispanics | Democrats | 2024 | 73.9 | 72.6 | 75.2 | 2,312 | | Hispanics | Independents | 1988 | 55.8 | 52.6 | 59.0 | 173 | | Hispanics | Independents | 1992 | 59.4 | 57.1 | 61.7 | 256 | | Hispanics | Independents | 1994 | 56.2 | 52.5 | 59.9 | 171 | | Hispanics | Independents | 2000 | 61.3 | 57.5 | 65.1 | 166 | | Hispanics | Independents | 2008 | 61.2 | 57.4 | 65.0 | 228 | | Hispanics | Independents | 2012 | 59.3 | 57.1 | 61.6 | 723 | | Hispanics | Independents | 2016 | 63.8 | 61.4 | 66.2 | 460 | | Hispanics | Independents | 2020 | 68.5 | 66.4 | 70.6 | 818 | | Hispanics | Independents | 2024 | 61.7 | 57.7 | 65.6 | 303 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 1988 | 54.4 | 52.9 | 55.8 | 684 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 1992 | 59.0 | 57.7 | 60.3 | 820 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 1994 | 60.2 | 58.5 | 61.9 | 710 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 1996 | 61.7 | 60.0 | 63.3 | 570 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 2000 | 62.8 | 61.0 | 64.6 | 560 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 2002 | 63.8 | 61.8 | 65.8 | 570 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 2004 | 68.8 | 67.0 | 70.6 | 436 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 2008 | 63.3 | 61.4 | 65.1 | 596 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 2012 | 60.7 | 59.4 | 62.0 | 1,847 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 2016 | 64.7 | 63.4 | 66.0 | 1,463 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 2020 | 68.7 | 67.7 | 69.6 | 2,944 | | Hispanics | Republicans | 2024 | 66.6 | 65.2 | 67.9 | 2,050 | | Illegal immigrants | All respondents | 1988 | 35.7 | 34.5 | 36.9 | 1,658 | | Illegal immigrants | All respondents | 1992 | 36.1 | 35.2 | 37.1 | 2,165 | | Illegal immigrants | All respondents | 1994 | 32.3 | 30.9 | 33.7 | 1,746 | | Illegal immigrants | All respondents | 2004 | 40.5 | 38.9 | 42.1 | 1,039 | | Illegal immigrants | All respondents | 2008 | 39.3 | 37.9 | 40.7 | 2,048 | | Illegal immigrants | All respondents | 2012 | 38.0 | 37.1 | 38.9 | 5,458 | | Illegal immigrants | All respondents | 2016 | 41.9 | 40.8 | 43.0 | 3,580 | | Illegal immigrants | All respondents | 2020 | 48.2 | 47.3 | 49.0 | 7,092 | | Illegal immigrants | All respondents | 2024 | 42.6 | 41.4 | 43.8 | 4,686 | | Illegal immigrants | Democrats | 1988 | 39.7 | 37.9 | 41.5 | 776 | | Illegal immigrants | Democrats | 1992 | 38.3 | 36.9 | 39.7 | 1,066 | | Illegal immigrants | Democrats | 1994 | 37.5 | 35.4 | 39.5 | 816 | | Illegal immigrants | Democrats | 2004 | 45.5 | 43.2 | 47.8 | 491 | | Illegal immigrants | Democrats | 2008 | 45.5 | 43.7 | 47.4 | 1,191 | | Illegal immigrants | Democrats | 2012 | 46.1 | 44.8 | 47.4 | 2,864 | | Illegal immigrants | Democrats | 2016 | 52.4 | 50.9 | 53.9 | 1,641 | | Illegal immigrants | Democrats | 2020 | 61.0 | 60.0 | 62.1 | 3,336 | | Illegal immigrants | Democrats | 2024 | 56.8 | 55.4 | 58.2 | 2,303 | | Illegal immigrants | Independents | 1988 | 32.3 | 28.4 | 36.1 | 176 | | Illegal immigrants | Independents | 1992 | 37.5 | 34.6 | 40.5 | 260 | | Illegal immigrants | Independents | 1994 | 30.5 | 26.2 | 34.8 | 182 | | Illegal immigrants | Independents | 2008 | 38.1 | 33.8 | 42.5 | 229 | | Illegal immigrants | Independents | 2012 | 37.2 | 34.5 | 39.8 | 725 | | Illegal immigrants | Independents | 2016 | 41.5 | 38.6 | 44.4 | 461 | | Illegal immigrants | Independents | 2020 | 48.7 | 46.2 | 51.1 | 820 | | Illegal immigrants | Independents | 2024 | 43.4 | 39.1 | 47.8 | 297 | | Illegal immigrants | Republicans | 1988 | 32.0 | 30.4 | 33.6 | 697 | | Illegal immigrants | Republicans | 1992 | 32.9 | 31.4 | 34.5 | 830 | | Illegal immigrants | Republicans | 1994 | 27.2 | 25.2 | 29.1 | 736 | | Illegal immigrants | Republicans | 2004 | 35.0 | 32.6 | 37.4 | 435 | | Illegal immigrants | Republicans | 2008 | 31.4 | 29.1 | 33.6 | 596 | | Illegal immigrants | Republicans | 2012 | 28.8 | 27.4 | 30.1 | 1,849 | | Illegal immigrants | Republicans | 2016 | 29.6 | 28.1 | 31.1 | 1,467 | | Illegal immigrants | Republicans | 2020 | 33.7 | 32.5 | 34.9 | 2,914 | | Illegal immigrants | Republicans | 2024 | 26.9 | 25.3 | 28.4 | 2,067 | Views: Illegal immigrants (series = Illegal immigrants); Hispanics (series = Hispanics). Note: The cumulative file labels the illegal immigrants item illegal aliens; the 2020 and 2024 studies label it illegal immigrants. The Hispanics ratings are available in more studies than the illegal immigrants ratings. Note: The series are the cleaned-file variables therm_illegal_aliens and therm_hispanics, which recode the cumulative file code 97, which stands for 97 to 100 degrees, to 100. Note: An independent cell is drawn only where it has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1988-2024; weighted (weight, VCF0009z) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/thermometers.json ### Table 6. Democratic and Republican answers were close on four GSS items in 1996 and far apart in 2024 Share giving the restrictive answer to four GSS immigration items, by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; 95% intervals | Interviews | Item | Group | Year | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Democrats | 1996 | 60.4 | 55.7 | 65.1 | 531 | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Democrats | 2004 | 47.4 | 41.9 | 52.8 | 466 | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Democrats | 2014 | 37.2 | 32.4 | 42.1 | 513 | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Democrats | 2024 | 26.2 | 21.1 | 31.3 | 568 | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Independents | 1996 | 65.1 | 56.4 | 73.8 | 160 | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Independents | 2004 | 57.1 | 48.5 | 65.8 | 180 | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Independents | 2014 | 36.0 | 28.2 | 43.7 | 202 | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Independents | 2024 | 43.5 | 36.0 | 51.0 | 336 | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Republicans | 1996 | 66.9 | 62.0 | 71.9 | 427 | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Republicans | 2004 | 59.0 | 53.6 | 64.4 | 437 | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Republicans | 2014 | 51.9 | 45.8 | 58.0 | 349 | | All interviews | Reduce the number of immigrants | Republicans | 2024 | 75.0 | 69.7 | 80.2 | 507 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Democrats | 1996 | 49.3 | 44.9 | 53.8 | 610 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Democrats | 2004 | 39.8 | 34.7 | 44.9 | 514 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Democrats | 2014 | 31.7 | 27.3 | 36.2 | 569 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Democrats | 2022 | 15.9 | 12.3 | 19.4 | 963 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Democrats | 2024 | 11.5 | 8.4 | 14.6 | 833 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Independents | 1996 | 52.6 | 44.2 | 61.0 | 185 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Independents | 2004 | 51.5 | 43.2 | 59.8 | 199 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Independents | 2014 | 33.0 | 26.1 | 40.0 | 240 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Independents | 2022 | 18.6 | 13.3 | 23.8 | 548 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Independents | 2024 | 20.0 | 15.2 | 24.8 | 548 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Republicans | 1996 | 46.1 | 41.0 | 51.1 | 460 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Republicans | 2004 | 40.3 | 35.2 | 45.5 | 474 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Republicans | 2014 | 41.1 | 35.4 | 46.8 | 385 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Republicans | 2022 | 35.3 | 29.4 | 41.2 | 701 | | All interviews | Immigrants take jobs away | Republicans | 2024 | 46.5 | 41.7 | 51.4 | 745 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Democrats | 1996 | 37.4 | 33.0 | 41.8 | 596 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Democrats | 2004 | 21.9 | 17.6 | 26.2 | 511 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Democrats | 2014 | 16.9 | 13.4 | 20.5 | 574 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Democrats | 2022 | 7.0 | 4.5 | 9.5 | 964 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Democrats | 2024 | 11.8 | 8.7 | 15.0 | 828 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Independents | 1996 | 34.5 | 26.5 | 42.5 | 186 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Independents | 2004 | 34.3 | 26.3 | 42.2 | 195 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Independents | 2014 | 23.0 | 16.7 | 29.4 | 233 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Independents | 2022 | 16.1 | 11.1 | 21.0 | 548 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Independents | 2024 | 21.6 | 16.6 | 26.5 | 541 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Republicans | 1996 | 32.6 | 27.9 | 37.4 | 457 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Republicans | 2004 | 28.4 | 23.6 | 33.2 | 465 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Republicans | 2014 | 23.7 | 18.7 | 28.7 | 375 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Republicans | 2022 | 37.2 | 31.2 | 43.2 | 696 | | All interviews | Immigrants increase crime rates | Republicans | 2024 | 54.9 | 50.0 | 59.8 | 735 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Democrats | 1996 | 33.1 | 28.8 | 37.3 | 594 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Democrats | 2004 | 22.0 | 17.7 | 26.4 | 507 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Democrats | 2014 | 17.1 | 13.5 | 20.6 | 568 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Democrats | 2024 | 6.4 | 3.7 | 9.2 | 604 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Independents | 1996 | 33.8 | 25.9 | 41.8 | 185 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Independents | 2004 | 27.9 | 20.4 | 35.4 | 195 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Independents | 2014 | 12.6 | 7.6 | 17.6 | 231 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Independents | 2024 | 12.8 | 8.2 | 17.4 | 366 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Republicans | 1996 | 33.5 | 28.7 | 38.4 | 446 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Republicans | 2004 | 21.0 | 16.7 | 25.3 | 469 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Republicans | 2014 | 25.8 | 20.7 | 30.9 | 382 | | All interviews | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Republicans | 2024 | 28.8 | 23.4 | 34.2 | 521 | | In person | Reduce the number of immigrants | Democrats | 1996 | 60.4 | 55.7 | 65.1 | 531 | | In person | Reduce the number of immigrants | Democrats | 2004 | 47.8 | 41.8 | 53.9 | 373 | | In person | Reduce the number of immigrants | Democrats | 2014 | 36.0 | 30.9 | 41.2 | 442 | | In person | Reduce the number of immigrants | Independents | 1996 | 65.1 | 56.4 | 73.8 | 160 | | In person | Reduce the number of immigrants | Independents | 2004 | 57.3 | 48.1 | 66.5 | 149 | | In person | Reduce the number of immigrants | Independents | 2014 | 39.1 | 30.3 | 47.9 | 165 | | In person | Reduce the number of immigrants | Republicans | 1996 | 66.9 | 62.0 | 71.9 | 427 | | In person | Reduce the number of immigrants | Republicans | 2004 | 60.5 | 54.6 | 66.3 | 351 | | In person | Reduce the number of immigrants | Republicans | 2014 | 52.5 | 46.0 | 59.1 | 301 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Democrats | 1996 | 49.3 | 44.9 | 53.8 | 610 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Democrats | 2004 | 39.4 | 33.8 | 45.0 | 416 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Democrats | 2014 | 31.3 | 26.6 | 36.0 | 493 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Democrats | 2022 | 18.1 | 12.6 | 23.7 | 432 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Democrats | 2024 | 15.5 | 9.6 | 21.4 | 286 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Independents | 1996 | 52.6 | 44.2 | 61.0 | 185 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Independents | 2004 | 51.2 | 42.3 | 60.0 | 163 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Independents | 2014 | 34.1 | 26.4 | 41.9 | 200 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Republicans | 1996 | 46.1 | 41.0 | 51.1 | 460 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Republicans | 2004 | 39.4 | 33.8 | 45.0 | 385 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Republicans | 2014 | 38.6 | 32.5 | 44.6 | 334 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Republicans | 2022 | 36.8 | 27.8 | 45.7 | 324 | | In person | Immigrants take jobs away | Republicans | 2024 | 48.7 | 40.2 | 57.3 | 256 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Democrats | 1996 | 37.4 | 33.0 | 41.8 | 596 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Democrats | 2004 | 22.6 | 17.8 | 27.4 | 416 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Democrats | 2014 | 16.6 | 12.8 | 20.3 | 497 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Democrats | 2022 | 6.9 | 3.2 | 10.5 | 433 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Democrats | 2024 | 18.3 | 12.0 | 24.7 | 281 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Independents | 1996 | 34.5 | 26.5 | 42.5 | 186 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Independents | 2004 | 34.1 | 25.6 | 42.6 | 160 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Independents | 2014 | 23.7 | 16.7 | 30.7 | 196 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Republicans | 1996 | 32.6 | 27.9 | 37.4 | 457 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Republicans | 2004 | 28.2 | 23.0 | 33.4 | 379 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Republicans | 2014 | 23.3 | 18.0 | 28.6 | 325 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Republicans | 2022 | 40.0 | 30.9 | 49.1 | 320 | | In person | Immigrants increase crime rates | Republicans | 2024 | 53.5 | 44.9 | 62.1 | 251 | | In person | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Democrats | 1996 | 33.1 | 28.8 | 37.3 | 594 | | In person | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Democrats | 2004 | 21.0 | 16.3 | 25.7 | 409 | | In person | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Democrats | 2014 | 16.9 | 13.0 | 20.7 | 492 | | In person | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Independents | 1996 | 33.8 | 25.9 | 41.8 | 185 | | In person | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Independents | 2004 | 28.0 | 20.0 | 36.0 | 160 | | In person | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Independents | 2014 | 13.2 | 7.6 | 18.9 | 193 | | In person | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Republicans | 1996 | 33.5 | 28.7 | 38.4 | 446 | | In person | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Republicans | 2004 | 22.6 | 17.8 | 27.4 | 381 | | In person | Immigrants are not good for the economy | Republicans | 2014 | 26.4 | 20.9 | 31.8 | 331 | Views: All interviews (view = All interviews); In person (view = In person). Note: Restrictive answers: reduce the number (letin1, reduced a little or a lot), agree or agree strongly that immigrants take jobs away and that they increase crime rates, and disagree or disagree strongly that immigrants are good for America's economy. Note: The jobs and crime items were also asked in 2022. In the in-person view a party cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100, so some points are missing. Source: General Social Survey, 1994-2024; weighted (weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/gss_items.json ### Table 7. Republicans were more restrictive than Democrats on every CES item in every year, with independents between them Share giving the restrictive answer to nine CES immigration policy items, by party identification including leaners, 2007 to 2021; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel | Item | Group | Year | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2007 | 39.8 | 37.8 | 41.8 | 4,372 | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2010 | 46.3 | 45.3 | 47.3 | 24,407 | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2011 | 42.1 | 40.6 | 43.6 | 9,349 | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2012 | 41.0 | 40.0 | 41.9 | 25,295 | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2013 | 38.6 | 37.1 | 40.2 | 7,527 | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2014 | 43.7 | 42.7 | 44.6 | 25,737 | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2015 | 39.0 | 37.3 | 40.6 | 6,681 | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2016 | 35.5 | 34.7 | 36.3 | 31,139 | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2017 | 26.1 | 24.7 | 27.5 | 8,585 | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2018 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2019 | 47.3 | 45.8 | 48.8 | 8,237 | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2020 | 37.5 | 36.7 | 38.3 | 29,329 | | Support more border patrols | Democrats | 2021 | 47.6 | 46.4 | 48.8 | 12,445 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2007 | 57.7 | 53.0 | 62.4 | 837 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2010 | 58.0 | 56.0 | 59.9 | 5,978 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2011 | 51.7 | 48.7 | 54.8 | 2,782 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2012 | 55.7 | 54.0 | 57.5 | 6,205 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2013 | 55.8 | 53.3 | 58.4 | 2,946 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2014 | 58.4 | 56.7 | 60.1 | 8,683 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2015 | 51.0 | 48.0 | 53.9 | 2,202 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2016 | 51.8 | 50.5 | 53.2 | 10,493 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2017 | 45.0 | 42.4 | 47.6 | 3,193 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2018 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2019 | 66.3 | 63.6 | 69.0 | 2,640 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2020 | 63.2 | 61.6 | 64.8 | 8,853 | | Support more border patrols | Independents | 2021 | 66.7 | 64.8 | 68.6 | 4,352 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2007 | 68.8 | 66.7 | 70.8 | 3,773 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2010 | 78.4 | 77.5 | 79.2 | 23,454 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2011 | 71.7 | 70.2 | 73.1 | 7,346 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2012 | 76.0 | 75.1 | 76.8 | 20,552 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2013 | 75.5 | 73.9 | 77.1 | 5,307 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2014 | 78.0 | 77.2 | 78.9 | 19,039 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2015 | 76.4 | 74.9 | 78.0 | 4,878 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2016 | 74.7 | 73.9 | 75.5 | 20,847 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2017 | 72.3 | 70.7 | 73.9 | 5,775 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2018 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2019 | 92.8 | 92.0 | 93.6 | 6,435 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2020 | 90.5 | 90.0 | 91.1 | 20,403 | | Support more border patrols | Republicans | 2021 | 92.8 | 92.1 | 93.5 | 8,139 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2007 | 52.1 | 50.1 | 54.2 | 4,372 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2010 | 42.1 | 41.1 | 43.1 | 24,407 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2011 | 39.6 | 38.1 | 41.0 | 9,349 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2012 | 35.4 | 34.5 | 36.3 | 25,295 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2013 | 36.6 | 35.1 | 38.2 | 7,527 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2014 | 33.1 | 32.3 | 34.0 | 25,737 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2015 | 31.9 | 30.3 | 33.5 | 6,681 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2016 | 27.9 | 27.2 | 28.6 | 31,139 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2017 | 24.6 | 23.3 | 25.9 | 8,585 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2018 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2019 | 15.3 | 14.3 | 16.4 | 8,260 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2020 | 11.5 | 11.0 | 12.1 | 29,339 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Democrats | 2021 | 12.6 | 11.8 | 13.4 | 12,445 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2007 | 71.2 | 66.8 | 75.5 | 837 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2010 | 63.6 | 61.8 | 65.5 | 5,978 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2011 | 61.2 | 58.3 | 64.1 | 2,782 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2012 | 57.7 | 55.9 | 59.4 | 6,205 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2013 | 59.8 | 57.3 | 62.4 | 2,946 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2014 | 60.4 | 58.8 | 62.1 | 8,683 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2015 | 58.1 | 55.2 | 61.1 | 2,202 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2016 | 51.8 | 50.4 | 53.2 | 10,493 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2017 | 53.1 | 50.5 | 55.8 | 3,193 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2018 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2019 | 38.8 | 36.1 | 41.5 | 2,647 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2020 | 32.0 | 30.5 | 33.6 | 8,853 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Independents | 2021 | 37.7 | 35.7 | 39.6 | 4,352 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2007 | 79.3 | 77.5 | 81.0 | 3,773 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2010 | 79.4 | 78.6 | 80.2 | 23,454 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2011 | 72.5 | 71.1 | 74.0 | 7,346 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2012 | 74.1 | 73.2 | 75.0 | 20,552 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2013 | 72.8 | 71.1 | 74.4 | 5,307 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2014 | 72.6 | 71.7 | 73.6 | 19,039 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2015 | 70.9 | 69.2 | 72.6 | 4,878 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2016 | 65.3 | 64.4 | 66.1 | 20,847 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2017 | 68.6 | 66.9 | 70.3 | 5,775 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2018 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2019 | 58.8 | 57.3 | 60.2 | 6,437 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2020 | 54.2 | 53.3 | 55.1 | 20,385 | | Oppose legal status for long-term residents | Republicans | 2021 | 60.7 | 59.3 | 62.0 | 8,139 | | Support fines for employers | Democrats | 2007 | 55.4 | 53.4 | 57.5 | 4,372 | | Support fines for employers | Democrats | 2010 | 63.2 | 58.4 | 68.0 | 921 | | Support fines for employers | Democrats | 2011 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support fines for employers | Democrats | 2012 | 51.6 | 50.6 | 52.5 | 25,295 | | Support fines for employers | Democrats | 2013 | 51.1 | 49.5 | 52.7 | 7,527 | | Support fines for employers | Democrats | 2014 | 52.3 | 51.4 | 53.3 | 25,737 | | Support fines for employers | Democrats | 2015 | 49.3 | 47.6 | 51.0 | 6,681 | | Support fines for employers | Democrats | 2016 | 51.1 | 49.3 | 52.9 | 6,113 | | Support fines for employers | Democrats | 2017 | 39.4 | 37.9 | 40.9 | 8,585 | | Support fines for employers | Independents | 2007 | 70.1 | 65.8 | 74.5 | 837 | | Support fines for employers | Independents | 2010 | 63.6 | 54.7 | 72.4 | 263 | | Support fines for employers | Independents | 2011 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support fines for employers | Independents | 2012 | 64.4 | 62.7 | 66.1 | 6,205 | | Support fines for employers | Independents | 2013 | 63.1 | 60.6 | 65.6 | 2,946 | | Support fines for employers | Independents | 2014 | 62.0 | 60.4 | 63.7 | 8,683 | | Support fines for employers | Independents | 2015 | 56.0 | 53.1 | 58.9 | 2,202 | | Support fines for employers | Independents | 2016 | 70.0 | 67.2 | 72.8 | 2,195 | | Support fines for employers | Independents | 2017 | 53.7 | 51.1 | 56.3 | 3,193 | | Support fines for employers | Republicans | 2007 | 75.7 | 73.9 | 77.6 | 3,773 | | Support fines for employers | Republicans | 2010 | 82.1 | 78.3 | 86.0 | 1,018 | | Support fines for employers | Republicans | 2011 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support fines for employers | Republicans | 2012 | 76.6 | 75.7 | 77.5 | 20,552 | | Support fines for employers | Republicans | 2013 | 76.7 | 75.1 | 78.3 | 5,307 | | Support fines for employers | Republicans | 2014 | 74.3 | 73.4 | 75.2 | 19,039 | | Support fines for employers | Republicans | 2015 | 74.5 | 72.9 | 76.1 | 4,878 | | Support fines for employers | Republicans | 2016 | 80.3 | 78.9 | 81.8 | 4,762 | | Support fines for employers | Republicans | 2017 | 72.7 | 71.1 | 74.3 | 5,775 | | Support police questioning | Democrats | 2010 | 24.1 | 23.3 | 25.0 | 24,407 | | Support police questioning | Democrats | 2011 | 24.8 | 23.5 | 26.2 | 9,349 | | Support police questioning | Democrats | 2012 | 19.7 | 18.9 | 20.4 | 25,295 | | Support police questioning | Democrats | 2013 | 20.0 | 18.7 | 21.4 | 7,527 | | Support police questioning | Democrats | 2014 | 20.8 | 20.0 | 21.6 | 25,737 | | Support police questioning | Democrats | 2015 | 19.9 | 18.6 | 21.3 | 6,681 | | Support police questioning | Democrats | 2016 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support police questioning | Democrats | 2017 | 11.7 | 10.7 | 12.7 | 8,585 | | Support police questioning | Independents | 2010 | 46.4 | 44.4 | 48.3 | 5,978 | | Support police questioning | Independents | 2011 | 38.4 | 35.4 | 41.3 | 2,782 | | Support police questioning | Independents | 2012 | 40.5 | 38.8 | 42.3 | 6,205 | | Support police questioning | Independents | 2013 | 37.1 | 34.5 | 39.6 | 2,946 | | Support police questioning | Independents | 2014 | 37.5 | 35.9 | 39.2 | 8,683 | | Support police questioning | Independents | 2015 | 34.6 | 31.8 | 37.4 | 2,202 | | Support police questioning | Independents | 2016 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support police questioning | Independents | 2017 | 31.2 | 28.7 | 33.6 | 3,193 | | Support police questioning | Republicans | 2010 | 69.9 | 69.0 | 70.8 | 23,454 | | Support police questioning | Republicans | 2011 | 63.5 | 62.0 | 65.1 | 7,346 | | Support police questioning | Republicans | 2012 | 63.1 | 62.1 | 64.1 | 20,552 | | Support police questioning | Republicans | 2013 | 59.2 | 57.3 | 61.0 | 5,307 | | Support police questioning | Republicans | 2014 | 56.5 | 55.4 | 57.5 | 19,039 | | Support police questioning | Republicans | 2015 | 56.1 | 54.3 | 57.9 | 4,878 | | Support police questioning | Republicans | 2016 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support police questioning | Republicans | 2017 | 54.8 | 53.0 | 56.6 | 5,775 | | Support identifying and deporting | Democrats | 2014 | 37.3 | 36.4 | 38.2 | 25,737 | | Support identifying and deporting | Democrats | 2015 | 30.8 | 29.3 | 32.4 | 6,681 | | Support identifying and deporting | Democrats | 2016 | 23.5 | 22.9 | 24.2 | 31,139 | | Support identifying and deporting | Democrats | 2017 | 18.4 | 17.2 | 19.6 | 8,585 | | Support identifying and deporting | Independents | 2014 | 60.4 | 58.7 | 62.1 | 8,683 | | Support identifying and deporting | Independents | 2015 | 55.9 | 53.0 | 58.9 | 2,202 | | Support identifying and deporting | Independents | 2016 | 47.8 | 46.4 | 49.2 | 10,493 | | Support identifying and deporting | Independents | 2017 | 42.3 | 39.7 | 44.9 | 3,193 | | Support identifying and deporting | Republicans | 2014 | 78.0 | 77.2 | 78.9 | 19,039 | | Support identifying and deporting | Republicans | 2015 | 74.2 | 72.6 | 75.8 | 4,878 | | Support identifying and deporting | Republicans | 2016 | 66.6 | 65.7 | 67.4 | 20,847 | | Support identifying and deporting | Republicans | 2017 | 67.0 | 65.2 | 68.7 | 5,775 | | Support barring services | Democrats | 2012 | 18.0 | 17.2 | 18.7 | 25,295 | | Support barring services | Democrats | 2013 | 18.4 | 17.2 | 19.7 | 7,527 | | Support barring services | Independents | 2012 | 36.5 | 34.8 | 38.2 | 6,205 | | Support barring services | Independents | 2013 | 35.6 | 33.1 | 38.1 | 2,946 | | Support barring services | Republicans | 2012 | 47.2 | 46.2 | 48.2 | 20,552 | | Support barring services | Republicans | 2013 | 45.6 | 43.7 | 47.4 | 5,307 | | Support reducing legal immigration | Democrats | 2018 | 21.4 | 20.7 | 22.2 | 26,987 | | Support reducing legal immigration | Democrats | 2019 | 20.0 | 18.8 | 21.1 | 8,226 | | Support reducing legal immigration | Democrats | 2020 | 20.2 | 19.6 | 20.9 | 29,328 | | Support reducing legal immigration | Independents | 2018 | 42.2 | 40.4 | 43.9 | 8,338 | | Support reducing legal immigration | Independents | 2019 | 41.7 | 38.9 | 44.4 | 2,638 | | Support reducing legal immigration | Independents | 2020 | 41.4 | 39.7 | 43.0 | 8,851 | | Support reducing legal immigration | Republicans | 2018 | 72.0 | 71.2 | 72.9 | 21,228 | | Support reducing legal immigration | Republicans | 2019 | 61.7 | 60.2 | 63.1 | 6,425 | | Support reducing legal immigration | Republicans | 2020 | 66.3 | 65.4 | 67.2 | 20,380 | | Support police reporting | Democrats | 2017 | 18.2 | 17.0 | 19.4 | 8,585 | | Support police reporting | Democrats | 2018 | 20.3 | 19.6 | 21.1 | 27,589 | | Support police reporting | Democrats | 2019 | 17.9 | 16.7 | 19.0 | 8,248 | | Support police reporting | Democrats | 2020 | 23.0 | 22.3 | 23.8 | 29,335 | | Support police reporting | Democrats | 2021 | 26.8 | 25.8 | 27.9 | 12,445 | | Support police reporting | Independents | 2017 | 43.7 | 41.1 | 46.3 | 3,193 | | Support police reporting | Independents | 2018 | 48.1 | 46.4 | 49.9 | 8,518 | | Support police reporting | Independents | 2019 | 45.6 | 42.8 | 48.4 | 2,647 | | Support police reporting | Independents | 2020 | 48.3 | 46.6 | 50.0 | 8,855 | | Support police reporting | Independents | 2021 | 51.5 | 49.5 | 53.5 | 4,352 | | Support police reporting | Republicans | 2017 | 70.7 | 69.0 | 72.3 | 5,775 | | Support police reporting | Republicans | 2018 | 82.6 | 81.9 | 83.3 | 21,702 | | Support police reporting | Republicans | 2019 | 81.9 | 80.7 | 83.1 | 6,445 | | Support police reporting | Republicans | 2020 | 75.5 | 74.7 | 76.3 | 20,397 | | Support police reporting | Republicans | 2021 | 71.7 | 70.5 | 72.9 | 8,139 | | Support the border wall | Democrats | 2017 | 5.9 | 5.2 | 6.7 | 8,585 | | Support the border wall | Democrats | 2018 | 11.9 | 11.3 | 12.4 | 27,478 | | Support the border wall | Democrats | 2019 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support the border wall | Democrats | 2020 | 13.1 | 12.6 | 13.7 | 29,337 | | Support the border wall | Democrats | 2021 | 15.4 | 14.5 | 16.2 | 12,445 | | Support the border wall | Independents | 2017 | 31.0 | 28.6 | 33.4 | 3,193 | | Support the border wall | Independents | 2018 | 39.2 | 37.5 | 40.9 | 8,468 | | Support the border wall | Independents | 2019 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support the border wall | Independents | 2020 | 40.8 | 39.1 | 42.4 | 8,848 | | Support the border wall | Independents | 2021 | 44.9 | 42.9 | 46.9 | 4,352 | | Support the border wall | Republicans | 2017 | 62.9 | 61.2 | 64.7 | 5,775 | | Support the border wall | Republicans | 2018 | 82.6 | 81.9 | 83.3 | 21,625 | | Support the border wall | Republicans | 2019 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Support the border wall | Republicans | 2020 | 82.6 | 81.9 | 83.3 | 20,399 | | Support the border wall | Republicans | 2021 | 85.6 | 84.7 | 86.6 | 8,139 | Note: Panel titles name the restrictive answer. Through 2017 the items were check-all-that-apply, and an unchecked item cannot be told from an explicit oppose; from 2018 respondents supported or opposed each item. Several items change wording by year, as the wording table shows. Note: The 2018 wave has only the reduce legal immigration, police reporting and wall items. A line breaks where an item was not asked. Note: Each party cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. The CES is an opt-in panel, so the intervals rest on a model. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative policy preferences, 2007-2021; weighted (single-wave weight), opt-in panel Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/ces_items.json ### Table 8. Nationscape respondents divided by party on every immigration item in every week of 2019 and 2020 Weekly share giving the restrictive answer to four Nationscape immigration items, by party identification without leaners, July 2019 to early 2021; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel | Item | Group | Week of | Left out of pooled estimates | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-07-15 | no | 12.9 | 9.9 | 15.9 | 1,516 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-07-22 | no | 14.6 | 11.7 | 17.5 | 1,959 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-07-29 | no | 14.9 | 12.1 | 17.7 | 2,053 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-08-05 | no | 14.0 | 11.1 | 16.9 | 1,739 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-08-12 | no | 10.4 | 7.8 | 13.0 | 1,744 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-08-19 | no | 13.2 | 10.8 | 15.7 | 2,402 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-08-26 | no | 13.9 | 11.1 | 16.7 | 1,764 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-09-02 | no | 13.9 | 11.2 | 16.6 | 1,882 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-09-09 | no | 14.1 | 11.1 | 17.0 | 1,775 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-09-16 | no | 14.0 | 11.1 | 16.9 | 1,913 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-09-23 | no | 16.0 | 12.9 | 19.1 | 1,784 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-09-30 | no | 14.6 | 12.2 | 16.9 | 2,857 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-10-07 | no | 14.8 | 11.5 | 18.0 | 1,518 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-10-14 | no | 17.1 | 13.4 | 20.9 | 1,219 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-10-21 | no | 16.6 | 13.6 | 19.6 | 2,037 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-10-28 | no | 14.5 | 11.7 | 17.3 | 2,134 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-11-04 | no | 11.6 | 9.0 | 14.1 | 1,710 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-11-11 | no | 12.9 | 10.5 | 15.2 | 2,245 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-11-18 | no | 19.2 | 14.9 | 23.6 | 1,010 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-11-25 | no | 15.1 | 12.4 | 17.7 | 2,256 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-12-02 | no | 11.0 | 8.2 | 13.8 | 1,363 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-12-09 | no | 15.6 | 13.2 | 18.1 | 2,349 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-12-16 | no | 14.0 | 11.5 | 16.5 | 1,996 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-12-23 | no | 15.1 | 12.4 | 17.8 | 1,670 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2019-12-30 | no | 12.7 | 10.7 | 14.7 | 2,778 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-01-06 | no | 18.9 | 15.5 | 22.3 | 1,376 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-01-13 | no | 13.4 | 10.8 | 15.9 | 1,903 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-01-20 | no | 12.7 | 10.3 | 15.1 | 2,061 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-01-27 | no | 15.1 | 12.0 | 18.1 | 1,509 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-02-03 | no | 15.6 | 12.7 | 18.5 | 1,834 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-02-10 | no | 16.7 | 13.7 | 19.7 | 1,668 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-02-17 | no | 15.6 | 13.0 | 18.2 | 2,062 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-02-24 | no | 13.4 | 10.7 | 16.1 | 1,584 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-03-02 | no | 18.6 | 15.7 | 21.5 | 1,971 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-03-09 | no | 13.7 | 11.1 | 16.4 | 1,781 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-03-16 | no | 16.8 | 14.2 | 19.5 | 1,979 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-03-23 | no | 18.2 | 15.4 | 21.0 | 1,814 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-03-30 | no | 19.6 | 17.5 | 21.7 | 3,180 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-04-06 | no | 15.7 | 13.9 | 17.4 | 3,967 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-04-13 | no | 18.1 | 15.2 | 21.0 | 1,598 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-04-20 | no | 15.1 | 12.4 | 17.8 | 1,592 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-04-27 | no | 13.5 | 10.8 | 16.1 | 1,533 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-05-04 | no | 16.8 | 14.3 | 19.3 | 2,216 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-05-11 | no | 18.0 | 15.0 | 21.0 | 1,482 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-05-18 | no | 16.1 | 13.8 | 18.3 | 2,421 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-05-25 | no | 20.7 | 17.6 | 23.8 | 1,522 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-06-01 | no | 13.6 | 11.2 | 16.1 | 1,759 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-06-08 | no | 14.1 | 11.7 | 16.6 | 1,903 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-06-15 | no | 13.8 | 11.5 | 16.2 | 1,931 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-06-22 | no | 14.5 | 12.1 | 16.9 | 1,991 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-06-29 | no | 15.1 | 12.4 | 17.7 | 1,709 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-07-06 | no | 15.2 | 12.3 | 18.2 | 1,429 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-07-13 | no | 18.2 | 16.2 | 20.2 | 3,579 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-07-20 | no | 14.9 | 12.9 | 16.8 | 3,104 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-07-27 | no | 16.0 | 13.7 | 18.3 | 2,312 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-08-03 | no | 13.3 | 10.7 | 16.0 | 1,504 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-08-10 | no | 13.4 | 10.8 | 16.0 | 1,602 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-08-17 | no | 13.5 | 11.0 | 16.0 | 1,997 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-08-24 | no | 14.2 | 11.3 | 17.1 | 1,595 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-08-31 | no | 18.3 | 15.2 | 21.4 | 1,628 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-09-07 | no | 16.9 | 14.0 | 19.9 | 1,696 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-09-14 | no | 19.2 | 16.4 | 22.1 | 2,088 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-09-21 | no | 16.6 | 13.4 | 19.8 | 1,571 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-09-28 | no | 17.5 | 14.1 | 20.9 | 1,424 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-10-05 | no | 16.6 | 13.7 | 19.5 | 1,891 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-10-12 | no | 16.8 | 13.9 | 19.8 | 1,804 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-10-19 | no | 18.7 | 15.4 | 22.0 | 1,611 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-10-26 | no | 18.7 | 15.9 | 21.6 | 2,019 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-11-02 | no | 15.0 | 12.3 | 17.7 | 1,758 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-11-09 | no | 21.0 | 18.1 | 24.0 | 1,886 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-11-16 | no | 19.2 | 16.0 | 22.3 | 1,698 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-11-23 | no | 19.0 | 16.3 | 21.7 | 2,147 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-11-30 | no | 20.8 | 18.1 | 23.6 | 2,303 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-12-07 | no | 17.9 | 14.6 | 21.2 | 1,398 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-12-14 | no | 19.1 | 16.5 | 21.6 | 2,365 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-12-21 | no | 18.0 | 15.4 | 20.5 | 2,102 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2020-12-28 | no | 16.8 | 13.4 | 20.2 | 1,166 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2021-01-11 | yes | 26.7 | 22.7 | 30.6 | 1,405 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2021-01-18 | yes | 39.3 | 35.6 | 43.1 | 1,522 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2021-01-25 | yes | 19.7 | 16.1 | 23.2 | 1,150 | | Build a wall (agree) | Democrats | 2021-02-01 | yes | 21.4 | 15.9 | 26.9 | 530 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-07-15 | no | 39.5 | 34.4 | 44.5 | 1,148 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-07-22 | no | 39.1 | 34.5 | 43.7 | 1,476 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-07-29 | no | 34.8 | 30.6 | 39.0 | 1,527 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-08-05 | no | 39.0 | 34.6 | 43.5 | 1,372 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-08-12 | no | 37.0 | 32.3 | 41.6 | 1,342 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-08-19 | no | 40.0 | 36.2 | 43.8 | 1,876 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-08-26 | no | 42.6 | 38.0 | 47.1 | 1,277 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-09-02 | no | 42.3 | 38.0 | 46.6 | 1,404 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-09-09 | no | 39.6 | 35.0 | 44.1 | 1,273 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-09-16 | no | 39.6 | 35.0 | 44.2 | 1,445 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-09-23 | no | 40.5 | 36.0 | 45.0 | 1,418 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-09-30 | no | 39.2 | 35.6 | 42.9 | 2,104 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-10-07 | no | 38.8 | 33.9 | 43.7 | 1,089 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-10-14 | no | 41.1 | 35.8 | 46.3 | 916 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-10-21 | no | 39.1 | 34.9 | 43.4 | 1,628 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-10-28 | no | 35.3 | 31.2 | 39.4 | 1,772 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-11-04 | no | 40.6 | 36.3 | 45.0 | 1,354 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-11-11 | no | 38.2 | 34.3 | 42.1 | 1,716 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-11-18 | no | 37.1 | 31.5 | 42.8 | 861 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-11-25 | no | 32.2 | 28.4 | 36.1 | 1,879 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-12-02 | no | 43.1 | 38.2 | 47.9 | 1,152 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-12-09 | no | 39.0 | 35.3 | 42.7 | 1,863 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-12-16 | no | 36.8 | 32.9 | 40.8 | 1,589 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-12-23 | no | 35.9 | 31.7 | 40.1 | 1,250 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2019-12-30 | no | 38.1 | 34.9 | 41.3 | 2,298 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-01-06 | no | 36.9 | 32.2 | 41.6 | 1,011 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-01-13 | no | 37.0 | 33.0 | 41.1 | 1,490 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-01-20 | no | 39.9 | 35.9 | 44.0 | 1,450 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-01-27 | no | 36.7 | 32.0 | 41.3 | 1,101 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-02-03 | no | 38.0 | 33.7 | 42.2 | 1,506 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-02-10 | no | 39.3 | 34.7 | 43.9 | 1,235 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-02-17 | no | 36.7 | 32.7 | 40.7 | 1,470 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-02-24 | no | 42.5 | 37.8 | 47.2 | 1,071 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-03-02 | no | 35.1 | 30.9 | 39.2 | 1,416 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-03-09 | no | 39.2 | 34.9 | 43.5 | 1,349 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-03-16 | no | 39.5 | 35.3 | 43.7 | 1,338 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-03-23 | no | 41.8 | 37.4 | 46.1 | 1,272 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-03-30 | no | 41.5 | 38.3 | 44.7 | 2,046 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-04-06 | no | 37.5 | 34.7 | 40.2 | 2,717 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-04-13 | no | 40.6 | 36.3 | 44.9 | 1,168 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-04-20 | no | 37.7 | 33.4 | 42.0 | 1,123 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-04-27 | no | 39.4 | 35.2 | 43.7 | 1,177 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-05-04 | no | 39.4 | 35.4 | 43.4 | 1,363 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-05-11 | no | 36.8 | 32.2 | 41.4 | 981 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-05-18 | no | 36.0 | 32.5 | 39.5 | 1,663 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-05-25 | no | 39.2 | 34.7 | 43.8 | 1,028 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-06-01 | no | 37.1 | 33.1 | 41.1 | 1,297 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-06-08 | no | 37.5 | 33.7 | 41.3 | 1,462 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-06-15 | no | 35.8 | 31.9 | 39.8 | 1,329 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-06-22 | no | 38.3 | 34.5 | 42.0 | 1,512 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-06-29 | no | 35.5 | 31.5 | 39.5 | 1,321 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-07-06 | no | 38.2 | 33.5 | 42.9 | 1,062 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-07-13 | no | 37.7 | 34.6 | 40.9 | 2,372 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-07-20 | no | 38.3 | 35.2 | 41.5 | 2,194 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-07-27 | no | 39.1 | 35.4 | 42.8 | 1,569 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-08-03 | no | 38.3 | 33.8 | 42.9 | 990 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-08-10 | no | 36.0 | 31.6 | 40.4 | 1,107 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-08-17 | no | 39.8 | 35.8 | 43.8 | 1,488 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-08-24 | no | 37.6 | 32.8 | 42.4 | 1,037 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-08-31 | no | 38.3 | 33.8 | 42.8 | 1,160 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-09-07 | no | 35.9 | 31.5 | 40.3 | 1,185 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-09-14 | no | 38.3 | 34.0 | 42.5 | 1,418 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-09-21 | no | 36.3 | 31.4 | 41.2 | 1,089 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-09-28 | no | 38.5 | 33.6 | 43.4 | 1,053 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-10-05 | no | 37.7 | 33.4 | 42.1 | 1,332 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-10-12 | no | 38.8 | 34.2 | 43.3 | 1,295 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-10-19 | no | 34.7 | 29.8 | 39.5 | 1,109 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-10-26 | no | 40.2 | 36.0 | 44.4 | 1,451 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-11-02 | no | 38.2 | 33.9 | 42.5 | 1,254 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-11-09 | no | 37.7 | 33.6 | 41.8 | 1,314 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-11-16 | no | 33.6 | 28.7 | 38.5 | 1,031 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-11-23 | no | 39.9 | 35.7 | 44.1 | 1,400 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-11-30 | no | 37.7 | 33.7 | 41.8 | 1,529 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-12-07 | no | 39.5 | 34.0 | 45.0 | 818 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-12-14 | no | 38.6 | 34.5 | 42.6 | 1,432 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-12-21 | no | 42.0 | 38.0 | 45.9 | 1,375 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2020-12-28 | no | 33.9 | 28.5 | 39.2 | 674 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2021-01-11 | yes | 45.2 | 39.6 | 50.9 | 837 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2021-01-18 | yes | 45.6 | 40.9 | 50.4 | 994 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2021-01-25 | yes | 40.1 | 34.9 | 45.3 | 797 | | Build a wall (agree) | Independents | 2021-02-01 | yes | 36.3 | 29.1 | 43.5 | 381 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-07-15 | no | 85.5 | 82.2 | 88.8 | 1,297 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-07-22 | no | 85.1 | 82.0 | 88.2 | 1,581 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-07-29 | no | 83.2 | 80.0 | 86.3 | 1,593 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-08-05 | no | 84.1 | 81.0 | 87.2 | 1,460 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-08-12 | no | 84.7 | 81.4 | 87.9 | 1,386 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-08-19 | no | 84.8 | 82.2 | 87.5 | 1,900 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-08-26 | no | 83.9 | 80.7 | 87.0 | 1,406 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-09-02 | no | 82.7 | 79.6 | 85.9 | 1,512 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-09-09 | no | 81.5 | 78.1 | 84.9 | 1,466 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-09-16 | no | 86.0 | 82.8 | 89.1 | 1,528 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-09-23 | no | 83.6 | 80.3 | 86.8 | 1,546 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-09-30 | no | 80.8 | 77.9 | 83.7 | 2,290 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-10-07 | no | 82.5 | 78.8 | 86.1 | 1,225 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-10-14 | no | 82.9 | 79.1 | 86.6 | 1,110 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-10-21 | no | 82.4 | 79.1 | 85.6 | 1,696 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-10-28 | no | 80.4 | 77.2 | 83.7 | 1,801 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-11-04 | no | 81.3 | 78.1 | 84.6 | 1,545 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-11-11 | no | 83.8 | 81.1 | 86.5 | 1,942 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-11-18 | no | 84.4 | 80.6 | 88.1 | 1,025 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-11-25 | no | 80.3 | 77.3 | 83.3 | 2,044 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-12-02 | no | 80.6 | 77.0 | 84.2 | 1,330 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-12-09 | no | 86.2 | 83.6 | 88.7 | 2,038 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-12-16 | no | 81.7 | 78.8 | 84.7 | 1,755 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-12-23 | no | 78.6 | 75.2 | 81.9 | 1,370 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2019-12-30 | no | 81.7 | 79.4 | 84.0 | 2,482 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-01-06 | no | 85.0 | 81.9 | 88.1 | 1,243 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-01-13 | no | 79.6 | 76.4 | 82.8 | 1,612 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-01-20 | no | 85.0 | 82.4 | 87.7 | 1,731 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-01-27 | no | 81.7 | 78.3 | 85.1 | 1,248 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-02-03 | no | 81.3 | 78.1 | 84.5 | 1,669 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-02-10 | no | 79.6 | 76.3 | 82.9 | 1,638 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-02-17 | no | 84.2 | 81.5 | 86.9 | 1,741 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-02-24 | no | 82.9 | 79.9 | 85.9 | 1,468 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-03-02 | no | 82.2 | 79.0 | 85.4 | 1,561 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-03-09 | no | 83.2 | 80.2 | 86.1 | 1,599 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-03-16 | no | 82.4 | 79.4 | 85.4 | 1,609 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-03-23 | no | 80.5 | 77.6 | 83.3 | 1,702 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-03-30 | no | 83.7 | 81.6 | 85.7 | 2,759 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-04-06 | no | 81.3 | 79.4 | 83.3 | 3,446 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-04-13 | no | 82.8 | 79.9 | 85.7 | 1,462 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-04-20 | no | 80.1 | 77.0 | 83.3 | 1,360 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-04-27 | no | 80.4 | 77.4 | 83.4 | 1,477 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-05-04 | no | 80.5 | 77.8 | 83.1 | 1,879 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-05-11 | no | 79.7 | 76.5 | 82.9 | 1,364 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-05-18 | no | 77.9 | 75.3 | 80.5 | 2,189 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-05-25 | no | 83.2 | 80.4 | 86.0 | 1,386 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-06-01 | no | 78.4 | 75.3 | 81.4 | 1,521 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-06-08 | no | 79.7 | 76.9 | 82.5 | 1,776 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-06-15 | no | 80.8 | 78.1 | 83.6 | 1,634 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-06-22 | no | 80.5 | 77.8 | 83.3 | 1,734 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-06-29 | no | 79.3 | 76.2 | 82.3 | 1,586 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-07-06 | no | 82.0 | 78.7 | 85.3 | 1,280 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-07-13 | no | 77.6 | 75.3 | 80.0 | 2,934 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-07-20 | no | 79.1 | 76.9 | 81.4 | 2,977 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-07-27 | no | 78.6 | 75.9 | 81.2 | 2,090 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-08-03 | no | 78.8 | 75.6 | 82.1 | 1,311 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-08-10 | no | 78.0 | 74.8 | 81.2 | 1,436 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-08-17 | no | 82.0 | 79.3 | 84.7 | 1,938 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-08-24 | no | 77.7 | 74.1 | 81.4 | 1,334 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-08-31 | no | 78.1 | 74.9 | 81.3 | 1,647 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-09-07 | no | 77.6 | 74.2 | 81.0 | 1,443 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-09-14 | no | 79.3 | 76.3 | 82.3 | 1,802 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-09-21 | no | 79.8 | 76.3 | 83.3 | 1,417 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-09-28 | no | 76.4 | 72.7 | 80.1 | 1,418 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-10-05 | no | 81.2 | 78.1 | 84.3 | 1,764 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-10-12 | no | 76.6 | 73.2 | 80.1 | 1,629 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-10-19 | no | 78.9 | 75.3 | 82.5 | 1,447 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-10-26 | no | 80.6 | 77.7 | 83.5 | 2,059 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-11-02 | no | 79.4 | 76.2 | 82.6 | 1,578 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-11-09 | no | 81.2 | 78.2 | 84.3 | 1,563 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-11-16 | no | 82.0 | 78.7 | 85.4 | 1,299 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-11-23 | no | 81.6 | 78.7 | 84.5 | 1,800 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-11-30 | no | 78.3 | 75.2 | 81.3 | 1,888 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-12-07 | no | 78.0 | 73.8 | 82.2 | 973 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-12-14 | no | 81.6 | 78.8 | 84.3 | 1,845 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-12-21 | no | 81.5 | 78.8 | 84.2 | 1,735 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2020-12-28 | no | 79.4 | 75.3 | 83.6 | 810 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2021-01-11 | yes | 78.7 | 74.6 | 82.8 | 1,075 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2021-01-18 | yes | 68.0 | 64.0 | 71.9 | 1,189 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2021-01-25 | yes | 79.0 | 75.2 | 82.7 | 1,017 | | Build a wall (agree) | Republicans | 2021-02-01 | yes | 78.1 | 72.0 | 84.1 | 418 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-07-15 | no | 23.0 | 19.2 | 26.9 | 1,456 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-07-22 | no | 19.6 | 16.3 | 22.9 | 1,922 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-07-29 | no | 23.5 | 20.1 | 26.9 | 1,948 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-08-05 | no | 18.4 | 15.1 | 21.8 | 1,653 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-08-12 | no | 22.3 | 18.7 | 25.9 | 1,661 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-08-19 | no | 18.2 | 15.3 | 21.0 | 2,300 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-08-26 | no | 21.3 | 18.0 | 24.7 | 1,715 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-09-02 | no | 18.4 | 15.3 | 21.5 | 1,783 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-09-09 | no | 18.5 | 15.1 | 22.0 | 1,675 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-09-16 | no | 20.5 | 17.1 | 23.9 | 1,861 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-09-23 | no | 21.4 | 17.8 | 24.9 | 1,714 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-09-30 | no | 22.4 | 19.5 | 25.2 | 2,765 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-10-07 | no | 21.4 | 17.6 | 25.2 | 1,464 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-10-14 | no | 25.5 | 21.1 | 29.9 | 1,189 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-10-21 | no | 23.5 | 20.0 | 27.1 | 1,917 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-10-28 | no | 22.5 | 19.1 | 25.9 | 2,044 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-11-04 | no | 20.4 | 17.1 | 23.7 | 1,679 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-11-11 | no | 19.6 | 16.7 | 22.5 | 2,153 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-11-18 | no | 27.1 | 22.2 | 32.0 | 972 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-11-25 | no | 23.4 | 20.1 | 26.6 | 2,164 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-12-02 | no | 19.8 | 16.2 | 23.5 | 1,309 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-12-09 | no | 22.6 | 19.7 | 25.6 | 2,247 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-12-16 | no | 21.5 | 18.4 | 24.6 | 1,901 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-12-23 | no | 25.3 | 22.0 | 28.7 | 1,624 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2019-12-30 | no | 21.2 | 18.7 | 23.8 | 2,628 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-01-06 | no | 25.1 | 21.3 | 28.9 | 1,336 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-01-13 | no | 17.8 | 14.9 | 20.8 | 1,845 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-01-20 | no | 20.7 | 17.7 | 23.7 | 1,935 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-01-27 | no | 23.7 | 20.0 | 27.4 | 1,453 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-02-03 | no | 22.6 | 19.2 | 26.0 | 1,807 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-02-10 | no | 25.1 | 21.6 | 28.7 | 1,620 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-02-17 | no | 21.3 | 18.3 | 24.3 | 1,989 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-02-24 | no | 21.4 | 18.0 | 24.8 | 1,464 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-03-02 | no | 24.7 | 21.5 | 28.0 | 1,882 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-03-09 | no | 17.3 | 14.3 | 20.3 | 1,691 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-03-16 | no | 25.0 | 21.8 | 28.2 | 1,898 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-03-23 | no | 24.4 | 21.2 | 27.7 | 1,720 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-03-30 | no | 27.3 | 24.9 | 29.7 | 3,079 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-04-06 | no | 25.7 | 23.6 | 27.9 | 3,769 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-04-13 | no | 25.7 | 22.3 | 29.0 | 1,543 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-04-20 | no | 23.7 | 20.5 | 27.0 | 1,549 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-04-27 | no | 20.8 | 17.6 | 24.0 | 1,465 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-05-04 | no | 21.4 | 18.6 | 24.2 | 2,111 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-05-11 | no | 24.6 | 21.1 | 28.1 | 1,426 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-05-18 | no | 26.8 | 24.1 | 29.6 | 2,325 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-05-25 | no | 27.5 | 24.0 | 30.9 | 1,476 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-06-01 | no | 20.6 | 17.6 | 23.6 | 1,664 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-06-08 | no | 22.3 | 19.3 | 25.3 | 1,838 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-06-15 | no | 18.3 | 15.6 | 21.0 | 1,837 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-06-22 | no | 21.6 | 18.7 | 24.5 | 1,946 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-06-29 | no | 20.8 | 17.7 | 23.9 | 1,645 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-07-06 | no | 20.3 | 17.0 | 23.7 | 1,382 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-07-13 | no | 23.8 | 21.5 | 26.1 | 3,482 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-07-20 | no | 21.9 | 19.5 | 24.2 | 2,948 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-07-27 | no | 19.6 | 17.1 | 22.2 | 2,210 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-08-03 | no | 19.9 | 16.7 | 23.0 | 1,485 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-08-10 | no | 21.6 | 18.3 | 24.8 | 1,552 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-08-17 | no | 19.9 | 16.9 | 22.9 | 1,920 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-08-24 | no | 20.2 | 16.8 | 23.5 | 1,539 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-08-31 | no | 22.4 | 19.0 | 25.8 | 1,559 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-09-07 | no | 22.1 | 18.8 | 25.5 | 1,616 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-09-14 | no | 26.0 | 22.7 | 29.2 | 2,038 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-09-21 | no | 24.8 | 21.0 | 28.7 | 1,500 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-09-28 | no | 21.5 | 17.8 | 25.2 | 1,374 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-10-05 | no | 26.8 | 23.2 | 30.3 | 1,810 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-10-12 | no | 24.0 | 20.7 | 27.4 | 1,757 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-10-19 | no | 23.2 | 19.5 | 26.9 | 1,564 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-10-26 | no | 25.5 | 22.3 | 28.7 | 2,007 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-11-02 | no | 20.8 | 17.7 | 24.0 | 1,665 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-11-09 | no | 25.0 | 21.8 | 28.3 | 1,810 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-11-16 | no | 26.6 | 23.0 | 30.2 | 1,607 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-11-23 | no | 25.3 | 22.2 | 28.3 | 2,086 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-11-30 | no | 24.8 | 21.7 | 27.8 | 2,167 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-12-07 | no | 27.8 | 23.9 | 31.7 | 1,340 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-12-14 | no | 26.5 | 23.5 | 29.4 | 2,256 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-12-21 | no | 25.3 | 22.3 | 28.2 | 1,982 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2020-12-28 | no | 24.5 | 20.5 | 28.5 | 1,111 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2021-01-11 | yes | 29.7 | 25.5 | 33.8 | 1,343 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2021-01-18 | yes | 47.8 | 44.0 | 51.6 | 1,561 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2021-01-25 | yes | 25.7 | 21.8 | 29.7 | 1,104 | | Deport all (agree) | Democrats | 2021-02-01 | yes | 24.7 | 18.7 | 30.6 | 496 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-07-15 | no | 46.6 | 41.3 | 51.9 | 1,111 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-07-22 | no | 42.3 | 37.5 | 47.1 | 1,395 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-07-29 | no | 36.3 | 31.9 | 40.7 | 1,401 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-08-05 | no | 38.9 | 34.3 | 43.5 | 1,274 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-08-12 | no | 37.7 | 32.9 | 42.4 | 1,280 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-08-19 | no | 38.1 | 34.3 | 41.9 | 1,821 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-08-26 | no | 39.8 | 35.1 | 44.5 | 1,200 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-09-02 | no | 44.4 | 39.8 | 48.9 | 1,299 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-09-09 | no | 35.6 | 31.0 | 40.2 | 1,218 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-09-16 | no | 40.5 | 35.7 | 45.2 | 1,343 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-09-23 | no | 39.6 | 34.9 | 44.2 | 1,337 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-09-30 | no | 38.6 | 34.9 | 42.4 | 1,995 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-10-07 | no | 45.1 | 39.9 | 50.3 | 1,025 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-10-14 | no | 40.5 | 35.0 | 45.9 | 831 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-10-21 | no | 40.2 | 35.7 | 44.7 | 1,521 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-10-28 | no | 37.6 | 33.4 | 41.9 | 1,677 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-11-04 | no | 42.5 | 37.9 | 47.1 | 1,247 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-11-11 | no | 37.0 | 32.9 | 41.0 | 1,617 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-11-18 | no | 37.7 | 31.9 | 43.5 | 807 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-11-25 | no | 35.6 | 31.5 | 39.7 | 1,761 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-12-02 | no | 43.1 | 38.1 | 48.1 | 1,105 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-12-09 | no | 43.2 | 39.3 | 47.1 | 1,757 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-12-16 | no | 36.9 | 32.8 | 40.9 | 1,537 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-12-23 | no | 35.5 | 31.2 | 39.8 | 1,184 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2019-12-30 | no | 39.7 | 36.4 | 43.0 | 2,126 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-01-06 | no | 38.1 | 33.3 | 43.0 | 963 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-01-13 | no | 38.2 | 34.0 | 42.5 | 1,352 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-01-20 | no | 39.8 | 35.6 | 44.0 | 1,372 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-01-27 | no | 38.6 | 33.8 | 43.5 | 1,037 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-02-03 | no | 40.4 | 36.0 | 44.8 | 1,432 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-02-10 | no | 41.7 | 37.0 | 46.5 | 1,198 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-02-17 | no | 38.1 | 33.9 | 42.2 | 1,389 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-02-24 | no | 44.3 | 39.4 | 49.1 | 1,023 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-03-02 | no | 41.2 | 36.7 | 45.7 | 1,317 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-03-09 | no | 40.9 | 36.5 | 45.4 | 1,264 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-03-16 | no | 40.5 | 36.1 | 44.8 | 1,276 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-03-23 | no | 44.8 | 40.3 | 49.3 | 1,186 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-03-30 | no | 43.8 | 40.5 | 47.1 | 1,916 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-04-06 | no | 42.3 | 39.4 | 45.2 | 2,560 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-04-13 | no | 46.5 | 42.0 | 51.0 | 1,092 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-04-20 | no | 38.3 | 33.9 | 42.8 | 1,063 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-04-27 | no | 42.7 | 38.3 | 47.1 | 1,126 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-05-04 | no | 38.8 | 34.7 | 43.0 | 1,252 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-05-11 | no | 40.9 | 36.1 | 45.6 | 964 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-05-18 | no | 39.9 | 36.2 | 43.6 | 1,557 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-05-25 | no | 42.9 | 38.1 | 47.7 | 954 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-06-01 | no | 38.9 | 34.8 | 43.1 | 1,205 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-06-08 | no | 39.1 | 35.2 | 43.1 | 1,378 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-06-15 | no | 38.3 | 34.2 | 42.5 | 1,221 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-06-22 | no | 38.2 | 34.3 | 42.0 | 1,429 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-06-29 | no | 34.0 | 29.9 | 38.0 | 1,277 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-07-06 | no | 39.0 | 34.1 | 43.9 | 992 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-07-13 | no | 39.0 | 35.7 | 42.3 | 2,218 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-07-20 | no | 40.0 | 36.8 | 43.3 | 2,103 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-07-27 | no | 37.8 | 33.9 | 41.6 | 1,478 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-08-03 | no | 35.9 | 31.4 | 40.5 | 960 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-08-10 | no | 36.8 | 32.2 | 41.3 | 1,013 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-08-17 | no | 37.9 | 33.8 | 42.0 | 1,407 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-08-24 | no | 35.7 | 31.0 | 40.4 | 1,002 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-08-31 | no | 36.3 | 31.7 | 41.0 | 1,092 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-09-07 | no | 36.1 | 31.6 | 40.6 | 1,139 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-09-14 | no | 36.8 | 32.5 | 41.1 | 1,364 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-09-21 | no | 39.3 | 34.1 | 44.5 | 1,012 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-09-28 | no | 34.4 | 29.5 | 39.4 | 996 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-10-05 | no | 37.7 | 33.2 | 42.3 | 1,223 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-10-12 | no | 34.2 | 29.6 | 38.8 | 1,200 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-10-19 | no | 34.7 | 29.8 | 39.7 | 1,042 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-10-26 | no | 39.0 | 34.6 | 43.4 | 1,361 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-11-02 | no | 37.2 | 32.7 | 41.7 | 1,137 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-11-09 | no | 35.9 | 31.6 | 40.1 | 1,223 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-11-16 | no | 26.7 | 22.2 | 31.2 | 1,012 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-11-23 | no | 39.6 | 35.3 | 43.9 | 1,329 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-11-30 | no | 38.2 | 34.0 | 42.4 | 1,421 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-12-07 | no | 36.1 | 30.5 | 41.7 | 776 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-12-14 | no | 37.3 | 33.1 | 41.5 | 1,304 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-12-21 | no | 40.9 | 36.8 | 45.0 | 1,277 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2020-12-28 | no | 35.0 | 29.3 | 40.6 | 617 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2021-01-11 | yes | 43.4 | 37.6 | 49.2 | 790 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2021-01-18 | yes | 56.5 | 51.8 | 61.2 | 989 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2021-01-25 | yes | 37.4 | 31.9 | 42.9 | 711 | | Deport all (agree) | Independents | 2021-02-01 | yes | 39.2 | 31.4 | 47.0 | 341 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-07-15 | no | 76.8 | 72.6 | 80.9 | 1,189 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-07-22 | no | 75.2 | 71.3 | 79.2 | 1,466 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-07-29 | no | 74.7 | 70.9 | 78.5 | 1,493 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-08-05 | no | 71.7 | 67.7 | 75.7 | 1,345 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-08-12 | no | 69.9 | 65.6 | 74.3 | 1,275 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-08-19 | no | 72.5 | 69.0 | 76.0 | 1,768 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-08-26 | no | 72.4 | 68.4 | 76.3 | 1,308 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-09-02 | no | 72.7 | 68.9 | 76.6 | 1,389 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-09-09 | no | 70.5 | 66.3 | 74.7 | 1,334 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-09-16 | no | 75.5 | 71.4 | 79.5 | 1,402 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-09-23 | no | 70.2 | 66.0 | 74.4 | 1,447 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-09-30 | no | 68.6 | 65.0 | 72.1 | 2,088 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-10-07 | no | 74.8 | 70.4 | 79.2 | 1,124 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-10-14 | no | 74.5 | 69.9 | 79.0 | 1,029 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-10-21 | no | 72.0 | 68.0 | 76.0 | 1,569 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-10-28 | no | 71.0 | 67.1 | 74.9 | 1,658 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-11-04 | no | 67.7 | 63.7 | 71.7 | 1,449 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-11-11 | no | 70.7 | 67.2 | 74.2 | 1,803 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-11-18 | no | 70.3 | 65.4 | 75.2 | 967 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-11-25 | no | 68.8 | 65.2 | 72.4 | 1,924 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-12-02 | no | 69.3 | 64.8 | 73.7 | 1,203 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-12-09 | no | 72.0 | 68.5 | 75.4 | 1,897 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-12-16 | no | 74.1 | 70.6 | 77.6 | 1,639 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-12-23 | no | 68.8 | 64.9 | 72.7 | 1,278 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2019-12-30 | no | 71.1 | 68.3 | 74.0 | 2,275 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-01-06 | no | 70.7 | 66.6 | 74.9 | 1,151 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-01-13 | no | 68.3 | 64.5 | 72.2 | 1,488 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-01-20 | no | 73.3 | 69.9 | 76.7 | 1,606 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-01-27 | no | 70.0 | 65.8 | 74.1 | 1,178 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-02-03 | no | 71.5 | 67.7 | 75.3 | 1,550 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-02-10 | no | 72.1 | 68.2 | 75.9 | 1,517 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-02-17 | no | 72.4 | 69.0 | 75.9 | 1,619 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-02-24 | no | 73.0 | 69.3 | 76.7 | 1,349 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-03-02 | no | 72.5 | 68.7 | 76.4 | 1,461 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-03-09 | no | 73.2 | 69.6 | 76.9 | 1,476 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-03-16 | no | 71.2 | 67.5 | 74.8 | 1,504 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-03-23 | no | 72.2 | 68.8 | 75.5 | 1,604 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-03-30 | no | 73.1 | 70.6 | 75.7 | 2,577 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-04-06 | no | 74.2 | 71.9 | 76.5 | 3,170 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-04-13 | no | 75.7 | 72.4 | 79.1 | 1,347 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-04-20 | no | 70.6 | 67.0 | 74.2 | 1,297 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-04-27 | no | 72.4 | 68.9 | 75.9 | 1,367 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-05-04 | no | 71.9 | 68.7 | 75.1 | 1,735 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-05-11 | no | 66.2 | 62.3 | 70.1 | 1,252 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-05-18 | no | 69.1 | 66.1 | 72.1 | 2,046 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-05-25 | no | 69.3 | 65.7 | 72.9 | 1,291 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-06-01 | no | 66.3 | 62.7 | 70.0 | 1,420 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-06-08 | no | 70.9 | 67.7 | 74.1 | 1,635 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-06-15 | no | 68.2 | 64.8 | 71.5 | 1,545 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-06-22 | no | 67.9 | 64.5 | 71.2 | 1,568 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-06-29 | no | 67.6 | 64.0 | 71.2 | 1,458 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-07-06 | no | 67.0 | 62.7 | 71.2 | 1,158 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-07-13 | no | 65.5 | 62.7 | 68.3 | 2,754 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-07-20 | no | 67.9 | 65.2 | 70.5 | 2,757 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-07-27 | no | 66.2 | 63.0 | 69.4 | 1,928 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-08-03 | no | 64.4 | 60.5 | 68.4 | 1,213 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-08-10 | no | 64.7 | 60.8 | 68.5 | 1,315 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-08-17 | no | 71.5 | 68.2 | 74.8 | 1,791 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-08-24 | no | 65.4 | 61.1 | 69.7 | 1,231 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-08-31 | no | 67.5 | 63.7 | 71.3 | 1,510 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-09-07 | no | 66.0 | 62.0 | 70.0 | 1,327 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-09-14 | no | 69.8 | 66.3 | 73.3 | 1,693 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-09-21 | no | 67.8 | 63.5 | 72.0 | 1,291 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-09-28 | no | 69.5 | 65.4 | 73.6 | 1,328 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-10-05 | no | 68.9 | 65.1 | 72.7 | 1,612 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-10-12 | no | 65.4 | 61.3 | 69.4 | 1,484 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-10-19 | no | 62.3 | 57.8 | 66.7 | 1,320 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-10-26 | no | 68.3 | 64.7 | 71.8 | 1,909 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-11-02 | no | 65.5 | 61.6 | 69.4 | 1,471 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-11-09 | no | 67.6 | 63.8 | 71.5 | 1,419 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-11-16 | no | 68.0 | 63.8 | 72.3 | 1,191 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-11-23 | no | 70.1 | 66.5 | 73.6 | 1,649 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-11-30 | no | 69.5 | 65.9 | 73.0 | 1,758 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-12-07 | no | 64.4 | 59.3 | 69.5 | 899 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-12-14 | no | 70.3 | 66.9 | 73.8 | 1,643 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-12-21 | no | 70.2 | 66.8 | 73.6 | 1,603 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2020-12-28 | no | 71.2 | 66.3 | 76.1 | 726 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2021-01-11 | yes | 68.4 | 63.5 | 73.4 | 985 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2021-01-18 | yes | 76.7 | 73.1 | 80.3 | 1,156 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2021-01-25 | yes | 70.8 | 66.3 | 75.2 | 914 | | Deport all (agree) | Republicans | 2021-02-01 | yes | 71.5 | 64.6 | 78.4 | 389 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-07-15 | no | 16.9 | 13.4 | 20.4 | 1,434 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-07-22 | no | 15.8 | 12.7 | 18.8 | 1,897 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-07-29 | no | 19.6 | 16.4 | 22.8 | 1,978 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-08-05 | no | 16.5 | 13.3 | 19.7 | 1,646 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-08-12 | no | 18.6 | 15.2 | 22.1 | 1,654 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-08-19 | no | 14.4 | 11.8 | 17.0 | 2,302 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-08-26 | no | 19.1 | 15.9 | 22.4 | 1,707 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-09-02 | no | 16.5 | 13.5 | 19.4 | 1,803 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-09-09 | no | 17.1 | 13.8 | 20.4 | 1,689 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-09-16 | no | 18.0 | 14.8 | 21.3 | 1,857 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-09-23 | no | 18.9 | 15.6 | 22.3 | 1,742 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-09-30 | no | 19.4 | 16.7 | 22.1 | 2,729 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-10-07 | no | 18.2 | 14.7 | 21.8 | 1,494 | | Path for all (disagree) | Democrats | 2019-10-14 | no | 19.8 | 15.8 | 23.9 | 1,200 | The first 500 of 972 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/nationscape.json. Views: Build a wall (agree) (item = Build a wall (agree)); Deport all (agree) (item = Deport all (agree)); Path for all (disagree) (item = Path for all (disagree)); Path for those brought as children (disagree) (item = Path for those brought as children (disagree)). Note: Party is the three-category party question (Democrat, Republican, independent), so Democrats and Republicans exclude leaners and independents include them. A week is drawn when it has at least 500 respondents on the item and at least 100 respondents with an effective sample of at least 100 in each of the two parties. Note: Open points are weeks after 28 December 2020. In the week of 18 January 2021 the Democratic and Republican shares move toward an even split on three of the four items, and the file does not say why. Source: Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape, July 2019 to February 2021; weighted (weight), opt-in panel Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/nationscape.json ### Table 9. Republicans were more restrictive than Democrats on every 2024 ANES immigration item, most on the border wall Share giving the restrictive answer to the 2024 ANES immigration items, by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; rows ordered by the all-respondent gap; 95% intervals | Respondents | Item | Group | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents counted | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All respondents | Favor a border wall | Democrats | 15.6 | 13.4 | 17.7 | 2,332 | | All respondents | Favor a border wall | Independents | 28.0 | 20.6 | 35.4 | 302 | | All respondents | Favor a border wall | Republicans | 76.5 | 73.9 | 79.1 | 2,094 | | All respondents | Illegal immigration increases crime | Democrats | 34.8 | 32.0 | 37.6 | 2,312 | | All respondents | Illegal immigration increases crime | Independents | 62.7 | 54.7 | 70.7 | 301 | | All respondents | Illegal immigration increases crime | Republicans | 89.0 | 87.1 | 90.9 | 2,079 | | All respondents | Immigration likely takes jobs | Democrats | 12.6 | 10.7 | 14.6 | 2,323 | | All respondents | Immigration likely takes jobs | Independents | 36.5 | 28.5 | 44.5 | 300 | | All respondents | Immigration likely takes jobs | Republicans | 52.6 | 49.5 | 55.6 | 2,079 | | All respondents | Make unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back | Democrats | 8.0 | 6.4 | 9.6 | 2,327 | | All respondents | Make unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back | Independents | 20.4 | 13.7 | 27.1 | 300 | | All respondents | Make unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back | Republicans | 41.7 | 38.6 | 44.7 | 2,084 | | All respondents | Adapting to US customs is very or extremely important | Democrats | 37.6 | 34.8 | 40.5 | 2,325 | | All respondents | Adapting to US customs is very or extremely important | Independents | 50.3 | 42.0 | 58.5 | 301 | | All respondents | Adapting to US customs is very or extremely important | Republicans | 67.1 | 64.2 | 70.0 | 2,078 | | All respondents | Decrease immigration levels | Democrats | 29.8 | 27.2 | 32.5 | 2,390 | | All respondents | Decrease immigration levels | Independents | 44.5 | 36.6 | 52.5 | 318 | | All respondents | Decrease immigration levels | Republicans | 58.7 | 55.8 | 61.7 | 2,170 | | All respondents | Favor ending birthright citizenship | Democrats | 14.8 | 12.7 | 16.9 | 2,334 | | All respondents | Favor ending birthright citizenship | Independents | 18.8 | 12.3 | 25.3 | 300 | | All respondents | Favor ending birthright citizenship | Republicans | 40.7 | 37.7 | 43.8 | 2,090 | | All respondents | Immigrants are bad for the economy | Democrats | 5.4 | 4.1 | 6.7 | 2,322 | | All respondents | Immigrants are bad for the economy | Independents | 26.0 | 18.7 | 33.2 | 301 | | All respondents | Immigrants are bad for the economy | Republicans | 30.0 | 27.2 | 32.8 | 2,069 | | All respondents | Oppose a path to citizenship | Democrats | 7.2 | 5.7 | 8.7 | 2,326 | | All respondents | Oppose a path to citizenship | Independents | 21.2 | 14.4 | 27.9 | 302 | | All respondents | Oppose a path to citizenship | Republicans | 30.3 | 27.4 | 33.1 | 2,075 | | All respondents | Children brought illegally should be sent back | Democrats | 4.9 | 3.6 | 6.2 | 2,331 | | All respondents | Children brought illegally should be sent back | Independents | 14.0 | 8.2 | 19.8 | 299 | | All respondents | Children brought illegally should be sent back | Republicans | 24.6 | 22.0 | 27.3 | 2,053 | | In person | Favor a border wall | Democrats | 14.2 | 9.6 | 18.7 | 465 | | In person | Favor a border wall | Republicans | 78.4 | 72.7 | 84.1 | 395 | | In person | Illegal immigration increases crime | Democrats | 39.8 | 33.4 | 46.3 | 459 | | In person | Illegal immigration increases crime | Republicans | 92.9 | 89.3 | 96.5 | 393 | | In person | Immigration likely takes jobs | Democrats | 11.7 | 7.5 | 15.9 | 465 | | In person | Immigration likely takes jobs | Republicans | 47.3 | 40.3 | 54.2 | 395 | | In person | Make unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back | Democrats | 4.8 | 2.0 | 7.6 | 464 | | In person | Make unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back | Republicans | 32.5 | 26.0 | 38.9 | 392 | | In person | Adapting to US customs is very or extremely important | Democrats | 30.7 | 24.7 | 36.7 | 468 | | In person | Adapting to US customs is very or extremely important | Republicans | 62.5 | 55.8 | 69.2 | 394 | | In person | Decrease immigration levels | Democrats | 25.2 | 19.5 | 30.9 | 460 | | In person | Decrease immigration levels | Republicans | 44.6 | 37.6 | 51.5 | 389 | | In person | Favor ending birthright citizenship | Democrats | 11.9 | 7.7 | 16.2 | 466 | | In person | Favor ending birthright citizenship | Republicans | 33.5 | 27.0 | 40.1 | 391 | | In person | Immigrants are bad for the economy | Democrats | 4.2 | 1.6 | 6.8 | 466 | | In person | Immigrants are bad for the economy | Republicans | 24.7 | 18.6 | 30.7 | 388 | | In person | Oppose a path to citizenship | Democrats | 6.2 | 3.1 | 9.4 | 468 | | In person | Oppose a path to citizenship | Republicans | 24.4 | 18.5 | 30.4 | 390 | | In person | Children brought illegally should be sent back | Democrats | 0.6 | 0.0 | 1.6 | 467 | | In person | Children brought illegally should be sent back | Republicans | 11.9 | 7.3 | 16.4 | 381 | | Web | Favor a border wall | Democrats | 17.6 | 14.1 | 21.1 | 855 | | Web | Favor a border wall | Republicans | 76.1 | 72.0 | 80.1 | 746 | | Web | Illegal immigration increases crime | Democrats | 32.7 | 28.3 | 37.0 | 846 | | Web | Illegal immigration increases crime | Republicans | 87.6 | 84.4 | 90.7 | 739 | | Web | Immigration likely takes jobs | Democrats | 12.6 | 9.5 | 15.7 | 848 | | Web | Immigration likely takes jobs | Republicans | 55.7 | 51.0 | 60.5 | 739 | | Web | Make unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back | Democrats | 10.3 | 7.5 | 13.1 | 854 | | Web | Make unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back | Republicans | 45.0 | 40.3 | 49.7 | 743 | | Web | Adapting to US customs is very or extremely important | Democrats | 38.3 | 33.7 | 42.8 | 849 | | Web | Adapting to US customs is very or extremely important | Republicans | 68.7 | 64.2 | 73.1 | 737 | | Web | Decrease immigration levels | Democrats | 29.3 | 25.1 | 33.5 | 847 | | Web | Decrease immigration levels | Republicans | 63.3 | 58.6 | 67.9 | 736 | | Web | Favor ending birthright citizenship | Democrats | 17.0 | 13.5 | 20.5 | 856 | | Web | Favor ending birthright citizenship | Republicans | 44.6 | 39.9 | 49.4 | 746 | | Web | Immigrants are bad for the economy | Democrats | 5.7 | 3.6 | 7.9 | 848 | | Web | Immigrants are bad for the economy | Republicans | 32.0 | 27.5 | 36.5 | 737 | | Web | Oppose a path to citizenship | Democrats | 8.6 | 6.0 | 11.1 | 849 | | Web | Oppose a path to citizenship | Republicans | 31.6 | 27.1 | 36.0 | 738 | | Web | Children brought illegally should be sent back | Democrats | 7.5 | 5.1 | 9.9 | 854 | | Web | Children brought illegally should be sent back | Republicans | 29.7 | 25.4 | 34.1 | 738 | Views: All respondents (view = All respondents); In person (view = In person); Web (view = Web). Note: All items use the post-election weight and respondents with a post-election interview, including the four items asked before the election, whose gaps with the pre-election weight are compared in the text; the in-person and web views use the post-election mode weights of the fresh in-person and fresh web samples, which leave out the panel and paper respondents. Note: An independent cell is drawn only where it has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100, so the in-person view has no independent dots. Note: Answers of neither favor nor oppose and the middle answers count as not restrictive. Don't know and refusals are left out. Source: ANES 2024 Time Series; weighted (post-election weight V240107b, mode weights V240101b and V240102b) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/anes2024_items.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (226), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | a_between_1624_n | 3 | studies | count of studies in which the independent share lies between the Democratic and Republican shares | ANES studies from 2016 to 2024 | 2016-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_a_1992 | 48.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | all respondents who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 | 95% CI 46.6% to 50.8% | 2,168 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_a_2020 | 28.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | all respondents who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2020 | 95% CI 27.0% to 29.8% | 7,350 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_a_2024 | 42.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | all respondents who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 95% CI 40.9% to 45.0% | 4,898 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_d_1992 | 46.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 | 95% CI 43.8% to 49.8% | 1,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_d_2008 | 42.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2008 | 95% CI 38.7% to 45.9% | 1,203 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_d_2008_ftf | 42.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2008, in-person interviews | 95% CI 38.7% to 45.9% | 1,203 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_d_2016 | 28.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016 | 95% CI 25.7% to 31.0% | 1,664 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_d_2016_ftf | 23.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016, in-person interviews | 95% CI 18.3% to 27.7% | 475 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_d_2020 | 14.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2020 | 95% CI 12.4% to 15.6% | 3,443 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_d_2024 | 29.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 95% CI 26.6% to 31.9% | 2,390 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_i_2008 | 50.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | independents who lean toward neither party who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2008 | 95% CI 41.9% to 58.2% | 227 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_r_1992 | 50.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 | 95% CI 46.7% to 53.5% | 818 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_r_2008 | 47.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2008 | 95% CI 43.2% to 52.5% | 596 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_r_2008_ftf | 47.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2008, in-person interviews | 95% CI 43.2% to 52.5% | 596 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_r_2016 | 62.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016 | 95% CI 59.7% to 65.6% | 1,476 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_r_2016_ftf | 54.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016, in-person interviews | 95% CI 48.5% to 59.9% | 455 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_r_2020 | 44.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2020 | 95% CI 42.3% to 46.9% | 3,043 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_r_2024 | 57.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 95% CI 54.6% to 60.6% | 2,170 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_r_2024_ftf | 44.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI 37.6% to 51.3% | 389 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_dec_r_2024_web | 63.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 59.2% to 68.3% | 736 | weight_web (web mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_1992 | 3.3 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 | 95% CI −1.2 to 7.9 | 1,898 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_2000 | 8.0 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2000 | 95% CI 2.4 to 13.6 | 1,515 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_2008_ftf | 5.6 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2008, in-person interviews | 95% CI −0.3 to 11.5 | 1,799 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_2012 | 15.1 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2012 | 95% CI 11.2 to 18.9 | 4,664 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_2016 | 34.3 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016 | 95% CI 30.4 to 38.3 | 3,140 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_2016_ftf | 31.2 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016, in-person interviews | 95% CI 23.8 to 38.6 | 930 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_2020 | 30.6 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2020 | 95% CI 27.7 to 33.4 | 6,486 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_2020_post | 29.3 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share with the post-election weight; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2020 | 95% CI 26.4 to 32.3 | 6,486 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_2024 | 28.3 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 95% CI 24.3 to 32.4 | 4,560 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_2024_ftf | 20.3 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI 11.5 to 29.1 | 849 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_2024_post | 28.9 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share with the post-election weight; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 95% CI 25.0 to 32.9 | 4,560 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gap_2024_web | 34.5 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 28.3 to 40.6 | 1,583 | weight_web (web mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_gss_r_2024_diff | 18.8 | percentage points | GSS Republican share reduced minus ANES Republican share decreased (two surveys, different questions) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the question on the number of immigrants | 2024 | 95% CI 14.2 to 23.4 | 3,259 | weight_use (GSS) and weight (VCF0009z, ANES) | General Social Survey | | | a_gss_r_2024_diff_ftf | 33.6 | percentage points | GSS in-person Republican share reduced minus ANES in-person Republican share decreased (two surveys, different questions) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) interviewed in person who answered the question on the number of immigrants | 2024 | 95% CI 24.7 to 42.4 | 767 | weight_use (GSS) and weight_ftf (ANES) | General Social Survey | | | a_inc_d_1992 | 10.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer increased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 | 95% CI 8.4% to 12.0% | 1,080 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_inc_d_2020 | 46.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer increased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2020 | 95% CI 44.2% to 48.8% | 3,443 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_inc_d_2024 | 24.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer increased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 95% CI 21.9% to 26.9% | 2,390 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_inc_r_2020 | 11.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer increased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2020 | 95% CI 9.9% to 12.8% | 3,043 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_web_share_2016 | 70% | share of respondents | share interviewed by web (count, unweighted) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016 | | | none (respondent count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | c_d_border_2007 | 39.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the CES item on more border patrols, support | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2007 | 95% CI 37.8% to 41.8% | 4,372 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_d_border_2017 | 26.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the CES item on more border patrols, support | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2017 | 95% CI 24.7% to 27.5% | 8,585 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_d_wall_2021 | 15.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the CES item on the border wall, support | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2021 | 95% CI 14.5% to 16.2% | 12,445 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_border_2007 | 28.9 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on more border patrols, support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2007 | 95% CI 26.1 to 31.8 | 8,145 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_border_2017 | 46.2 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on more border patrols, support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2017 | 95% CI 44.1 to 48.3 | 14,360 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_border_2019 | 45.5 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on more border patrols, support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2019 | 95% CI 43.8 to 47.1 | 14,672 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_border_2021 | 45.2 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on more border patrols, support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2021 | 95% CI 43.8 to 46.6 | 20,584 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_legalize_2007 | 27.2 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on legal status for long-term residents, oppose | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2007 | 95% CI 24.4 to 29.9 | 8,145 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_legalize_2017 | 44.0 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on legal status for long-term residents, oppose | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2017 | 95% CI 41.9 to 46.2 | 14,360 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_legalize_2019 | 43.4 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on legal status for long-term residents, oppose | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2019 | 95% CI 41.6 to 45.2 | 14,697 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_legalize_2021 | 48.0 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on legal status for long-term residents, oppose | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2021 | 95% CI 46.5 to 49.6 | 20,584 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_wall_2017 | 57.0 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on the border wall, support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2017 | 95% CI 55.1 to 58.9 | 14,360 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_wall_2018 | 70.7 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on the border wall, support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2018 | 95% CI 69.8 to 71.6 | 49,103 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_wall_2020 | 69.5 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on the border wall, support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2020 | 95% CI 68.6 to 70.4 | 49,736 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_gap_wall_2021 | 70.3 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the CES item on the border wall, support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2021 | 95% CI 69.0 to 71.5 | 20,584 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_ind_above_n | 56 | item-years | count of item-years in which the independent share exceeds the Democratic share with an interval above zero | CES immigration policy items | 2007-2021 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_ind_below_n | 57 | item-years | count of item-years in which the Republican share exceeds the independent share with an interval above zero | CES immigration policy items | 2007-2021 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_r_wall_2021 | 85.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the CES item on the border wall, support | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2021 | 95% CI 84.7% to 86.6% | 8,139 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | g_between_n | 9 | surveys | count of surveys in which the independent share lies between the Democratic and Republican shares | GSS surveys with a reliable independent estimate | 2004-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | g_between_tot | 10 | surveys | count of surveys in which an independent cell clears the suppression floor | GSS surveys with a reliable independent estimate | 2004-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | g_dec_d_2004 | 47.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2004 | 95% CI 41.4% to 53.3% | 389 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_dec_d_2008 | 51.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2008 | 95% CI 46.5% to 55.9% | 641 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_dec_d_2016 | 26.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2016 | 95% CI 23.2% to 30.5% | 862 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_dec_d_2021 | 15.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2021 | 95% CI 12.6% to 17.7% | 1,220 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_dec_d_2024 | 28.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2024 | 95% CI 25.3% to 32.5% | 1,212 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_dec_r_2016 | 61.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2016 | 95% CI 56.7% to 65.8% | 617 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_dec_r_2022 | 59.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2022 | 95% CI 54.6% to 64.0% | 1,103 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_dec_r_2022_ftf | 54.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2022, in-person interviews | 95% CI 47.6% to 61.9% | 500 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_dec_r_2024 | 76.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2024 | 95% CI 72.9% to 79.8% | 1,089 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_dec_r_2024_ftf | 78.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI 72.4% to 83.6% | 378 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_gap_1994 | 6.5 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the earlier GSS form of the question on the number of immigrants (letin in 1994 and 2000, letin1 in 1996), answer decreased or reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 1994 | 95% CI 0.3 to 12.6 | 1,174 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_gap_1996 | 6.5 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the earlier GSS form of the question on the number of immigrants (letin in 1994 and 2000, letin1 in 1996), answer decreased or reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 1996 | 95% CI −0.3 to 13.4 | 958 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_gap_2000 | 3.3 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the earlier GSS form of the question on the number of immigrants (letin in 1994 and 2000, letin1 in 1996), answer decreased or reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2000 | 95% CI −3.5 to 10.1 | 1,027 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_gap_2004 | 10.3 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2004 | 95% CI 1.8 to 18.8 | 735 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_gap_2012 | 12.8 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2012 | 95% CI 4.8 to 20.7 | 994 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_gap_2016 | 34.4 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2016 | 95% CI 28.5 to 40.2 | 1,479 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_gap_2022 | 41.6 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2022 | 95% CI 35.9 to 47.2 | 2,511 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_gap_2024 | 47.5 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2024 | 95% CI 42.5 to 52.5 | 2,301 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | g_overlap_share_2014 | 65% | share of respondents | share of letin1 respondents who also answered letin1a (count, unweighted) | GSS respondents who answered letin1 | 2014 | | | none (respondent count) | General Social Survey | | | g_overlap_share_2024 | 99% | share of respondents | share of letin1 respondents who also answered letin1a (count, unweighted) | GSS respondents who answered letin1 | 2024 | | | none (respondent count) | General Social Survey | | | g_variant_max | 7.2 | percentage points | largest absolute difference between the gap on letin1 and the gap on letin1a (the two forms went to different respondents in 2004 and partly to the same respondents in 2014 and 2024) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2004, 2014 and 2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_crime_d_1996 | 37.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS item that immigrants increase crime rates (immcrime), answer agree or agree strongly | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 1996 | 95% CI 33.0% to 41.8% | 596 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_crime_d_2024 | 11.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS item that immigrants increase crime rates (immcrime), answer agree or agree strongly | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 8.7% to 15.0% | 828 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_crime_gap_2004 | 6.5 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS item that immigrants increase crime rates (immcrime), answer agree or agree strongly | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2004 | 95% CI 0.1 to 12.9 | 976 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_crime_gap_2024 | 43.0 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS item that immigrants increase crime rates (immcrime), answer agree or agree strongly | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 37.2 to 48.9 | 1,563 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_crime_r_1996 | 32.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS item that immigrants increase crime rates (immcrime), answer agree or agree strongly | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 1996 | 95% CI 27.9% to 37.4% | 457 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_crime_r_2024 | 54.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS item that immigrants increase crime rates (immcrime), answer agree or agree strongly | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 50.0% to 59.8% | 735 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_economy_gap_2024 | 22.3 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS item that immigrants are good for America's economy (immameco), answer disagree or disagree strongly | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 16.2 to 28.4 | 1,125 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_fewer_gap_2004 | 11.6 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants (letin1), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2004 | 95% CI 4.0 to 19.3 | 903 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_fewer_gap_2024 | 48.8 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants (letin1), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 41.5 to 56.1 | 1,075 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_jobs_d_1996 | 49.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS item that immigrants take jobs away (immjobs), answer agree or agree strongly | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 1996 | 95% CI 44.9% to 53.8% | 610 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_jobs_d_2024 | 11.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS item that immigrants take jobs away (immjobs), answer agree or agree strongly | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 8.4% to 14.6% | 833 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_jobs_gap_2024 | 35.1 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS item that immigrants take jobs away (immjobs), answer agree or agree strongly | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 29.3 to 40.8 | 1,578 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_jobs_r_1996 | 46.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS item that immigrants take jobs away (immjobs), answer agree or agree strongly | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 1996 | 95% CI 41.0% to 51.1% | 460 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_jobs_r_2024 | 46.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS item that immigrants take jobs away (immjobs), answer agree or agree strongly | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 41.7% to 51.4% | 745 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_web_2021 | 88% | share of interviews | share of interviews by web (count) | GSS 2021 respondents who answered the question on the number of immigrants | 2021 | | | none (interview count) | General Social Survey | | | n_a_early | 7 | studies | count of study years with the item | ANES studies from 1992 to 2008 | 1992-2008 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_a_i_above | 5 | studies | count of studies in which the independent share is above both party shares | ANES studies before 2016 with an independent estimate | 1992-2012 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_a_i_pre | 7 | studies | count of studies in which an independent cell clears the suppression floor | ANES studies before 2016 with an independent estimate | 1992-2012 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_a_zero | 6 | studies | count of studies in which the 95% interval of the Republican minus Democratic gap includes zero | ANES studies from 1992 to 2008 | 1992-2008 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_item | 32,751 | respondents | count of respondents with a usable answer (increased, same or decreased) | ANES respondents who answered the question on the number of immigrants | 1992-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_waves | 11 | studies | count of study years with the item | ANES studies that asked the question | 1992-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ces_items | 9 | items | count of immigration policy items in the cumulative policy file | CES immigration policy items | 2007-2021 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_ces_itemyears | 57 | item-years | count of item-years with a Republican minus Democratic gap | CES immigration policy items | 2007-2021 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_gss_item | 21,070 | respondents | count of respondents with a usable answer to letin1a | GSS respondents who answered the question on the number of immigrants nowadays | 2004-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_gss_items | 4 | items | count of items in the GSS module comparison | GSS immigration module items used | 1996-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_gss_waves | 11 | surveys | count of survey years with the item | GSS survey years that asked letin1a | 2004-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_ns_weeks | 77 | weeks | count of weeks with at least 500 respondents and enough respondents in each party on the wall item | Nationscape weekly waves | July 2019 to December 2020 | | | none (count) | Nationscape | | | n_t_items | 10 | items | count of items in the 2024 comparison | 2024 ANES immigration items used | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | n_th_studies | 9 | studies | count of study years with the rating and enough respondents in both parties | ANES studies with the illegal immigrants thermometer | 1988-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ns_chg_deport | −6.1 | percentage points | later minus earlier Republican minus Democratic gap, weeks pooled within each half year; share who agree with deporting all undocumented immigrants | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July to December 2019 compared with July to December 2020 | 95% CI −7.5 to −4.7 | 170,810 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_chg_wall | −6.5 | percentage points | later minus earlier Republican minus Democratic gap, weeks pooled within each half year; share who agree with building a wall on the southern US border | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July to December 2019 compared with July to December 2020 | 95% CI −7.6 to −5.3 | 181,095 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_d19_wall | 14.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who agree with building a wall on the southern US border, weeks pooled | Democrats (no leaners) who answered the item | July to December 2019 | 95% CI 13.6% to 14.7% | 47,673 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_d20_wall | 17.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who agree with building a wall on the southern US border, weeks pooled | Democrats (no leaners) who answered the item | July to December 2020 | 95% CI 16.7% to 17.8% | 49,677 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_d_path_dream | 9.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who disagree with a path to citizenship for those brought here as children | Democrats (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 9.1% to 9.6% | 152,999 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_d_wall | 15.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who agree with building a wall on the southern US border | Democrats (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 15.5% to 16.1% | 147,696 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_d_wall_jan18 | 39.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who agree with building a wall on the southern US border | Democrats (no leaners) who answered the wall item | week of 18 January 2021 | 95% CI 35.6% to 43.1% | 1,522 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_gap_deport | 47.3 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share who agree with deporting all undocumented immigrants | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 46.8 to 47.9 | 260,334 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_gap_path_all | 37.1 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share who disagree with a path to citizenship for all undocumented immigrants | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 36.6 to 37.7 | 262,675 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_gap_path_dream | 22.0 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share who disagree with a path to citizenship for those brought here as children | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 21.5 to 22.5 | 274,792 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_gap_wall | 65.4 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share who agree with building a wall on the southern US border | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 64.9 to 65.8 | 275,835 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_i_wall | 38.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who agree with building a wall on the southern US border | independents who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 37.8% to 38.8% | 106,663 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_r19_wall | 82.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who agree with building a wall on the southern US border, weeks pooled | Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July to December 2019 | 95% CI 82.2% to 83.5% | 40,328 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_r20_path_all | 52.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who disagree with a path to citizenship for all undocumented immigrants, weeks pooled | Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July to December 2020 | 95% CI 51.8% to 53.3% | 40,655 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_r20_wall | 79.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who agree with building a wall on the southern US border, weeks pooled | Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July to December 2020 | 95% CI 78.8% to 80.0% | 43,417 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_r_path_dream | 31.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who disagree with a path to citizenship for those brought here as children | Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 30.9% to 31.8% | 121,793 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_r_path_jan18 | 44.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who disagree with a path to citizenship for all undocumented immigrants | Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | week of 18 January 2021 | 95% CI 40.0% to 48.5% | 1,166 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_r_wall | 81.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who agree with building a wall on the southern US border | Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 80.8% to 81.5% | 128,139 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_wall_max | 74.3 | percentage points | highest across weeks of the weekly Republican minus Democratic gap in agreeing with a wall on the southern border | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the wall item | weekly, July 2019 to December 2020 | | | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_wall_min | 57.4 | percentage points | lowest across weeks of the weekly Republican minus Democratic gap in agreeing with a wall on the southern border | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the wall item | weekly, July 2019 to December 2020 | | | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_wk_jan | 18 January 2021 | date | Monday that starts the field week in which the party shares move toward an even split on three of the four items | Nationscape weekly waves | 2021 | | | none (count) | Nationscape | | | rule_sd | 0.25 | standard deviations of the answer | threshold of the sort-date rule of the chapter Sort dates by attitude | the party gap on an attitude | all study years | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sort_bound | 2016 | year | first study year in which the lower end of the 95% interval of the Republican minus Democratic gap in the z-score exceeds the rule and stays above it in every later study | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the five-category ANES question on the number of immigrants | 1992-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sort_point | 2012 | year | first study year in which the point estimate of the Republican minus Democratic gap in the z-score exceeds the rule and stays above it in every later study | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the five-category ANES question on the number of immigrants | 1992-2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_d_0816 | −13.9 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI −18.4 to −9.5 | 2,867 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_d_1620 | −14.3 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −17.4 to −11.2 | 5,107 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_d_2024 | 15.2 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 12.1 to 18.3 | 5,833 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_d_9224 | −17.6 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 to 2024 | 95% CI −21.6 to −13.6 | 3,470 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_ftf_1216 | 21.4 | percentage points | later minus earlier Republican minus Democratic gap within one mode; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question, in-person respondents | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 11.4 to 31.4 | 2,562 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_gap_1216 | 19.3 | percentage points | later minus earlier Republican minus Democratic gap (two separate samples); the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the question on the number of immigrants | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 13.8 to 24.8 | 7,804 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_gap_1620 | −3.8 | percentage points | later minus earlier Republican minus Democratic gap (two separate samples); the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the question on the number of immigrants | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −8.6 to 1.1 | 9,626 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_gap_1620_lo | −8.6 | percentage points | lower end of the 95% interval of the later minus earlier Republican minus Democratic gap (two separate samples); the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the question on the number of immigrants | 2016 to 2020 | | 9,626 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_gap_2024 | −2.2 | percentage points | later minus earlier Republican minus Democratic gap (two separate samples); the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the question on the number of immigrants | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −7.2 to 2.7 | 11,046 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_gap_2024_post | −0.4 | percentage points | later minus earlier Republican minus Democratic gap with the post-election weight; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −5.4 to 4.6 | 11,046 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_gss_r_0816 | 12.4 | percentage points | change in the Republican share wanting fewer immigrants among all ANES respondents minus the change in the GSS (different questions, separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the question on the number of immigrants | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI 3.3 to 21.4 | 3,122 | weight, weight_ftf (ANES) and weight_use (GSS) | General Social Survey | | | st_a_ir_2008 | 2.2 | percentage points | weighted independent share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers and independents who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2008 | 95% CI −7.2 to 11.6 | 823 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_modegap_2012 | 8.2 | percentage points | web gap minus in-person gap, Republican minus Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2012 | 95% CI 0.0 to 16.4 | 4,664 | weight_ftf and weight_web (mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_modegap_2016 | 4.8 | percentage points | web gap minus in-person gap, Republican minus Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016 | 95% CI −3.9 to 13.5 | 3,140 | weight_ftf and weight_web (mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_modegap_2016_hi | 13.5 | percentage points | upper end of the 95% interval of the web gap minus in-person gap, Republican minus Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016 | | 3,140 | weight_ftf and weight_web (mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_modegap_2024 | 14.2 | percentage points | web gap minus in-person gap, Republican minus Democratic share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 95% CI 3.4 to 25.0 | 2,432 | weight_ftf and weight_web (mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_moder_2012 | 9.3 | percentage points | web share minus in-person share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2012 | 95% CI 3.0 to 15.7 | 1,827 | weight_ftf and weight_web (mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_moder_2016 | 12.1 | percentage points | web share minus in-person share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016 | 95% CI 5.5 to 18.7 | 1,476 | weight_ftf and weight_web (mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_moder_2024 | 19.3 | percentage points | web share minus in-person share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 95% CI 11.1 to 27.5 | 1,125 | weight_ftf and weight_web (mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_moderd_2012 | 1.1 | percentage points | web share minus in-person share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2012 | 95% CI −4.0 to 6.3 | 2,837 | weight_ftf and weight_web (mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_moderd_2016 | 7.3 | percentage points | web share minus in-person share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016 | 95% CI 1.7 to 13.0 | 1,664 | weight_ftf and weight_web (mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_moderd_2024 | 5.1 | percentage points | web share minus in-person share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2024 | 95% CI −1.8 to 12.1 | 1,307 | weight_ftf and weight_web (mode weights) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_r_0816 | 14.8 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI 9.3 to 20.3 | 2,072 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_r_1620 | −18.1 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −21.8 to −14.3 | 4,519 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_r_2024 | 13.0 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 9.2 to 16.8 | 5,213 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_r_9224 | 7.5 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.9 to 12.1 | 2,988 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_web_1216 | 18.0 | percentage points | later minus earlier Republican minus Democratic gap within one mode; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES immigration level question, web respondents | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 11.4 to 24.6 | 5,242 | weight_web (web mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_af_d_0816 | −19.3 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share, in-person respondents only; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) interviewed in person who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI −25.2 to −13.4 | 1,678 | weight before 2008 (in person by design) and weight_ftf from 2008 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_af_d_9224 | −22.7 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share, in-person respondents only; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) interviewed in person who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 to 2024 | 95% CI −29.0 to −16.3 | 1,540 | weight before 2008 (in person by design) and weight_ftf from 2008 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_af_gss_r_0816 | 3.9 | percentage points | change in the Republican share wanting fewer immigrants among in-person ANES respondents minus the change in the GSS (different questions, separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the question on the number of immigrants | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI −6.4 to 14.2 | 2,101 | weight, weight_ftf (ANES) and weight_use (GSS) | General Social Survey | | | st_af_r_0816 | 6.3 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share, in-person respondents only; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) interviewed in person who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI −1.0 to 13.7 | 1,051 | weight before 2008 (in person by design) and weight_ftf from 2008 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_af_r_1624 | −9.8 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share, in-person respondents only; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) interviewed in person who answered the ANES immigration level question | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −18.6 to −0.9 | 844 | weight before 2008 (in person by design) and weight_ftf from 2008 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_af_r_9224 | −5.7 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share, in-person respondents only; the ANES question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a), answer decreased (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) interviewed in person who answered the ANES immigration level question | 1992 to 2024 | 95% CI −13.3 to 2.0 | 1,207 | weight before 2008 (in person by design) and weight_ftf from 2008 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_c_d_border_0717 | −13.7 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the CES item on more border patrols, support (check-all-that-apply format; two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2007 to 2017 | 95% CI −16.1 to −11.3 | 12,957 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | st_c_r_border_0717 | 3.5 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the CES item on more border patrols, support (check-all-that-apply format; two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2007 to 2017 | 95% CI 0.9 to 6.1 | 9,548 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | st_g_d_0816 | −24.3 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI −30.2 to −18.3 | 1,503 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_d_1622 | −9.1 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2016 to 2022 | 95% CI −13.9 to −4.3 | 2,270 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_d_2224 | 11.1 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI 6.4 to 15.9 | 2,620 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_ftf_2224 | 6.6 | percentage points | later minus earlier Republican minus Democratic gap within one mode; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants, in-person respondents | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI −5.5 to 18.6 | 1,909 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_ftfr_2224 | 23.3 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted Republican share within one mode; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants, in-person respondents | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI 14.2 to 32.3 | 878 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_modegap_2022 | 13.5 | percentage points | web gap minus in-person gap, Republican minus Democratic share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2022 | 95% CI 2.0 to 25.0 | 2,266 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_modegap_2024 | 7.6 | percentage points | web gap minus in-person gap, Republican minus Democratic share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2024 | 95% CI −3.2 to 18.4 | 2,032 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_moder_2022 | 12.6 | percentage points | web share minus in-person share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2022 | 95% CI 3.0 to 22.2 | 996 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_moder_2024 | −0.4 | percentage points | web share minus in-person share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2024 | 95% CI −7.7 to 6.9 | 972 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_r_0816 | 2.4 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2008 to 2016 | 95% CI −4.7 to 9.6 | 1,050 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_r_0816_hi | 9.6 | percentage points | upper end of the 95% interval of the later minus earlier weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2008 to 2016 | | 1,050 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_r_1618 | −8.9 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2016 to 2018 | 95% CI −16.3 to −1.6 | 1,130 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_r_1622 | −1.9 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2016 to 2022 | 95% CI −8.5 to 4.6 | 1,720 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_r_1624 | 15.1 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 9.4 to 20.8 | 1,706 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_r_2224 | 17.0 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted share; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI 11.2 to 22.9 | 2,192 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_variant_2004 | 1.3 | percentage points | gap on letin1 minus gap on letin1a (Republican minus Democratic share; different respondents in 2004) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants | 2004 | 95% CI −10.1 to 12.7 | 1,638 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_web_2224 | 0.7 | percentage points | later minus earlier Republican minus Democratic gap within one mode; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants, web respondents | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI −9.6 to 10.9 | 2,389 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_webr_2224 | 10.2 | percentage points | later minus earlier weighted Republican share within one mode; the GSS question on the number of immigrants nowadays (letin1a), answer reduced a little or a lot | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on the number of immigrants, web respondents | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.3 to 18.1 | 1,090 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_th_d_8824 | 17.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | later minus earlier weighted mean rating of illegal immigrants (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 to 2024 | 95% CI 14.8 to 19.3 | 3,079 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_th_gap_8824 | 22.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | later minus earlier warmth gap (Democratic mean rating of illegal immigrants minus Republican mean rating), two separate samples | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 to 2024 | 95% CI 19.0 to 25.4 | 5,843 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_th_r_8824 | −5.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | later minus earlier weighted mean rating of illegal immigrants (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 to 2024 | 95% CI −7.4 to −2.9 | 2,764 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_thf_r_8824 | −3.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | later minus earlier weighted mean rating of illegal immigrants, in-person respondents only (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) interviewed in person who rated illegal immigrants | 1988 to 2024 | 95% CI −7.2 to 0.0 | 1,084 | weight before 2008 (in person by design) and weight_ftf from 2008 | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_thh_d_8824 | 14.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | later minus earlier weighted mean rating of Hispanics (two separate samples) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 to 2024 | 95% CI 12.2 to 16.1 | 3,075 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_thh_gap_8824 | 1.9 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | later minus earlier warmth gap (Democratic mean rating of Hispanics minus Republican mean rating), two separate samples | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.9 to 4.7 | 5,809 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_thh_r_8824 | 12.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | later minus earlier weighted mean rating of Hispanics (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 to 2024 | 95% CI 10.2 to 14.2 | 2,734 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | t_d_children | 4.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share giving the restrictive answer: children brought illegally should be sent back | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 3.6% to 6.2% | 2,331 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_gap_birthright | 25.9 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share giving the restrictive answer: favor ending birthright citizenship | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 22.3 to 29.6 | 4,424 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_gap_children | 19.7 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share giving the restrictive answer: children brought illegally should be sent back | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 16.8 to 22.7 | 4,384 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_gap_crime | 54.2 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share giving the restrictive answer: illegal immigration increases crime | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 50.8 to 57.6 | 4,391 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_gap_economy | 24.6 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share giving the restrictive answer: immigrants are bad for the economy | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 21.5 to 27.8 | 4,391 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_gap_jobs | 39.9 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share giving the restrictive answer: immigration likely takes jobs | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 36.3 to 43.6 | 4,402 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_gap_levels | 28.9 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share giving the restrictive answer: decrease immigration levels | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 25.0 to 32.9 | 4,560 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_gap_levels_ftf | 19.4 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share giving the restrictive answer: decrease immigration levels | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI 10.4 to 28.4 | 849 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_gap_levels_web | 33.9 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share giving the restrictive answer: decrease immigration levels | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 27.7 to 40.2 | 1,583 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_gap_nopath | 23.1 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share giving the restrictive answer: oppose a path to citizenship | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 19.8 to 26.3 | 4,401 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_gap_wall | 60.9 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share giving the restrictive answer: favor a border wall | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 57.6 to 64.3 | 4,426 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_mode_max_other | 11.0 | percentage points | largest absolute difference between the web gap and the in-person gap (Republican minus Democratic) across the nine items other than immigration levels | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 4.1 to 17.8 | 2,440 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_pre_weight_max | 0.3 | percentage points | largest absolute difference, over the four pre-election items, between the gap weighted with the post-election weight and the gap weighted with the pre-election weight (V240107a) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | | | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_r_children | 24.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share giving the restrictive answer: children brought illegally should be sent back | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 22.0% to 27.3% | 2,053 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | th_d_1988 | 39.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean feeling thermometer rating of illegal immigrants (illegal aliens in the cumulative file label) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 | 95% CI 37.9 to 41.5 | 776 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | th_d_2024 | 56.8 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean feeling thermometer rating of illegal immigrants (illegal aliens in the cumulative file label) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 2024 | 95% CI 55.4 to 58.2 | 2,303 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | th_gap_1988 | 7.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating of illegal immigrants among Democrats minus the mean among Republicans (warmth gap) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 | 95% CI 5.3 to 10.1 | 1,473 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | th_gap_2024 | 29.9 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating of illegal immigrants among Democrats minus the mean among Republicans (warmth gap) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 2024 | 95% CI 27.8 to 32.0 | 4,370 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | th_r_1988 | 32.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean feeling thermometer rating of illegal immigrants (illegal aliens in the cumulative file label) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 | 95% CI 30.4 to 33.6 | 697 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | th_r_2004 | 35.0 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean feeling thermometer rating of illegal immigrants (illegal aliens in the cumulative file label) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 2004 | 95% CI 32.6 to 37.4 | 435 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | th_r_2020 | 33.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean feeling thermometer rating of illegal immigrants (illegal aliens in the cumulative file label) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 2020 | 95% CI 32.5 to 34.9 | 2,914 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | th_r_2024 | 26.9 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean feeling thermometer rating of illegal immigrants (illegal aliens in the cumulative file label) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 2024 | 95% CI 25.3 to 28.4 | 2,067 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | thh_d_1988 | 59.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean feeling thermometer rating of Hispanics | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 | 95% CI 58.2 to 61.2 | 763 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | thh_d_2024 | 73.9 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean feeling thermometer rating of Hispanics | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 2024 | 95% CI 72.6 to 75.2 | 2,312 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | thh_gap_1988 | 5.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating of Hispanics among Democrats minus the mean among Republicans (warmth gap) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 | 95% CI 3.3 to 7.5 | 1,447 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | thh_gap_2024 | 7.3 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating of Hispanics among Democrats minus the mean among Republicans (warmth gap) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 2024 | 95% CI 5.4 to 9.2 | 4,362 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | thh_r_1988 | 54.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean feeling thermometer rating of Hispanics | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 1988 | 95% CI 52.9 to 55.8 | 684 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | thh_r_2024 | 66.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean feeling thermometer rating of Hispanics | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who rated the group | 2024 | 95% CI 65.2 to 67.9 | 2,050 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | z_gap_2012_ftf | 0.237 | standard deviations of the answer | Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score of the five-category answer (VCF0879), standardized within the mode | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) interviewed in person who answered the five-category ANES question on the number of immigrants | 2012 | 95% CI 0.102 to 0.372 | 1,632 | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | z_gap_2012_web | 0.372 | standard deviations of the answer | Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score of the five-category answer (VCF0879), standardized within the mode | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) interviewed on the web who answered the five-category ANES question on the number of immigrants | 2012 | 95% CI 0.280 to 0.464 | 3,032 | weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | z_lo_2012 | 0.248 | standard deviations of the answer | lower end of the 95% interval of the Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score of the five-category answer (VCF0879) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the five-category ANES question on the number of immigrants | 2012 | | 4,664 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | z_lo_2012_part | 0.2500 | standard deviations of the answer | lower end of the 95% interval of the Republican minus Democratic gap in the z-score of the five-category answer (VCF0879) standardized among party identifiers only | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the five-category ANES question on the number of immigrants | 2012 | | 4,664 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Feeling thermometer: A 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way. ## Methods Sample. ANES Cumulative Data File respondents who gave an increased, same or decreased answer to the question on the number of immigrants (VCF0879a; don't know is missing): 32,751 respondents in 11 studies from 1992 to 2024. GSS respondents who answered letin1a, the number of immigrants nowadays should be (asked in 11 surveys from 2004 to 2024, none in 2020): 21,070 respondents. CES respondents who answered at least one of nine immigration policy items between 2007 and 2021: 474,358. Nationscape respondents who answered at least one of four policy items in the weeks from July 2019 to 28 December 2020: 456,979. ANES 2024 Time Series respondents with a post-election weight: 4,964. Party and estimand. Democrats and Republicans include leaners (ANES and CES seven-point party identification 1 to 3 and 5 to 7; GSS partyid 0 to 2 and 4 to 6); independents are those who lean toward neither party (ANES and CES 4, GSS 3). Nationscape uses the three-category party question, so its Democrats and Republicans exclude leaners and its independents include them. Members of other parties are in the all-respondent line only. Every outcome is the restrictive answer (wanting fewer immigrants, favoring a restrictive policy, or saying immigrants have a bad effect), as the wording table lists. The party gap is the Republican share minus the Democratic share in percentage points, the sign used in the chapter Sort dates by attitude. The thermometer gap is signed the other way (Democrats minus Republicans in warmth). Coding. Coding is read from the stored value labels and never from a correlation with party: ANES VCF0879 1 increased a lot to 5 decreased a lot and VCF0879a 1 increased, 3 same, 5 decreased; GSS letin1a, letin1 and letin 1 increased a lot to 5 reduced a lot and immjobs, immcrime and immameco 1 agree strongly to 5 disagree strongly (checked against the file labels in the build). CES items are 1 for support; the restrictive answer is support except for legal status, where it is oppose. Nationscape items are agree (1) or disagree (2) with not sure missing; the restrictive answer is agree except for the two path to citizenship items, where it is disagree. Weights. ANES weight VCF0009z, with weight_ftf and weight_web for in-person and web respondents in 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024 (2008 was a single-mode in-person study; 2020 has no mode weights). GSS weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004); the GSS mode is joined from the raw file. CES weight, the single-wave weight. Nationscape weight. The cumulative file weight VCF0009z is the full-sample weight, and the questions on the number of immigrants and the thermometers are post-election items. The file also has a post-election weight (VCF9999, weight_postelection) for 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 among the studies with the question; the gap with that weight differs from the gap shown by at most 1.2 points (largest in 2020), and the text gives the 2020 and 2024 gaps with it. The file has no post-election mode weights, so the ANES in-person and web estimates use weight_ftf and weight_web. The 2024 Time Series items use the post-election weight V240107b, and the mode views use the post-election mode weights V240101b and V240102b of the fresh in-person and fresh web samples, which leave out the panel and paper respondents. The four items asked before the election (V241386, V241387, V241390, V241393) use the post-election weight like the others; with the pre-election weight V240107a their gaps differ by at most 0.3 points. In-person ANES view. The in-person series combines the studies of 1992 to 1998 and 2004 (in person by design; weight VCF0009z) with the in-person samples of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024 (mode ftf; weight_ftf). The 2000 study, which mixed in-person and telephone interviews with no interview-form variable in the file, and the telephone study of 2002 are left out, and 2020 had no in-person interviews. Intervals. 95% intervals use the Kish effective sample size with a normal approximation, treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the strata and clusters of the designs. A gap, a change between surveys and a mode difference combine the two standard errors in quadrature, treating the two estimates as independent. Adjacent ANES studies are treated as independent although the 2020 and 2024 studies re-interviewed some earlier respondents. The CES and Nationscape are opt-in panels, so their intervals rest on a model. In 2004 the GSS letin1 and letin1a forms went to different respondents; in 2014 and 2024 most respondents who answered letin1 also answered letin1a, so the two forms are compared by their point estimates in those years. Suppression. A Democratic or Republican cell in a yearly series needs at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100; an independent or all-respondent cell, and every cell in a mode, item, CES or 2024 split, needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. A gap needs both party cells to clear the floor. A Nationscape week needs at least 500 respondents on the item. Dating by reference. The date of the opening applies the rule of the chapter Sort dates by attitude to the five-category ANES answer (VCF0879, 1 increased a lot to 5 decreased a lot; 2000 is not coded to five answers): the Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score (weighted mean and standard deviation of all respondents with the item that year), a threshold of 0.25 standard deviations, the point-estimate date as the first study from which the estimate stays above it and the lower-bound date as the first study from which the lower end of the 95% interval stays above it. The z-score standardizes among all respondents with the item, as the code of that chapter does; standardizing among party identifiers only, the lower end of the 2012 interval is 0.2500, at the mark. The 2012 in-person and web gaps standardize within each mode. CES. Weights and cells use the single-wave weight. Items are check-all-that-apply through 2017 and support or oppose from 2018 according to the guide to the cumulative policy file, so the figure breaks between 2017 and 2019 and no level or gap is compared across the break. The per-year sign check recomputes the Republican minus Democratic gap in the restrictive direction for every item-year and finds it above zero in all of them, so the 2014 reversal of the ACA repeal item has no counterpart in these items. Nationscape. Weekly bins are the Monday of the field week. Weeks after 28 December 2020 are drawn as open points and left out of the pooled and half-year estimates: only four 2021 weeks have 500 respondents on the items, and in the weeks of 11 and 18 January 2021 the party shares are far from the 2019 and 2020 weeks; the week of 18 January moves toward an even split on three of the four items. Half-year estimates pool the weeks of July to December 2019 and of July to December 2020. ## What these data cannot show - Each survey interviews a new sample, so a change in a party's share can come from people changing their view, changing their party or being replaced by new adults, and these data cannot separate them. - Party identification is itself an answer, and people may change it because of their views on immigration or change their views because of their party. - Abrajano and Hajnal [3] argue for the first order, and these data can neither support nor reject it. - The party lines also combine people of every origin, so changes in who belongs to each party are not separated from changes in what they say. - Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) is planned to follow group differences in the vote. - Levels cannot be compared across surveys. - The ANES and the GSS differ by 18.8 (95% CI 14.2 to 23.4) points in the Republican share wanting fewer immigrants in 2024, and by 33.6 (95% CI 24.7 to 42.4) points among in-person respondents in each, and the chapter does not say which is closer to the truth. - The ANES question has five answers that the chapter collapses to decreased against the rest, the GSS question has five answers collapsed the same way, and the CES, Nationscape and 2024 ANES policy items measure different things on different scales. - The mode checks are limited to the years that have mode weights or a mode variable. - The 2020 ANES levels and the 2021 GSS, which was mostly web, cannot be split, and the cumulative file has no post-election mode weights, so the in-person and web ANES estimates use the full-sample mode weights. - The CES changes format and wording across years, so changes that cross 2018 are not read, and the Nationscape file has no leaner question for most weeks. - The chapter has no measure of behavior, of elite positions or of the size of the foreign-born population. - It does not ask whether the American gap is unusual. - The European Social Survey has immigration questions in many countries but no party vote in the file used for this book, and a comparison on left-right placement would need an American question that matches theirs. - Chapter 15.2, Immigration and local context (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration-and-local-context; planned) is planned to take up the local foreign-born share. - No result here shows that immigration attitudes changed party loyalty or that party loyalty changed attitudes. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Hainmueller, Jens; Hopkins, Daniel J. (2014). Public Attitudes Toward Immigration. Annual Review of Political Science 17: 225-249. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-polisci-102512-194818 3. Abrajano, Marisa; Hajnal, Zoltan L. (2015). White Backlash: Immigration, Race, and American Politics. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400866489 4. American National Election Studies (2022). ANES 2020 Time Series Study Full Release: User Guide and Codebook. Stanford University and the University of Michigan. https://electionstudies.org/data-center/2020-time-series-study/ 5. Dagonel, Angelo (2023). Guide to the Cumulative CES Policy Preferences. Harvard Dataverse, Cumulative CES Policy Preferences, version 3 (guide last updated 2023-01-18). https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OSXDQO 6. Tausanovitch, Chris; Vavreck, Lynn (2023). Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape Project (data version 20211215). Harvard Dataverse, version 1. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CQFP3Z ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/immigration/build.py (sha256 9cd550d4f71faa93ffba738c7915f90f98452566fcca4088ea80d10c1f3e8aee) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes2024_ts/anes_timeseries_2024_spss_20260519.sav | 12,757,094 | 3107c838755f88353d0e3e39b2c3d5f76a2888cf56a179e3acac84ab431335d2 | bb318a018a39b4cf87ccc91b50a5b7c5b41746d28c0226f4a6c176e8c74966d6 | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/nationscape/nationscape_clean.parquet | 43,528,088 | 6a7904b0ca979052a375585356a3e4fb85129f4902770bee653b54e95fc936e4 | 8dc1daf282a9fa90033abf3be0312eb5d1bf351a6a0b719c43204c904af86a44 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | b326bd417926a3687d53257acf8c726208d41b0a6ffcc664fb3470f99ca61b1a | | figures/anes2024_items.json | feee72560ed2dfa7942db30e692d2df9079f477f7479133a4113efe55125d7f9 | | figures/ces_items.json | c312155fa65d40f27d7d3c24e2c987f08f2766d8bede18e56aa57069ee7f6920 | | figures/gap_by_year.json | 94caff9dd9c507ec26d04a4ccf1240bb873242242682cb21736225eeb7a8a0c2 | | figures/gss_items.json | 456d58dbb97caffe19733ae92f451b68a8fe78134c690b50b40d0cb1cdaa9d87 | | figures/mode_check.json | bc6621248be16c210778f80d370d198f68d368b4deeef572cc75d86dda81c8aa | | figures/nationscape.json | 8e803d653f2cd72e851fbdc6e28791ab387d441dc6dc3d59c59f1276389e323d | | figures/share_by_party.json | 77b98d6fba71fa7868b51c347f844216999747cb7edcc0e8463ffefed4bccae3 | | figures/thermometers.json | 6a9956c304fe49dbdb3adf561986e5af3c06862d7af299a3429f639086443e70 | | figures/wording.json | a15b3d2b64c11e55b427946dfc2a8192d69d8c5827f8806f89a93323dc3b6d09 | | meta.json | 6e7e48b607261bf784f16674c5d8cee313958d443dd0ad1207f795394e1b889c | | refs.json | 96bea85e2f46fdd9ae61d0e74441065b2756880c8febb9a2eafc091990372914 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/facts.json - Table 1, figure "wording" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/wording.json - Table 2, figure "gap_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/gap_by_year.json - Table 3, figure "share_by_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/share_by_party.json - Table 4, figure "mode_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/mode_check.json - Table 5, figure "thermometers" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/thermometers.json - Table 6, figure "gss_items" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/gss_items.json - Table 7, figure "ces_items" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/ces_items.json - Table 8, figure "nationscape" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/nationscape.json - Table 9, figure "anes2024_items" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/immigration/figures/anes2024_items.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Guns: report Chapter 4.3 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/guns. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Guns - Chapter: 4.3 (Part IV, Issue by issue; The great sorting) - Question: How have gun ownership and gun-policy attitudes sorted by party? - Dek: In the General Social Survey, the share living in a household with a gun was 6.8 points higher among Republicans than Democrats in 1973 to 1980 and 27.7 points higher in 2016 to 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - General Social Survey. Raw file 1972-2024: gun in the home (owngun), personally owns (rowngun), police permit (gunlaw), census region, community type (xnorcsiz), race, strata and primary sampling units (vstrat and vpsu); interview mode from the raw file; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024, the question on buying a gun (VCF9238) in the six studies from 2000 to 2020; mode weights for 2012 and 2016; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode split - ANES 2024 Time Series. 2024 Time Series: buying a gun (V242325), background checks (V242326), assault-style rifles (V242329) and guns in the household (V241583); years: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews); weights: V240107b (post-election); V240107a for the household item; V240101b and V240102b for the mode views - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative CES policy items 2010-2021: sale laws (guns_scale, 2010 and 2012), background checks, assault rifles, concealed carry and owners' names (2013-2021); years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (single-wave weight) - Nationscape. Weekly waves July 2019 to December 2020: household gun and six gun policy items, party with the follow-up question on leaners; years: 2019-07-18 to 2021-04-15 (85 weekly waves); weights: weight - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/guns - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/guns/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/guns/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026guns ```bibtex @misc{singh2026guns, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Guns}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/guns}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 6.8 | 95% CI 4.0 to 9.7 | 6,274 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | go_gap_e | | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 27.7 | 95% CI 24.9 to 30.4 | 8,833 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | go_gap_l | | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 53.0% | 95% CI 50.8% to 55.2% | 3,622 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | go_r_l | | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 25.3% | 95% CI 23.7% to 26.9% | 5,211 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | go_d_l | | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 54.2% | 95% CI 51.9% to 56.5% | 2,220 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | go_r_e | | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 47.3% | 95% CI 45.6% to 49.1% | 4,054 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | go_d_e | | fall in the weighted share, early period minus late period (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 22.0 | 95% CI 19.7 to 24.4 | 9,265 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | go_fall_d | | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | −1.2 | 95% CI −4.4 to 2.0 | 5,842 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | go_chg_r | | rise in the weighted share, late period minus early period (two separate samples); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 7.8 | 95% CI 5.9 to 9.8 | 10,024 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | gm_rise_d | | fall in the weighted share, early period minus late period (two separate samples); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 17.5 | 95% CI 14.5 to 20.4 | 6,418 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | gm_fall_r | | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973 to 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 4.1 | 95% CI 1.8 to 6.5 | 7,473 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | gm_gap_e | | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 29.4 | 95% CI 26.9 to 32.0 | 8,969 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | gm_gap_l | | count of respondents with a yes or no answer to owngun | GSS respondents who answered the gun in the home question | 1973-2024 | 47,521 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_g_own | | count of survey years with the item | GSS survey years that asked the gun in the home question | 1973-2024 | 30 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_g_own_waves | | count of respondents with a favor or oppose answer to gunlaw | GSS respondents who answered the police permit question | 1972-2024 | 50,498 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_g_perm | | count of survey years with the item | GSS survey years that asked the police permit question | 1972-2024 | 32 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_g_perm_waves | | count of respondents with a usable answer to VCF9238 | ANES respondents who answered the question on buying a gun | 2000-2020 | 22,800 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_a_item | | count of study years with the item | ANES studies that asked the question on buying a gun | 2000-2020 | 6 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_a_waves | | count of respondents with an answer to at least one of the five gun items | CES respondents who answered at least one gun item | 2010-2021 | 443,846 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_ces_resp | | count of respondents in the weeks through 28 December 2020 with an answer to at least one of the seven gun items | Nationscape respondents who answered at least one gun item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 476,723 | | | none (count) | Nationscape | n_ns_resp | | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share, with a design-based interval (Taylor linearisation with the GSS strata and primary sampling units); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 6.8 | 95% CI 3.9 to 9.8 | 6,274 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | go_gap_e_design | | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share, with a design-based interval (Taylor linearisation with the GSS strata and primary sampling units); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 27.7 | 95% CI 25.0 to 30.3 | 8,833 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | go_gap_l_design | ## Findings In the General Social Survey (GSS), 53.0% of Republican identifiers and 25.3% of Democratic identifiers lived in a household with a gun in 2016 to 2024, a gap of 27.7 (95% CI 24.9 to 30.4) points. In 1973 to 1980 the shares were 54.2% and 47.3%, a gap of 6.8 (95% CI 4.0 to 9.7) points. Between the two periods the Democratic share fell by 22.0 (95% CI 19.7 to 24.4) points, while the Republican share changed by −1.2 (95% CI −4.4 to 2.0) points, an interval that includes zero. The GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun moved mostly on the Republican side. The Democratic share in favor rose by 7.8 (95% CI 5.9 to 9.8) points and the Republican share fell by 17.5 (95% CI 14.5 to 20.4) points, which took the gap from 4.1 (95% CI 1.8 to 6.5) to 29.4 (95% CI 26.9 to 32.0) points. Each question counts one answer: that a household has a gun, that the respondent owns one, or that the respondent favors a policy. A gap is the difference between the parties in the share giving that answer, in points, written so that a positive gap means the party that favors that side is higher. For stricter rules the gap is the Democratic share minus the Republican share, and for owning a gun, easing concealed carry and prohibiting the publication of owners' names it is the Republican share minus the Democratic share. Party includes leaners, independents are the respondents who lean toward neither party, and every interval is a 95% confidence interval. In person means interviewed in person, which covers every GSS respondent before 2004. Each survey words its questions in its own way (Table 1), so no line in this chapter joins two surveys. The American National Election Studies (ANES), the Cooperative Election Study (CES) and Nationscape ask about other policies, and each shows a party gap in the expected direction on every item it asks. (Note: Shares use the survey weights and cover respondents who answered the item: 47,521 in 30 GSS surveys for a gun in the home, 50,498 in 32 for the police permit, 22,800 in 6 ANES studies for the question on buying a gun, and 443,846 CES and 476,723 Nationscape respondents on at least one gun item. Intervals use the Kish effective sample size [1] and treat the weighted sample as if respondents had been drawn one by one. A design-based interval that uses the GSS strata and primary sampling units, which the survey records from 1975, is 6.8 (95% CI 3.9 to 9.8) for the 1973 to 1980 ownership gap and 27.7 (95% CI 25.0 to 30.3) for 2016 to 2024, against 6.8 (95% CI 4.0 to 9.7) and 27.7 (95% CI 24.9 to 30.4) here, so the simplification changes them little; the 1973 and 1974 respondents have no design variables. The CES and Nationscape are opt-in panels, so their intervals rest on a model and say nothing about who chose to join.) Schuman and Presser asked why national surveys showed strong support for gun registration while legislatures did not enact it. They found that question wording matters and that opponents hold their views more strongly than supporters, and that neither fully explains the difference [2]. Joslyn and coauthors used the GSS from 1972 to 2012 and report that owning a firearm is associated with voting for Republican presidential candidates across the election cycles they examine [3]. The GSS measures ownership from one respondent's report about the home, and Smith, Laken and Son find that husbands report a gun in the home more often than wives [4]. This chapter describes how ownership and policy answers line up with party, a case of party sorting in which an answer that once cut across the parties comes to follow them, and it does not test either account. Chapter 4.1, The abortion sort (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort) and Chapter 4.2, Immigration (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration) follow two other issues in the same way. Table 1. Each survey words its gun questions differently and counts a different answer ### Ownership fell among Democrats and independents and changed less among Republicans Table 2 plots the share with a gun in the home in each GSS survey year. Pooled over 1973 to 1980 the Democratic share was 47.3% and the independent share 48.5%. Pooled over 2016 to 2024 they were 25.3% and 27.4%, falls of 22.0 (95% CI 19.7 to 24.4) and 21.1 (95% CI 16.7 to 25.5) points. The Republican share was 54.2% and then 53.0%, and its change has an interval that includes zero and excludes a fall as large as either of the other two. The gap between Republicans and Democrats therefore grew by 20.8 (95% CI 16.8 to 24.8) points as Democrats and independents fell and Republicans changed less. Table 2. Household gun ownership fell among Democrats and independents and changed less among Republicans The pooled Republican comparison hides a dip and depends on how the data are cut. The Republican share was between 44.0% and 47.6% in the surveys of 1998 to 2006, and pooled over them it was 45.9%, a change of −8.2 (95% CI −11.4 to −5.1) points from 1973 to 1980. It was back near its early level from 2008 on. Among respondents interviewed in person in 2016 to 2024 the Republican change is −4.6 (95% CI −8.9 to −0.3) points and the gap is 24.7 (95% CI 20.4 to 29.1) points. Among those interviewed on the web the change is +1.6 (95% CI −2.2 to 5.5) points and the gap 29.6 (95% CI 25.7 to 33.4) points, a web minus in-person difference in the gap of 4.8 (95% CI −1.0 to 10.7) points that includes zero. Counting every refusal as a nonowner gives a Republican change of −3.7 (95% CI −6.9 to −0.6) points, and counting every refusal as an owner gives +1.1 (95% CI −2.1 to 4.2). The same two rules put the 2016 to 2024 gap between 25.1 and 29.5 points. The cuts disagree on whether the Republican change differs from zero, and all of them put it far below the Democratic fall. The Democratic fall came in steps. The share was 39.2% in 1996 and 29.1% in 2000, a fall of 10.1 (95% CI 5.0 to 15.2) points, and it was 21.3% in 2010. From 22.0% in 2016 to 27.4% in 2024 it changed by +5.4 (95% CI −0.2 to 10.9) points, an interval that includes zero. Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates a party gap by the survey year in which it passes 0.25 standard deviations (SD) of the answers and stays above that mark. Applied to a gun in the home, the point estimate passes the mark in 1998 and the lower end of the interval in 2008, and the upper end of the interval has stayed above it since 1993, so the data allow dates from 1993 to 2008. This chapter standardizes over the Democratic and Republican identifiers in each survey, and that chapter standardizes over all respondents with the item. The dates are the same either way. The personal ownership question gives a different Republican result. It is a follow-up that asks respondents who report a gun in the home whether any gun belongs to them, and it starts in 1980. In 1980 the share personally owning a gun was 29.6% among Democrats and 31.5% among Republicans, and in 2016 to 2024 it was 15.8% and 38.6%. The Democratic share fell by 13.8 (95% CI 9.5 to 18.1) points and the Republican share changed by +7.1 (95% CI 1.5 to 12.8) points, so the gap grew from 1.8 (95% CI −4.8 to 8.4) to 22.8 (95% CI 20.2 to 25.3) points. The Republican change depends on mode. It is +3.5 (95% CI −2.7 to 9.8) points among respondents interviewed in person, an interval that includes zero, and +9.7 (95% CI 3.7 to 15.8) points among those interviewed on the web. The in-person Republican share runs from 33.1% to 38.3% across the 2016 to 2024 surveys and the web share from 40.0% to 42.7%, so the Republican rise in personal ownership coincides with the web surveys and is not an established change. Republican respondents refuse the household question more often than Democrats. In 2016 to 2024 5.4% of Republican respondents refused or skipped it against 1.0% of Democrats, and in 1973 to 1980 the shares were 0.5% and 0.6%. The estimates above drop these respondents. Smith, Laken and Son estimate that most respondents who refused the question in the surveys of 1973 to 2012 were gun owners [4]. That estimate does not cover 2016 to 2024, but if it carries over, the dropped-refusal gap is more likely to be too low than too high, and the range from 25.1 to 29.5 points does not change the pattern. ### Support for a police permit fell among Republicans The GSS has asked whether respondents favor a law requiring a police permit before buying a gun in 32 surveys since 1972. In 1973 to 1980 75.1% of Democrats and 71.0% of Republicans were in favor, a gap of 4.1 (95% CI 1.8 to 6.5) points. In 2016 to 2024 the shares were 82.9% and 53.5% (Table 3). The Republican share fell by 17.5 (95% CI 14.5 to 20.4) points, the Democratic share rose by 7.8 (95% CI 5.9 to 9.8) points, and the independent share changed by −5.9 (95% CI −9.8 to −2.0) points. Among respondents interviewed in person the Republican fall is 12.6 (95% CI 8.7 to 16.6) points and the Democratic rise 6.7 (95% CI 4.1 to 9.2) points, so the gap is 23.4 (95% CI 19.3 to 27.5) points in person against 34.5 (95% CI 30.9 to 38.1) on the web, a web minus in-person difference of 11.1 (95% CI 5.6 to 16.5) points. That comparison mixes mode and survey year. The interval for the Republican share in 2016 to 2024 lies above an even split, so most Republican identifiers still favor a permit in these data, and so do 68.7% of all respondents, against 73.6% in 1973 to 1980. Majority support for a gun measure in surveys is the setting of the study by Schuman and Presser [2], who asked how strongly respondents hold their views. The GSS has no measure of strength. Table 3. Support for a police permit to buy a gun rose among Democrats and fell among Republicans Table 4 puts the ownership gap, the permit gap and the ANES gap on one axis. By the dating rule of Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude), the gap in opposing a permit passes 0.25 SD by its point estimate in 2000 and by its lower bound in 2014, against 1998 and 2008 for ownership. The point-estimate dates fall in adjacent surveys, and the upper end of the interval stays above the mark from 1993 for the permit item as it does for ownership. The difference between the two z-scored gaps, ownership minus permit, has an interval that excludes zero in 1987, 2021 and 2022 and in no survey from 1993 to 2018, so the data do not order the two openings. The ANES asks whether the government should make buying a gun more difficult, easier, or leave the rules as they are, in six studies from 2000 to 2020. The Democratic share saying more difficult was 68.9% in 2000 and 75.3% in 2020, a change of +6.4 (95% CI 2.5 to 10.4) points. The Republican share was 44.5% and 22.4%, a fall of 22.2 (95% CI 17.6 to 26.7) points, and the gap grew from 24.4 (95% CI 19.0 to 29.7) to 53.0 (95% CI 50.2 to 55.8) points. The ANES gap is already above the mark in its first study, where the lower end of the 2000 interval is 0.38 SD, so the ANES cannot say when the gap opened. The cumulative file does not have the item for 2024, and the 2024 Time Series, a separate file, asks it with the same three answers. In it 82.2% of Democrats and 31.5% of Republicans favor making buying a gun more difficult, a gap of 50.7 (95% CI 47.0 to 54.3) points. From 2020 to 2024 the Democratic share changed by +6.9 (95% CI 3.9 to 9.9) points, the Republican share by +9.1 (95% CI 5.7 to 12.6) points and the gap by −2.3 (95% CI −6.9 to 2.3) points, an interval that includes zero. The 2020 study had no in-person interviews and the 2024 study mixes modes, so that change mixes mode and time. Table 4. The party gaps on gun ownership and gun permits were at most 13.2 points through 1996 and at least 17.4 points from 2008 ### The permit gap holds among owners and nonowners A party difference in support for a permit could be a difference in who owns guns. Among respondents who answered both questions, the gap in favoring a permit in 2016 to 2024 was 28.1 (95% CI 23.8 to 32.4) points among respondents with a gun in the home and 22.1 (95% CI 18.5 to 25.6) points among those without one, so it is larger among owners than among nonowners by 6.0 (95% CI 0.5 to 11.6) points. In 1973 to 1980 the two gaps were 0.9 (95% CI −3.1 to 4.9) and 3.2 (95% CI 0.2 to 6.3) points. Within each party, owners are less likely than nonowners to favor a permit. Among Democrats the shares are 75.3% and 85.8%, a difference of −10.6 (95% CI −14.0 to −7.2) points, and among Republicans 47.2% and 63.8%, a difference of −16.6 (95% CI −21.0 to −12.2) points. A Democratic owner is more likely to favor a permit than a Republican nonowner, by 11.5 (95% CI 7.1 to 15.9) points, which is the amount by which the party gap among nonowners exceeds the owner difference among Democrats. Against the owner difference among Republicans the nonowner gap is larger by 5.5 (95% CI −1.8 to 12.8) points, an interval that includes zero. ### The ownership gap appears within regions and kinds of community Ownership differs by place, so the party gap could be a place gap. Table 5 compares the parties within four census regions and four community types. In 2016 to 2024 the Republican share is higher in every row, by between 14.0 and 29.3 points. The gap is smallest in point terms in rural areas (14.0 (95% CI 4.5 to 23.5)), where Democrats are most likely to have a gun (57.1%). The rural cells are small. The Democratic cell has 267 respondents, 4.4% of Democratic respondents in 2016 to 2024. In 1973 to 1980 the gap ran from −1.5 to 16.8 points and its interval included zero in 4 of 8 rows. It was largest in the Northeast (16.8 (95% CI 11.0 to 22.5)), where Democrats were least likely to have a gun (22.7%), and near zero in rural areas (2.1 (95% CI −3.2 to 7.5)) and in the West and in small cities and towns. Table 5. Republicans were more likely than Democrats to live in a household with a gun in every region and kind of community Place relates to ownership within each party. In 2016 to 2024 57.1% of Democrats in rural areas had a gun in the home against 18.9% in central cities, a difference of 38.2 (95% CI 30.4 to 46.0) points, and among Republicans the shares were 71.1% and 39.6%, a difference of 31.5 (95% CI 23.7 to 39.3) points. Democrats in rural areas were more likely to have a gun than Republicans in central cities by 17.5 (95% CI 8.5 to 26.6) points, and the difference was 31.9 (95% CI 25.9 to 38.0) points in 1973 to 1980. The place mix of the Democratic Party also changed. The share of Democratic respondents living in suburbs rose from 36.9% to 57.1%, and the share in rural areas fell from 16.5% to 4.4%. Because rural respondents are most likely to have a gun, part of the Democratic fall could be a change in where Democrats live. Net of region and community type, in a linear probability model with the region by community interaction and HC3 errors, the Democratic change is −18.7 (95% CI −21.0 to −16.3) points against −22.0 (95% CI −24.4 to −19.7) without them, and the Republican change is −1.2 (95% CI −4.4 to 2.1) points. The gap in 2016 to 2024 net of place is 23.6 (95% CI 20.9 to 26.4) points against 27.7 (95% CI 24.9 to 30.4) raw, and in 1973 to 1980 it is 4.5 (95% CI 1.8 to 7.3) against 6.8 (95% CI 4.0 to 9.7). Adjusting for place lowers each gap by a few points and leaves most of both. The same model puts the 2016 to 2024 permit gap at 28.0 (95% CI 25.3 to 30.7) points against 29.4 (95% CI 26.9 to 32.0) raw. The racial mix of the Democratic Party also changed, from 84.2% White among Democratic respondents in 1973 to 1980 to 64.7% in 2016 to 2024. Among White respondents alone, the Democratic share with a gun in the home fell from 49.4% to 28.1%, a change of −21.3 (95% CI −24.1 to −18.6) points, and the Republican share changed by +1.7 (95% CI −1.6 to 5.0) points, so the Democratic fall holds among White respondents. Chapter 15.1, Party and place (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place) compares party gaps on the CES gun item with gaps between counties of different partisan lean. ### The size of the gap depends on the policy item Table 6 plots five CES items. Background checks draw support from both parties, 95.9% of Democrats and 81.5% of Republicans in 2021, a gap of 14.3 (95% CI 13.2 to 15.5) points that is smaller than the gap of 17.2 (95% CI 15.5 to 18.9) points in 2013. The gap on banning assault rifles grew from 42.1 (95% CI 39.9 to 44.3) points in 2013 to 55.8 (95% CI 54.3 to 57.3) in 2021, and the Republican share in support fell by 10.5 (95% CI 8.3 to 12.7) points while the Democratic share changed by +3.2 (95% CI 1.7 to 4.7) points. The items that favor the gun side moved on the Democratic side. On easier concealed-carry permits the gap grew from 36.4 (95% CI 34.1 to 38.7) to 44.1 (95% CI 42.6 to 45.7) points, with a Democratic change of −6.2 (95% CI −7.8 to −4.5) points and a Republican change of +1.6 (95% CI −0.7 to 3.8) points. On prohibiting the publication of owners' names the gap grew from 22.6 (95% CI 20.2 to 24.9) points in 2013 to 30.8 (95% CI 29.6 to 31.9) in 2020, with a Democratic change of −9.4 (95% CI −11.3 to −7.6) points and a Republican change of −1.2 (95% CI −3.1 to 0.6) points. Table 6. In the CES the party gap grew on assault rifles, concealed carry and owners' names and did not grow on background checks The cumulative CES file reverses the coding of one health care item in 2014. A check of every gun item in every year found no reversal. The party expected to favor each item is higher in all 34 item-years, with an interval above zero. The wording and coding follow the guide to the cumulative file [5]. The CES stems change in 2016, 2019 and 2021, and the file has no gun item in 2022 to 2024. Nationscape interviewed adults every week from July 2019 [6], and Table 7 pools the weeks through December 2020. In Nationscape 29.5% of Democrats and 51.5% of Republicans lived in a household with a gun, a gap of 22.0 (95% CI 21.5 to 22.5) points. That is smaller than the 2016 to 2024 GSS gap and about equal to the ANES 2024 gap of 23.6 (95% CI 19.6 to 27.7) points, where the shares were 28.6% and 52.2%. Background checks drew 95.0% of Democrats and 89.2% of Republicans, a gap of 5.8 (95% CI 5.5 to 6.1) points. The gaps were 34.6 (95% CI 34.1 to 35.1) on banning assault rifles, 35.5 (95% CI 34.4 to 36.6) on putting control over ownership above the right to own, and 21.0 (95% CI 20.6 to 21.5) on banning all guns, which 32.8% of Democrats and 11.8% of Republicans favored. Between July to December 2019 and July to December 2020 no gap changed by more than 2.2 points. Levels differ across surveys with the answers offered. The Republican share favoring background checks is 81.5% in the 2021 CES, 80.4% in the 2024 ANES, where neither favor nor oppose is an answer, and 89.2% in Nationscape. Table 7. In Nationscape the parties differed on every gun item and differed least on background checks ### The gaps are above zero within each interview mode The GSS moved from in-person interviews to the web. Of the 2021 respondents who answered the household question, 87% were interviewed on the web, and the 2022 and 2024 surveys used both modes. The ANES added a web sample in 2012, and the 2020 study had no in-person interviews and no separate weights by mode [7]. Table 8 splits the gaps by interview mode. Every gap is above zero in every mode, and web and in-person gaps differ by more than sampling error in one of 7 comparisons, the 2024 GSS permit gap, which is 34.2 (95% CI 26.2 to 42.3) points on the web and 18.4 (95% CI 7.6 to 29.1) in person, a difference of 15.9 (95% CI 2.4 to 29.3) points. Table 8. Every party gap is above zero within each interview mode, and web and in-person gaps differ by more than sampling error only on the 2024 GSS permit item The in-person GSS ownership gap was 27.3 (95% CI 19.9 to 34.6) points in 2018 and 25.9 (95% CI 14.4 to 37.3) in 2024, and the web gap was 28.7 (95% CI 24.2 to 33.3) in 2021 and 34.1 (95% CI 25.2 to 43.1) in 2024, so the ownership gap is present in each mode. Pooled over 2016 to 2024 the in-person ownership gap is 24.7 (95% CI 20.4 to 29.1) points, and the in-person Republican change from 1973 to 1980 is −4.6 (95% CI −8.9 to −0.3) points. The latest movement in the permit gap depends on mode more clearly. Pooled over 2016 to 2024 the permit gap is 23.4 (95% CI 19.3 to 27.5) points in person and 34.5 (95% CI 30.9 to 38.1) on the web. The mostly web survey of 2021 gives a permit gap of 35.4 (95% CI 31.1 to 39.7) points against 22.8 (95% CI 16.0 to 29.7) among in-person respondents in 2018, a difference of 12.6 (95% CI 4.5 to 20.7) points that mixes mode and time. In person, neither the 2022 nor the 2024 permit gap differs from the 2018 gap by more than sampling error, so the rise from 2018 to 2021 is not matched by an in-person rise. The ANES gap on buying a gun was 45.4 (95% CI 38.7 to 52.1) points in person and 42.2 (95% CI 38.0 to 46.3) on the web in 2016. It rose by 9.9 (95% CI 5.4 to 14.4) points from 2016 to 2020, the year of the mode change, and the 2020 study has no weights by mode, so the ANES cannot separate that rise from the change of mode. ### Democrats changed more on owning guns and Republicans on regulating sales Each survey shows its change mostly on one side of the issue (Table 9). On the household gun item the Democratic share changed by −22.0 (95% CI −24.4 to −19.7) points and the Republican share by −1.2 (95% CI −4.4 to 2.0). On concealed carry the Democratic share changed by −6.2 (95% CI −7.8 to −4.5) points against +1.6 (95% CI −0.7 to 3.8) for Republicans, and on owners' names by −9.4 (95% CI −11.3 to −7.6) against −1.2 (95% CI −3.1 to 0.6). The Democratic change is larger in size than the Republican change on these items, by 20.8 (95% CI 16.8 to 24.8), 4.6 (95% CI 1.8 to 7.4) and 8.2 (95% CI 5.6 to 10.8) points. On the items about regulating sales the larger change is Republican. The GSS permit share changed by −17.5 (95% CI −20.4 to −14.5) points among Republicans against +7.8 (95% CI 5.9 to 9.8) among Democrats, the ANES share saying buying a gun should be more difficult by −22.2 (95% CI −26.7 to −17.6) against +6.4 (95% CI 2.5 to 10.4), and the CES assault rifle share by −10.5 (95% CI −12.7 to −8.3) against +3.2 (95% CI 1.7 to 4.7). The Republican change is larger in size by 9.6 (95% CI 6.1 to 13.1), 15.7 (95% CI 9.7 to 21.8) and 7.2 (95% CI 4.6 to 9.9) points. Independents moved with the party that moved. Their household ownership share fell by 21.1 (95% CI 16.7 to 25.5) points, like Democrats, and their ANES share saying buying a gun should be more difficult changed by −15.5 (95% CI −24.1 to −6.8) points, closer to the Republican change. Table 9. Democrats changed more on owning and carrying guns and Republicans changed more on regulating sales, except for personal ownership and background checks Personal ownership and background checks do not follow the pattern. Personal ownership changed by −13.8 (95% CI −18.1 to −9.5) points among Democrats and +7.1 (95% CI 1.5 to 12.8) among Republicans, and the sizes of the two changes differ by 6.7 (95% CI −0.4 to 13.8) points, an interval that includes zero. The CES background check share rose by +3.8 (95% CI 1.9 to 5.7) points among Republicans and +1.0 (95% CI 0.1 to 1.8) among Democrats, so the Republican change runs the opposite way to the Republican falls on the other items about regulating sales. ### What these data cannot show Each survey draws a new sample, so a change in a party's share can come from people changing their view, changing their party or being replaced by new adults, and these data cannot separate the three. A Democratic fall in gun ownership could be Democrats who gave up a gun, gun owners who left the party, or younger Democrats who never owned one. The ownership results are not evidence that ownership changed party loyalty or that party loyalty changed ownership, which Joslyn and coauthors study with vote choice [3]. The chapter has no birth cohort breakdown and does not date when any individual changed. The ownership measures are reports. One respondent answers for the home, so the household share depends on who answers, and Smith, Laken and Son show that husbands and wives report differently [4]. Refusals are about 5.4% of Republican respondents in 2016 to 2024, and the bounds treat them as all owners or none, which leaves the Republican change in household ownership uncertain. The items count guns in the home or owned, not how many guns, what kind, whether they are carried or how they are stored. The policy items each name one proposal, so the chapter says nothing about other debates such as laws on carrying a gun without a permit or on removing guns from people judged to be dangerous, and it has no measure of how strongly respondents hold a view, which was the question in the study by Schuman and Presser [2]. Wording limits every comparison across surveys. The CES items are for or against a proposal in a list, the ANES 2024 items offer a middle answer, and the Nationscape items offer not sure, so the levels differ by survey even where the gaps agree. The ANES 2024 buying a gun point comes from the separate Time Series file, and the GSS and ANES samples after 2020 mix or change interview mode, which affects the latest permit result, the Republican personal ownership rise and the 2020 ANES step. The GSS intervals treat respondents as drawn one by one; the design-based check above changes the pooled gaps little. The CES and Nationscape are opt-in panels, and the gun items in the CES end in 2021. Place is the respondent's own community type and census region, which are not the county and say nothing about rural counties as a whole. The chapter has no result on firearm deaths, which Chapter 13.2, Firearm deaths and the vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/firearm-deaths-and-the-vote; planned) is planned to take up. ## Tables ### Table 1. Each survey words its gun questions differently and counts a different answer Question wording or file label, answers offered, years used, the answer counted and the direction of the gap, by survey and item | Survey | Item | Question wording or file label | Answers | Years used | Answer counted | Gap | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | GSS | Gun in the home (owngun) | Do you happen to have in your home (if house: or garage) any guns or revolvers? | Yes, no (refused is missing) | 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1987 to 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022, 2024 | Yes | Republican minus Democratic | | GSS | Gun owned by the respondent (rowngun) | Do any of these guns personally belong to you? Asked of respondents who report a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning | Yes, no (refused is missing) | 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1987 to 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022, 2024 | Yes | Republican minus Democratic | | GSS | Police permit (gunlaw) | Would you favor or oppose a law which would require a person to obtain a police permit before he or she could buy a gun? | Favor, oppose | 1972 to 1977, 1980, 1982, 1984, 1985, 1987 to 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022, 2024 | Favor | Democratic minus Republican | | ANES cumulative file | Buying a gun (VCF9238) | Should the government make it more difficult or easier to buy a gun, or should the rules stay the same as they are now? (file label) | More difficult, keep the rules about the same, make it easier | 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 | More difficult | Democratic minus Republican | | ANES 2024 | Buying a gun (V242325) | Should federal government make it more difficult or easier to buy a gun (file label; the cumulative file lacks this item for 2024) | More difficult, easier, keep these rules about the same | 2024 | More difficult | Democratic minus Republican | | ANES 2024 | Background checks (V242326) | Favor or oppose background checks for gun purchases (file label) | Favor, oppose, neither favor nor oppose | 2024 | Favor | Democratic minus Republican | | ANES 2024 | Assault-style rifles (V242329) | Favor or oppose banning 'assault-style' rifles (file label) | Favor, oppose, neither favor nor oppose | 2024 | Favor | Democratic minus Republican | | ANES 2024 | Guns in the household (V241583) | How many guns in household (file label; asked before the election) | A number of guns, 0 for none | 2024 | One or more | Republican minus Democratic | | CES | Firearm sale laws (guns_scale) | In general, do you feel that the laws covering the sale of firearms should be made more strict, less strict, or kept as they are? | More strict, less strict, kept as they are | 2010, 2012 | More strict | Democratic minus Republican | | CES | Background checks (guns_bgchecks) | On the issue of gun regulation, are you for or against each of the following proposals? Background checks for all sales, including at gun shows and over the Internet (2016: support or oppose; 2019: the item alone; 2021: Require criminal background checks on all gun sales) | For or support, against or oppose | 2013 to 2019, 2021 | Support | Democratic minus Republican | | CES | Assault rifles (guns_assaultban) | Ban assault rifles (same stem as the background checks item) | For or support, against or oppose | 2013 to 2021 | Support | Democratic minus Republican | | CES | Concealed carry (guns_permits) | Make it easier for people to obtain concealed-carry permit (2014: concealed weapons permits) | For or support, against or oppose | 2013 to 2021 | Support | Republican minus Democratic | | CES | Owners' names (guns_names) | Prohibit state and local governments from publishing the names and addresses of all gun owners | For or support, against or oppose | 2013 to 2017, 2020 | Support | Republican minus Democratic | | Nationscape | Household gun (gun_household) | Respondent or household member owns a gun (file description) | Yes, no | 77 weekly waves, Jul 2019 to Dec 2020 | Yes | Republican minus Democratic | | Nationscape | Background checks | Require background checks for all gun purchases (file description) | Agree, disagree, not sure | 77 weekly waves, Jul 2019 to Dec 2020 | Agree | Democratic minus Republican | | Nationscape | Registry | Create a public government registry of gun ownership (file description) | Agree, disagree, not sure | 77 weekly waves, Jul 2019 to Dec 2020 | Agree | Democratic minus Republican | | Nationscape | Assault rifles | Ban assault rifles (file description) | Agree, disagree, not sure | 77 weekly waves, Jul 2019 to Dec 2020 | Agree | Democratic minus Republican | | Nationscape | Magazines | Limit gun magazines to 10 bullets (file description) | Agree, disagree, not sure | 77 weekly waves, Jul 2019 to Dec 2020 | Agree | Democratic minus Republican | | Nationscape | Ban all guns | Ban all guns (file description) | Agree, disagree, not sure | 77 weekly waves, Jul 2019 to Dec 2020 | Agree | Democratic minus Republican | | Nationscape | Control over rights | It is more important for government to control who owns guns than to protect the right to own guns (file description) | Four answers from strongly agree to strongly disagree | 65 weekly waves, Sep 2019 to Dec 2020 | Agree or agree strongly | Democratic minus Republican | Note: A gap is written so that it is positive when the party that favors that side is higher: Democratic minus Republican for the gun control answers and Republican minus Democratic for owning a gun, easing concealed carry and prohibiting publication of owners' names. Note: CES wording is quoted from the guide to the Cumulative CES Policy Preferences file; the file's own item labels are shorter. ANES and Nationscape rows give the file label or description because the full question text was not checked. The cumulative-file label for the buying-a-gun item says the government and the 2024 label says the federal government; the chapter does not claim the questions differ, and the answers are the same three in a different code order. Note: The CES gun items are for or against each proposal in a list, so a middle answer is not offered; the ANES 2024 background check and assault rifle items offer neither favor nor oppose, which counts as not favoring. Source: General Social Survey, ANES Cumulative Data File and 2024 Time Series, CES cumulative policy preferences guide and Nationscape codebook; question wording only, no weights apply Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/wording.json ### Table 2. Household gun ownership fell among Democrats and independents and changed less among Republicans Share of respondents with a gun in the home, by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; General Social Survey, 1973 to 2024; 95% intervals | Measure | Group | Year | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1973 | 43.8 | 40.0 | 47.5 | 797 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1974 | 44.0 | 40.3 | 47.8 | 817 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1976 | 47.8 | 44.0 | 51.6 | 823 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1977 | 51.8 | 48.0 | 55.5 | 868 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1980 | 49.1 | 44.7 | 53.5 | 749 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1982 | 48.2 | 44.2 | 52.1 | 1,098 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1984 | 42.1 | 37.7 | 46.5 | 748 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1985 | 45.9 | 41.4 | 50.5 | 747 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1987 | 44.0 | 40.2 | 47.9 | 1,020 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1988 | 39.0 | 34.1 | 43.9 | 481 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1989 | 42.4 | 37.4 | 47.5 | 478 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1990 | 40.3 | 34.8 | 45.9 | 385 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1991 | 43.6 | 38.2 | 49.0 | 425 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1993 | 41.0 | 36.2 | 45.9 | 503 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1994 | 39.1 | 35.6 | 42.7 | 937 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1996 | 39.2 | 35.6 | 42.9 | 874 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 1998 | 32.1 | 28.6 | 35.7 | 879 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2000 | 29.1 | 25.5 | 32.7 | 819 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2002 | 32.3 | 27.0 | 37.7 | 408 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2004 | 30.3 | 25.0 | 35.6 | 394 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2006 | 29.0 | 25.2 | 32.8 | 845 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2008 | 27.7 | 23.4 | 31.9 | 634 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2010 | 21.3 | 17.1 | 25.5 | 571 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2012 | 25.9 | 21.6 | 30.2 | 597 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2014 | 25.5 | 21.8 | 29.1 | 781 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2016 | 22.0 | 18.5 | 25.4 | 894 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2018 | 23.8 | 19.8 | 27.8 | 705 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2021 | 25.4 | 22.9 | 27.9 | 1,819 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2022 | 27.7 | 23.4 | 32.1 | 963 | | Household has a gun | Democrats | 2024 | 27.4 | 23.0 | 31.7 | 830 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1973 | 56.5 | 47.3 | 65.7 | 138 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1974 | 47.4 | 38.3 | 56.5 | 144 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1976 | 46.1 | 39.0 | 53.3 | 235 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1977 | 48.9 | 40.7 | 57.1 | 174 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1980 | 46.6 | 38.7 | 54.5 | 246 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1982 | 49.7 | 41.5 | 57.9 | 219 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1984 | 37.2 | 28.6 | 45.7 | 160 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1987 | 42.5 | 34.3 | 50.6 | 197 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1989 | 44.9 | 35.3 | 54.5 | 124 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1994 | 37.8 | 30.9 | 44.7 | 246 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1996 | 40.9 | 34.7 | 47.0 | 305 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 1998 | 30.1 | 24.3 | 36.0 | 311 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2000 | 28.4 | 23.2 | 33.7 | 361 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2002 | 28.8 | 20.5 | 37.2 | 166 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2004 | 31.9 | 23.2 | 40.6 | 145 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2006 | 29.2 | 23.9 | 34.5 | 413 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2008 | 27.6 | 20.7 | 34.5 | 221 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2010 | 31.7 | 24.1 | 39.3 | 225 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2012 | 26.7 | 19.7 | 33.6 | 252 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2014 | 22.9 | 17.5 | 28.3 | 316 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2016 | 31.8 | 25.2 | 38.4 | 304 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2018 | 31.3 | 24.2 | 38.5 | 267 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2021 | 25.4 | 21.6 | 29.1 | 785 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2022 | 23.5 | 17.7 | 29.3 | 535 | | Household has a gun | Independents | 2024 | 29.9 | 24.4 | 35.4 | 544 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1973 | 54.7 | 49.9 | 59.6 | 473 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1974 | 52.3 | 47.1 | 57.4 | 428 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1976 | 54.0 | 48.7 | 59.3 | 410 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1977 | 55.6 | 50.6 | 60.6 | 461 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1980 | 54.1 | 48.5 | 59.6 | 448 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1982 | 53.5 | 48.0 | 59.0 | 495 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1984 | 55.3 | 49.9 | 60.8 | 522 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1985 | 47.4 | 42.5 | 52.3 | 607 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1987 | 51.7 | 46.9 | 56.5 | 563 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1988 | 51.2 | 45.5 | 56.9 | 358 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1989 | 52.5 | 47.2 | 57.9 | 417 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1990 | 49.3 | 43.8 | 54.8 | 409 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1991 | 45.8 | 40.5 | 51.0 | 416 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1993 | 52.5 | 47.0 | 58.0 | 418 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1994 | 51.5 | 47.5 | 55.6 | 733 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1996 | 49.6 | 45.6 | 53.7 | 703 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 1998 | 46.5 | 42.1 | 50.8 | 630 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2000 | 47.1 | 42.8 | 51.5 | 609 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2002 | 47.6 | 41.2 | 53.9 | 319 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2004 | 45.0 | 38.9 | 51.1 | 326 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2006 | 44.0 | 39.5 | 48.5 | 666 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2008 | 50.4 | 45.0 | 55.9 | 441 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2010 | 48.8 | 42.7 | 54.8 | 398 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2012 | 53.6 | 47.2 | 59.9 | 385 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2014 | 52.1 | 47.1 | 57.1 | 502 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2016 | 45.8 | 40.9 | 50.7 | 576 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2018 | 52.1 | 46.4 | 57.8 | 490 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2021 | 54.6 | 51.2 | 58.1 | 1,177 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2022 | 51.7 | 45.3 | 58.1 | 667 | | Household has a gun | Republicans | 2024 | 58.1 | 53.1 | 63.1 | 712 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1973 | 43.8 | 40.0 | 47.5 | 797 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1974 | 44.0 | 40.3 | 47.8 | 817 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1976 | 47.8 | 44.0 | 51.6 | 823 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1977 | 51.8 | 48.0 | 55.5 | 868 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1980 | 49.1 | 44.7 | 53.5 | 749 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1982 | 48.2 | 44.2 | 52.1 | 1,098 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1984 | 42.1 | 37.7 | 46.5 | 748 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1985 | 45.9 | 41.4 | 50.5 | 747 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1987 | 44.0 | 40.2 | 47.9 | 1,020 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1988 | 39.0 | 34.1 | 43.9 | 481 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1989 | 42.4 | 37.4 | 47.5 | 478 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1990 | 40.3 | 34.8 | 45.9 | 385 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1991 | 43.6 | 38.2 | 49.0 | 425 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1993 | 41.0 | 36.2 | 45.9 | 503 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1994 | 39.1 | 35.6 | 42.7 | 937 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1996 | 39.2 | 35.6 | 42.9 | 874 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1998 | 32.1 | 28.6 | 35.7 | 879 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2000 | 29.1 | 25.5 | 32.7 | 819 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2002 | 32.3 | 27.0 | 37.7 | 408 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2004 | 28.8 | 22.7 | 34.9 | 297 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2006 | 29.2 | 25.4 | 33.0 | 793 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2008 | 29.2 | 24.5 | 33.8 | 556 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2010 | 21.3 | 16.9 | 25.8 | 511 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2012 | 25.7 | 21.0 | 30.3 | 522 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2014 | 25.8 | 21.9 | 29.8 | 678 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2016 | 22.4 | 18.8 | 26.0 | 828 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2018 | 24.7 | 20.4 | 29.0 | 633 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2022 | 28.8 | 22.4 | 35.3 | 432 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2024 | 25.4 | 18.3 | 32.5 | 284 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1973 | 56.5 | 47.3 | 65.7 | 138 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1974 | 47.4 | 38.3 | 56.5 | 144 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1976 | 46.1 | 39.0 | 53.3 | 235 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1977 | 48.9 | 40.7 | 57.1 | 174 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1980 | 46.6 | 38.7 | 54.5 | 246 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1982 | 49.7 | 41.5 | 57.9 | 219 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1984 | 37.2 | 28.6 | 45.7 | 160 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1987 | 42.5 | 34.3 | 50.6 | 197 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1989 | 44.9 | 35.3 | 54.5 | 124 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1994 | 37.8 | 30.9 | 44.7 | 246 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1996 | 40.9 | 34.7 | 47.0 | 305 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 1998 | 30.1 | 24.3 | 36.0 | 311 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 2000 | 28.4 | 23.2 | 33.7 | 361 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 2002 | 28.8 | 20.5 | 37.2 | 166 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 2006 | 27.9 | 22.4 | 33.3 | 389 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 2008 | 27.3 | 19.9 | 34.7 | 190 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 2010 | 31.8 | 23.7 | 39.9 | 203 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 2012 | 26.7 | 19.2 | 34.2 | 221 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 2014 | 22.9 | 17.0 | 28.8 | 264 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 2016 | 31.3 | 24.5 | 38.1 | 290 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Independents | 2018 | 30.9 | 23.1 | 38.7 | 229 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1973 | 54.7 | 49.9 | 59.6 | 473 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1974 | 52.3 | 47.1 | 57.4 | 428 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1976 | 54.0 | 48.7 | 59.3 | 410 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1977 | 55.6 | 50.6 | 60.6 | 461 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1980 | 54.1 | 48.5 | 59.6 | 448 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1982 | 53.5 | 48.0 | 59.0 | 495 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1984 | 55.3 | 49.9 | 60.8 | 522 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1985 | 47.4 | 42.5 | 52.3 | 607 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1987 | 51.7 | 46.9 | 56.5 | 563 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1988 | 51.2 | 45.5 | 56.9 | 358 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1989 | 52.5 | 47.2 | 57.9 | 417 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1990 | 49.3 | 43.8 | 54.8 | 409 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1991 | 45.8 | 40.5 | 51.0 | 416 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1993 | 52.5 | 47.0 | 58.0 | 418 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1994 | 51.5 | 47.5 | 55.6 | 733 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1996 | 49.6 | 45.6 | 53.7 | 703 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1998 | 46.5 | 42.1 | 50.8 | 630 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2000 | 47.1 | 42.8 | 51.5 | 609 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2002 | 47.6 | 41.2 | 53.9 | 319 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2004 | 42.4 | 35.7 | 49.1 | 261 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2006 | 43.3 | 38.8 | 47.9 | 623 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2008 | 50.3 | 44.6 | 56.0 | 393 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2010 | 48.4 | 42.1 | 54.7 | 358 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2012 | 55.4 | 48.7 | 62.0 | 321 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2014 | 50.8 | 45.5 | 56.1 | 441 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2016 | 46.3 | 41.2 | 51.4 | 536 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2018 | 52.0 | 46.0 | 57.9 | 441 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2022 | 50.4 | 40.8 | 60.0 | 307 | | Household has a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2024 | 51.2 | 42.2 | 60.3 | 244 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1980 | 29.6 | 25.6 | 33.7 | 733 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1982 | 28.8 | 25.2 | 32.4 | 1,077 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1984 | 23.9 | 20.1 | 27.8 | 747 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1985 | 28.9 | 24.8 | 33.1 | 746 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1987 | 26.8 | 23.3 | 30.2 | 1,013 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1988 | 25.2 | 20.8 | 29.5 | 479 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1989 | 25.1 | 20.7 | 29.6 | 477 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1990 | 25.4 | 20.5 | 30.3 | 385 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1991 | 30.1 | 25.1 | 35.1 | 423 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1993 | 28.3 | 23.9 | 32.8 | 503 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1994 | 25.3 | 22.2 | 28.5 | 937 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1996 | 24.1 | 20.9 | 27.4 | 870 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 1998 | 19.6 | 16.6 | 22.5 | 878 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2000 | 18.3 | 15.3 | 21.4 | 819 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2002 | 23.4 | 18.6 | 28.3 | 408 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2004 | 20.6 | 15.9 | 25.3 | 393 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2006 | 19.0 | 15.7 | 22.2 | 845 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2008 | 18.4 | 14.7 | 22.1 | 634 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2010 | 14.3 | 10.7 | 17.9 | 571 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2012 | 16.9 | 13.2 | 20.6 | 596 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2014 | 15.8 | 12.8 | 18.9 | 780 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2016 | 13.9 | 11.1 | 16.8 | 894 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2018 | 14.6 | 11.3 | 18.0 | 705 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2021 | 16.7 | 14.6 | 18.9 | 1,818 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2022 | 17.0 | 13.4 | 20.7 | 963 | | Respondent owns a gun | Democrats | 2024 | 15.4 | 11.9 | 19.0 | 829 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 1980 | 26.9 | 19.8 | 34.0 | 240 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 1982 | 32.8 | 25.0 | 40.6 | 214 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 1984 | 23.1 | 15.6 | 30.5 | 160 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 1987 | 28.0 | 20.6 | 35.5 | 195 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 1989 | 26.4 | 17.8 | 34.9 | 123 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 1994 | 26.9 | 20.6 | 33.2 | 246 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 1996 | 25.3 | 19.9 | 30.8 | 304 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 1998 | 19.2 | 14.2 | 24.2 | 310 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2000 | 19.1 | 14.6 | 23.7 | 361 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2002 | 17.4 | 10.4 | 24.3 | 166 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2004 | 22.9 | 15.0 | 30.7 | 144 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2006 | 16.7 | 12.4 | 21.1 | 413 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2008 | 18.0 | 12.1 | 24.0 | 221 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2010 | 19.0 | 12.6 | 25.4 | 225 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2012 | 15.6 | 9.9 | 21.3 | 252 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2014 | 16.5 | 11.8 | 21.3 | 316 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2016 | 16.9 | 11.5 | 22.2 | 302 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2018 | 20.3 | 14.0 | 26.5 | 266 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2021 | 19.0 | 15.7 | 22.4 | 785 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2022 | 14.8 | 9.9 | 19.6 | 535 | | Respondent owns a gun | Independents | 2024 | 22.1 | 17.1 | 27.1 | 544 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1980 | 31.5 | 26.2 | 36.7 | 437 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1982 | 33.9 | 28.6 | 39.2 | 481 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1984 | 28.3 | 23.4 | 33.2 | 521 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1985 | 29.6 | 25.1 | 34.1 | 605 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1987 | 30.9 | 26.4 | 35.4 | 559 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1988 | 29.1 | 23.9 | 34.3 | 357 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1989 | 30.2 | 25.3 | 35.2 | 414 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1990 | 31.7 | 26.6 | 36.8 | 407 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1991 | 30.0 | 25.1 | 34.9 | 414 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1993 | 34.0 | 28.8 | 39.2 | 417 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1994 | 32.3 | 28.5 | 36.1 | 731 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1996 | 32.5 | 28.7 | 36.2 | 702 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 1998 | 30.8 | 26.7 | 34.8 | 627 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2000 | 31.9 | 27.8 | 36.0 | 608 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2002 | 37.5 | 31.4 | 43.7 | 319 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2004 | 30.5 | 24.8 | 36.1 | 326 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2006 | 28.8 | 24.7 | 32.9 | 665 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2008 | 33.6 | 28.5 | 38.8 | 441 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2010 | 32.1 | 26.5 | 37.8 | 397 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2012 | 36.6 | 30.4 | 42.8 | 384 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2014 | 38.8 | 33.9 | 43.7 | 501 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2016 | 32.7 | 28.1 | 37.3 | 575 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2018 | 34.8 | 29.3 | 40.3 | 490 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2021 | 41.8 | 38.4 | 45.2 | 1,172 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2022 | 40.7 | 34.4 | 47.0 | 663 | | Respondent owns a gun | Republicans | 2024 | 38.7 | 33.8 | 43.7 | 710 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1980 | 29.6 | 25.6 | 33.7 | 733 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1982 | 28.8 | 25.2 | 32.4 | 1,077 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1984 | 23.9 | 20.1 | 27.8 | 747 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1985 | 28.9 | 24.8 | 33.1 | 746 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1987 | 26.8 | 23.3 | 30.2 | 1,013 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1988 | 25.2 | 20.8 | 29.5 | 479 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1989 | 25.1 | 20.7 | 29.6 | 477 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1990 | 25.4 | 20.5 | 30.3 | 385 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1991 | 30.1 | 25.1 | 35.1 | 423 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1993 | 28.3 | 23.9 | 32.8 | 503 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1994 | 25.3 | 22.2 | 28.5 | 937 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1996 | 24.1 | 20.9 | 27.4 | 870 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 1998 | 19.6 | 16.6 | 22.5 | 878 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2000 | 18.3 | 15.3 | 21.4 | 819 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2002 | 23.4 | 18.6 | 28.3 | 408 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2004 | 20.3 | 14.9 | 25.7 | 296 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2006 | 19.4 | 16.0 | 22.7 | 793 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2008 | 19.6 | 15.6 | 23.7 | 556 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2010 | 15.0 | 11.1 | 18.9 | 511 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2012 | 16.4 | 12.4 | 20.3 | 521 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2014 | 15.8 | 12.5 | 19.1 | 677 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2016 | 14.1 | 11.1 | 17.1 | 828 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2018 | 15.4 | 11.8 | 19.0 | 633 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2022 | 16.7 | 11.4 | 22.0 | 432 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Democrats | 2024 | 14.9 | 9.1 | 20.8 | 284 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 1980 | 26.9 | 19.8 | 34.0 | 240 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 1982 | 32.8 | 25.0 | 40.6 | 214 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 1984 | 23.1 | 15.6 | 30.5 | 160 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 1987 | 28.0 | 20.6 | 35.5 | 195 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 1989 | 26.4 | 17.8 | 34.9 | 123 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 1994 | 26.9 | 20.6 | 33.2 | 246 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 1996 | 25.3 | 19.9 | 30.8 | 304 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 1998 | 19.2 | 14.2 | 24.2 | 310 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 2000 | 19.1 | 14.6 | 23.7 | 361 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 2002 | 17.4 | 10.4 | 24.3 | 166 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 2006 | 16.5 | 12.0 | 21.0 | 389 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 2008 | 17.5 | 11.2 | 23.8 | 190 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 2010 | 19.0 | 12.2 | 25.9 | 203 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 2012 | 16.4 | 10.2 | 22.6 | 221 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 2014 | 15.9 | 10.7 | 21.0 | 264 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 2016 | 16.0 | 10.6 | 21.4 | 288 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Independents | 2018 | 20.7 | 13.9 | 27.6 | 228 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1980 | 31.5 | 26.2 | 36.7 | 437 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1982 | 33.9 | 28.6 | 39.2 | 481 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1984 | 28.3 | 23.4 | 33.2 | 521 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1985 | 29.6 | 25.1 | 34.1 | 605 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1987 | 30.9 | 26.4 | 35.4 | 559 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1988 | 29.1 | 23.9 | 34.3 | 357 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1989 | 30.2 | 25.3 | 35.2 | 414 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1990 | 31.7 | 26.6 | 36.8 | 407 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1991 | 30.0 | 25.1 | 34.9 | 414 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1993 | 34.0 | 28.8 | 39.2 | 417 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1994 | 32.3 | 28.5 | 36.1 | 731 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1996 | 32.5 | 28.7 | 36.2 | 702 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 1998 | 30.8 | 26.7 | 34.8 | 627 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2000 | 31.9 | 27.8 | 36.0 | 608 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2002 | 37.5 | 31.4 | 43.7 | 319 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2004 | 27.9 | 21.8 | 34.0 | 261 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2006 | 28.0 | 23.9 | 32.1 | 622 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2008 | 32.0 | 26.6 | 37.3 | 393 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2010 | 32.0 | 26.1 | 37.9 | 357 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2012 | 38.8 | 32.3 | 45.3 | 321 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2014 | 38.3 | 33.2 | 43.5 | 440 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2016 | 33.1 | 28.3 | 37.9 | 535 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2018 | 34.4 | 28.7 | 40.1 | 441 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2022 | 38.3 | 28.9 | 47.6 | 306 | | Respondent owns a gun (in person) | Republicans | 2024 | 34.4 | 25.9 | 43.0 | 244 | Views: Household has a gun (measure = Household has a gun); Household has a gun (in person) (measure = Household has a gun (in person)); Respondent owns a gun (measure = Respondent owns a gun); Respondent owns a gun (in person) (measure = Respondent owns a gun (in person)). Note: Household ownership is the answer of one respondent about the home, asked from 1973. Personal ownership is a follow-up to respondents who report a gun in the home, asked from 1980; respondents with no gun in the home count as not owning. Note: In-person views keep respondents interviewed in person and every survey before 2004, which was in person by design; the 2021 survey has no in-person respondents, so those lines break. A line also breaks where fewer than 150 respondents in a party were interviewed in person. Note: Refused answers are left out of every view. Republican respondents refused the household question more often than Democrats in 2016 to 2024, and the text bounds the effect. An independent cell is drawn only where it has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. Note: GSS interviews were mostly in person through 2018, mostly on the web in 2021, and in both modes in 2022 and 2024. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted (weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/own_by_party.json ### Table 3. Support for a police permit to buy a gun rose among Democrats and fell among Republicans Share favoring a police permit to buy a gun (GSS) or favoring making it more difficult to buy a gun (ANES), by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; 95% intervals | Survey and answer | Group | Year | File | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Democrats | 2000 | ANES cumulative file | 68.9 | 65.5 | 72.3 | 884 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Democrats | 2004 | ANES cumulative file | 68.2 | 64.0 | 72.3 | 587 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Democrats | 2008 | ANES cumulative file | 55.7 | 52.2 | 59.1 | 1,348 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Democrats | 2012 | ANES cumulative file | 63.1 | 60.7 | 65.5 | 3,094 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Democrats | 2016 | ANES cumulative file | 74.0 | 71.7 | 76.4 | 1,935 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Democrats | 2020 | ANES cumulative file | 75.3 | 73.3 | 77.3 | 3,441 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Democrats | 2024 | ANES 2024 Time Series | 82.2 | 80.0 | 84.5 | 2,319 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Independents | 2000 | ANES cumulative file | 58.3 | 51.0 | 65.7 | 220 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Independents | 2008 | ANES cumulative file | 49.2 | 41.5 | 56.9 | 259 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Independents | 2012 | ANES cumulative file | 46.6 | 42.0 | 51.2 | 780 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Independents | 2016 | ANES cumulative file | 45.9 | 41.0 | 50.9 | 570 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Independents | 2020 | ANES cumulative file | 42.9 | 38.3 | 47.4 | 863 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Independents | 2024 | ANES 2024 Time Series | 48.5 | 40.3 | 56.8 | 302 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Republicans | 2000 | ANES cumulative file | 44.5 | 40.4 | 48.7 | 675 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Republicans | 2004 | ANES cumulative file | 41.8 | 37.0 | 46.6 | 482 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Republicans | 2008 | ANES cumulative file | 35.4 | 31.1 | 39.7 | 652 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Republicans | 2012 | ANES cumulative file | 26.2 | 23.8 | 28.7 | 1,991 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Republicans | 2016 | ANES cumulative file | 30.9 | 28.3 | 33.5 | 1,722 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Republicans | 2020 | ANES cumulative file | 22.4 | 20.4 | 24.3 | 3,050 | | ANES: more difficult to buy a gun | Republicans | 2024 | ANES 2024 Time Series | 31.5 | 28.6 | 34.4 | 2,070 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1972 | GSS | 75.2 | 72.0 | 78.3 | 891 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1973 | GSS | 77.1 | 73.9 | 80.3 | 784 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1974 | GSS | 77.2 | 74.1 | 80.4 | 818 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1975 | GSS | 77.5 | 74.3 | 80.8 | 793 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1976 | GSS | 74.2 | 70.9 | 77.5 | 827 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1977 | GSS | 73.7 | 70.4 | 77.0 | 862 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1980 | GSS | 70.8 | 66.7 | 74.8 | 743 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1982 | GSS | 74.7 | 71.3 | 78.2 | 1,083 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1984 | GSS | 75.9 | 72.0 | 79.7 | 740 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1985 | GSS | 77.1 | 73.3 | 80.9 | 743 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1987 | GSS | 70.4 | 66.8 | 74.0 | 1,008 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1988 | GSS | 79.9 | 75.9 | 84.0 | 475 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1989 | GSS | 84.1 | 80.3 | 87.9 | 474 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1990 | GSS | 84.5 | 80.3 | 88.6 | 377 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1991 | GSS | 82.2 | 78.0 | 86.3 | 422 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1993 | GSS | 84.8 | 81.2 | 88.3 | 501 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1994 | GSS | 83.7 | 81.0 | 86.4 | 935 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1996 | GSS | 86.2 | 83.6 | 88.8 | 861 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 1998 | GSS | 86.8 | 84.3 | 89.4 | 874 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2000 | GSS | 86.8 | 84.1 | 89.5 | 804 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2002 | GSS | 85.8 | 81.8 | 89.8 | 408 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2004 | GSS | 84.9 | 80.8 | 89.1 | 397 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2006 | GSS | 87.2 | 84.4 | 90.0 | 838 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2008 | GSS | 84.7 | 81.3 | 88.2 | 630 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2010 | GSS | 83.6 | 79.8 | 87.3 | 580 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2012 | GSS | 80.8 | 77.0 | 84.7 | 595 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2014 | GSS | 83.8 | 80.7 | 86.9 | 787 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2016 | GSS | 79.7 | 76.4 | 83.1 | 894 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2018 | GSS | 83.4 | 79.8 | 86.9 | 698 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2021 | GSS | 82.2 | 80.0 | 84.5 | 1,814 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2022 | GSS | 86.2 | 82.9 | 89.6 | 963 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Democrats | 2024 | GSS | 83.9 | 80.3 | 87.5 | 828 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1972 | GSS | 70.7 | 62.5 | 78.9 | 156 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1973 | GSS | 78.3 | 70.8 | 85.9 | 140 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1974 | GSS | 73.2 | 64.9 | 81.4 | 139 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1975 | GSS | 70.2 | 63.3 | 77.1 | 202 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1976 | GSS | 68.4 | 61.7 | 75.2 | 228 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1977 | GSS | 72.5 | 65.2 | 79.9 | 171 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1980 | GSS | 76.0 | 69.1 | 82.9 | 237 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1982 | GSS | 74.9 | 67.8 | 82.0 | 218 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1984 | GSS | 71.8 | 63.6 | 80.1 | 151 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1987 | GSS | 69.4 | 61.6 | 77.3 | 189 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1989 | GSS | 72.9 | 64.1 | 81.6 | 120 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1994 | GSS | 79.5 | 73.7 | 85.4 | 239 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1996 | GSS | 79.8 | 74.6 | 84.9 | 294 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 1998 | GSS | 84.5 | 79.7 | 89.2 | 299 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2000 | GSS | 83.5 | 79.1 | 87.9 | 353 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2002 | GSS | 88.5 | 82.6 | 94.4 | 164 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2004 | GSS | 82.4 | 75.4 | 89.4 | 149 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2006 | GSS | 78.2 | 73.3 | 83.0 | 413 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2008 | GSS | 85.5 | 80.0 | 91.0 | 218 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2010 | GSS | 78.0 | 71.3 | 84.6 | 231 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2012 | GSS | 74.2 | 67.3 | 81.2 | 245 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2014 | GSS | 69.8 | 63.9 | 75.7 | 314 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2016 | GSS | 69.0 | 62.4 | 75.6 | 299 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2018 | GSS | 74.5 | 67.7 | 81.3 | 261 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2021 | GSS | 61.3 | 57.2 | 65.4 | 806 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2022 | GSS | 70.4 | 64.2 | 76.7 | 535 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Independents | 2024 | GSS | 68.6 | 63.0 | 74.1 | 538 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1972 | GSS | 73.5 | 69.1 | 77.9 | 445 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1973 | GSS | 71.3 | 66.9 | 75.7 | 476 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1974 | GSS | 74.3 | 69.8 | 78.9 | 423 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1975 | GSS | 71.6 | 66.9 | 76.2 | 438 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1976 | GSS | 72.4 | 67.6 | 77.1 | 409 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1977 | GSS | 69.9 | 65.3 | 74.6 | 452 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1980 | GSS | 66.8 | 61.5 | 72.0 | 448 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1982 | GSS | 68.1 | 63.0 | 73.2 | 496 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1984 | GSS | 64.3 | 59.0 | 69.6 | 513 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1985 | GSS | 73.4 | 69.0 | 77.7 | 604 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1987 | GSS | 71.4 | 67.1 | 75.8 | 560 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1988 | GSS | 70.5 | 65.3 | 75.7 | 355 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1989 | GSS | 76.4 | 71.9 | 81.0 | 410 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1990 | GSS | 77.9 | 73.3 | 82.4 | 406 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1991 | GSS | 79.2 | 74.9 | 83.5 | 417 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1993 | GSS | 79.2 | 74.7 | 83.7 | 411 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1994 | GSS | 73.1 | 69.5 | 76.8 | 731 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1996 | GSS | 77.1 | 73.7 | 80.5 | 696 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 1998 | GSS | 78.3 | 74.7 | 82.0 | 618 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2000 | GSS | 72.2 | 68.3 | 76.2 | 609 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2002 | GSS | 72.7 | 67.1 | 78.3 | 323 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2004 | GSS | 74.8 | 69.5 | 80.1 | 331 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2006 | GSS | 73.8 | 69.8 | 77.7 | 665 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2008 | GSS | 67.0 | 61.9 | 72.1 | 446 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2010 | GSS | 63.3 | 57.7 | 69.0 | 417 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2012 | GSS | 63.4 | 57.4 | 69.4 | 397 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2014 | GSS | 58.3 | 53.5 | 63.1 | 527 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2016 | GSS | 59.1 | 54.4 | 63.9 | 599 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2018 | GSS | 60.4 | 54.8 | 66.1 | 510 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2021 | GSS | 46.9 | 43.5 | 50.3 | 1,229 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2022 | GSS | 52.3 | 46.2 | 58.5 | 700 | | GSS: favor a police permit | Republicans | 2024 | GSS | 55.6 | 50.7 | 60.6 | 734 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1972 | GSS | 75.2 | 72.0 | 78.3 | 891 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1973 | GSS | 77.1 | 73.9 | 80.3 | 784 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1974 | GSS | 77.2 | 74.1 | 80.4 | 818 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1975 | GSS | 77.5 | 74.3 | 80.8 | 793 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1976 | GSS | 74.2 | 70.9 | 77.5 | 827 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1977 | GSS | 73.7 | 70.4 | 77.0 | 862 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1980 | GSS | 70.8 | 66.7 | 74.8 | 743 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1982 | GSS | 74.7 | 71.3 | 78.2 | 1,083 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1984 | GSS | 75.9 | 72.0 | 79.7 | 740 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1985 | GSS | 77.1 | 73.3 | 80.9 | 743 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1987 | GSS | 70.4 | 66.8 | 74.0 | 1,008 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1988 | GSS | 79.9 | 75.9 | 84.0 | 475 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1989 | GSS | 84.1 | 80.3 | 87.9 | 474 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1990 | GSS | 84.5 | 80.3 | 88.6 | 377 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1991 | GSS | 82.2 | 78.0 | 86.3 | 422 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1993 | GSS | 84.8 | 81.2 | 88.3 | 501 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1994 | GSS | 83.7 | 81.0 | 86.4 | 935 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1996 | GSS | 86.2 | 83.6 | 88.8 | 861 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 1998 | GSS | 86.8 | 84.3 | 89.4 | 874 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2000 | GSS | 86.8 | 84.1 | 89.5 | 804 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2002 | GSS | 85.8 | 81.8 | 89.8 | 408 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2004 | GSS | 82.8 | 77.8 | 87.8 | 301 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2006 | GSS | 86.4 | 83.4 | 89.3 | 787 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2008 | GSS | 83.7 | 79.9 | 87.5 | 552 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2010 | GSS | 84.0 | 80.1 | 88.0 | 517 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2012 | GSS | 81.3 | 77.2 | 85.5 | 520 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2014 | GSS | 83.0 | 79.6 | 86.4 | 685 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2016 | GSS | 79.3 | 75.8 | 82.8 | 830 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2018 | GSS | 83.4 | 79.6 | 87.1 | 628 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2022 | GSS | 84.5 | 79.3 | 89.7 | 434 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Democrats | 2024 | GSS | 80.5 | 74.0 | 87.0 | 282 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1972 | GSS | 70.7 | 62.5 | 78.9 | 156 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1973 | GSS | 78.3 | 70.8 | 85.9 | 140 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1974 | GSS | 73.2 | 64.9 | 81.4 | 139 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1975 | GSS | 70.2 | 63.3 | 77.1 | 202 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1976 | GSS | 68.4 | 61.7 | 75.2 | 228 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1977 | GSS | 72.5 | 65.2 | 79.9 | 171 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1980 | GSS | 76.0 | 69.1 | 82.9 | 237 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1982 | GSS | 74.9 | 67.8 | 82.0 | 218 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1984 | GSS | 71.8 | 63.6 | 80.1 | 151 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1987 | GSS | 69.4 | 61.6 | 77.3 | 189 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1989 | GSS | 72.9 | 64.1 | 81.6 | 120 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1994 | GSS | 79.5 | 73.7 | 85.4 | 239 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1996 | GSS | 79.8 | 74.6 | 84.9 | 294 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 1998 | GSS | 84.5 | 79.7 | 89.2 | 299 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 2000 | GSS | 83.5 | 79.1 | 87.9 | 353 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 2002 | GSS | 88.5 | 82.6 | 94.4 | 164 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 2006 | GSS | 77.9 | 72.9 | 83.0 | 387 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 2008 | GSS | 84.9 | 78.9 | 90.9 | 187 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 2010 | GSS | 76.1 | 68.9 | 83.4 | 209 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 2012 | GSS | 73.2 | 65.6 | 80.8 | 214 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 2014 | GSS | 69.2 | 62.7 | 75.6 | 264 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 2016 | GSS | 69.1 | 62.3 | 75.9 | 285 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Independents | 2018 | GSS | 74.1 | 66.6 | 81.6 | 222 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1972 | GSS | 73.5 | 69.1 | 77.9 | 445 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1973 | GSS | 71.3 | 66.9 | 75.7 | 476 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1974 | GSS | 74.3 | 69.8 | 78.9 | 423 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1975 | GSS | 71.6 | 66.9 | 76.2 | 438 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1976 | GSS | 72.4 | 67.6 | 77.1 | 409 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1977 | GSS | 69.9 | 65.3 | 74.6 | 452 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1980 | GSS | 66.8 | 61.5 | 72.0 | 448 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1982 | GSS | 68.1 | 63.0 | 73.2 | 496 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1984 | GSS | 64.3 | 59.0 | 69.6 | 513 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1985 | GSS | 73.4 | 69.0 | 77.7 | 604 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1987 | GSS | 71.4 | 67.1 | 75.8 | 560 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1988 | GSS | 70.5 | 65.3 | 75.7 | 355 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1989 | GSS | 76.4 | 71.9 | 81.0 | 410 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1990 | GSS | 77.9 | 73.3 | 82.4 | 406 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1991 | GSS | 79.2 | 74.9 | 83.5 | 417 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1993 | GSS | 79.2 | 74.7 | 83.7 | 411 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1994 | GSS | 73.1 | 69.5 | 76.8 | 731 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1996 | GSS | 77.1 | 73.7 | 80.5 | 696 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 1998 | GSS | 78.3 | 74.7 | 82.0 | 618 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2000 | GSS | 72.2 | 68.3 | 76.2 | 609 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2002 | GSS | 72.7 | 67.1 | 78.3 | 323 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2004 | GSS | 73.8 | 67.9 | 79.7 | 265 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2006 | GSS | 72.3 | 68.2 | 76.4 | 622 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2008 | GSS | 68.3 | 63.0 | 73.6 | 398 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2010 | GSS | 61.8 | 55.8 | 67.8 | 372 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2012 | GSS | 59.2 | 52.7 | 65.7 | 333 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2014 | GSS | 56.4 | 51.3 | 61.6 | 465 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2016 | GSS | 58.5 | 53.5 | 63.4 | 560 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2018 | GSS | 60.6 | 54.8 | 66.3 | 459 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2022 | GSS | 53.7 | 44.5 | 62.9 | 322 | | GSS: favor a police permit (in person) | Republicans | 2024 | GSS | 62.1 | 53.6 | 70.7 | 250 | Views: GSS: police permit (survey = GSS: favor a police permit); GSS: police permit, in person (survey = GSS: favor a police permit (in person)); ANES: buying a gun (survey = ANES: more difficult to buy a gun). Note: Shaded band: the GSS move from in-person to web interviews between 2018 and 2021 in the GSS view, and the ANES mode change from 2016 to 2020 in the ANES view. The in-person GSS view keeps respondents interviewed in person and every survey before 2004, so its line breaks in 2021, a survey with no in-person respondents. Note: The ANES cumulative file asks the question in 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020. The 2024 point is the same question from the 2024 Time Series, a separate file because the cumulative file does not have the item for 2024; it is weighted with the post-election weight, and the 2020 study had no in-person interviews. Note: An independent cell is drawn only where it has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024, and ANES Cumulative Data File, 2000-2020, with the ANES 2024 Time Series; weighted (weight_use; VCF0009z; V240107b) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/permit_by_party.json ### Table 4. The party gaps on gun ownership and gun permits were at most 13.2 points through 1996 and at least 17.4 points from 2008 Gap between the parties in the share with a gun in the home (Republican minus Democratic) and in the share favoring a police permit or making buying a gun more difficult (Democratic minus Republican); party identifiers including leaners; 95% intervals | Series | Year | File | Gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES: more difficult | 2000 | ANES cumulative file | 24.4 | 19.0 | 29.7 | 1,559 | | ANES: more difficult | 2004 | ANES cumulative file | 26.3 | 20.0 | 32.7 | 1,069 | | ANES: more difficult | 2008 | ANES cumulative file | 20.3 | 14.8 | 25.8 | 2,000 | | ANES: more difficult | 2012 | ANES cumulative file | 36.8 | 33.4 | 40.3 | 5,085 | | ANES: more difficult | 2016 | ANES cumulative file | 43.1 | 39.6 | 46.6 | 3,657 | | ANES: more difficult | 2020 | ANES cumulative file | 53.0 | 50.2 | 55.8 | 6,491 | | ANES: more difficult | 2024 | ANES 2024 Time Series | 50.7 | 47.0 | 54.3 | 4,389 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1973 | GSS | 10.9 | 4.8 | 17.1 | 1,270 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1974 | GSS | 8.3 | 1.9 | 14.6 | 1,245 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1976 | GSS | 6.2 | −0.3 | 12.7 | 1,233 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1977 | GSS | 3.8 | −2.4 | 10.1 | 1,329 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1980 | GSS | 5.0 | −2.1 | 12.1 | 1,197 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1982 | GSS | 5.4 | −1.4 | 12.1 | 1,593 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1984 | GSS | 13.2 | 6.2 | 20.2 | 1,270 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1985 | GSS | 1.5 | −5.2 | 8.2 | 1,354 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1987 | GSS | 7.7 | 1.5 | 13.9 | 1,583 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1988 | GSS | 12.1 | 4.6 | 19.7 | 839 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1989 | GSS | 10.1 | 2.7 | 17.5 | 895 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1990 | GSS | 9.0 | 1.2 | 16.7 | 794 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1991 | GSS | 2.2 | −5.4 | 9.7 | 841 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1993 | GSS | 11.5 | 4.1 | 18.8 | 921 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1994 | GSS | 12.4 | 7.0 | 17.8 | 1,670 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1996 | GSS | 10.4 | 5.0 | 15.9 | 1,577 | | GSS: gun in the home | 1998 | GSS | 14.3 | 8.7 | 19.9 | 1,509 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2000 | GSS | 18.0 | 12.4 | 23.7 | 1,428 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2002 | GSS | 15.2 | 6.9 | 23.5 | 727 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2004 | GSS | 14.7 | 6.6 | 22.8 | 720 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2006 | GSS | 15.0 | 9.1 | 20.9 | 1,511 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2008 | GSS | 22.8 | 15.8 | 29.7 | 1,075 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2010 | GSS | 27.5 | 20.1 | 34.8 | 969 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2012 | GSS | 27.7 | 20.0 | 35.4 | 982 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2014 | GSS | 26.7 | 20.5 | 32.9 | 1,283 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2016 | GSS | 23.8 | 17.8 | 29.8 | 1,470 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2018 | GSS | 28.3 | 21.3 | 35.3 | 1,195 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2021 | GSS | 29.3 | 25.0 | 33.5 | 2,996 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2022 | GSS | 24.0 | 16.3 | 31.8 | 1,630 | | GSS: gun in the home | 2024 | GSS | 30.7 | 24.1 | 37.4 | 1,542 | | GSS: police permit | 1972 | GSS | 1.7 | −3.7 | 7.1 | 1,336 | | GSS: police permit | 1973 | GSS | 5.8 | 0.4 | 11.3 | 1,260 | | GSS: police permit | 1974 | GSS | 2.9 | −2.6 | 8.4 | 1,241 | | GSS: police permit | 1975 | GSS | 6.0 | 0.3 | 11.6 | 1,231 | | GSS: police permit | 1976 | GSS | 1.8 | −4.0 | 7.6 | 1,236 | | GSS: police permit | 1977 | GSS | 3.7 | −2.0 | 9.5 | 1,314 | | GSS: police permit | 1980 | GSS | 4.0 | −2.6 | 10.6 | 1,191 | | GSS: police permit | 1982 | GSS | 6.6 | 0.5 | 12.8 | 1,579 | | GSS: police permit | 1984 | GSS | 11.5 | 5.0 | 18.1 | 1,253 | | GSS: police permit | 1985 | GSS | 3.7 | −2.1 | 9.5 | 1,347 | | GSS: police permit | 1987 | GSS | −1.0 | −6.7 | 4.6 | 1,568 | | GSS: police permit | 1988 | GSS | 9.5 | 2.9 | 16.1 | 830 | | GSS: police permit | 1989 | GSS | 7.7 | 1.7 | 13.6 | 884 | | GSS: police permit | 1990 | GSS | 6.6 | 0.4 | 12.7 | 783 | | GSS: police permit | 1991 | GSS | 2.9 | −3.0 | 8.9 | 839 | | GSS: police permit | 1993 | GSS | 5.6 | −0.1 | 11.3 | 912 | | GSS: police permit | 1994 | GSS | 10.5 | 6.0 | 15.0 | 1,666 | | GSS: police permit | 1996 | GSS | 9.1 | 4.8 | 13.4 | 1,557 | | GSS: police permit | 1998 | GSS | 8.5 | 4.0 | 12.9 | 1,492 | | GSS: police permit | 2000 | GSS | 14.6 | 9.8 | 19.3 | 1,413 | | GSS: police permit | 2002 | GSS | 13.1 | 6.2 | 19.9 | 731 | | GSS: police permit | 2004 | GSS | 10.1 | 3.4 | 16.9 | 728 | | GSS: police permit | 2006 | GSS | 13.5 | 8.6 | 18.3 | 1,503 | | GSS: police permit | 2008 | GSS | 17.8 | 11.6 | 23.9 | 1,076 | | GSS: police permit | 2010 | GSS | 20.2 | 13.4 | 27.0 | 997 | | GSS: police permit | 2012 | GSS | 17.4 | 10.3 | 24.6 | 992 | | GSS: police permit | 2014 | GSS | 25.5 | 19.8 | 31.2 | 1,314 | | GSS: police permit | 2016 | GSS | 20.6 | 14.8 | 26.4 | 1,493 | | GSS: police permit | 2018 | GSS | 22.9 | 16.3 | 29.6 | 1,208 | | GSS: police permit | 2021 | GSS | 35.3 | 31.3 | 39.4 | 3,043 | | GSS: police permit | 2022 | GSS | 33.9 | 26.9 | 40.9 | 1,663 | | GSS: police permit | 2024 | GSS | 28.3 | 22.2 | 34.4 | 1,562 | Note: The GSS items are asked in different numbers of survey years, so the lines have different points. A party cell needs at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100, and a gap needs both parties to clear that floor. Note: Shaded bands: the ANES mode change from 2016 to 2020 and the GSS move from in-person to web interviews between 2018 and 2021. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024, and ANES Cumulative Data File, 2000-2020, with the ANES 2024 Time Series; weighted (weight_use; VCF0009z; V240107b) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/gap_by_year.json ### Table 5. Republicans were more likely than Democrats to live in a household with a gun in every region and kind of community Share with a gun in the home among Democrats and Republicans, including leaners, by census region and community type, GSS surveys of 2016 to 2024 pooled; 95% intervals | Surveys | Kind of place | Place | Democrats (%) | Lower | Upper | Democrats counted | Republicans (%) | Lower | Upper | Republicans counted | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1973 to 1980 | Region | Northeast | 22.7 | 19.5 | 25.9 | 851 | 39.4 | 34.6 | 44.2 | 483 | | 2016 to 2024 | Region | Northeast | 14.4 | 11.4 | 17.4 | 944 | 42.0 | 36.1 | 47.8 | 469 | | 1973 to 1980 | Region | Midwest | 51.2 | 48.0 | 54.5 | 1,143 | 57.0 | 52.8 | 61.1 | 653 | | 2016 to 2024 | Region | Midwest | 30.5 | 26.9 | 34.1 | 1,204 | 55.8 | 51.0 | 60.6 | 918 | | 1973 to 1980 | Region | South | 61.4 | 58.5 | 64.4 | 1,354 | 67.3 | 63.4 | 71.2 | 708 | | 2016 to 2024 | Region | South | 30.3 | 27.5 | 33.1 | 1,838 | 58.2 | 54.9 | 61.5 | 1,557 | | 1973 to 1980 | Region | West | 47.2 | 43.0 | 51.3 | 706 | 47.1 | 41.5 | 52.7 | 376 | | 2016 to 2024 | Region | West | 23.6 | 20.4 | 26.7 | 1,225 | 46.4 | 41.3 | 51.4 | 678 | | 1973 to 1980 | Community type | Central city | 33.9 | 31.0 | 36.8 | 1,379 | 42.9 | 38.1 | 47.8 | 516 | | 2016 to 2024 | Community type | Central city | 18.9 | 16.5 | 21.3 | 1,815 | 39.6 | 34.5 | 44.7 | 794 | | 1973 to 1980 | Community type | Suburb | 44.3 | 41.5 | 47.2 | 1,444 | 48.3 | 44.7 | 51.9 | 896 | | 2016 to 2024 | Community type | Suburb | 26.3 | 24.1 | 28.4 | 2,863 | 54.1 | 51.3 | 56.9 | 2,149 | | 1973 to 1980 | Community type | Small city or town | 57.7 | 53.1 | 62.3 | 523 | 56.2 | 50.0 | 62.4 | 298 | | 2016 to 2024 | Community type | Small city or town | 31.4 | 24.3 | 38.5 | 266 | 60.7 | 53.2 | 68.1 | 284 | | 1973 to 1980 | Community type | Rural area | 74.9 | 71.3 | 78.4 | 708 | 77.0 | 73.0 | 81.0 | 510 | | 2016 to 2024 | Community type | Rural area | 57.1 | 49.7 | 64.6 | 267 | 71.1 | 65.2 | 76.9 | 395 | Views: 2016 to 2024 (period = 2016 to 2024); 1973 to 1980 (period = 1973 to 1980). Note: Community type groups the NORC size-of-place code: central cities of large and medium metropolitan areas, their suburbs and unincorporated areas, small cities and towns outside those areas, and rural areas (villages, hamlets and open country). Region is the census region of interview. Note: Years are pooled after rescaling each year's weights to average one. A party cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. Source: General Social Survey, 1973-1980 and 2016-2024; weighted (weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/place_gap.json ### Table 6. In the CES the party gap grew on assault rifles, concealed carry and owners' names and did not grow on background checks Share supporting each CES gun policy item, by party identification including leaners, 2010 to 2021; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel | Item | Group | Year | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Laws on gun sales more strict (2010, 2012) | Democrats | 2010 | 63.2 | 62.2 | 64.1 | 24,381 | | Laws on gun sales more strict (2010, 2012) | Democrats | 2012 | 68.2 | 67.3 | 69.1 | 25,256 | | Laws on gun sales more strict (2010, 2012) | Independents | 2010 | 34.6 | 32.7 | 36.4 | 5,972 | | Laws on gun sales more strict (2010, 2012) | Independents | 2012 | 37.8 | 36.0 | 39.5 | 6,192 | | Laws on gun sales more strict (2010, 2012) | Republicans | 2010 | 18.0 | 17.2 | 18.8 | 23,431 | | Laws on gun sales more strict (2010, 2012) | Republicans | 2012 | 20.7 | 19.8 | 21.5 | 20,529 | | Support background checks for all sales | Democrats | 2013 | 94.9 | 94.2 | 95.6 | 7,499 | | Support background checks for all sales | Democrats | 2014 | 95.3 | 94.9 | 95.7 | 25,676 | | Support background checks for all sales | Democrats | 2015 | 95.2 | 94.5 | 95.9 | 6,645 | | Support background checks for all sales | Democrats | 2016 | 96.5 | 96.2 | 96.8 | 31,066 | | Support background checks for all sales | Democrats | 2017 | 96.1 | 95.5 | 96.7 | 8,581 | | Support background checks for all sales | Democrats | 2018 | 96.5 | 96.2 | 96.8 | 27,516 | | Support background checks for all sales | Democrats | 2019 | 95.9 | 95.4 | 96.5 | 8,292 | | Support background checks for all sales | Democrats | 2021 | 95.9 | 95.4 | 96.3 | 12,445 | | Support background checks for all sales | Independents | 2013 | 82.0 | 80.0 | 84.0 | 2,931 | | Support background checks for all sales | Independents | 2014 | 82.5 | 81.2 | 83.8 | 8,641 | | Support background checks for all sales | Independents | 2015 | 82.7 | 80.5 | 85.0 | 2,186 | | Support background checks for all sales | Independents | 2016 | 85.4 | 84.5 | 86.4 | 10,440 | | Support background checks for all sales | Independents | 2017 | 86.2 | 84.4 | 88.1 | 3,189 | | Support background checks for all sales | Independents | 2018 | 87.1 | 86.0 | 88.3 | 8,479 | | Support background checks for all sales | Independents | 2019 | 80.8 | 78.6 | 83.0 | 2,666 | | Support background checks for all sales | Independents | 2021 | 83.4 | 81.9 | 84.9 | 4,352 | | Support background checks for all sales | Republicans | 2013 | 77.7 | 76.1 | 79.3 | 5,276 | | Support background checks for all sales | Republicans | 2014 | 78.9 | 78.1 | 79.8 | 18,937 | | Support background checks for all sales | Republicans | 2015 | 78.2 | 76.6 | 79.7 | 4,857 | | Support background checks for all sales | Republicans | 2016 | 82.3 | 81.6 | 83.0 | 20,762 | | Support background checks for all sales | Republicans | 2017 | 85.6 | 84.4 | 86.9 | 5,772 | | Support background checks for all sales | Republicans | 2018 | 82.9 | 82.2 | 83.6 | 21,604 | | Support background checks for all sales | Republicans | 2019 | 75.2 | 73.9 | 76.5 | 6,468 | | Support background checks for all sales | Republicans | 2021 | 81.5 | 80.5 | 82.6 | 8,139 | | Support banning assault rifles | Democrats | 2013 | 82.7 | 81.5 | 83.9 | 7,446 | | Support banning assault rifles | Democrats | 2014 | 81.4 | 80.7 | 82.1 | 25,548 | | Support banning assault rifles | Democrats | 2015 | 82.5 | 81.2 | 83.7 | 6,642 | | Support banning assault rifles | Democrats | 2016 | 83.7 | 83.1 | 84.3 | 30,958 | | Support banning assault rifles | Democrats | 2017 | 86.9 | 85.9 | 88.0 | 8,577 | | Support banning assault rifles | Democrats | 2018 | 86.2 | 85.6 | 86.8 | 27,466 | | Support banning assault rifles | Democrats | 2019 | 86.1 | 85.1 | 87.1 | 8,285 | | Support banning assault rifles | Democrats | 2020 | 85.5 | 84.9 | 86.1 | 29,347 | | Support banning assault rifles | Democrats | 2021 | 85.9 | 85.1 | 86.8 | 12,445 | | Support banning assault rifles | Independents | 2013 | 54.1 | 51.5 | 56.8 | 2,908 | | Support banning assault rifles | Independents | 2014 | 52.6 | 50.9 | 54.3 | 8,604 | | Support banning assault rifles | Independents | 2015 | 54.4 | 51.4 | 57.4 | 2,180 | | Support banning assault rifles | Independents | 2016 | 54.3 | 52.9 | 55.6 | 10,417 | | Support banning assault rifles | Independents | 2017 | 61.0 | 58.4 | 63.6 | 3,190 | | Support banning assault rifles | Independents | 2018 | 57.2 | 55.4 | 58.9 | 8,452 | | Support banning assault rifles | Independents | 2019 | 52.7 | 49.9 | 55.5 | 2,662 | | Support banning assault rifles | Independents | 2020 | 53.4 | 51.8 | 55.1 | 8,858 | | Support banning assault rifles | Independents | 2021 | 49.6 | 47.6 | 51.6 | 4,352 | | Support banning assault rifles | Republicans | 2013 | 40.6 | 38.7 | 42.4 | 5,241 | | Support banning assault rifles | Republicans | 2014 | 39.9 | 38.9 | 41.0 | 18,880 | | Support banning assault rifles | Republicans | 2015 | 37.8 | 36.0 | 39.6 | 4,848 | | Support banning assault rifles | Republicans | 2016 | 41.9 | 41.0 | 42.8 | 20,675 | | Support banning assault rifles | Republicans | 2017 | 50.0 | 48.2 | 51.8 | 5,772 | | Support banning assault rifles | Republicans | 2018 | 39.7 | 38.8 | 40.7 | 21,541 | | Support banning assault rifles | Republicans | 2019 | 34.7 | 33.2 | 36.1 | 6,464 | | Support banning assault rifles | Republicans | 2020 | 33.9 | 33.0 | 34.7 | 20,412 | | Support banning assault rifles | Republicans | 2021 | 30.1 | 28.9 | 31.3 | 8,139 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Democrats | 2013 | 23.5 | 22.1 | 24.9 | 7,480 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Democrats | 2014 | 23.0 | 22.2 | 23.8 | 25,617 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Democrats | 2015 | 22.4 | 21.0 | 23.8 | 6,637 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Democrats | 2016 | 22.1 | 21.4 | 22.8 | 30,966 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Democrats | 2017 | 19.2 | 17.9 | 20.4 | 8,578 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Democrats | 2018 | 16.2 | 15.5 | 16.8 | 27,473 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Democrats | 2019 | 18.1 | 16.9 | 19.2 | 8,291 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Democrats | 2020 | 18.2 | 17.5 | 18.8 | 29,346 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Democrats | 2021 | 17.3 | 16.4 | 18.2 | 12,445 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Independents | 2013 | 46.1 | 43.5 | 48.7 | 2,913 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Independents | 2014 | 48.1 | 46.4 | 49.8 | 8,629 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Independents | 2015 | 47.9 | 44.9 | 50.9 | 2,183 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Independents | 2016 | 47.3 | 46.0 | 48.7 | 10,429 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Independents | 2017 | 44.7 | 42.1 | 47.3 | 3,191 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Independents | 2018 | 41.6 | 39.9 | 43.4 | 8,468 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Independents | 2019 | 44.0 | 41.2 | 46.8 | 2,665 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Independents | 2020 | 44.2 | 42.6 | 45.9 | 8,857 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Independents | 2021 | 44.7 | 42.6 | 46.7 | 4,352 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Republicans | 2013 | 59.9 | 58.0 | 61.8 | 5,247 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Republicans | 2014 | 61.6 | 60.6 | 62.7 | 18,902 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Republicans | 2015 | 63.1 | 61.3 | 64.9 | 4,852 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Republicans | 2016 | 61.3 | 60.4 | 62.1 | 20,723 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Republicans | 2017 | 63.5 | 61.7 | 65.2 | 5,774 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Republicans | 2018 | 59.7 | 58.8 | 60.6 | 21,538 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Republicans | 2019 | 64.6 | 63.2 | 66.1 | 6,469 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Republicans | 2020 | 63.2 | 62.4 | 64.1 | 20,413 | | Support easier concealed-carry permits | Republicans | 2021 | 61.5 | 60.2 | 62.8 | 8,139 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Democrats | 2013 | 50.7 | 49.1 | 52.3 | 7,449 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Democrats | 2014 | 48.3 | 47.4 | 49.3 | 25,573 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Democrats | 2015 | 49.1 | 47.4 | 50.8 | 6,621 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Democrats | 2016 | 49.0 | 48.2 | 49.8 | 30,906 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Democrats | 2017 | 42.0 | 40.5 | 43.6 | 8,580 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Democrats | 2020 | 41.3 | 40.4 | 42.1 | 29,346 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Independents | 2013 | 63.3 | 60.8 | 65.8 | 2,928 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Independents | 2014 | 64.2 | 62.6 | 65.8 | 8,624 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Independents | 2015 | 64.7 | 61.9 | 67.5 | 2,185 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Independents | 2016 | 66.0 | 64.7 | 67.3 | 10,427 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Independents | 2017 | 61.1 | 58.5 | 63.6 | 3,189 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Independents | 2020 | 58.5 | 56.8 | 60.1 | 8,859 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Republicans | 2013 | 73.3 | 71.6 | 74.9 | 5,278 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Republicans | 2014 | 71.5 | 70.5 | 72.4 | 18,960 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Republicans | 2015 | 72.7 | 71.1 | 74.4 | 4,862 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Republicans | 2016 | 73.1 | 72.3 | 73.9 | 20,774 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Republicans | 2017 | 71.0 | 69.3 | 72.6 | 5,773 | | Support prohibiting publication of owners' names | Republicans | 2020 | 72.0 | 71.2 | 72.9 | 20,412 | Note: Gaps are written so that they are positive when the party that favors the item is higher: Democratic minus Republican for background checks, assault rifles and stricter sale laws, Republican minus Democratic for concealed carry and owners' names. Note: The sale laws item (2010 and 2012) is a three-answer question and a different item from the 2013 to 2021 for or against items; the panels are not joined. A line breaks where an item was not asked. Note: The CES gun items are for or against each proposal in a list, with a stem that changes in 2016, 2019 and 2021 as the wording table shows. Each party cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. The CES is an opt-in panel, so the intervals rest on a model. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative policy preferences, 2010-2021; weighted (single-wave weight), opt-in panel Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/ces_items.json ### Table 7. In Nationscape the parties differed on every gun item and differed least on background checks Share owning a gun in the household or supporting each gun policy, by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; July 2019 to December 2020 pooled; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel | Item | Group | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | A household member owns a gun | Democrats | 29.5 | 29.2 | 29.8 | 206,052 | | A household member owns a gun | Independents | 31.5 | 30.9 | 32.2 | 51,285 | | A household member owns a gun | Republicans | 51.5 | 51.1 | 51.8 | 172,984 | | Background checks for all purchases | Democrats | 95.0 | 94.8 | 95.1 | 202,676 | | Background checks for all purchases | Independents | 92.2 | 91.8 | 92.6 | 47,888 | | Background checks for all purchases | Republicans | 89.2 | 89.0 | 89.5 | 169,429 | | Public registry of gun ownership | Democrats | 83.8 | 83.3 | 84.3 | 55,877 | | Public registry of gun ownership | Independents | 68.7 | 67.4 | 70.1 | 12,023 | | Public registry of gun ownership | Republicans | 51.5 | 50.7 | 52.2 | 47,159 | | Ban assault rifles | Democrats | 82.9 | 82.7 | 83.2 | 188,159 | | Ban assault rifles | Independents | 63.2 | 62.5 | 64.0 | 41,063 | | Ban assault rifles | Republicans | 48.3 | 47.9 | 48.7 | 155,727 | | Limit magazines to 10 bullets | Democrats | 79.9 | 79.6 | 80.3 | 169,663 | | Limit magazines to 10 bullets | Independents | 59.4 | 58.5 | 60.2 | 36,583 | | Limit magazines to 10 bullets | Republicans | 46.3 | 45.9 | 46.7 | 146,106 | | Ban all guns | Democrats | 32.8 | 32.5 | 33.2 | 181,840 | | Ban all guns | Independents | 20.8 | 20.2 | 21.4 | 43,791 | | Ban all guns | Republicans | 11.8 | 11.5 | 12.0 | 167,429 | | Controlling who owns guns matters more than the right to own | Democrats | 79.2 | 78.5 | 79.8 | 36,694 | | Controlling who owns guns matters more than the right to own | Independents | 59.2 | 57.5 | 60.9 | 8,418 | | Controlling who owns guns matters more than the right to own | Republicans | 43.7 | 42.8 | 44.5 | 31,937 | Note: Party is the three-category party question with the follow-up that Nationscape asks of independents in every week, so Democrats and Republicans include leaners and independents lean toward neither, as in the other surveys. Weeks after 28 December 2020 are left out. Note: The registry item was asked through mid-January 2021 and the control item from mid-September 2019, so the items cover different weeks. Each share rests on weekly waves pooled with the Nationscape weight. Source: Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape, July 2019 to December 2020; weighted (weight), opt-in panel Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/nationscape.json ### Table 8. Every party gap is above zero within each interview mode, and web and in-person gaps differ by more than sampling error only on the 2024 GSS permit item Party gap by interview mode for the GSS gun in the home and police permit items and the ANES buying a gun item; party identifiers including leaners; 95% intervals | Item | Year and mode | Gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES: more difficult to buy (Democratic minus Republican) | 2012 in person | 35.0 | 29.1 | 41.0 | 1,805 | | ANES: more difficult to buy (Democratic minus Republican) | 2012 web | 37.9 | 33.7 | 42.1 | 3,280 | | ANES: more difficult to buy (Democratic minus Republican) | 2016 in person | 45.4 | 38.7 | 52.1 | 1,037 | | ANES: more difficult to buy (Democratic minus Republican) | 2016 web | 42.2 | 38.0 | 46.3 | 2,620 | | ANES: more difficult to buy (Democratic minus Republican) | 2024 in person | 49.3 | 41.0 | 57.6 | 862 | | ANES: more difficult to buy (Democratic minus Republican) | 2024 web | 51.1 | 45.5 | 56.8 | 1,581 | | GSS: gun in the home (Republican minus Democratic) | 2018 in person | 27.3 | 19.9 | 34.6 | 1,074 | | GSS: gun in the home (Republican minus Democratic) | 2021 web | 28.7 | 24.2 | 33.3 | 2,619 | | GSS: gun in the home (Republican minus Democratic) | 2022 in person | 21.6 | 10.0 | 33.1 | 739 | | GSS: gun in the home (Republican minus Democratic) | 2022 web | 24.6 | 13.8 | 35.4 | 742 | | GSS: gun in the home (Republican minus Democratic) | 2024 in person | 25.9 | 14.4 | 37.3 | 528 | | GSS: gun in the home (Republican minus Democratic) | 2024 web | 34.1 | 25.2 | 43.1 | 822 | | GSS: police permit (Democratic minus Republican) | 2018 in person | 22.8 | 16.0 | 29.7 | 1,087 | | GSS: police permit (Democratic minus Republican) | 2021 web | 35.4 | 31.1 | 39.7 | 2,661 | | GSS: police permit (Democratic minus Republican) | 2022 in person | 30.8 | 20.2 | 41.4 | 756 | | GSS: police permit (Democratic minus Republican) | 2022 web | 34.3 | 24.5 | 44.0 | 749 | | GSS: police permit (Democratic minus Republican) | 2024 in person | 18.4 | 7.6 | 29.1 | 532 | | GSS: police permit (Democratic minus Republican) | 2024 web | 34.2 | 26.2 | 42.3 | 837 | Note: GSS in-person and web rows are the respondents interviewed in each mode; the GSS 2022 and 2024 surveys mixed the two, and 2021 was mostly web. The 2020 ANES study has no separate weights by mode, so it has no row. Note: The 2024 ANES rows are the fresh in-person and fresh web samples of the 2024 Time Series with the post-election mode weights; the panel and paper respondents are in neither. A party cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. Source: General Social Survey, 2018-2024, and ANES Cumulative Data File, 2012 and 2016, and ANES 2024 Time Series; weighted (weight_use; weight_ftf and weight_web; post-election mode weights V240101b and V240102b) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/mode_check.json ### Table 9. Democrats changed more on owning and carrying guns and Republicans changed more on regulating sales, except for personal ownership and background checks Change in the share of Democrats and of Republicans, including leaners, giving the answer named, from the first to the last period of each survey; percentage points; 95% intervals | Item and period | Group | Change (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | GSS: Household has a gun (1973-80 to 2016-24) | Democrats | −22.0 | −24.4 | −19.7 | 9,265 | | GSS: Household has a gun (1973-80 to 2016-24) | Republicans | −1.2 | −4.4 | 2.0 | 5,842 | | GSS: Respondent owns a gun (1980 to 2016-24) | Democrats | −13.8 | −18.1 | −9.5 | 5,942 | | GSS: Respondent owns a gun (1980 to 2016-24) | Republicans | 7.1 | 1.5 | 12.8 | 4,047 | | GSS: Favor a police permit (1973-80 to 2016-24) | Democrats | 7.8 | 5.9 | 9.8 | 10,024 | | GSS: Favor a police permit (1973-80 to 2016-24) | Republicans | −17.5 | −20.4 | −14.6 | 6,418 | | ANES: Make buying a gun more difficult (2000 to 2020) | Democrats | 6.4 | 2.5 | 10.4 | 4,325 | | ANES: Make buying a gun more difficult (2000 to 2020) | Republicans | −22.2 | −26.7 | −17.6 | 3,725 | | CES: Background checks for all sales (2013 to 2021) | Democrats | 1.0 | 0.1 | 1.8 | 19,944 | | CES: Background checks for all sales (2013 to 2021) | Republicans | 3.8 | 1.9 | 5.7 | 13,415 | | CES: Ban assault rifles (2013 to 2021) | Democrats | 3.2 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 19,891 | | CES: Ban assault rifles (2013 to 2021) | Republicans | −10.5 | −12.7 | −8.3 | 13,380 | | CES: Easier concealed-carry permits (2013 to 2021) | Democrats | −6.2 | −7.8 | −4.5 | 19,925 | | CES: Easier concealed-carry permits (2013 to 2021) | Republicans | 1.6 | −0.7 | 3.8 | 13,386 | | CES: Prohibit publishing owners' names (2013 to 2020) | Democrats | −9.4 | −11.3 | −7.6 | 36,795 | | CES: Prohibit publishing owners' names (2013 to 2020) | Republicans | −1.2 | −3.1 | 0.6 | 25,690 | Note: Period comparisons: GSS 1973 to 1980 pooled against 2016 to 2024 pooled, except personal ownership, which starts in 1980. ANES 2000 against 2020. CES first against last year each item was asked. Note: The change is in the share giving the answer named in each row, as the wording table lists. A negative value means the share fell. Source: General Social Survey, 1973-2024; ANES Cumulative Data File, 2000-2020; CES cumulative policy preferences, 2013-2021; weighted (weight_use; VCF0009z; single-wave weight) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/within_party.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (218), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | adj_chg_own_d_cells | −18.7 | percentage points | late-period minus early-period share from a weighted linear probability model with the interaction of region and community type, HC3 errors; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −21.0 to −16.3 | 9,265 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | adj_chg_own_r_cells | −1.2 | percentage points | late-period minus early-period share from a weighted linear probability model with the interaction of region and community type, HC3 errors; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.4 to 2.1 | 5,842 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | adj_own_cells_e | 4.5 | percentage points | Republican minus Democratic gap from a weighted linear probability model with the interaction of region and community type, HC3 errors; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 1.8 to 7.3 | 6,274 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | adj_own_cells_l | 23.6 | percentage points | Republican minus Democratic gap from a weighted linear probability model with the interaction of region and community type, HC3 errors; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 20.9 to 26.4 | 8,833 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | adj_permit_cells_l | 28.0 | percentage points | Democratic minus Republican gap from a weighted linear probability model with the interaction of region and community type, HC3 errors; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 25.3 to 30.7 | 8,969 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | ah_chg_d | +6.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 2020 minus 2000 (two separate samples); the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2000 to 2020 | 95% CI 2.5 to 10.4 | 4,325 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_chg_i | −15.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 2020 minus 2000 (two separate samples); the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | independents who lean toward neither party who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2000 to 2020 | 95% CI −24.1 to −6.8 | 1,083 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_chg_r | −22.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 2020 minus 2000 (two separate samples); the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2000 to 2020 | 95% CI −26.7 to −17.6 | 3,725 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_d_2000 | 68.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2000 | 95% CI 65.5% to 72.3% | 884 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_d_2020 | 75.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2020 | 95% CI 73.3% to 77.3% | 3,441 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_fall_r | 22.2 | percentage points | fall in the weighted share, 2000 minus 2020 (two separate samples); the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2000 to 2020 | 95% CI 17.6 to 26.7 | 3,725 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_gap_2000 | 24.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2000 | 95% CI 19.0 to 29.7 | 1,559 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_gap_2016 | 43.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2016 | 95% CI 39.6 to 46.6 | 3,657 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_gap_2020 | 53.0 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2020 | 95% CI 50.2 to 55.8 | 6,491 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_gap_to24 | −2.3 | percentage points | 2024 Time Series gap minus 2020 cumulative-file gap, Democratic minus Republican share (two separate samples); the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −6.9 to 2.3 | 10,880 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | ah_r_2000 | 44.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2000 | 95% CI 40.4% to 48.7% | 675 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_r_2020 | 22.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2020 | 95% CI 20.4% to 24.3% | 3,050 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_step_1620 | 9.9 | percentage points | change in the weighted Democratic minus Republican gap, 2020 minus 2016 (two separate samples); the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 5.4 to 14.4 | 10,148 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ah_to24_d | +6.9 | percentage points | 2024 Time Series weighted share (post-election weight) minus 2020 cumulative-file weighted share (two separate samples); the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 3.9 to 9.9 | 5,760 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | ah_to24_r | +9.1 | percentage points | 2024 Time Series weighted share (post-election weight) minus 2020 cumulative-file weighted share (two separate samples); the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 5.7 to 12.6 | 5,120 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | bound_chg_r_high | +1.1 | percentage points | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples) when every refusal is counted as an owner | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who were asked the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −2.1 to 4.2 | 6,039 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | bound_chg_r_low | −3.7 | percentage points | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples) when every refusal is counted as a nonowner | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who were asked the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −6.9 to −0.6 | 6,039 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | bound_high_l | 29.5 | percentage points | weighted Republican minus Democratic gap in a gun in the home when every refusal is counted as an owner | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who were asked the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 26.8 to 32.2 | 9,063 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | bound_low_l | 25.1 | percentage points | weighted Republican minus Democratic gap in a gun in the home when every refusal is counted as a nonowner | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who were asked the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 22.4 to 27.8 | 9,063 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | c_assault_chg_d | +3.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, last year asked minus first year asked (two separate samples); the CES item on banning assault rifles (guns_assaultban), answer support | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 1.7 to 4.7 | 19,891 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_assault_chg_r | −10.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, last year asked minus first year asked (two separate samples); the CES item on banning assault rifles (guns_assaultban), answer support | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI −12.7 to −8.3 | 13,380 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_assault_fall_r | 10.5 | percentage points | fall in the weighted share, first year minus last year (two separate samples); the CES item on banning assault rifles (guns_assaultban), answer support | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 8.3 to 12.7 | 13,380 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_assault_gap_2013 | 42.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share; the CES item on banning assault rifles (guns_assaultban), answer support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 | 95% CI 39.9 to 44.3 | 12,687 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_assault_gap_2021 | 55.8 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share; the CES item on banning assault rifles (guns_assaultban), answer support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2021 | 95% CI 54.3 to 57.3 | 20,584 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_bg_chg_d | +1.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, last year asked minus first year asked (two separate samples); the CES item on background checks for all sales (guns_bgchecks), answer support | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 0.1 to 1.8 | 19,944 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_bg_chg_r | +3.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, last year asked minus first year asked (two separate samples); the CES item on background checks for all sales (guns_bgchecks), answer support | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 1.9 to 5.7 | 13,415 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_bg_d_2021 | 95.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the CES item on background checks for all sales (guns_bgchecks), answer support | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2021 | 95% CI 95.4% to 96.3% | 12,445 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_bg_gap_2013 | 17.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share; the CES item on background checks for all sales (guns_bgchecks), answer support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 | 95% CI 15.5 to 18.9 | 12,775 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_bg_gap_2021 | 14.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share; the CES item on background checks for all sales (guns_bgchecks), answer support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2021 | 95% CI 13.2 to 15.5 | 20,584 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_bg_r_2021 | 81.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the CES item on background checks for all sales (guns_bgchecks), answer support | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2021 | 95% CI 80.5% to 82.6% | 8,139 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_names_chg_d | −9.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, last year asked minus first year asked (two separate samples); the CES item on prohibiting publication of gun owners' names (guns_names), answer support | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 to 2020 | 95% CI −11.3 to −7.6 | 36,795 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_names_chg_r | −1.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, last year asked minus first year asked (two separate samples); the CES item on prohibiting publication of gun owners' names (guns_names), answer support | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 to 2020 | 95% CI −3.1 to 0.6 | 25,690 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_names_gap_2013 | 22.6 | percentage points | weighted Republican minus Democratic share; the CES item on prohibiting publication of gun owners' names (guns_names), answer support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 | 95% CI 20.2 to 24.9 | 12,727 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_names_gap_2020 | 30.8 | percentage points | weighted Republican minus Democratic share; the CES item on prohibiting publication of gun owners' names (guns_names), answer support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2020 | 95% CI 29.6 to 31.9 | 49,758 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_permits_chg_d | −6.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, last year asked minus first year asked (two separate samples); the CES item on easier concealed-carry permits (guns_permits), answer support | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI −7.8 to −4.5 | 19,925 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_permits_chg_r | +1.6 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, last year asked minus first year asked (two separate samples); the CES item on easier concealed-carry permits (guns_permits), answer support | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI −0.7 to 3.8 | 13,386 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_permits_gap_2013 | 36.4 | percentage points | weighted Republican minus Democratic share; the CES item on easier concealed-carry permits (guns_permits), answer support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2013 | 95% CI 34.1 to 38.7 | 12,727 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | c_permits_gap_2021 | 44.1 | percentage points | weighted Republican minus Democratic share; the CES item on easier concealed-carry permits (guns_permits), answer support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2021 | 95% CI 42.6 to 45.7 | 20,584 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | comp_d_rural_e | 16.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share living in a rural area (community type from the NORC size-of-place code) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 15.2% to 17.8% | 4,054 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | comp_d_rural_l | 4.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share living in a rural area (community type from the NORC size-of-place code) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 3.7% to 5.2% | 5,211 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | comp_d_sub_e | 36.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share living in a suburb (community type from the NORC size-of-place code) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 35.2% to 38.6% | 4,054 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | comp_d_sub_l | 57.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share living in a suburb (community type from the NORC size-of-place code) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 55.3% to 58.9% | 5,211 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gap_post_min | 17.4 | percentage points | smallest weighted party gap in any survey year from 2008 across the GSS gun in the home, GSS police permit and ANES buying a gun series (the 2024 Time Series item excluded) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home or police permit question or the ANES question on buying a gun | 2008 to 2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_pre_max | 13.2 | percentage points | largest weighted party gap in any GSS survey through 1996 across the two series (Republican minus Democratic share with a gun in the home; Democratic minus Republican share favoring a permit) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home or police permit question | 1972 to 1996 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gm_a_e | 73.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | all respondents who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973 to 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 72.6% to 74.6% | 8,789 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_a_l | 68.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | all respondents who answered the GSS police permit question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 67.5% to 69.8% | 11,884 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_chg_d | +7.8 | percentage points | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 5.9 to 9.8 | 10,024 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_chg_i | −5.9 | percentage points | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | independents who lean toward neither party who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −9.8 to −2.0 | 3,556 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_chg_r | −17.5 | percentage points | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −20.4 to −14.5 | 6,418 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_d_e | 75.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973 to 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 73.7% to 76.5% | 4,827 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_d_l | 82.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 81.6% to 84.3% | 5,197 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_fall_r | 17.5 | percentage points | fall in the weighted share, early period minus late period (two separate samples); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 14.5 to 20.4 | 6,418 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_fall_r_ftf | 12.6 | percentage points | fall in the weighted share, early period minus late period (two separate samples); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question interviewed in person | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI 8.7 to 16.6 | 4,237 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_gap_1996 | 9.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1996 | 95% CI 4.8 to 13.4 | 1,557 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gm_gap_2008 | 17.8 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 2008 | 95% CI 11.6 to 23.9 | 1,076 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gm_gap_2024 | 28.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 2024 | 95% CI 22.2 to 34.4 | 1,562 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gm_gap_e | 4.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973 to 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 1.8 to 6.5 | 7,473 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_gap_l | 29.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 26.9 to 32.0 | 8,969 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_gap_l_ftf | 23.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question interviewed in person | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled), in-person interviews | 95% CI 19.3 to 27.5 | 3,765 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_gap_l_web | 34.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question interviewed on the web | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled), web interviews | 95% CI 30.9 to 38.1 | 4,247 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_mode_diff_l | 11.1 | percentage points | gap among respondents interviewed on the web minus the gap among respondents interviewed in person (two separate groups, different survey years); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 5.6 to 16.5 | 8,012 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_r_e | 71.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973 to 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 69.0% to 72.9% | 2,646 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_r_l | 53.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 51.3% to 55.7% | 3,772 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_rise_d | 7.8 | percentage points | rise in the weighted share, late period minus early period (two separate samples); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 5.9 to 9.8 | 10,024 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gm_rise_d_ftf | 6.7 | percentage points | rise in the weighted share, late period minus early period (two separate samples); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question interviewed in person | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI 4.1 to 9.2 | 7,001 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_chg_d | −22.0 | percentage points | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −24.4 to −19.7 | 9,265 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_chg_r | −1.2 | percentage points | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.4 to 2.0 | 5,842 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_chg_r_ftf | −4.6 | percentage points | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question interviewed in person | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI −8.9 to −0.3 | 3,748 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_chg_r_mid | −8.2 | percentage points | share pooled over the surveys of 1998 to 2006 minus the 1973 to 1980 share (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 1998 to 2006 | 95% CI −11.4 to −5.1 | 4,770 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_chg_r_web | +1.6 | percentage points | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question interviewed on the web | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024, web interviews | 95% CI −2.2 to 5.5 | 3,911 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_d_1996 | 39.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1996 | 95% CI 35.6% to 42.9% | 874 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | go_d_2000 | 29.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2000 | 95% CI 25.5% to 32.7% | 819 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | go_d_2010 | 21.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2010 | 95% CI 17.1% to 25.5% | 571 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | go_d_2016 | 22.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 | 95% CI 18.5% to 25.4% | 894 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | go_d_2024 | 27.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2024 | 95% CI 23.0% to 31.7% | 830 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | go_d_e | 47.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 45.6% to 49.1% | 4,054 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_d_l | 25.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 23.7% to 26.9% | 5,211 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_fall_d | 22.0 | percentage points | fall in the weighted share, early period minus late period (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 19.7 to 24.4 | 9,265 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_fall_d_9600 | 10.1 | percentage points | fall in the weighted Democratic share, 1996 minus 2000 (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1996 to 2000 | 95% CI 5.0 to 15.2 | 1,693 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | go_fall_i | 21.1 | percentage points | fall in the weighted share, early period minus late period (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | independents who lean toward neither party who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 16.7 to 25.5 | 3,372 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_gap_1996 | 10.4 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1996 | 95% CI 5.0 to 15.9 | 1,577 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | go_gap_2008 | 22.8 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2008 | 95% CI 15.8 to 29.7 | 1,075 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | go_gap_2024 | 30.7 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2024 | 95% CI 24.1 to 37.4 | 1,542 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | go_gap_e | 6.8 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 4.0 to 9.7 | 6,274 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_gap_e_design | 6.8 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share, with a design-based interval (Taylor linearisation with the GSS strata and primary sampling units); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 3.9 to 9.8 | 6,274 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_gap_l | 27.7 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 24.9 to 30.4 | 8,833 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_gap_l_design | 27.7 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share, with a design-based interval (Taylor linearisation with the GSS strata and primary sampling units); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 25.0 to 30.3 | 8,833 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_gap_l_ftf | 24.7 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question interviewed in person | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled), in-person interviews | 95% CI 20.4 to 29.1 | 3,705 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_gap_l_web | 29.6 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question interviewed on the web | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled), web interviews | 95% CI 25.7 to 33.4 | 4,183 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_gapchg | 20.8 | percentage points | late-period gap minus early-period gap, Republican minus Democratic share (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 16.8 to 24.8 | 15,107 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_i_e | 48.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | independents who lean toward neither party who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 44.8% to 52.2% | 937 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_i_l | 27.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | independents who lean toward neither party who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 25.0% to 29.8% | 2,435 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_mode_diff_l | 4.8 | percentage points | gap among respondents interviewed on the web minus the gap among respondents interviewed in person (two separate groups, different survey years); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI −1.0 to 10.7 | 7,888 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_r_9806_hi | 47.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | highest of the five yearly weighted Republican shares in the GSS surveys of 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1998 to 2006 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | go_r_9806_lo | 44.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | lowest of the five yearly weighted Republican shares in the GSS surveys of 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 and 2006; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1998 to 2006 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | go_r_e | 54.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 51.9% to 56.5% | 2,220 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_r_l | 53.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 50.8% to 55.2% | 3,622 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_r_mid | 45.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1998 to 2006 (GSS surveys pooled) | 95% CI 43.7% to 48.1% | 2,550 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | go_step_d_1624 | +5.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted Democratic share, 2024 minus 2016 (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.2 to 10.9 | 1,724 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gp_chg_d | −13.8 | percentage points | late-period share minus 1980 share (two separate samples); the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −18.1 to −9.5 | 5,942 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gp_chg_r | +7.1 | percentage points | late-period share minus 1980 share (two separate samples); the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.5 to 12.8 | 4,047 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gp_chg_r_ftf | +3.5 | percentage points | late-period share minus 1980 share (two separate samples); the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question interviewed in person | 1980 to 2016 to 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI −2.7 to 9.8 | 1,963 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gp_chg_r_web | +9.7 | percentage points | late-period share minus 1980 share (two separate samples); the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question interviewed on the web | 1980 to 2016 to 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 3.7 to 15.8 | 2,118 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gp_d_e | 29.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1980 (GSS) | 95% CI 25.6% to 33.7% | 733 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gp_d_l | 15.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 14.5% to 17.1% | 5,209 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gp_fall_d | 13.8 | percentage points | fall in the weighted share, 1980 minus the late period (two separate samples); the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 9.5 to 18.1 | 5,942 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gp_gap_e | 1.8 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1980 (GSS) | 95% CI −4.8 to 8.4 | 1,170 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gp_gap_l | 22.8 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 20.2 to 25.3 | 8,819 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gp_r_e | 31.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1980 (GSS) | 95% CI 26.2% to 36.7% | 437 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gp_r_ftf_hi | 38.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | highest of the yearly weighted Republican shares personally owning a gun in the GSS surveys of 2016 to 2024 with enough respondents; the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question, interviewed in person | 2016 to 2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gp_r_ftf_lo | 33.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | lowest of the yearly weighted Republican shares personally owning a gun in the GSS surveys of 2016 to 2024 with enough respondents; the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question, interviewed in person | 2016 to 2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gp_r_l | 38.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 36.4% to 40.8% | 3,610 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gp_r_web_hi | 42.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | highest of the yearly weighted Republican shares personally owning a gun in the GSS surveys of 2016 to 2024 with enough respondents; the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question, interviewed on the web | 2016 to 2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gp_r_web_lo | 40.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | lowest of the yearly weighted Republican shares personally owning a gun in the GSS surveys of 2016 to 2024 with enough respondents; the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question, interviewed on the web | 2016 to 2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | grad_d_l | 38.2 | percentage points | weighted share in rural areas minus weighted share in central cities (two groups); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 30.4 to 46.0 | 2,082 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | grad_r_l | 31.5 | percentage points | weighted share in rural areas minus weighted share in central cities (two groups); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 23.7 to 39.3 | 1,189 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | gss_web_2021 | 87% | share of interviews | share of interviews by web (count) | GSS 2021 respondents who answered the gun in the home question | 2021 | | 3,912 | none (interview count) | General Social Survey | | | mo_anes_2016_ftf | 45.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share; the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2016, in-person interviews | 95% CI 38.7 to 52.1 | 1,037 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_anes_2016_web | 42.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share; the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2016, web interviews | 95% CI 38.0 to 46.3 | 2,620 | weight_web (web mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_own_2018_ftf | 27.3 | percentage points | weighted Republican minus Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2018, in-person interviews | 95% CI 19.9 to 34.6 | 1,074 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mo_own_2021_web | 28.7 | percentage points | weighted Republican minus Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2021, web interviews | 95% CI 24.2 to 33.3 | 2,619 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mo_own_2024_ftf | 25.9 | percentage points | weighted Republican minus Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI 14.4 to 37.3 | 528 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mo_own_2024_web | 34.1 | percentage points | weighted Republican minus Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 25.2 to 43.1 | 822 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mo_perm_2018_ftf | 22.8 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 2018, in-person interviews | 95% CI 16.0 to 29.7 | 1,087 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mo_perm_2021_web | 35.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 2021, web interviews | 95% CI 31.1 to 39.7 | 2,661 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mo_perm_2024_ftf | 18.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 2024, in-person interviews | 95% CI 7.6 to 29.1 | 532 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mo_perm_2024_web | 34.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 26.2 to 42.3 | 837 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mo_perm_diff_2024 | 15.9 | percentage points | web gap minus in-person gap (two separate groups); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question | 2024 | 95% CI 2.4 to 29.3 | 1,369 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mo_perm_step_1821 | 12.6 | percentage points | 2021 web gap minus 2018 in-person gap (two separate samples in different modes); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 2018 (in person) to 2021 (web) | 95% CI 4.5 to 20.7 | 3,748 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_a_item | 22,800 | respondents | count of respondents with a usable answer to VCF9238 | ANES respondents who answered the question on buying a gun | 2000-2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_a_waves | 6 | studies | count of study years with the item | ANES studies that asked the question on buying a gun | 2000-2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ces_itemyears | 34 | item-years | count of item-years with a party gap | CES gun items | 2010-2021 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_ces_resp | 443,846 | respondents | count of respondents with an answer to at least one of the five gun items | CES respondents who answered at least one gun item | 2010-2021 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_g_own | 47,521 | respondents | count of respondents with a yes or no answer to owngun | GSS respondents who answered the gun in the home question | 1973-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_g_own_waves | 30 | surveys | count of survey years with the item | GSS survey years that asked the gun in the home question | 1973-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_g_perm | 50,498 | respondents | count of respondents with a favor or oppose answer to gunlaw | GSS respondents who answered the police permit question | 1972-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_g_perm_waves | 32 | surveys | count of survey years with the item | GSS survey years that asked the police permit question | 1972-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_mode_pairs | 7 | comparisons | count of web minus in-person gap comparisons: GSS gun in the home 2022 and 2024, GSS police permit 2022 and 2024, ANES buying a gun 2012, 2016 and 2024 | web and in-person gaps in the same year | 2012-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_ns_resp | 476,723 | respondents | count of respondents in the weeks through 28 December 2020 with an answer to at least one of the seven gun items | Nationscape respondents who answered at least one gun item | July 2019 to December 2020 | | | none (count) | Nationscape | | | n_rural_d_l | 267 | respondents | count of respondents in the rural Democratic cell | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) in rural areas who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | ns_assault_gap | 34.6 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share, weekly waves pooled; the Nationscape item: ban assault rifles | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 34.1 to 35.1 | 343,886 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_ban_d | 32.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share, weekly waves pooled; the Nationscape item: ban all guns | Democrats (leaners included) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 32.5% to 33.2% | 181,840 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_ban_gap | 21.0 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share, weekly waves pooled; the Nationscape item: ban all guns | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 20.6 to 21.5 | 349,269 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_ban_r | 11.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share, weekly waves pooled; the Nationscape item: ban all guns | Republicans (leaners included) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 11.5% to 12.0% | 167,429 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_bg_d | 95.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share, weekly waves pooled; the Nationscape item: background checks for all gun purchases | Democrats (leaners included) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 94.8% to 95.1% | 202,676 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_bg_gap | 5.8 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share, weekly waves pooled; the Nationscape item: background checks for all gun purchases | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 5.5 to 6.1 | 372,105 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_bg_r | 89.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share, weekly waves pooled; the Nationscape item: background checks for all gun purchases | Republicans (leaners included) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 89.0% to 89.5% | 169,429 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_chg_max | 2.2 | percentage points | largest absolute change in the party gap across the seven Nationscape items, July to December 2020 minus July to December 2019 | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July to December 2019 to July to December 2020 | | | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_control_gap | 35.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic minus Republican share, weekly waves pooled; the Nationscape item: controlling who owns guns matters more than the right to own | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 34.4 to 36.6 | 68,631 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_household_d | 29.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share, weekly waves pooled; the Nationscape item: a household member owns a gun | Democrats (leaners included) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 29.2% to 29.8% | 206,052 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_household_gap | 22.0 | percentage points | weighted Republican minus Democratic share, weekly waves pooled; the Nationscape item: a household member owns a gun | Democrats and Republicans (no leaners) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 21.5 to 22.5 | 379,036 | weight | Nationscape | | | ns_household_r | 51.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share, weekly waves pooled; the Nationscape item: a household member owns a gun | Republicans (leaners included) who answered the item | July 2019 to December 2020 | 95% CI 51.1% to 51.8% | 172,984 | weight | Nationscape | | | pl_city_d_l | 18.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) in the central city who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 16.5% to 21.3% | 1,815 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | pl_city_r_l | 39.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) in the central city who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 34.5% to 44.7% | 794 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | pl_max_gap_e | 16.8 | percentage points | highest of the eight weighted Republican minus Democratic gaps; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) in each of four regions and four community types, who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | | | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | pl_max_gap_l | 29.3 | percentage points | highest of the eight weighted Republican minus Democratic gaps; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) in each of four regions and four community types, who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | | | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | pl_min_gap_e | −1.5 | percentage points | lowest of the eight weighted Republican minus Democratic gaps; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) in each of four regions and four community types, who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | | | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | pl_min_gap_l | 14.0 | percentage points | lowest of the eight weighted Republican minus Democratic gaps; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) in each of four regions and four community types, who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | | | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | pl_n_groups | 8 | rows | count of regions and community types in the place figure | four regions and four community types | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | pl_n_zero_e | 4 | rows | count of the eight rows in which the 95% interval of the Republican minus Democratic gap includes zero | four regions and four community types | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | pl_ne_d_e | 22.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) in the northeast who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 19.5% to 25.9% | 851 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | pl_ne_gap_e | 16.8 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) in the northeast, who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 11.0 to 22.5 | 1,334 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | pl_rural_d_l | 57.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) in the rural area who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 49.7% to 64.6% | 267 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | pl_rural_gap_e | 2.1 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) in the rural area, who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI −3.2 to 7.5 | 1,218 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | pl_rural_gap_l | 14.0 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) in the rural area, who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 4.5 to 23.5 | 662 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | pl_rural_r_l | 71.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Republican identifiers (leaners included) in the rural area who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 65.2% to 76.9% | 395 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_cmp_d | 11.5 | percentage points | weighted share of Democrats with a gun in the home favoring a permit minus the share of Republicans without one (two groups); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic owners and Republican nonowners (leaners included), who answered both GSS questions | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 7.1 to 15.9 | 3,050 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_cmp_r | 5.5 | percentage points | Democratic minus Republican gap among respondents without a gun in the home minus the size of the difference between Republican owners and Republican nonowners (four groups); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered both GSS questions | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI −1.8 to 12.8 | 7,418 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_gap_diff | 6.0 | percentage points | Democratic minus Republican gap among respondents with a gun in the home minus the gap among those without (four groups); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered both GSS questions | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 0.5 to 11.6 | 8,738 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_non_d_l | 85.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) without a gun in the home, who answered both GSS questions | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 84.3% to 87.3% | 3,831 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_non_gap_e | 3.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) without a gun in the home, who answered both GSS questions | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 0.2 to 6.3 | 3,182 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_non_gap_l | 22.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) without a gun in the home, who answered both GSS questions | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 18.5 to 25.6 | 5,561 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_non_r_l | 63.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Republican identifiers (leaners included) without a gun in the home, who answered both GSS questions | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 60.5% to 67.0% | 1,730 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_own_d_l | 75.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) with a gun in the home, who answered both GSS questions | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 72.2% to 78.3% | 1,320 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_own_gap_e | 0.9 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) with a gun in the home, who answered both GSS questions | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI −3.1 to 4.9 | 2,995 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_own_gap_l | 28.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) with a gun in the home, who answered both GSS questions | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 23.8 to 32.4 | 3,177 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_own_r_l | 47.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Republican identifiers (leaners included) with a gun in the home, who answered both GSS questions | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 44.2% to 50.2% | 1,857 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_ownchg_d_l | −10.6 | percentage points | weighted share among respondents with a gun in the home minus the share among those without (two groups); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered both GSS questions | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI −14.0 to −7.2 | 5,151 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | po_ownchg_r_l | −16.6 | percentage points | weighted share among respondents with a gun in the home minus the share among those without (two groups); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered both GSS questions | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI −21.0 to −12.2 | 3,587 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | rdcr_e | 31.9 | percentage points | weighted share of rural Democrats minus weighted share of central-city Republicans with a gun in the home (two groups); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers in rural areas and Republican identifiers in central cities (leaners included), who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 25.9 to 38.0 | 1,224 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | rdcr_l | 17.5 | percentage points | weighted share of rural Democrats minus weighted share of central-city Republicans with a gun in the home (two groups); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic identifiers in rural areas and Republican identifiers in central cities (leaners included), who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 8.5 to 26.6 | 1,061 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | ref_d_e | 0.6% | percent of respondents who were asked the household question | weighted share who refused or skipped the question (owngun refused, or missing with rowngun refused) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who were asked the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 0.3% to 0.8% | 4,077 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | ref_d_l | 1.0% | percent of respondents who were asked the household question | weighted share who refused or skipped the question (owngun refused, or missing with rowngun refused) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who were asked the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 0.6% to 1.3% | 5,257 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | ref_r_e | 0.5% | percent of respondents who were asked the household question | weighted share who refused or skipped the question (owngun refused, or missing with rowngun refused) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who were asked the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 0.2% to 0.9% | 2,233 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | ref_r_l | 5.4% | percent of respondents who were asked the household question | weighted share who refused or skipped the question (owngun refused, or missing with rowngun refused) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who were asked the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 4.4% to 6.4% | 3,806 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | rule_sd | 0.25 | standard deviations of the answer | threshold of the sort-date rule of the chapter Sort dates by attitude | the party gap on an attitude | all survey years | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | sd_own_bound | 2008 | year | first survey year in which the lower end of the 95% interval of the Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score of a gun in the home (owngun, scored 1 for yes) exceeds the rule and stays above it in every later survey | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1972-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | sd_own_point | 1998 | year | first survey year in which the point estimate of the Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score of a gun in the home (owngun, scored 1 for yes) exceeds the rule and stays above it in every later survey | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1972-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | sd_own_upper | 1993 | year | first survey year from which the upper end of the 95% interval of the Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score of a gun in the home (owngun, scored 1 for yes) stays above the rule in every later survey | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1972-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | sd_perm_bound | 2014 | year | first survey year in which the lower end of the 95% interval of the Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score of opposing a police permit (gunlaw, scored 1 for oppose) exceeds the rule and stays above it in every later survey | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1972-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | sd_perm_point | 2000 | year | first survey year in which the point estimate of the Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score of opposing a police permit (gunlaw, scored 1 for oppose) exceeds the rule and stays above it in every later survey | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1972-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | sd_perm_upper | 1993 | year | first survey year from which the upper end of the 95% interval of the Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score of opposing a police permit (gunlaw, scored 1 for oppose) stays above the rule in every later survey | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS police permit question | 1972-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | size_anes_harder | 15.7 | percentage points | size of the size of the Republican change minus the size of the Democratic change (each change is a later minus earlier weighted share from two separate samples; sizes are absolute values); the ANES question on buying a gun (VCF9238), answer more difficult | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2000 to 2020 | 95% CI 9.7 to 21.8 | 8,050 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | size_ces_assault | 7.2 | percentage points | size of the size of the Republican change minus the size of the Democratic change (each change is a later minus earlier weighted share from two separate samples; sizes are absolute values); the CES item on banning assault rifles (guns_assaultban), answer support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 4.6 to 9.9 | 33,271 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | size_ces_names | 8.2 | percentage points | size of the Democratic change minus the size of the Republican change (each change is a later minus earlier weighted share from two separate samples; sizes are absolute values); the CES item on prohibiting publication of gun owners' names (guns_names), answer support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2013 to 2020 | 95% CI 5.6 to 10.8 | 62,485 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | size_ces_permits | 4.6 | percentage points | size of the Democratic change minus the size of the Republican change (each change is a later minus earlier weighted share from two separate samples; sizes are absolute values); the CES item on easier concealed-carry permits (guns_permits), answer support | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 1.8 to 7.4 | 33,311 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | size_gss_own | 20.8 | percentage points | size of the Democratic change minus the size of the Republican change (each change is a later minus earlier weighted share from two separate samples; sizes are absolute values); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 1973-80 to 2016-24 | 95% CI 16.8 to 24.8 | 15,107 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | size_gss_permit | 9.6 | percentage points | size of the size of the Republican change minus the size of the Democratic change (each change is a later minus earlier weighted share from two separate samples; sizes are absolute values); the GSS question on a police permit to buy a gun (gunlaw), answer favor | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 1973-80 to 2016-24 | 95% CI 6.1 to 13.1 | 16,442 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | size_gss_personal | 6.7 | percentage points | size of the Democratic change minus the size of the Republican change (each change is a later minus earlier weighted share from two separate samples; sizes are absolute values); the GSS personally owns a gun follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home; no gun in the home counts as not owning), answer yes | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the item | 1980 to 2016-24 | 95% CI −0.4 to 13.8 | 9,989 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | t_bg_r | 80.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the 2024 ANES item on background checks for gun purchases (V242326), answer favor | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the 2024 ANES background checks item | 2024 | 95% CI 77.9% to 82.8% | 2,074 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_gap_h | 50.7 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the 2024 ANES question on buying a gun (V242325), answer more difficult | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the 2024 ANES question on buying a gun | 2024 | 95% CI 47.0 to 54.3 | 4,389 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_h_d | 82.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the 2024 ANES question on buying a gun (V242325), answer more difficult | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the 2024 ANES question on buying a gun | 2024 | 95% CI 80.0% to 84.5% | 2,319 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_h_r | 31.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the 2024 ANES question on buying a gun (V242325), answer more difficult | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the 2024 ANES question on buying a gun | 2024 | 95% CI 28.6% to 34.4% | 2,070 | w_post (V240107b, post-election); w_post_ftf and w_post_web for the mode views | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_own_d | 28.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share with one or more guns in the household (V241583, asked before the election) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the 2024 ANES household guns question | 2024 | 95% CI 26.0% to 31.2% | 2,489 | w_pre (V240107a, pre-election) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_own_gap | 23.6 | percentage points | weighted Republican share minus weighted Democratic share with one or more guns in the household (V241583) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the 2024 ANES household guns question | 2024 | 95% CI 19.6 to 27.7 | 4,571 | w_pre (V240107a, pre-election) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | t_own_r | 52.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share with one or more guns in the household (V241583, asked before the election) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the 2024 ANES household guns question | 2024 | 95% CI 49.1% to 55.3% | 2,082 | w_pre (V240107a, pre-election) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | wh_chg_d | −21.3 | percentage points | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | White Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −24.1 to −18.6 | 6,839 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | wh_chg_r | +1.7 | percentage points | late-period share minus early-period share (two separate samples); the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | White Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 to 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −1.6 to 5.0 | 5,359 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | wh_d_e | 49.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | White Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 47.6% to 51.3% | 3,413 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | wh_d_l | 28.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS gun in the home question (owngun), answer yes | White Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 26.1% to 30.1% | 3,426 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | wh_share_d_e | 84.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who are White (GSS race 1) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 1973 to 1980 (GSS surveys of 1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980, pooled) | 95% CI 83.0% to 85.5% | 4,054 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | wh_share_d_l | 64.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share who are White (GSS race 1) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS gun in the home question | 2016 to 2024 (GSS surveys of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, pooled) | 95% CI 62.9% to 66.4% | 5,174 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are pooled | General Social Survey | | | z_anes_2000_lo | 0.38 | standard deviations of the answer | lower end of the 95% interval of the Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score of the three-answer question (VCF9238, scored 1 more difficult, 2 same, 3 easier) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES question on buying a gun | 2000 | | 1,559 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Party sorting: The alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors. - HC3 robust standard errors: A way of computing standard errors that stays valid when the spread of the outcome differs across respondents, with a correction for small samples. The book uses it for regressions that have no clusters. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. ## Methods Sample. GSS respondents (raw file, weight_use) who answered the gun in the home question (owngun, yes or no; refused is missing): 47,521 respondents in 30 surveys from 1973 to 2024; the police permit question (gunlaw, favor or oppose): 50,498 respondents in 32 surveys from 1972 to 2024; the personally owns follow-up (rowngun, asked of respondents with a gun in the home from 1980): 41,426 respondents in 26 surveys. ANES Cumulative Data File respondents who answered the question on buying a gun (VCF9238): 22,800 respondents in 6 studies (2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020); ANES 2024 Time Series respondents with a post-election weight: 4,964. CES respondents who answered at least one of five gun items between 2010 and 2021: 443,846. Nationscape respondents who answered at least one of seven gun items in the weeks from July 2019 to 28 December 2020: 476,723. Party and estimand. Democrats and Republicans include leaners (ANES and CES seven-point party identification 1 to 3 and 5 to 7; GSS partyid 0 to 2 and 4 to 6); independents are those who lean toward neither party (ANES and CES 4, GSS 3). Nationscape asks the three-category party question and, of every independent in every week, whether the respondent is closer to the Democratic Party, the Republican Party or neither, so its Democrats and Republicans include leaners and its independents answered neither; independents without a lean answer and respondents who chose something else have no party. Each outcome is the share giving one answer, as the wording table lists. The party gap is written so that it is positive when the party that favors that side is higher: Democratic minus Republican for favoring a police permit, making buying a gun more difficult, background checks, an assault rifle ban, a registry, limiting magazines, banning all guns, stricter sale laws and putting gun control above gun rights; Republican minus Democratic for a gun in the home, personal ownership, easier concealed-carry permits and prohibiting publication of owners' names. Coding. Coding is read from stored labels and never from a correlation with party: GSS owngun, rowngun 1 yes, 2 no, 3 refused; gunlaw 1 favor, 2 oppose; region 1 northeast to 4 west; ANES VCF9238 1 more difficult, 2 keep the rules about the same, 3 make it easier; ANES 2024 V242325 1 more difficult, 2 easier, 3 keep the rules (recoded to the cumulative-file order), V242326 and V242329 1 favor, 2 oppose, 3 neither; CES raw items 1 support, 2 oppose and the sale-law scale 1 more strict, 2 less strict, 3 kept as they are (the stored 0 or 1 items are checked against the raw items); Nationscape items are stored as 1 for agree or yes. Personal ownership is 1 if owngun is yes and rowngun is yes, 0 if owngun is no or rowngun is no, and missing otherwise. Community type groups the NORC size of place code xnorcsiz: central cities (codes 1 and 2), suburbs and unincorporated areas of metropolitan cities (3 to 6), small cities and towns (7 and 8) and rural areas (9 and 10). Weights. GSS weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before); the GSS interview mode is joined from the raw file. In person means interviewed in person (GSS mode 1) or in any survey before 2004, which was in person by design; web means GSS mode 4. One weighting rule applies to every pooled period and subgroup: the weights of all respondents who answered the item and named a party are rescaled to average one within each survey year, and only then is a subgroup (region, community type, race, owner, interview mode) selected. ANES weight VCF0009z, with weight_ftf and weight_web in 2012 and 2016 (the 2020 study has no mode weights). ANES 2024 post-election items use V240107b, the household guns item uses the pre-election weight V240107a, and the mode views use V240101b and V240102b of the fresh in-person and fresh web samples. CES weight, the single-wave weight. Nationscape weight. Intervals. 95% intervals use the Kish effective sample size with a normal approximation, treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the strata and clusters of the designs. A gap, a change between surveys or periods and a mode difference combine the two standard errors in quadrature, treating the estimates as independent. The place-adjusted gaps and changes are weighted linear probability models with HC3 errors. The CES and Nationscape are opt-in panels, so their intervals rest on a model. As a check on the simple-random-sample intervals, the pooled GSS gaps also have design-based intervals from a Taylor linearisation with the survey strata (vstrat) and primary sampling units (vpsu), which the GSS records from 1975 (the 1973 and 1974 respondents enter as single-respondent units): ownership gap 6.8 [3.9, 9.8] early and 27.7 [25.0, 30.3] late; permit gap 4.1 [1.9, 6.4] early and 29.4 [26.7, 32.2] late; the design-based standard error is 1.03 times the one used in the chapter for the early ownership gap and 0.97 times for the late one. Periods. The early period pools the GSS surveys of 1973 to 1980 that asked the item (1973, 1974, 1976, 1977 and 1980 for a gun in the home, and also 1975 for the police permit) and the late period pools those of 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2024, after rescaling each year's weights to average one so that years count in proportion to their respondents. Personal ownership starts in 1980, so its early period is the 1980 survey alone. The CES and ANES changes compare the first and last year each item was asked. Suppression. A Democratic or Republican cell in a yearly series needs at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100; an independent or all-respondent cell, and every cell in a mode, place, period or item split, needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. A gap needs both party cells to clear the floor. A Nationscape week needs at least 500 respondents on the item. Dating by reference. The dates use the rule of the chapter Sort dates by attitude: the Republican minus Democratic gap in the within-year z-score, scored so that a higher value is less regulation (a gun in the home, opposing a permit, the three-answer ANES item scored 1 more difficult to 3 easier), a threshold of 0.25 standard deviations, the point-estimate date as the first survey from which the estimate stays above it and the lower-bound date as the first survey from which the lower end of the 95% interval stays above it; the upper-bound date is the first survey from which the upper end stays above it. This chapter standardizes over the Democratic and Republican identifiers with the item in each survey; the code of that chapter standardizes over all respondents with the item, and the dates are the same either way (checked in the build). The difference between the ownership and permit z-gaps is tested survey by survey as a difference of independent estimates. Refusals. Refused answers to the household question (owngun refused, or owngun missing with rowngun refused) are left out. The bounds count every refusal as an owner or as a nonowner. Smith, Laken and Son's estimate that most refusers are owners covers the surveys of 1973 to 2012. CES. The per-year sign check recomputes the party gap in the expected direction for every item-year (all item-years, 34 in all) and finds it above zero in each, so the 2014 reversal of the ACA repeal item that the loader corrects has no counterpart in the gun items. Nationscape. Weekly waves from July 2019 to 28 December 2020 are pooled with the Nationscape weight; the half-year comparison uses July to December 2019 and July to December 2020. ANES 2024. The 2024 buying-a-gun point comes from the 2024 Time Series because the cumulative file lacks the item for 2024; it is weighted with the post-election weight and plotted with the cumulative-file points. ## What these data cannot show - Each survey draws a new sample, so a change in a party's share can come from people changing their view, changing their party or being replaced by new adults, and these data cannot separate the three. - A Democratic fall in gun ownership could be Democrats who gave up a gun, gun owners who left the party, or younger Democrats who never owned one. - The ownership results are not evidence that ownership changed party loyalty or that party loyalty changed ownership, which Joslyn and coauthors study with vote choice [3]. - The chapter has no birth cohort breakdown and does not date when any individual changed. - The ownership measures are reports. - One respondent answers for the home, so the household share depends on who answers, and Smith, Laken and Son show that husbands and wives report differently [4]. - Refusals are about 5.4% of Republican respondents in 2016 to 2024, and the bounds treat them as all owners or none, which leaves the Republican change in household ownership uncertain. - The items count guns in the home or owned, not how many guns, what kind, whether they are carried or how they are stored. - The policy items each name one proposal, so the chapter says nothing about other debates such as laws on carrying a gun without a permit or on removing guns from people judged to be dangerous, and it has no measure of how strongly respondents hold a view, which was the question in the study by Schuman and Presser [2]. - Wording limits every comparison across surveys. - The CES items are for or against a proposal in a list, the ANES 2024 items offer a middle answer, and the Nationscape items offer not sure, so the levels differ by survey even where the gaps agree. - The ANES 2024 buying a gun point comes from the separate Time Series file, and the GSS and ANES samples after 2020 mix or change interview mode, which affects the latest permit result, the Republican personal ownership rise and the 2020 ANES step. - The GSS intervals treat respondents as drawn one by one; the design-based check above changes the pooled gaps little. - The CES and Nationscape are opt-in panels, and the gun items in the CES end in 2021. - Place is the respondent's own community type and census region, which are not the county and say nothing about rural counties as a whole. - The chapter has no result on firearm deaths, which Chapter 13.2, Firearm deaths and the vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/firearm-deaths-and-the-vote; planned) is planned to take up. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Schuman, Howard; Presser, Stanley (1977). Attitude Measurement and the Gun Control Paradox. Public Opinion Quarterly 41(4): 427-438. https://doi.org/10.1086/268405 3. Joslyn, Mark R.; Haider-Markel, Donald P.; Baggs, Michael; Bilbo, Andrew (2017). Emerging Political Identities? Gun Ownership and Voting in Presidential Elections. Social Science Quarterly 98(2): 382-396. https://doi.org/10.1111/ssqu.12421 4. Smith, Tom W.; Laken, Faith; Son, Jaesok (2014). Gun Ownership in the United States: Measurement Issues and Trends. GSS Methodological Report No. 123, NORC at the University of Chicago (revised October 2015). https://gss.norc.org/Documents/reports/methodological-reports/MR123%20Gun%20Ownership.pdf 5. Dagonel, Angelo (2023). Guide to the Cumulative CES Policy Preferences. Harvard Dataverse, Cumulative CES Policy Preferences, version 3 (guide last updated 2023-01-18). https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OSXDQO 6. Tausanovitch, Chris; Vavreck, Lynn (2023). Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape Project (data version 20211215). Harvard Dataverse, version 1. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/CQFP3Z 7. American National Election Studies (2021). ANES 2020 Time Series Study Full Release: User Guide and Codebook. Stanford University and the University of Michigan. https://electionstudies.org/data-center/2020-time-series-study/ ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/guns/build.py (sha256 2435098c44ad5ef8193deab2e6b0125641c3c5c85ee9608fc5fa6edef59655f2) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes2024_ts/anes_timeseries_2024_spss_20260519.sav | 12,757,094 | 3107c838755f88353d0e3e39b2c3d5f76a2888cf56a179e3acac84ab431335d2 | bb318a018a39b4cf87ccc91b50a5b7c5b41746d28c0226f4a6c176e8c74966d6 | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/nationscape/nationscape_clean.parquet | 43,528,088 | 6a7904b0ca979052a375585356a3e4fb85129f4902770bee653b54e95fc936e4 | 8dc1daf282a9fa90033abf3be0312eb5d1bf351a6a0b719c43204c904af86a44 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | ec35efc6b8fb4d66d65a5da232ce6f1cda1747e043c980234d6ccb48f1216366 | | figures/ces_items.json | b13291afa6257cda8a6ff4c35bd0fa8a9c7b16098c94184971f0f3d0f569d23a | | figures/gap_by_year.json | c688906b84ecefe4eac999cb679b309d615678642ad2c11223011c21bbfdce41 | | figures/mode_check.json | add3877504bee663726ce47ec8c1615175bc810ab402f2f04e8b9d6bdae7ccce | | figures/nationscape.json | c0eaa33b7da0d9e6b0c364752f7188bf5b9c740604089e941e0ff46263702912 | | figures/own_by_party.json | 742e060f9b946e3a0a0bde871e0c4786ab875553d6d1100d08d2b2a1ebf2fe70 | | figures/permit_by_party.json | 00d52f14e3ddfa0c1cf44e88e92b79345fcb71aa0d9d27fb371d31f0530bb02c | | figures/place_gap.json | 601b5e9c58784e23df9f895ed72e2cad13279493e707058f49fdf01280c3eef6 | | figures/within_party.json | 8bcb2482539e0cc4954d5fb236db663654c7fb0cc00f213ad8908ad245d78c21 | | figures/wording.json | 1045d838fb874fa20239e1b20abd4d0f494890a739c801526def19c7cd59a486 | | meta.json | 9cef3177ab7854a58426b19fdfebcb843b22021a2ae9aef44ca4ef6d3ad229ff | | refs.json | 332c6a3eb29691bb7b7ccc4b449e24b59c3f7da1117fc35240037f7f16e3891d | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/guns/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/guns/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/facts.json - Table 1, figure "wording" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/wording.json - Table 2, figure "own_by_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/own_by_party.json - Table 3, figure "permit_by_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/permit_by_party.json - Table 4, figure "gap_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/gap_by_year.json - Table 5, figure "place_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/place_gap.json - Table 6, figure "ces_items" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/ces_items.json - Table 7, figure "nationscape" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/nationscape.json - Table 8, figure "mode_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/mode_check.json - Table 9, figure "within_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/guns/figures/within_party.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Perceptions of the economy: report Chapter 4.4 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Perceptions of the economy - Chapter: 4.4 (Part IV, Issue by issue; The great sorting) - Question: How much do partisans' views of the national economy depend on which party holds the White House? - Dek: In the American National Election Studies from 2012 to 2024, the president's partisans were 34.0 points more likely than the other party's partisans to say the economy had gotten better over the past year. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024, surveys from 1980 to 2024: retrospective economy (VCF0870), approval of the president's job (VCF0450), party identification (VCF0301), president in office; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode comparison - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative common content 2006-2024: retrospective economy (economy_retro), 7-point party identification; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (year-specific) - Nationscape. Weekly waves July 2019 to January 2021: retrospective economy (economy_better_scale), 3-category party identification; years: 2019-07-18 to 2021-04-15 (85 weekly waves); weights: weight (survey weight) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026perceptionsoftheeconomy ```bibtex @misc{singh2026perceptionsoftheeconomy, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Perceptions of the economy}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) | 34.0 | 95% CI 32.5 to 35.4 | 20,874 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | prem_late | | weighted share saying better | Democrats including leaners | 2016 | 45.0% | 95% CI 42.3% to 47.7% | 1,934 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | d_share_2016 | | weighted share saying better | Republicans including leaners | 2016 | 11.2% | 95% CI 9.6% to 13.1% | 1,726 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | r_share_2016 | | weighted share saying better | Democrats including leaners | 2020 | 5.2% | 95% CI 4.3% to 6.3% | 3,829 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | d_share_2020 | | weighted share saying better | Republicans including leaners | 2020 | 36.2% | 95% CI 34.1% to 38.4% | 3,425 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | r_share_2020 | | constant | cutoff that separates the low-premium surveys | 1980 to 2024 | 10 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | low_cut | | count | ANES surveys with a premium below the cutoff | 1980 to 2024 | 6 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_low | | count | ANES surveys that ask the retrospective economy item | 1980 to 2024 | 18 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_years | | count of respondents in the yearly premium cells | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1980 to 2024 | 42,864 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_n_resp | | count of respondents in the yearly premium cells | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024 | 568,229 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | ces_n_resp | | count of respondents in the weekly party cells | Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item | July 2019 to January 2021 | 324,560 | | | none (count) | Nationscape | ns_n_resp | | count | Nationscape waves with 500 or more Democrats and 500 or more Republicans | July 2019 to January 2021 | 80 | | | none (count) | Nationscape | n_ns_weeks | ## Findings In the American National Election Studies (ANES) of 2016, with a Democrat in the White House, 45.0% of Democrats and 11.2% of Republicans said the national economy had gotten better over the past year. In 2020, with a Republican in the White House, the shares were 5.2% and 36.2%. The president's party had the higher share in every ANES survey since 1980 and in every Cooperative Election Study (CES) survey since 2006. The difference between the parties, counted in points, averaged 34.0 in the ANES from 2012 to 2024. It was smaller than 10 points in 6 of the 18 ANES surveys. The measure is one survey question about the past year, a judgment rather than a measured condition. The ANES asks whether, over the past year, the nation's economy has gotten better, stayed about the same or gotten worse. The CES asks the same question with five answers, and this chapter counts somewhat better and much better as better. A respondent is a partisan if they name a party or say they lean toward one (leaners are included), and pure independents are left out. The in-party premium, called the premium below, is the share of the president's party who say better minus the share of the other party who say better, so it is signed toward the president's party. The gap is the Democratic share minus the Republican share, so it is signed by party. Because the gap changes sign with the presidency, the chapter follows the premium over time rather than the gap. The analysis uses 42,864 ANES partisans, 568,229 CES partisans and, for the weekly figure, 324,560 respondent-weeks in 80 waves of the Nationscape survey. (Note: Every estimate is weighted with the survey weights of its survey. Each interval is a confidence interval that treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample, using the Wilson formula [1] on the Kish effective sample size [2], and intervals that account for the sample design can be wider or narrower.) ### Each party says the economy improved under its own president Table 1 plots the two parties' answers in each ANES survey since 1980. The line for the party in the White House is above the other line in every survey, and the two lines cross at every change of party. The gap between Democrats and Republicans was +33.8 (95% CI 30.5 to 37.0) points in 2016, −31.0 (95% CI −33.3 to −28.7) in 2020 and +31.8 (95% CI 28.8 to 34.8) in 2024, so it reversed sign at each of the last two changes of party. (Note: The gap changes sign at all 6 changes of party in the ANES and at all 3 in the CES. At 4 of the 6 ANES changes and 3 of the 3 CES changes, the gap before and the gap after each have an interval on the side of zero that the president's party predicts. The two ANES exceptions are the change from 1980 to 1982, where the earlier gap was +1.4 (95% CI −0.6 to 3.4) points, and the change from 1992 to 1994, where the later gap was +4.0 (95% CI −1.2 to 9.3). Both intervals include zero.) The difference between the lines has a 95% interval above zero in 15 of the 18 surveys. The exceptions are 1980, 1990 and 1994, where the interval includes zero, and this chapter comes back to them below. The intervals for 2002 (3.0 (95% CI 0.2 to 5.9) points) and 2008 (2.2 (95% CI 0.3 to 4.0) points) start close to zero. An interval that accounted for the sample design could be wider, and those two surveys would then join the exceptions. Table 1. Each party is more likely to say the economy improved when its own party holds the White House The CES asks the item every year, so it shows how fast the reversal happens (Table 2). Between 2016 and 2017 the gap moved from +43.6 to −48.3 points. Between 2020 and 2021 it moved from −38.7 to +37.9, and between 2008 and 2009 from −1.3 to +19.2. The 95% interval of the premium is above zero in 19 of the 19 CES surveys. The 2008 gap is small because no more than 2.1% of either party said the economy got better in the autumn of 2008, a survey taken up again below. Table 2. In the CES the president's party has the higher share in every year, and the lines cross at each change of party in the White House ### The ANES premium is higher after 2012 The evidence for a rise is thin, because it rests on the six ANES surveys from 1980 to 1990 and the four from 2012 to 2024. Table 3 plots the in-party premium in both surveys. In the six ANES surveys from 1980 to 1990 the premium averaged 14.8 points, and in the four surveys from 2012 to 2024 it averaged 34.0, a difference of 19.2 (95% CI 4.8 to 33.7) points. (Note: Each average counts every survey once, so a survey with more respondents does not weigh more. The six earlier surveys are 1980, 1982, 1984, 1986, 1988 and 1990, and the four later ones are 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024. The interval on the difference treats each survey as one observation and lets the two periods differ in spread (a Welch t interval). Sampling error alone gives 19.2 (95% CI 17.2 to 21.3) for the same difference, an interval that describes these ten surveys and not a typical survey of each period.) The earlier average includes 1980 and 1990, when no more than 4.3% of either party said the economy got better. Leaving those two surveys out, the average for 1982 to 1988 is 21.8 points, and the later average is 12.2 (95% CI −4.3 to 28.8) points higher, an interval that includes zero when each survey is one observation. Most of the difference between the averages comes from the president's party. Its share saying better averaged 26.0% in the earlier surveys and 41.6% in the later ones, while the other party's share went from 11.2% to 7.7%. Table 3. The ANES premium averages higher from 2012 on, while the CES premium ranges from 1.3 to 63.1 points The higher level from 2012 does not come from the web samples that the ANES added that year. The premium was already 32.5 (95% CI 27.0 to 38.0) points in 2004, when interviews were mainly face-to-face, and Table 4 shows that face-to-face interviews alone give 35.1 (95% CI 29.9 to 40.4) points in 2012, 38.4 (95% CI 32.3 to 44.5) in 2016 and 33.3 (95% CI 26.9 to 39.7) in 2024. The smallest of the three is 33.3 points, against an average of 14.8 from 1980 to 1990. The two interview modes do not give the same premium. Face-to-face minus web is −6.7 (95% CI −13.0 to −0.3) points in 2012, +6.3 (95% CI −0.9 to 13.5) in 2016 and +1.6 (95% CI −6.2 to 9.5) in 2024, so the difference reaches 6.7 points and changes sign between 2012 and 2016. Only the 2012 interval excludes zero. The two surveys differ in level. The CES premium is higher than the ANES premium in every year in which both ask the item after 2008, by 11.2 (95% CI 8.1 to 14.4) points in 2012, 9.9 (95% CI 6.5 to 13.2) in 2016, 7.7 (95% CI 5.2 to 10.2) in 2020 and 15.7 (95% CI 12.5 to 19.0) in 2024. The questions differ in the number of answers, and the surveys differ in mode, sample and weighting. This chapter compares the shape of each series and does not treat the levels as interchangeable. Table 4. Face-to-face interviews alone give an ANES premium of at least 33.3 points in 2012, 2016 and 2024, against an average of 14.8 points from 1980 to 1990 The CES cannot say whether the premium rose, because its series starts in 2006. Its premium runs from 1.3 (95% CI 0.9 to 1.6) points in 2008 to 63.1 (95% CI 62.1 to 64.0) in 2006. By presidency the average premium runs between 29.3 and 42.5 points (Table 5), and within each presidency the highest and lowest yearly premiums differ by at least 26.7 points. (Note: The CES fields a large survey in each even year, when there is a national election, and a smaller one in each odd year. Its premium averages 39.7 points in the even-year surveys and 31.5 in the odd-year surveys, and the cumulative file gives no reason for the difference. A straight line fitted to the yearly premiums has a slope of 0.53 (95% CI −0.85 to 1.91) points per year over 2006 to 2024 in the CES, an interval that includes zero and the ANES slope of 0.49 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.97) points per year over 1980 to 2024. The ANES interval clears zero by a small margin, and without 1980 and 1990 the ANES slope is 0.37 (95% CI −0.16 to 0.89) points per year.) Table 5. The CES premium averages between 29.3 and 42.5 points by presidency, and the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by at least 26.7 points ### The premium shrinks when the president's party says worse In 6 of the 18 ANES surveys (1980, 1990, 1992, 1994, 2002 and 2008) the premium is below 10 points, and it is at most 5.7. In the other 12 surveys it is 14.6 or more. In every low survey except 1994, no more than 8.1% of the president's party said the economy got better, against at least 22.8% in every one of the other surveys (Table 6). The premium cannot exceed the share of the president's own party who say better, so a survey in which even the president's partisans mostly say worse leaves little room for it. Table 6. The premium is below 10 points in 6 ANES surveys, and in all but 1994 no more than 8.1% of the president's party said the economy got better In 1990, 72.3% of the president's party and 75.8% of the other party said the economy got worse, and in 2008 the shares were 87.6% and 93.9%. The parties still differed about the president in these years. The approval premium, the share of the president's party approving of the president's job minus the share of the other party, was at least 34.9 points in every ANES survey, including 1990 and 2008. The 1994 survey does not fit that account. 37.2% of the president's party and 33.2% of the other party said the economy got better, and the premium of 4.0 (95% CI −1.2 to 9.3) points has an interval that includes zero. Approval of Clinton divided the parties as usual, by 55.0 (95% CI 50.3 to 59.7) points. The ANES interviewed its 1994 sample after the November election, but it did the same in 1982, 1986, 1990 and 1998, so timing does not separate 1994 from those surveys. These data cannot say whether the state of the economy or a feature of the sample made the premium small. (Note: In only 1 other ANES survey, 1998, was the other party's share saying better higher in the sample than in 1994, at 38.4% (95% CI 33.8% to 43.3%), and that interval overlaps the 1994 interval.) ### Weekly answers moved before the 2021 inauguration The weekly Nationscape survey shows how quickly answers can change (Table 7). In late February 2020, 74.9% (95% CI 71.7% to 77.8%) of Republican identifiers said the economy got better, and by mid-April the share was 22.0% (95% CI 19.2% to 25.1%). The Democratic share went from 20.0% to 12.1% over the same weeks. A Republican was president, so the premium is the Republican share minus the Democratic share, and it went from 54.9 (95% CI 50.9 to 58.9) points to 10.0 (95% CI 6.2 to 13.7), close to the 10-point cutoff that marks the low-premium surveys above. The pandemic was declared in March, and the survey cannot separate a change in conditions from a change in what partisans say. The levels differ from the other two surveys. In 2020 the share of Republicans saying better was 36.2% in the ANES and 44.4% in the CES, against 28.2% in Nationscape in the last full week before the election, and the Democratic shares were 5.2%, 5.7% and 10.3%. The surveys differ in mode, sample and timing, and Nationscape leaves out leaners, so this figure is read for its shape. Table 7. The Republican share saying better fell from 74.9% to 22.0% within two months in 2020, and the parties' lines met before the inauguration The change of president shows up before the inauguration. From the last full week before the election to mid-January the Democratic share rose from 10.3% to 18.2% and the Republican share fell from 28.2% to 18.6%, so the lines met before the new president took office. The Republican share in the election week itself, 33.6%, is above the share in the week before, but the intervals overlap. By the last week of January the shares were 23.6% and 13.3%. Several things changed between November and January, including the election result, and the survey cannot say which of them moved answers. ### Belief and expression give two readings of the gap The premium shows that partisans answer differently, not why. One reading is that partisans perceive different economies. Bartels found that Democrats and Republicans differ in their perceptions of events that have an objective answer [3]. A panel around the 2006 midterm election found that partisans' economic assessments moved apart after control of Congress changed, and the authors attribute the movement to different views of the parties' economic competence [4]. A second reading is that partisans give congenial answers when asked, even when they know or could infer less flattering facts. In two surveys with experiments, monetary payments and appeals for accuracy reduced the partisan gap in reports of economic conditions [5]. Small payments for correct answers also narrowed partisan gaps on other factual questions [6]. Behavior gives mixed evidence. One study found that consumption changed after a presidential election in line with a county's partisan makeup [7], and a later study of administrative spending data found that partisan shifts in expectations after the 2008 and 2016 elections had no effect on household spending [8]. Nothing in the ANES, CES or Nationscape items can separate these readings. Chapter 2.1, Feelings toward the other party (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party) covers how partisans feel about each other. Chapter 6.2, Trust in government (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/trust-in-government; planned) asks whether trust in the federal government also follows the party in the White House. Views about economic policy, such as trade and taxes, are a different subject from perceptions of how the economy performed, and Chapter 4.6, Trade and economic populism (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/trade-and-economic-populism; planned) takes them up. Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates when abortion, religion and racial resentment became partisan divides and finds no sort date for economic perceptions, whose gap follows the party of the president. ### What these data cannot show The surveys record what partisans say in one interview, so they cannot separate different information from a wish to praise one's own side. A partisan who answers "worse" may have read different news, may live in a region or work in an industry where the year went differently, may hold a different standard for what counts as better, or may be signaling loyalty. The question asks about the nation over one year, and the data hold no measure of what actually happened to unemployment, prices or income. The chapter reads the low-premium surveys through the share of each party saying worse and through presidential approval, and it cannot say how much of any survey's premium reflects conditions. The comparison of 1980 to 1990 with 2012 to 2024 also mixes party attachment with conditions. The earlier surveys include 1980 and 1990, when no more than 4.3% of either party said the economy got better, which lowers the earlier average, and the analysis cannot say what the premium would have been in those years with better conditions. The comparison rests on six and four surveys (four and four without 1980 and 1990), and the premium differs across surveys by more than sampling error, so the comparison of 1982 to 1988 with 2012 to 2024 cannot separate a higher premium from year-to-year variation. The CES starts in 2006, so it cannot check whether the premium was lower before then, and its own slope is too imprecise to confirm or rule out a rise since. Party identification is measured in the same interview as the economic judgment. A respondent whose view of the economy shapes their party identification would appear as a partisan with a matching view, and repeated cross-sections cannot separate that from partisans changing their view. The intervals for shares, premiums and gaps treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample, so the true intervals can be wider or narrower. The CES and Nationscape recruit online respondents who chose to join a panel, and their weights adjust for known traits only. The ANES has no weights for interview mode in 2020, so the mode comparison covers 2012, 2016 and 2024. The Nationscape party measure leaves out leaners, and its weekly estimates overlap the pandemic, so they cannot isolate the effect of any single event. The CES premium differs between even-year and odd-year surveys for reasons the file does not give. ## Tables ### Table 1. Each party is more likely to say the economy improved when its own party holds the White House Share of partisans (leaners included) saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by party; ANES, 1980 to 2024 | Survey year | Grouping | Group | President | Share saying better (%) | Interval low | Interval high | n | | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1980 | party | Democrats | Carter | 4.3 | 3.1 | 5.9 | 818 | | 1980 | party | Republicans | Carter | 2.9 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 523 | | 1980 | role | President's party | Carter | 4.3 | 3.1 | 5.9 | 818 | | 1980 | role | Other party | Carter | 2.9 | 1.7 | 4.7 | 523 | | 1982 | party | Democrats | Reagan | 6.6 | 5.0 | 8.6 | 758 | | 1982 | party | Republicans | Reagan | 22.8 | 19.1 | 26.9 | 435 | | 1982 | role | President's party | Reagan | 22.8 | 19.1 | 26.9 | 435 | | 1982 | role | Other party | Reagan | 6.6 | 5.0 | 8.6 | 758 | | 1984 | party | Democrats | Reagan | 25.9 | 23.3 | 28.6 | 1,013 | | 1984 | party | Republicans | Reagan | 63.8 | 60.6 | 67.0 | 868 | | 1984 | role | President's party | Reagan | 63.8 | 60.6 | 67.0 | 868 | | 1984 | role | Other party | Reagan | 25.9 | 23.3 | 28.6 | 1,013 | | 1986 | party | Democrats | Reagan | 17.7 | 15.5 | 20.2 | 1,043 | | 1986 | party | Republicans | Reagan | 32.3 | 29.1 | 35.7 | 755 | | 1986 | role | President's party | Reagan | 32.3 | 29.1 | 35.7 | 755 | | 1986 | role | Other party | Reagan | 17.7 | 15.5 | 20.2 | 1,043 | | 1988 | party | Democrats | Reagan | 10.8 | 8.9 | 12.9 | 920 | | 1988 | party | Republicans | Reagan | 29.1 | 26.0 | 32.3 | 801 | | 1988 | role | President's party | Reagan | 29.1 | 26.0 | 32.3 | 801 | | 1988 | role | Other party | Reagan | 10.8 | 8.9 | 12.9 | 920 | | 1990 | party | Democrats | Bush | 3.5 | 2.5 | 4.8 | 1,000 | | 1990 | party | Republicans | Bush | 3.7 | 2.5 | 5.3 | 710 | | 1990 | role | President's party | Bush | 3.7 | 2.5 | 5.3 | 710 | | 1990 | role | Other party | Bush | 3.5 | 2.5 | 4.8 | 1,000 | | 1992 | party | Democrats | Bush | 2.4 | 1.7 | 3.5 | 1,217 | | 1992 | party | Republicans | Bush | 8.1 | 6.5 | 10.0 | 918 | | 1992 | role | President's party | Bush | 8.1 | 6.5 | 10.0 | 918 | | 1992 | role | Other party | Bush | 2.4 | 1.7 | 3.5 | 1,217 | | 1994 | party | Democrats | Clinton | 37.2 | 33.6 | 41.0 | 819 | | 1994 | party | Republicans | Clinton | 33.2 | 29.6 | 37.0 | 741 | | 1994 | role | President's party | Clinton | 37.2 | 33.6 | 41.0 | 819 | | 1994 | role | Other party | Clinton | 33.2 | 29.6 | 37.0 | 741 | | 1996 | party | Democrats | Clinton | 48.6 | 44.9 | 52.3 | 887 | | 1996 | party | Republicans | Clinton | 26.2 | 22.6 | 30.2 | 650 | | 1996 | role | President's party | Clinton | 48.6 | 44.9 | 52.3 | 887 | | 1996 | role | Other party | Clinton | 26.2 | 22.6 | 30.2 | 650 | | 1998 | party | Democrats | Clinton | 53.7 | 49.5 | 57.8 | 647 | | 1998 | party | Republicans | Clinton | 38.4 | 33.8 | 43.3 | 467 | | 1998 | role | President's party | Clinton | 53.7 | 49.5 | 57.8 | 647 | | 1998 | role | Other party | Clinton | 38.4 | 33.8 | 43.3 | 467 | | 2000 | party | Democrats | Clinton | 49.6 | 45.9 | 53.3 | 879 | | 2000 | party | Republicans | Clinton | 26.3 | 22.8 | 30.1 | 676 | | 2000 | role | President's party | Clinton | 49.6 | 45.9 | 53.3 | 879 | | 2000 | role | Other party | Clinton | 26.3 | 22.8 | 30.1 | 676 | | 2002 | party | Democrats | Bush | 3.7 | 2.3 | 5.8 | 703 | | 2002 | party | Republicans | Bush | 6.7 | 4.8 | 9.4 | 665 | | 2002 | role | President's party | Bush | 6.7 | 4.8 | 9.4 | 665 | | 2002 | role | Other party | Bush | 3.7 | 2.3 | 5.8 | 703 | | 2004 | party | Democrats | Bush | 10.1 | 7.7 | 13.1 | 585 | | 2004 | party | Republicans | Bush | 42.6 | 37.9 | 47.4 | 479 | | 2004 | role | President's party | Bush | 42.6 | 37.9 | 47.4 | 479 | | 2004 | role | Other party | Bush | 10.1 | 7.7 | 13.1 | 585 | | 2008 | party | Democrats | Bush | 1.4 | 0.8 | 2.4 | 1,362 | | 2008 | party | Republicans | Bush | 3.5 | 2.2 | 5.6 | 651 | | 2008 | role | President's party | Bush | 3.5 | 2.2 | 5.6 | 651 | | 2008 | role | Other party | Bush | 1.4 | 0.8 | 2.4 | 1,362 | | 2012 | party | Democrats | Obama | 48.8 | 46.4 | 51.3 | 3,091 | | 2012 | party | Republicans | Obama | 9.4 | 7.9 | 11.2 | 1,992 | | 2012 | role | President's party | Obama | 48.8 | 46.4 | 51.3 | 3,091 | | 2012 | role | Other party | Obama | 9.4 | 7.9 | 11.2 | 1,992 | | 2016 | party | Democrats | Obama | 45.0 | 42.3 | 47.7 | 1,934 | | 2016 | party | Republicans | Obama | 11.2 | 9.6 | 13.1 | 1,726 | | 2016 | role | President's party | Obama | 45.0 | 42.3 | 47.7 | 1,934 | | 2016 | role | Other party | Obama | 11.2 | 9.6 | 13.1 | 1,726 | | 2020 | party | Democrats | Trump | 5.2 | 4.3 | 6.3 | 3,829 | | 2020 | party | Republicans | Trump | 36.2 | 34.1 | 38.4 | 3,425 | | 2020 | role | President's party | Trump | 36.2 | 34.1 | 38.4 | 3,425 | | 2020 | role | Other party | Trump | 5.2 | 4.3 | 6.3 | 3,829 | | 2024 | party | Democrats | Biden | 36.5 | 33.9 | 39.3 | 2,546 | | 2024 | party | Republicans | Biden | 4.7 | 3.6 | 6.2 | 2,331 | | 2024 | role | President's party | Biden | 36.5 | 33.9 | 39.3 | 2,546 | | 2024 | role | Other party | Biden | 4.7 | 3.6 | 6.2 | 2,331 | Views: Democrats and Republicans (basis = party); President's party and other party (basis = role). Note: The ANES ran no survey in 2006, 2010, 2014, 2018 or 2022, so each line joins survey years. Note: Interviews before 2012 were mainly face-to-face; web samples begin in 2012 (see the mode comparison later in the chapter). Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_anes.json ### Table 2. In the CES the president's party has the higher share in every year, and the lines cross at each change of party in the White House Share of partisans (leaners included) saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by party; CES, 2006 to 2024 | Survey year | Party | President | Share saying better (%) | Interval low | Interval high | n | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2006 | Democrats | Bush | 7.2 | 6.8 | 7.7 | 16,316 | | 2006 | Republicans | Bush | 70.3 | 69.4 | 71.1 | 14,998 | | 2007 | Democrats | Bush | 2.1 | 1.6 | 2.8 | 4,240 | | 2007 | Republicans | Bush | 25.6 | 23.7 | 27.6 | 3,671 | | 2008 | Democrats | Bush | 0.9 | 0.7 | 1.1 | 14,626 | | 2008 | Republicans | Bush | 2.1 | 1.9 | 2.4 | 13,856 | | 2009 | Democrats | Obama | 24.4 | 23.1 | 25.7 | 5,973 | | 2009 | Republicans | Obama | 5.2 | 4.6 | 5.9 | 5,453 | | 2010 | Democrats | Obama | 36.0 | 35.1 | 37.0 | 23,997 | | 2010 | Republicans | Obama | 5.9 | 5.4 | 6.4 | 23,350 | | 2011 | Democrats | Obama | 24.3 | 23.0 | 25.6 | 9,165 | | 2011 | Republicans | Obama | 4.9 | 4.2 | 5.6 | 7,285 | | 2012 | Democrats | Obama | 55.9 | 55.0 | 56.9 | 24,943 | | 2012 | Republicans | Obama | 5.3 | 4.9 | 5.8 | 20,488 | | 2013 | Democrats | Obama | 46.1 | 44.5 | 47.8 | 7,387 | | 2013 | Republicans | Obama | 10.5 | 9.4 | 11.8 | 5,253 | | 2014 | Democrats | Obama | 52.8 | 51.9 | 53.8 | 25,131 | | 2014 | Republicans | Obama | 11.9 | 11.3 | 12.6 | 18,807 | | 2015 | Democrats | Obama | 56.3 | 54.6 | 57.9 | 6,480 | | 2015 | Republicans | Obama | 12.9 | 11.7 | 14.2 | 4,792 | | 2016 | Democrats | Obama | 52.2 | 51.4 | 53.0 | 30,201 | | 2016 | Republicans | Obama | 8.6 | 8.1 | 9.1 | 20,484 | | 2017 | Democrats | Trump | 26.6 | 25.3 | 28.1 | 8,200 | | 2017 | Republicans | Trump | 75.0 | 73.3 | 76.5 | 5,651 | | 2018 | Democrats | Trump | 23.3 | 22.6 | 24.1 | 26,244 | | 2018 | Republicans | Trump | 83.4 | 82.7 | 84.1 | 21,346 | | 2019 | Democrats | Trump | 26.3 | 25.1 | 27.7 | 8,081 | | 2019 | Republicans | Trump | 49.3 | 47.7 | 50.8 | 6,363 | | 2020 | Democrats | Trump | 5.7 | 5.3 | 6.1 | 28,686 | | 2020 | Republicans | Trump | 44.4 | 43.5 | 45.3 | 19,648 | | 2021 | Democrats | Biden | 45.5 | 44.3 | 46.7 | 11,808 | | 2021 | Republicans | Biden | 7.6 | 6.9 | 8.4 | 8,001 | | 2022 | Democrats | Biden | 25.0 | 24.3 | 25.8 | 28,158 | | 2022 | Republicans | Biden | 4.2 | 3.8 | 4.6 | 20,127 | | 2023 | Democrats | Biden | 41.9 | 40.6 | 43.2 | 10,420 | | 2023 | Republicans | Biden | 8.5 | 7.8 | 9.3 | 8,738 | | 2024 | Democrats | Biden | 52.5 | 51.5 | 53.5 | 28,671 | | 2024 | Republicans | Biden | 5.0 | 4.5 | 5.5 | 21,191 | Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2024; weighted (year-specific weight) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_ces.json ### Table 3. The ANES premium averages higher from 2012 on, while the CES premium ranges from 1.3 to 63.1 points In-party premium, percentage points; partisans including leaners; ANES 1980 to 2024 and CES 2006 to 2024 | Survey year | Survey | President | Premium (points) | Interval low | Interval high | n | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1980 | ANES | Carter | 1.4 | −0.6 | 3.4 | 1,341 | | 1982 | ANES | Reagan | 16.2 | 11.8 | 20.5 | 1,193 | | 1984 | ANES | Reagan | 38.0 | 33.8 | 42.1 | 1,881 | | 1986 | ANES | Reagan | 14.6 | 10.5 | 18.6 | 1,798 | | 1988 | ANES | Reagan | 18.3 | 14.6 | 22.1 | 1,721 | | 1990 | ANES | Bush | 0.2 | −1.6 | 2.0 | 1,710 | | 1992 | ANES | Bush | 5.7 | 3.7 | 7.6 | 2,135 | | 1994 | ANES | Clinton | 4.0 | −1.2 | 9.3 | 1,560 | | 1996 | ANES | Clinton | 22.3 | 17.1 | 27.6 | 1,537 | | 1998 | ANES | Clinton | 15.3 | 8.9 | 21.6 | 1,114 | | 2000 | ANES | Clinton | 23.3 | 18.1 | 28.5 | 1,555 | | 2002 | ANES | Bush | 3.0 | 0.2 | 5.9 | 1,368 | | 2004 | ANES | Bush | 32.5 | 27.0 | 38.0 | 1,064 | | 2008 | ANES | Bush | 2.2 | 0.3 | 4.0 | 2,013 | | 2012 | ANES | Obama | 39.4 | 36.4 | 42.4 | 5,083 | | 2016 | ANES | Obama | 33.8 | 30.5 | 37.0 | 3,660 | | 2020 | ANES | Trump | 31.0 | 28.7 | 33.3 | 7,254 | | 2024 | ANES | Biden | 31.8 | 28.8 | 34.8 | 4,877 | | 2006 | CES | Bush | 63.1 | 62.1 | 64.0 | 31,314 | | 2007 | CES | Bush | 23.5 | 21.5 | 25.6 | 7,911 | | 2008 | CES | Bush | 1.3 | 0.9 | 1.6 | 28,482 | | 2009 | CES | Obama | 19.2 | 17.7 | 20.7 | 11,426 | | 2010 | CES | Obama | 30.1 | 29.1 | 31.2 | 47,347 | | 2011 | CES | Obama | 19.4 | 18.0 | 20.9 | 16,450 | | 2012 | CES | Obama | 50.6 | 49.5 | 51.7 | 45,431 | | 2013 | CES | Obama | 35.6 | 33.6 | 37.6 | 12,640 | | 2014 | CES | Obama | 40.9 | 39.8 | 42.1 | 43,938 | | 2015 | CES | Obama | 43.4 | 41.3 | 45.4 | 11,272 | | 2016 | CES | Obama | 43.6 | 42.7 | 44.6 | 50,685 | | 2017 | CES | Trump | 48.3 | 46.2 | 50.4 | 13,851 | | 2018 | CES | Trump | 60.1 | 59.0 | 61.1 | 47,590 | | 2019 | CES | Trump | 22.9 | 20.9 | 24.9 | 14,444 | | 2020 | CES | Trump | 38.7 | 37.7 | 39.7 | 48,334 | | 2021 | CES | Biden | 37.9 | 36.4 | 39.3 | 19,809 | | 2022 | CES | Biden | 20.8 | 20.0 | 21.7 | 48,285 | | 2023 | CES | Biden | 33.4 | 31.9 | 34.9 | 19,158 | | 2024 | CES | Biden | 47.5 | 46.4 | 48.7 | 49,862 | | 1980 | ANES average | n/a | 14.8 | n/a | n/a | 9,644 | | 1990 | ANES average | n/a | 14.8 | n/a | n/a | 9,644 | | 2001 | ANES average | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | 2012 | ANES average | n/a | 34.0 | n/a | n/a | 20,874 | | 2024 | ANES average | n/a | 34.0 | n/a | n/a | 20,874 | Note: The ANES adds web interviews in 2012; the CES is an online panel throughout. Mode comparisons follow in the chapter. Note: The averages count each survey once and carry no band here: the interval of an average covers sampling error within each survey only, and the yearly premiums vary by more than that. Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024, and Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2024; weighted (VCF0009z for the ANES, year-specific weight for the CES) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_trend.json ### Table 4. Face-to-face interviews alone give an ANES premium of at least 33.3 points in 2012, 2016 and 2024, against an average of 14.8 points from 1980 to 1990 In-party premium, percentage points, by survey and interview mode; partisans including leaners; 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | Year | Survey and mode | Premium (points) | Interval low | Interval high | n | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2012 | ANES all modes | 39.4 | 36.4 | 42.4 | 5,083 | | 2012 | ANES face-to-face | 35.1 | 29.9 | 40.4 | 1,805 | | 2012 | ANES web | 41.8 | 38.2 | 45.4 | 3,278 | | 2012 | CES online panel | 50.6 | 49.5 | 51.7 | 45,431 | | 2016 | ANES all modes | 33.8 | 30.5 | 37.0 | 3,660 | | 2016 | ANES face-to-face | 38.4 | 32.3 | 44.5 | 1,042 | | 2016 | ANES web | 32.1 | 28.3 | 35.9 | 2,618 | | 2016 | CES online panel | 43.6 | 42.7 | 44.6 | 50,685 | | 2020 | ANES all modes | 31.0 | 28.7 | 33.3 | 7,254 | | 2020 | CES online panel | 38.7 | 37.7 | 39.7 | 48,334 | | 2024 | ANES all modes | 31.8 | 28.8 | 34.8 | 4,877 | | 2024 | ANES face-to-face | 33.3 | 26.9 | 39.7 | 966 | | 2024 | ANES web | 31.7 | 27.2 | 36.2 | 1,855 | | 2024 | CES online panel | 47.5 | 46.4 | 48.7 | 49,862 | Note: The ANES has no mode weights in 2020, so that year shows the all-mode estimate only. Note: The ANES all-mode estimate for 2024 also includes panel and paper respondents, who have no mode weight. Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024, and Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2024; weighted (VCF0009z for the ANES, year-specific weight for the CES); weight_ftf and weight_web for the face-to-face and web rows Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/instrument_and_mode.json ### Table 5. The CES premium averages between 29.3 and 42.5 points by presidency, and the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by at least 26.7 points Average, lowest and highest yearly in-party premium in each presidency, percentage points; partisans including leaners; CES, 2006 to 2024 | Presidency | Years | Average premium (points) | Lowest yearly premium | Highest yearly premium | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Bush | 2006 to 2008 | 29.3 | 1.3 | 63.1 | | Obama | 2009 to 2016 | 35.4 | 19.2 | 50.6 | | Trump | 2017 to 2020 | 42.5 | 22.9 | 60.1 | | Biden | 2021 to 2024 | 34.9 | 20.8 | 47.5 | Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2024; weighted (year-specific weight) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/ces_by_presidency.json ### Table 6. The premium is below 10 points in 6 ANES surveys, and in all but 1994 no more than 8.1% of the president's party said the economy got better In-party premium against the share of the president's party saying the economy got better, one point per ANES survey, 1980 to 2024; percent and percentage points | Survey year | President's party saying better (%) | Premium (points) | Interval low | Interval high | n | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1980 | 4.3 | 1.4 | −0.6 | 3.4 | 1,341 | | 1982 | 22.8 | 16.2 | 11.8 | 20.5 | 1,193 | | 1984 | 63.8 | 38.0 | 33.8 | 42.1 | 1,881 | | 1986 | 32.3 | 14.6 | 10.5 | 18.6 | 1,798 | | 1988 | 29.1 | 18.3 | 14.6 | 22.1 | 1,721 | | 1990 | 3.7 | 0.2 | −1.6 | 2.0 | 1,710 | | 1992 | 8.1 | 5.7 | 3.7 | 7.6 | 2,135 | | 1994 | 37.2 | 4.0 | −1.2 | 9.3 | 1,560 | | 1996 | 48.6 | 22.3 | 17.1 | 27.6 | 1,537 | | 1998 | 53.7 | 15.3 | 8.9 | 21.6 | 1,114 | | 2000 | 49.6 | 23.3 | 18.1 | 28.5 | 1,555 | | 2002 | 6.7 | 3.0 | 0.2 | 5.9 | 1,368 | | 2004 | 42.6 | 32.5 | 27.0 | 38.0 | 1,064 | | 2008 | 3.5 | 2.2 | 0.3 | 4.0 | 2,013 | | 2012 | 48.8 | 39.4 | 36.4 | 42.4 | 5,083 | | 2016 | 45.0 | 33.8 | 30.5 | 37.0 | 3,660 | | 2020 | 36.2 | 31.0 | 28.7 | 33.3 | 7,254 | | 2024 | 36.5 | 31.8 | 28.8 | 34.8 | 4,877 | Note: The chart shows each survey's estimate without its interval; the data table gives the interval of each premium. Source: American National Election Studies Cumulative Data File, 1980-2024; weighted (VCF0009z) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_vs_in_share.json ### Table 7. The Republican share saying better fell from 74.9% to 22.0% within two months in 2020, and the parties' lines met before the inauguration Share of Democratic and Republican identifiers saying the national economy got better over the past year, percent, by interview week; Nationscape, July 2019 to January 2021 | Week starts | Week ends | Party | Share saying better (%) | Interval low | Interval high | n | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2019-07-18 | 2019-07-21 | Democrats | 16.3 | 13.5 | 19.7 | 1,741 | | 2019-07-18 | 2019-07-21 | Republicans | 70.2 | 66.0 | 74.1 | 1,445 | | 2019-07-22 | 2019-07-28 | Democrats | 14.8 | 12.3 | 17.7 | 2,252 | | 2019-07-22 | 2019-07-28 | Republicans | 66.4 | 62.3 | 70.2 | 1,750 | | 2019-07-29 | 2019-08-04 | Democrats | 14.9 | 12.5 | 17.7 | 2,346 | | 2019-07-29 | 2019-08-04 | Republicans | 66.1 | 62.2 | 69.7 | 1,814 | | 2019-08-05 | 2019-08-11 | Democrats | 14.3 | 11.8 | 17.2 | 1,959 | | 2019-08-05 | 2019-08-11 | Republicans | 64.0 | 60.1 | 67.7 | 1,654 | | 2019-08-12 | 2019-08-18 | Democrats | 12.3 | 9.9 | 15.1 | 1,970 | | 2019-08-12 | 2019-08-18 | Republicans | 64.6 | 60.4 | 68.6 | 1,565 | | 2019-08-19 | 2019-08-25 | Democrats | 12.5 | 10.4 | 14.9 | 2,707 | | 2019-08-19 | 2019-08-25 | Republicans | 66.9 | 63.5 | 70.2 | 2,152 | | 2019-08-26 | 2019-09-01 | Democrats | 11.0 | 8.9 | 13.6 | 1,993 | | 2019-08-26 | 2019-09-01 | Republicans | 64.4 | 60.4 | 68.2 | 1,571 | | 2019-09-02 | 2019-09-08 | Democrats | 11.4 | 9.3 | 14.0 | 2,119 | | 2019-09-02 | 2019-09-08 | Republicans | 62.2 | 58.4 | 65.9 | 1,685 | | 2019-09-09 | 2019-09-15 | Democrats | 11.5 | 9.2 | 14.3 | 2,002 | | 2019-09-09 | 2019-09-15 | Republicans | 64.7 | 60.6 | 68.6 | 1,632 | | 2019-09-16 | 2019-09-22 | Democrats | 12.8 | 10.4 | 15.7 | 2,171 | | 2019-09-16 | 2019-09-22 | Republicans | 66.0 | 61.9 | 69.9 | 1,709 | | 2019-09-23 | 2019-09-29 | Democrats | 11.4 | 9.2 | 14.2 | 2,044 | | 2019-09-23 | 2019-09-29 | Republicans | 64.5 | 60.5 | 68.4 | 1,741 | | 2019-09-30 | 2019-10-06 | Democrats | 12.8 | 10.9 | 15.1 | 3,266 | | 2019-09-30 | 2019-10-06 | Republicans | 62.7 | 59.3 | 66.0 | 2,579 | | 2019-10-07 | 2019-10-13 | Democrats | 13.6 | 11.0 | 16.8 | 1,732 | | 2019-10-07 | 2019-10-13 | Republicans | 62.1 | 57.6 | 66.3 | 1,377 | | 2019-10-14 | 2019-10-20 | Democrats | 15.7 | 12.6 | 19.3 | 1,397 | | 2019-10-14 | 2019-10-20 | Republicans | 68.4 | 63.9 | 72.7 | 1,251 | | 2019-10-21 | 2019-10-27 | Democrats | 13.1 | 10.8 | 15.9 | 2,337 | | 2019-10-21 | 2019-10-27 | Republicans | 66.1 | 62.2 | 69.8 | 1,911 | | 2019-10-28 | 2019-11-03 | Democrats | 16.4 | 13.8 | 19.4 | 2,427 | | 2019-10-28 | 2019-11-03 | Republicans | 68.4 | 64.7 | 71.9 | 2,030 | | 2019-11-04 | 2019-11-10 | Democrats | 14.7 | 12.2 | 17.6 | 1,936 | | 2019-11-04 | 2019-11-10 | Republicans | 69.7 | 66.1 | 73.1 | 1,769 | | 2019-11-11 | 2019-11-17 | Democrats | 12.9 | 10.9 | 15.3 | 2,565 | | 2019-11-11 | 2019-11-17 | Republicans | 68.1 | 64.8 | 71.2 | 2,181 | | 2019-11-18 | 2019-11-24 | Democrats | 17.1 | 13.7 | 21.3 | 1,156 | | 2019-11-18 | 2019-11-24 | Republicans | 69.8 | 65.2 | 74.1 | 1,158 | | 2019-11-25 | 2019-12-01 | Democrats | 14.7 | 12.4 | 17.3 | 2,604 | | 2019-11-25 | 2019-12-01 | Republicans | 69.8 | 66.5 | 72.9 | 2,303 | | 2019-12-02 | 2019-12-08 | Democrats | 13.6 | 11.0 | 16.8 | 1,566 | | 2019-12-02 | 2019-12-08 | Republicans | 68.9 | 64.8 | 72.7 | 1,490 | | 2019-12-09 | 2019-12-15 | Democrats | 14.0 | 11.9 | 16.4 | 2,706 | | 2019-12-09 | 2019-12-15 | Republicans | 69.7 | 66.4 | 72.8 | 2,316 | | 2019-12-16 | 2019-12-22 | Democrats | 18.9 | 16.4 | 21.7 | 2,289 | | 2019-12-16 | 2019-12-22 | Republicans | 70.0 | 66.7 | 73.2 | 1,996 | | 2019-12-23 | 2019-12-29 | Democrats | 22.4 | 19.6 | 25.5 | 1,913 | | 2019-12-23 | 2019-12-29 | Republicans | 73.4 | 69.8 | 76.6 | 1,526 | | 2019-12-30 | 2020-01-05 | Democrats | 17.8 | 15.7 | 20.0 | 3,131 | | 2019-12-30 | 2020-01-05 | Republicans | 73.1 | 70.5 | 75.5 | 2,804 | | 2020-01-06 | 2020-01-12 | Democrats | 19.3 | 16.3 | 22.7 | 1,572 | | 2020-01-06 | 2020-01-12 | Republicans | 73.7 | 69.9 | 77.2 | 1,401 | | 2020-01-13 | 2020-01-19 | Democrats | 21.7 | 18.9 | 24.7 | 2,195 | | 2020-01-13 | 2020-01-19 | Republicans | 70.1 | 66.6 | 73.4 | 1,845 | | 2020-01-20 | 2020-01-26 | Democrats | 15.9 | 13.6 | 18.5 | 2,370 | | 2020-01-20 | 2020-01-26 | Republicans | 70.8 | 67.5 | 73.8 | 1,972 | | 2020-01-27 | 2020-02-02 | Democrats | 17.8 | 14.9 | 21.0 | 1,714 | | 2020-01-27 | 2020-02-02 | Republicans | 73.1 | 69.2 | 76.6 | 1,417 | | 2020-02-03 | 2020-02-09 | Democrats | 15.3 | 12.8 | 18.1 | 2,143 | | 2020-02-03 | 2020-02-09 | Republicans | 73.2 | 69.6 | 76.4 | 1,897 | | 2020-02-10 | 2020-02-16 | Democrats | 20.7 | 17.9 | 23.9 | 1,935 | | 2020-02-10 | 2020-02-16 | Republicans | 73.2 | 69.7 | 76.5 | 1,823 | | 2020-02-17 | 2020-02-23 | Democrats | 20.0 | 17.4 | 22.7 | 2,366 | | 2020-02-17 | 2020-02-23 | Republicans | 74.9 | 71.7 | 77.8 | 1,967 | | 2020-02-24 | 2020-03-01 | Democrats | 19.0 | 16.3 | 22.1 | 1,778 | | 2020-02-24 | 2020-03-01 | Republicans | 68.9 | 65.3 | 72.3 | 1,682 | | 2020-03-02 | 2020-03-08 | Democrats | 16.4 | 14.0 | 19.2 | 2,264 | | 2020-03-02 | 2020-03-08 | Republicans | 66.0 | 62.2 | 69.5 | 1,767 | | 2020-03-09 | 2020-03-15 | Democrats | 14.0 | 11.7 | 16.6 | 2,054 | | 2020-03-09 | 2020-03-15 | Republicans | 58.9 | 55.2 | 62.5 | 1,803 | | 2020-03-16 | 2020-03-22 | Democrats | 8.9 | 7.2 | 11.0 | 2,313 | | 2020-03-16 | 2020-03-22 | Republicans | 44.5 | 40.9 | 48.1 | 1,837 | | 2020-03-23 | 2020-03-29 | Democrats | 10.3 | 8.5 | 12.6 | 2,097 | | 2020-03-23 | 2020-03-29 | Republicans | 37.0 | 33.8 | 40.4 | 1,918 | | 2020-03-30 | 2020-04-05 | Democrats | 9.9 | 8.5 | 11.5 | 3,657 | | 2020-03-30 | 2020-04-05 | Republicans | 31.1 | 28.7 | 33.6 | 3,108 | | 2020-04-06 | 2020-04-12 | Democrats | 7.2 | 6.1 | 8.5 | 4,597 | | 2020-04-06 | 2020-04-12 | Republicans | 28.1 | 26.0 | 30.2 | 3,908 | | 2020-04-13 | 2020-04-19 | Democrats | 12.1 | 10.0 | 14.5 | 1,857 | | 2020-04-13 | 2020-04-19 | Republicans | 22.0 | 19.2 | 25.1 | 1,654 | | 2020-04-20 | 2020-04-26 | Democrats | 7.4 | 5.8 | 9.4 | 1,846 | | 2020-04-20 | 2020-04-26 | Republicans | 21.5 | 18.6 | 24.6 | 1,566 | | 2020-04-27 | 2020-05-03 | Democrats | 6.9 | 5.3 | 9.0 | 1,784 | | 2020-04-27 | 2020-05-03 | Republicans | 24.2 | 21.3 | 27.4 | 1,684 | | 2020-05-04 | 2020-05-10 | Democrats | 6.6 | 5.2 | 8.3 | 2,556 | | 2020-05-04 | 2020-05-10 | Republicans | 21.4 | 18.9 | 24.2 | 2,138 | | 2020-05-11 | 2020-05-17 | Democrats | 10.4 | 8.4 | 12.9 | 1,735 | | 2020-05-11 | 2020-05-17 | Republicans | 18.1 | 15.4 | 21.1 | 1,583 | | 2020-05-18 | 2020-05-24 | Democrats | 9.5 | 8.0 | 11.3 | 2,806 | | 2020-05-18 | 2020-05-24 | Republicans | 23.3 | 20.9 | 25.8 | 2,503 | | 2020-05-25 | 2020-05-31 | Democrats | 7.6 | 6.0 | 9.7 | 1,799 | | 2020-05-25 | 2020-05-31 | Republicans | 21.1 | 18.4 | 24.1 | 1,587 | | 2020-06-01 | 2020-06-07 | Democrats | 6.3 | 4.9 | 8.1 | 2,035 | | 2020-06-01 | 2020-06-07 | Republicans | 20.1 | 17.5 | 23.0 | 1,757 | | 2020-06-08 | 2020-06-14 | Democrats | 6.4 | 4.9 | 8.1 | 2,197 | | 2020-06-08 | 2020-06-14 | Republicans | 22.4 | 19.8 | 25.2 | 2,000 | | 2020-06-15 | 2020-06-21 | Democrats | 5.9 | 4.6 | 7.6 | 2,214 | | 2020-06-15 | 2020-06-21 | Republicans | 18.7 | 16.3 | 21.4 | 1,898 | | 2020-06-22 | 2020-06-28 | Democrats | 6.5 | 5.1 | 8.3 | 2,337 | | 2020-06-22 | 2020-06-28 | Republicans | 17.2 | 15.0 | 19.8 | 1,991 | | 2020-06-29 | 2020-07-05 | Democrats | 5.6 | 4.2 | 7.4 | 1,961 | | 2020-06-29 | 2020-07-05 | Republicans | 21.2 | 18.5 | 24.2 | 1,785 | | 2020-07-06 | 2020-07-12 | Democrats | 4.8 | 3.4 | 6.7 | 1,666 | | 2020-07-06 | 2020-07-12 | Republicans | 20.7 | 17.6 | 24.2 | 1,458 | | 2020-07-13 | 2020-07-19 | Democrats | 9.0 | 7.7 | 10.5 | 4,172 | | 2020-07-13 | 2020-07-19 | Republicans | 22.4 | 20.3 | 24.7 | 3,373 | | 2020-07-20 | 2020-07-26 | Democrats | 6.0 | 4.8 | 7.3 | 3,562 | | 2020-07-20 | 2020-07-26 | Republicans | 21.0 | 19.0 | 23.2 | 3,379 | | 2020-07-27 | 2020-08-02 | Democrats | 7.3 | 5.9 | 9.0 | 2,640 | | 2020-07-27 | 2020-08-02 | Republicans | 14.6 | 12.6 | 16.8 | 2,423 | | 2020-08-03 | 2020-08-09 | Democrats | 5.3 | 3.9 | 7.2 | 1,739 | | 2020-08-03 | 2020-08-09 | Republicans | 19.8 | 17.0 | 22.9 | 1,504 | | 2020-08-10 | 2020-08-16 | Democrats | 6.6 | 5.0 | 8.6 | 1,849 | | 2020-08-10 | 2020-08-16 | Republicans | 22.1 | 19.3 | 25.3 | 1,659 | | 2020-08-17 | 2020-08-23 | Democrats | 5.6 | 4.3 | 7.4 | 2,320 | | 2020-08-17 | 2020-08-23 | Republicans | 21.3 | 18.8 | 24.1 | 2,237 | | 2020-08-24 | 2020-08-30 | Democrats | 6.9 | 5.2 | 9.1 | 1,865 | | 2020-08-24 | 2020-08-30 | Republicans | 26.6 | 23.1 | 30.4 | 1,506 | | 2020-08-31 | 2020-09-06 | Democrats | 7.6 | 5.8 | 9.8 | 1,875 | | 2020-08-31 | 2020-09-06 | Republicans | 23.3 | 20.4 | 26.5 | 1,898 | | 2020-09-07 | 2020-09-13 | Democrats | 8.3 | 6.5 | 10.5 | 1,966 | | 2020-09-07 | 2020-09-13 | Republicans | 24.3 | 21.2 | 27.7 | 1,669 | | 2020-09-14 | 2020-09-20 | Democrats | 9.7 | 7.9 | 11.9 | 2,430 | | 2020-09-14 | 2020-09-20 | Republicans | 28.4 | 25.4 | 31.6 | 2,069 | | 2020-09-21 | 2020-09-27 | Democrats | 8.5 | 6.5 | 11.1 | 1,809 | | 2020-09-21 | 2020-09-27 | Republicans | 24.0 | 20.7 | 27.6 | 1,629 | | 2020-09-28 | 2020-10-04 | Democrats | 8.3 | 6.3 | 10.9 | 1,665 | | 2020-09-28 | 2020-10-04 | Republicans | 27.1 | 23.7 | 30.9 | 1,673 | | 2020-10-05 | 2020-10-11 | Democrats | 6.4 | 4.9 | 8.4 | 2,205 | | 2020-10-05 | 2020-10-11 | Republicans | 20.4 | 17.6 | 23.5 | 2,058 | | 2020-10-12 | 2020-10-18 | Democrats | 9.0 | 7.2 | 11.3 | 2,127 | | 2020-10-12 | 2020-10-18 | Republicans | 26.9 | 23.7 | 30.4 | 1,871 | | 2020-10-19 | 2020-10-25 | Democrats | 9.9 | 7.8 | 12.6 | 1,897 | | 2020-10-19 | 2020-10-25 | Republicans | 28.0 | 24.4 | 31.9 | 1,669 | | 2020-10-26 | 2020-11-01 | Democrats | 10.3 | 8.5 | 12.5 | 2,424 | | 2020-10-26 | 2020-11-01 | Republicans | 28.2 | 25.2 | 31.4 | 2,383 | | 2020-11-02 | 2020-11-08 | Democrats | 9.9 | 8.0 | 12.2 | 2,050 | | 2020-11-02 | 2020-11-08 | Republicans | 33.6 | 30.2 | 37.1 | 1,808 | | 2020-11-09 | 2020-11-15 | Democrats | 14.1 | 11.9 | 16.6 | 2,165 | | 2020-11-09 | 2020-11-15 | Republicans | 30.8 | 27.5 | 34.2 | 1,790 | | 2020-11-16 | 2020-11-22 | Democrats | 14.3 | 11.8 | 17.1 | 1,931 | | 2020-11-16 | 2020-11-22 | Republicans | 25.6 | 22.2 | 29.3 | 1,496 | | 2020-11-23 | 2020-11-29 | Democrats | 11.9 | 10.0 | 14.1 | 2,520 | | 2020-11-23 | 2020-11-29 | Republicans | 27.3 | 24.4 | 30.5 | 2,079 | | 2020-11-30 | 2020-12-06 | Democrats | 15.3 | 13.2 | 17.8 | 2,639 | | 2020-11-30 | 2020-12-06 | Republicans | 21.3 | 18.7 | 24.3 | 2,209 | | 2020-12-07 | 2020-12-13 | Democrats | 18.1 | 15.2 | 21.5 | 1,630 | | 2020-12-07 | 2020-12-13 | Republicans | 24.1 | 20.2 | 28.3 | 1,131 | | 2020-12-14 | 2020-12-20 | Democrats | 13.6 | 11.6 | 15.8 | 2,713 | | 2020-12-14 | 2020-12-20 | Republicans | 21.4 | 18.8 | 24.2 | 2,125 | | 2020-12-21 | 2020-12-27 | Democrats | 14.2 | 12.1 | 16.5 | 2,387 | | 2020-12-21 | 2020-12-27 | Republicans | 21.0 | 18.4 | 23.8 | 1,975 | | 2020-12-28 | 2020-12-30 | Democrats | 10.2 | 7.9 | 13.1 | 1,334 | | 2020-12-28 | 2020-12-30 | Republicans | 18.6 | 15.2 | 22.6 | 924 | | 2021-01-12 | 2021-01-16 | Democrats | 18.2 | 15.2 | 21.7 | 1,647 | | 2021-01-12 | 2021-01-16 | Republicans | 18.6 | 15.2 | 22.5 | 1,222 | | 2021-01-21 | 2021-01-24 | Democrats | 18.3 | 15.7 | 21.2 | 1,788 | | 2021-01-21 | 2021-01-24 | Republicans | 13.8 | 11.3 | 16.7 | 1,404 | | 2021-01-25 | 2021-01-31 | Democrats | 23.6 | 20.3 | 27.2 | 1,358 | | 2021-01-25 | 2021-01-31 | Republicans | 13.3 | 10.6 | 16.5 | 1,155 | Note: Party is the file's three-category party identification, so leaners are not counted with a party. Nationscape recruits online respondents who chose to take part, and the intervals treat it as a probability sample. Note: The levels differ from the other two surveys: in 2020 the Republican share saying better is 28.2% in the last full week before the election, against 36.2% in the ANES and 44.4% in the CES, so this figure is read for its shape. Note: The Republican share in the election week (33.6%) is above the share in the week before (28.2%), and its 95% interval overlaps the intervals of the weeks on either side. Note: No wave was fielded between the end of December 2020 and the middle of January 2021, and the line is not drawn across that gap. Source: Democracy Fund + UCLA Nationscape, July 2019 to January 2021; weighted (survey weight) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/nationscape_weeks.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (104), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | anes_gap_1980 | +1.4 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1980 | 95% CI −0.6 to 3.4 | 1,341 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1994 | +4.0 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1994 | 95% CI −1.2 to 9.3 | 1,560 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2016 | +33.8 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 30.5 to 37.0 | 3,660 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2020 | −31.0 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2020 | 95% CI −33.3 to −28.7 | 7,254 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2024 | +31.8 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 28.8 to 34.8 | 4,877 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_n_resp | 42,864 | respondents | count of respondents in the yearly premium cells | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_prem_1984 | 38.0 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1984 | 95% CI 33.8 to 42.1 | 1,881 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_prem_1990 | 0.2 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1990 | 95% CI −1.6 to 2.0 | 1,710 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_prem_1994 | 4.0 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1994 | 95% CI −1.2 to 9.3 | 1,560 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_prem_2002 | 3.0 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2002 | 95% CI 0.2 to 5.9 | 1,368 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_prem_2004 | 32.5 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2004 | 95% CI 27.0 to 38.0 | 1,064 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_prem_2008 | 2.2 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2008 | 95% CI 0.3 to 4.0 | 2,013 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_slope | 0.49 | percentage points per year | least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year, one point per survey, t interval | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1980 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.97 | 42,864 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_slope_ex | 0.37 | percentage points per year | least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year, one point per survey, t interval | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1982 to 2024, without 1980 and 1990 | 95% CI −0.16 to 0.89 | 39,813 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | appr_prem_1994 | 55.0 | percentage points | in-party share approving of the president's job minus out-party share, weighted | ANES partisans who gave an approve or disapprove answer | 1994 | 95% CI 50.3 to 59.7 | 1,509 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | appr_prem_min | 34.9 | percentage points | smallest yearly premium in approval of the president's job | ANES partisans who gave an approve or disapprove answer | 1980 to 2024 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ces_d_share_2020 | 5.7% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Democrats including leaners | 2020 | 95% CI 5.3% to 6.1% | 28,686 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_even_mean | 39.7 | percentage points | mean of the yearly premiums in the even-year surveys, each survey counted once | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006, 2008 and every second year to 2024 | | 441,268 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | No interval: it is the unweighted mean of 10 yearly premiums. | | ces_gap_2008 | −1.3 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2008 | 95% CI −1.6 to −0.9 | 28,482 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2009 | +19.2 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2009 | 95% CI 17.7 to 20.7 | 11,426 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2016 | +43.6 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 42.7 to 44.6 | 50,685 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2017 | −48.3 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2017 | 95% CI −50.4 to −46.2 | 13,851 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2020 | −38.7 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2020 | 95% CI −39.7 to −37.7 | 48,334 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2021 | +37.9 | percentage points, Democratic minus Republican | Democratic share saying better minus Republican share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2021 | 95% CI 36.4 to 39.3 | 19,809 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_mean_high | 42.5 | percentage points | largest of the four presidency means of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024, by presidency | | | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | No interval: the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by more than sampling error, and a presidency has only 3 to 8 surveys. | | ces_mean_low | 29.3 | percentage points | smallest of the four presidency means of the yearly premiums (Bush 2006 to 2008, Obama 2009 to 2016, Trump 2017 to 2020, Biden 2021 to 2024), each survey counted once | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024, by presidency | | | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | No interval: the yearly premiums within a presidency differ by more than sampling error, and a presidency has only 3 to 8 surveys. | | ces_n_resp | 568,229 | respondents | count of respondents in the yearly premium cells | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_odd_mean | 31.5 | percentage points | mean of the yearly premiums in the odd-year surveys, each survey counted once | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2007, 2009 and every second year to 2023 | | 126,961 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | No interval: it is the unweighted mean of 9 yearly premiums. | | ces_prem_2006 | 63.1 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 | 95% CI 62.1 to 64.0 | 31,314 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_prem_2008 | 1.3 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2008 | 95% CI 0.9 to 1.6 | 28,482 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_r_share_2020 | 44.4% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Republicans including leaners | 2020 | 95% CI 43.5% to 45.3% | 19,648 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_range_min | 26.7 | percentage points | smallest, across the four presidencies, of the largest minus the smallest yearly premium within the presidency | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024, by presidency | | | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_share_max_2008 | 2.1% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | larger of the two party shares | partisans of either party | 2008 | | | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_slope | 0.53 | percentage points per year | least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year, one point per survey, t interval | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2006 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.85 to 1.91 | 568,229 | weight (year-specific) | Cooperative Election Study | | | d_share_2016 | 45.0% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Democrats including leaners | 2016 | 95% CI 42.3% to 47.7% | 1,934 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | d_share_2020 | 5.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Democrats including leaners | 2020 | 95% CI 4.3% to 6.3% | 3,829 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ftf_min | 33.3 | percentage points | smallest of the three face-to-face premiums | ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2012, 2016 and 2024 | | | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ftf_prem_2012 | 35.1 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2012 | 95% CI 29.9 to 40.4 | 1,805 | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ftf_prem_2016 | 38.4 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2016 | 95% CI 32.3 to 44.5 | 1,042 | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ftf_prem_2024 | 33.3 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES face-to-face respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2024 | 95% CI 26.9 to 39.7 | 966 | weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | in_share_1994 | 37.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | partisans of the president's party | 1994 | 95% CI 33.6% to 41.0% | 819 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | in_share_early | 26.0% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once | partisans of the president's party | 1980 to 1990 (six surveys) | 95% CI 24.8% to 27.2% | 9,644 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | in_share_late | 41.6% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once | partisans of the president's party | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) | 95% CI 40.4% to 42.9% | 20,874 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | in_share_max_low5 | 8.1% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | largest in-party share among those surveys | partisans of the president's party | the five low-premium surveys other than 1994 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | in_share_min_high | 22.8% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | smallest in-party share among those surveys | partisans of the president's party | the surveys with a premium at or above the cutoff | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | in_worse_1990 | 72.3% | percent of partisans who said the economy got worse | weighted share saying worse | partisans of the president's party | 1990 | 95% CI 68.8% to 75.4% | 710 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | in_worse_2008 | 87.6% | percent of partisans who said the economy got worse | weighted share saying worse | partisans of the president's party | 2008 | 95% CI 84.3% to 90.2% | 651 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | low_cut | 10 | percentage points | constant | cutoff that separates the low-premium surveys | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | low_share_max_8090 | 4.3% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | largest of the four shares (both parties, both surveys) | partisans of either party | 1980 and 1990 | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | max_low | 5.7 | percentage points | largest premium among the surveys below the cutoff | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | the low-premium surveys | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | min_high | 14.6 | percentage points | smallest premium among the surveys at or above the cutoff | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | the other surveys | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_diff_2012 | −6.7 | percentage points, face-to-face minus web | face-to-face premium minus web premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2012 | 95% CI −13.0 to −0.3 | | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_diff_2016 | +6.3 | percentage points, face-to-face minus web | face-to-face premium minus web premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2016 | 95% CI −0.9 to 13.5 | | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_diff_2024 | +1.6 | percentage points, face-to-face minus web | face-to-face premium minus web premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2024 | 95% CI −6.2 to 9.5 | | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_diff_max | 6.7 | percentage points | largest absolute difference between the face-to-face and web premiums | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2012, 2016 and 2024 | | | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_both_ci | 4 | changes of party in the White House | count | transfers at which the gap before and the gap after each have an interval on the side of zero that the president's party predicts | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_ci_pos | 15 | ANES survey years | count | ANES surveys in which the 95% interval of the premium is above zero | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_transfers | 6 | changes of party in the White House | count | changes of the president's party between two surveys | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_years | 18 | ANES survey years | count | ANES surveys that ask the retrospective economy item | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ces_both_ci | 3 | changes of party in the White House | count | transfers at which the gap before and the gap after each have an interval on the side of zero that the president's party predicts | 2006 to 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_ces_ci_pos | 19 | CES survey years | count | CES surveys in which the 95% interval of the premium is above zero | 2006 to 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_ces_transfers | 3 | changes of party in the White House | count | changes of the president's party between two surveys | 2006 to 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_ces_years | 19 | CES survey years | count | CES surveys that ask the retrospective economy item | 2006 to 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_high | 12 | ANES survey years | count | ANES surveys with a premium at or above the cutoff | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_low | 6 | ANES survey years | count | ANES surveys with a premium below the cutoff | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ns_weeks | 80 | weekly waves | count | Nationscape waves with 500 or more Democrats and 500 or more Republicans | July 2019 to January 2021 | | | none (count) | Nationscape | | | n_out_above_1994 | 1 | ANES survey years | count | ANES surveys in which the share of the other party saying better exceeds the 1994 share | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ns_d_apr | 12.1% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Democrats among Nationscape respondents | 2020-04-13 to 2020-04-19 | 95% CI 10.0% to 14.5% | 1,857 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_d_end | 23.6% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Democrats among Nationscape respondents | 2021-01-25 to 2021-01-31 | 95% CI 20.3% to 27.2% | 1,358 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_d_feb | 20.0% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Democrats among Nationscape respondents | 2020-02-17 to 2020-02-23 | 95% CI 17.4% to 22.7% | 2,366 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_d_jan | 18.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Democrats among Nationscape respondents | 2021-01-12 to 2021-01-16 | 95% CI 15.2% to 21.7% | 1,647 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_d_oct | 10.3% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Democrats among Nationscape respondents | 2020-10-26 to 2020-11-01 | 95% CI 8.5% to 12.5% | 2,424 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_n_resp | 324,560 | respondent-weeks | count of respondents in the weekly party cells | Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item | July 2019 to January 2021 | | | none (count) | Nationscape | | | ns_prem_apr | 10.0 | percentage points | Republican share saying better minus Democratic share in one weekly wave (a Republican was president), standard errors combined in quadrature | Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item | 2020-04-13 to 2020-04-19 | 95% CI 6.2 to 13.7 | | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_prem_feb | 54.9 | percentage points | Republican share saying better minus Democratic share in one weekly wave (a Republican was president), standard errors combined in quadrature | Nationscape respondents who identify as Democrats or Republicans and answered the item | 2020-02-17 to 2020-02-23 | 95% CI 50.9 to 58.9 | | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_r_apr | 22.0% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2020-04-13 to 2020-04-19 | 95% CI 19.2% to 25.1% | 1,654 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_r_end | 13.3% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2021-01-25 to 2021-01-31 | 95% CI 10.6% to 16.5% | 1,155 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_r_feb | 74.9% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2020-02-17 to 2020-02-23 | 95% CI 71.7% to 77.8% | 1,967 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_r_jan | 18.6% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2021-01-12 to 2021-01-16 | 95% CI 15.2% to 22.5% | 1,222 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_r_nov | 33.6% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2020-11-02 to 2020-11-08 | 95% CI 30.2% to 37.1% | 1,808 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | ns_r_oct | 28.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better in one weekly wave | Republicans among Nationscape respondents | 2020-10-26 to 2020-11-01 | 95% CI 25.2% to 31.4% | 2,383 | weight (Nationscape survey weight) | Nationscape | | | offset_2012 | 11.2 | percentage points, CES minus ANES | CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | partisans with an answer in both surveys | 2012 | 95% CI 8.1 to 14.4 | | weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z) | Cooperative Election Study | | | offset_2016 | 9.9 | percentage points, CES minus ANES | CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | partisans with an answer in both surveys | 2016 | 95% CI 6.5 to 13.2 | | weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z) | Cooperative Election Study | | | offset_2020 | 7.7 | percentage points, CES minus ANES | CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | partisans with an answer in both surveys | 2020 | 95% CI 5.2 to 10.2 | | weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z) | Cooperative Election Study | | | offset_2024 | 15.7 | percentage points, CES minus ANES | CES premium minus ANES premium, standard errors combined in quadrature | partisans with an answer in both surveys | 2024 | 95% CI 12.5 to 19.0 | | weight (CES year-specific) and weight (ANES VCF0009z) | Cooperative Election Study | | | out_share_1994 | 33.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | partisans of the other party | 1994 | 95% CI 29.6% to 37.0% | 741 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | out_share_1998 | 38.4% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | partisans of the other party | 1998 | 95% CI 33.8% to 43.3% | 467 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | out_share_early | 11.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once | partisans of the other party | 1980 to 1990 (six surveys) | 95% CI 10.4% to 12.0% | 9,644 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | out_share_late | 7.7% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | mean of the yearly shares, each survey counted once | partisans of the other party | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) | 95% CI 6.9% to 8.4% | 20,874 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | out_worse_1990 | 75.8% | percent of partisans who said the economy got worse | weighted share saying worse | partisans of the other party | 1990 | 95% CI 73.0% to 78.4% | 1,000 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | out_worse_2008 | 93.9% | percent of partisans who said the economy got worse | weighted share saying worse | partisans of the other party | 2008 | 95% CI 92.0% to 95.3% | 1,362 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | prem_change | 19.2 | percentage points | difference between the two era means, standard errors combined in quadrature; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 minus 1980 to 1990 | 95% CI 17.2 to 21.3 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | prem_change_ex_svy | 12.2 | percentage points | difference between the two era means with each survey as one observation; Welch t interval on the yearly premiums (4 and 4 surveys) | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 minus 1982 to 1988 | 95% CI −4.3 to 28.8 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | prem_change_svy | 19.2 | percentage points | difference between the two era means with each survey as one observation; Welch t interval on the yearly premiums (6 and 4 surveys) | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 minus 1980 to 1990 | 95% CI 4.8 to 33.7 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | prem_early | 14.8 | percentage points | mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1980 to 1990 (six surveys) | 95% CI 13.3 to 16.2 | 9,644 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | prem_early_ex | 21.8 | percentage points | mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 1982 to 1988 (four surveys) | 95% CI 19.7 to 23.8 | 6,593 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | prem_late | 34.0 | percentage points | mean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey only | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) | 95% CI 32.5 to 35.4 | 20,874 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | prem_late_max | 39.4 | percentage points | largest of the yearly premiums | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | prem_late_min | 31.0 | percentage points | smallest of the yearly premiums | ANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the item | 2012 to 2024 (four surveys) | | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_share_2016 | 11.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Republicans including leaners | 2016 | 95% CI 9.6% to 13.1% | 1,726 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_share_2020 | 36.2% | percent of partisans who said the economy got better | weighted share saying better | Republicans including leaners | 2020 | 95% CI 34.1% to 38.4% | 3,425 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | web_prem_2012 | 41.8 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES web respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2012 | 95% CI 38.2 to 45.4 | 3,278 | weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | web_prem_2016 | 32.1 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES web respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2016 | 95% CI 28.3 to 35.9 | 2,618 | weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | web_prem_2024 | 31.7 | percentage points | in-party share saying better minus out-party share, weighted with the mode-specific weight | ANES web respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2024 | 95% CI 27.2 to 36.2 | 1,855 | weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. ## Methods Sample: ANES Cumulative Data File respondents in the 18 surveys from 1980 to 2024 that ask whether the national economy got better, stayed about the same or got worse over the past year (VCF0870), who identify with or lean toward a party (7-point party identification, 1 to 3 Democratic and 5 to 7 Republican; pure independents are left out) and carry a positive weight: 42,864 respondents. CES cumulative common content respondents in the 19 surveys from 2006 to 2024 (item economy_retro, recoded so that somewhat better and much better count as better and 'not sure' is missing; party by the 7-point scale with leaners): 568,229 respondents. Nationscape weekly waves from July 2019 to January 2021 (economy_better_scale, 3 = better), Democratic and Republican identifiers only because the file's 3-category party identification has no leaners: 324,560 respondent-weeks in 80 waves. Estimand: for each survey year, the weighted share of partisans who say the economy got better, by party and by relation to the president; the in-party premium is the share among partisans of the president's party minus the share among partisans of the other party, in percentage points. The president's party is the party of the president in office at the time of interview (the ANES cumulative file's president variable; for the CES, which is fielded each autumn, the president in office that autumn: Bush 2006 to 2008, Obama 2009 to 2016, Trump 2017 to 2020, Biden 2021 to 2024). Weights: ANES weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the interview-mode comparison in 2012, 2016 and 2024 (2008 was face-to-face only and 2020 has no mode weights); CES year-specific weight; Nationscape survey weight. Intervals: 95% intervals; a share uses the Wilson interval on the Kish effective sample size; a premium or gap combines the two normal standard errors in quadrature; an average of yearly estimates counts each survey once and combines the yearly standard errors in quadrature, so its interval covers sampling error within each survey only and not the spread between surveys (the CES presidency averages carry no interval and are shown with their lowest and highest yearly values); the difference between two periods is also given with a Welch t interval on the yearly premiums, which treats each survey as one observation and lets the two periods differ in spread; the difference between the face-to-face and web premiums combines the two standard errors in quadrature; a slope is the least-squares slope of the yearly premium on the survey year with a t interval on the number of surveys minus two. The intervals for shares, premiums, gaps, era averages and mode differences are model based (a weighted simple random sample) and ignore clustering and stratification; the Welch and slope intervals take the yearly premiums as the observations. Suppression: a party-year cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100, a survey needs at least 150 respondents on the item, and a Nationscape party-week cell needs at least 500 respondents; no ANES or CES cell fell below a floor (the smallest cell holds 435 respondents), and 80 weekly Nationscape waves meet the weekly floor while the thin waves after January 2021 do not. Item differences: the ANES item has three answers and the CES item five, so levels differ across the two surveys. Timing: the ANES surveys of 1982, 1986, 1990, 1994 and 1998 have post-election interviews only (no respondent has a pre-election interview in the cumulative file). ## What these data cannot show - The surveys record what partisans say in one interview, so they cannot separate different information from a wish to praise one's own side. - A partisan who answers "worse" may have read different news, may live in a region or work in an industry where the year went differently, may hold a different standard for what counts as better, or may be signaling loyalty. - The question asks about the nation over one year, and the data hold no measure of what actually happened to unemployment, prices or income. - The chapter reads the low-premium surveys through the share of each party saying worse and through presidential approval, and it cannot say how much of any survey's premium reflects conditions. - The comparison of 1980 to 1990 with 2012 to 2024 also mixes party attachment with conditions. - The earlier surveys include 1980 and 1990, when no more than 4.3% of either party said the economy got better, which lowers the earlier average, and the analysis cannot say what the premium would have been in those years with better conditions. - The comparison rests on six and four surveys (four and four without 1980 and 1990), and the premium differs across surveys by more than sampling error, so the comparison of 1982 to 1988 with 2012 to 2024 cannot separate a higher premium from year-to-year variation. - The CES starts in 2006, so it cannot check whether the premium was lower before then, and its own slope is too imprecise to confirm or rule out a rise since. - Party identification is measured in the same interview as the economic judgment. - A respondent whose view of the economy shapes their party identification would appear as a partisan with a matching view, and repeated cross-sections cannot separate that from partisans changing their view. - The intervals for shares, premiums and gaps treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample, so the true intervals can be wider or narrower. - The CES and Nationscape recruit online respondents who chose to join a panel, and their weights adjust for known traits only. - The ANES has no weights for interview mode in 2020, so the mode comparison covers 2012, 2016 and 2024. - The Nationscape party measure leaves out leaners, and its weekly estimates overlap the pandemic, so they cannot isolate the effect of any single event. - The CES premium differs between even-year and odd-year surveys for reasons the file does not give. ## References 1. Wilson, Edwin B. (1927). Probable Inference, the Law of Succession, and Statistical Inference. Journal of the American Statistical Association 22(158): 209-212. https://doi.org/10.1080/01621459.1927.10502953 2. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 3. Bartels, Larry M. (2002). Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political Perceptions. Political Behavior 24(2): 117-150. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1021226224601 4. Gerber, Alan S.; Huber, Gregory A. (2010). Partisanship, Political Control, and Economic Assessments. American Journal of Political Science 54(1): 153-173. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00424.x 5. Prior, Markus; Sood, Gaurav; Khanna, Kabir (2015). You Cannot Be Serious: The Impact of Accuracy Incentives on Partisan Bias in Reports of Economic Perceptions. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 10(4): 489-518. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00014127 6. Bullock, John G.; Gerber, Alan S.; Hill, Seth J.; Huber, Gregory A. (2015). Partisan Bias in Factual Beliefs about Politics. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 10(4): 519-578. https://nowpublishers.com/article/Details/QJPS-14074 7. Gerber, Alan S.; Huber, Gregory A. (2009). Partisanship and Economic Behavior: Do Partisan Differences in Economic Forecasts Predict Real Economic Behavior?. American Political Science Review 103(3): 407-426. 8. Mian, Atif R.; Sufi, Amir; Khoshkhou, Nasim (2023). Partisan Bias, Economic Expectations, and Household Spending. Review of Economics and Statistics 105(3): 493-510. https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/105/3/493/100979/Partisan-Bias-Economic-Expectations-and-Household ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/perceptions-of-the-economy/build.py (sha256 31dd75a70dfb637a8087213a1c84a702642bb1730768b90f8b04eccba431c84e) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/nationscape/nationscape_clean.parquet | 43,528,088 | 6a7904b0ca979052a375585356a3e4fb85129f4902770bee653b54e95fc936e4 | 8dc1daf282a9fa90033abf3be0312eb5d1bf351a6a0b719c43204c904af86a44 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 3ddb57bf606953b125471134b2ef26b947ac3f9e064599163a7b50263a886d2c | | figures/ces_by_presidency.json | b4cbe5d9d9d3714c2e8e21ac404973509e45b08e874ef40b14289c86b3214262 | | figures/instrument_and_mode.json | d68eb8a8498a8d7137bb2e48eedf008d7e2af0a28161d449084f525074b18699 | | figures/nationscape_weeks.json | c0b7ce9444314a20e47ca205b3e3c2ea1534d836f7126573effda8e728bb6a8e | | figures/premium_trend.json | b2dc403d3d645d00bfd8ad2ecc6d88074e68c0db0ff5af4799b9b817f49e9a7e | | figures/premium_vs_in_share.json | 018b86ef761b9bf2473d912c38007035515641ea3fa66c77d84d3c7cc35737ca | | figures/share_better_anes.json | 6645d8fdb9aa72192defe51b6ef308685eace9fb51bdf6ff146ebd2c4076c5ae | | figures/share_better_ces.json | ca074729eb21c5dfb80820b996ee35c5d4b3d6739f4f4c68d4f9d61fec3afd73 | | meta.json | 34455f80583917bcb9d11685cc1f0f22486b2398486d9ee05a27247949f0fb03 | | refs.json | b813078a3d0da0dd71a4046ec8a7517d1135fae9a69c11b70c66c0985ee81e30 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/perceptions-of-the-economy/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/facts.json - Table 1, figure "share_better_anes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_anes.json - Table 2, figure "share_better_ces" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/share_better_ces.json - Table 3, figure "premium_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_trend.json - Table 4, figure "instrument_and_mode" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/instrument_and_mode.json - Table 5, figure "ces_by_presidency" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/ces_by_presidency.json - Table 6, figure "premium_vs_in_share" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/premium_vs_in_share.json - Table 7, figure "nationscape_weeks" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/perceptions-of-the-economy/figures/nationscape_weeks.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Health care: report Chapter 4.5 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/health-care. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Health care - Chapter: 4.5 (Part IV, Issue by issue; The great sorting) - Question: How have views on government's role in health care divided by party? - Dek: In the American National Election Studies, the share on the government side of the health insurance scale was 24.4 points higher among Democrats than Republicans in 1970 and 46.6 points higher in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024, government health insurance scale (VCF0806) in the 16 studies from 1970 to 2024; mode weights for 2012, 2016 and 2024; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode split - General Social Survey. Cumulative data 1972-2024: helpsick (26 surveys, 1975-2024) and natheal (34 surveys, 1973-2024); interview mode and interview date joined from the raw file; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative CES policy preferences, five health items 2012-2021, with the loader's 2014 recode of the ACA repeal item; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (single-wave weight) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/health-care - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/health-care/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/health-care/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026healthcare ```bibtex @misc{singh2026healthcare, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Health care}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/health-care}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1970 | 24.4 | 95% CI 18.6 to 30.2 | 1,112 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | gp_a_1970 | | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2024 | 46.6 | 95% CI 42.8 to 50.4 | 4,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | gp_a_2024 | | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2024 | 71.7% | 95% CI 69.0% to 74.3% | 2,360 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | lv_a_d_2024 | | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2024 | 25.1% | 95% CI 22.4% to 27.7% | 2,129 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | lv_a_r_2024 | | count of ANES study years with VCF0806 | ANES studies that asked the question | 1970-2024 | 16 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_waves | | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 1975 | 17.1 | 95% CI 10.8 to 23.4 | 1,236 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | gp_g_1975 | | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2024 | 42.5 | 95% CI 36.1 to 48.9 | 1,538 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | gp_g_2024 | | weighted share choosing the midpoint (point 4) of the seven-point scale, years pooled | ANES respondents who answered the government health insurance question | ANES 1970-2024 | 18% | 95% CI 18% to 19% | 38,318 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | a_mid_share | | count of respondents who answered VCF0806 | ANES respondents who answered the government health insurance question | 1970-2024 | 38,318 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_anes_item | | count of respondents who answered helpsick | GSS respondents who answered the help-pay question | 1975-2024 | 39,798 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_gss_help | | count of GSS survey years with helpsick | GSS survey years that asked the help-pay question | 1975-2024 | 26 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_gss_help_waves | | count of respondents who answered natheal | GSS respondents who answered the health spending question | 1973-2024 | 41,240 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_gss_spend | | count of GSS survey years with natheal | GSS survey years that asked the health spending question | 1973-2024 | 34 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_gss_spend_waves | | share of all respondents (2705) who answered the government health insurance scale (unweighted count) | ANES respondents in 1972 | 1972 | 41% | | 1,112 | none (unweighted count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | a_cov_1972 | | share of all respondents (2257) who answered the government health insurance scale (unweighted count) | ANES respondents in 1984 | 1984 | 35% | | 792 | none (unweighted count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | a_cov_1984 | | share of all respondents (1807) who answered the government health insurance scale (unweighted count) | ANES respondents in 2000 | 2000 | 52% | | 935 | none (unweighted count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | a_cov_2000 | | share of all respondents (2322) who answered the government health insurance scale (unweighted count) | ANES respondents in 2008 | 2008 | 45% | | 1,044 | none (unweighted count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | a_cov_2008 | ## Findings In the American National Election Studies (ANES), 71.7% of Democrats and 25.1% of Republicans placed themselves on the government side of a seven-point scale from a government insurance plan to private insurance plans in 2024, a gap of 46.6 (95% CI 42.8 to 50.4) points. The gap was already 24.4 (95% CI 18.6 to 30.2) points in 1970, the first study that asked, and its interval lies above zero in all 16 ANES studies that did, so the two parties did not start from agreement. The General Social Survey (GSS) words the question differently, asking whether the federal government should help people pay for doctors and hospital bills, and shows a gap of 17.1 (95% CI 10.8 to 23.4) points in 1975 and 42.5 (95% CI 36.1 to 48.9) points in 2024. Each question is scored for its government-side answer: the answers nearest the government plan on the ANES scale, the answers nearest government help on the GSS five-point scale and, for the Cooperative Election Study (CES), the answer that Democrats give more often (supporting a proposal, or opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act). The ANES cut counts every answer from the government plan up to, but not including, the midpoint as the government side and leaves the midpoint, which 18% of the answers chose, in the denominator. A gap is the Democratic share minus the Republican share, in points, so a positive gap means that Democrats were more likely to give the answer. Party includes leaners, and independents are the respondents who lean toward neither party. Every interval is a 95% confidence interval. Democratic, independent and Republican shares are reported separately, because a gap can widen when either party moves. (Note: Shares use the survey weights and cover respondents who answered the item: 38,318 in 16 ANES studies from 1970 to 2024, 39,798 in 26 GSS surveys from 1975 to 2024 for the question on help paying for medical care, and 41,240 in 34 GSS surveys from 1973 to 2024 for the question on spending. The ANES asked the scale of only a subsample of respondents in 1972, 1984, 2000 and 2008, reaching 41%, 35%, 52% and 45% of respondents. Answers of don't know and of not having thought about it are left out. Intervals use the Kish effective sample size [1] and treat the weighted sample as if respondents had been drawn one by one, which ignores the stages of the sample design. The CES is an opt-in panel, so its intervals rest on a model and say nothing about who chose to join.) Each survey asks in its own words (Table 1), so a level in one survey is not comparable with a level in another and no line in this chapter joins two surveys. The ANES scale contrasts a government insurance plan with private insurance. The GSS question asks about the responsibility of the government in Washington for help with medical bills. A second GSS question asks whether the country spends too much, too little or about the right amount on the nation's health, and it mentions neither insurance nor the government's role. The CES asks about named policies, and its spending item concerns state legislatures. Table 1. Each survey asks about government's role in health care in its own words and on its own scale Two dates are marked on the charts. President Clinton's health plan was proposed in 1993 and did not pass Congress in 1994 [2], and the Affordable Care Act became law in March 2010 [3]. The dates are positions on the axis. Each survey is treated as its own sample, with the ANES panel overlaps described at the end, so a comparison of surveys before and after a date gives the timing of two measurements and does not test whether the event moved opinion. Tesler reports that opinion on health care came to line up with racial attitudes under President Obama [4], and Chapter 5.2, Racial attitudes and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology) tests that with the ANES item used here. Chapter 15.1, Party and place (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place) compares the ACA party gap with the gap between deep-red and deep-blue counties, and Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates when other attitudes became partisan, so this chapter dates no threshold. The [Issues explorer](https://vishalsingh.org/politics/explore/issues) shows the CES gaps by group and place. ### The parties differed before 1993 Table 2 plots the gap in every survey year. Before 1993 the ANES gap ran from 16.8 (95% CI 9.7 to 23.9) points in 1984 to 30.2 (95% CI 25.8 to 34.5) points in 1992. Pooled over the studies from 1970 to 1992 it was 24.3 (95% CI 22.3 to 26.3) points, with 55.2% of Democrats and 30.8% of Republicans on the government side. The GSS gap on help with medical bills was 17.3 (95% CI 15.0 to 19.6) points pooled over the surveys from 1975 to 1991, with 58.1% of Democrats and 40.8% of Republicans on the government side. The interval for the gap lies above zero in all 7 ANES studies and all 9 GSS help-pay surveys before 1993, and in every later one. Table 2. The party gap on government's role in health care was above zero in every survey that asked about it and larger after 2010 than before 1993 The gap was larger in each later period on the cut used here. Pooled over the studies of 1994 to 2008 the ANES gap was 30.5 (95% CI 27.8 to 33.3) points, and pooled over 2012 to 2024 it was 46.8 (95% CI 45.1 to 48.4) points. The gap changed by +6.2 (95% CI 2.8 to 9.6) points from the period before 1993 to the middle one and by +16.2 (95% CI 13.0 to 19.4) points from the middle one to the last. The second change is larger than the first, and their intervals do not overlap. The GSS help-pay gap was 26.4 (95% CI 24.3 to 28.4) points pooled over 1993 to 2008 and 39.9 (95% CI 37.6 to 42.1) points pooled over 2010 to 2024, changes of +9.1 (95% CI 6.0 to 12.1) and +13.5 (95% CI 10.4 to 16.6) points. In the GSS the two changes have overlapping intervals, so the data do not rank them. The point estimate of every survey from 2010 on is larger than that of any survey before 1993 in both series. The first ANES change depends on where the scale is cut. Counting a narrower government side, the end point of the scale and the point beside it, gives pooled gaps of 22.5, 23.9 and 39.0 points and a first change of +1.4 (95% CI −1.8 to 4.5) points, an interval that includes zero. Counting every answer up to the midpoint gives a first change of +10.9 (95% CI 7.5 to 14.3) points. The second change, the change from the first period to the last, and the fall in the Republican share in each step hold under all three cuts. The GSS changes keep their sign under the two other cuts tested, which narrow the government side to the end answer and which widen it to include the midpoint. The ANES therefore finds a larger gap from 2010 on under every cut and a larger gap in the middle period only on the cut used here. Between adjacent surveys the gap moves in both directions, by amounts that single-year samples mostly cannot separate from zero. The interval for the change between adjacent ANES studies excludes zero for 4 of the 15 pairs: 1988 to 1992 (+7.5 (95% CI 1.0 to 14.0) points), 2008 to 2012 (+9.8 (95% CI 1.4 to 18.2)), 2016 to 2020 (+14.3 (95% CI 9.8 to 18.8)) and 2020 to 2024 (−7.4 (95% CI −12.1 to −2.8)), a fall. In the GSS it does so for 3 of the 25 pairs: 1975 to 1983 (+9.9 (95% CI 0.8 to 18.9) points), 1983 to 1984 (−9.7 (95% CI −19.3 to −0.2)), a fall, and 2018 to 2021 (+9.9 (95% CI 1.4 to 18.4)). Of these 7 intervals, 5 have a bound within 2 points of zero, and the intervals ignore the stages of the sample design, so each of these steps is weak evidence taken alone. The GSS gap rose and then fell by similar amounts in adjacent surveys in 1975 to 1984, so the single-year points describe a period better than any one step. ### The Republican share was lower after both dates The Republican share on the government side was lower after both dates in both surveys, and in the ANES so was the Democratic share. Table 3 compares the surveys on either side of each date. Around the Clinton plan the ANES gap changed by +0.5 (95% CI −6.2 to 7.3) points from 1992 to 1994, as the Democratic share changed by −12.1 (95% CI −17.0 to −7.2) points and the Republican share by −12.6 (95% CI −17.3 to −8.0) points. In the GSS the gap changed by +7.0 (95% CI −1.9 to 16.0) points from 1993 to 1994, with the Republican share changing by −8.5 (95% CI −15.0 to −1.9) points and the Democratic share by −1.4 (95% CI −7.5 to 4.7) points. Around the ACA debate the ANES gap changed by +9.8 (95% CI 1.4 to 18.2) points from 2008 to 2012, with Republican and Democratic changes of −15.5 (95% CI −21.8 to −9.2) and −5.7 (95% CI −11.2 to −0.1) points. The GSS gap changed by +7.5 (95% CI −2.2 to 17.1) points from 2008 to 2010, with Republican and Democratic changes of −13.8 (95% CI −20.9 to −6.7) and −6.3 (95% CI −12.9 to 0.2) points. The GSS 2010 survey was in the field from mid-March to mid-August, and 94% of the respondents who answered the help-pay question were interviewed after the law was signed in late March. The Republican change has an interval below zero in all four comparisons. The Democratic fall in the two ANES comparisons has an interval for 2008 to 2012 that reaches close to zero. The gap's interval excludes zero only for the ANES in 2008 to 2012, and the ANES gap changed little from 1992 to 1994 because the Democratic and Republican shares fell by similar amounts. The 1992 ANES is high for both parties. The Democratic share was 52.3% in 1988, 64.2% in 1992 and 52.1% in 1994, and the Republican share was 29.6%, 34.1% and 21.4%, so the change from 1992 to 1994 starts from a high point. The Republican share in 1994 and 1996 (21.4% and 21.0%) was also below its level in 2000, 2004 and 2008 (29.1%, 28.9% and 28.9%), so the middle period averages a dip and the fall from before 1993 to that period is not a steady decline. The ANES row for 2008 to 2012 spans the study's addition of a web sample, taken up below. Table 3. The Republican share on the government side was lower in the survey after each date than in the survey before it ### The Republican share fell in both steps The Democratic share rose in the last step in both surveys, and in the first step only in the GSS. Table 4 shows the shares behind the gaps. In the ANES the Republican share on the government side was 30.8% before 1993, 24.9% from 1994 to 2008 and 17.9% from 2012 on, falling by −5.9 (95% CI −8.4 to −3.5) and −7.0 (95% CI −9.2 to −4.8) points between periods. The Democratic share was 55.2%, 55.4% and 64.7%, and it changed by +0.3 (95% CI −2.1 to 2.7) points in the first step, an interval that includes zero, and by +9.3 (95% CI 6.9 to 11.6) points in the second. In the GSS help-pay question the Republican share fell from 40.8% to 35.7% to 28.5%, by −5.2 (95% CI −7.5 to −2.9) and −7.2 (95% CI −9.4 to −4.9) points. The Democratic share rose from 58.1% to 62.0% to 68.4%, by +3.9 (95% CI 1.8 to 5.9) and +6.4 (95% CI 4.3 to 8.4) points. Over the whole span the ANES Republican share changed by −12.9 (95% CI −14.7 to −11.1) points and the Democratic share by +9.6 (95% CI 7.7 to 11.4) points. The fall in the Republican share exceeds the rise in the Democratic share by +3.3 (95% CI 0.8 to 5.9) points, an interval above zero, so the ANES says that the Republican share moved more. The GSS shares changed by −12.3 (95% CI −14.7 to −9.9) and +10.2 (95% CI 8.1 to 12.3) points, and the fall exceeds the rise by +2.1 (95% CI −1.1 to 5.3) points, an interval that includes zero, so the GSS does not say which party moved more. In both surveys the Republican share fell in every step and the Democratic share rose in the last step, and the Democratic share rose in the first step in the GSS and not in the ANES. The ANES gap fell between 2020 and 2024 with the Republican share changing by +8.2 (95% CI 5.0 to 11.4) points and the Democratic share by +0.8 (95% CI −2.6 to 4.1) points, an interval that includes zero. Table 4. In the ANES and the GSS help-pay question the Republican share on the government side was lower and the Democratic share higher from 2010 on than before 1993 Independents lay between the two parties in all 12 ANES studies and all 21 GSS surveys whose independent cell clears the floor. The independent share in the ANES was 47.8% before 1993 and 42.1% from 2012 on, and in the GSS 49.4% and 51.8%. ### The spending question has its own pattern The GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health does not mention the government's role or insurance. A majority of Republicans said too little in 25 of the 34 surveys by point estimate, and the interval for the Republican share lies above a majority in 19 of them and below a majority in 4. The gap on this question was 13.2 (95% CI 11.4 to 15.0), 17.6 (95% CI 15.5 to 19.7) and 25.5 (95% CI 22.8 to 28.2) points pooled over the three periods, and its interval lies above zero in 32 of the 34 surveys. Because it is a different question, its levels are not compared with the help-pay levels. The spending question also moves with the period in a way the help-pay question does not. The share of all respondents saying too little was 63.0% before 1993, 71.9% from 1993 to 2008 and 65.5% from 2010 on, changing by +8.9 (95% CI 7.7 to 10.2) and −6.4 (95% CI −7.9 to −4.9) points, whereas the help-pay share among all respondents changes by an amount whose interval includes zero in both steps. The Republican share was 54.5%, 61.9% and 50.7%, and the Democratic share rose and then fell, so the spending gap widened in the last period with the Republican share falling by more than the Democratic share. The gap does not settle. It was 29.2 (95% CI 21.0 to 37.4) points in 2010 and 15.4 (95% CI 8.6 to 22.3) in 2016, a change of −13.8 (95% CI −24.4 to −3.1) points whose interval excludes zero. It was 41.7 (95% CI 36.0 to 47.3) in 2021, the largest gap in the series, and 15.3 (95% CI 8.2 to 22.5) in 2024, a change of −26.3 (95% CI −35.5 to −17.2) points, also with an interval that excludes zero. The 2021 survey was mostly web, and among web respondents the change from 2021 to 2024 was −18.7 (95% CI −29.7 to −7.7) points. The in-person spending cells in 2022 and 2024 are too small to report, so no in-person survey checks the 2021 value. ### The CES gaps on the ACA and on later proposals In the CES, Democrats were more likely than Republicans to give the Democratic-side answer in all 22 item-years other than the 2014 repeal item, by 37.3 to 68.7 points. The 2014 repeal item gives a gap of 69.2 (95% CI 68.2 to 70.2) points after a recode that is explained below. The CES asked about the Affordable Care Act in every year from 2012 to 2021 (Table 5). The share opposing repeal was 80.3% among Democrats and 23.9% among Republicans in 2012, a gap of 56.4 (95% CI 55.2 to 57.6) points, and 79.6% and 26.6% in 2021, a gap of 53.1 (95% CI 51.5 to 54.6) points. In the years other than 2014 the gap ran from 51.3 to 68.7 points. The CES health items begin in 2012, after the law passed, so they cannot show whether the gap on the ACA widened the way the ANES and GSS gaps did. The wording of the repeal question changes in 2014, in 2016 and from 2018, so the lines in the figure join only years with the same wording. Within the 2018 to 2021 wording the Democratic share changed by −5.4 (95% CI −6.5 to −4.2) points, the Republican share by +3.1 (95% CI 1.7 to 4.6) points and the gap by −8.5 (95% CI −10.3 to −6.7) points. Table 5. Democrats opposed repealing the ACA more often than Republicans in every CES year, counting 2014 after a recode, with independents between them The 2014 point needs its own explanation. The cumulative file gives support the same code and label in every year, but in 2014 the code labelled support is the Democratic answer. Read at face value, the stored 2014 answers would make Democrats more likely than Republicans to support repealing the law, by 69.2 (95% CI 68.2 to 70.2) points, whereas in the other years Republicans are more likely than Democrats to support repeal, by 51.3 to 68.7 points. The loader reverses the code for the 55,829 respondents who answered in 2014, and the reversed gap is 69.2 (95% CI 68.2 to 70.2) points. The guide to the cumulative policy file says that an earlier version of the file applied the same switch of support and oppose to the 2014 answers and that the later version does not, because the 2014 question already asked about repealing the law [5]. The stored counts equal the later version, so the file in use is the one without the switch. What differs in 2014 is the party pattern of the answers and not the label, and the reversal rests on that pattern and on the earlier version's switch, not on a value label that explains it. The 2014 question also differs in wording from the neighboring years, describing the provisions of the law and asking how the respondent would vote (Table 1). The chapter therefore draws 2014 as an open point apart from the lines and uses it in no comparison. Table 6 gives the other CES health items. The Medicare for All gap was 52.2 (95% CI 51.2 to 53.3) points in 2018 under one wording, and 53.2 (95% CI 51.4 to 55.0), 57.8 (95% CI 56.8 to 58.8) and 57.9 (95% CI 56.5 to 59.4) points in 2019, 2020 and 2021 under another. The gap on restoring the ACA mandate was 42.1 (95% CI 40.3 to 43.9), 43.7 (95% CI 42.6 to 44.8) and 41.5 (95% CI 39.9 to 43.0) points in 2019, 2020 and 2021, and the gap on lowering the Medicare eligibility age was 37.3 (95% CI 35.4 to 39.3) and 40.0 (95% CI 38.9 to 41.2) points in 2019 and 2020. On state health spending the gap was 45.4 (95% CI 44.1 to 46.7), 40.5 (95% CI 39.3 to 41.7), 45.3 (95% CI 44.2 to 46.4) and 49.0 (95% CI 47.9 to 50.1) points in the four even years. The interval for the gap lies above zero in every item-year, counting 2014 after the recode, and the independent share lies between the parties in every one. Table 6. Democrats gave the Democratic-side answer more often than Republicans on every other CES health item, with independents between them ### Interview mode changes the reading of the latest movement The ANES added a web sample in 2012, the 2020 ANES study had no in-person interviews [6], and the GSS moved to the web in 2021, when 87.3% of the respondents who answered the help-pay question were interviewed that way. The latest movements in each survey therefore mix any change of opinion with a change of mode. Table 7 compares like with like where the data allow it. In the ANES the gap changed by +9.8 (95% CI 1.4 to 18.2) points from 2008 to 2012. Among in-person respondents, the only mode in 2008, the change is +8.2 (95% CI −1.5 to 17.8) points, an interval that includes zero, and the Republican share among them changed by −11.7 (95% CI −18.9 to −4.5) points, an interval below zero. Web and in-person respondents in 2012 differ by +2.5 (95% CI −4.4 to 9.4) points, and the web minus in-person differences in 2016 and 2024 are −4.9 (95% CI −12.9 to 3.0) and +1.7 (95% CI −8.0 to 11.4) points. All three intervals include zero, and together they run from −12.9 to +11.4 points, so they do not rule out a mode difference as large as the rise from 2008 to 2012. The largest step is 2016 to 2020, +14.3 (95% CI 9.8 to 18.8) points. The 2020 study has no separate weights by mode, but 2016 web respondents alone give a rise of +15.6 (95% CI 10.6 to 20.6) points to all 2020 respondents. That compares one mode with all respondents and cannot separate the 2020 design from a change of opinion. The two samples also share people, since the 2020 study includes 2,839 re-interviews of 2016 respondents among 8,280 pre-election interviews. From 2020 to 2024 the gap changed by −7.4 (95% CI −12.1 to −2.8) points, and among 2024 fresh web respondents alone the change from 2020 is −4.9 (95% CI −11.1 to 1.2) points, an interval that includes zero. In 2024, 1,901 of the 4,489 partisans who answered the scale come from the panel outside the fresh samples, and the gap among the fresh in-person and web samples alone is 47.0 (95% CI 42.2 to 51.9) points, against 46.6 for all respondents. Table 7. The ANES gap was higher in 2020 than among 2016 web respondents, and the in-person GSS gap in 2022 cannot be told from its 2018 level In the GSS the help-pay gap changed by +9.9 (95% CI 1.4 to 18.4) points from 2018 to 2021, the survey in which most interviews moved to the web and which has no in-person group. The like-for-like comparison runs from 2018 to 2022, the first later survey with in-person respondents. Among all respondents the change is +1.9 (95% CI −8.0 to 11.7) points, and among in-person respondents it is −6.0 (95% CI −18.9 to 6.8) points. Both intervals include zero, and the in-person interval still allows a rise. The gap among web respondents was 45.5 points in 2021, 43.9 in 2022 and 49.5 in 2024, and among in-person respondents it was 39.1 in 2018 and 33.1 in 2022. The web gap exceeds the in-person gap in the same survey by +10.9 (95% CI −3.5 to 25.2) points in 2022 and +16.8 (95% CI 2.8 to 30.7) points in 2024, so the all-respondent GSS series cannot separate the mode from the 2021 move. The rise around the ACA debate appears among in-person respondents, +10.5 (95% CI 0.2 to 20.9) points from 2008 to 2010, although the lower end of that interval is close to zero. The period comparison does not depend on the web samples. Among in-person respondents alone the ANES gap was 43.0 (95% CI 39.1 to 46.8) points over 2012, 2016 and 2024, a change of +18.6 (95% CI 14.3 to 23.0) points from the period before 1993. The in-person GSS gap over 2010 to 2018, 2022 and 2024 was 36.8 (95% CI 33.9 to 39.7) points, a change of +19.5 (95% CI 15.8 to 23.2) points. ### The gap widened within age and education groups A widening gap among all respondents could come from one kind of respondent. Table 8 splits the gap by age and education and compares the period before 1993 with 2010 and after. Among all ANES partisans the gap was 24.3 (95% CI 22.3 to 26.3) points before 1993 and 46.8 (95% CI 45.1 to 48.4) points from 2010 on, and in every group of either survey the later interval lies above the earlier one. Table 8. The party gap was larger from 2010 on than before 1993 in every age and education group The three age groups have overlapping intervals in both periods and in both surveys. The later ANES gaps are 44.7 (95% CI 41.8 to 47.6) points in the youngest group, 46.2 (95% CI 43.5 to 48.9) points in the middle group and 48.5 (95% CI 45.5 to 51.6) points in the oldest group, the one at or above the age of Medicare eligibility. Education separates the groups in both periods. In the ANES the gap among people with a high school education or less was 19.3 (95% CI 16.6 to 22.0) points before 1993 and 33.9 (95% CI 30.3 to 37.5) points from 2010 on, against 34.7 (95% CI 30.4 to 38.9) and 59.5 (95% CI 57.3 to 61.7) points among college graduates. In the GSS the same order holds between people without and with a bachelor's degree, at 33.8 (95% CI 30.9 to 36.7) and 53.4 (95% CI 50.0 to 56.8) points in the later period. Both parties contribute to the education difference in the later period. Among ANES Democrats the government-side share was 57.0% (95% CI 54.2% to 59.7%) with a high school education or less and 72.7% (95% CI 71.0% to 74.3%) among college graduates, and among Republicans it was 23.1% (95% CI 20.8% to 25.4%) and 13.2% (95% CI 11.8% to 14.6%). Chapter 3.2, The diploma divide (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide) takes up the education divide in vote and party. ### What these data cannot show The intervals treat each study as an independent sample, and the ANES has exceptions. The 2020 study includes 2,839 re-interviews of 2016 respondents among 8,280 pre-election interviews, and 1,901 of the 4,489 partisans who answered the scale in 2024 come from the panel outside the fresh samples. The intervals for changes that involve 2016, 2020 and 2024, and for the mode comparisons that set one mode against all 2020 respondents, treat the samples as independent. If answers by the same person are positively correlated across waves, those intervals are wider than panel-aware intervals would be. A gap can also widen because people change their view, change their party or are replaced by new adults, and the surveys cannot say which. The comparisons around the Clinton plan and the ACA debate use two surveys each, one on either side, and give no read of the months between them; the ANES fields a study only in election years, and the GSS surveys that bracket each date are a year or more apart. They cannot separate the two events from anything else that happened between the surveys, and they say nothing about the cause of the Republican decline in either period. The three surveys measure three things. The ANES scale is about insurance, the GSS help-pay question is about the federal government's responsibility for medical bills, and the CES items name policies that were on the national agenda in the years they were asked. A reader should not take the ANES gap, the GSS gap and the CES gap as three estimates of one quantity. The CES health items begin in 2012 and end in 2021, so they have nothing before the ACA passed and nothing for 2022 to 2024. The wording changes for the ACA item in 2014, 2016 and 2018 and for Medicare for All in 2019, and the 2014 answers needed a reversal that rests on the party pattern and on an earlier version of the file, not on a value label. The CES intervals ignore how the panel was recruited. The government side of the ANES scale is also a choice, and the first change between periods depends on it. The 2020 ANES study has no mode weights, so the 2016 to 2020 step cannot be split by mode, and the web and in-person comparisons are wide. The ANES asked the scale of a subsample of respondents in 1972, 1984, 2000 and 2008, reaching 41%, 35%, 52% and 45% of respondents, so the intervals for those studies are wider and the 2008 to 2012 step carries a wide interval. The GSS asked the spending question of a subsample from 1984 to 1993. Neither survey measures how much respondents care about the issue, how they would trade coverage against cost, or what they know about the programs they were asked about, and neither the ANES scale nor the GSS items name Medicare or Medicaid. The group results combine years, so they describe the periods and not any single year, and the groups are cross-sections, not people followed over time. ## Tables ### Table 1. Each survey asks about government's role in health care in its own words and on its own scale Question wording or file label, answers offered, years used and the answer counted, by survey and item | Survey | Item | Question wording or file label | Answers | Years used | Answer counted | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | ANES cumulative file | Government against private health insurance (VCF0806) | A government insurance plan that would cover all medical and hospital expenses, against medical expenses paid by individuals and private insurance plans; respondents place themselves on a seven-point scale (file label: Government Health Insurance Scale; end points: government insurance plan, private insurance plan). | Seven points; haven't thought much is left out | 1970, 1972, 1976, 1978, 1984, 1988, 1992, 1994, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020, 2024 | Points 1 to 3, the government side | | GSS | Government help paying for medical care (helpsick) | In general, some people think that it is the responsibility of the government in Washington to see to it that people have help in paying for doctors and hospital bills. Others think that these matters are not the responsibility of the federal government and that people should take care of these things themselves. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you made up your mind on this? | Five points, 1 government should help to 5 people should help themselves; the midpoint is agree with both | 1975, 1983, 1984, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022, 2024 | Points 1 and 2, the government side | | GSS | Spending on the nation's health (natheal) | Are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on improving and protecting the nation's health? | Too little, about the right amount, too much | 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1980, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016, 2018, 2021, 2022, 2024 | Too little | | CES | Repeal the Affordable Care Act, 2012, 2013, 2015, 2017 | Congress considered many important bills over the past few years. For each of the following tell us whether you support or oppose the legislation in principle. Repeal Affordable Care Act. Would repeal the Affordable Care Act. | Support, oppose | 2012, 2013, 2015, 2017 | Oppose | | CES | Repeal the Affordable Care Act, 2014 | The Affordable Health Care Act was passed into law in 2010. It does the following: requires Americans to obtain health insurance; prevents insurance companies from denying coverage for pre-existing conditions; allows people to keep current health insurance and care provider; sets up national health insurance option for those without coverage, but allows states the option to implement their own insurance system. Would you vote to repeal the Affordable Care Act if you were in Congress in today? | Support, oppose (in the file, code 1 is the Democratic answer in this year; see the text) | 2014 | Oppose, after the loader recode | | CES | Repeal the Affordable Care Act, 2016 | Congress considers many issues. If you were in Congress would you vote for or against each of the following? Repeal Affordable Care Act. Would repeal the Affordable Care Act of 2009 (also known as Obamacare). | Support, oppose | 2016 | Oppose | | CES | Repeal the Affordable Care Act, 2018 to 2021 | Thinking now about health care policy, would you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Repeal the entire Affordable Care Act. (The 2020 and 2021 stems are shortened.) | Support, oppose | 2018 to 2021 | Oppose | | CES | Medicare for All, 2018 | Thinking now about health care policy, would you support or oppose each of the following proposals? Provide Medicare for all Americans. | Support, oppose | 2018 | Support | | CES | Medicare for All, 2019 to 2021 | Expand Medicare to a single comprehensive public health care coverage program that would cover all Americans. (The 2019 stem is the health care policy stem above.) | Support, oppose | 2019 to 2021 | Support | | CES | Restore the ACA mandate | Restore the Affordable Care Act's mandate that all individuals be required to purchase health insurance. | Support, oppose | 2019, 2020, 2021 | Support | | CES | Lower the Medicare age | Lower the eligibility age for Medicare from 65 to 50. | Support, oppose | 2019, 2020 | Support | | CES | State spending on health care | State legislatures must make choices when making spending decisions on important state programs. Would you like your legislature to increase or decrease spending on the five areas below? Health Care. (2014 and 2020 use shorter forms.) | Greatly increase, slightly increase, maintain, slightly decrease, greatly decrease | 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020 | Greatly or slightly increase | Note: The ANES row gives the file label and the end points of the scale; the full question text was not checked in each study. The GSS wording is from the GSS dictionary and the CES wording is quoted from the guide to the Cumulative CES Policy Preferences file, whose item labels are shorter. Note: The CES health spending item asks about state legislatures, not the federal government. The ANES seven-point item is coded 1 for the government plan in the cumulative file, and the file leaves out the respondents who were not asked the scale: it reaches only a subsample in 1972, 1984, 2000 and 2008. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1970-2024, General Social Survey dictionary, 1973-2024, and the guide to the Cumulative CES Policy Preferences file, 2012-2021; question wording only, no weights apply Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/wording.json ### Table 2. The party gap on government's role in health care was above zero in every survey that asked about it and larger after 2010 than before 1993 Democratic minus Republican share on the government side (ANES, GSS help) or saying we spend too little (GSS spending), party identifiers including leaners, 1970 to 2024; 95% intervals | Survey and answer | Year | Gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES: government plan | 1970 | 24.4 | 18.6 | 30.2 | 1,112 | | ANES: government plan | 1972 | 18.8 | 12.5 | 25.0 | 959 | | ANES: government plan | 1976 | 24.2 | 19.3 | 29.2 | 1,494 | | ANES: government plan | 1978 | 25.1 | 20.3 | 29.8 | 1,596 | | ANES: government plan | 1984 | 16.8 | 9.7 | 23.9 | 688 | | ANES: government plan | 1988 | 22.7 | 17.9 | 27.5 | 1,512 | | ANES: government plan | 1992 | 30.2 | 25.8 | 34.5 | 1,873 | | ANES: government plan | 1994 | 30.7 | 25.6 | 35.9 | 1,470 | | ANES: government plan | 1996 | 31.0 | 25.7 | 36.3 | 1,402 | | ANES: government plan | 2000 | 24.4 | 17.1 | 31.6 | 822 | | ANES: government plan | 2004 | 32.6 | 26.2 | 39.1 | 991 | | ANES: government plan | 2008 | 32.1 | 24.3 | 39.9 | 914 | | ANES: government plan | 2012 | 41.9 | 38.7 | 45.1 | 4,760 | | ANES: government plan | 2016 | 39.8 | 36.2 | 43.4 | 3,294 | | ANES: government plan | 2020 | 54.0 | 51.3 | 56.7 | 6,577 | | ANES: government plan | 2024 | 46.6 | 42.8 | 50.4 | 4,489 | | GSS: government should help | 1975 | 17.1 | 10.8 | 23.4 | 1,236 | | GSS: government should help | 1983 | 27.0 | 20.5 | 33.5 | 1,348 | | GSS: government should help | 1984 | 17.3 | 10.3 | 24.2 | 1,235 | | GSS: government should help | 1986 | 21.4 | 15.3 | 27.5 | 1,233 | | GSS: government should help | 1987 | 16.8 | 10.7 | 22.9 | 1,565 | | GSS: government should help | 1988 | 11.8 | 4.4 | 19.3 | 857 | | GSS: government should help | 1989 | 16.4 | 9.1 | 23.8 | 872 | | GSS: government should help | 1990 | 12.9 | 5.1 | 20.7 | 771 | | GSS: government should help | 1991 | 14.1 | 6.8 | 21.4 | 866 | | GSS: government should help | 1993 | 20.0 | 12.7 | 27.3 | 882 | | GSS: government should help | 1994 | 27.0 | 21.8 | 32.2 | 1,654 | | GSS: government should help | 1996 | 23.8 | 18.4 | 29.2 | 1,539 | | GSS: government should help | 1998 | 21.8 | 16.3 | 27.4 | 1,508 | | GSS: government should help | 2000 | 29.1 | 23.6 | 34.7 | 1,445 | | GSS: government should help | 2002 | 30.5 | 22.4 | 38.7 | 705 | | GSS: government should help | 2004 | 22.5 | 14.1 | 31.0 | 727 | | GSS: government should help | 2006 | 29.2 | 23.4 | 35.1 | 1,498 | | GSS: government should help | 2008 | 32.1 | 25.3 | 38.9 | 1,093 | | GSS: government should help | 2010 | 39.6 | 32.8 | 46.4 | 1,060 | | GSS: government should help | 2012 | 31.8 | 24.5 | 39.0 | 1,017 | | GSS: government should help | 2014 | 38.6 | 32.9 | 44.3 | 1,255 | | GSS: government should help | 2016 | 43.6 | 38.1 | 49.1 | 1,520 | | GSS: government should help | 2018 | 36.5 | 29.6 | 43.5 | 1,203 | | GSS: government should help | 2021 | 46.4 | 41.5 | 51.3 | 2,005 | | GSS: government should help | 2022 | 38.4 | 31.4 | 45.4 | 1,703 | | GSS: government should help | 2024 | 42.5 | 36.1 | 48.9 | 1,538 | | GSS: spending too little | 1973 | 13.4 | 7.4 | 19.5 | 1,242 | | GSS: spending too little | 1974 | 6.9 | 0.7 | 13.1 | 1,212 | | GSS: spending too little | 1975 | 12.4 | 6.2 | 18.7 | 1,225 | | GSS: spending too little | 1976 | 11.6 | 5.2 | 18.1 | 1,205 | | GSS: spending too little | 1977 | 14.0 | 7.7 | 20.3 | 1,277 | | GSS: spending too little | 1978 | 18.5 | 11.4 | 25.6 | 1,247 | | GSS: spending too little | 1980 | 21.9 | 15.0 | 28.9 | 1,164 | | GSS: spending too little | 1982 | 14.1 | 7.3 | 20.9 | 1,538 | | GSS: spending too little | 1983 | 18.7 | 12.0 | 25.4 | 1,345 | | GSS: spending too little | 1984 | 23.0 | 11.7 | 34.2 | 404 | | GSS: spending too little | 1985 | 10.9 | 1.6 | 20.2 | 639 | | GSS: spending too little | 1986 | 14.6 | 5.9 | 23.4 | 614 | | GSS: spending too little | 1987 | 15.2 | 5.3 | 25.2 | 517 | | GSS: spending too little | 1988 | 6.7 | −1.7 | 15.1 | 598 | | GSS: spending too little | 1989 | 10.7 | 2.5 | 18.8 | 639 | | GSS: spending too little | 1990 | 7.0 | −1.1 | 15.1 | 572 | | GSS: spending too little | 1991 | 12.0 | 4.0 | 19.9 | 631 | | GSS: spending too little | 1993 | 17.3 | 9.6 | 24.9 | 662 | | GSS: spending too little | 1994 | 24.7 | 18.8 | 30.7 | 1,234 | | GSS: spending too little | 1996 | 21.2 | 15.2 | 27.2 | 1,153 | | GSS: spending too little | 1998 | 14.1 | 7.9 | 20.4 | 1,075 | | GSS: spending too little | 2000 | 14.8 | 8.6 | 21.0 | 1,068 | | GSS: spending too little | 2002 | 16.2 | 9.9 | 22.4 | 1,042 | | GSS: spending too little | 2004 | 14.3 | 8.5 | 20.1 | 1,150 | | GSS: spending too little | 2006 | 17.8 | 11.5 | 24.1 | 1,130 | | GSS: spending too little | 2008 | 15.7 | 8.4 | 23.0 | 787 | | GSS: spending too little | 2010 | 29.2 | 21.0 | 37.4 | 792 | | GSS: spending too little | 2012 | 25.1 | 16.2 | 34.1 | 752 | | GSS: spending too little | 2014 | 25.7 | 18.5 | 32.9 | 965 | | GSS: spending too little | 2016 | 15.4 | 8.6 | 22.3 | 1,129 | | GSS: spending too little | 2018 | 23.4 | 15.9 | 31.0 | 898 | | GSS: spending too little | 2021 | 41.7 | 36.0 | 47.3 | 1,467 | | GSS: spending too little | 2022 | 29.8 | 21.3 | 38.4 | 1,248 | | GSS: spending too little | 2024 | 15.3 | 8.2 | 22.5 | 1,155 | Note: The 2012, 2016 and 2024 ANES studies combined in-person and web samples, and the 2020 study had no in-person interviews. GSS interviews were mostly in person through 2018, mostly on the web in 2021, and in both modes in 2022 and 2024. The text and the mode figure check what these changes can do to the lines. Note: The ANES asked the scale of a subsample of respondents in 1972, 1984, 2000 and 2008, so those intervals are wider. The ANES government side is the three points nearest the government plan, and the midpoint stays in the denominator. The GSS asked the spending question of a subsample from 1984 to 1993, so its intervals are wider there. A party cell needs at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1970-2024, and General Social Survey, 1973-2024; weighted (weight, VCF0009z; weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/gap_by_year.json ### Table 3. The Republican share on the government side was lower in the survey after each date than in the survey before it Change between the surveys that bracket the Clinton plan (1993 to 1994) and the ACA debate and passage (2009 to 2010) in the party gap and in each party's government-side share; leaners included; 95% intervals | Panel | Comparison | Change (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Change in the gap | ANES 1992 to 1994 | 0.5 | −6.2 | 7.3 | 3,343 | | Change in the Democratic share | ANES 1992 to 1994 | −12.1 | −17.0 | −7.2 | 1,822 | | Change in the Republican share | ANES 1992 to 1994 | −12.6 | −17.3 | −8.0 | 1,521 | | Change in the gap | GSS 1993 to 1994 | 7.0 | −1.9 | 16.0 | 2,536 | | Change in the Democratic share | GSS 1993 to 1994 | −1.4 | −7.5 | 4.7 | 1,383 | | Change in the Republican share | GSS 1993 to 1994 | −8.5 | −15.0 | −1.9 | 1,153 | | Change in the gap | ANES 2008 to 2012 | 9.8 | 1.4 | 18.2 | 5,674 | | Change in the Democratic share | ANES 2008 to 2012 | −5.7 | −11.2 | −0.1 | 3,469 | | Change in the Republican share | ANES 2008 to 2012 | −15.5 | −21.8 | −9.2 | 2,205 | | Change in the gap | GSS 2008 to 2010 | 7.5 | −2.2 | 17.1 | 2,153 | | Change in the Democratic share | GSS 2008 to 2010 | −6.3 | −12.9 | 0.2 | 1,296 | | Change in the Republican share | GSS 2008 to 2010 | −13.8 | −20.9 | −6.7 | 857 | Note: The ANES added web interviews in 2012, so the 2008 to 2012 row mixes a change of mode with any change of opinion; the mode figure splits it. The GSS pairs are the closest GSS surveys on each side of the event dates. Note: The 2008 ANES asked the item of a subsample of its respondents, which widens the intervals of the 2008 to 2012 row. The GSS 2010 survey was in the field from March to August, and most of its interviews followed the signing of the ACA in late March. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1992, 1994, 2008 and 2012, and General Social Survey, 1993, 1994, 2008 and 2010; weighted (weight, VCF0009z; weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/dated_changes.json ### Table 4. In the ANES and the GSS help-pay question the Republican share on the government side was lower and the Democratic share higher from 2010 on than before 1993 Share on the government side (ANES, GSS help-pay) or saying we spend too little (GSS spending), by party identification; leaners are in the parties and independents lean toward neither; all respondents dashed; 95% intervals | Survey and answer | Group | Year | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 1970 | 45.2 | 42.4 | 47.9 | 1,284 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 1972 | 45.5 | 42.6 | 48.4 | 1,112 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 1976 | 44.2 | 41.9 | 46.6 | 1,769 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 1978 | 45.2 | 42.9 | 47.4 | 1,884 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 1984 | 37.8 | 34.4 | 41.1 | 792 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 1988 | 42.4 | 40.0 | 44.7 | 1,707 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 1992 | 51.6 | 49.5 | 53.8 | 2,140 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 1994 | 38.2 | 35.6 | 40.8 | 1,637 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 1996 | 39.3 | 36.6 | 42.1 | 1,536 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 2000 | 44.4 | 40.8 | 47.9 | 935 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 2004 | 46.7 | 43.5 | 49.9 | 1,112 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 2008 | 47.5 | 43.7 | 51.3 | 1,044 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 2012 | 35.7 | 34.0 | 37.4 | 5,471 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 2016 | 38.2 | 36.4 | 40.1 | 3,765 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 2020 | 45.0 | 43.5 | 46.5 | 7,352 | | ANES: government plan | All respondents | 2024 | 49.7 | 47.7 | 51.8 | 4,778 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 1970 | 54.5 | 50.8 | 58.2 | 697 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 1972 | 52.9 | 48.8 | 57.1 | 561 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 1976 | 53.6 | 50.2 | 56.9 | 869 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 1978 | 54.4 | 51.3 | 57.5 | 1,006 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 1984 | 45.0 | 39.7 | 50.2 | 347 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 1988 | 52.3 | 48.9 | 55.8 | 793 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 1992 | 64.2 | 61.3 | 67.1 | 1,068 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 1994 | 52.1 | 48.2 | 56.1 | 754 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 1996 | 52.0 | 48.1 | 55.9 | 806 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 2000 | 53.5 | 48.5 | 58.5 | 480 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 2004 | 61.6 | 57.0 | 66.1 | 536 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 2008 | 61.0 | 56.0 | 65.9 | 620 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 2012 | 55.3 | 52.8 | 57.8 | 2,849 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 2016 | 56.6 | 53.7 | 59.4 | 1,704 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 2020 | 70.9 | 68.8 | 73.0 | 3,472 | | ANES: government plan | Democrats | 2024 | 71.7 | 69.0 | 74.3 | 2,360 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 1970 | 43.8 | 36.2 | 51.5 | 162 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 1972 | 48.0 | 39.9 | 56.0 | 148 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 1976 | 47.0 | 40.7 | 53.2 | 257 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 1978 | 46.3 | 40.4 | 52.3 | 272 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 1988 | 48.1 | 40.8 | 55.3 | 183 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 1992 | 53.4 | 47.3 | 59.6 | 257 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 1994 | 47.1 | 38.5 | 55.7 | 161 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 1996 | 44.7 | 35.1 | 54.2 | 129 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 2012 | 35.6 | 31.0 | 40.3 | 696 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 2016 | 42.3 | 37.0 | 47.7 | 458 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 2020 | 45.0 | 40.2 | 49.9 | 755 | | ANES: government plan | Independents | 2024 | 51.4 | 42.7 | 60.2 | 267 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 1970 | 30.1 | 25.7 | 34.5 | 415 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 1972 | 34.2 | 29.5 | 38.8 | 398 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 1976 | 29.3 | 25.7 | 33.0 | 625 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 1978 | 29.3 | 25.6 | 33.0 | 590 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 1984 | 28.2 | 23.4 | 32.9 | 341 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 1988 | 29.6 | 26.3 | 33.0 | 719 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 1992 | 34.1 | 30.8 | 37.3 | 805 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 1994 | 21.4 | 18.1 | 24.7 | 716 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 1996 | 21.0 | 17.3 | 24.6 | 596 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 2000 | 29.1 | 23.8 | 34.4 | 342 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 2004 | 28.9 | 24.4 | 33.4 | 455 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 2008 | 28.9 | 22.9 | 34.9 | 294 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 2012 | 13.4 | 11.4 | 15.4 | 1,911 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 2016 | 16.8 | 14.6 | 19.0 | 1,590 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 2020 | 16.9 | 15.2 | 18.6 | 3,105 | | ANES: government plan | Republicans | 2024 | 25.1 | 22.4 | 27.7 | 2,129 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1975 | 49.9 | 47.1 | 52.8 | 1,453 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1983 | 48.4 | 45.2 | 51.6 | 1,540 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1984 | 45.1 | 41.9 | 48.3 | 1,409 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1986 | 49.4 | 46.5 | 52.3 | 1,427 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1987 | 47.9 | 45.1 | 50.8 | 1,774 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1988 | 48.4 | 44.9 | 51.9 | 972 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1989 | 55.6 | 52.2 | 59.1 | 1,010 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1990 | 58.7 | 55.0 | 62.4 | 871 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1991 | 56.8 | 53.3 | 60.2 | 993 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1993 | 52.6 | 49.2 | 56.1 | 1,026 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1994 | 47.3 | 44.8 | 49.8 | 1,945 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1996 | 48.8 | 46.3 | 51.3 | 1,867 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 1998 | 49.0 | 46.4 | 51.5 | 1,849 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2000 | 50.5 | 47.9 | 53.0 | 1,830 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2002 | 51.3 | 47.5 | 55.1 | 898 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2004 | 54.1 | 50.1 | 58.0 | 864 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2006 | 52.3 | 49.6 | 54.9 | 1,964 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2008 | 54.0 | 50.8 | 57.1 | 1,331 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2010 | 45.9 | 42.5 | 49.3 | 1,326 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2012 | 45.5 | 42.1 | 48.9 | 1,297 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2014 | 43.1 | 40.3 | 45.8 | 1,640 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2016 | 49.8 | 47.0 | 52.5 | 1,896 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2018 | 52.2 | 48.9 | 55.4 | 1,528 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2021 | 54.1 | 51.7 | 56.4 | 2,627 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2022 | 55.8 | 52.6 | 59.0 | 2,323 | | GSS: government should help pay | All respondents | 2024 | 53.1 | 50.1 | 56.1 | 2,138 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1975 | 56.7 | 52.9 | 60.5 | 795 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1983 | 58.7 | 54.4 | 63.0 | 826 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1984 | 53.0 | 48.5 | 57.5 | 729 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1986 | 59.5 | 55.5 | 63.5 | 716 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1987 | 55.9 | 52.0 | 59.8 | 1,009 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1988 | 55.0 | 50.0 | 60.0 | 473 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1989 | 63.2 | 58.2 | 68.2 | 471 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1990 | 64.4 | 59.1 | 69.7 | 411 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1991 | 62.4 | 57.4 | 67.4 | 447 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1993 | 61.2 | 56.3 | 66.2 | 483 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1994 | 59.8 | 56.2 | 63.4 | 900 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1996 | 58.7 | 55.0 | 62.4 | 861 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 1998 | 58.9 | 55.1 | 62.7 | 847 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2000 | 63.0 | 59.2 | 66.8 | 804 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2002 | 63.5 | 58.0 | 69.0 | 405 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2004 | 65.0 | 59.3 | 70.7 | 397 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2006 | 64.5 | 60.6 | 68.4 | 839 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2008 | 67.0 | 62.7 | 71.3 | 653 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2010 | 60.6 | 55.7 | 65.6 | 643 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2012 | 58.2 | 53.4 | 63.0 | 627 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2014 | 58.0 | 53.9 | 62.1 | 746 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2016 | 69.2 | 65.5 | 72.9 | 914 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2018 | 70.2 | 65.9 | 74.5 | 676 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2021 | 74.8 | 71.7 | 78.0 | 1,187 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2022 | 74.4 | 70.0 | 78.7 | 939 | | GSS: government should help pay | Democrats | 2024 | 73.0 | 68.7 | 77.3 | 826 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 1975 | 44.1 | 36.5 | 51.7 | 200 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 1984 | 43.4 | 34.2 | 52.7 | 147 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 1986 | 45.9 | 37.7 | 54.1 | 182 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 1987 | 45.7 | 37.3 | 54.2 | 188 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 1989 | 57.9 | 48.4 | 67.4 | 123 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 1993 | 56.5 | 46.8 | 66.2 | 128 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 1994 | 44.6 | 37.4 | 51.8 | 228 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 1996 | 53.9 | 47.3 | 60.4 | 293 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 1998 | 51.3 | 44.6 | 58.1 | 293 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2000 | 52.9 | 46.9 | 58.8 | 339 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2002 | 54.5 | 45.3 | 63.8 | 171 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2006 | 56.6 | 50.7 | 62.4 | 430 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2008 | 56.0 | 47.9 | 64.1 | 207 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2010 | 50.6 | 42.5 | 58.7 | 230 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2012 | 48.1 | 39.9 | 56.2 | 233 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2014 | 50.2 | 43.9 | 56.5 | 335 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2016 | 45.3 | 38.1 | 52.6 | 306 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2018 | 49.3 | 41.5 | 57.2 | 254 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2021 | 48.7 | 43.6 | 53.8 | 531 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2022 | 60.0 | 53.5 | 66.6 | 534 | | GSS: government should help pay | Independents | 2024 | 55.7 | 49.7 | 61.6 | 537 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1975 | 39.6 | 34.6 | 44.6 | 441 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1983 | 31.7 | 26.8 | 36.6 | 522 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1984 | 35.8 | 30.4 | 41.1 | 506 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1986 | 38.1 | 33.5 | 42.7 | 517 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1987 | 39.1 | 34.3 | 43.8 | 556 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1988 | 43.2 | 37.7 | 48.7 | 384 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1989 | 46.8 | 41.4 | 52.2 | 401 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1990 | 51.5 | 45.7 | 57.3 | 360 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1991 | 48.3 | 43.0 | 53.6 | 419 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1993 | 41.3 | 35.9 | 46.6 | 399 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1994 | 32.8 | 29.1 | 36.5 | 754 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1996 | 34.9 | 31.0 | 38.9 | 678 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 1998 | 37.1 | 33.1 | 41.1 | 661 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2000 | 33.9 | 29.8 | 38.0 | 641 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2002 | 33.0 | 26.9 | 39.0 | 300 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2004 | 42.4 | 36.3 | 48.6 | 330 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2006 | 35.3 | 30.9 | 39.6 | 659 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2008 | 34.9 | 29.6 | 40.2 | 440 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2010 | 21.0 | 16.3 | 25.8 | 417 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2012 | 26.5 | 21.0 | 32.0 | 390 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2014 | 19.4 | 15.4 | 23.4 | 509 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2016 | 25.6 | 21.5 | 29.7 | 606 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2018 | 33.7 | 28.2 | 39.1 | 527 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2021 | 28.4 | 24.7 | 32.1 | 818 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2022 | 36.0 | 30.5 | 41.4 | 764 | | GSS: government should help pay | Republicans | 2024 | 30.5 | 25.8 | 35.2 | 712 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1973 | 62.7 | 60.0 | 65.4 | 1,445 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1974 | 66.3 | 63.6 | 69.0 | 1,426 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1975 | 65.4 | 62.7 | 68.1 | 1,425 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1976 | 63.1 | 60.4 | 65.9 | 1,441 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1977 | 58.2 | 55.4 | 61.0 | 1,454 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1978 | 57.5 | 54.3 | 60.7 | 1,471 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1980 | 57.8 | 54.6 | 61.0 | 1,407 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1982 | 59.8 | 56.8 | 62.8 | 1,761 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1983 | 59.9 | 56.7 | 63.0 | 1,531 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1984 | 59.9 | 54.7 | 65.1 | 465 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1985 | 64.4 | 60.1 | 68.7 | 727 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1986 | 60.0 | 55.9 | 64.0 | 702 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1987 | 70.9 | 66.4 | 75.4 | 589 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1988 | 69.3 | 65.5 | 73.2 | 692 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1989 | 70.0 | 66.2 | 73.7 | 738 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1990 | 73.2 | 69.4 | 77.0 | 653 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1991 | 70.9 | 67.2 | 74.6 | 729 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1993 | 75.0 | 71.5 | 78.5 | 768 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1994 | 66.9 | 64.1 | 69.6 | 1,440 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1996 | 67.5 | 64.7 | 70.2 | 1,394 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 1998 | 67.8 | 64.9 | 70.6 | 1,345 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2000 | 71.8 | 69.1 | 74.5 | 1,379 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2002 | 72.8 | 70.1 | 75.6 | 1,336 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2004 | 77.9 | 75.3 | 80.5 | 1,382 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2006 | 73.5 | 70.7 | 76.2 | 1,451 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2008 | 76.5 | 73.4 | 79.7 | 973 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2010 | 58.7 | 54.9 | 62.4 | 988 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2012 | 59.7 | 55.8 | 63.6 | 969 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2014 | 57.5 | 54.3 | 60.7 | 1,240 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2016 | 63.0 | 59.9 | 66.1 | 1,405 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2018 | 70.7 | 67.3 | 74.1 | 1,156 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2021 | 66.0 | 63.4 | 68.6 | 1,966 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2022 | 68.3 | 64.8 | 71.8 | 1,747 | | GSS: spending too little | All respondents | 2024 | 73.8 | 70.8 | 76.7 | 1,645 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1973 | 67.1 | 63.4 | 70.7 | 771 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1974 | 68.1 | 64.5 | 71.7 | 795 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1975 | 69.5 | 66.0 | 73.1 | 794 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1976 | 67.3 | 63.7 | 70.9 | 805 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1977 | 63.0 | 59.3 | 66.6 | 840 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1978 | 63.5 | 59.3 | 67.8 | 776 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1980 | 66.2 | 62.0 | 70.5 | 731 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1982 | 64.2 | 60.3 | 68.0 | 1,060 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1983 | 67.3 | 63.1 | 71.5 | 820 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1984 | 68.7 | 61.9 | 75.5 | 243 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1985 | 69.2 | 63.0 | 75.4 | 340 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1986 | 64.9 | 59.4 | 70.3 | 363 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1987 | 75.6 | 70.0 | 81.2 | 340 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1988 | 72.1 | 66.8 | 77.5 | 339 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1989 | 72.8 | 67.4 | 78.3 | 345 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1990 | 76.9 | 71.5 | 82.3 | 288 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1991 | 76.9 | 71.8 | 82.1 | 325 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1993 | 81.9 | 77.3 | 86.4 | 357 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1994 | 77.7 | 74.2 | 81.1 | 705 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1996 | 76.0 | 72.2 | 79.7 | 628 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 1998 | 74.7 | 70.8 | 78.6 | 607 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2000 | 77.4 | 73.6 | 81.1 | 612 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2002 | 80.1 | 76.2 | 84.1 | 570 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2004 | 84.3 | 80.8 | 87.7 | 613 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2006 | 81.4 | 77.7 | 85.1 | 654 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2008 | 83.4 | 79.5 | 87.3 | 479 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2010 | 69.9 | 64.7 | 75.0 | 458 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2012 | 68.9 | 63.7 | 74.1 | 476 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2014 | 67.8 | 63.4 | 72.2 | 581 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2016 | 70.2 | 65.9 | 74.4 | 663 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2018 | 83.6 | 79.5 | 87.6 | 498 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2021 | 84.2 | 81.1 | 87.2 | 868 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2022 | 80.4 | 75.8 | 85.0 | 719 | | GSS: spending too little | Democrats | 2024 | 79.8 | 75.2 | 84.4 | 622 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 1973 | 62.9 | 54.0 | 71.7 | 139 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 1974 | 67.8 | 59.1 | 76.5 | 138 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 1975 | 67.6 | 60.2 | 75.0 | 186 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 1976 | 61.1 | 54.1 | 68.1 | 228 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 1977 | 56.2 | 47.7 | 64.6 | 161 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 1978 | 62.6 | 54.2 | 71.1 | 210 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 1980 | 57.2 | 49.1 | 65.3 | 232 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 1982 | 64.8 | 56.7 | 72.9 | 204 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 1994 | 70.6 | 62.6 | 78.6 | 168 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 1996 | 78.0 | 71.6 | 84.4 | 215 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 1998 | 67.0 | 60.0 | 73.9 | 236 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2000 | 74.7 | 68.9 | 80.6 | 283 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2002 | 75.3 | 69.1 | 81.6 | 255 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2004 | 80.7 | 74.6 | 86.9 | 211 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2006 | 73.7 | 67.3 | 80.1 | 289 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2008 | 75.1 | 67.3 | 83.0 | 162 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2010 | 65.7 | 56.7 | 74.6 | 168 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2012 | 60.1 | 51.1 | 69.1 | 187 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2014 | 59.5 | 52.1 | 67.0 | 230 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2016 | 60.3 | 51.9 | 68.7 | 230 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2018 | 67.6 | 59.5 | 75.6 | 213 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2021 | 62.6 | 56.9 | 68.4 | 411 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2022 | 72.5 | 65.8 | 79.2 | 421 | | GSS: spending too little | Independents | 2024 | 78.6 | 73.2 | 84.0 | 429 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1973 | 53.6 | 48.8 | 58.5 | 471 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1974 | 61.2 | 56.2 | 66.3 | 417 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1975 | 57.1 | 52.0 | 62.2 | 431 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1976 | 55.7 | 50.3 | 61.0 | 400 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1977 | 48.9 | 43.8 | 54.1 | 437 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1978 | 45.0 | 39.3 | 50.8 | 471 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1980 | 44.3 | 38.8 | 49.8 | 433 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1982 | 50.1 | 44.5 | 55.6 | 478 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1983 | 48.6 | 43.4 | 53.8 | 525 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1984 | 45.7 | 36.8 | 54.7 | 161 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1985 | 58.3 | 51.4 | 65.2 | 299 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1986 | 50.2 | 43.4 | 57.1 | 251 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1987 | 60.4 | 52.1 | 68.6 | 177 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1988 | 65.4 | 58.9 | 71.9 | 259 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1989 | 62.2 | 56.0 | 68.3 | 294 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1990 | 69.9 | 63.9 | 75.9 | 284 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1991 | 65.0 | 59.0 | 70.9 | 306 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1993 | 64.6 | 58.5 | 70.7 | 305 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1994 | 52.9 | 48.1 | 57.8 | 529 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1996 | 54.8 | 50.1 | 59.4 | 525 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 1998 | 60.6 | 55.8 | 65.5 | 468 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2000 | 62.6 | 57.6 | 67.5 | 456 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2002 | 64.0 | 59.1 | 68.9 | 472 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2004 | 69.9 | 65.3 | 74.6 | 537 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2006 | 63.6 | 58.5 | 68.6 | 476 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2008 | 67.7 | 61.5 | 73.9 | 308 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2010 | 40.7 | 34.3 | 47.0 | 334 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2012 | 43.8 | 36.5 | 51.1 | 276 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2014 | 42.1 | 36.4 | 47.9 | 384 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2016 | 54.8 | 49.4 | 60.2 | 466 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2018 | 60.1 | 53.8 | 66.5 | 400 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2021 | 42.5 | 37.7 | 47.3 | 599 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2022 | 50.6 | 43.4 | 57.8 | 529 | | GSS: spending too little | Republicans | 2024 | 64.4 | 58.9 | 70.0 | 533 | Views: ANES: government plan (instrument = ANES: government plan); GSS: government should help pay (instrument = GSS: government should help pay); GSS: spending too little (instrument = GSS: spending too little). Note: An independent cell is drawn only where it has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100, so some independent points are missing, in the ANES view in 1984, 2000, 2004 and 2008. Note: The ANES counts points 1 to 3 of the seven-point scale, the GSS help-pay view counts points 1 and 2 of the five-point scale, and the GSS spending view counts the answer too little. The ANES scale was asked of a subsample in 1972, 1984, 2000 and 2008, and the midpoint of the scale stays in the denominator. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1970-2024, and General Social Survey, 1973-2024; weighted (weight, VCF0009z; weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/share_by_party.json ### Table 5. Democrats opposed repealing the ACA more often than Republicans in every CES year, counting 2014 after a recode, with independents between them Share opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act, by party identification including leaners, 2012 to 2021; open points are the 2014 and 2016 questions, which are worded differently; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel | Group | Year | Question worded differently from its neighbours (2014, 2016) | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Democrats | 2012 | no | 80.3 | 79.5 | 81.1 | 24,358 | | Democrats | 2013 | no | 73.4 | 72.0 | 74.9 | 7,267 | | Democrats | 2014 | yes | 80.0 | 79.3 | 80.8 | 25,595 | | Democrats | 2015 | no | 66.1 | 64.5 | 67.7 | 6,584 | | Democrats | 2016 | yes | 70.9 | 70.2 | 71.6 | 31,104 | | Democrats | 2017 | no | 83.9 | 82.7 | 85.0 | 8,518 | | Democrats | 2018 | no | 85.0 | 84.4 | 85.6 | 27,585 | | Democrats | 2019 | no | 81.8 | 80.7 | 83.0 | 8,228 | | Democrats | 2020 | no | 83.1 | 82.5 | 83.7 | 29,302 | | Democrats | 2021 | no | 79.6 | 78.7 | 80.6 | 12,445 | | Independents | 2012 | no | 53.9 | 52.1 | 55.8 | 5,890 | | Independents | 2013 | no | 37.6 | 35.0 | 40.2 | 2,825 | | Independents | 2014 | yes | 34.3 | 32.7 | 35.9 | 8,616 | | Independents | 2015 | no | 37.0 | 34.1 | 39.9 | 2,159 | | Independents | 2016 | yes | 34.6 | 33.3 | 35.9 | 10,471 | | Independents | 2017 | no | 47.2 | 44.5 | 49.8 | 3,161 | | Independents | 2018 | no | 53.9 | 52.2 | 55.6 | 8,514 | | Independents | 2019 | no | 46.3 | 43.5 | 49.1 | 2,631 | | Independents | 2020 | no | 53.0 | 51.3 | 54.6 | 8,839 | | Independents | 2021 | no | 49.8 | 47.8 | 51.8 | 4,352 | | Republicans | 2012 | no | 23.9 | 23.0 | 24.8 | 19,613 | | Republicans | 2013 | no | 12.3 | 11.1 | 13.6 | 5,153 | | Republicans | 2014 | yes | 10.8 | 10.2 | 11.5 | 18,925 | | Republicans | 2015 | no | 14.8 | 13.4 | 16.1 | 4,833 | | Republicans | 2016 | yes | 11.7 | 11.1 | 12.2 | 20,818 | | Republicans | 2017 | no | 15.2 | 13.9 | 16.5 | 5,733 | | Republicans | 2018 | no | 23.5 | 22.7 | 24.2 | 21,693 | | Republicans | 2019 | no | 18.6 | 17.4 | 19.8 | 6,435 | | Republicans | 2020 | no | 21.3 | 20.5 | 22.0 | 20,358 | | Republicans | 2021 | no | 26.6 | 25.4 | 27.8 | 8,139 | Note: The cumulative file labels code 1 as support in every year, but in 2014 that code is the Democratic answer, the opposite of the party pattern in every other year. The loader reverses the 2014 answers, and the open 2014 point is the answer after the reversal; with the stored code the 2014 gap would have the opposite sign. The 2014 question also differs in wording from the neighbouring years, as the wording table shows. Note: The wording is a bill considered in Congress in 2012, 2013, 2015 and 2017, a vote for or against in 2016 and a health care proposal to repeal the entire law from 2018. Each party cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. The CES is an opt-in panel, so the intervals rest on a model. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative policy preferences, 2012-2021; weighted (single-wave weight), opt-in panel Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/ces_aca.json ### Table 6. Democrats gave the Democratic-side answer more often than Republicans on every other CES health item, with independents between them Share supporting each CES health proposal, by party identification including leaners, 2014 to 2021; 95% intervals from an opt-in panel | Item | Group | Year | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Medicare for All, 2018 wording | Democrats | 2018 | 91.8 | 91.3 | 92.3 | 27,585 | | Medicare for All, 2018 wording | Independents | 2018 | 71.4 | 69.8 | 73.0 | 8,520 | | Medicare for All, 2018 wording | Republicans | 2018 | 39.6 | 38.7 | 40.5 | 21,684 | | Medicare for All, 2019 to 2021 wording | Democrats | 2019 | 78.2 | 77.0 | 79.4 | 8,226 | | Medicare for All, 2019 to 2021 wording | Democrats | 2020 | 87.6 | 87.1 | 88.2 | 29,313 | | Medicare for All, 2019 to 2021 wording | Democrats | 2021 | 88.4 | 87.6 | 89.2 | 12,445 | | Medicare for All, 2019 to 2021 wording | Independents | 2019 | 57.9 | 55.1 | 60.7 | 2,633 | | Medicare for All, 2019 to 2021 wording | Independents | 2020 | 64.7 | 63.1 | 66.3 | 8,850 | | Medicare for All, 2019 to 2021 wording | Independents | 2021 | 64.3 | 62.4 | 66.3 | 4,352 | | Medicare for All, 2019 to 2021 wording | Republicans | 2019 | 25.0 | 23.7 | 26.3 | 6,425 | | Medicare for All, 2019 to 2021 wording | Republicans | 2020 | 29.8 | 29.0 | 30.6 | 20,379 | | Medicare for All, 2019 to 2021 wording | Republicans | 2021 | 30.5 | 29.3 | 31.7 | 8,139 | | Restore the ACA mandate | Democrats | 2019 | 58.6 | 57.1 | 60.0 | 8,220 | | Restore the ACA mandate | Democrats | 2020 | 61.7 | 60.9 | 62.6 | 29,301 | | Restore the ACA mandate | Democrats | 2021 | 59.1 | 58.0 | 60.3 | 12,445 | | Restore the ACA mandate | Independents | 2019 | 29.3 | 26.7 | 31.9 | 2,636 | | Restore the ACA mandate | Independents | 2020 | 32.2 | 30.6 | 33.7 | 8,848 | | Restore the ACA mandate | Independents | 2021 | 28.5 | 26.7 | 30.3 | 4,352 | | Restore the ACA mandate | Republicans | 2019 | 16.5 | 15.3 | 17.6 | 6,430 | | Restore the ACA mandate | Republicans | 2020 | 18.1 | 17.4 | 18.8 | 20,381 | | Restore the ACA mandate | Republicans | 2021 | 17.7 | 16.6 | 18.7 | 8,139 | | Lower the Medicare age to 50 | Democrats | 2019 | 72.3 | 71.0 | 73.6 | 8,228 | | Lower the Medicare age to 50 | Democrats | 2020 | 77.0 | 76.3 | 77.7 | 29,301 | | Lower the Medicare age to 50 | Independents | 2019 | 59.8 | 57.0 | 62.5 | 2,640 | | Lower the Medicare age to 50 | Independents | 2020 | 62.5 | 60.9 | 64.1 | 8,846 | | Lower the Medicare age to 50 | Republicans | 2019 | 35.0 | 33.6 | 36.5 | 6,431 | | Lower the Medicare age to 50 | Republicans | 2020 | 37.0 | 36.1 | 37.9 | 20,373 | | Increase state health spending | Democrats | 2014 | 69.4 | 68.4 | 70.3 | 22,144 | | Increase state health spending | Democrats | 2016 | 72.1 | 71.3 | 72.9 | 24,870 | | Increase state health spending | Democrats | 2018 | 86.7 | 86.0 | 87.3 | 24,096 | | Increase state health spending | Democrats | 2020 | 87.1 | 86.5 | 87.7 | 25,216 | | Increase state health spending | Independents | 2014 | 41.1 | 39.3 | 42.9 | 7,468 | | Increase state health spending | Independents | 2016 | 44.1 | 42.6 | 45.6 | 8,435 | | Increase state health spending | Independents | 2018 | 61.5 | 59.7 | 63.3 | 7,010 | | Increase state health spending | Independents | 2020 | 58.2 | 56.5 | 60.0 | 7,243 | | Increase state health spending | Republicans | 2014 | 24.0 | 23.0 | 24.9 | 16,935 | | Increase state health spending | Republicans | 2016 | 31.5 | 30.6 | 32.4 | 17,935 | | Increase state health spending | Republicans | 2018 | 41.3 | 40.4 | 42.3 | 19,308 | | Increase state health spending | Republicans | 2020 | 38.1 | 37.2 | 39.0 | 17,942 | Note: The 2018 Medicare for All question reads provide Medicare for all Americans and the 2019 to 2021 questions read expand Medicare to a single comprehensive public health care coverage program, so the 2018 point is not joined to the later line. The spending item asks about state legislatures and was asked in even years only. Note: Each party cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. The CES is an opt-in panel, so the intervals rest on a model. The ACA repeal item is in its own figure. Source: Cooperative Election Study cumulative policy preferences, 2012-2021; weighted (single-wave weight), opt-in panel Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/ces_items.json ### Table 7. The ANES gap was higher in 2020 than among 2016 web respondents, and the in-person GSS gap in 2022 cannot be told from its 2018 level Changes in the Democratic minus Republican gap within one interview mode, and web minus in-person differences in the same year; leaners included; 95% intervals | Panel | Comparison | Estimate (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Change in the gap within or across modes | ANES in person, 2008 to 2012 | 8.2 | −1.5 | 17.8 | 2,570 | | Change in the gap within or across modes | ANES web 2016 to all 2020 | 15.6 | 10.6 | 20.6 | 8,895 | | Change in the gap within or across modes | ANES all 2020 to web 2024 | −4.9 | −11.1 | 1.2 | 8,244 | | Change in the gap within or across modes | GSS in person, 2008 to 2010 | 10.5 | 0.2 | 20.9 | 1,909 | | Change in the gap within or across modes | GSS all respondents, 2018 to 2022 | 1.9 | −8.0 | 11.7 | 2,906 | | Change in the gap within or across modes | GSS in person, 2018 to 2022 | −6.0 | −18.9 | 6.8 | 1,848 | | Change in the gap within or across modes | GSS web, 2021 to 2024 | 4.0 | −5.8 | 13.9 | 2,586 | | Change in the gap within or across modes | GSS spending, web, 2021 to 2024 | −18.7 | −29.7 | −7.7 | 1,919 | | Web minus in-person gap, same year | ANES 2012 | 2.5 | −4.4 | 9.4 | 4,760 | | Web minus in-person gap, same year | ANES 2016 | −4.9 | −12.9 | 3.0 | 3,294 | | Web minus in-person gap, same year | ANES 2024 | 1.7 | −8.0 | 11.4 | 2,588 | | Web minus in-person gap, same year | GSS 2022 | 10.9 | −3.5 | 25.2 | 1,541 | | Web minus in-person gap, same year | GSS 2024 | 16.8 | 2.8 | 30.7 | 1,373 | Note: The 2024 ANES mode groups are the fresh in-person and fresh web samples; the panel respondents are in neither. The ANES 2008 study was in person only. GSS in-person rows leave out phone and other interviews, and the 2021 GSS has no in-person group, so the in-person comparison runs from 2018 to 2022. Note: The GSS spending row is the only row about the spending question; every other GSS row is the help-pay question. Cells need at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100 in each party. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2008 to 2024, and General Social Survey, 2008 to 2024; weighted (weight_ftf and weight_web, the ANES weights for each mode; weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/mode_check.json ### Table 8. The party gap was larger from 2010 on than before 1993 in every age and education group Democratic minus Republican share on the government side, before 1993 against 2010 and after, by group; party identifiers including leaners; 95% intervals | Survey and answer | Group | Gap before 1993 (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | Gap from 2010 (points) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES: government plan | All partisans | 24.3 | 22.3 | 26.3 | 9,234 | 46.8 | 45.1 | 48.4 | 19,120 | | ANES: government plan | Under 45 | 24.5 | 21.8 | 27.3 | 4,848 | 44.7 | 41.8 | 47.6 | 6,728 | | ANES: government plan | 45 to 64 | 23.9 | 20.3 | 27.5 | 2,769 | 46.2 | 43.5 | 48.9 | 6,749 | | ANES: government plan | 65 or older | 25.0 | 20.2 | 29.8 | 1,584 | 48.5 | 45.5 | 51.6 | 5,091 | | ANES: government plan | High school or less | 19.3 | 16.6 | 22.0 | 5,359 | 33.9 | 30.3 | 37.5 | 4,301 | | ANES: government plan | Some college | 26.3 | 22.0 | 30.5 | 1,940 | 44.9 | 42.0 | 47.8 | 6,299 | | ANES: government plan | College graduate | 34.7 | 30.4 | 38.9 | 1,837 | 59.5 | 57.3 | 61.7 | 8,315 | | GSS: government should help pay | All partisans | 17.3 | 15.0 | 19.6 | 9,983 | 39.9 | 37.6 | 42.1 | 11,301 | | GSS: government should help pay | Under 45 | 17.1 | 14.0 | 20.2 | 5,449 | 37.2 | 33.3 | 41.1 | 4,311 | | GSS: government should help pay | 45 to 64 | 18.3 | 13.9 | 22.7 | 2,615 | 39.6 | 35.8 | 43.3 | 3,892 | | GSS: government should help pay | 65 or older | 17.7 | 12.6 | 22.8 | 1,891 | 43.5 | 39.3 | 47.7 | 2,837 | | GSS: government should help pay | No bachelor's degree | 14.2 | 11.6 | 16.8 | 8,138 | 33.8 | 30.9 | 36.7 | 7,109 | | GSS: government should help pay | Bachelor's or higher | 31.4 | 26.4 | 36.3 | 1,834 | 53.4 | 50.0 | 56.8 | 4,181 | Views: ANES: government plan (instrument = ANES: government plan); GSS: government should help pay (instrument = GSS: government should help pay). Note: Before 1993 combines the ANES studies of 1970 to 1992 and the GSS surveys of 1975 to 1991; 2010 and after combines the ANES studies of 2012 to 2024 and the GSS surveys of 2010 to 2024. The GSS degree question has no category for some college without a degree, so the GSS view splits at a bachelor's degree. Note: Education groups in the ANES are high school or less, some college and college graduate. Age is measured at the interview. Cells need at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100 in each party. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1970-2024, and General Social Survey, 1975-2024; weighted (weight, VCF0009z; weight_use); years combined after rescaling each year's weights to average one Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/gap_within_groups.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (224), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | a_between_n | 12 | studies | count of studies with all three party cells | ANES studies with Democratic, independent and Republican cells above their floors | 1970-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_cov_1972 | 41% | percent of ANES respondents | share of all respondents (2705) who answered the government health insurance scale (unweighted count) | ANES respondents in 1972 | 1972 | | 1,112 | none (unweighted count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_cov_1984 | 35% | percent of ANES respondents | share of all respondents (2257) who answered the government health insurance scale (unweighted count) | ANES respondents in 1984 | 1984 | | 792 | none (unweighted count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_cov_2000 | 52% | percent of ANES respondents | share of all respondents (1807) who answered the government health insurance scale (unweighted count) | ANES respondents in 2000 | 2000 | | 935 | none (unweighted count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_cov_2008 | 45% | percent of ANES respondents | share of all respondents (2322) who answered the government health insurance scale (unweighted count) | ANES respondents in 2008 | 2008 | | 1,044 | none (unweighted count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_mid_share | 18% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share choosing the midpoint (point 4) of the seven-point scale, years pooled | ANES respondents who answered the government health insurance question | ANES 1970-2024 | 95% CI 18% to 19% | 38,318 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_pre_n | 7 | studies | count of ANES studies from 1970 to 1992 with a party gap, all with an interval above zero | ANES studies before 1993 | 1970-1992 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_steps_excl | 4 | pairs | count of pairs in which the 95% interval of the change in the party gap excludes zero | adjacent ANES studies | 1970-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | a_steps_n | 15 | pairs | count of pairs of adjacent ANES studies with a party gap in both | adjacent ANES studies | 1970-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes2020_panel_n | 2,839 | interviews | count reported in the ANES 2020 user guide (2,839 re-interviews of the 2016 panel among 8,280 pre-election interviews) | 2020 ANES pre-election interviews that re-interviewed 2016 respondents | 2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes2020_total_n | 8,280 | interviews | count reported in the ANES 2020 user guide | 2020 ANES pre-election interviews | 2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes2024_dr_n | 4,489 | respondents | count of respondents who answered VCF0806 and are Democratic or Republican identifiers | 2024 ANES Democratic and Republican identifiers who answered the scale | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes2024_panel_n | 1,901 | respondents | count of respondents with a positive CDF weight and neither mode weight (the panel re-interviews) | 2024 ANES Democratic and Republican identifiers who answered the scale and are outside the fresh in-person and fresh web samples | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ce_aca_d_2012 | 80.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2012 | 95% CI 79.5% to 81.1% | 24,358 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ce_aca_d_2021 | 79.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2021 | 95% CI 78.7% to 80.6% | 12,445 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ce_aca_r_2012 | 23.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act (CES, opt-in panel) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2012 | 95% CI 23.0% to 24.8% | 19,613 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ce_aca_r_2021 | 26.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act (CES, opt-in panel) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2021 | 95% CI 25.4% to 27.8% | 8,139 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ce_aca_stored_2014 | 69.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share of the stored answer 'support repeal' (code 1, labelled support in every year) if the stored 2014 code is taken at face value (no recode) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES ACA repeal item | 2014 | 95% CI 68.2 to 70.2 | 44,520 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_aca_2012 | 56.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2012 | 95% CI 55.2 to 57.6 | 43,971 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_aca_2014 | 69.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2014 | 95% CI 68.2 to 70.2 | 44,520 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_aca_2021 | 53.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2021 | 95% CI 51.5 to 54.6 | 20,584 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_aca_hi_ex14 | 68.7 | percentage points | largest of the nine yearly party gaps on opposing ACA repeal, 2014 left out (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES ACA repeal item | 2017 | 95% CI 67.0 to 70.5 | 14,251 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_aca_lo_ex14 | 51.3 | percentage points | smallest of the nine yearly party gaps on opposing ACA repeal, 2014 left out (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES ACA repeal item | 2015 | 95% CI 49.3 to 53.4 | 11,417 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_age_2019 | 37.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting lowering the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 50 (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2019 | 95% CI 35.4 to 39.3 | 14,659 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_age_2020 | 40.0 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting lowering the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 50 (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2020 | 95% CI 38.9 to 41.2 | 49,674 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_mandate_2019 | 42.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting restoring the ACA mandate (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2019 | 95% CI 40.3 to 43.9 | 14,650 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_mandate_2020 | 43.7 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting restoring the ACA mandate (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2020 | 95% CI 42.6 to 44.8 | 49,682 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_mandate_2021 | 41.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting restoring the ACA mandate (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2021 | 95% CI 39.9 to 43.0 | 20,584 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_max | 68.7 | percentage points | largest of the 22 item-year party gaps other than the 2014 ACA repeal item (aca_repeal, 2017); answer opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2017 | 95% CI 67.0 to 70.5 | 14,251 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_mfa_2018 | 52.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting Medicare for All (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2018 | 95% CI 51.2 to 53.3 | 49,269 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_mfa_2019 | 53.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting Medicare for All (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2019 | 95% CI 51.4 to 55.0 | 14,651 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_mfa_2020 | 57.8 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting Medicare for All (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2020 | 95% CI 56.8 to 58.8 | 49,692 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_mfa_2021 | 57.9 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting Medicare for All (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2021 | 95% CI 56.5 to 59.4 | 20,584 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_min | 37.3 | percentage points | smallest of the 22 item-year party gaps other than the 2014 ACA repeal item (mcare_age, 2019); answer supporting lowering the Medicare eligibility age from 65 to 50 (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2019 | 95% CI 35.4 to 39.3 | 14,659 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_spend_2014 | 45.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting an increase in state spending on health care (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2014 | 95% CI 44.1 to 46.7 | 39,079 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_spend_2016 | 40.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting an increase in state spending on health care (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2016 | 95% CI 39.3 to 41.7 | 42,805 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_spend_2018 | 45.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting an increase in state spending on health care (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2018 | 95% CI 44.2 to 46.4 | 43,404 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cg_spend_2020 | 49.0 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; answer supporting an increase in state spending on health care (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2020 | 95% CI 47.9 to 50.1 | 43,158 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cst_aca_2018_2021 | −8.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2021 minus 2018, answer opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2018 to 2021 | 95% CI −10.3 to −6.7 | 69,862 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cstp_aca_d_2018_2021 | −5.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted share opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act, 2021 minus 2018 (CES, opt-in panel) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2018 to 2021 | 95% CI −6.5 to −4.2 | 40,030 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cstp_aca_r_2018_2021 | +3.1 | percentage points | change in the weighted share opposing repeal of the Affordable Care Act, 2021 minus 2018 (CES, opt-in panel) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the CES item | 2018 to 2021 | 95% CI 1.7 to 4.6 | 29,832 | weight (single-wave weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cut_a2_gap_1 | 22.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years, government side counted as points 1 and 2 only of the seven-point scale | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 | 95% CI 20.6 to 24.4 | 9,234 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cut_a2_gap_2 | 23.9 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years, government side counted as points 1 and 2 only of the seven-point scale | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1994-2008 | 95% CI 21.4 to 26.4 | 5,599 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cut_a2_gap_3 | 39.0 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years, government side counted as points 1 and 2 only of the seven-point scale | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 37.5 to 40.6 | 19,120 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cutc_a2_gap_12 | +1.4 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted party gap between windows, government side counted as points 1 and 2 only of the seven-point scale | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 to 1994-2008 | 95% CI −1.8 to 4.5 | 14,833 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cutc_a4_gap_12 | +10.9 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted party gap between windows, government side counted as points 1 to 4 (the midpoint included) of the seven-point scale | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 to 1994-2008 | 95% CI 7.5 to 14.3 | 14,833 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | g_between_n | 21 | surveys | count of surveys with all three party cells, help-pay question | GSS surveys with Democratic, independent and Republican cells above their floors | 1975-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | g_pre_n | 9 | surveys | count of GSS help-pay surveys from 1975 to 1991 with a party gap, all with an interval above zero | GSS surveys before 1993 with the help-pay question | 1975-1991 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | g_steps_excl | 3 | pairs | count of pairs in which the 95% interval of the change in the party gap excludes zero | adjacent GSS surveys with the help-pay question | 1975-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | g_steps_n | 25 | pairs | count of pairs of adjacent GSS surveys with a party gap in both | adjacent GSS surveys with the help-pay question | 1975-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | gp_a_1970 | 24.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1970 | 95% CI 18.6 to 30.2 | 1,112 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gp_a_1984 | 16.8 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1984 | 95% CI 9.7 to 23.9 | 688 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gp_a_1992 | 30.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1992 | 95% CI 25.8 to 34.5 | 1,873 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gp_a_2012 | 41.9 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2012 | 95% CI 38.7 to 45.1 | 4,760 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gp_a_2020 | 54.0 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2020 | 95% CI 51.3 to 56.7 | 6,577 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gp_a_2024 | 46.6 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2024 | 95% CI 42.8 to 50.4 | 4,489 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gp_g_1975 | 17.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 1975 | 95% CI 10.8 to 23.4 | 1,236 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_g_1991 | 14.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 1991 | 95% CI 6.8 to 21.4 | 866 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_g_2016 | 43.6 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2016 | 95% CI 38.1 to 49.1 | 1,520 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_g_2018_ftf | 39.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2018, in-person interviews | 95% CI 32.1 to 46.1 | 1,089 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_g_2021_web | 45.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2021, web interviews | 95% CI 40.2 to 50.7 | 1,749 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_g_2022_ftf | 33.1 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2022, in-person interviews | 95% CI 22.3 to 43.8 | 759 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_g_2022_web | 43.9 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2022, web interviews | 95% CI 34.4 to 53.4 | 782 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_g_2024 | 42.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2024 | 95% CI 36.1 to 48.9 | 1,538 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_g_2024_web | 49.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2024, web interviews | 95% CI 41.2 to 57.9 | 837 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_s_1973 | 13.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | 1973 | 95% CI 7.4 to 19.5 | 1,242 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_s_2010 | 29.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | 2010 | 95% CI 21.0 to 37.4 | 792 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_s_2016 | 15.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | 2016 | 95% CI 8.6 to 22.3 | 1,129 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_s_2021 | 41.7 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | 2021 | 95% CI 36.0 to 47.3 | 1,467 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gp_s_2024 | 15.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | 2024 | 95% CI 8.2 to 22.5 | 1,155 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gr_a_all_early | 24.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question, all partisans | ANES 1970-1992 | 95% CI 22.3 to 26.3 | 9,234 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gr_a_all_late | 46.8 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question, all partisans | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 45.1 to 48.4 | 19,120 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gr_a_col_early | 34.7 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question, within the group college graduate | ANES 1970-1992 | 95% CI 30.4 to 38.9 | 1,837 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gr_a_col_late | 59.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question, within the group college graduate | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 57.3 to 61.7 | 8,315 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gr_a_hs_early | 19.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question, within the group high school or less | ANES 1970-1992 | 95% CI 16.6 to 22.0 | 5,359 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gr_a_hs_late | 33.9 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question, within the group high school or less | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 30.3 to 37.5 | 4,301 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gr_a_m45_late | 46.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question, within the group 45 to 64 | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 43.5 to 48.9 | 6,749 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gr_a_o65_late | 48.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question, within the group 65 or older | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 45.5 to 51.6 | 5,091 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gr_a_u45_late | 44.7 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question, within the group under 45 | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 41.8 to 47.6 | 6,728 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gr_g_all_early | 17.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS help-pay question, all partisans | GSS 1975-1991 | 95% CI 15.0 to 19.6 | 9,983 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | gr_g_all_late | 39.9 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS help-pay question, all partisans | GSS 2010-2024 | 95% CI 37.6 to 42.1 | 11,301 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | gr_g_ba_late | 53.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS help-pay question, within the group bachelor's degree or higher | GSS 2010-2024 | 95% CI 50.0 to 56.8 | 4,181 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | gr_g_nb_late | 33.8 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; within the group, pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS help-pay question, within the group no bachelor's degree | GSS 2010-2024 | 95% CI 30.9 to 36.7 | 7,109 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | grl_a_col_d_late | 72.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) within the group college graduate who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 71.0% to 74.3% | 4,791 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | grl_a_col_r_late | 13.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) within the group college graduate who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 11.8% to 14.6% | 3,524 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | grl_a_hs_d_late | 57.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) within the group high school or less who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 54.2% to 59.7% | 2,280 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | grl_a_hs_r_late | 23.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) within the group high school or less who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 20.8% to 25.4% | 2,021 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gss_2010_after | 94% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share interviewed after 23 March 2010, the day the Affordable Care Act was signed (interview date has month and day only) | GSS respondents who answered the help-pay question in 2010 | 2010 | 95% CI 92% to 95% | 1,326 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | gss_web_2021 | 87.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | share of respondents interviewed on the web (unweighted count) | GSS respondents who answered the help-pay question in 2021 | 2021 | | 2,627 | none (unweighted count) | General Social Survey | | | lv_a_d_1970 | 54.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1970 | 95% CI 50.8% to 58.2% | 697 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_d_1988 | 52.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1988 | 95% CI 48.9% to 55.8% | 793 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_d_1992 | 64.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1992 | 95% CI 61.3% to 67.1% | 1,068 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_d_1994 | 52.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1994 | 95% CI 48.2% to 56.1% | 754 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_d_2012 | 55.3% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2012 | 95% CI 52.8% to 57.8% | 2,849 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_d_2024 | 71.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2024 | 95% CI 69.0% to 74.3% | 2,360 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_r_1970 | 30.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1970 | 95% CI 25.7% to 34.5% | 415 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_r_1988 | 29.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1988 | 95% CI 26.3% to 33.0% | 719 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_r_1992 | 34.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1992 | 95% CI 30.8% to 37.3% | 805 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_r_1994 | 21.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1994 | 95% CI 18.1% to 24.7% | 716 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_r_1996 | 21.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1996 | 95% CI 17.3% to 24.6% | 596 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_r_2000 | 29.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2000 | 95% CI 23.8% to 34.4% | 342 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_r_2004 | 28.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2004 | 95% CI 24.4% to 33.4% | 455 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_r_2008 | 28.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2008 | 95% CI 22.9% to 34.9% | 294 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_r_2012 | 13.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2012 | 95% CI 11.4% to 15.4% | 1,911 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_a_r_2024 | 25.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2024 | 95% CI 22.4% to 27.7% | 2,129 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_g_d_1975 | 56.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 1975 | 95% CI 52.9% to 60.5% | 795 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | lv_g_d_2024 | 73.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2024 | 95% CI 68.7% to 77.3% | 826 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | lv_g_r_1975 | 39.6% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 1975 | 95% CI 34.6% to 44.6% | 441 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | lv_g_r_2024 | 30.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2024 | 95% CI 25.8% to 35.2% | 712 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | lv_s_d_2008 | 83.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | 2008 | 95% CI 79.5% to 87.3% | 479 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | lv_s_d_2024 | 79.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | 2024 | 95% CI 75.2% to 84.4% | 622 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | lv_s_r_2008 | 67.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | 2008 | 95% CI 61.5% to 73.9% | 308 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | lv_s_r_2024 | 64.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | 2024 | 95% CI 58.9% to 70.0% | 533 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | mo_a_0812_ftf | +8.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap among in-person respondents, 2012 minus 2008 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question, in-person interviews | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −1.5 to 17.8 | 2,570 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_a_0812_ftf_r | −11.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted Republican share on the government side among in-person respondents, 2012 minus 2008 (two separate samples) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) interviewed in person who answered the ANES scale | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −18.9 to −4.5 | 825 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_a_1620_web | +15.6 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2020 (all respondents, no mode weights) minus 2016 (web respondents only); the 2020 study re-interviewed 2016 respondents and the 2024 study re-interviewed panel respondents, so the interval treats overlapping samples as independent | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2016 (web respondents) to 2020 | 95% CI 10.6 to 20.6 | 8,895 | weight_web (2016 web respondents); weight (2020) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_a_2024_web | −4.9 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2024 (fresh web respondents only) minus 2020 (all respondents, no mode weights) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2020 to 2024 (web respondents) | 95% CI −11.1 to 1.2 | 8,244 | weight (2020); weight_web (2024 web respondents) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_a_ci_hi | +11.4 | percentage points | highest upper end of the three 95% intervals for web minus in-person party gaps | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2012, 2016 and 2024 | | | weight_web and weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_a_ci_lo | −12.9 | percentage points | lowest lower end of the three 95% intervals for web minus in-person party gaps | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2012, 2016 and 2024 | | | weight_web and weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_a_diff_2012 | +2.5 | percentage points | web respondents' weighted party gap minus in-person respondents' gap, 2012 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2012 | 95% CI −4.4 to 9.4 | 4,760 | weight_web and weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_a_diff_2016 | −4.9 | percentage points | web respondents' weighted party gap minus in-person respondents' gap, 2016 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2016 | 95% CI −12.9 to 3.0 | 3,294 | weight_web and weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_a_diff_2024 | +1.7 | percentage points | web respondents' weighted party gap minus in-person respondents' gap, 2024 (fresh samples; two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2024 | 95% CI −8.0 to 11.4 | 2,588 | weight_web and weight_ftf | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_a_fresh_2024 | 47.0 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; fresh samples only (panel re-interviews left out); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | 2024 ANES Democratic and Republican identifiers in the fresh in-person and fresh web samples who answered the scale | 2024 | 95% CI 42.2 to 51.9 | 2,588 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mo_g_0810_ftf | +10.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap among in-person respondents, 2010 minus 2008 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS help-pay question, in-person interviews | 2008 to 2010 | 95% CI 0.2 to 20.9 | 1,909 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | mo_g_1822_ftf | −6.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap among in-person respondents, 2022 minus 2018 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS help-pay question, in-person interviews | 2018 to 2022 | 95% CI −18.9 to 6.8 | 1,848 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | mo_g_2124_web | +4.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap among web respondents, 2024 minus 2021 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS help-pay question, web interviews | 2021 to 2024 | 95% CI −5.8 to 13.9 | 2,586 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | mo_g_diff_2022 | +10.9 | percentage points | web respondents' weighted party gap minus in-person respondents' gap, 2022 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS help-pay question | 2022 | 95% CI −3.5 to 25.2 | 1,541 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | mo_g_diff_2024 | +16.8 | percentage points | web respondents' weighted party gap minus in-person respondents' gap, 2024 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS help-pay question | 2024 | 95% CI 2.8 to 30.7 | 1,373 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | mo_s_2124_web | −18.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap among web respondents, 2024 minus 2021 (two separate samples) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS health spending question, web interviews | 2021 to 2024 | 95% CI −29.7 to −7.7 | 1,919 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | n_anes_item | 38,318 | respondents | count of respondents who answered VCF0806 | ANES respondents who answered the government health insurance question | 1970-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_waves | 16 | studies | count of ANES study years with VCF0806 | ANES studies that asked the question | 1970-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ces_itemyears_ex14 | 22 | item-years | count of item-years with a plotted party gap, the 2014 ACA repeal item left out | CES health item-years other than the 2014 ACA repeal item | 2012-2021 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_gss_help | 39,798 | respondents | count of respondents who answered helpsick | GSS respondents who answered the help-pay question | 1975-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_gss_help_waves | 26 | surveys | count of GSS survey years with helpsick | GSS survey years that asked the help-pay question | 1975-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_gss_spend | 41,240 | respondents | count of respondents who answered natheal | GSS respondents who answered the health spending question | 1973-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_gss_spend_waves | 34 | surveys | count of GSS survey years with natheal | GSS survey years that asked the health spending question | 1973-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | near_zero_cut | 2 | percentage points | distance from zero, in points, used to call an interval bound close to zero | adjacent ANES studies and adjacent GSS help-pay surveys | 1970-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | recode_2014_rows | 55,829 | respondents | count of 2014 answers reversed by the loader recode (1 minus the stored code) | CES 2014 respondents who answered the ACA repeal item | 2014 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | s_above_n | 32 | surveys | count of surveys in which the 95% interval of the party gap lies above zero | GSS surveys with the health spending question | 1973-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | s_rep_above | 19 | surveys | count of surveys in which the 95% interval of the Republican share saying too little lies above 50 percent | GSS surveys with the health spending question | 1973-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | s_rep_below | 4 | surveys | count of surveys in which the 95% interval of the Republican share saying too little lies below 50 percent | GSS surveys with the health spending question | 1973-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | s_rep_n | 34 | surveys | count of GSS survey years with a Republican share | GSS surveys with the health spending question | 1973-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | s_rep_point | 25 | surveys | count of surveys in which the weighted Republican share saying too little is above 50 percent | GSS surveys with the health spending question | 1973-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | s_total_n | 34 | surveys | count of GSS survey years with a plotted spending gap | GSS surveys with the health spending question | 1973-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | st_a_1988_1992 | +7.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 1992 minus 1988 (two separate samples); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1988 to 1992 | 95% CI 1.0 to 14.0 | 3,385 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_1992_1994 | +0.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 1994 minus 1992 (two separate samples); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1992 to 1994 | 95% CI −6.2 to 7.3 | 3,343 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_2008_2012 | +9.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2012 minus 2008 (two separate samples); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI 1.4 to 18.2 | 5,674 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_2016_2020 | +14.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2020 minus 2016 (two overlapping samples); the 2020 study re-interviewed 2016 respondents and the 2024 study re-interviewed panel respondents, so the interval treats overlapping samples as independent; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 9.8 to 18.8 | 9,871 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_2020_2024 | −7.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2024 minus 2020 (two overlapping samples); the 2020 study re-interviewed 2016 respondents and the 2024 study re-interviewed panel respondents, so the interval treats overlapping samples as independent; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −12.1 to −2.8 | 11,066 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_d_1992_1994 | −12.1 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 1994 minus 1992 (two separate samples); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1992 to 1994 | 95% CI −17.0 to −7.2 | 1,822 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_d_2008_2012 | −5.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 2012 minus 2008 (two separate samples); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −11.2 to −0.1 | 3,469 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_d_2020_2024 | +0.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 2024 minus 2020 (two overlapping samples); the 2020 study re-interviewed 2016 respondents and the 2024 study re-interviewed panel respondents, so the interval treats overlapping samples as independent; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −2.6 to 4.1 | 5,832 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_r_1992_1994 | −12.6 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 1994 minus 1992 (two separate samples); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 1992 to 1994 | 95% CI −17.3 to −8.0 | 1,521 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_r_2008_2012 | −15.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 2012 minus 2008 (two separate samples); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −21.8 to −9.2 | 2,205 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_a_r_2020_2024 | +8.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 2024 minus 2020 (two overlapping samples); the 2020 study re-interviewed 2016 respondents and the 2024 study re-interviewed panel respondents, so the interval treats overlapping samples as independent; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 5.0 to 11.4 | 5,234 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | st_g_1975_1983 | +9.9 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 1983 minus 1975 (two separate samples); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 1975 to 1983 | 95% CI 0.8 to 18.9 | 2,584 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_1983_1984 | −9.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 1984 minus 1983 (two separate samples); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 1983 to 1984 | 95% CI −19.3 to −0.2 | 2,583 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_1993_1994 | +7.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 1994 minus 1993 (two separate samples); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 1993 to 1994 | 95% CI −1.9 to 16.0 | 2,536 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_2008_2010 | +7.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2010 minus 2008 (two separate samples); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2008 to 2010 | 95% CI −2.2 to 17.1 | 2,153 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_2018_2021 | +9.9 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2021 minus 2018 (two separate samples); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2018 to 2021 | 95% CI 1.4 to 18.4 | 3,208 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_2018_2022 | +1.9 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2022 minus 2018 (two separate samples); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2018 to 2022 | 95% CI −8.0 to 11.7 | 2,906 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_d_1993_1994 | −1.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 1994 minus 1993 (two separate samples); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 1993 to 1994 | 95% CI −7.5 to 4.7 | 1,383 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_d_2008_2010 | −6.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 2010 minus 2008 (two separate samples); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2008 to 2010 | 95% CI −12.9 to 0.2 | 1,296 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_r_1993_1994 | −8.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 1994 minus 1993 (two separate samples); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 1993 to 1994 | 95% CI −15.0 to −1.9 | 1,153 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_g_r_2008_2010 | −13.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted share, 2010 minus 2008 (two separate samples); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | 2008 to 2010 | 95% CI −20.9 to −6.7 | 857 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_s_2010_2016 | −13.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2016 minus 2010 (two separate samples); the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | 2010 to 2016 | 95% CI −24.4 to −3.1 | 1,921 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | st_s_2021_2024 | −26.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted party gap, 2024 minus 2021 (two separate samples); the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | 2021 to 2024 | 95% CI −35.5 to −17.2 | 2,622 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004) | General Social Survey | | | steps_excl_n | 7 | pairs | count of adjacent-survey changes in the party gap whose 95% interval excludes zero (ANES and GSS together) | adjacent ANES studies and adjacent GSS help-pay surveys | 1970-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | steps_near_n | 5 | pairs | count of those changes whose interval has a bound within the stated number of points of zero | adjacent ANES studies and adjacent GSS help-pay surveys | 1970-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_d_1 | 55.2% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 | 95% CI 53.8% to 56.5% | 5,341 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_d_2 | 55.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1994-2008 | 95% CI 53.5% to 57.4% | 3,196 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_d_3 | 64.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 63.5% to 66.0% | 10,385 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_gap_1 | 24.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 | 95% CI 22.3 to 26.3 | 9,234 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_gap_2 | 30.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1994-2008 | 95% CI 27.8 to 33.3 | 5,599 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_gap_3 | 46.8 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 45.1 to 48.4 | 19,120 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_gap_3_ftf | 43.0 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; in-person respondents only, pooled over the years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question, in-person interviews | ANES 2012, 2016 and 2024 | 95% CI 39.1 to 46.8 | 3,553 | weight_ftf (in-person mode weight), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_i_1 | 47.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | independents who lean toward neither party who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 | 95% CI 45.2% to 50.5% | 1,378 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_i_3 | 42.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | independents who lean toward neither party who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 39.4% to 44.9% | 2,176 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_r_1 | 30.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 | 95% CI 29.4% to 32.3% | 3,893 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_r_2 | 24.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1994-2008 | 95% CI 23.0% to 26.8% | 2,403 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_a_r_3 | 17.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 2012-2024 | 95% CI 16.9% to 19.0% | 8,735 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_g_d_1 | 58.1% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1975-1991 | 95% CI 56.6% to 59.6% | 5,877 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_g_d_2 | 62.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1993-2008 | 95% CI 60.6% to 63.4% | 6,189 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_g_d_3 | 68.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 2010-2024 | 95% CI 66.9% to 69.9% | 6,558 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_g_gap_1 | 17.3 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1975-1991 | 95% CI 15.0 to 19.6 | 9,983 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_g_gap_2 | 26.4 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1993-2008 | 95% CI 24.3 to 28.4 | 11,051 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_g_gap_3 | 39.9 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 2010-2024 | 95% CI 37.6 to 42.1 | 11,301 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_g_gap_3_ftf | 36.8 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; in-person respondents only, pooled over the years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS help-pay question, in-person interviews | GSS 2010-2018, 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI 33.9 to 39.7 | 6,708 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_g_i_1 | 49.4% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | independents who lean toward neither party who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1975-1991 | 95% CI 46.3% to 52.5% | 1,335 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_g_i_3 | 51.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | independents who lean toward neither party who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 2010-2024 | 95% CI 49.4% to 54.1% | 2,960 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_g_r_1 | 40.8% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1975-1991 | 95% CI 39.1% to 42.6% | 4,106 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_g_r_2 | 35.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1993-2008 | 95% CI 34.1% to 37.2% | 4,862 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_g_r_3 | 28.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 2010-2024 | 95% CI 26.8% to 30.2% | 4,743 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_s_a_1 | 63.0% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | all respondents who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | GSS 1973-1991 | 95% CI 62.1% to 63.8% | 18,656 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_s_a_2 | 71.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | all respondents who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | GSS 1993-2008 | 95% CI 70.9% to 72.8% | 11,468 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_s_a_3 | 65.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | all respondents who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | GSS 2010-2024 | 95% CI 64.3% to 66.6% | 11,116 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_s_gap_1 | 13.2 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | GSS 1973-1991 | 95% CI 11.4 to 15.0 | 16,069 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_s_gap_2 | 17.6 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | GSS 1993-2008 | 95% CI 15.5 to 19.7 | 9,301 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_s_gap_3 | 25.5 | percentage points | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | GSS 2010-2024 | 95% CI 22.8 to 28.2 | 8,406 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_s_r_1 | 54.5% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | GSS 1973-1991 | 95% CI 53.1% to 55.9% | 6,094 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_s_r_2 | 61.9% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | GSS 1993-2008 | 95% CI 60.2% to 63.5% | 4,076 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | w_s_r_3 | 50.7% | percent of respondents who answered the item | weighted share pooled over the window's years; the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | GSS 2010-2024 | 95% CI 48.5% to 52.9% | 3,521 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_a_d_12 | +0.3 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (Before 1993 to 1993 to 2009; two separate sets of surveys); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 to 1994-2008 | 95% CI −2.1 to 2.7 | 8,537 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wc_a_d_13 | +9.6 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (Before 1993 to 2010 and after; two separate sets of surveys); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 to 2012-2024 | 95% CI 7.7 to 11.4 | 15,726 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wc_a_d_23 | +9.3 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (1993 to 2009 to 2010 and after; two separate sets of surveys); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1994-2008 to 2012-2024 | 95% CI 6.9 to 11.6 | 13,581 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wc_a_fallrise_13 | +3.3 | percentage points | fall in the pooled Republican share minus rise in the pooled Democratic share, before 1993 to 2010 and after (independent party samples); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 to 2012-2024 | 95% CI 0.8 to 5.9 | 28,354 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wc_a_gap_12 | +6.2 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted party gap between windows (Before 1993 to 1993 to 2009; two separate sets of surveys); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 to 1994-2008 | 95% CI 2.8 to 9.6 | 14,833 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wc_a_gap_13_ftf | +18.6 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted party gap from before 1993 to the later period among in-person respondents; the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 to in-person 2012-2024 | 95% CI 14.3 to 23.0 | 12,787 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wc_a_gap_23 | +16.2 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted party gap between windows (1993 to 2009 to 2010 and after; two separate sets of surveys); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1994-2008 to 2012-2024 | 95% CI 13.0 to 19.4 | 24,719 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wc_a_r_12 | −5.9 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (Before 1993 to 1993 to 2009; two separate sets of surveys); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 to 1994-2008 | 95% CI −8.4 to −3.5 | 6,296 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wc_a_r_13 | −12.9 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (Before 1993 to 2010 and after; two separate sets of surveys); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1970-1992 to 2012-2024 | 95% CI −14.7 to −11.1 | 12,628 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wc_a_r_23 | −7.0 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (1993 to 2009 to 2010 and after; two separate sets of surveys); the ANES seven-point government against private health insurance scale (VCF0806), answers 1 to 3 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES government health insurance question | ANES 1994-2008 to 2012-2024 | 95% CI −9.2 to −4.8 | 11,138 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | wc_g_d_12 | +3.9 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (Before 1993 to 1993 to 2009; two separate sets of surveys); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1975-1991 to 1993-2008 | 95% CI 1.8 to 5.9 | 12,066 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_g_d_13 | +10.2 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (Before 1993 to 2010 and after; two separate sets of surveys); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1975-1991 to 2010-2024 | 95% CI 8.1 to 12.3 | 12,435 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_g_d_23 | +6.4 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (1993 to 2009 to 2010 and after; two separate sets of surveys); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1993-2008 to 2010-2024 | 95% CI 4.3 to 8.4 | 12,747 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_g_fallrise_13 | +2.1 | percentage points | fall in the pooled Republican share minus rise in the pooled Democratic share, before 1993 to 2010 and after (independent party samples); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1975-1991 to 2010-2024 | 95% CI −1.1 to 5.3 | 21,284 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_g_gap_12 | +9.1 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted party gap between windows (Before 1993 to 1993 to 2009; two separate sets of surveys); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1975-1991 to 1993-2008 | 95% CI 6.0 to 12.1 | 21,034 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_g_gap_13_ftf | +19.5 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted party gap from before 1993 to the later period among in-person respondents; the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS help-pay question | GSS 1975-1991 to in-person 2010-2024 | 95% CI 15.8 to 23.2 | 16,691 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_g_gap_23 | +13.5 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted party gap between windows (1993 to 2009 to 2010 and after; two separate sets of surveys); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1993-2008 to 2010-2024 | 95% CI 10.4 to 16.6 | 22,352 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_g_r_12 | −5.2 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (Before 1993 to 1993 to 2009; two separate sets of surveys); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1975-1991 to 1993-2008 | 95% CI −7.5 to −2.9 | 8,968 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_g_r_13 | −12.3 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (Before 1993 to 2010 and after; two separate sets of surveys); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1975-1991 to 2010-2024 | 95% CI −14.7 to −9.9 | 8,849 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_g_r_23 | −7.2 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (1993 to 2009 to 2010 and after; two separate sets of surveys); the GSS question on whether government should help pay for medical care (helpsick), answers 1 and 2 (the government side) | Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the GSS question on government help paying for doctors and hospital bills | GSS 1993-2008 to 2010-2024 | 95% CI −9.4 to −4.9 | 9,605 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_s_a_12 | +8.9 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (Before 1993 to 1993 to 2009; two separate sets of surveys); the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | all respondents who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | GSS 1973-1991 to 1993-2008 | 95% CI 7.7 to 10.2 | 30,124 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | | wc_s_a_23 | −6.4 | percentage points | change in the pooled weighted share between windows (1993 to 2009 to 2010 and after; two separate sets of surveys); the GSS question on spending to improve and protect the nation's health (natheal), answer too little | all respondents who answered the GSS question on spending on the nation's health | GSS 1993-2008 to 2010-2024 | 95% CI −7.9 to −4.9 | 22,584 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004), rescaled to average one within each survey year before years are combined | General Social Survey | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. ## Methods Sample. ANES Cumulative Data File respondents who answered the government health insurance scale (VCF0806: 1 government insurance plan to 7 private insurance plan; haven't thought much about it is missing): 38,318 respondents in 16 studies from 1970 to 2024, of whom 38,125 name or lean toward a party or call themselves independent. The scale was asked of a subsample of respondents in 1972, 1984, 2000 and 2008 (41, 35, 52 and 45 percent of respondents answered it). GSS respondents who answered helpsick (should the government in Washington help pay for doctors and hospital bills, 1 government should help to 5 people should help themselves): 39,798 respondents in 26 surveys from 1975 to 2024. GSS respondents who answered natheal (spending too little, about right or too much on improving and protecting the nation's health): 41,240 respondents in 34 surveys from 1973 to 2024. CES respondents 2012 to 2021 who answered at least one of five health items: 385,461 respondents. The CES itself runs from 2006; its health items begin in 2012. Party and estimand. Leaners count with their party (ANES pid_7pt 1 to 3 Democratic and 5 to 7 Republican, GSS partyid 0 to 2 and 4 to 6, CES pid7_num 1 to 3 and 5 to 7). Independents are the respondents who lean toward neither party (ANES and CES 4, GSS 3); members of other parties are left out. The outcome is the government-side answer: ANES points 1 to 3, GSS helpsick answers 1 and 2, GSS natheal answer 1 (too little), and for the CES the answer that Democrats give more often (opposing repeal of the ACA, supporting Medicare for All, restoring the ACA mandate, lowering the Medicare age, increasing state spending on health care), read from the question wording. The gap is the Democratic share minus the Republican share in percentage points. The ANES midpoint (point 4, 18 percent of answers) stays in the denominator. Cut sensitivity. On the ANES scale the first change in the pooled gap depends on the cut: counting points 1 and 2 only gives pooled gaps of 22.5, 23.9 and 39.0 points and a first change of 1.4 [−1.8, 4.5] points; counting points 1 to 4 gives a first change of 10.9 [7.5, 14.3] points, against 6.2 [2.8, 9.6] with points 1 to 3. The second change, the change from the first period to the last, and the fall in the Republican share in both steps are above or below zero under all three cuts. On the GSS item, counting answer 1 only or answers 1 to 3 keeps both changes in the gap above zero. Weights. ANES weight (VCF0009z); GSS weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before); CES single-wave weight for yearly estimates. Pooled periods rescale each year's weights to average one so that years count in proportion to their respondents. Periods. The periods follow the two dates in the chapter question and are named by the survey year: before 1993 (ANES 1970 to 1992, GSS help-pay 1975 to 1991, GSS spending 1973 to 1991), 1993 to 2009 (ANES 1994 to 2008, GSS 1993 to 2008) and 2010 and after (ANES 2012 to 2024, GSS 2010 to 2024). The GSS 2010 survey was in the field from mid-March to mid-August 2010, and 94 percent of the respondents who answered the help-pay question were interviewed after the law was signed in late March. The dates are positions on an axis, not tests of a cause. Mode. ANES mode-specific estimates use weight_ftf and weight_web, the weights for in-person and web respondents, which exist for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024 (2008 was a single-mode in-person study; 2020 has no mode weights). The 2024 mode groups are the newly recruited in-person and web samples; the 1,901 panel respondents among the 4,489 partisans who answered are in neither group. GSS interview mode (in person, phone, web or other) is joined from the raw file and exists from 2004; the in-person GSS rows leave out phone and other interviews, and the 2021 GSS has no in-person group. Mode comparisons compare separate samples. Intervals. 95% intervals come from the Kish effective sample size with a normal approximation, which treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignores strata and clusters. Differences between two estimates (gaps, changes between surveys or periods, mode differences) combine the two standard errors in quadrature, which assumes the estimates are independent. The GSS surveys are treated as independent cross-sections. The ANES pairs are independent except where respondents are re-interviewed: the 2020 ANES study includes 2,839 re-interviews of 2016 respondents among 8,280 pre-election interviews, and in 2024 1,901 of the 4,489 partisans who answered the scale are panel respondents. Changes that involve 2016, 2020 and 2024, and the mode comparisons that set 2016 web respondents or the 2024 fresh samples against all 2020 respondents, therefore overlap in people, and if answers are positively correlated across waves their intervals are wider than panel-aware intervals would be. The 2024 gap among the fresh in-person and web samples alone is 47.0 [42.2, 51.9] points. The CES is an opt-in panel, so its intervals rest on a model and say nothing about who chose to join. Suppression. A Democratic or Republican cell in a yearly series needs at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. An independent cell, and every cell of a CES year, mode, period or group estimate, needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100. A gap needs both party cells to clear its floor. CES checks. Every CES item-year is checked for the sign of the Democratic minus Republican gap in the Democratic-side answer: the 22 item-years other than the 2014 ACA repeal item have a gap with an interval above zero without any recode. The 2014 ACA item passes only after a recode. The cumulative file labels code 1 as support in every year, but in 2014 that code is the Democratic answer: at face value the 2014 gap in supporting repeal would be Democratic minus Republican 69.2 points, where in the other nine years Republicans are more likely than Democrats to support repeal. The guide to the cumulative policy file says that an earlier version of the file applied the same switch of support and oppose to the 2014 answers and that version 3 does not, because the 2014 question already asked about repeal; the stored counts equal version 3. The loader recodes the 55,829 2014 answers as one minus the stored code and the build asserts that no other year changes. The recode rests on the party pattern and on the earlier version's switch, not on a value label. The chapter draws 2014 apart from the lines because its wording also differs. ## What these data cannot show - The intervals treat each study as an independent sample, and the ANES has exceptions. - The 2020 study includes 2,839 re-interviews of 2016 respondents among 8,280 pre-election interviews, and 1,901 of the 4,489 partisans who answered the scale in 2024 come from the panel outside the fresh samples. - The intervals for changes that involve 2016, 2020 and 2024, and for the mode comparisons that set one mode against all 2020 respondents, treat the samples as independent. - If answers by the same person are positively correlated across waves, those intervals are wider than panel-aware intervals would be. - A gap can also widen because people change their view, change their party or are replaced by new adults, and the surveys cannot say which. - The comparisons around the Clinton plan and the ACA debate use two surveys each, one on either side, and give no read of the months between them; the ANES fields a study only in election years, and the GSS surveys that bracket each date are a year or more apart. - They cannot separate the two events from anything else that happened between the surveys, and they say nothing about the cause of the Republican decline in either period. - The three surveys measure three things. - The ANES scale is about insurance, the GSS help-pay question is about the federal government's responsibility for medical bills, and the CES items name policies that were on the national agenda in the years they were asked. - A reader should not take the ANES gap, the GSS gap and the CES gap as three estimates of one quantity. - The CES health items begin in 2012 and end in 2021, so they have nothing before the ACA passed and nothing for 2022 to 2024. - The wording changes for the ACA item in 2014, 2016 and 2018 and for Medicare for All in 2019, and the 2014 answers needed a reversal that rests on the party pattern and on an earlier version of the file, not on a value label. - The CES intervals ignore how the panel was recruited. - The government side of the ANES scale is also a choice, and the first change between periods depends on it. - The 2020 ANES study has no mode weights, so the 2016 to 2020 step cannot be split by mode, and the web and in-person comparisons are wide. - The ANES asked the scale of a subsample of respondents in 1972, 1984, 2000 and 2008, reaching 41%, 35%, 52% and 45% of respondents, so the intervals for those studies are wider and the 2008 to 2012 step carries a wide interval. - The GSS asked the spending question of a subsample from 1984 to 1993. - Neither survey measures how much respondents care about the issue, how they would trade coverage against cost, or what they know about the programs they were asked about, and neither the ANES scale nor the GSS items name Medicare or Medicaid. - The group results combine years, so they describe the periods and not any single year, and the groups are cross-sections, not people followed over time. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Skocpol, Theda (1996). Boomerang: Clinton's Health Security Effort and the Turn Against Government in U.S. Politics. W. W. Norton. 3. United States Congress (2010). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Public Law 111-148. Approved 23 March 2010. https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/PLAW-111publ148 4. Tesler, Michael (2012). The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race. American Journal of Political Science 56(3): 690-704. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00577.x 5. Dagonel, Angelo (2023). Guide to the Cumulative CES Policy Preferences. Harvard Dataverse, Cumulative CES Policy Preferences, version 3 (guide last updated 2023-01-18). https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/OSXDQO 6. American National Election Studies (2021). ANES 2020 Time Series Study Full Release: User Guide and Codebook. Stanford University and the University of Michigan. https://electionstudies.org/data-center/2020-time-series-study/ ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/health-care/build.py (sha256 6eb9ef75f67c4a591bdb42da92c6644e46fa64f95091de9fe4b05319ee566217) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | ad6d1706efe0cb75c7569fff4982a92d01da5f005241bc9d6381115935b5aa09 | | figures/ces_aca.json | 281e614488302f763c28465931416322c95feb7143a8196cb31ee62c753d933a | | figures/ces_items.json | 09c69edeafc40e732d9bca78efe0b88ffbb29a1ed897376a1176768197a0de1c | | figures/dated_changes.json | 3d3dd848f96d26f5f6689eba496526b2cc44f220c8db15aef726e16dfec0fcba | | figures/gap_by_year.json | 0c3822c903cdb702151a1f3169b3ef72b5f5aaf25679b0624914273ab8959b92 | | figures/gap_within_groups.json | 878ef17be5b4725f890ed57fabc223498d6e607292a02e10e49d7fc1adbad296 | | figures/mode_check.json | 9bd21c1f7dd004791fb39212ec2ce7754eb8844406c58abc64bb11350e7954c3 | | figures/share_by_party.json | 53315b833ee4ac94b7e55b4e7f13b2b13b5ed2b8124791f208384a2ca318cf81 | | figures/wording.json | fffcb2df4cae272911a5883ae9aef8ea52827b9f2db08d5b88bfef7a00dd55a2 | | meta.json | b98a5dbc4445fd676216015edf44b9d467f77cd76858a0f07505a19814af53f2 | | refs.json | d5c5d77981cad24d88eff4cca6ffeaaf1199e772a357a04950d171449d9b179e | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/health-care/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/health-care/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/facts.json - Table 1, figure "wording" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/wording.json - Table 2, figure "gap_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/gap_by_year.json - Table 3, figure "dated_changes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/dated_changes.json - Table 4, figure "share_by_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/share_by_party.json - Table 5, figure "ces_aca" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/ces_aca.json - Table 6, figure "ces_items" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/ces_items.json - Table 7, figure "mode_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/mode_check.json - Table 8, figure "gap_within_groups" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/health-care/figures/gap_within_groups.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Fifty years of racial attitudes: report Chapter 5.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Fifty years of racial attitudes - Chapter: 5.1 (Part V, Race and racial attitudes; The great sorting) - Question: Which racial attitudes changed since the 1970s, and when did the post-2012 movement begin? - Dek: Among white respondents to the General Social Survey, the share attributing racial inequality mainly to discrimination was 30.0% in 2014 and 41.2% in 2018, after equal-treatment answers had risen from the 1970s to the 2000s. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - General Social Survey. Cumulative data 1972-2024 (race, party and the race items; interview mode from the raw file); years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1964-2024: thermometers, resentment items, aid to Black Americans, affirmative action, party and presidential vote; mode weights for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: VCF0009z; VCF0009x and VCF0009y for the mode views - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content 2008 and 2012: affirmative action item, party and presidential vote; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (single wave) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026fiftyyearsofracialattitudes ```bibtex @misc{singh2026fiftyyearsofracialattitudes, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Fifty years of racial attitudes}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 30.0% | 95% CI 27.0% to 33.0% | 1,215 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | disc_2014 | | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 41.2% | 95% CI 37.4% to 45.1% | 1,076 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | disc_2018 | | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: no (no law against black-white marriage) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1972 | 62.6% | 95% CI 59.7% to 65.4% | 1,306 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | marry_1972 | | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: no (no law against black-white marriage) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2002 | 87.6% | 95% CI 84.9% to 90.3% | 742 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | marry_2002 | | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose (would not oppose a relative marrying a black person) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1990 | 35.0% | 95% CI 31.8% to 38.1% | 1,130 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | rel_1990 | | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose (would not oppose a relative marrying a black person) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2024 | 92.4% | 95% CI 90.5% to 94.2% | 1,517 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | rel_2024 | | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1977 | 42.0% | 95% CI 39.0% to 45.0% | 1,273 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | disc_1977 | | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2004 | 28.8% | 95% CI 24.9% to 32.7% | 694 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | disc_2004 | | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 37.1% | 95% CI 34.0% to 40.2% | 1,332 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | disc_2016 | | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: 1 or 2 on a five-point scale from government should help (1) to no special treatment (5) (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 11.2% | 95% CI 9.2% to 13.2% | 1,216 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | help_2014 | | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: 1 or 2 on a five-point scale from government should help (1) to no special treatment (5) (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 21.4% | 95% CI 18.8% to 24.0% | 1,382 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | help_2016 | | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 44.9% | 95% CI 39.6% to 50.2% | 471 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | dem_disc_2014 | | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 61.6% | 95% CI 55.5% to 67.6% | 392 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | dem_disc_2018 | | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 18.2% | 95% CI 14.2% to 22.2% | 468 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | rep_disc_2014 | | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 23.3% | 95% CI 18.0% to 28.5% | 458 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | rep_disc_2018 | | weighted share who report Hispanic origin | white GSS respondents who answered the Hispanic-origin question | 2012 to 2024 | 11.4% | 95% CI 10.8% to 12.1% | 15,012 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | hisp_white | ## Findings Among white respondents to the General Social Survey (GSS), the share who oppose a law against marriages between Black people and whites rose from 62.6% in 1972 to 87.6% in 2002, the last year the question was asked. The share who would not oppose a close relative marrying a Black person rose from 35.0% in 1990 to 92.4% in 2024. Items on the causes of racial inequality and on government action followed another schedule. The share who say that Black people's worse jobs, income and housing are mainly due to discrimination fell from 42.0% in 1977 to 28.8% in 2004 and was 30.0% in 2014, then rose to 37.1% in 2016 and 41.2% in 2018. The share who place themselves at the help end of a five-point scale on whether government has a special obligation to improve Black people's living standards (the two answers nearest to government should help) went from 11.2% in 2014 to 21.4% in 2016. A single step fitted to the in-person interviews of the 2000 to 2018 surveys falls at the 2016 survey for each of six dated explanation and policy items among white respondents, which puts the new level between the 2014 and 2016 surveys. A step is a form assumption, and a kinked trend fits some of the items better. The 2014 and 2016 surveys were conducted mostly in person, so the date does not come from a change of survey mode. The movement is larger among white Democrats. Their share attributing racial inequality to discrimination went from 44.9% in 2014 to 61.6% in 2018, and white Republicans' share went from 18.2% to 23.3%. The GSS is a repeated cross-section of US adults, interviewed in person (with some telephone interviews from 2004) through 2018, mostly on the web in 2021, and in person and on the web in 2022 and 2024. The American National Election Studies (ANES) interviewed mainly in person until 2008, added a web sample in 2012, and held no in-person interviews in 2020. The Cooperative Election Study (CES), an online opt-in panel, gives a second reading of the vote in 2008 and 2012. Results for race and party are shown separately. "White respondents" are white in the GSS race coding, which includes Hispanic whites (11.4% of white respondents from 2012 to 2024), and white non-Hispanic in the ANES and CES. Party includes leaners. (Note: Every share and mean is weighted, with 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size [1]. The intervals treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the surveys' clustering, and the CES intervals also ignore how respondents join an opt-in panel. The methods note in the appendix gives the sample floors, the item wording and the years each item was asked.) Two neighboring chapters cover parts of this ground and are summarized here and not rebuilt. Chapter 5.2, Racial attitudes and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology) relates the ANES racial resentment index to ideology between and within parties, and Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude) dates the year in which the Republican minus Democratic gap on resentment passes a fixed threshold. This chapter dates the level of each item among white respondents, which is a different quantity, and uses the resentment index only in the section on the vote. Chapter 5.3, Racial attitudes after George Floyd's death (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-after-george-floyd; planned) covers the weeks after May 2020. ### Four kinds of items The surveys ask four kinds of question. Principles of equal treatment ask whether Black and white people should be treated alike, for example in marriage, in housing and in a party's choice of a presidential nominee. Explanations of racial inequality ask whether the gap in jobs, income and housing is mainly due to discrimination, to inborn ability, to a lack of chance for education or to a lack of motivation or will power. Policy implementation asks what government should do about the gap: help improve Black people's living standards, spend on it, or give preference in hiring and promotion. Affect is the ANES feeling thermometer, a rating of a group on a scale from zero to one hundred. Schuman, Steeh, Bobo and Krysan separate principles of equality from government implementation of them and add questions about the sources of inequality [2], and Kluegel traced the GSS explanations through 1989 [3]. Each GSS series here is the weighted share of white respondents, among those who answered, who gave the answer named in its label. The government-help question is a five-point scale, and its series counts the two answers nearest to government should help. The chapter dates the answers on discrimination, will power, government help, spending, affirmative action and the special-favors statement, and splits them by party and race. It calls them the dated items. ### Equal-treatment answers rose from the 1970s to the 2000s Table 1 plots the answers of white respondents by kind. The share who oppose a law against marriages between Black people and whites went from 62.6% in 1972 to 87.6% in 2002. The share who disagree that white people have a right to keep Black people out of their neighborhoods went from 60.8% in 1972 to 86.8% in 1996, and the share who would vote for a qualified Black nominee of their own party went from 74.0% in 1972 to 95.7% in 2010. The file has no readings of those questions after those years. The two equal-treatment items still asked in 2024 kept rising after 2012. The share who would vote for a law barring housing discrimination went from 35.5% in 1973 to 68.5% in 2012 and 82.8% in 2022, and was 77.7% (95% CI 70.7% to 84.6%) in 2024, when the item went to fewer respondents. The share who would not oppose a relative marrying a Black person went from 78.4% in 2012 to 92.4% in 2024. Table 1. Equal-treatment answers rose from the 1970s to the 2000s, and explanation and policy answers other than will power were level from the mid-2000s to 2014 and then moved Table 2 gives the change between pooled periods of surveys for every item. The equal-treatment items changed most early. From 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 the open-housing item changed by +23.7 (95% CI 21.6 to 25.9) points, the segregation item by +20.3 (95% CI 18.2 to 22.3) and the intermarriage-law item by +14.3 (95% CI 12.6 to 15.9). The shares saying yes to the explanations fell. Over the same years the share attributing the gap to inborn ability changed by −9.6 (95% CI −12.4 to −6.7) points and the share attributing it to will power by −4.5 (95% CI −7.8 to −1.3), and from 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 the share citing discrimination changed by −7.1 (95% CI −9.4 to −4.7) points and the share citing will power by −9.3 (95% CI −11.8 to −6.7). Table 2. Equal-treatment items changed most before 2008, and the policy items changed most from 2010-2014 on ### Most explanation and policy answers were level from 2004 to 2014 From 2004-2008 to 2010-2014, the pooled periods before and during the Obama presidency, the changes in the dated items lie between −2.5 and +2.1 points, and the interval includes zero for 5 of the six. The exception is the affirmative action item, at +2.1 (95% CI 0.1 to 4.0) points. The two equal-treatment items asked in both periods kept rising, by +3.4 (95% CI 0.7 to 6.1) points for the open-housing law and +8.6 (95% CI 6.2 to 11.1) for a relative's marriage. After 2014 the dated items moved. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 the share citing discrimination changed by +8.4 (95% CI 5.3 to 11.5) points, the share citing will power by −9.0 (95% CI −12.2 to −5.7), the share at the help end of the government-help scale by +10.0 (95% CI 7.6 to 12.4), the share saying too little is spent on improving the conditions of Black people by +20.9 (95% CI 17.2 to 24.5), the share favoring preference in hiring by +5.7 (95% CI 3.3 to 8.2) and the share rejecting the statement that Black people should work up without special favors by +8.2 (95% CI 5.8 to 10.6). The comparison with 2021-2024 pools one web survey and two mixed-mode surveys, so the later years are read by interview mode below. The share citing inborn ability changed by −1.5 (95% CI −3.1 to 0.2) points from 2010-2014 to 2016-2018, an interval that includes zero, so the movement is in the explanations that place the gap in discrimination, education and motivation and not in the one that places it in ability. ### White respondents rated Black and white Americans alike by 2024 White respondents in the ANES rated Black Americans at 60.7 on average in 1964, 69.1 in 2004, 61.8 in 2012 and 69.5 in 2024, and rated white Americans at 86.7 in 1964 and 70.2 in 2024 (Table 3). The average of each respondent's own difference, the rating of white Americans minus the rating of Black Americans, went from 26.1 (95% CI 24.7 to 27.4) in 1964 to 0.7 (95% CI −0.3 to 1.6) in 2024. Table 3. By 2024 white respondents rated Black and white Americans almost alike, after a fall in the rating of Black Americans from 2008 to 2012 Affect has its own Obama-era change. In face-to-face interviews, the only mode in 2008, the rating of Black Americans among white respondents changed by −3.4 (95% CI −5.5 to −1.3) points from 2008 to 2012, by −3.4 (95% CI −6.7 to −0.1) among white Democrats and by −3.1 (95% CI −6.1 to −0.1) among white Republicans. The fall was similar in the two parties. From 2012 to 2016 the face-to-face rating changed by +7.6 (95% CI 3.4 to 11.9) points among Democrats and +1.9 (95% CI −1.6 to 5.4) among Republicans, an interval that includes zero for Republicans, and the web interviews give +6.4 (95% CI 4.1 to 8.8) and +4.6 (95% CI 2.5 to 6.8). The ANES has no study in 2014, so it dates this rise only to the interval from 2012 to 2016, in face-to-face interviews and on the web. ### Most dated items change between the 2014 and 2016 surveys Table 4 dates the movement. Each row fits two levels to the yearly shares, one before the first new survey and one from it on, and reports the survey that fits best and how often resampling the respondents agrees. The best-fitting first new survey is 2016 for each dated item among white respondents and among white Democrats. Of the 1,000 bootstrap replicates for each item, the share that choose 2016 runs from 51.4% to 100.0%. The least certain date is for will power, where 51.4% of the replicates choose 2016 and 38.0% choose an earlier survey. In single-survey comparisons the change from 2012 to 2014 has an interval that excludes zero for 0 of the six dated items, and the change from 2014 to 2016 does so for 5. That change is +18.2 (95% CI 12.7 to 23.8) points for spending, +9.1 (95% CI 5.6 to 12.6) for the help end of the government-help scale and +6.3 (95% CI 1.7 to 10.9) for discrimination, and −3.8 (95% CI −8.6 to 1.1) for will power, an interval that includes zero. A step is a form assumption. A trend that is constant before a kink and linear after it fits the discrimination share better than a step, with a weighted squared error of 2.4 against 8.0, because the share keeps rising from 2016 to 2018. It fits the will-power share better still, 3.0 against 15.2, because that share keeps falling, so will power belongs with trend items more than step items. The step fits the government-help and spending shares better than the kink. The kink falls at 2014.0 (95% CI 2012.0 to 2015.5) for discrimination and at 2011.4 (95% CI 2008.0 to 2014.8) for will power, and the latest upper end of a kink interval across the dated items is 2015.5. By point estimate the kink years run from about 2011 to 2014, so the kinked trend starts the rise at or before the 2014 survey, while the step puts the new level at the 2016 survey. Table 4. The best single step falls at the 2016 survey for each of the six dated items among white respondents and among white Democrats, and a kinked trend fits discrimination and will power better ### The post-2018 changes depend on interview mode The GSS interviewed 87.3% of its 2021 respondents on the web and held no in-person interviews that year, so the level after 2018 needs a mode check. Table 5 gives, for each item asked in both modes, the in-person level in 2010-2014, 2016-2018 and 2022-2024 and the web level in 2022-2024, all for white respondents. By sign, web respondents gave the answer less often than in-person respondents on 6 of the 9 items and more often on 3. By interval, the gap excludes zero below on 5 items and above on 1, and it is at most 9.9 points. In person, the share citing discrimination changed by +12.0 (95% CI 5.3 to 18.7) points from 2016-2018 to 2022-2024, the share citing will power by −7.1 (95% CI −13.4 to −0.8), the share favoring preference in hiring by +6.2 (95% CI 1.7 to 10.6) and the share saying too little is spent by −1.3 (95% CI −7.7 to 5.1), an interval that includes zero. The in-person change excludes zero for 4 of the six dated items. The web level in 2022-2024 minus the in-person level in 2016-2018 is +2.1 (95% CI −3.8 to 7.9) points for discrimination, so the post-2018 rise in that share holds in person and not on the web. Spending is lower on the web than in person in 2022-2024, by −7.1 (95% CI −13.9 to −0.3) points, and the in-person change is within sampling error of zero, so the chapter does not read the lower all-interview level after 2018 as a fall. Table 5. The post-2018 level depends on interview mode: in 2022 and 2024 web respondents gave the answer less often than in-person respondents on 6 of 9 items ### The movement is larger among white Democrats Table 6 splits the dated items by party. Among white Democrats the share citing discrimination was 44.9% (95% CI 39.6% to 50.2%) in 2014, 54.6% in 2016, 61.6% in 2018, 81.5% in 2021 and 73.3% in 2024. Among white Republicans it was 18.2% in 2014, 23.3% in 2018 and 21.4% in 2024. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 the share citing discrimination changed by +14.8 (95% CI 9.7 to 19.9) points among Democrats and +2.5 (95% CI −1.7 to 6.7) among Republicans, and the share at the help end of the government-help scale by +18.7 (95% CI 14.2 to 23.2) and +5.0 (95% CI 2.3 to 7.6). The interval for the change excludes zero for 6 of the six dated items among Democrats and for 4 among Republicans. The Democratic change minus the Republican change excludes zero on 4 of the six, discrimination and government help among them. For will power the difference is −4.0 (95% CI −11.0 to 3.0) points and for spending +7.3 (95% CI −0.5 to 15.0), both intervals that include zero. Republicans moved on will power (−8.5 (95% CI −13.7 to −3.3) points) and on spending, by +19.0 (95% CI 13.8 to 24.3) against +26.3 (95% CI 20.5 to 32.1) among Democrats. Republican best step dates differ by item (2004 for discrimination, 2016 for spending and affirmative action, 2018 for the others), so for discrimination the step at a fixed 2016 date is +18.5 (95% CI 14.1 to 23.2) points among Democrats and +0.4 (95% CI −3.3 to 4.3) among Republicans. The Republican spending share was 16.9% among web respondents in 2021 and 27.9% in person in 2022 and 2024 pooled. Table 6. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 white Democrats moved on each of the six dated items and white Republicans on 4, and the Democratic change is separable from the Republican change on 4 The mode view of Table 6 shows that the Democratic web levels lie beyond the 2014 level for every dated item. The pooled 2022-2024 in-person cell clears the sample floor for 4 of the six dated items, and for those it also lies beyond the 2014 level. Among white Democrats the share at the help end of the government-help scale was 19.0% in 2014 and 37.5% in 2016, and in 2022 and 2024 pooled it was 45.9% (95% CI 38.3% to 53.4%) in person and 52.3% (95% CI 46.7% to 57.9%) on the web. ### Black respondents moved in the same direction on some items Table 7 adds race of respondent. Black respondents give the structural or pro-government answer more often than white respondents in every period on 5 of the six dated items. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 the help-end share changed by +9.6 (95% CI 2.4 to 16.8) points among Black respondents and +10.0 (95% CI 7.6 to 12.4) among white respondents, and the share citing discrimination by +7.0 (95% CI 0.2 to 13.8) and +8.4 (95% CI 5.3 to 11.5). Among Black respondents the interval excludes zero for 3 of the six dated items, and among white respondents for 6. Black respondents' shares show no change distinguishable from zero on affirmative action (−0.8 (95% CI −7.7 to 6.2) points) or will power (−0.2 (95% CI −7.1 to 6.7)), but those intervals are wide enough to overlap the white intervals of +5.7 (95% CI 3.3 to 8.2) and −9.0 (95% CI −12.2 to −5.7). Table 7. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 white respondents moved on 6 of the six dated items and Black respondents on 3, with wider intervals for Black respondents ### The tie to the vote rose from 2012 to 2016 The 2008 to 2012 change is within sampling error. In the ANES, a standard deviation more racial resentment goes with 22.1 points more Republican share of the two-party vote among white voters in 2008, 23.2 in 2012 and 31.3 in 2016. The change from 2008 to 2012 is +1.1 (95% CI −2.4 to 4.6) points, an interval that allows a rise of up to 4.6 points but not one as large as the change from 2012 to 2016, +8.2 (95% CI 5.8 to 10.5) points. This is an association across elections and not an effect of the Obama presidency. The vote analysis uses the 16,299 white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican candidate and have a racial resentment index score, in the presidential years from 1988 to 2024 in which the index was asked (it was not asked in 1996). In each year a linear probability model of a Republican vote on an attitude, standardized within the year, gives a slope: the points of Republican two-party vote that go with a standard deviation more of the racially conservative answer. Higher resentment, a colder rating of Black Americans, placing aid to Black Americans at the self-help end and opposing affirmative action are the conservative poles, and the other three attitudes have their own samples, which include 1996. For the racial resentment index, the slope was 10.1 (95% CI 7.1 to 13.1) in 1988, 17.8 (95% CI 14.1 to 21.5) in 2004, 22.1 (95% CI 19.2 to 25.0) in 2008, 23.2 (95% CI 21.3 to 25.0) in 2012, 31.3 (95% CI 29.9 to 32.8) in 2016, 34.9 in 2020 and 33.0 in 2024 (Table 8). It gained +7.7 (95% CI 2.9 to 12.4) points from 1988 to 2004, +4.3 (95% CI −0.4 to 9.0) from 2004 to 2008, +1.1 (95% CI −2.4 to 4.6) from 2008 to 2012 and +8.2 (95% CI 5.8 to 10.5) from 2012 to 2016. The interval for 2004 to 2008 includes zero and reaches above the change from 2012 to 2016, so the data do not rule out a rise of that size during the 2008 campaign. The interval for 2008 to 2012 ends below the lower end of the interval for 2012 to 2016. Table 8. Among white voters the tie between racial resentment and the Republican vote rose from 1988 to 2004 and from 2012 to 2016, with no rise distinguishable from zero from 2008 to 2012 The 2008 to 2012 comparison is also the change in ANES mode, so the face-to-face views give the cleaner reading. Among face-to-face respondents the slope was 22.1 (95% CI 19.2 to 25.0) in 2008 and 21.8 (95% CI 18.1 to 25.6) in 2012, a change of −0.3 (95% CI −5.0 to 4.5) points, and the 2012 to 2016 change was +8.7 (95% CI 3.9 to 13.4). The CES is online in both years and has one racial policy item in the presidential years, opposition to affirmative action. Its slope was 25.5 (95% CI 24.8 to 26.2) in 2008 and 24.9 (95% CI 24.2 to 25.6) in 2012, a change of −0.6 (95% CI −1.6 to 0.4) points. Tesler finds that racial attitudes became more closely tied to evaluations of politicians and parties and to opinion on policies attached to President Obama [4] [5]. The slope here is for the vote and not for evaluations or policy opinion, and it shows no rise distinguishable from zero between the 2008 and 2012 elections in person or in the CES. Holding party identification fixed shrinks the slope in every year, to 7.1 in 2012 and 13.4 in 2016 against 23.2 and 31.3. The split between and within parties belongs to Chapter 5.2, Racial attitudes and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology), which reports the same pattern for ideology, and this chapter does not carry it further. Party identification is measured in the same interview and can follow racial attitudes as well as precede them [6]. Table 9 gives the same relation in levels, with the resentment index cut into thirds inside each year so that the thirds are equal in size. The Republican share among the most resentful third was 79.4% (95% CI 73.9% to 84.9%) in 2008, 78.7% in 2012 and 89.1% in 2016, and among the least resentful third 28.8% (95% CI 22.9% to 34.7%), 27.0% and 17.1%. The gap between the most and least resentful thirds changed by +1.2 (95% CI −8.3 to 10.7) points from 2008 to 2012 and +20.3 (95% CI 13.6 to 27.0) from 2012 to 2016. Fixed index cuts keep the score and not the rank fixed, so the groups change in size. With them the gap changed by +15.7 (95% CI 2.5 to 28.8) points from 2004 to 2008, +0.5 (95% CI −9.2 to 10.3) from 2008 to 2012 and +9.7 (95% CI 2.8 to 16.6) from 2012 to 2016. The size of the 2012 to 2016 rise depends on the cut, and the 2008 to 2012 change is within sampling error under both. The Republican share among all white voters was 56.4% in 2008, 57.1% in 2012 and 57.4% in 2016, so the widening gap came with no comparable change in the white vote as a whole. Sides, Tesler and Vavreck describe changes in the party coalitions along racial and ethnic identities that preceded the 2016 election and were reinforced by the campaign [7]. Table 9. The Republican share among the most resentful third of white voters rose from 79.4% in 2008 to 89.1% in 2016, and fell among the least resentful third from 28.8% to 17.1% ### What these data cannot show The GSS, ANES and CES interview new respondents in each wave, so a change in a share mixes people who changed their answers, people who changed party and the replacement of older adults by younger ones, and this chapter cannot separate them. The step dates describe when a new level first appears in surveys fielded in alternate years. The step and the kink are assumptions about the form of change and give different starts, the 2016 survey for the step and the 2014 survey or earlier for the kink. The dates do not say why the level changed, and the 2016 GSS was fielded during the presidential campaign. The items measure answers to questions and not behavior. The principle items reached ceilings that leave little room to move, three of them have no readings after 2010, and the data cannot tell a change in belief from a change in willingness to say what the question invites. The GSS wording of the group changed over the period from Negroes to Blacks to African Americans, and in 2022 and 2024 the effective samples for party and race cells are small enough that the chapter pools those years. In the in-person view the Black respondents' cells for the discrimination and will-power items in 2022 and 2024 are suppressed, and Hispanic respondents cannot be separated in the GSS before 2000. The post-2018 levels depend on interview mode on several items, so the later comparisons are read by mode and not as changes over time. Results for Hispanic, Asian and other voters are not shown, and Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) is where voters of those groups belong. The vote section describes association across elections. It cannot separate the Obama presidency from the 2012 re-election campaign, the change in candidates in 2016, or the changes in the parties' coalitions, so a rise from 2012 to 2016 is not an effect of either. The vote is self-reported after the election and leans slightly Democratic, the attitude and party identification are measured in the same interview, the resentment index has no 1996 reading, ANES 2020 has no mode weights, and the CES holds one racial policy item in 2008 and 2012. The chapter does not test whether racial attitudes changed how people voted, and the surveys cannot say whether the movement after 2014 comes from the events of those years. Policing items and the weeks after May 2020 are in Chapter 5.4, Policing (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/policing; planned) and Chapter 5.3, Racial attitudes after George Floyd's death (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-after-george-floyd; planned). ## Tables ### Table 1. Equal-treatment answers rose from the 1970s to the 2000s, and explanation and policy answers other than will power were level from the mid-2000s to 2014 and then moved Share of white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) giving the answer named at the right of each line, percent, by survey year, 1972 to 2024, in three panels by kind of item | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | panel | series | view | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | | 28.40 | 23.10 | 25.80 | 1,267 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1977 | | 23.50 | 18 | 20.70 | 1,279 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1985 | | 22.70 | 17.70 | 20.20 | 1,203 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1986 | | 23.30 | 17.10 | 20.20 | 787 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1988 | | 19.40 | 13.70 | 16.60 | 819 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1989 | | 22.30 | 17.10 | 19.70 | 1,107 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1990 | | 20.50 | 14.60 | 17.50 | 820 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1991 | | 13.20 | 8.60 | 10.90 | 881 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1993 | | 15.70 | 11.80 | 13.70 | 1,565 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1994 | | 11.70 | 8.40 | 10 | 1,521 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1996 | | 12.50 | 8.90 | 10.70 | 1,422 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 1998 | | 14.60 | 10.80 | 12.70 | 1,387 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2000 | | 15.60 | 9.90 | 12.70 | 701 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2002 | | 10.40 | 5.80 | 8.10 | 711 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2004 | | 9.10 | 5.90 | 7.50 | 1,408 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2006 | | 11.70 | 7.30 | 9.50 | 998 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2008 | | 11.10 | 6.90 | 9 | 1,046 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2010 | | 9.80 | 5.70 | 7.70 | 960 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2012 | | 8.90 | 5.60 | 7.20 | 1,229 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2014 | | 8.60 | 5.30 | 6.90 | 1,359 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2016 | | 7.80 | 4.10 | 6 | 1,101 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2018 | | 5.40 | 3.20 | 4.30 | 2,050 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2021 | | 8.40 | 3.30 | 5.90 | 817 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2022 | | 7.20 | 2.70 | 4.90 | 719 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | all | 2024 | | 45 | 39 | 42 | 1,273 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1977 | | 45.20 | 38.50 | 41.90 | 1,285 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1985 | | 42.70 | 36.70 | 39.70 | 1,215 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1986 | | 42.30 | 34.80 | 38.60 | 786 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1988 | | 42.50 | 35 | 38.70 | 808 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1989 | | 41.60 | 35.20 | 38.40 | 1,087 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1990 | | 39.80 | 32.20 | 36 | 820 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1991 | | 39.90 | 32.70 | 36.30 | 862 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1993 | | 37.90 | 32.60 | 35.20 | 1,542 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1994 | | 37.10 | 31.70 | 34.40 | 1,493 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1996 | | 33.90 | 28.40 | 31.20 | 1,390 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 1998 | | 35.10 | 29.60 | 32.40 | 1,351 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2000 | | 34.90 | 27 | 30.90 | 699 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2002 | | 32.70 | 24.90 | 28.80 | 694 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2004 | | 33 | 27.20 | 30.10 | 1,382 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2006 | | 34.10 | 27.10 | 30.60 | 977 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2008 | | 34.50 | 27.60 | 31 | 1,029 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2010 | | 34.40 | 27.20 | 30.80 | 937 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2012 | | 33 | 27 | 30 | 1,215 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2014 | | 40.20 | 34 | 37.10 | 1,332 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2016 | | 45.10 | 37.40 | 41.20 | 1,076 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2018 | | 52.10 | 46.70 | 49.40 | 2,043 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2021 | | 55.30 | 44.30 | 49.80 | 805 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2022 | | 47.90 | 37.50 | 42.70 | 708 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | all | 2024 | | 54.90 | 48.90 | 51.90 | 1,284 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1977 | | 55.10 | 48.30 | 51.70 | 1,308 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1985 | | 52.80 | 46.60 | 49.70 | 1,222 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1986 | | 56 | 48.20 | 52.10 | 790 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1988 | | 57.20 | 49.60 | 53.40 | 826 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1989 | | 53.80 | 47.30 | 50.60 | 1,107 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1990 | | 55.70 | 47.80 | 51.80 | 834 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1991 | | 55.50 | 48 | 51.80 | 869 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1993 | | 50.10 | 44.50 | 47.30 | 1,572 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1994 | | 45.60 | 40 | 42.80 | 1,524 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1996 | | 44.40 | 38.50 | 41.50 | 1,413 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 1998 | | 45.80 | 40.10 | 42.90 | 1,381 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2000 | | 45.50 | 37.10 | 41.30 | 699 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2002 | | 43 | 34.50 | 38.70 | 698 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2004 | | 47.90 | 41.80 | 44.80 | 1,404 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2006 | | 50.60 | 43.10 | 46.80 | 993 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2008 | | 49.60 | 42.20 | 45.90 | 1,042 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2010 | | 44.70 | 37.10 | 40.90 | 953 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2012 | | 43.30 | 37 | 40.20 | 1,225 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2014 | | 53.90 | 47.50 | 50.70 | 1,349 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2016 | | 56.10 | 48.30 | 52.20 | 1,092 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2018 | | 54.20 | 48.80 | 51.50 | 2,038 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2021 | | 55.70 | 44.80 | 50.30 | 806 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2022 | | 52.30 | 41.90 | 47.10 | 710 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | all | 2024 | | 67.30 | 61.50 | 64.40 | 1,256 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1977 | | 62.80 | 56.10 | 59.50 | 1,275 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1985 | | 68.10 | 62.20 | 65.20 | 1,198 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1986 | | 65.90 | 58.40 | 62.10 | 780 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1988 | | 65.60 | 58.10 | 61.80 | 810 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1989 | | 67.50 | 61.10 | 64.30 | 1,075 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1990 | | 65.20 | 57.60 | 61.40 | 808 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1991 | | 57.50 | 50 | 53.70 | 843 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1993 | | 60 | 54.40 | 57.20 | 1,531 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1994 | | 57.10 | 51.50 | 54.30 | 1,471 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1996 | | 52 | 46 | 49 | 1,351 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 1998 | | 54.50 | 48.60 | 51.50 | 1,327 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2000 | | 54.80 | 46.20 | 50.50 | 676 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2002 | | 54.90 | 46.20 | 50.50 | 686 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2004 | | 52.90 | 46.60 | 49.70 | 1,376 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2006 | | 55.70 | 48.10 | 51.90 | 971 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2008 | | 54.10 | 46.60 | 50.30 | 1,017 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2010 | | 52.50 | 44.60 | 48.60 | 928 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2012 | | 49.20 | 42.70 | 46 | 1,211 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2014 | | 44.90 | 38.50 | 41.70 | 1,329 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2016 | | 39.80 | 32.30 | 36 | 1,071 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2018 | | 32 | 27.10 | 29.60 | 2,032 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2021 | | 34.20 | 24.30 | 29.30 | 793 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2022 | | 30.60 | 21.50 | 26.10 | 710 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | all | 2024 | | 12.90 | 8.80 | 10.90 | 1,149 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 1994 | | 13.10 | 9.50 | 11.30 | 1,477 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 1996 | | 13 | 9.30 | 11.10 | 1,373 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 1998 | | 15.50 | 11.60 | 13.50 | 1,362 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2000 | | 13.40 | 8.10 | 10.80 | 699 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2002 | | 15.10 | 9.50 | 12.30 | 698 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2004 | | 12.80 | 8.90 | 10.90 | 1,396 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2006 | | 14.20 | 9.30 | 11.80 | 972 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2008 | | 15.10 | 10.10 | 12.60 | 1,019 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2010 | | 17.10 | 11.60 | 14.40 | 930 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2012 | | 15.90 | 11.40 | 13.70 | 1,201 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2014 | | 21.10 | 16 | 18.60 | 1,304 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2016 | | 23.30 | 16.90 | 20.10 | 1,046 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2018 | | 22.10 | 17.80 | 19.90 | 2,007 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2021 | | 26.80 | 20.30 | 23.50 | 1,588 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2022 | | 24 | 18.10 | 21 | 1,428 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | all | 2024 | | 23 | 18.20 | 20.60 | 1,287 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1975 | | 15.90 | 11.20 | 13.60 | 1,358 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1983 | | 17 | 12 | 14.50 | 1,189 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1984 | | 15 | 10.90 | 12.90 | 1,217 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1986 | | 18.80 | 14 | 16.40 | 1,182 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1987 | | 13.10 | 8.40 | 10.80 | 811 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1988 | | 19.50 | 13.90 | 16.70 | 851 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1989 | | 18.10 | 13.30 | 15.70 | 1,108 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1990 | | 18.60 | 13 | 15.80 | 817 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1991 | | 15.50 | 10.50 | 13 | 858 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1993 | | 12.30 | 8.90 | 10.60 | 1,621 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1994 | | 13.20 | 9.60 | 11.40 | 1,519 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1996 | | 15.70 | 11.70 | 13.70 | 1,447 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 1998 | | 16.30 | 12.30 | 14.30 | 1,432 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2000 | | 14.70 | 9.30 | 12 | 716 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2002 | | 13.50 | 8.20 | 10.90 | 695 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2004 | | 14.60 | 10.40 | 12.50 | 1,422 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2006 | | 12.80 | 8.30 | 10.50 | 1,017 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2008 | | 16 | 10.80 | 13.40 | 1,012 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2010 | | 13.50 | 8.60 | 11.10 | 953 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2012 | | 13.20 | 9.20 | 11.20 | 1,216 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2014 | | 24 | 18.80 | 21.40 | 1,382 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2016 | | 25.80 | 19.20 | 22.50 | 1,080 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2018 | | 32.90 | 28 | 30.40 | 2,026 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2021 | | 29.40 | 22.70 | 26 | 1,639 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2022 | | 25.70 | 19.60 | 22.60 | 1,450 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | all | 2024 | | 12.20 | 8.30 | 10.20 | 1,193 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 1994 | | 12.80 | 9.40 | 11.10 | 1,548 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 1996 | | 13.20 | 9.60 | 11.40 | 1,459 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 1998 | | 13.60 | 9.90 | 11.80 | 1,420 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2000 | | 11.50 | 6.60 | 9.10 | 706 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2002 | | 14.60 | 9.10 | 11.80 | 719 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2004 | | 12.40 | 8.60 | 10.50 | 1,428 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2006 | | 13.10 | 8.50 | 10.80 | 1,006 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2008 | | 14.30 | 9.50 | 11.90 | 1,066 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2010 | | 13.40 | 8.50 | 11 | 964 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2012 | | 15.90 | 11.40 | 13.60 | 1,244 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2014 | | 21.90 | 16.90 | 19.40 | 1,370 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2016 | | 25 | 18.60 | 21.80 | 1,104 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2018 | | 30.50 | 25.80 | 28.10 | 2,050 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2021 | | 33.90 | 26.90 | 30.40 | 1,663 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2022 | | 27.40 | 21.40 | 24.40 | 1,504 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | all | 2024 | | 31.70 | 26.10 | 28.90 | 1,214 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1973 | | 29.80 | 24.30 | 27.10 | 1,203 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1974 | | 25.60 | 20.40 | 23 | 1,210 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1975 | | 26.90 | 21.80 | 24.40 | 1,259 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1976 | | 23.90 | 18.80 | 21.40 | 1,223 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1977 | | 22.80 | 17.20 | 20 | 1,248 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1978 | | 25.30 | 19.60 | 22.50 | 1,202 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1980 | | 26.20 | 20.40 | 23.30 | 1,199 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1982 | | 30.20 | 24 | 27.10 | 1,280 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1983 | | 37.60 | 26.80 | 32.20 | 384 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1984 | | 35.40 | 26.30 | 30.90 | 615 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1985 | | 34.90 | 26.50 | 30.70 | 557 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1986 | | 39.10 | 28.20 | 33.60 | 371 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1987 | | 35.50 | 26.90 | 31.20 | 537 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1988 | | 36 | 27.70 | 31.80 | 591 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1989 | | 40.70 | 31.60 | 36.20 | 517 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1990 | | 34.80 | 26.40 | 30.60 | 564 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1991 | | 36.80 | 28.40 | 32.60 | 599 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1993 | | 29.20 | 23.40 | 26.30 | 1,130 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1994 | | 30 | 23.90 | 27 | 1,030 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1996 | | 33.70 | 27.30 | 30.50 | 991 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 1998 | | 32.60 | 26.30 | 29.50 | 973 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2000 | | 28.90 | 22.70 | 25.80 | 1,000 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2002 | | 29.20 | 22.90 | 26 | 1,008 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2004 | | 32.30 | 25.30 | 28.80 | 981 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2006 | | 34.60 | 26.40 | 30.50 | 674 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2008 | | 27.90 | 20.10 | 24 | 663 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2010 | | 33.60 | 25 | 29.30 | 640 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2012 | | 29.90 | 23 | 26.40 | 840 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2014 | | 50.10 | 42.40 | 46.20 | 946 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2016 | | 53.30 | 44.20 | 48.70 | 778 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2018 | | 48.10 | 42 | 45 | 1,522 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2021 | | 48.80 | 39.60 | 44.20 | 1,185 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2022 | | 44 | 35.90 | 39.90 | 1,089 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | all | 2024 | | 76.60 | 71.30 | 74 | 1,262 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1972 | | 84.90 | 80.30 | 82.60 | 1,251 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1974 | | 85.50 | 80.90 | 83.20 | 1,243 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1975 | | 81.30 | 76.30 | 78.80 | 1,284 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1977 | | 87.10 | 82.10 | 84.60 | 1,291 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1978 | | 88.80 | 84.20 | 86.50 | 1,240 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1982 | | 85.90 | 80.80 | 83.30 | 1,353 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1983 | | 87.40 | 82.40 | 84.90 | 1,270 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1985 | | 88.80 | 84.50 | 86.60 | 1,210 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1986 | | 83.60 | 77.50 | 80.60 | 780 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1988 | | 85.30 | 79.40 | 82.40 | 812 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1989 | | 89.30 | 83.80 | 86.60 | 732 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1990 | | 90.90 | 85.80 | 88.30 | 829 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1991 | | 90.50 | 85.70 | 88.10 | 858 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1993 | | 90.70 | 87.20 | 89 | 1,570 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1994 | | 93.90 | 89.50 | 91.70 | 768 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 1996 | | 95.80 | 92.30 | 94 | 998 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 2008 | | 97.20 | 94.20 | 95.70 | 1,052 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | all | 2010 | | 65.40 | 59.70 | 62.60 | 1,306 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1972 | | 66 | 60.30 | 63.20 | 1,277 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1973 | | 69.80 | 64.20 | 67 | 1,274 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1974 | | 66.80 | 61 | 63.90 | 1,289 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1975 | | 71.50 | 66 | 68.70 | 1,322 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1976 | | 76.70 | 71.40 | 74 | 1,313 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1977 | | 73.40 | 67.40 | 70.40 | 1,281 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1980 | | 72.20 | 66 | 69.10 | 1,281 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1982 | | 77.60 | 71.40 | 74.50 | 1,192 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1984 | | 77.10 | 71.20 | 74.10 | 1,301 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1985 | | 78.10 | 72.50 | 75.30 | 1,187 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1987 | | 78.60 | 71.90 | 75.30 | 775 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1988 | | 81.70 | 75.50 | 78.60 | 865 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1989 | | 83.80 | 77.60 | 80.70 | 754 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1990 | | 82.80 | 76.40 | 79.60 | 799 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1991 | | 85.40 | 79.60 | 82.50 | 867 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1993 | | 86.60 | 82.60 | 84.60 | 1,606 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1994 | | 89 | 85.20 | 87.10 | 1,515 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1996 | | 88.70 | 84.80 | 86.80 | 1,448 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 1998 | | 90.50 | 86.80 | 88.60 | 1,345 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 2000 | | 90.30 | 84.90 | 87.60 | 742 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | all | 2002 | | 38.30 | 32.60 | 35.50 | 1,283 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1973 | | 38.40 | 32.70 | 35.60 | 1,300 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1975 | | 37.90 | 32.30 | 35.10 | 1,339 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1976 | | 42.10 | 35.50 | 38.80 | 1,330 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1978 | | 45.20 | 38.70 | 41.90 | 1,292 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1980 | | 47.90 | 41.20 | 44.60 | 1,382 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1983 | | 52.80 | 45.80 | 49.30 | 1,227 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1984 | | 50.80 | 44.70 | 47.70 | 1,234 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1986 | | 54.10 | 47.60 | 50.90 | 1,197 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1987 | | 57.60 | 50.10 | 53.90 | 820 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1988 | | 61.90 | 54.60 | 58.20 | 864 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1989 | | 59.80 | 53.30 | 56.50 | 1,116 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1990 | | 63.70 | 56.20 | 60 | 824 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1991 | | 66.70 | 59.50 | 63.10 | 867 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1993 | | 64.20 | 58.90 | 61.60 | 1,638 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1994 | | 69.10 | 61.70 | 65.40 | 786 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 1996 | | 69.60 | 61.70 | 65.60 | 702 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2004 | | 68.60 | 62.80 | 65.70 | 1,462 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2006 | | 71.70 | 65 | 68.40 | 1,034 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2008 | | 74.10 | 67.10 | 70.60 | 973 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2010 | | 72 | 64.90 | 68.50 | 966 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2012 | | 73.40 | 67.60 | 70.50 | 1,256 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2014 | | 79.40 | 74 | 76.70 | 1,372 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2016 | | 80.80 | 74.50 | 77.60 | 1,129 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2018 | | 87 | 78.50 | 82.80 | 790 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2022 | | 84.60 | 70.70 | 77.70 | 279 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for open-housing law | all | 2024 | | 38.10 | 31.80 | 35 | 1,130 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 1990 | | 61 | 53.30 | 57.10 | 767 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 1996 | | 61.50 | 55.80 | 58.60 | 1,472 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 1998 | | 65.70 | 60.80 | 63.30 | 1,782 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2000 | | 71.70 | 63.80 | 67.70 | 713 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2002 | | 73.60 | 65.80 | 69.70 | 723 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2004 | | 73.30 | 67.60 | 70.40 | 1,436 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2006 | | 77.80 | 71.30 | 74.50 | 1,012 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2008 | | 81.70 | 75.70 | 78.70 | 1,064 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2010 | | 81.60 | 75.20 | 78.40 | 972 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2012 | | 85.40 | 80.50 | 82.90 | 1,238 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2014 | | 86.40 | 81.80 | 84.10 | 1,375 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2016 | | 89.90 | 84.80 | 87.40 | 1,114 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2018 | | 93.60 | 90.70 | 92.10 | 2,056 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2021 | | 95.10 | 91.40 | 93.30 | 1,679 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2022 | | 94.20 | 90.50 | 92.40 | 1,517 | Principles of equal treatment | Would not oppose a relative's marriage | all | 2024 | | 63.70 | 57.80 | 60.80 | 1,251 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1972 | | 64.40 | 58.60 | 61.50 | 1,330 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1976 | | 62 | 56 | 59 | 1,296 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1977 | | 72.10 | 66 | 69.10 | 1,271 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1980 | | 76.20 | 70.40 | 73.30 | 1,287 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1982 | | 76.60 | 70.40 | 73.50 | 1,219 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1984 | | 78.40 | 72.50 | 75.40 | 1,301 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1985 | | 78.70 | 73.20 | 75.90 | 1,199 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1987 | | 79.50 | 73 | 76.30 | 783 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1988 | | 80.10 | 73.80 | 76.90 | 861 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1989 | | 80.40 | 73.70 | 77.10 | 750 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1990 | | 83.30 | 77 | 80.20 | 807 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1991 | | 88.80 | 83.60 | 86.20 | 878 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1993 | | 85.90 | 81.80 | 83.90 | 1,609 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1994 | | 89.50 | 84.10 | 86.80 | 746 | Principles of equal treatment | No right to exclude Black neighbors | all | 1996 | | 28.40 | 23.10 | 25.80 | 1,267 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1977 | | 23.50 | 18 | 20.70 | 1,279 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1985 | | 22.70 | 17.70 | 20.20 | 1,203 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1986 | | 23.30 | 17.10 | 20.20 | 787 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1988 | | 19.40 | 13.70 | 16.60 | 819 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1989 | | 22.30 | 17.10 | 19.70 | 1,107 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1990 | | 20.50 | 14.60 | 17.50 | 820 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1991 | | 13.20 | 8.60 | 10.90 | 881 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1993 | | 15.70 | 11.80 | 13.70 | 1,565 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1994 | | 11.70 | 8.40 | 10 | 1,521 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1996 | | 12.50 | 8.90 | 10.70 | 1,422 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 1998 | | 14.60 | 10.80 | 12.70 | 1,387 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2000 | | 15.60 | 9.90 | 12.70 | 701 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2002 | | 10.80 | 5.60 | 8.20 | 568 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2004 | | 10 | 6.60 | 8.30 | 1,317 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2006 | | 12.50 | 7.70 | 10.10 | 855 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2008 | | 11.70 | 7.20 | 9.50 | 933 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2010 | | 10.60 | 6.10 | 8.40 | 835 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2012 | | 9 | 5.40 | 7.20 | 1,060 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2014 | | 8.90 | 5.40 | 7.20 | 1,257 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2016 | | 8.70 | 4.60 | 6.70 | 984 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2018 | | 13.80 | 4.30 | 9 | 344 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2022 | | 12.10 | 2.90 | 7.50 | 222 | Explanations of racial inequality | Inborn ability | inperson | 2024 | | 45 | 39 | 42 | 1,273 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1977 | | 45.20 | 38.50 | 41.90 | 1,285 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1985 | | 42.70 | 36.70 | 39.70 | 1,215 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1986 | | 42.30 | 34.80 | 38.60 | 786 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1988 | | 42.50 | 35 | 38.70 | 808 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1989 | | 41.60 | 35.20 | 38.40 | 1,087 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1990 | | 39.80 | 32.20 | 36 | 820 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1991 | | 39.90 | 32.70 | 36.30 | 862 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1993 | | 37.90 | 32.60 | 35.20 | 1,542 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1994 | | 37.10 | 31.70 | 34.40 | 1,493 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1996 | | 33.90 | 28.40 | 31.20 | 1,390 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 1998 | | 35.10 | 29.60 | 32.40 | 1,351 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2000 | | 34.90 | 27 | 30.90 | 699 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2002 | | 34.90 | 26 | 30.40 | 553 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2004 | | 33.10 | 27.20 | 30.10 | 1,293 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2006 | | 33.40 | 26.10 | 29.80 | 843 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2008 | | 36.20 | 28.80 | 32.50 | 917 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2010 | | 34.80 | 27.10 | 31 | 814 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2012 | | 34.40 | 27.90 | 31.20 | 1,050 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2014 | | 40.80 | 34.20 | 37.50 | 1,234 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2016 | | 47.90 | 39.80 | 43.80 | 965 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2018 | | 64.70 | 47.90 | 56.30 | 333 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2022 | | 54.90 | 37.10 | 46 | 215 | Explanations of racial inequality | Discrimination | inperson | 2024 | | 54.90 | 48.90 | 51.90 | 1,284 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1977 | | 55.10 | 48.30 | 51.70 | 1,308 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1985 | | 52.80 | 46.60 | 49.70 | 1,222 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1986 | | 56 | 48.20 | 52.10 | 790 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1988 | | 57.20 | 49.60 | 53.40 | 826 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1989 | | 53.80 | 47.30 | 50.60 | 1,107 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1990 | | 55.70 | 47.80 | 51.80 | 834 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1991 | | 55.50 | 48 | 51.80 | 869 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1993 | | 50.10 | 44.50 | 47.30 | 1,572 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1994 | | 45.60 | 40 | 42.80 | 1,524 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1996 | | 44.40 | 38.50 | 41.50 | 1,413 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 1998 | | 45.80 | 40.10 | 42.90 | 1,381 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2000 | | 45.50 | 37.10 | 41.30 | 699 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2002 | | 44.20 | 34.80 | 39.50 | 556 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2004 | | 48.10 | 41.80 | 45 | 1,312 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2006 | | 48.80 | 40.80 | 44.80 | 852 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2008 | | 50.90 | 43.10 | 47 | 929 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2010 | | 46.20 | 38 | 42.10 | 828 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2012 | | 42.70 | 35.90 | 39.30 | 1,056 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2014 | | 53.60 | 46.80 | 50.20 | 1,248 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2016 | | 56.40 | 48.20 | 52.30 | 979 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2018 | | 56 | 39.30 | 47.70 | 337 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2022 | | 57.70 | 39.80 | 48.80 | 216 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of chance for education | inperson | 2024 | | 67.30 | 61.50 | 64.40 | 1,256 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1977 | | 62.80 | 56.10 | 59.50 | 1,275 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1985 | | 68.10 | 62.20 | 65.20 | 1,198 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1986 | | 65.90 | 58.40 | 62.10 | 780 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1988 | | 65.60 | 58.10 | 61.80 | 810 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1989 | | 67.50 | 61.10 | 64.30 | 1,075 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1990 | | 65.20 | 57.60 | 61.40 | 808 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1991 | | 57.50 | 50 | 53.70 | 843 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1993 | | 60 | 54.40 | 57.20 | 1,531 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1994 | | 57.10 | 51.50 | 54.30 | 1,471 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1996 | | 52 | 46 | 49 | 1,351 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 1998 | | 54.50 | 48.60 | 51.50 | 1,327 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2000 | | 54.80 | 46.20 | 50.50 | 676 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2002 | | 55.30 | 45.60 | 50.50 | 548 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2004 | | 54 | 47.60 | 50.80 | 1,286 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2006 | | 57.50 | 49.50 | 53.50 | 834 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2008 | | 53.80 | 46 | 49.90 | 909 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2010 | | 53.20 | 44.80 | 49 | 808 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2012 | | 49.60 | 42.70 | 46.10 | 1,043 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2014 | | 45.70 | 39 | 42.40 | 1,232 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2016 | | 39.80 | 31.90 | 35.80 | 957 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2018 | | 39.20 | 23.80 | 31.50 | 325 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2022 | | 42.20 | 25.40 | 33.80 | 219 | Explanations of racial inequality | Lack of motivation or will power | inperson | 2024 | | 12.90 | 8.80 | 10.90 | 1,149 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 1994 | | 13.10 | 9.50 | 11.30 | 1,477 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 1996 | | 13 | 9.30 | 11.10 | 1,373 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 1998 | | 15.50 | 11.60 | 13.50 | 1,362 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2000 | | 13.40 | 8.10 | 10.80 | 699 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2002 | | 14.50 | 8.40 | 11.40 | 560 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2004 | | 13.20 | 9.20 | 11.20 | 1,303 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2006 | | 14.60 | 9.40 | 12 | 835 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2008 | | 16.30 | 10.90 | 13.60 | 908 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2010 | | 17.90 | 12 | 15 | 813 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2012 | | 15.20 | 10.50 | 12.90 | 1,034 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2014 | | 21.40 | 16.10 | 18.80 | 1,206 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2016 | | 24.70 | 17.90 | 21.30 | 938 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2018 | | 32.10 | 21.20 | 26.70 | 619 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2022 | | 30.50 | 19.70 | 25.10 | 429 | Policy implementation | Favors preferential hiring | inperson | 2024 | | 23 | 18.20 | 20.60 | 1,287 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1975 | | 15.90 | 11.20 | 13.60 | 1,358 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1983 | | 17 | 12 | 14.50 | 1,189 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1984 | | 15 | 10.90 | 12.90 | 1,217 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1986 | | 18.80 | 14 | 16.40 | 1,182 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1987 | | 13.10 | 8.40 | 10.80 | 811 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1988 | | 19.50 | 13.90 | 16.70 | 851 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1989 | | 18.10 | 13.30 | 15.70 | 1,108 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1990 | | 18.60 | 13 | 15.80 | 817 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1991 | | 15.50 | 10.50 | 13 | 858 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1993 | | 12.30 | 8.90 | 10.60 | 1,621 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1994 | | 13.20 | 9.60 | 11.40 | 1,519 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1996 | | 15.70 | 11.70 | 13.70 | 1,447 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 1998 | | 16.30 | 12.30 | 14.30 | 1,432 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2000 | | 14.70 | 9.30 | 12 | 716 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2002 | | 13.50 | 7.70 | 10.60 | 569 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2004 | | 14.40 | 10.20 | 12.30 | 1,332 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2006 | | 12.90 | 8.20 | 10.60 | 891 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2008 | | 16.10 | 10.60 | 13.30 | 898 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2010 | | 14.30 | 8.90 | 11.60 | 822 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2012 | | 13.90 | 9.40 | 11.60 | 1,042 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2014 | | 23.40 | 18.10 | 20.70 | 1,284 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2016 | | 25.80 | 19.10 | 22.50 | 972 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2018 | | 31.30 | 20.50 | 25.90 | 649 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2022 | | 30.30 | 19.10 | 24.70 | 433 | Policy implementation | At the help end of the scale | inperson | 2024 | | 12.20 | 8.30 | 10.20 | 1,193 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 1994 | | 12.80 | 9.40 | 11.10 | 1,548 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 1996 | | 13.20 | 9.60 | 11.40 | 1,459 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 1998 | | 13.60 | 9.90 | 11.80 | 1,420 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2000 | | 11.50 | 6.60 | 9.10 | 706 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2002 | | 15.10 | 8.90 | 12 | 573 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2004 | | 12.50 | 8.60 | 10.50 | 1,336 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2006 | | 13.30 | 8.40 | 10.80 | 864 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2008 | | 14.10 | 9.10 | 11.60 | 949 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2010 | | 12.60 | 7.70 | 10.20 | 846 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2012 | | 15.70 | 11 | 13.40 | 1,075 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2014 | | 21.70 | 16.50 | 19.10 | 1,269 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2016 | | 26.30 | 19.50 | 22.90 | 988 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2018 | | 36.40 | 25.50 | 31 | 672 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2022 | | 25.20 | 15.60 | 20.40 | 476 | Policy implementation | Rejects the special-favors view | inperson | 2024 | | 31.70 | 26.10 | 28.90 | 1,214 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1973 | | 29.80 | 24.30 | 27.10 | 1,203 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1974 | | 25.60 | 20.40 | 23 | 1,210 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1975 | | 26.90 | 21.80 | 24.40 | 1,259 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1976 | | 23.90 | 18.80 | 21.40 | 1,223 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1977 | | 22.80 | 17.20 | 20 | 1,248 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1978 | | 25.30 | 19.60 | 22.50 | 1,202 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1980 | | 26.20 | 20.40 | 23.30 | 1,199 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1982 | | 30.20 | 24 | 27.10 | 1,280 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1983 | | 37.60 | 26.80 | 32.20 | 384 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1984 | | 35.40 | 26.30 | 30.90 | 615 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1985 | | 34.90 | 26.50 | 30.70 | 557 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1986 | | 39.10 | 28.20 | 33.60 | 371 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1987 | | 35.50 | 26.90 | 31.20 | 537 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1988 | | 36 | 27.70 | 31.80 | 591 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1989 | | 40.70 | 31.60 | 36.20 | 517 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1990 | | 34.80 | 26.40 | 30.60 | 564 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1991 | | 36.80 | 28.40 | 32.60 | 599 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1993 | | 29.20 | 23.40 | 26.30 | 1,130 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1994 | | 30 | 23.90 | 27 | 1,030 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1996 | | 33.70 | 27.30 | 30.50 | 991 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 1998 | | 32.60 | 26.30 | 29.50 | 973 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2000 | | 28.90 | 22.70 | 25.80 | 1,000 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2002 | | 26.80 | 19.80 | 23.30 | 778 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2004 | | 31.70 | 24.80 | 28.20 | 923 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2006 | | 33.30 | 24.80 | 29 | 588 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2008 | | 26.70 | 18.50 | 22.60 | 595 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2010 | | 35.10 | 25.70 | 30.40 | 545 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2012 | | 31.70 | 24.10 | 27.90 | 715 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2014 | | 50.20 | 42.10 | 46.20 | 871 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2016 | | 53.70 | 44.20 | 48.90 | 686 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2018 | | 54.90 | 39.60 | 47.20 | 456 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2022 | | 52.20 | 36.30 | 44.30 | 296 | Policy implementation | Too little spent | inperson | 2024 | | 76.60 | 71.30 | 74 | 1,262 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1972 | | 84.90 | 80.30 | 82.60 | 1,251 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1974 | | 85.50 | 80.90 | 83.20 | 1,243 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1975 | | 81.30 | 76.30 | 78.80 | 1,284 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1977 | | 87.10 | 82.10 | 84.60 | 1,291 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1978 | | 88.80 | 84.20 | 86.50 | 1,240 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1982 | | 85.90 | 80.80 | 83.30 | 1,353 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1983 | | 87.40 | 82.40 | 84.90 | 1,270 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1985 | | 88.80 | 84.50 | 86.60 | 1,210 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1986 | | 83.60 | 77.50 | 80.60 | 780 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1988 | | 85.30 | 79.40 | 82.40 | 812 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1989 | | 89.30 | 83.80 | 86.60 | 732 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1990 | | 90.90 | 85.80 | 88.30 | 829 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1991 | | 90.50 | 85.70 | 88.10 | 858 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1993 | | 90.70 | 87.20 | 89 | 1,570 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1994 | | 93.90 | 89.50 | 91.70 | 768 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 1996 | | 95.80 | 92.10 | 94 | 859 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 2008 | | 97.10 | 93.90 | 95.50 | 941 | Principles of equal treatment | Would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | 2010 | | 65.40 | 59.70 | 62.60 | 1,306 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1972 | | 66 | 60.30 | 63.20 | 1,277 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1973 | | 69.80 | 64.20 | 67 | 1,274 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1974 | | 66.80 | 61 | 63.90 | 1,289 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1975 | | 71.50 | 66 | 68.70 | 1,322 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1976 | | 76.70 | 71.40 | 74 | 1,313 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1977 | | 73.40 | 67.40 | 70.40 | 1,281 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1980 | | 72.20 | 66 | 69.10 | 1,281 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1982 | | 77.60 | 71.40 | 74.50 | 1,192 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1984 | | 77.10 | 71.20 | 74.10 | 1,301 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1985 | | 78.10 | 72.50 | 75.30 | 1,187 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1987 | | 78.60 | 71.90 | 75.30 | 775 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1988 | | 81.70 | 75.50 | 78.60 | 865 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1989 | | 83.80 | 77.60 | 80.70 | 754 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1990 | | 82.80 | 76.40 | 79.60 | 799 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1991 | | 85.40 | 79.60 | 82.50 | 867 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1993 | | 86.60 | 82.60 | 84.60 | 1,606 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1994 | | 89 | 85.20 | 87.10 | 1,515 | Principles of equal treatment | No law against Black-white marriage | inperson | 1996 | The first 500 of 559 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/kinds_trends.json. Views: All interviews (view = all); In-person interviews only (view = inperson). Note: The GSS was in person (with some telephone interviews from 2004) through 2018, had no 2020 survey, had 87.3% of its 2021 interviews on the web and mixed in-person and web interviews in 2022 and 2024. The in-person view leaves out 2021 and the telephone interviews and plots only the in-person interviews of 2022 and 2024. Note: Bands are left off because five lines in a panel overlap; the tooltip and the data table give every interval. Each item is asked of a different set of years, and a line joins the years in which its item was asked, so the Black president item joins 1996 to 2008 and the open-housing item joins 1996 to 2004. The help-end line counts the two answers nearest to government should help on a five-point scale. Note: Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted (weight_use); white respondents (race code white, Hispanic whites included); 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/kinds_trends.json ### Table 2. Equal-treatment items changed most before 2008, and the policy items changed most from 2010-2014 on Change in the share of white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) giving the answer named in each row, percentage points, between pooled periods of surveys; empty cells are items not asked in both periods | col | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | row | view | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 15.90 | 12.60 | 14.30 | 13,447 | Principle: no law against intermarriage | all | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 8.30 | 5.10 | 6.70 | 10,621 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | all | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 9.80 | 5.70 | 7.70 | 6,579 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | all | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 4 | −0.700 | 1.70 | 2,050 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | all | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 22.30 | 18.20 | 20.30 | 9,565 | Principle: no right to exclude neighbors | all | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 25.90 | 21.60 | 23.70 | 10,051 | Principle: open-housing law | all | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 9.80 | 5 | 7.40 | 9,327 | Principle: open-housing law | all | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 6.10 | 0.700 | 3.40 | 6,393 | Principle: open-housing law | all | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 10 | 4.40 | 7.20 | 5,696 | Principle: open-housing law | all | | 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 8.50 | 0.100 | 4.30 | 3,570 | Principle: open-housing law | all | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 40.20 | 33 | 36.60 | 4,301 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | all | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 11.10 | 6.20 | 8.60 | 6,445 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | all | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 7.70 | 3 | 5.30 | 5,763 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | all | | 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 9 | 5 | 7 | 7,741 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | all | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −1.70 | −8.30 | −5 | 7,178 | Explanation: discrimination | all | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −4.70 | −9.40 | −7.10 | 8,958 | Explanation: discrimination | all | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 3.30 | −2.10 | 0.600 | 6,234 | Explanation: discrimination | all | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 11.50 | 5.30 | 8.40 | 5,589 | Explanation: discrimination | all | | 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 12.50 | 5.90 | 9.20 | 5,964 | Explanation: discrimination | all | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −6.70 | −12.40 | −9.60 | 7,246 | Explanation: inborn ability | all | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −6.40 | −9.50 | −7.90 | 9,096 | Explanation: inborn ability | all | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 1.30 | −1.90 | −0.300 | 6,352 | Explanation: inborn ability | all | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 0.200 | −3.10 | −1.50 | 5,695 | Explanation: inborn ability | all | | 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | −0.200 | −3.30 | −1.70 | 6,046 | Explanation: inborn ability | all | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 2.10 | −4.60 | −1.20 | 7,282 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | all | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −4 | −9 | −6.50 | 9,093 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | all | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 1 | −4.80 | −1.90 | 6,315 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | all | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 12.40 | 5.90 | 9.10 | 5,661 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | all | | 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 2.30 | −4.40 | −1 | 5,995 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | all | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −1.30 | −7.80 | −4.50 | 7,103 | Explanation: lack of will power | all | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −6.70 | −11.80 | −9.30 | 8,880 | Explanation: lack of will power | all | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 0.500 | −5.40 | −2.50 | 6,189 | Explanation: lack of will power | all | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | −5.70 | −12.20 | −9 | 5,556 | Explanation: lack of will power | all | | 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | −7.20 | −13.60 | −10.40 | 5,935 | Explanation: lack of will power | all | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −4.60 | −9.80 | −7.20 | 7,353 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | all | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −0.300 | −3.60 | −1.90 | 9,200 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | all | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 2.30 | −1.50 | 0.400 | 6,315 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | all | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 12.40 | 7.60 | 10 | 5,643 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | all | | 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 7.60 | 2.30 | 4.90 | 7,577 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | all | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 7.70 | 3.70 | 5.70 | 10,047 | Policy: too little spending | all | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 0.100 | −5.10 | −2.50 | 6,601 | Policy: too little spending | all | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 1.30 | −4.70 | −1.70 | 4,806 | Policy: too little spending | all | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 24.50 | 17.20 | 20.90 | 3,867 | Policy: too little spending | all | | 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | −0.400 | −7.80 | −4.10 | 5,520 | Policy: too little spending | all | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 3 | −1.80 | 0.600 | 4,215 | Policy: preferential hiring | all | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 4 | 0.100 | 2.10 | 6,216 | Policy: preferential hiring | all | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 8.20 | 3.30 | 5.70 | 5,500 | Policy: preferential hiring | all | | 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 4.60 | −0.400 | 2.10 | 7,373 | Policy: preferential hiring | all | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 3 | −1.70 | 0.600 | 4,346 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | all | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 3.30 | −0.500 | 1.40 | 6,427 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | all | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 10.60 | 5.80 | 8.20 | 5,748 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | all | | 2016-2018 to 2021-2024 | 9.90 | 4.70 | 7.30 | 7,691 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | all | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 15.90 | 12.60 | 14.30 | 13,447 | Principle: no law against intermarriage | inperson | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 8.30 | 5.10 | 6.70 | 10,621 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 9.80 | 5.50 | 7.70 | 6,440 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 4 | −0.900 | 1.50 | 1,800 | Principle: would vote for a Black nominee | inperson | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 22.30 | 18.20 | 20.30 | 9,565 | Principle: no right to exclude neighbors | inperson | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 25.90 | 21.60 | 23.70 | 10,051 | Principle: open-housing law | inperson | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 10 | 5.10 | 7.60 | 8,950 | Principle: open-housing law | inperson | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 5.40 | −0.400 | 2.50 | 5,597 | Principle: open-housing law | inperson | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 10.30 | 4.30 | 7.30 | 5,064 | Principle: open-housing law | inperson | | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 10.60 | 1.60 | 6.10 | 3,175 | Principle: open-housing law | inperson | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 39.40 | 32.10 | 35.80 | 3,915 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | inperson | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 11.70 | 6.40 | 9.10 | 5,645 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | inperson | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 8.10 | 3 | 5.60 | 5,128 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | inperson | | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 8.90 | 2.90 | 5.90 | 3,437 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | inperson | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −1.70 | −8.30 | −5 | 7,178 | Explanation: discrimination | inperson | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −4.50 | −9.40 | −6.90 | 8,594 | Explanation: discrimination | inperson | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 4.40 | −1.40 | 1.50 | 5,470 | Explanation: discrimination | inperson | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 12 | 5.40 | 8.70 | 4,980 | Explanation: discrimination | inperson | | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 18.70 | 5.30 | 12 | 2,747 | Explanation: discrimination | inperson | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −6.70 | −12.40 | −9.60 | 7,246 | Explanation: inborn ability | inperson | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −5.70 | −9 | −7.30 | 8,719 | Explanation: inborn ability | inperson | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 1.20 | −2.30 | −0.600 | 5,568 | Explanation: inborn ability | inperson | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 0.400 | −3.10 | −1.30 | 5,069 | Explanation: inborn ability | inperson | | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 5.10 | −2.20 | 1.50 | 2,807 | Explanation: inborn ability | inperson | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 2.10 | −4.60 | −1.20 | 7,282 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | inperson | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −4.20 | −9.40 | −6.80 | 8,718 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | inperson | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 2 | −4.20 | −1.10 | 5,533 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | inperson | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 11.80 | 5.10 | 8.50 | 5,040 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | inperson | | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 3.70 | −9.70 | −3 | 2,780 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | inperson | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −1.30 | −7.80 | −4.50 | 7,103 | Explanation: lack of will power | inperson | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −5.70 | −11 | −8.30 | 8,515 | Explanation: lack of will power | inperson | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | −0.200 | −6.50 | −3.40 | 5,428 | Explanation: lack of will power | inperson | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | −5.30 | −12.10 | −8.70 | 4,949 | Explanation: lack of will power | inperson | | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | −0.800 | −13.40 | −7.10 | 2,733 | Explanation: lack of will power | inperson | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | −4.60 | −9.80 | −7.20 | 7,353 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | inperson | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −0.400 | −3.70 | −2.10 | 8,858 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | inperson | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 2.80 | −1.30 | 0.800 | 5,554 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | inperson | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 11.90 | 6.80 | 9.30 | 5,018 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | inperson | | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 8.40 | −0.500 | 3.90 | 3,338 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | inperson | | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 7.70 | 3.70 | 5.70 | 10,047 | Policy: too little spending | inperson | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | −1.20 | −6.60 | −3.90 | 6,227 | Policy: too little spending | inperson | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 3.40 | −3 | 0.200 | 4,144 | Policy: too little spending | inperson | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 24.30 | 16.50 | 20.40 | 3,412 | Policy: too little spending | inperson | | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 5.10 | −7.70 | −1.30 | 2,309 | Policy: too little spending | inperson | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 3.10 | −1.90 | 0.600 | 3,847 | Policy: preferential hiring | inperson | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 4.30 | 0.200 | 2.20 | 5,453 | Policy: preferential hiring | inperson | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 8.70 | 3.50 | 6.10 | 4,899 | Policy: preferential hiring | inperson | | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 10.60 | 1.70 | 6.20 | 3,192 | Policy: preferential hiring | inperson | | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 3 | −1.70 | 0.700 | 3,966 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | inperson | | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 2.90 | −1 | 0.900 | 5,643 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | inperson | | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 11.40 | 6.40 | 8.90 | 5,127 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | inperson | | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 10.10 | 1.50 | 5.80 | 3,405 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | inperson | Views: All interviews (view = all); In-person interviews only (view = inperson). Note: Periods pool the surveys of 1972 to 1977, 1988 to 1994, 2004 to 2008, 2010 to 2014, 2016 to 2018 and 2021 to 2024, after rescaling each year's weights to average one. The last column pools 2021, 2022 and 2024, mostly web and mixed-mode interviews, so a change into it can come from the change of mode; the in-person view uses the in-person interviews of 2022 and 2024. Note: A direction is the answer named in the row label: for example a positive change in the explanation rows is a larger share saying yes to that explanation. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted (weight_use); white respondents (race code white, Hispanic whites included); 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/schedule.json ### Table 3. By 2024 white respondents rated Black and white Americans almost alike, after a fall in the rating of Black Americans from 2008 to 2012 Mean feeling thermometer rating of Black Americans and of white Americans among white non-Hispanic respondents, points on a scale from 0 to 100, 1964 to 2024, all respondents and by party including leaners | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | group | measure | n | view | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | 61.80 | 59.50 | 60.70 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,366 | all | 1964 | | 61.80 | 59.10 | 60.40 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,126 | all | 1966 | | 62.90 | 60.60 | 61.70 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,337 | all | 1968 | | 59.90 | 57.50 | 58.70 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,285 | all | 1970 | | 62.10 | 60.30 | 61.20 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,850 | all | 1972 | | 64.50 | 62 | 63.30 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,324 | all | 1974 | | 58.80 | 57 | 57.90 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,602 | all | 1976 | | 61.60 | 59.50 | 60.60 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,136 | all | 1980 | | 63.40 | 60.80 | 62.10 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,108 | all | 1982 | | 63.50 | 61.50 | 62.50 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,516 | all | 1984 | | 64.20 | 62.20 | 63.20 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,598 | all | 1986 | | 58.50 | 56.40 | 57.40 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,315 | all | 1988 | | 67.80 | 65.50 | 66.70 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,443 | all | 1990 | | 62.20 | 60.40 | 61.30 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,686 | all | 1992 | | 60.80 | 58.30 | 59.50 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,317 | all | 1994 | | 64.10 | 61.90 | 63 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,173 | all | 1996 | | 67.80 | 65 | 66.40 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 883 | all | 1998 | | 65.60 | 63 | 64.30 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,123 | all | 2000 | | 67.10 | 64.20 | 65.60 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 987 | all | 2002 | | 70.60 | 67.60 | 69.10 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 740 | all | 2004 | | 67.40 | 64.80 | 66.10 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,020 | all | 2008 | | 62.70 | 60.90 | 61.80 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 3,254 | all | 2012 | | 67.80 | 65.90 | 66.90 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 2,591 | all | 2016 | | 70.60 | 69.20 | 69.90 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 5,173 | all | 2020 | | 70.60 | 68.50 | 69.50 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 3,374 | all | 2024 | | 61.90 | 58.90 | 60.40 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 792 | all | 1964 | | 62.70 | 58.90 | 60.80 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 586 | all | 1966 | | 63.30 | 60 | 61.60 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 680 | all | 1968 | | 61.40 | 58.10 | 59.80 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 659 | all | 1970 | | 63.40 | 60.90 | 62.20 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 877 | all | 1972 | | 65.70 | 62.20 | 64 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 635 | all | 1974 | | 59.70 | 57.10 | 58.40 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 728 | all | 1976 | | 63.80 | 60.80 | 62.30 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 532 | all | 1980 | | 63.90 | 60.40 | 62.10 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 559 | all | 1982 | | 64.80 | 61.70 | 63.20 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 641 | all | 1984 | | 65 | 61.90 | 63.40 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 688 | all | 1986 | | 60.90 | 57.60 | 59.20 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 526 | all | 1988 | | 69.30 | 65.90 | 67.60 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 673 | all | 1990 | | 63.70 | 61 | 62.40 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 747 | all | 1992 | | 62.60 | 58.50 | 60.60 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 535 | all | 1994 | | 66.60 | 63.50 | 65.10 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 552 | all | 1996 | | 68.90 | 64.60 | 66.70 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 394 | all | 1998 | | 68.90 | 65.10 | 67 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 484 | all | 2000 | | 68.80 | 64.20 | 66.50 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 404 | all | 2002 | | 72.40 | 67.70 | 70.10 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 295 | all | 2004 | | 70.80 | 66.80 | 68.80 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 436 | all | 2008 | | 66.20 | 63.40 | 64.80 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 1,283 | all | 2012 | | 73 | 70 | 71.50 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 1,024 | all | 2016 | | 76.40 | 74.20 | 75.30 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 2,146 | all | 2020 | | 76.10 | 73.20 | 74.70 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 1,485 | all | 2024 | | 64.70 | 60.70 | 62.70 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 449 | all | 1964 | | 62.50 | 58.40 | 60.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 385 | all | 1966 | | 64 | 60.50 | 62.30 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 491 | all | 1968 | | 60 | 56 | 58 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 453 | all | 1970 | | 61.30 | 58.40 | 59.80 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 712 | all | 1972 | | 64.70 | 60.50 | 62.60 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 464 | all | 1974 | | 59.10 | 56.50 | 57.80 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 614 | all | 1976 | | 60.70 | 57.10 | 58.90 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 437 | all | 1980 | | 64.70 | 60.40 | 62.60 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 403 | all | 1982 | | 63.50 | 60.50 | 62 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 698 | all | 1984 | | 65.40 | 62.30 | 63.90 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 685 | all | 1986 | | 58 | 55.10 | 56.60 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 638 | all | 1988 | | 68.30 | 64.80 | 66.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 590 | all | 1990 | | 61.80 | 59.30 | 60.60 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 734 | all | 1992 | | 61.10 | 57.60 | 59.40 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 636 | all | 1994 | | 63.10 | 59.80 | 61.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 523 | all | 1996 | | 68.50 | 64.10 | 66.30 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 384 | all | 1998 | | 65.30 | 61.50 | 63.40 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 495 | all | 2000 | | 68.10 | 64 | 66 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 496 | all | 2002 | | 72 | 68.10 | 70 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 373 | all | 2004 | | 66.40 | 62.60 | 64.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 457 | all | 2008 | | 61.50 | 58.90 | 60.20 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 1,518 | all | 2012 | | 65.20 | 62.50 | 63.90 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 1,255 | all | 2016 | | 68 | 65.90 | 66.90 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 2,512 | all | 2020 | | 68 | 65 | 66.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 1,698 | all | 2024 | | 87.60 | 85.80 | 86.70 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,367 | all | 1964 | | 86.80 | 84.70 | 85.70 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,124 | all | 1966 | | 83.40 | 81.40 | 82.40 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,343 | all | 1968 | | 79.90 | 77.80 | 78.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,293 | all | 1970 | | 80.50 | 78.90 | 79.70 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,867 | all | 1972 | | 80.90 | 78.60 | 79.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,336 | all | 1974 | | 75.50 | 73.80 | 74.70 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,635 | all | 1976 | | 78.40 | 76.40 | 77.40 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,148 | all | 1980 | | 74.80 | 72.40 | 73.60 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,109 | all | 1982 | | 75.80 | 74 | 74.90 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,522 | all | 1984 | | 74.80 | 72.70 | 73.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,324 | all | 1988 | | 72.30 | 70.50 | 71.40 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,694 | all | 1992 | | 72.30 | 70.10 | 71.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,333 | all | 1994 | | 71.90 | 69.60 | 70.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,164 | all | 1996 | | 71.20 | 68.40 | 69.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 893 | all | 1998 | | 74.20 | 71.70 | 73 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,128 | all | 2000 | | 70 | 67.10 | 68.50 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 989 | all | 2002 | | 75.20 | 72.20 | 73.70 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 739 | all | 2004 | | 74.50 | 71.90 | 73.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,021 | all | 2008 | | 74 | 72.40 | 73.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 3,258 | all | 2012 | | 74.20 | 72.40 | 73.30 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 2,592 | all | 2016 | | 72 | 70.50 | 71.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 5,152 | all | 2020 | | 71.20 | 69.20 | 70.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 3,373 | all | 2024 | | 89.10 | 86.90 | 88 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 793 | all | 1964 | | 88.90 | 86.10 | 87.50 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 584 | all | 1966 | | 84.60 | 81.90 | 83.30 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 682 | all | 1968 | | 82.10 | 79.40 | 80.80 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 660 | all | 1970 | | 82.20 | 79.80 | 81 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 885 | all | 1972 | | 82.60 | 79.40 | 81 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 641 | all | 1974 | | 76.80 | 74.30 | 75.50 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 744 | all | 1976 | | 80.10 | 77.20 | 78.60 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 537 | all | 1980 | | 76.30 | 73 | 74.70 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 556 | all | 1982 | | 77.50 | 74.90 | 76.20 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 641 | all | 1984 | | 76.50 | 73.10 | 74.80 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 525 | all | 1988 | | 73.60 | 70.90 | 72.30 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 751 | all | 1992 | | 74.40 | 70.90 | 72.70 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 542 | all | 1994 | | 73.80 | 70.60 | 72.20 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 546 | all | 1996 | | 71.90 | 67.70 | 69.80 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 392 | all | 1998 | | 75.40 | 71.60 | 73.50 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 486 | all | 2000 | | 70.90 | 66.30 | 68.60 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 404 | all | 2002 | | 75.80 | 70.50 | 73.20 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 298 | all | 2004 | | 75.60 | 71.50 | 73.50 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 435 | all | 2008 | | 75.30 | 72.70 | 74 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 1,284 | all | 2012 | | 74.30 | 71.40 | 72.80 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 1,024 | all | 2016 | | 70.50 | 68.20 | 69.40 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 2,144 | all | 2020 | | 70.60 | 67.60 | 69.10 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 1,489 | all | 2024 | | 87.20 | 84 | 85.60 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 449 | all | 1964 | | 86.50 | 83 | 84.70 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 385 | all | 1966 | | 83.20 | 79.90 | 81.50 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 492 | all | 1968 | | 79.30 | 75.70 | 77.50 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 458 | all | 1970 | | 80.50 | 78 | 79.20 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 722 | all | 1972 | | 81.30 | 77.60 | 79.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 470 | all | 1974 | | 75.80 | 73 | 74.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 623 | all | 1976 | | 78.80 | 75.50 | 77.20 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 443 | all | 1980 | | 75.70 | 71.90 | 73.80 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 404 | all | 1982 | | 75.80 | 73.20 | 74.50 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 703 | all | 1984 | | 74.90 | 71.90 | 73.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 646 | all | 1988 | | 72.60 | 69.90 | 71.30 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 738 | all | 1992 | | 72.40 | 69.40 | 70.90 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 640 | all | 1994 | | 71.30 | 68 | 69.70 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 521 | all | 1996 | | 72.50 | 68.20 | 70.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 387 | all | 1998 | | 75.10 | 71.60 | 73.30 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 497 | all | 2000 | | 71.20 | 67.20 | 69.20 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 499 | all | 2002 | | 77.10 | 73.10 | 75.10 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 370 | all | 2004 | | 75.70 | 71.90 | 73.80 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 457 | all | 2008 | | 74.90 | 72.60 | 73.70 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 1,520 | all | 2012 | | 75.40 | 73 | 74.20 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 1,256 | all | 2016 | | 74.40 | 72.50 | 73.50 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 2,495 | all | 2020 | | 73.10 | 70.20 | 71.60 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 1,692 | all | 2024 | | 67.40 | 64.80 | 66.10 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,020 | ftf | 2008 | | 64.40 | 61.10 | 62.70 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 852 | ftf | 2012 | | 68.90 | 64.80 | 66.90 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 699 | ftf | 2016 | | 73.30 | 68.80 | 71 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 605 | ftf | 2024 | | 70.80 | 66.80 | 68.80 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 436 | ftf | 2008 | | 68 | 62.90 | 65.40 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 356 | ftf | 2012 | | 76.40 | 69.70 | 73.10 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 265 | ftf | 2016 | | 81.30 | 75 | 78.10 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 276 | ftf | 2024 | | 66.40 | 62.60 | 64.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 457 | ftf | 2008 | | 63.70 | 59.10 | 61.40 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 395 | ftf | 2012 | | 65.90 | 60.60 | 63.30 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 368 | ftf | 2016 | | 69.20 | 63 | 66.10 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 306 | ftf | 2024 | | 74.50 | 71.90 | 73.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,021 | ftf | 2008 | | 74.60 | 71.50 | 73.10 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 855 | ftf | 2012 | | 75.30 | 71.60 | 73.50 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 699 | ftf | 2016 | | 71.70 | 67.30 | 69.50 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 605 | ftf | 2024 | | 75.60 | 71.50 | 73.50 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 435 | ftf | 2008 | | 75.70 | 70.90 | 73.30 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 356 | ftf | 2012 | | 77.20 | 70.80 | 74 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 265 | ftf | 2016 | | 73.40 | 66.70 | 70 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 277 | ftf | 2024 | | 75.70 | 71.90 | 73.80 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 457 | ftf | 2008 | | 74.80 | 70.40 | 72.60 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 397 | ftf | 2012 | | 76 | 71.30 | 73.70 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 368 | ftf | 2016 | | 72.50 | 66.30 | 69.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 305 | ftf | 2024 | | 62.40 | 60.30 | 61.40 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 2,402 | web | 2012 | | 68 | 65.80 | 66.90 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,892 | web | 2016 | | 70.30 | 67.20 | 68.80 | All white respondents | Rating of Black Americans | 1,163 | web | 2024 | | 66.10 | 62.90 | 64.50 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 927 | web | 2012 | | 72.60 | 69.30 | 71 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 759 | web | 2016 | | 74.50 | 70 | 72.20 | White Democrats | Rating of Black Americans | 514 | web | 2024 | | 61 | 58 | 59.50 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 1,123 | web | 2012 | | 65.70 | 62.60 | 64.10 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 887 | web | 2016 | | 70 | 65.40 | 67.70 | White Republicans | Rating of Black Americans | 554 | web | 2024 | | 74.20 | 72.40 | 73.30 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 2,403 | web | 2012 | | 74.20 | 72.30 | 73.20 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,893 | web | 2016 | | 71.30 | 68.20 | 69.80 | All white respondents | Rating of white Americans | 1,157 | web | 2024 | | 75.80 | 72.90 | 74.40 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 928 | web | 2012 | | 74 | 70.90 | 72.40 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 759 | web | 2016 | | 69.10 | 64.60 | 66.90 | White Democrats | Rating of white Americans | 516 | web | 2024 | | 75.70 | 73.10 | 74.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 1,123 | web | 2012 | | 75.70 | 73 | 74.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 888 | web | 2016 | | 75.70 | 71.20 | 73.40 | White Republicans | Rating of white Americans | 548 | web | 2024 | Views: All interviews (view = all); Face to face (view = ftf); Web (view = web). Note: Face-to-face and web estimates exist for 2008 (face to face only), 2012, 2016 and 2024; 2020 has no mode weights. The thermometer toward white Americans was not asked in 1986 or 1990. Note: Ratings of Black Americans by white respondents in 1964 to 1970 come from the same item as later years. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1964-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/affect.json ### Table 4. The best single step falls at the 2016 survey for each of the six dated items among white respondents and among white Democrats, and a kinked trend fits discrimination and will power better Best-fitting single step in the yearly share, by item and group, in-person surveys 2000 to 2018, among white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included); step in percentage points, share of bootstrap replicates choosing each date, and the error of a trend with one kink | Group | Item | Best-fitting first new survey | Step at that survey (points) | Step at the 2016 survey (points) | 2016 step, lower end | 2016 step, upper end | Replicates at that survey (%) | Replicates at an earlier survey (%) | Error of the best step | Error of the kinked trend | Kink year | Kink year, lower end | Kink year, upper end | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | White respondents | Discrimination | 2016 | +8.9 | +8.9 | +5.8 | +11.6 | 74 | 1 | 8.0 | 2.4 | 2014.0 | 2012.0 | 2015.5 | | White respondents | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016 | −10.6 | −10.6 | −13.3 | −7.6 | 51 | 38 | 15.2 | 3.0 | 2011.4 | 2008.0 | 2014.8 | | White respondents | At the help end of the scale | 2016 | +9.2 | +9.2 | +7.0 | +11.6 | 100 | 0 | 9.2 | 12.9 | 2013.9 | 2012.9 | 2014.0 | | White respondents | Too little spent | 2016 | +20.3 | +20.3 | +17.3 | +23.7 | 100 | 0 | 16.1 | 24.1 | 2013.4 | 2010.9 | 2014.0 | | White respondents | Favors preferential hiring | 2016 | +7.2 | +7.2 | +4.9 | +9.8 | 87 | 10 | 9.6 | 9.1 | 2013.6 | 2006.0 | 2014.7 | | White respondents | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016 | +9.3 | +9.3 | +7.2 | +11.8 | 92 | 7 | 11.2 | 4.6 | 2012.8 | 2011.4 | 2013.9 | | White Democrats | Discrimination | 2016 | +18.5 | +18.5 | +14.1 | +23.2 | 78 | 20 | 13.1 | 5.5 | 2012.4 | 2007.3 | 2013.8 | | White Democrats | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016 | −17.6 | −17.6 | −21.4 | −13.3 | 60 | 39 | 15.5 | 6.0 | 2008.6 | 2004.1 | 2013.4 | | White Democrats | At the help end of the scale | 2016 | +19.1 | +19.1 | +15.1 | +23.4 | 100 | 0 | 9.2 | 14.5 | 2013.5 | 2012.0 | 2014.0 | | White Democrats | Too little spent | 2016 | +29.1 | +29.1 | +24.0 | +34.3 | 100 | 0 | 15.3 | 20.1 | 2013.5 | 2009.6 | 2014.0 | | White Democrats | Favors preferential hiring | 2016 | +13.8 | +13.8 | +9.4 | +18.1 | 65 | 31 | 12.6 | 6.4 | 2011.1 | 2006.0 | 2014.7 | | White Democrats | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016 | +19.6 | +19.6 | +15.4 | +24.6 | 85 | 15 | 11.2 | 7.1 | 2011.6 | 2008.0 | 2013.4 | | White Republicans | Discrimination | 2004 | −3.3 | +0.4 | −3.3 | +4.3 | 41 | 0 | 6.4 | 8.3 | 2015.9 | 2004.0 | 2015.9 | | White Republicans | Lack of motivation or will power | 2018 | −10.4 | −6.8 | −11.2 | −2.5 | 39 | 61 | 6.5 | 3.8 | 2012.6 | 2009.3 | 2015.9 | | White Republicans | At the help end of the scale | 2018 | +6.3 | +2.9 | +0.5 | +6.1 | 50 | 50 | 11.9 | 10.9 | 2015.4 | 2004.0 | 2015.9 | | White Republicans | Too little spent | 2016 | +15.0 | +15.0 | +10.6 | +20.2 | 98 | 2 | 10.9 | 14.8 | 2013.5 | 2010.2 | 2014.0 | | White Republicans | Favors preferential hiring | 2016 | +1.4 | +1.4 | −1.0 | +4.2 | 28 | 50 | 4.1 | 3.9 | 2014.2 | 2004.0 | 2015.9 | | White Republicans | Rejects the special-favors view | 2018 | +6.7 | +2.1 | −0.4 | +5.2 | 62 | 38 | 13.6 | 13.5 | 2015.9 | 2004.0 | 2015.9 | Note: The fit uses the surveys of 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018, all conducted in person, so the dates cannot come from the move to the web. A step cannot begin before 2004 or leave fewer than one survey after it. The kinked trend is constant before the kink and linear after it, with the kink anywhere from 2004 to just before 2016. A step and a kink are assumptions about the form of change. The bootstrap resamples respondents within each survey year with replacement (seed 12345) and refits; the interval for a step size or a kink year is the 2.5th to 97.5th percentile. Survey spacing is two years, so a date is a survey and not a month. Source: General Social Survey, 2000-2018; weighted (weight_use); in-person interviews; white respondents (race code white, Hispanic whites included), leaners included for party; seeded bootstrap of respondents within each survey year Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/step_dates.json ### Table 5. The post-2018 level depends on interview mode: in 2022 and 2024 web respondents gave the answer less often than in-person respondents on 6 of 9 items Share of white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) giving the answer named in each row, percent, in-person interviews of 2010-2014, 2016-2018 and 2022-2024 and web interviews of 2022-2024, 95% intervals | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | item | n | series | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | | 81.50 | 78 | 79.80 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | 2,860 | In person, 2010-2014 | | 87.20 | 83.50 | 85.30 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | 2,268 | In person, 2016-2018 | | 93.60 | 88.80 | 91.20 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | 1,169 | In person, 2022-2024 | | 96 | 92.80 | 94.40 | Principle: accepts a relative's marriage | 1,700 | Web, 2022-2024 | | 33.60 | 29.50 | 31.50 | Explanation: discrimination | 2,781 | In person, 2010-2014 | | 42.80 | 37.70 | 40.30 | Explanation: discrimination | 2,199 | In person, 2016-2018 | | 58.50 | 46.10 | 52.30 | Explanation: discrimination | 548 | In person, 2022-2024 | | 47.60 | 37.10 | 42.30 | Explanation: discrimination | 804 | Web, 2022-2024 | | 9.50 | 7.10 | 8.30 | Explanation: inborn ability | 2,828 | In person, 2010-2014 | | 8.30 | 5.60 | 7 | Explanation: inborn ability | 2,241 | In person, 2016-2018 | | 11.80 | 5 | 8.40 | Explanation: inborn ability | 566 | In person, 2022-2024 | | 4.10 | 0.800 | 2.50 | Explanation: inborn ability | 806 | Web, 2022-2024 | | 44.80 | 40.50 | 42.70 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | 2,813 | In person, 2010-2014 | | 53.70 | 48.50 | 51.10 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | 2,227 | In person, 2016-2018 | | 54.30 | 41.90 | 48.10 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | 553 | In person, 2022-2024 | | 54.30 | 43.70 | 49 | Explanation: lack of chance for education | 807 | Web, 2022-2024 | | 50.40 | 46 | 48.20 | Explanation: lack of will power | 2,760 | In person, 2010-2014 | | 42.10 | 36.90 | 39.50 | Explanation: lack of will power | 2,189 | In person, 2016-2018 | | 38.10 | 26.70 | 32.40 | Explanation: lack of will power | 544 | In person, 2022-2024 | | 28.40 | 19.40 | 23.90 | Explanation: lack of will power | 803 | Web, 2022-2024 | | 13.60 | 10.70 | 12.20 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | 2,762 | In person, 2010-2014 | | 23.60 | 19.40 | 21.50 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | 2,256 | In person, 2016-2018 | | 29.30 | 21.50 | 25.40 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | 1,082 | In person, 2022-2024 | | 26.20 | 20.50 | 23.30 | Policy: help end of the government-help scale | 1,726 | Web, 2022-2024 | | 29.30 | 24.50 | 26.90 | Policy: too little spending | 1,855 | In person, 2010-2014 | | 50.50 | 44.30 | 47.40 | Policy: too little spending | 1,557 | In person, 2016-2018 | | 51.70 | 40.50 | 46.10 | Policy: too little spending | 752 | In person, 2022-2024 | | 42.80 | 35.20 | 39 | Policy: too little spending | 1,313 | Web, 2022-2024 | | 15.30 | 12.20 | 13.70 | Policy: preferential hiring | 2,755 | In person, 2010-2014 | | 22 | 17.80 | 19.90 | Policy: preferential hiring | 2,144 | In person, 2016-2018 | | 29.90 | 22.10 | 26 | Policy: preferential hiring | 1,048 | In person, 2022-2024 | | 22.50 | 16.80 | 19.60 | Policy: preferential hiring | 1,672 | Web, 2022-2024 | | 13.30 | 10.40 | 11.80 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | 2,870 | In person, 2010-2014 | | 22.90 | 18.70 | 20.80 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | 2,257 | In person, 2016-2018 | | 30.30 | 22.80 | 26.60 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | 1,148 | In person, 2022-2024 | | 30.90 | 24.60 | 27.80 | Policy: rejects the special-favors view | 1,697 | Web, 2022-2024 | Note: The open-housing item is not shown because it was not asked of web respondents. The telephone and other-mode interviews are left out of both modes. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted (weight_use); white respondents (race code white, Hispanic whites included); 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/mode_gap.json ### Table 6. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 white Democrats moved on each of the six dated items and white Republicans on 4, and the Democratic change is separable from the Republican change on 4 Share of white Democrats and white Republicans (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included; leaners included) giving the answer named above each panel, percent, 2000 to 2024, all interviews and by interview mode | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | panel | pooled | series | view | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | | 44.90 | 35.60 | 40.30 | 523 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2000 | | 43.90 | 29.90 | 36.90 | 260 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2002 | | 49.10 | 34.80 | 42 | 258 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2004 | | 42.10 | 32.40 | 37.20 | 532 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2006 | | 45.10 | 33.80 | 39.40 | 422 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2008 | | 47.20 | 35.40 | 41.30 | 423 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2010 | | 47.60 | 36 | 41.80 | 398 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2012 | | 50.20 | 39.60 | 44.90 | 471 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2014 | | 59.70 | 49.60 | 54.60 | 541 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2016 | | 67.60 | 55.50 | 61.60 | 392 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2018 | | 84.80 | 78.10 | 81.50 | 858 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2021 | | 85.40 | 71.70 | 78.50 | 306 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2022 | | 81 | 65.60 | 73.30 | 237 | Discrimination | no | Democrats | all | 2024 | | 30.40 | 22.10 | 26.20 | 524 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2000 | | 28.10 | 17.30 | 22.70 | 289 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2002 | | 21.90 | 12.50 | 17.20 | 316 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2004 | | 28 | 19.90 | 24 | 585 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2006 | | 26.50 | 16.80 | 21.70 | 389 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2008 | | 25.60 | 16.10 | 20.90 | 408 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2010 | | 25.20 | 14.80 | 20 | 345 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2012 | | 22.20 | 14.20 | 18.20 | 468 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2014 | | 25.10 | 17 | 21.10 | 538 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2016 | | 28.50 | 18 | 23.30 | 458 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2018 | | 22.70 | 15.90 | 19.30 | 732 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2021 | | 31.80 | 17 | 24.40 | 321 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2022 | | 27.80 | 15.10 | 21.40 | 314 | Discrimination | no | Republicans | all | 2024 | | 52.90 | 43.40 | 48.20 | 520 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2000 | | 55 | 40.30 | 47.70 | 255 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2002 | | 52.70 | 38.50 | 45.60 | 263 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2004 | | 47.20 | 37.20 | 42.20 | 531 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2006 | | 54 | 42.50 | 48.30 | 421 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2008 | | 45.40 | 33.90 | 39.70 | 417 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2010 | | 46.80 | 35.10 | 40.90 | 389 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2012 | | 43 | 32.70 | 37.90 | 470 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2014 | | 33.20 | 24.10 | 28.60 | 546 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2016 | | 29.90 | 19.20 | 24.50 | 397 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2018 | | 18.90 | 12.60 | 15.80 | 856 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2021 | | 18.80 | 7.50 | 13.20 | 305 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2022 | | 15.50 | 5.10 | 10.30 | 244 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats | all | 2024 | | 59.80 | 50.40 | 55.10 | 518 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2000 | | 60.60 | 47.20 | 53.90 | 272 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2002 | | 60.50 | 47.90 | 54.20 | 312 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2004 | | 62.30 | 52.90 | 57.60 | 583 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2006 | | 60.50 | 48.50 | 54.50 | 382 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2008 | | 66 | 54.50 | 60.30 | 403 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2010 | | 63.60 | 50.60 | 57.10 | 340 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2012 | | 59.20 | 48.80 | 54 | 466 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2014 | | 57.10 | 47.10 | 52.10 | 533 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2016 | | 50.30 | 37.90 | 44.10 | 442 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2018 | | 49.20 | 40.70 | 45 | 721 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2021 | | 52.30 | 35.10 | 43.70 | 314 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2022 | | 48.20 | 33 | 40.60 | 315 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans | all | 2024 | | 27.30 | 19.40 | 23.30 | 551 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2000 | | 21.20 | 11.20 | 16.20 | 284 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2002 | | 21.60 | 11.30 | 16.50 | 278 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2004 | | 23.10 | 15 | 19 | 518 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2006 | | 21.70 | 13.10 | 17.40 | 420 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2008 | | 26.30 | 16.30 | 21.30 | 422 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2010 | | 23.10 | 13.80 | 18.50 | 399 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2012 | | 23.10 | 14.90 | 19 | 471 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2014 | | 42.30 | 32.80 | 37.50 | 584 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2016 | | 45.10 | 33.60 | 39.30 | 417 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2018 | | 61.30 | 52.90 | 57.10 | 853 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2021 | | 57.40 | 45.20 | 51.30 | 592 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2022 | | 53.10 | 40.70 | 46.90 | 490 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats | all | 2024 | | 9.70 | 5.10 | 7.40 | 584 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2000 | | 10.90 | 4 | 7.50 | 280 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2002 | | 10.30 | 3.90 | 7.10 | 307 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2004 | | 9.90 | 4.90 | 7.40 | 584 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2006 | | 5.40 | 1.20 | 3.30 | 412 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2008 | | 8.60 | 3 | 5.80 | 384 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2010 | | 6.10 | 1.30 | 3.70 | 349 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2012 | | 5.40 | 1.60 | 3.50 | 463 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2014 | | 10 | 4.80 | 7.40 | 526 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2016 | | 15.30 | 7.40 | 11.40 | 457 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2018 | | 10.40 | 5.70 | 8.10 | 744 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2021 | | 10.10 | 4 | 7.10 | 667 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2022 | | 9.60 | 3.90 | 6.70 | 602 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans | all | 2024 | | 44 | 33.10 | 38.50 | 384 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2000 | | 40.20 | 28.90 | 34.50 | 368 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2002 | | 39.80 | 28.70 | 34.30 | 389 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2004 | | 47 | 34.60 | 40.80 | 384 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2006 | | 46.20 | 33.20 | 39.70 | 292 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2008 | | 44.60 | 30.40 | 37.50 | 260 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2010 | | 48.40 | 34.30 | 41.30 | 277 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2012 | | 42.60 | 31 | 36.80 | 348 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2014 | | 67.80 | 56.40 | 62.10 | 396 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2016 | | 74.90 | 61.70 | 68.30 | 288 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2018 | | 80.40 | 71.80 | 76.10 | 629 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2021 | | 78.30 | 65.60 | 71.90 | 454 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2022 | | 74.40 | 60.90 | 67.60 | 370 | Too little spent | no | Democrats | all | 2024 | | 27.20 | 18 | 22.60 | 374 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2000 | | 20.30 | 12.50 | 16.40 | 431 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2002 | | 24.10 | 15.50 | 19.80 | 456 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2004 | | 22.10 | 13.30 | 17.70 | 395 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2006 | | 27.60 | 15.40 | 21.50 | 253 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2008 | | 17 | 7.60 | 12.30 | 277 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2010 | | 23.20 | 11.30 | 17.30 | 230 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2012 | | 20 | 10.90 | 15.50 | 320 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2014 | | 38.50 | 27.30 | 32.90 | 377 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2016 | | 42 | 28.30 | 35.10 | 330 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2018 | | 19.90 | 12.60 | 16.20 | 550 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2021 | | 28.60 | 15.40 | 22 | 442 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2022 | | 23.50 | 13.50 | 18.50 | 442 | Too little spent | no | Republicans | all | 2024 | | 21.90 | 14.50 | 18.20 | 519 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2000 | | 20.60 | 10.20 | 15.40 | 259 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2002 | | 19.10 | 9.20 | 14.10 | 263 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2004 | | 18.10 | 11.10 | 14.60 | 538 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2006 | | 19.30 | 11 | 15.20 | 414 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2008 | | 23.40 | 13.90 | 18.60 | 412 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2010 | | 26.50 | 16.60 | 21.60 | 386 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2012 | | 24.90 | 16.20 | 20.50 | 460 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2014 | | 32.40 | 23.30 | 27.80 | 527 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2016 | | 41.50 | 29.10 | 35.30 | 367 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2018 | | 43.60 | 35.10 | 39.40 | 839 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2021 | | 48.80 | 36.80 | 42.80 | 589 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2022 | | 43.80 | 31.80 | 37.80 | 471 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats | all | 2024 | | 11.40 | 6.20 | 8.80 | 543 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2000 | | 11.30 | 4.30 | 7.80 | 288 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2002 | | 10.80 | 4.20 | 7.50 | 317 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2004 | | 9.30 | 4.50 | 6.90 | 591 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2006 | | 10.60 | 4.40 | 7.50 | 391 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2008 | | 11.80 | 5.20 | 8.50 | 402 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2010 | | 9.10 | 3 | 6.10 | 345 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2012 | | 10.10 | 4.60 | 7.30 | 464 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2014 | | 11.60 | 6 | 8.80 | 535 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2016 | | 11.80 | 4.90 | 8.40 | 450 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2018 | | 4.40 | 1.50 | 2.90 | 724 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2021 | | 10.90 | 4.30 | 7.60 | 627 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2022 | | 11.10 | 5.20 | 8.10 | 626 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans | all | 2024 | | 19.60 | 12.80 | 16.20 | 550 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2000 | | 17 | 7.50 | 12.20 | 264 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2002 | | 22.90 | 12.10 | 17.50 | 269 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2004 | | 21.50 | 13.90 | 17.70 | 553 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2006 | | 19.60 | 11.40 | 15.50 | 436 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2008 | | 24.70 | 15.20 | 19.90 | 432 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2010 | | 25.40 | 15.90 | 20.70 | 398 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2012 | | 27.90 | 19 | 23.50 | 478 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2014 | | 40.80 | 31.20 | 36 | 557 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2016 | | 44 | 32 | 38 | 400 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2018 | | 59.90 | 51.40 | 55.70 | 864 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2021 | | 64.70 | 53 | 58.90 | 615 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2022 | | 57 | 45 | 51 | 499 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats | all | 2024 | | 11 | 6 | 8.50 | 552 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2000 | | 11.10 | 4.20 | 7.70 | 290 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2002 | | 12 | 5.10 | 8.60 | 324 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2004 | | 9.30 | 4.50 | 6.90 | 599 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2006 | | 9.80 | 3.80 | 6.80 | 393 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2008 | | 8.50 | 3.10 | 5.80 | 420 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2010 | | 6.20 | 1.30 | 3.80 | 355 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2012 | | 9 | 3.90 | 6.40 | 476 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2014 | | 10 | 4.80 | 7.40 | 552 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2016 | | 16.20 | 8.10 | 12.10 | 463 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2018 | | 9.40 | 5 | 7.20 | 735 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2021 | | 17.80 | 9.40 | 13.60 | 651 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2022 | | 12.90 | 6.60 | 9.70 | 647 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans | all | 2024 | | 44.90 | 35.60 | 40.30 | 523 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 43.90 | 29.90 | 36.90 | 260 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 53.40 | 37 | 45.20 | 197 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 42.30 | 32.40 | 37.30 | 498 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 43.60 | 31.40 | 37.50 | 362 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 49.40 | 37 | 43.20 | 379 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 48.10 | 35.70 | 41.90 | 348 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 52.10 | 40.60 | 46.40 | 397 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 61.30 | 50.80 | 56 | 499 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 70.20 | 57.50 | 63.90 | 355 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 85.80 | 78.90 | 82.40 | 775 | Discrimination | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 | | 84.90 | 71.70 | 78.30 | 300 | Discrimination | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 | | 30.40 | 22.10 | 26.20 | 524 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 28.10 | 17.30 | 22.70 | 289 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 23.80 | 13.10 | 18.40 | 253 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 28.40 | 20.10 | 24.30 | 548 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 26.10 | 16 | 21.10 | 339 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 26.50 | 16.50 | 21.50 | 361 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 26.20 | 15 | 20.60 | 293 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 24.60 | 15.80 | 20.20 | 417 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 25.30 | 16.90 | 21.10 | 500 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 31 | 19.80 | 25.40 | 409 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 38.10 | 21.70 | 29.90 | 249 | Discrimination | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 | | 22.90 | 15.70 | 19.30 | 621 | Discrimination | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 | | 23.80 | 10.90 | 17.40 | 319 | Discrimination | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 | | 52.90 | 43.40 | 48.20 | 520 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 55 | 40.30 | 47.70 | 255 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 53.90 | 37.80 | 45.90 | 201 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 49.80 | 39.60 | 44.70 | 497 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 56.40 | 43.90 | 50.20 | 360 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 46.50 | 34.50 | 40.50 | 373 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 48.80 | 36.10 | 42.50 | 339 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 43.60 | 32.40 | 38 | 395 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 34.10 | 24.40 | 29.30 | 504 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 29.60 | 18.40 | 24 | 359 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 17.90 | 11.50 | 14.70 | 774 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 | | 11.30 | 3 | 7.20 | 301 | Lack of motivation or will power | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 | | 59.80 | 50.40 | 55.10 | 518 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 60.60 | 47.20 | 53.90 | 272 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 60.40 | 46.50 | 53.40 | 249 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 62.60 | 53 | 57.80 | 545 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 61.20 | 48.80 | 55 | 332 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 64.80 | 52.80 | 58.80 | 360 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 65.50 | 51.90 | 58.70 | 289 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 58.20 | 47.20 | 52.70 | 416 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 56.90 | 46.50 | 51.70 | 495 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 51.30 | 38.30 | 44.80 | 395 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 56 | 38.30 | 47.20 | 247 | Lack of motivation or will power | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 | | 49.50 | 40.30 | 44.90 | 612 | Lack of motivation or will power | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 | | 47.10 | 30.50 | 38.80 | 318 | Lack of motivation or will power | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 | | 27.30 | 19.40 | 23.30 | 551 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 21.20 | 11.20 | 16.20 | 284 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 21.40 | 10.20 | 15.80 | 228 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 24 | 15.70 | 19.80 | 481 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 21.40 | 12.60 | 17 | 371 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 26.70 | 16 | 21.30 | 370 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 23.50 | 13.40 | 18.50 | 344 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 24.30 | 15.30 | 19.80 | 400 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 42.20 | 32.50 | 37.40 | 539 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 46.10 | 33.90 | 40 | 367 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 53.40 | 38.30 | 45.90 | 349 | At the help end of the scale | yes | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2023 | | 61.40 | 52.50 | 56.90 | 773 | At the help end of the scale | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 | | 57.90 | 46.70 | 52.30 | 630 | At the help end of the scale | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 | | 9.70 | 5.10 | 7.40 | 584 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 10.90 | 4 | 7.50 | 280 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 10.60 | 3.50 | 7 | 245 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 9.40 | 4.40 | 6.90 | 547 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 6.30 | 1.60 | 3.90 | 361 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 9.50 | 3.20 | 6.40 | 339 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 7.50 | 1.70 | 4.60 | 298 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 5.80 | 1.60 | 3.70 | 401 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 9.80 | 4.40 | 7.10 | 490 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 16.10 | 8 | 12.10 | 418 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 14.60 | 6.30 | 10.40 | 492 | At the help end of the scale | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 | | 10.50 | 5.60 | 8.10 | 634 | At the help end of the scale | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 | | 5.50 | 1.50 | 3.50 | 663 | At the help end of the scale | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 | | 44 | 33.10 | 38.50 | 384 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 40.20 | 28.90 | 34.50 | 368 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 34.90 | 22.90 | 28.90 | 293 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 47.20 | 35.30 | 41.20 | 361 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 41.90 | 28.50 | 35.20 | 259 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 43.50 | 28.60 | 36.10 | 230 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 51.70 | 36.50 | 44.10 | 238 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 43.40 | 30.80 | 37.10 | 295 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 69.10 | 57.20 | 63.10 | 360 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 76.10 | 62.40 | 69.30 | 261 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 78.70 | 62 | 70.40 | 265 | Too little spent | yes | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2023 | | 81.20 | 72.10 | 76.70 | 561 | Too little spent | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 | | 76.30 | 64.70 | 70.50 | 491 | Too little spent | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 | | 27.20 | 18 | 22.60 | 374 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 20.30 | 12.50 | 16.40 | 431 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 23.70 | 13.90 | 18.80 | 351 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 20.40 | 11.80 | 16.10 | 373 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 26.10 | 13.80 | 20 | 218 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 17.10 | 7.20 | 12.20 | 253 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 25.20 | 12 | 18.60 | 192 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 22.80 | 12.40 | 17.60 | 271 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 38.40 | 26.70 | 32.50 | 351 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 39.60 | 25.80 | 32.70 | 292 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 36 | 19.70 | 27.90 | 309 | Too little spent | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 | | 20.90 | 12.80 | 16.90 | 462 | Too little spent | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 | | 18.60 | 9.80 | 14.20 | 483 | Too little spent | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 | | 21.90 | 14.50 | 18.20 | 519 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 20.60 | 10.20 | 15.40 | 259 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 19.50 | 8.40 | 13.90 | 205 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 18.30 | 11.20 | 14.70 | 504 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 19.70 | 10.70 | 15.20 | 357 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 24.50 | 14.40 | 19.50 | 370 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 25.60 | 15.30 | 20.40 | 335 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 25.80 | 16.30 | 21 | 387 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 33.20 | 23.50 | 28.30 | 483 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 42.20 | 29.20 | 35.70 | 332 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 50.10 | 35.30 | 42.70 | 337 | Favors preferential hiring | yes | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2023 | | 43.70 | 34.70 | 39.20 | 758 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 | | 46.20 | 35.10 | 40.60 | 618 | Favors preferential hiring | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 | | 11.40 | 6.20 | 8.80 | 543 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 11.30 | 4.30 | 7.80 | 288 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 10.30 | 3.30 | 6.80 | 254 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 9.90 | 4.80 | 7.40 | 552 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 12 | 5.10 | 8.50 | 338 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 13.20 | 5.90 | 9.60 | 358 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 10.70 | 3.70 | 7.20 | 297 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 8.60 | 3.40 | 6 | 413 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 11.60 | 5.70 | 8.70 | 497 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 13.60 | 5.90 | 9.80 | 403 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 17.50 | 8.60 | 13 | 468 | Favors preferential hiring | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 | | 4.30 | 1.30 | 2.80 | 618 | Favors preferential hiring | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 | | 4.90 | 1 | 2.90 | 656 | Favors preferential hiring | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 | | 19.60 | 12.80 | 16.20 | 550 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 17 | 7.50 | 12.20 | 264 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 25 | 12.50 | 18.70 | 206 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 21 | 13.40 | 17.20 | 518 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 20.90 | 11.70 | 16.30 | 374 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 23.20 | 13.60 | 18.40 | 387 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 23.40 | 13.60 | 18.50 | 350 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 27.60 | 18.10 | 22.90 | 403 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 40.90 | 30.80 | 35.80 | 512 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 44.80 | 32.10 | 38.50 | 362 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 62.80 | 48.40 | 55.60 | 370 | Rejects the special-favors view | yes | Democrats, in person | bymode | 2023 | | 60.90 | 51.90 | 56.40 | 779 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Democrats, web | bymode | 2021 | | 61.90 | 50.80 | 56.30 | 627 | Rejects the special-favors view | yes | Democrats, web | bymode | 2023 | | 11 | 6 | 8.50 | 552 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2000 | | 11.10 | 4.20 | 7.70 | 290 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2002 | | 13.40 | 5.40 | 9.40 | 259 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2004 | | 9.60 | 4.70 | 7.20 | 561 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2006 | | 9.90 | 3.70 | 6.80 | 341 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2008 | | 9.60 | 3.60 | 6.60 | 373 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2010 | | 5.40 | 0.800 | 3.10 | 305 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2012 | | 9.50 | 4 | 6.80 | 424 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2014 | | 9.70 | 4.40 | 7 | 514 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2016 | | 17.80 | 9.10 | 13.40 | 415 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2018 | | 18 | 9.20 | 13.60 | 501 | Rejects the special-favors view | yes | Republicans, in person | bymode | 2023 | | 9.60 | 4.80 | 7.20 | 625 | Rejects the special-favors view | no | Republicans, web | bymode | 2021 | | 12.60 | 6 | 9.30 | 662 | Rejects the special-favors view | yes | Republicans, web | bymode | 2023 | Views: All interviews (view = all); By interview mode (view = bymode). Note: The GSS was in person (with some telephone interviews from 2004) through 2018, had no 2020 survey, had 87.3% of its 2021 interviews on the web and mixed in-person and web interviews in 2022 and 2024. The mode view plots in-person interviews through 2018 and web interviews from 2021. Note: The 2022 and 2024 cells alone fall below the effective sample floor for several items, so the mode view pools them in one point at 2023; a point is dropped when the pooled cell is still below the floor, as for in-person Democrats on the discrimination and will-power items. The help-end panel counts the two answers nearest to government should help. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted (weight_use); white respondents by party, leaners included (race code white, Hispanic whites included); 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/party_mode.json ### Table 7. From 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 white respondents moved on 6 of the six dated items and Black respondents on 3, with wider intervals for Black respondents Share of white (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) and of Black respondents giving the answer named above each panel, percent, by pooled period of surveys, 95% intervals; all interviews and in-person interviews only | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | panel | period | race_label | view | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | | 59.80 | 50.60 | 55.20 | 669 | Discrimination | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all | | 32.50 | 28.60 | 30.60 | 3,181 | Discrimination | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all | | 67.20 | 57.20 | 62.20 | 550 | Discrimination | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all | | 41.40 | 36.50 | 38.90 | 2,408 | Discrimination | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all | | 79.30 | 70.40 | 74.80 | 684 | Discrimination | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all | | 50.40 | 45.90 | 48.20 | 3,556 | Discrimination | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all | | 50.50 | 41.20 | 45.90 | 671 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all | | 50.20 | 46 | 48.10 | 3,156 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all | | 50.80 | 40.50 | 45.60 | 558 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all | | 41.60 | 36.70 | 39.20 | 2,400 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all | | 34.50 | 25.10 | 29.80 | 688 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all | | 30.80 | 26.80 | 28.80 | 3,535 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all | | 44.10 | 34.40 | 39.20 | 617 | At the help end of the scale | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all | | 13.20 | 10.50 | 11.90 | 3,181 | At the help end of the scale | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all | | 54.10 | 43.60 | 48.90 | 565 | At the help end of the scale | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all | | 23.90 | 19.80 | 21.90 | 2,462 | At the help end of the scale | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all | | 64.60 | 55.70 | 60.10 | 996 | At the help end of the scale | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all | | 28.50 | 25.10 | 26.80 | 5,115 | At the help end of the scale | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all | | 75.20 | 65.20 | 70.20 | 480 | Too little spent | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all | | 28.70 | 24.30 | 26.50 | 2,143 | Too little spent | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all | | 84 | 73.70 | 78.90 | 409 | Too little spent | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all | | 50.30 | 44.40 | 47.40 | 1,724 | Too little spent | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all | | 90 | 82.80 | 86.40 | 781 | Too little spent | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all | | 45.50 | 41.10 | 43.30 | 3,796 | Too little spent | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all | | 47.10 | 37.80 | 42.50 | 641 | Favors preferential hiring | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all | | 15 | 12.10 | 13.50 | 3,150 | Favors preferential hiring | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all | | 46.90 | 36.50 | 41.70 | 536 | Favors preferential hiring | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all | | 21.30 | 17.30 | 19.30 | 2,350 | Favors preferential hiring | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all | | 48.70 | 39.80 | 44.30 | 1,008 | Favors preferential hiring | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all | | 22.90 | 19.80 | 21.40 | 5,023 | Favors preferential hiring | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all | | 34.90 | 26.50 | 30.70 | 685 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | all | | 13.60 | 10.90 | 12.30 | 3,274 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2010-2014 | White respondents | all | | 41.50 | 31.50 | 36.50 | 555 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | all | | 22.40 | 18.50 | 20.50 | 2,474 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016-2018 | White respondents | all | | 47 | 38.40 | 42.70 | 1,048 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2021-2024 | Black respondents | all | | 29.50 | 26.10 | 27.80 | 5,217 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2021-2024 | White respondents | all | | 60.20 | 50.50 | 55.30 | 617 | Discrimination | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson | | 33.60 | 29.50 | 31.50 | 2,781 | Discrimination | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson | | 67.30 | 56.80 | 62 | 514 | Discrimination | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson | | 42.80 | 37.70 | 40.30 | 2,199 | Discrimination | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson | | 58.50 | 46.10 | 52.30 | 548 | Discrimination | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson | | 50.70 | 41 | 45.90 | 620 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson | | 50.40 | 46 | 48.20 | 2,760 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson | | 52.30 | 41.70 | 47 | 523 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson | | 42.10 | 36.90 | 39.50 | 2,189 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson | | 38.10 | 26.70 | 32.40 | 544 | Lack of motivation or will power | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson | | 43.50 | 33.20 | 38.40 | 567 | At the help end of the scale | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson | | 13.60 | 10.70 | 12.20 | 2,762 | At the help end of the scale | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson | | 54.60 | 43.80 | 49.20 | 540 | At the help end of the scale | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson | | 23.60 | 19.40 | 21.50 | 2,256 | At the help end of the scale | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson | | 61.60 | 45.70 | 53.70 | 363 | At the help end of the scale | 2022-2024 | Black respondents | inperson | | 29.30 | 21.50 | 25.40 | 1,082 | At the help end of the scale | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson | | 75.40 | 65 | 70.20 | 448 | Too little spent | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson | | 29.30 | 24.50 | 26.90 | 1,855 | Too little spent | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson | | 84.60 | 74.10 | 79.40 | 387 | Too little spent | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson | | 50.50 | 44.30 | 47.40 | 1,557 | Too little spent | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson | | 89.50 | 76.40 | 83 | 279 | Too little spent | 2022-2024 | Black respondents | inperson | | 51.70 | 40.50 | 46.10 | 752 | Too little spent | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson | | 47.10 | 37.40 | 42.20 | 592 | Favors preferential hiring | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson | | 15.30 | 12.20 | 13.70 | 2,755 | Favors preferential hiring | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson | | 46.90 | 36.10 | 41.50 | 501 | Favors preferential hiring | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson | | 22 | 17.80 | 19.90 | 2,144 | Favors preferential hiring | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson | | 58.10 | 42.20 | 50.20 | 363 | Favors preferential hiring | 2022-2024 | Black respondents | inperson | | 29.90 | 22.10 | 26 | 1,048 | Favors preferential hiring | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson | | 35.10 | 26.20 | 30.60 | 632 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2010-2014 | Black respondents | inperson | | 13.30 | 10.40 | 11.80 | 2,870 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2010-2014 | White respondents | inperson | | 41.60 | 31.30 | 36.50 | 521 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016-2018 | Black respondents | inperson | | 22.90 | 18.70 | 20.80 | 2,257 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2016-2018 | White respondents | inperson | | 44.60 | 29.80 | 37.20 | 386 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2022-2024 | Black respondents | inperson | | 30.30 | 22.80 | 26.60 | 1,148 | Rejects the special-favors view | 2022-2024 | White respondents | inperson | Views: All interviews (view = all); In-person interviews only (view = inperson). Note: The in-person view leaves out the 2021 survey and the telephone interviews and uses the in-person interviews of 2022 and 2024; in that view Black respondents' cells for the discrimination and will-power items in 2022 and 2024 fall below the effective sample floor and are not drawn. 'Black' and 'white' are the GSS race codes; Hispanic origin is not separated, and Hispanic respondents appear in whichever race code they chose. The help-end panel counts the two answers nearest to government should help. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted (weight_use); white and Black respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white); 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/by_race.json ### Table 8. Among white voters the tie between racial resentment and the Republican vote rose from 1988 to 2004 and from 2012 to 2016, with no rise distinguishable from zero from 2008 to 2012 Percentage points of the Republican share of the two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of each racial attitude, white non-Hispanic voters, ANES 1988 to 2024 and CES 2008 and 2012 | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | other | panel | series | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | | 13.20 | 6.80 | 10 | 867 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 1988 | | 15.10 | 9.20 | 12.20 | 984 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 1992 | | 18.70 | 12.10 | 15.40 | 778 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 1996 | | 12.60 | 2.30 | 7.50 | 443 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2000 | | 22.80 | 15.10 | 19 | 547 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2004 | | 22.50 | 15.50 | 19 | 688 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2008 | | 24.20 | 20.30 | 22.30 | 2,345 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2012 | | 30.60 | 26.80 | 28.70 | 1,797 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2016 | | 33.90 | 31.70 | 32.80 | 4,291 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2020 | | 32.60 | 28.90 | 30.70 | 2,710 | no | all_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2024 | | 7.60 | 1.30 | 4.50 | 922 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 1988 | | 5.40 | −0.800 | 2.30 | 1,032 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 1992 | | 8.30 | 0.800 | 4.50 | 808 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 1996 | | 7.20 | 0 | 3.60 | 827 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2000 | | 5.50 | −3.30 | 1.10 | 588 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2004 | | 10.40 | 2.80 | 6.60 | 767 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2008 | | 9.90 | 5.20 | 7.60 | 2,526 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2012 | | 13.80 | 8.90 | 11.30 | 1,919 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2016 | | 13.50 | 9.90 | 11.70 | 4,412 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2020 | | 10.50 | 5.40 | 7.90 | 2,827 | no | all_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2024 | | 10.20 | 4.30 | 7.20 | 1,025 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 1992 | | 12.50 | 4.40 | 8.40 | 778 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 1996 | | 12 | 4.80 | 8.40 | 822 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2000 | | 17.80 | 10.20 | 14 | 573 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2004 | | 16.60 | 9.50 | 13.10 | 738 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2008 | | 17.10 | 11.90 | 14.50 | 2,489 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2012 | | 21.10 | 16.40 | 18.70 | 1,911 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2016 | | 25.70 | 22.30 | 24 | 4,504 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2020 | | 26.40 | 22.40 | 24.40 | 2,921 | no | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2024 | | 26.20 | 24.80 | 25.50 | 19,797 | yes | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (CES) | 2008 | | 25.60 | 24.20 | 24.90 | 30,271 | yes | all_free | Opposes affirmative action (CES) | 2012 | | 13.10 | 7.10 | 10.10 | 952 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 1988 | | 16.30 | 11.20 | 13.80 | 1,052 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 1992 | | 16.30 | 9.50 | 12.90 | 887 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2000 | | 21.50 | 14.10 | 17.80 | 601 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2004 | | 25 | 19.20 | 22.10 | 782 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2008 | | 25 | 21.30 | 23.20 | 2,541 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2012 | | 32.80 | 29.90 | 31.30 | 1,942 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2016 | | 35.70 | 34 | 34.90 | 4,574 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2020 | | 34.40 | 31.60 | 33 | 2,968 | no | all_free | Racial resentment index | 2024 | | 22.50 | 15.50 | 19 | 688 | no | ftf_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2008 | | 24.60 | 17 | 20.80 | 539 | no | ftf_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2012 | | 32.20 | 24.20 | 28.20 | 483 | no | ftf_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2016 | | 37.10 | 27.90 | 32.50 | 447 | no | ftf_free | Black people should help themselves (aid item) | 2024 | | 10.40 | 2.80 | 6.60 | 767 | no | ftf_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2008 | | 11.30 | 3 | 7.10 | 602 | no | ftf_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2012 | | 19.20 | 8.80 | 14 | 511 | no | ftf_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2016 | | 16.90 | 6.60 | 11.80 | 488 | no | ftf_free | Colder rating of Black Americans | 2024 | | 16.60 | 9.50 | 13.10 | 738 | no | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2008 | | 15.40 | 5.90 | 10.70 | 566 | no | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2012 | | 23.90 | 14.20 | 19.10 | 506 | no | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2016 | | 32.40 | 24.80 | 28.60 | 476 | no | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (ANES) | 2024 | | 26.20 | 24.80 | 25.50 | 19,797 | yes | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (CES) | 2008 | | 25.60 | 24.20 | 24.90 | 30,271 | yes | ftf_free | Opposes affirmative action (CES) | 2012 | | 25 | 19.20 | 22.10 | 782 | no | ftf_free | Racial resentment index | 2008 | | 25.60 | 18.10 | 21.80 | 609 | no | ftf_free | Racial resentment index | 2012 | | 33.50 | 27.50 | 30.50 | 523 | no | ftf_free | Racial resentment index | 2016 | | 37.50 | 31.90 | 34.70 | 495 | no | ftf_free | Racial resentment index | 2024 | Views: All interviews (panel = all_free); Face to face only (panel = ftf_free). Note: Attitudes are oriented so that a high value is the more racially conservative pole: higher resentment, a colder rating of Black Americans, placing Black people's aid on the self-help end, and opposing affirmative action. Each attitude is standardized within the estimation sample, so a slope is per standard deviation of that sample. Party identification is not held fixed in this figure. Note: The resentment items were not asked in 1996, so that line joins 1992 and 2000; the affirmative action item was not asked in 1988. ANES 2020 has no mode weights, so it is missing from the face-to-face view, and the CES is an online opt-in panel in both years, so its intervals are model based. Intervals are HC3. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1964-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024); Cooperative Election Study, 2008 and 2012; weighted (single-wave weight) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/vote_assoc.json ### Table 9. The Republican share among the most resentful third of white voters rose from 79.4% in 2008 to 89.1% in 2016, and fell among the least resentful third from 28.8% to 17.1% Republican share of the two-party presidential vote among white non-Hispanic voters in the lowest, middle and highest group of the racial resentment index (thirds inside each election year, or fixed index cuts), percent, ANES 1988 to 2024, 95% intervals | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | group | grouping | n | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | 53.20 | 42.20 | 47.70 | Least resentful third | exact | 322 | 1988 | | 37.10 | 27.60 | 32.30 | Least resentful third | exact | 385 | 1992 | | 44.60 | 32.70 | 38.70 | Least resentful third | exact | 318 | 2000 | | 43.20 | 29 | 36.10 | Least resentful third | exact | 247 | 2004 | | 34.70 | 22.90 | 28.80 | Least resentful third | exact | 302 | 2008 | | 30.60 | 23.30 | 27 | Least resentful third | exact | 962 | 2012 | | 20.50 | 13.70 | 17.10 | Least resentful third | exact | 672 | 2016 | | 9.30 | 6 | 7.60 | Least resentful third | exact | 1,927 | 2020 | | 11.70 | 6.60 | 9.10 | Least resentful third | exact | 1,107 | 2024 | | 69.10 | 58.60 | 63.80 | Middle third | exact | 400 | 1988 | | 56.40 | 46.50 | 51.40 | Middle third | exact | 505 | 1992 | | 62.20 | 50.10 | 56.20 | Middle third | exact | 418 | 2000 | | 71.60 | 57.80 | 64.70 | Middle third | exact | 227 | 2004 | | 67.60 | 55 | 61.30 | Middle third | exact | 304 | 2008 | | 69.50 | 61.90 | 65.70 | Middle third | exact | 1,126 | 2012 | | 70 | 61.80 | 65.90 | Middle third | exact | 821 | 2016 | | 66.70 | 60.30 | 63.50 | Middle third | exact | 1,668 | 2020 | | 63.90 | 55 | 59.50 | Middle third | exact | 1,189 | 2024 | | 76.20 | 66.30 | 71.20 | Most resentful third | exact | 426 | 1988 | | 64.40 | 54.30 | 59.40 | Most resentful third | exact | 365 | 1992 | | 73.70 | 62.40 | 68.10 | Most resentful third | exact | 331 | 2000 | | 80.70 | 67.80 | 74.30 | Most resentful third | exact | 245 | 2004 | | 84.90 | 73.90 | 79.40 | Most resentful third | exact | 323 | 2008 | | 82.10 | 75.30 | 78.70 | Most resentful third | exact | 849 | 2012 | | 91.90 | 86.30 | 89.10 | Most resentful third | exact | 702 | 2016 | | 92 | 88 | 90 | Most resentful third | exact | 1,475 | 2020 | | 91.10 | 85.40 | 88.20 | Most resentful third | exact | 1,028 | 2024 | | 53.30 | 42.40 | 47.80 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 322 | 1988 | | 38.50 | 29 | 33.70 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 385 | 1992 | | 44.70 | 32.70 | 38.70 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 318 | 2000 | | 43.10 | 28.80 | 36 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 206 | 2004 | | 31.20 | 18.70 | 24.90 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 228 | 2008 | | 27 | 19.40 | 23.20 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 780 | 2012 | | 28.60 | 21.60 | 25.10 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 838 | 2016 | | 25.90 | 21.40 | 23.70 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 2,530 | 2020 | | 28.60 | 22.30 | 25.50 | Index of 50 or less | fixed | 1,561 | 2024 | | 69.50 | 60.20 | 64.90 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 407 | 1988 | | 56 | 46.30 | 51.20 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 411 | 1992 | | 63 | 51 | 57 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 316 | 2000 | | 72 | 58.40 | 65.20 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 227 | 2004 | | 67.20 | 54.80 | 61 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 304 | 2008 | | 69.10 | 61.30 | 65.20 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 912 | 2012 | | 76.90 | 68.10 | 72.50 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 555 | 2016 | | 82.40 | 76.20 | 79.30 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 1,126 | 2020 | | 80 | 71.10 | 75.50 | Index above 50 to 75 | fixed | 782 | 2024 | | 78.50 | 66.80 | 72.60 | Index above 75 | fixed | 223 | 1988 | | 68.90 | 57 | 63 | Index above 75 | fixed | 256 | 1992 | | 75 | 62.60 | 68.80 | Index above 75 | fixed | 253 | 2000 | | 82.10 | 67.70 | 74.90 | Index above 75 | fixed | 168 | 2004 | | 85.10 | 74 | 79.50 | Index above 75 | fixed | 250 | 2008 | | 81.80 | 74.90 | 78.30 | Index above 75 | fixed | 849 | 2012 | | 93 | 86.90 | 90 | Index above 75 | fixed | 549 | 2016 | | 94.50 | 90.10 | 92.30 | Index above 75 | fixed | 918 | 2020 | | 93.80 | 87.20 | 90.50 | Index above 75 | fixed | 625 | 2024 | Views: Thirds inside each year (grouping = exact); Fixed index cuts (grouping = fixed). Note: The resentment index was not asked in 1996, so no group is drawn for that year. In the default view the groups are exact weighted thirds inside each year, with respondents who share an index score split in proportion across the cut. In the fixed-cut view the cuts are at the same index scores in every year (50 and 75, the pooled terciles of white two-party voters), so the groups change in size from year to year. All interview modes are pooled; the mode comparison is in the previous figure. Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1964-2024; weighted (VCF0009z; mode weights VCF0009x and VCF0009y for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/vote_levels.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (165), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | boot_reps | 1,000 | bootstrap replicates | number of seeded bootstrap replicates behind each step date | each group and item | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ces_2008 | 25.5 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of opposition to affirmative action | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 | 95% CI 24.8 to 26.2 | 19,797 | weight (single wave) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_2012 | 24.9 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of opposition to affirmative action | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012 | 95% CI 24.2 to 25.6 | 30,271 | weight (single wave) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_ch | −0.6 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of opposition to affirmative action | change in the weighted linear probability slope (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −1.6 to 0.4 | 50,068 | weight (single wave) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_0408 | +4.3 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2004 to 2008 | 95% CI −0.4 to 9.0 | 1,383 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ch_0812 | +1.1 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −2.4 to 4.6 | 3,323 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ch_0812_hi | 4.6 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | upper end of the 95% interval for the change in the weighted linear probability slope (racial resentment index) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 to 2012 | | 3,323 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ch_1216 | +8.2 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 5.8 to 10.5 | 4,483 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ch_8804 | +7.7 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 1988 to 2004 | 95% CI 2.9 to 12.4 | 1,553 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ch_ftf_0812 | −0.3 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 to 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −5.0 to 4.5 | 1,391 | mode weights | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ch_ftf_1216 | +8.7 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | change in the weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012 to 2016, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 3.9 to 13.4 | 1,132 | mode weights | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_disc_2014 | 44.9% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 95% CI 39.6% to 50.2% | 471 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_disc_2016 | 54.6% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 49.6% to 59.7% | 541 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_disc_2018 | 61.6% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 95% CI 55.5% to 67.6% | 392 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_disc_2021 | 81.5% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2021 | 95% CI 78.1% to 84.8% | 858 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_disc_2024 | 73.3% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 65.6% to 81.0% | 237 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_help_2014 | 19.0% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 95% CI 14.9% to 23.1% | 471 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_help_2016 | 37.5% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 32.8% to 42.3% | 584 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_help_ip2224 | 45.9% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who said government should help improve Black people's living standards | white Democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled, in person interviews | 95% CI 38.3% to 53.4% | 349 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_help_web2224 | 52.3% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who said government should help improve Black people's living standards | white Democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled, web interviews | 95% CI 46.7% to 57.9% | 630 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | disc_1977 | 42.0% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1977 | 95% CI 39.0% to 45.0% | 1,273 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | disc_2004 | 28.8% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2004 | 95% CI 24.9% to 32.7% | 694 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | disc_2014 | 30.0% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 95% CI 27.0% to 33.0% | 1,215 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | disc_2016 | 37.1% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 34.0% to 40.2% | 1,332 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | disc_2018 | 41.2% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 95% CI 37.4% to 45.1% | 1,076 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fix16_dem_disc | +18.5 | percentage points | size of the step at the 2016 survey in the weighted share (discrimination) | white democrats (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018, step at the 2016 survey | 95% CI 14.1 to 23.2 | 3,818 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fix16_rep_disc | +0.4 | percentage points | size of the step at the 2016 survey in the weighted share (discrimination) | white republicans (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018, step at the 2016 survey | 95% CI −3.3 to 4.3 | 3,933 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fix_2012 | 7.1 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012 | 95% CI 5.5 to 8.8 | 2,535 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fix_2016 | 13.4 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2016 | 95% CI 11.2 to 15.6 | 1,941 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fxgapch_0408 | +15.7 | percentage points | change in the gap in the Republican share between the groups above the upper and at or below the lower fixed index cut | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2004 to 2008 | 95% CI 2.5 to 28.8 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fxgapch_0812 | +0.5 | percentage points | change in the gap in the Republican share between the groups above the upper and at or below the lower fixed index cut | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −9.2 to 10.3 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fxgapch_1216 | +9.7 | percentage points | change in the gap in the Republican share between the groups above the upper and at or below the lower fixed index cut | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 2.8 to 16.6 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_spend | −7.1 | percentage points | web minus in-person difference in the weighted share who said too little is spent on improving conditions of Black people | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −13.9 to −0.3 | 2,065 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | help_2014 | 11.2% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: 1 or 2 on a five-point scale from government should help (1) to no special treatment (5) (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 95% CI 9.2% to 13.2% | 1,216 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | help_2016 | 21.4% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: 1 or 2 on a five-point scale from government should help (1) to no special treatment (5) (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2016 | 95% CI 18.8% to 24.0% | 1,382 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | hisp_white | 11.4% | percent of white respondents who are Hispanic | weighted share who report Hispanic origin | white GSS respondents who answered the Hispanic-origin question | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 10.8% to 12.1% | 15,012 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ingroup_1964 | 26.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer (rating of white Americans minus rating of Black Americans) | weighted mean of the respondent's own difference in ratings | white respondents who rated both groups | 1964 | 95% CI 24.7 to 27.4 | 1,366 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ingroup_2024 | 0.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer (rating of white Americans minus rating of Black Americans) | weighted mean of the respondent's own difference in ratings | white respondents who rated both groups | 2024 | 95% CI −0.3 to 1.6 | 3,269 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ipchg_aff | +6.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (favors preference in hiring and promoting black people) among in-person respondents | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 95% CI 1.7 to 10.6 | 3,192 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ipchg_disc | +12.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) among in-person respondents | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 95% CI 5.3 to 18.7 | 2,747 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ipchg_spend | −1.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) among in-person respondents | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 95% CI −7.7 to 5.1 | 2,309 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ipchg_will | −7.1 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) among in-person respondents | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | 95% CI −13.4 to −0.8 | 2,733 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | kink_disc | 2014.0 | survey year of the kink | year at which the fitted trend turns from constant to linear (discrimination) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 | 95% CI 2012.0 to 2015.5 | 9,719 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | kink_ub_max | 2015.5 | survey year of the kink | latest upper end of the bootstrap interval for the kink year across the six items | white respondents, in person, six dated items | surveys 2000 to 2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | kink_will | 2011.4 | survey year of the kink | year at which the fitted trend turns from constant to linear (lack of motivation or will power) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 | 95% CI 2008.0 to 2014.8 | 9,620 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | lv_high_2008 | 79.4% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the most resentful third of the resentment index | 2008 | 95% CI 73.9% to 84.9% | 323 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_high_2012 | 78.7% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the most resentful third of the resentment index | 2012 | 95% CI 75.3% to 82.1% | 849 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_high_2016 | 89.1% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the most resentful third of the resentment index | 2016 | 95% CI 86.3% to 91.9% | 702 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_low_2008 | 28.8% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the least resentful third of the resentment index | 2008 | 95% CI 22.9% to 34.7% | 302 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_low_2012 | 27.0% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the least resentful third of the resentment index | 2012 | 95% CI 23.3% to 30.6% | 962 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lv_low_2016 | 17.1% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters in the least resentful third of the resentment index | 2016 | 95% CI 13.7% to 20.5% | 672 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lvgapch_0812 | +1.2 | percentage points | change in the gap in the Republican share between the most and least resentful thirds | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −8.3 to 10.7 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | lvgapch_1216 | +20.3 | percentage points | change in the gap in the Republican share between the most and least resentful thirds | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 13.6 to 27.0 | | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | marry_1972 | 62.6% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: no (no law against black-white marriage) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1972 | 95% CI 59.7% to 65.4% | 1,306 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | marry_2002 | 87.6% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: no (no law against black-white marriage) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2002 | 95% CI 84.9% to 90.3% | 742 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mode_gap_max | 9.9 | percentage points | largest absolute difference across the 9 items between web and in-person respondents in the weighted share who gave the answer | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_blk_higher | 5 | items out of six | number of dated items on which the interval for Black respondents lies above the interval for white respondents in all three periods | Black and white respondents | 2010-2014, 2016-2018 and 2021-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_blk_moved | 3 | items out of six | number of items whose change in the share has an interval that excludes zero | Black respondents | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_dem_ip | 4 | items out of six | number of dated items whose pooled in-person Democratic cell clears the sample floor | white Democrats | 2022 and 2024 pooled, in-person interviews | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_dem_moved | 6 | items out of six | number of dated items whose change between pooled periods has an interval that excludes zero | white Democrats | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_dr_sep | 4 | items out of six | number of dated items on which the Democratic change minus the Republican change has an interval that excludes zero | white Democrats and white Republicans | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_ip_moved | 4 | items out of six | number of dated items whose in-person change has an interval that excludes zero | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2016-2018 to 2022-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_mode_items | 9 | items | number of items with an in-person and a web estimate that clear the floor | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_mode_neg | 5 | items out of 9 | number of items on which web respondents gave the answer less often than in-person respondents, with an interval that excludes zero | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_mode_neg_sign | 6 | items out of 9 | number of items on which the web share is below the in-person share, by the sign of the estimate | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_mode_pos | 1 | items out of 9 | number of items on which web respondents gave the answer more often than in-person respondents, with an interval that excludes zero | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_mode_pos_sign | 3 | items out of 9 | number of items on which the web share is above the in-person share, by the sign of the estimate | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_obama_zero | 5 | items out of six | number of dated items whose change between pooled periods has an interval that includes zero | six dated items, white respondents | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_rep_moved | 4 | items out of six | number of dated items whose change between pooled periods has an interval that excludes zero | white Republicans | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_rep_zero | 4 | items out of six | number of items whose step has a bootstrap interval that includes zero | white Republicans | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_vote_res | 16,299 | respondents | count of respondents | white non-Hispanic ANES respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and have a resentment index score | the nine presidential years from 1988 to 2024 in which the index was asked | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_wave1214 | 0 | items out of six | number of items whose change in the share among white respondents has an interval that excludes zero | six dated items | 2012 to 2014 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_wave1416 | 5 | items out of six | number of items whose change in the share among white respondents has an interval that excludes zero | six dated items | 2014 to 2016 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_wht_moved | 6 | items out of six | number of items whose change in the share has an interval that excludes zero | white respondents | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | obama_aff | +2.1 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who favor preference in hiring and promoting Black people | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 95% CI 0.1 to 4.0 | 6,216 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | obama_max | +2.1 | percentage points | largest change among six items in the weighted share who gave the answer | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | | 6,216 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | obama_min | −2.5 | percentage points | smallest change among six items in the weighted share who gave the answer | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | | 6,189 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | obama_open | +3.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who would vote for a law barring housing discrimination | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 95% CI 0.7 to 6.1 | 6,393 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | obama_rel | +8.6 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who would not oppose a close relative marrying a Black person | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2004-2008 to 2010-2014 | 95% CI 6.2 to 11.1 | 6,445 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | open_1973 | 35.5% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: the law that bars refusing to sell because of race (would vote for a law barring housing discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1973 | 95% CI 32.6% to 38.3% | 1,283 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | open_2012 | 68.5% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: the law that bars refusing to sell because of race (would vote for a law barring housing discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2012 | 95% CI 64.9% to 72.0% | 966 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | open_2022 | 82.8% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: the law that bars refusing to sell because of race (would vote for a law barring housing discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 | 95% CI 78.5% to 87.0% | 790 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | open_2024 | 77.7% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: the law that bars refusing to sell because of race (would vote for a law barring housing discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 70.7% to 84.6% | 279 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | p16_max | 100.0% | percent of bootstrap replicates | largest share of replicates that place the best single step at the 2016 survey | white respondents, six items | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 | | 1,000 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | p16_min | 51.4% | percent of bootstrap replicates | smallest share of replicates that place the best single step at the 2016 survey | white respondents, six items | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 | | 1,000 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | p16_will | 51.4% | percent of bootstrap replicates | share of replicates that place the best single step at the 2016 survey | white respondents, will-power item | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 | | 1,000 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pchg_dem_disc | +14.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) between two pooled periods | white Democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 9.7 to 19.9 | 2,225 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pchg_dem_help | +18.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) between two pooled periods | white Democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 14.2 to 23.2 | 2,293 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pchg_dem_spend | +26.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) between two pooled periods | white Democrats (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 20.5 to 32.1 | 1,569 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pchg_rep_disc | +2.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) between two pooled periods | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −1.7 to 6.7 | 2,217 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pchg_rep_help | +5.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) between two pooled periods | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 2.3 to 7.6 | 2,179 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pchg_rep_spend | +19.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) between two pooled periods | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 13.8 to 24.3 | 1,534 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pchg_rep_will | −8.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) between two pooled periods | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −13.7 to −3.3 | 2,184 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pdiff_spend | +7.3 | percentage points | Democratic change minus Republican change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) | white Democrats and white Republicans (leaners included) | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −0.5 to 15.0 | 3,103 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pdiff_will | −4.0 | percentage points | Democratic change minus Republican change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) | white Democrats and white Republicans (leaners included) | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −11.0 to 3.0 | 4,403 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pe_will | 38.0% | percent of bootstrap replicates | share of replicates that place the best single step at a survey before 2016 | white respondents, will-power item | in-person surveys 2000 to 2018 | | 1,000 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pres_1972 | 74.0% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (would vote for a qualified black nominee) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1972 | 95% CI 71.3% to 76.6% | 1,262 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pres_2010 | 95.7% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: yes (would vote for a qualified black nominee) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2010 | 95% CI 94.2% to 97.2% | 1,052 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | race_chg_aff_b | −0.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (favors preference in hiring and promoting black people) | black respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −7.7 to 6.2 | 1,177 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | race_chg_aff_w | +5.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (favors preference in hiring and promoting black people) | white respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 3.3 to 8.2 | 5,500 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | race_chg_disc_b | +7.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | black respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 0.2 to 13.8 | 1,219 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | race_chg_disc_w | +8.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 5.3 to 11.5 | 5,589 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | race_chg_help_b | +9.6 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | black respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 2.4 to 16.8 | 1,182 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | race_chg_help_w | +10.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 7.6 to 12.4 | 5,643 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | race_chg_will_b | −0.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) | black respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −7.1 to 6.7 | 1,229 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | race_chg_will_w | −9.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) | white respondents (GSS race codes, Hispanic whites included in white) who answered the item | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −12.2 to −5.7 | 5,556 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rel_1990 | 35.0% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose (would not oppose a relative marrying a black person) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1990 | 95% CI 31.8% to 38.1% | 1,130 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rel_2012 | 78.4% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose (would not oppose a relative marrying a black person) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2012 | 95% CI 75.2% to 81.6% | 972 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rel_2024 | 92.4% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose (would not oppose a relative marrying a black person) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 90.5% to 94.2% | 1,517 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rep_disc_2014 | 18.2% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2014 | 95% CI 14.2% to 22.2% | 468 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rep_disc_2018 | 23.3% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2018 | 95% CI 18.0% to 28.5% | 458 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rep_disc_2024 | 21.4% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2024 | 95% CI 15.1% to 27.8% | 314 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rep_spend_ip2224 | 27.9% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who said too little is spent on improving conditions of Black people | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2022 and 2024 pooled, in-person interviews | 95% CI 19.7% to 36.0% | 309 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rep_spend_web21 | 16.9% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share who said too little is spent on improving conditions of Black people | white Republicans (leaners included; GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 2021, web interviews | 95% CI 12.8% to 20.9% | 462 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | repshare_2008 | 56.4% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2008 | 95% CI 52.5% to 60.3% | 783 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | repshare_2012 | 57.1% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2012 | 95% CI 54.7% to 59.5% | 2,555 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | repshare_2016 | 57.4% | percent voting Republican | weighted share who voted for the Republican candidate | white non-Hispanic two-party voters | 2016 | 95% CI 54.8% to 60.0% | 1,957 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | seg_1972 | 60.8% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: disagree slightly or strongly (whites have no right to exclude black neighbors) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1972 | 95% CI 57.8% to 63.7% | 1,251 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | seg_1996 | 86.8% | percent of respondents giving the answer | weighted share of white respondents who gave the answer: disagree slightly or strongly (whites have no right to exclude black neighbors) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | 1996 | 95% CI 84.1% to 89.5% | 746 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | slope_1988 | 10.1 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 1988 | 95% CI 7.1 to 13.1 | 952 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_2004 | 17.8 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2004 | 95% CI 14.1 to 21.5 | 601 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_2008 | 22.1 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008 | 95% CI 19.2 to 25.0 | 782 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_2012 | 23.2 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012 | 95% CI 21.3 to 25.0 | 2,541 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_2016 | 31.3 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2016 | 95% CI 29.9 to 32.8 | 1,942 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_2020 | 34.9 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2020 | 95% CI 34.0 to 35.7 | 4,574 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_2024 | 33.0 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 31.6 to 34.4 | 2,968 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_ftf_2008 | 22.1 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2008, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 19.2 to 25.0 | 782 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_ftf_2012 | 21.8 | percentage points of the Republican two-party presidential vote per standard deviation of the attitude | weighted linear probability slope on the standardized attitude (racial resentment index; party not held fixed) | white non-Hispanic voters for a major-party candidate | 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 18.1 to 25.6 | 609 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sse_kink_disc | 2.4 | weighted squared error of the yearly shares around the fitted kinked trend | inverse-variance weighted squared error of the best trend with one kink (discrimination) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | sse_kink_will | 3.0 | weighted squared error of the yearly shares around the fitted kinked trend | inverse-variance weighted squared error of the best trend with one kink (lack of motivation or will power) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | sse_step_disc | 8.0 | weighted squared error of the yearly shares around the fitted step | inverse-variance weighted squared error of the best single step (discrimination) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | sse_step_will | 15.2 | weighted squared error of the yearly shares around the fitted step | inverse-variance weighted squared error of the best single step (lack of motivation or will power) | white respondents, in person | surveys 2000 to 2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | therm_b_1964 | 60.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of black americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 1964 | 95% CI 59.5 to 61.8 | 1,366 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_b_2004 | 69.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of black americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 2004 | 95% CI 67.6 to 70.6 | 740 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_b_2012 | 61.8 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of black americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 2012 | 95% CI 60.9 to 62.7 | 3,254 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_b_2024 | 69.5 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of black americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 2024 | 95% CI 68.5 to 70.6 | 3,374 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_ftf_0812 | −3.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | all white respondents who rated Black Americans | 2008 to 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −5.5 to −1.3 | 1,872 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_ftf_dem_0812 | −3.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white democrats who rated Black Americans | 2008 to 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −6.7 to −0.1 | 792 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_ftf_dem_1216 | +7.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white democrats who rated Black Americans | 2012 to 2016, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI 3.4 to 11.9 | 621 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_ftf_rep_0812 | −3.1 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white republicans who rated Black Americans | 2008 to 2012, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −6.1 to −0.1 | 852 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_ftf_rep_1216 | +1.9 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white republicans who rated Black Americans | 2012 to 2016, face-to-face interviews | 95% CI −1.6 to 5.4 | 763 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_w_1964 | 86.7 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of white americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 1964 | 95% CI 85.8 to 87.6 | 1,367 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_w_2024 | 70.2 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | weighted mean rating (rating of white americans) | all white respondents with a rating | 2024 | 95% CI 69.2 to 71.2 | 3,373 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_web_dem_1216 | +6.4 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white democrats who rated Black Americans | 2012 to 2016, web interviews | 95% CI 4.1 to 8.8 | 1,686 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_web_rep_1216 | +4.6 | points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer | change in the weighted mean rating of Black Americans | white republicans who rated Black Americans | 2012 to 2016, web interviews | 95% CI 2.5 to 6.8 | 2,010 | weight_web (VCF0009y) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | w_abil_a | −9.6 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (inborn ability) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 95% CI −12.4 to −6.7 | 7,246 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_abil_c | −1.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who attribute the gap to inborn ability between two pooled periods | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −3.1 to 0.2 | 5,695 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_aff_c | +5.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (favors preference in hiring and promoting black people) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 3.3 to 8.2 | 5,500 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_disc_b | −7.1 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 95% CI −9.4 to −4.7 | 8,958 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_disc_c | +8.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 5.3 to 11.5 | 5,589 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_fav_c | +8.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (rejects that black people should work up without special favors) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 5.8 to 10.6 | 5,748 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_help_c | +10.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 7.6 to 12.4 | 5,643 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_marry_a | +14.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (no law against black-white marriage) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 95% CI 12.6 to 15.9 | 13,447 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_open_a | +23.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (would vote for a law barring housing discrimination) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 95% CI 21.6 to 25.9 | 10,051 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_seg_a | +20.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (whites have no right to exclude black neighbors) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 95% CI 18.2 to 22.3 | 9,565 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_spend_c | +20.9 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI 17.2 to 24.5 | 3,867 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_will_a | −4.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1972-1977 to 1988-1994 | 95% CI −7.8 to −1.3 | 7,103 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_will_b | −9.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 1988-1994 to 2004-2008 | 95% CI −11.8 to −6.7 | 8,880 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | w_will_c | −9.0 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) between two pooled periods of surveys | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, pooled periods | 2010-2014 to 2016-2018 | 95% CI −12.2 to −5.7 | 5,556 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | wave_disc | +6.3 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (discrimination) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2014 to 2016 | 95% CI 1.7 to 10.9 | 2,284 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | wave_help | +9.1 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5)) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2014 to 2016 | 95% CI 5.6 to 12.6 | 2,326 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | wave_spend | +18.2 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (too little is spent on improving conditions of black people) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2014 to 2016 | 95% CI 12.7 to 23.8 | 1,586 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | wave_will | −3.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who gave the answer (lack of motivation or will power) | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item, in-person interviews | 2014 to 2016 | 95% CI −8.6 to 1.1 | 2,275 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | web_2021 | 87.3% | percent of interviews by web | share of interviews conducted on the web (count) | all 2021 GSS respondents | 2021 | | 4,032 | none (interview count) | General Social Survey | | | webchg_disc | +2.1 | percentage points | web share in 2022 and 2024 minus in-person share in 2016 and 2018 who said racial inequality is mainly due to discrimination | white respondents (GSS race code, Hispanic whites included) who answered the item | web interviews of 2022 and 2024 against in-person interviews of 2016 and 2018 | 95% CI −3.8 to 7.9 | 3,003 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | ## Definitions - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Racial resentment: A survey scale, developed by Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders, that measures moral judgments about the work ethic and deservingness of Black Americans. Higher scores mean more resentment. - Feeling thermometer: A 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way. - Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors. ## Methods Sample, GSS. White and Black respondents in the GSS cumulative file, 1972 to 2024, read from the raw file because interview mode is only there (59,937 white respondents in all). 'White' and 'Black' are the GSS race codes; Hispanic origin cannot be separated before 2000, so white includes Hispanic whites (11.4% of white respondents from 2012 to 2024 report Hispanic origin). Party is partyid 0 to 2 (Democrats) and 4 to 6 (Republicans), leaners included, and pure independents are left out of party splits. Interview mode is in person (mode in person from 2004, and every survey before 2004 by design), telephone, web or other; the in-person views use in-person interviews only and leave out telephone interviews, and 2021 had no in-person interviews. Items, GSS (answer counted, years asked, then the label). racmar (No, 1972 to 2002): No law against Black-white marriage; racpres (Yes, 1972 to 2010): Would vote for a qualified Black nominee; racseg (Disagree slightly or strongly, 1972 to 1996): Whites have no right to exclude Black neighbors; racopen (The law that bars refusing to sell because of race, 1973 to 2024): Would vote for a law barring housing discrimination; marblk (Favor, strongly favor or neither favor nor oppose, 1990 to 2024): Would not oppose a relative marrying a Black person; racdif1 (Yes, 1977 to 2024): Discrimination; racdif2 (Yes, 1977 to 2024): Inborn ability; racdif3 (Yes, 1977 to 2024): Lack of chance for education; racdif4 (Yes, 1977 to 2024): Lack of motivation or will power; helpblk (1 or 2 on a five-point scale from government should help (1) to no special treatment (5), 1975 to 2024): Places self at the help end of the government-help scale (1 or 2 of 5); natrace (Too little, 1973 to 2024): Too little is spent on improving conditions of Black people; affrmact (Strongly favors or favors, 1994 to 2024): Favors preference in hiring and promoting Black people; wrkwayup (Disagree somewhat or strongly, 1994 to 2024): Rejects that Black people should work up without special favors. The denominator of each share is the respondents with a substantive answer. The value labels of every item were read from the raw file and asserted before recoding. The government-help item (helpblk) is a five-point scale with only the end points and the midpoint labeled; the series counts codes 1 and 2, the two answers nearest to government should help (code 1 alone is a smaller share). Sample, ANES. White non-Hispanic respondents (VCF0106) in the ANES Cumulative Data File. Affect: the feeling thermometers toward Black Americans (VCF0206) and white Americans (VCF0207), 1964 to 2024. Vote: the two-party presidential vote (VCF0704, major-party candidates only; 17,265 white non-Hispanic voters in the presidential years 1988 to 2024, of whom 16,299 have a racial resentment index score in the nine presidential years that asked it). Attitudes: the racial resentment index (the mean of four 0 to 1 items, VCF9039 to VCF9042, for respondents who answered at least two, times 100; the book's one definition, not asked in 1996), a colder rating of Black Americans (100 minus the thermometer), aid to Black Americans (VCF0830, 7 is the self-help end) and opposition to affirmative action (VCF0867a: raw codes 1, 2, 4 and 5 recoded to 1 to 4, 4 is strongly oppose). Party identification is the seven-point scale (pid_7pt), leaners included in Democrats (1 to 3) and Republicans (5 to 7). Sample, CES. White non-Hispanic respondents in the 2008 and 2012 surveys of the cumulative file who reported a major-party presidential vote, with opposition to affirmative action on the four-point item (1 strongly support, 4 strongly oppose) and the seven-point party scale. The single-wave weight is used; a post-election weight exists for 2012 only and gives a slope of the same size. The party-gap sign of the item was checked in every year it exists (Republicans more opposed in all seven). The CES is an opt-in panel, so its intervals are model based. Weights. GSS weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before); ANES VCF0009z, with weight_ftf and weight_web (VCF0009x and VCF0009y) for the mode views of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024, and no mode weights for 2020; CES weight. In a pooled period each year's weights are rescaled to average one over the respondents with an answer. Estimators and intervals. A share or mean is a weighted mean of the 0/1 or rating with a 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size; a change between two periods or elections is the difference of two independent estimates with the standard errors combined in quadrature, and so is the Democratic minus Republican difference in a change. These intervals treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the strata and clusters of the designs. A vote slope is the coefficient on the standardized attitude (weighted mean 0 and SD 1 within the year and sample) in a weighted linear probability model of a Republican vote against a Democratic vote, with HC3 errors; the one 'party held fixed' sentence adds a dummy for each of the seven party-identification categories. Groups of the resentment index: in the default view exact weighted thirds inside each year, with respondents who share an index score split in proportion across a cut, so the three thirds hold the same weighted number of voters; in the fixed-cut view the groups are an index of 50 or less, above 50 to 75 and above 75 in every year (50 and 75 are the pooled weighted terciles of white two-party voters, 1988 to 2024), so the group sizes change by year. A gap between groups combines the two Kish standard errors. Step dates and form check. For one group and item, the yearly weighted shares of the in-person surveys of 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2016 and 2018 are fitted by two constants, one before the first new survey s and one from s on, with s no earlier than 2004 and at least one survey after it. The best s minimizes the inverse-variance weighted squared error. The step at the fixed survey of 2016 is also reported, because the best date differs by item for white Republicans. As a check on the form, a trend that is constant before a kink and linear after it is fitted to the same shares (kink between 2004.0 and 2015.95 in steps of 0.05, weighted least squares); its weighted squared error is compared with the step's. The bootstrap (1,000 replicates, seed 12345) resamples respondents with replacement within each survey year, recomputes the yearly shares and variances and refits all three; the table reports the share of replicates that choose each date and the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of the step size, the step at 2016 and the kink year. Suppression. A yearly series cell needs at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100 (timeline floor); a party, race, mode, period or pooled cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100 (subgroup floor); a vote slope needs 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100. The GSS 2022 and 2024 cells alone are often under the effective-sample floor, so the mode views pool the two years and plot the pooled cell at 2023. Rounding: every displayed number and every plotted or tabled value is rounded half up from the unrounded estimate by b3.fmt, and a printed change can differ by 0.1 from the difference of two printed shares. Survey mode. GSS: in person through 2018, no 2020 survey, 2021 mostly web (no in-person interviews), 2022 and 2024 in person and web; every estimate after 2020 is shown in the all-interview view and in an in-person or web view or in the mode figure. ANES: in person through 2008, web added in 2012; the mode views use the mode weights. CES: online in every year. ## What these data cannot show - The GSS, ANES and CES interview new respondents in each wave, so a change in a share mixes people who changed their answers, people who changed party and the replacement of older adults by younger ones, and this chapter cannot separate them. - The step dates describe when a new level first appears in surveys fielded in alternate years. - The step and the kink are assumptions about the form of change and give different starts, the 2016 survey for the step and the 2014 survey or earlier for the kink. - The dates do not say why the level changed, and the 2016 GSS was fielded during the presidential campaign. - The items measure answers to questions and not behavior. - The principle items reached ceilings that leave little room to move, three of them have no readings after 2010, and the data cannot tell a change in belief from a change in willingness to say what the question invites. - The GSS wording of the group changed over the period from Negroes to Blacks to African Americans, and in 2022 and 2024 the effective samples for party and race cells are small enough that the chapter pools those years. - In the in-person view the Black respondents' cells for the discrimination and will-power items in 2022 and 2024 are suppressed, and Hispanic respondents cannot be separated in the GSS before 2000. - The post-2018 levels depend on interview mode on several items, so the later comparisons are read by mode and not as changes over time. - Results for Hispanic, Asian and other voters are not shown, and Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) is where voters of those groups belong. - The vote section describes association across elections. - It cannot separate the Obama presidency from the 2012 re-election campaign, the change in candidates in 2016, or the changes in the parties' coalitions, so a rise from 2012 to 2016 is not an effect of either. - The vote is self-reported after the election and leans slightly Democratic, the attitude and party identification are measured in the same interview, the resentment index has no 1996 reading, ANES 2020 has no mode weights, and the CES holds one racial policy item in 2008 and 2012. - The chapter does not test whether racial attitudes changed how people voted, and the surveys cannot say whether the movement after 2014 comes from the events of those years. - Policing items and the weeks after May 2020 are in Chapter 5.4, Policing (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/policing; planned) and Chapter 5.3, Racial attitudes after George Floyd's death (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-after-george-floyd; planned). ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Schuman, Howard; Steeh, Charlotte; Bobo, Lawrence; Krysan, Maria (1997). Racial Attitudes in America: Trends and Interpretations, revised edition. Harvard University Press. 3. Kluegel, James R. (1990). Trends in Whites' Explanations of the Black-White Gap in Socioeconomic Status, 1977-1989. American Sociological Review 55(4): 512-525. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095804 4. Tesler, Michael (2012). The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race. American Journal of Political Science 56(3): 690-704. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00577.x 5. Tesler, Michael (2016). Post-Racial or Most-Racial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo22961444.html 6. Engelhardt, Andrew M. (2021). Racial Attitudes Through a Partisan Lens. British Journal of Political Science 51(3): 1062-1079. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000437 7. Sides, John; Tesler, Michael; Vavreck, Lynn (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America. Princeton University Press. https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691174198/identity-crisis ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/build.py (sha256 313b2bdf023662c8e50e8dc18ce24aebd9a86c3316e6e0d45be89209b7654a87) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 7b06bf1d6db375430d6e4fd0fa9bc49725d4245c2b78def498765406050abe65 | | figures/affect.json | bd74986938988fada15eda1588b36df69980c5a3f61eb8e60d5f89e2f801bee9 | | figures/by_race.json | fc2b0c12b0d097d72b5c2ea5eaa3bae006ba148d09d0a85b833f8767edf36e89 | | figures/kinds_trends.json | 8c94527c9a048ba030dddb567c6cf1f1f71952b4d1a8c2075a05e480e741853e | | figures/mode_gap.json | 151deacd9396ae9683c1daac0b703234cf973d8876dba7a9001a80097793f160 | | figures/party_mode.json | 3c539e18e85324c0a0b9adb93c3f0e0d93666ada973963f803526785e6068dff | | figures/schedule.json | 9a0c324980cabdf8a0cc5c535638facbd50097345b266240fcfea73b42f1c4f7 | | figures/step_dates.json | 52250c071553a069317e3ca4a2478ef7672851ce4617e5e300b4fbdcdea57482 | | figures/vote_assoc.json | 933a461949ba937afc217ce20a6fab50b967ad09d5b9bc160e6316574b4050d6 | | figures/vote_levels.json | 536ee092fa036294ad0e5389f15b9913bdbcc277972c1773bd1a6e259c14bbea | | meta.json | 75f880ac28f79145ba74e9b435607b53bb39cfc95c9eb969f23d297637ecbb80 | | refs.json | 59afd9424dd24b8a8d831ad6332f4dee6f6184afe2b38663500b0a25fed0f797 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/facts.json - Table 1, figure "kinds_trends" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/kinds_trends.json - Table 2, figure "schedule" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/schedule.json - Table 3, figure "affect" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/affect.json - Table 4, figure "step_dates" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/step_dates.json - Table 5, figure "mode_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/mode_gap.json - Table 6, figure "party_mode" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/party_mode.json - Table 7, figure "by_race" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/by_race.json - Table 8, figure "vote_assoc" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/vote_assoc.json - Table 9, figure "vote_levels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes/figures/vote_levels.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Racial attitudes and ideology: report Chapter 5.2 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Racial attitudes and ideology - Chapter: 5.2 (Part V, Race and racial attitudes; The great sorting) - Question: How closely does racial resentment track ideological self-placement, and how much of the rise runs through party? - Dek: Among white non-Hispanic respondents to the American National Election Studies, the correlation between racial resentment and conservative self-placement was +0.27 in 1986 and +0.66 in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024; racial resentment statements VCF9039 to VCF9042 (asked 1986-2024), self-placement VCF0803, party identification VCF0301, policy items VCF0806, VCF0839 and VCF0843; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: VCF0009z; weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode comparison - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026racialattitudesandideology ```bibtex @misc{singh2026racialattitudesandideology, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Racial attitudes and ideology}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | +0.27 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.34 | 664 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | r_white_1986 | | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | +0.66 | 95% CI 0.63 to 0.69 | 3,204 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | r_white_2024 | | standardized slope of self-placement on the resentment index in a regression with seven party-identification categories held fixed (HC3 interval); not a correlation: both variables are standardized on the whole white sample of the year, not within party categories | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | +0.23 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.31 | 662 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | net_1986 | | standardized slope of self-placement on the resentment index in a regression with seven party-identification categories held fixed (HC3 interval); not a correlation: both variables are standardized on the whole white sample of the year, not within party categories | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | +0.24 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.29 | 3,200 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | net_2024 | | one minus the ratio of the average of the two within-party per-decade changes (Democrats and Republicans, correlations standardized inside party and year) to the per-decade change in the total correlation; percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap (500 replicates, seed 12345) that resamples respondents inside each year; the share exceeds 100 percent in a replicate whose net trend is negative | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement, Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 72% | 95% CI 63% to 83% | 20,614 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | share_within | | one minus the ratio of the per-decade change in the standardized slope net of party identification (year-specific party dummies) to the per-decade change in the total correlation; percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap (500 replicates, seed 12345) that resamples respondents inside each year; the share exceeds 100 percent in a replicate whose net trend is negative | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 97% | 95% CI 86% to 109% | 20,614 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | share_party | | count of respondents pooled across survey years | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986-2024 | 20,658 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_white | | count of years with at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100 or more | ANES survey years with a headline estimate | 1986-2024 | 13 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_years | ## Findings Among white non-Hispanic respondents to the American National Election Studies (ANES), the correlation between racial resentment and conservative self-placement rose from +0.27 (95% CI 0.19 to 0.34) in 1986 to +0.66 (95% CI 0.63 to 0.69) in 2024. Most of that rise is between the parties. With party identification held fixed, so that respondents are compared only with others in the same party category, the standardized slope is +0.23 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.31) in 1986 and +0.24 (95% CI 0.19 to 0.29) in 2024. Depending on how party is held fixed, 72% to 97% of the per-decade rise in the correlation is removed. Holding party fixed compares respondents who share a party label; it is an accounting of the association, not a test of whether party changed anyone's answers. Racial resentment is measured with four ANES statements about the place of Black Americans in society [1]. Each statement is recoded so that its most resentful answer scores one and its least resentful answer scores zero, and the index averages the statements a respondent answered, at least two of the four, and multiplies by one hundred, so it runs from zero for the least resentful answers to one hundred for the most resentful. Differences in its average are in index points. Self-placement is the seven-point question that runs from extremely liberal to extremely conservative. The chapter reports the weighted correlation between the two by survey year, for the 20,658 white non-Hispanic respondents who have both answers in 13 ANES study years between 1986 and 2024. The series for respondents of every race and ethnicity is a toggle on the first figure. (Note: Agreement is the resentful answer for the statements that Black people should work their way up without special favors and that they should try harder. Disagreement is the resentful answer for the statements that slavery and discrimination have made it difficult to rise and that Black people have gotten less than they deserve. The direction comes from the answer labels stored with each item, not from any correlation with ideology. Intervals use the Kish effective sample size [2] and Fisher z [3], treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering.) The same four statements define the resentment series in Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sort-dates-by-attitude), which dates when each attitude became a partisan divide. ### The correlation rose after 2012 Table 1 shows the correlation for each survey year. It rose slowly from +0.27 in 1986 to +0.43 in 2008 and was +0.44 in 2012. The change between 2008 and 2012, the first Obama term, was +0.01 (95% CI −0.06 to 0.08), which the data cannot distinguish from zero. The rise came afterwards, by +0.23 (95% CI 0.19 to 0.27) from 2012 to 2020, to +0.67 in 2020, and the correlation was +0.66 in 2024. The series does not show a rise at the 2008 election. The increase falls in the years around the 2016 election, and studies of that campaign report that views about race and identity were tied more closely to vote choice than in earlier elections [4]. Chapter 5.1, Fifty years of racial attitudes (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes) asks whether racial attitudes became more tied to vote choice during the Obama presidency. Table 1. Among white respondents the correlation between resentment and conservative self-placement rose from +0.27 in 1986 to +0.66 in 2024 The series for all respondents has the same shape at a lower level, from +0.22 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.29) in 1986 to +0.63 (95% CI 0.60 to 0.65) in 2024. Restricting the headline series to white respondents matches the population that Kinder and Sanders study [1]. ### The parties moved apart on resentment Party identification is related to both variables, and both links tightened. Among white respondents the correlation between the resentment index and seven-point party identification rose from +0.06 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.12) in 1986 to +0.62 (95% CI 0.59 to 0.65) in 2024, and the correlation between party identification and self-placement rose from +0.37 to +0.79 (Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology) covers the second). The second view of Table 2 plots both. A correlation across all white respondents therefore mixes two things: how resentment and ideology line up among people who share a party, and how far apart the parties sit on both. The first view of Table 2 shows where the first change came from. The gap in the average resentment score between white Republicans and white Democrats, counting leaners with the party they lean toward, went from 4.2 (95% CI 0.9 to 7.6) index points in 1986 to 37.6 (95% CI 35.3 to 39.9) in 2024. It widened in two stages. Through 2012 Republicans' average rose, from 61.2 to 75.3, while Democrats' stayed level, at 57.0 in 1986 and 55.5 in 2012. After 2012 Democrats' average fell by 26.0 (95% CI 23.5 to 28.4) index points and Republicans' by 8.1 (95% CI 6.2 to 10.0). (Note: Changes and gaps are computed from unrounded estimates, so a printed change can differ from the difference of the printed endpoints in the last digit.) The 1998 study asked only two of the four statements, so the level of its index is not comparable with the years on either side and the figure leaves 1998 out of the averages. Table 2. The gap in average resentment between white Republicans and white Democrats widened from 4.2 index points in 1986 to 37.6 in 2024 Web respondents score higher than face-to-face respondents in the same year, by between 4.8 and 9.5 index points in the four party-by-year cells for 2012 and 2024, and the averages in Table 2 are not adjusted for mode. Table 3 gives the two modes separately, and the fall since 2012 appears in each mode and in both parties. Table 3. Average resentment fell from 2012 to 2024 in both interview modes and both parties, and web respondents score 4.8 to 9.5 index points higher ### Holding party fixed removes most of the rise Table 4 separates the two parts of that correlation. The net-of-party line is the standardized slope of self-placement on the resentment index in a regression that also contains a dummy variable for each of the seven party-identification categories, fitted separately in each year, so the party differences can vary by year. The slope was +0.23 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.31) in 1986 and +0.24 (95% CI 0.19 to 0.29) in 2024, while the total correlation went from +0.27 to +0.66. (Note: A dummy variable equals one for respondents in a category and zero otherwise. The seven categories are strong, weak and leaning Democrats, independents, and the same three for Republicans. Both variables are standardized with weighted means and standard deviations inside each survey year, so the standardized slope of self-placement on the index equals the weighted correlation and the two lines share an axis. The net-of-party line is a slope in units of the spread of both variables across all white respondents, which is larger than their spread inside party categories, so it differs from a correlation among respondents in the same category.) Table 4. With party held fixed the slope is +0.23 in 1986 and +0.24 in 2024, against a total correlation of +0.27 and +0.66 A year-interaction test puts numbers on the difference. It regresses the standardized outcome on the index and on the index times decade, counting each survey year equally, and reads the change per decade from the second coefficient. In the net-of-party version the party categories enter as separate dummy variables in every survey year, as they do in the yearly fits. Table 5 gives the results. In total the correlation gained 0.112 (95% CI 0.090 to 0.133) per decade. With party identification held fixed the slope gained 0.004 (95% CI −0.011 to 0.018), an interval that includes zero, and the reduction is 97% (95% CI 86% to 109%) of the total gain. The upper end of that interval lies above the whole total gain because some redraws of the bootstrap sample give a net gain below zero. (Note: The interval for each share comes from a bootstrap, which redraws the sample of respondents inside each year many times and reads the interval from the spread of the estimates. Each trend interval is the wider of two: a respondent-level HC3 interval, and an interval that treats each survey year as a cluster, with critical values from the t distribution for the number of years. Neither is always the wider, so the cautious choice is the wider of the two.) Table 5. Depending on the measure, 72% to 97% of the per-decade rise in the correlation disappears when party identification is held fixed The share depends on the measure, and the three measures answer different questions. The slope keeps both variables in whole-sample units. The partial correlation removes party from both variables and then standardizes what is left, so it is expressed in units of the spread inside party categories, and its reduction is 84% (95% CI 74% to 96%). The third measure averages the Democratic and Republican correlations shown in the second view of Table 4, and its reduction is 72% (95% CI 63% to 83%). The three shares differ because the spread of each variable inside a party changed as the parties sorted. The data do not choose among them, and all three place most of the rise between the parties. That is an accounting statement. It does not say that party affiliation changed anyone's answers, and the section on what these data cannot show returns to the direction of influence. ### Resentment still tracks ideology within parties Inside the parties, the correlation is the same measure applied to Democrats and Republicans separately, shown in the second view of Table 4. Among Democrats it was +0.41 (95% CI 0.31 to 0.50) in 1986 and +0.44 (95% CI 0.37 to 0.49) in 2024, and it stayed between +0.35 and +0.51 in every survey year. Among Republicans it rose from +0.04 (95% CI −0.07 to 0.16) to +0.26 (95% CI 0.20 to 0.33). The gain per decade is 0.018 (95% CI −0.002 to 0.039) among Democrats, an interval that includes zero, and 0.044 (95% CI 0.019 to 0.070) among Republicans. The difference between the two, 0.026 (95% CI −0.003 to 0.055), also includes zero, so these data do not separate the parties. (Note: For Democrats the year-clustered interval for the same gain, 0.018 (95% CI 0.008 to 0.029), is narrower and excludes zero. The text and the figures report the wider interval.) The gain inside each party is small next to the total gain of 0.112 per decade. Table 6 sorts the 13,305 white respondents in the 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 studies into thirds of the resentment index, cutting the thirds inside each survey year. The index takes few distinct values, so the thirds are not equal in size, holding 37%, 36% and 28% of respondents. The most resentful third averages 5.3 (95% CI 5.2 to 5.3) on the seven-point self-placement scale and the least resentful third 3.2 (95% CI 3.1 to 3.2), a difference of 2.1 (95% CI 2.0 to 2.2) points. The third view shows the share who call themselves conservative, meaning slightly conservative, conservative or extremely conservative. Table 6. The ideology gap between resentment thirds is 2.1 points among white respondents, 1.1 among Democrats and 0.6 among Republicans Inside each party the gradient is present and narrower. The difference between the ends of the index is 1.1 (95% CI 0.9 to 1.2) points among Democrats and 0.6 (95% CI 0.5 to 0.7) among Republicans. Democrats in the most resentful third average 3.7 (95% CI 3.5 to 3.8), which is left of the scale midpoint, and Republicans in the least resentful third average 5.0 (95% CI 5.0 to 5.1), which is right of it. Those two groups are small, with 411 Democrats in the most resentful third and 926 Republicans in the least resentful third, so their intervals are wide. Within a party, more resentful respondents are more conservative on average, and the difference across all white respondents is larger because the parties differ on both scores. ### Each statement and each mode shows the rise ANES added web interviews in 2012, and the 2020 and 2024 studies also mix modes, so a change in survey mode could raise or lower the correlation. Table 7 compares the two modes with mode-specific weights. Among face-to-face respondents the correlation went from +0.43 in 2012 to +0.70 (95% CI 0.63 to 0.75) in 2024, and among web respondents from +0.45 to +0.66 (95% CI 0.62 to 0.70). In each year with both modes the two estimates are within 0.05 of each other, and the face-to-face correlation in 2024 is above its 2008 value of +0.43. The comparison covers 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024. ANES 2020 has no mode weights, so the 2020 point cannot be checked this way. Table 7. The correlation rose in both interview modes from 2012 to 2024, from +0.43 to +0.70 face-to-face and from +0.45 to +0.66 on the web The index is an average, and an average can rise because one statement does. Table 8 shows that all four statements move the same way. The statement about slavery and discrimination has the lowest estimate in 1986, +0.14 (95% CI 0.06 to 0.21), although its interval overlaps those of the other three, and it ends at +0.56 (95% CI 0.52 to 0.59). The statement about special favors goes from +0.22 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.29) to +0.59 (95% CI 0.55 to 0.62), the statement about trying harder from +0.22 to +0.57, and the statement about what Black people deserve from +0.24 to +0.58. Table 8. Each of the four resentment statements is more strongly correlated with conservative self-placement in 2024 than in 1986 ### Health insurance and services show the same rise Tesler [5] [6] describes a spillover of racialization, in which opinion on a policy came to line up with racial attitudes once the policy became attached to President Obama, even though the policy had no racial content. The ANES policy items let the same question be asked of the resentment index across the survey years. Health insurance and government services show the strengthening link that a spillover account predicts, and it appears inside both parties. Three features limit what that establishes. The defense item, included as a comparison, rises too, the 2008 to 2012 change is mixed with the move to web interviews, and party composition may have changed in ways that the data do not capture. Table 9 shows the health-insurance, government-services and defense-spending items, each oriented so that a high value is the conservative position (a private plan rather than a government plan, fewer government services, and higher defense spending). Defense spending has no claim to be a placebo, because its correlation with the index is already +0.23 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.30) in 1986. The health-insurance item was not asked in 1986, 1990 or 1998, and the defense item was not asked in 1998 or 2012. Table 9. By 2020 the resentment index correlated with the health-insurance, government-services and defense-spending items at +0.53, +0.48 and +0.53 Among white respondents the correlation of the index with the health-insurance item rose from +0.03 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.09) in 1988 to +0.48 (95% CI 0.44 to 0.52) in 2024, and with the government-services item from +0.06 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.13) in 1986 to +0.50 (95% CI 0.46 to 0.54). The defense item ends at +0.44 (95% CI 0.40 to 0.48). Table 11 gives the gain per decade for each item. The 2008 to 2012 window is the comparison that bears on a spillover account, and it is also the window in which ANES added web interviews. Among all respondents the health-insurance correlation changed by +0.15 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.26) and the government-services correlation by +0.22 (95% CI 0.11 to 0.33). Table 10 separates the modes. In 2012 web respondents show higher correlations than face-to-face respondents for both items, by +0.14 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.23) for health insurance and +0.14 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.23) for government services. Among face-to-face respondents alone, the only mode in 2008, the change from 2008 to 2012 is +0.06 (95% CI −0.06 to 0.19) for health insurance, an interval that includes zero, and +0.13 (95% CI 0.00 to 0.26) for government services, an interval whose lower end is at zero. The 2008 to 2012 change in the all-interview series therefore cannot be separated from the move to web interviews. Table 10. In 2012 web respondents' correlations with the health-insurance and government-services items were +0.42 and +0.40, against +0.28 and +0.26 face-to-face Holding party fixed removes part of the per-decade gains and not all of them. It removes 56% (95% CI 49% to 64%) to 67% (95% CI 59% to 77%) of the gain across the policy items, against 97% for self-placement, and the gains net of party stay above zero for every item. Inside the Democratic Party the health-insurance correlation rose from +0.04 in 1988 to +0.37 in 2024, and inside the Republican Party from +0.01 to +0.16, while the self-placement correlation inside the Democratic Party gained 0.018 per decade. The health-insurance item therefore moved with resentment inside that party where the ideology label moved little. The same patterns would also arise if the party groups had changed in composition in ways that the seven categories do not capture. Table 11. Holding party identification fixed removes 56% to 67% of the per-decade rise in the three policy items, against 97% for self-placement ### The resentment index is contested The scale has a long history of dispute. Kinder and Sears [7] proposed symbolic racism as a blend of anti-Black affect and traditional moral values, and Sears and Henry [8] report evidence that the measure combines anti-Black affect with conservative values such as individualism. Sniderman and Tetlock [9] argued that inferring prejudice from answers to such items attributes a motive that principled conservatism can also explain. Feldman and Huddy [10] found that resentment means different things to white liberals and conservatives. Among liberals it behaved as a measure of prejudice, and among conservatives it was tied to opposition to race-conscious programs regardless of the race of the recipient. Carmines, Sniderman and Easter [11] concluded that the items conflate resentment with racial policy attitudes and do not validly measure racism. The evidence here cannot settle the dispute. Two of the statements, about special favors and about trying harder, invite an answer based on views about government and individual responsibility, and those views are also related to self-placement. A correlation between the index and ideology is therefore partly a correlation between two related political attitudes, and if the scale carries different content on the left and the right, the correlation mixes those contents. Two checks bear on the measure without resolving it. Among white respondents the index correlates −0.32 (95% CI −0.38 to −0.25) with the feeling thermometer toward Black Americans in 1986 and −0.28 (95% CI −0.32 to −0.23) in 2024. The sign is negative because more resentful respondents rate Black Americans colder. The yearly values run from −0.10 in 1998, when only two statements were asked, to −0.35 in 2016, so the index is related to warmth without being the same thing. The rise in Table 8 also appears in the statements about slavery and about what Black people deserve as well as in those about favors and effort, so the rise does not come from the items with the most policy content alone. ### What these data cannot show The ANES is a series of cross-sections. A change from one year to the next mixes people who changed their answers, people who changed parties, and the replacement of older cohorts by younger ones, and this chapter cannot separate them. The Republican rise in the within-party correlation, for example, could come from Republicans who changed their views or from a different set of people calling themselves Republican in 2024 than in 1986. The direction of influence is not identified. Resentment and party identification are measured in the same interview. Holding party fixed compares respondents who share a party label, and it does not show that party identification is an outcome or a cause of resentment. Engelhardt [12] reports, from panel studies in the 1990s and 2000s, that white respondents aligned their racial attitudes with their party loyalties, so a change in resentment scores can follow party as well as precede it. The data also cannot show why the parties moved apart. They hold no measures of the messages voters heard, no panel that follows the same people, and no experiment. The share of the rise that is between the parties depends on how the association is measured, and the intervals reflect sampling error only. Several other limits are about measurement and coverage. The headline series describes white non-Hispanic respondents, and the toggle for all respondents pools every group as a comparison. The resentment statements were not asked in 1996 and 2002, and only two were asked in 1998. Intervals assume a simple random sample and ignore the ANES sampling design, which can raise or lower the variance. The mode checks cover the years with mode weights and leave out 2020, mean resentment and the policy-item correlations differ by mode within a year, and the trend tests pool the survey years without modeling the change to web interviews in 2012. The spillover comparison rests on policy items that the ANES asked in most years, it cannot separate the 2008 to 2012 change from the move to web interviews, and it cannot tell a racialized policy from one that became partisan for other reasons. The Floyd period in 2020 is in Chapter 5.3, Racial attitudes after George Floyd's death (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-after-george-floyd; planned), and other racial attitudes, such as views on interracial marriage and aid to Black Americans, are in Chapter 5.1, Fifty years of racial attitudes (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes). ## Tables ### Table 1. Among white respondents the correlation between resentment and conservative self-placement rose from +0.27 in 1986 to +0.66 in 2024 Weighted correlation of the racial resentment index with seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement, by ANES survey year, white non-Hispanic respondents | Year | Sample | Correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1986 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.27 | +0.19 | +0.34 | 664 | 664 | | 1988 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,014 | 1,014 | | 1990 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.31 | +0.23 | +0.38 | 529 | 529 | | 1992 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.31 | +0.26 | +0.36 | 1,345 | 1,340 | | 1994 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.33 | +0.27 | +0.38 | 1,099 | 914 | | 1998 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.28 | +0.21 | +0.35 | 789 | 670 | | 2000 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.39 | +0.30 | +0.47 | 471 | 389 | | 2004 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.40 | +0.33 | +0.47 | 619 | 524 | | 2008 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.43 | +0.37 | +0.49 | 823 | 660 | | 2012 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.48 | 3,111 | 1,984 | | 2016 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.58 | +0.55 | +0.61 | 2,191 | 1,562 | | 2020 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.67 | +0.65 | +0.69 | 4,799 | 2,785 | | 2024 | White non-Hispanic respondents | +0.66 | +0.63 | +0.69 | 3,204 | 1,502 | | 1986 | All respondents | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.29 | 812 | 812 | | 1988 | All respondents | +0.26 | +0.21 | +0.31 | 1,256 | 1,256 | | 1990 | All respondents | +0.26 | +0.19 | +0.33 | 657 | 657 | | 1992 | All respondents | +0.32 | +0.28 | +0.37 | 1,652 | 1,646 | | 1994 | All respondents | +0.30 | +0.25 | +0.36 | 1,381 | 1,131 | | 1998 | All respondents | +0.27 | +0.21 | +0.33 | 999 | 851 | | 2000 | All respondents | +0.34 | +0.26 | +0.41 | 577 | 473 | | 2004 | All respondents | +0.39 | +0.33 | +0.45 | 824 | 693 | | 2008 | All respondents | +0.39 | +0.34 | +0.44 | 1,481 | 980 | | 2012 | All respondents | +0.41 | +0.38 | +0.44 | 4,930 | 2,761 | | 2016 | All respondents | +0.55 | +0.51 | +0.58 | 2,874 | 2,017 | | 2020 | All respondents | +0.64 | +0.62 | +0.65 | 6,333 | 3,532 | | 2024 | All respondents | +0.63 | +0.60 | +0.65 | 4,263 | 2,005 | Views: White non-Hispanic respondents (sample = White non-Hispanic respondents); All respondents (sample = All respondents). Note: The resentment statements were not asked in 1996 and 2002. The 1998 index has two statements, so that year is marked and is not strictly comparable with the years on either side. Note: ANES added web interviews in 2012, and the 2020 and 2024 studies also mix modes. The mode check later in the chapter compares the two modes. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1986-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); white non-Hispanic respondents; interval from Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/loading_trend.json ### Table 2. The gap in average resentment between white Republicans and white Democrats widened from 4.2 index points in 1986 to 37.6 in 2024 Weighted mean of the racial resentment index (0 least resentful, 100 most resentful) by party identification, leaners included, and, in the second view, weighted correlations, white non-Hispanic respondents | Year | View | Series | Mean or correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1986 | means | Democrats | 56.99 | 54.42 | 59.56 | 375 | 375 | | 1988 | means | Democrats | 60.70 | 58.74 | 62.65 | 538 | 538 | | 1990 | means | Democrats | 55.68 | 53.02 | 58.34 | 338 | 338 | | 1992 | means | Democrats | 57.25 | 55.44 | 59.06 | 765 | 762 | | 1994 | means | Democrats | 59.93 | 57.84 | 62.03 | 555 | 454 | | 2000 | means | Democrats | 58.27 | 55.96 | 60.59 | 516 | 413 | | 2004 | means | Democrats | 56.20 | 53.03 | 59.37 | 308 | 252 | | 2008 | means | Democrats | 56.20 | 53.64 | 58.75 | 443 | 353 | | 2012 | means | Democrats | 55.52 | 53.81 | 57.23 | 1,295 | 823 | | 2016 | means | Democrats | 41.37 | 39.32 | 43.42 | 1,037 | 729 | | 2020 | means | Democrats | 27.10 | 25.70 | 28.50 | 2,224 | 1,251 | | 2024 | means | Democrats | 29.57 | 27.77 | 31.37 | 1,547 | 727 | | 1986 | means | Republicans | 61.23 | 59.10 | 63.36 | 356 | 356 | | 1988 | means | Republicans | 64.87 | 63.30 | 66.44 | 657 | 657 | | 1990 | means | Republicans | 59.40 | 57.02 | 61.79 | 317 | 317 | | 1992 | means | Republicans | 65.23 | 63.77 | 66.69 | 747 | 744 | | 1994 | means | Republicans | 68.27 | 66.69 | 69.85 | 651 | 546 | | 2000 | means | Republicans | 68.99 | 67.11 | 70.87 | 529 | 445 | | 2004 | means | Republicans | 69.58 | 67.43 | 71.73 | 377 | 319 | | 2008 | means | Republicans | 72.60 | 70.66 | 74.53 | 464 | 377 | | 2012 | means | Republicans | 75.27 | 74.06 | 76.49 | 1,524 | 982 | | 2016 | means | Republicans | 70.60 | 69.22 | 71.98 | 1,270 | 904 | | 2020 | means | Republicans | 67.59 | 66.47 | 68.71 | 2,603 | 1,530 | | 2024 | means | Republicans | 67.13 | 65.68 | 68.58 | 1,803 | 852 | | 1986 | means | All white respondents | 59.57 | 58.02 | 61.11 | 844 | 844 | | 1988 | means | All white respondents | 63.62 | 62.46 | 64.79 | 1,355 | 1,355 | | 1990 | means | All white respondents | 58.19 | 56.50 | 59.88 | 742 | 742 | | 1992 | means | All white respondents | 61.60 | 60.50 | 62.69 | 1,723 | 1,716 | | 1994 | means | All white respondents | 64.82 | 63.58 | 66.05 | 1,354 | 1,120 | | 2000 | means | All white respondents | 64.12 | 62.69 | 65.55 | 1,197 | 977 | | 2004 | means | All white respondents | 63.76 | 61.93 | 65.59 | 757 | 628 | | 2008 | means | All white respondents | 64.77 | 63.19 | 66.34 | 1,040 | 834 | | 2012 | means | All white respondents | 66.71 | 65.70 | 67.72 | 3,279 | 2,102 | | 2016 | means | All white respondents | 58.27 | 56.98 | 59.55 | 2,626 | 1,847 | | 2020 | means | All white respondents | 51.02 | 49.94 | 52.10 | 5,374 | 3,068 | | 2024 | means | All white respondents | 51.52 | 50.11 | 52.93 | 3,552 | 1,668 | | 1986 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.27 | 0.19 | 0.34 | 664 | 664 | | 1988 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.22 | 0.16 | 0.27 | 1,014 | 1,014 | | 1990 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.31 | 0.23 | 0.38 | 529 | 529 | | 1992 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.31 | 0.26 | 0.36 | 1,345 | 1,340 | | 1994 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.38 | 1,099 | 914 | | 1998 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.28 | 0.21 | 0.35 | 789 | 670 | | 2000 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.39 | 0.30 | 0.47 | 471 | 389 | | 2004 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.40 | 0.33 | 0.47 | 619 | 524 | | 2008 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.43 | 0.37 | 0.49 | 823 | 660 | | 2012 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.44 | 0.40 | 0.48 | 3,111 | 1,984 | | 2016 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.58 | 0.55 | 0.61 | 2,191 | 1,562 | | 2020 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.67 | 0.65 | 0.69 | 4,799 | 2,785 | | 2024 | corr | Resentment and ideology | 0.66 | 0.63 | 0.69 | 3,204 | 1,502 | | 1986 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.06 | −0.01 | 0.12 | 838 | 838 | | 1988 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.13 | 1,351 | 1,351 | | 1990 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.08 | 0.01 | 0.15 | 740 | 740 | | 1992 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.20 | 1,714 | 1,707 | | 1994 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.19 | 0.14 | 0.25 | 1,347 | 1,114 | | 1998 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.17 | 0.10 | 0.23 | 936 | 795 | | 2000 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.21 | 0.15 | 0.27 | 1,189 | 971 | | 2004 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.27 | 0.20 | 0.34 | 748 | 620 | | 2008 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.39 | 1,029 | 825 | | 2012 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.40 | 0.36 | 0.43 | 3,269 | 2,094 | | 2016 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.49 | 0.45 | 0.52 | 2,618 | 1,849 | | 2020 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.62 | 0.60 | 0.64 | 5,367 | 3,065 | | 2024 | corr | Resentment and party | 0.62 | 0.59 | 0.65 | 3,540 | 1,662 | | 1986 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.37 | 0.32 | 0.42 | 1,316 | 1,316 | | 1988 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.45 | 0.40 | 0.50 | 1,131 | 1,131 | | 1990 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.45 | 1,040 | 1,040 | | 1992 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.47 | 0.43 | 0.51 | 1,462 | 1,457 | | 1994 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.53 | 0.48 | 0.58 | 1,111 | 924 | | 1998 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.48 | 0.42 | 0.54 | 793 | 673 | | 2000 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.51 | 0.44 | 0.58 | 532 | 436 | | 2004 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.63 | 0.58 | 0.68 | 675 | 571 | | 2008 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.67 | 0.63 | 0.71 | 884 | 705 | | 2012 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.68 | 0.65 | 0.70 | 3,326 | 2,123 | | 2016 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.75 | 0.73 | 0.77 | 2,490 | 1,788 | | 2020 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.79 | 0.78 | 0.80 | 5,290 | 3,085 | | 2024 | corr | Party and ideology | 0.79 | 0.77 | 0.81 | 3,528 | 1,655 | Views: Average resentment (panel = means); Correlations with party identification (panel = corr). Note: Independents who do not lean to either party are left out of the two party lines and included in the all-respondents line. Note: The 1998 study asked only two of the four statements, so the level of its index is not comparable with the years on either side and 1998 is left out of the means; the lines join 1994 and 2000. The resentment statements were not asked in 1996 and 2002. Note: Web respondents score higher than face-to-face respondents in the same year, and these means are not adjusted for mode; the next figure gives the two modes separately. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1986-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); white non-Hispanic respondents; interval from the Kish effective sample size (Fisher z for the correlations) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/resentment_by_party.json ### Table 3. Average resentment fell from 2012 to 2024 in both interview modes and both parties, and web respondents score 4.8 to 9.5 index points higher Weighted mean of the racial resentment index (0 least resentful, 100 most resentful) by interview mode, with the mode weights, white non-Hispanic Democrats and Republicans, leaners included, 2012 and 2024 | Party | Year and mode | Mean index | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Democrats | 2012, face-to-face | 52.4 | 49.3 | 55.6 | 363 | 255 | | Democrats | 2012, web | 57.2 | 55.2 | 59.2 | 932 | 579 | | Democrats | 2024, face-to-face | 23.0 | 19.5 | 26.5 | 278 | 150 | | Democrats | 2024, web | 32.5 | 29.8 | 35.1 | 543 | 327 | | Republicans | 2012, face-to-face | 72.0 | 69.7 | 74.3 | 397 | 295 | | Republicans | 2012, web | 77.2 | 75.9 | 78.6 | 1,127 | 719 | | Republicans | 2024, face-to-face | 63.8 | 60.4 | 67.2 | 314 | 171 | | Republicans | 2024, web | 69.9 | 67.7 | 72.1 | 599 | 358 | Note: ANES 2020 has no mode weights, and the 2024 panel and paper respondents are in neither mode, so the two modes do not cover every respondent. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2012 and 2024; weighted with the mode weights (weight_ftf for in-person rows, weight_web for web rows); white non-Hispanic respondents; interval from the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/resentment_by_mode.json ### Table 4. With party held fixed the slope is +0.23 in 1986 and +0.24 in 2024, against a total correlation of +0.27 and +0.66 Standardized slope of seven-point self-placement on the racial resentment index, without and with the seven party-identification categories held fixed, and, in the second view, the correlation inside each party, white non-Hispanic respondents | Year | View | Series | Correlation or slope | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1986 | net | All white respondents | +0.27 | +0.19 | +0.34 | 664 | 664 | | 1988 | net | All white respondents | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,014 | 1,014 | | 1990 | net | All white respondents | +0.31 | +0.23 | +0.38 | 529 | 529 | | 1992 | net | All white respondents | +0.31 | +0.26 | +0.36 | 1,345 | 1,340 | | 1994 | net | All white respondents | +0.33 | +0.27 | +0.38 | 1,099 | 914 | | 1998 | net | All white respondents | +0.28 | +0.21 | +0.35 | 789 | 670 | | 2000 | net | All white respondents | +0.39 | +0.30 | +0.47 | 471 | 389 | | 2004 | net | All white respondents | +0.40 | +0.33 | +0.47 | 619 | 524 | | 2008 | net | All white respondents | +0.43 | +0.37 | +0.49 | 823 | 660 | | 2012 | net | All white respondents | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.48 | 3,111 | 1,984 | | 2016 | net | All white respondents | +0.58 | +0.55 | +0.61 | 2,191 | 1,562 | | 2020 | net | All white respondents | +0.67 | +0.65 | +0.69 | 4,799 | 2,785 | | 2024 | net | All white respondents | +0.66 | +0.63 | +0.69 | 3,204 | 1,502 | | 1986 | net | Net of party identification | +0.23 | +0.16 | +0.31 | 662 | 662 | | 1988 | net | Net of party identification | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.22 | 1,011 | 1,011 | | 1990 | net | Net of party identification | +0.25 | +0.17 | +0.33 | 529 | 529 | | 1992 | net | Net of party identification | +0.21 | +0.16 | +0.26 | 1,342 | 1,337 | | 1994 | net | Net of party identification | +0.21 | +0.15 | +0.26 | 1,097 | 913 | | 1998 | net | Net of party identification | +0.18 | +0.11 | +0.25 | 784 | 666 | | 2000 | net | Net of party identification | +0.25 | +0.16 | +0.34 | 470 | 389 | | 2004 | net | Net of party identification | +0.21 | +0.14 | +0.29 | 614 | 520 | | 2008 | net | Net of party identification | +0.20 | +0.14 | +0.26 | 817 | 655 | | 2012 | net | Net of party identification | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 3,104 | 1,978 | | 2016 | net | Net of party identification | +0.22 | +0.18 | +0.26 | 2,189 | 1,561 | | 2020 | net | Net of party identification | +0.24 | +0.20 | +0.27 | 4,795 | 2,782 | | 2024 | net | Net of party identification | +0.24 | +0.19 | +0.29 | 3,200 | 1,500 | | 1986 | within | All white respondents | +0.27 | +0.19 | +0.34 | 664 | 664 | | 1988 | within | All white respondents | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,014 | 1,014 | | 1990 | within | All white respondents | +0.31 | +0.23 | +0.38 | 529 | 529 | | 1992 | within | All white respondents | +0.31 | +0.26 | +0.36 | 1,345 | 1,340 | | 1994 | within | All white respondents | +0.33 | +0.27 | +0.38 | 1,099 | 914 | | 1998 | within | All white respondents | +0.28 | +0.21 | +0.35 | 789 | 670 | | 2000 | within | All white respondents | +0.39 | +0.30 | +0.47 | 471 | 389 | | 2004 | within | All white respondents | +0.40 | +0.33 | +0.47 | 619 | 524 | | 2008 | within | All white respondents | +0.43 | +0.37 | +0.49 | 823 | 660 | | 2012 | within | All white respondents | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.48 | 3,111 | 1,984 | | 2016 | within | All white respondents | +0.58 | +0.55 | +0.61 | 2,191 | 1,562 | | 2020 | within | All white respondents | +0.67 | +0.65 | +0.69 | 4,799 | 2,785 | | 2024 | within | All white respondents | +0.66 | +0.63 | +0.69 | 3,204 | 1,502 | | 1986 | within | Democrats | +0.41 | +0.31 | +0.50 | 292 | 292 | | 1988 | within | Democrats | +0.37 | +0.28 | +0.45 | 385 | 385 | | 1990 | within | Democrats | +0.41 | +0.30 | +0.51 | 245 | 245 | | 1992 | within | Democrats | +0.39 | +0.32 | +0.46 | 582 | 580 | | 1994 | within | Democrats | +0.40 | +0.31 | +0.49 | 429 | 352 | | 1998 | within | Democrats | +0.39 | +0.29 | +0.48 | 348 | 299 | | 2000 | within | Democrats | +0.35 | +0.21 | +0.48 | 204 | 166 | | 2004 | within | Democrats | +0.51 | +0.40 | +0.60 | 250 | 210 | | 2008 | within | Democrats | +0.46 | +0.36 | +0.55 | 335 | 267 | | 2012 | within | Democrats | +0.39 | +0.33 | +0.45 | 1,229 | 774 | | 2016 | within | Democrats | +0.47 | +0.40 | +0.53 | 868 | 609 | | 2020 | within | Democrats | +0.46 | +0.41 | +0.50 | 2,036 | 1,147 | | 2024 | within | Democrats | +0.44 | +0.37 | +0.49 | 1,447 | 673 | | 1986 | within | Republicans | +0.04 | −0.07 | +0.16 | 298 | 298 | | 1988 | within | Republicans | +0.06 | −0.02 | +0.14 | 532 | 532 | | 1990 | within | Republicans | +0.16 | +0.04 | +0.28 | 246 | 246 | | 1992 | within | Republicans | +0.03 | −0.05 | +0.11 | 625 | 623 | | 1994 | within | Republicans | +0.08 | −0.01 | +0.17 | 579 | 487 | | 1998 | within | Republicans | +0.05 | −0.06 | +0.16 | 363 | 307 | | 2000 | within | Republicans | +0.23 | +0.09 | +0.36 | 221 | 186 | | 2004 | within | Republicans | +0.05 | −0.07 | +0.17 | 326 | 279 | | 2008 | within | Republicans | +0.04 | −0.07 | +0.14 | 404 | 326 | | 2012 | within | Republicans | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.19 | 1,473 | 946 | | 2016 | within | Republicans | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.23 | 1,116 | 805 | | 2020 | within | Republicans | +0.26 | +0.21 | +0.31 | 2,346 | 1,410 | | 2024 | within | Republicans | +0.26 | +0.20 | +0.33 | 1,631 | 778 | Views: Total and net of party identification (panel = net); Inside each party (panel = within). Note: Independents who do not lean to either party are in the total and net-of-party lines and in neither party line. Note: The resentment statements were not asked in 1996 and 2002. The 1998 index has two statements, so that year is marked and is not strictly comparable with the years on either side. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1986-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); white non-Hispanic respondents; net-of-party slopes with HC3 intervals Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/party_conditioning.json ### Table 5. Depending on the measure, 72% to 97% of the per-decade rise in the correlation disappears when party identification is held fixed Change per decade in the correlation, or in the standardized slope, of self-placement on the racial resentment index, and the share of the total change that disappears when party is held fixed, white non-Hispanic respondents, survey years 1986 to 2024 | Measure | Change per decade | Interval low | Interval high | Share of the total change removed | Interval low | Interval high | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All white respondents (total correlation) | +0.112 | +0.090 | +0.133 | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Net of party identification (standardized slope) | +0.004 | −0.011 | +0.018 | 97% | 86% | 109% | | Partial correlation given party identification | +0.018 | +0.004 | +0.032 | 84% | 74% | 96% | | Average of the Democratic and Republican correlations | +0.031 | +0.017 | +0.045 | 72% | 63% | 83% | | Inside Democrats | +0.018 | −0.002 | +0.039 | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Inside Republicans | +0.044 | +0.019 | +0.070 | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Republican minus Democratic change | +0.026 | −0.003 | +0.055 | n/a | n/a | n/a | Note: Each share has a percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap that resamples respondents inside each year. The share passes 100 percent in a replicate whose held-fixed change is negative. Note: Each change is a year-interaction coefficient. Its interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval; for Democrats the year-clustered interval is narrower and excludes zero. Note: The trend tests pool the survey years and do not model the change in interview mode in 2012. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1986-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); white non-Hispanic respondents; year-interaction coefficients, each survey year counting equally; shares with percentile intervals from a seeded bootstrap Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/share_table.json ### Table 6. The ideology gap between resentment thirds is 2.1 points among white respondents, 1.1 among Democrats and 0.6 among Republicans Gap in mean seven-point self-placement (1 extremely liberal, 7 extremely conservative) between the most and least resentful third of the racial resentment index; the other views show the mean in each third and the share conservative; white non-Hispanic respondents, 2012 to 2024 pooled | View | Group | Third of the index | Gap in mean self-placement | Low | High | Mean self-placement | Low | High | Percent conservative | Low | High | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | gap | All white respondents | n/a | 2.10 | 2.02 | 2.17 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 8,643 | | gap | Democrats | n/a | 1.08 | 0.92 | 1.23 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 4,249 | | gap | Republicans | n/a | 0.58 | 0.48 | 0.68 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 3,711 | | terc | All white respondents | Least resentful third | n/a | n/a | n/a | 3.19 | 3.14 | 3.24 | 18.7 | 17.3 | 20.1 | 5,160 | | terc | All white respondents | Middle third | n/a | n/a | n/a | 4.72 | 4.67 | 4.77 | 54.1 | 52.3 | 56.0 | 4,662 | | terc | All white respondents | Most resentful third | n/a | n/a | n/a | 5.29 | 5.23 | 5.34 | 69.8 | 67.8 | 71.8 | 3,483 | | terc | Democrats | Least resentful third | n/a | n/a | n/a | 2.59 | 2.55 | 2.64 | 4.2 | 3.3 | 5.0 | 3,838 | | terc | Democrats | Middle third | n/a | n/a | n/a | 3.48 | 3.40 | 3.56 | 10.4 | 8.2 | 12.5 | 1,331 | | terc | Democrats | Most resentful third | n/a | n/a | n/a | 3.67 | 3.52 | 3.82 | 18.1 | 13.3 | 23.0 | 411 | | terc | Republicans | Least resentful third | n/a | n/a | n/a | 5.04 | 4.95 | 5.13 | 69.8 | 65.9 | 73.6 | 926 | | terc | Republicans | Middle third | n/a | n/a | n/a | 5.36 | 5.31 | 5.41 | 78.4 | 76.5 | 80.4 | 2,855 | | terc | Republicans | Most resentful third | n/a | n/a | n/a | 5.62 | 5.57 | 5.67 | 81.7 | 79.8 | 83.5 | 2,785 | Views: Gap between the ends (panel = gap); Mean self-placement (panel = terc); Share conservative (panel = terc). Note: Thirds are cut within each survey year on all white respondents, so they mean the same thing in every group. Group sizes are in the tooltips and the data table. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (VCF0009z); white non-Hispanic respondents; intervals from the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/tercile_ideology.json ### Table 7. The correlation rose in both interview modes from 2012 to 2024, from +0.43 to +0.70 face-to-face and from +0.45 to +0.66 on the web Weighted correlation of the resentment index with seven-point self-placement by interview mode, white non-Hispanic respondents, years with mode weights | Year and mode | Correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2008, face-to-face | +0.43 | +0.37 | +0.49 | 823 | 660 | | 2012, face-to-face | +0.43 | +0.36 | +0.50 | 702 | 501 | | 2012, web | +0.45 | +0.41 | +0.49 | 2,409 | 1,522 | | 2016, face-to-face | +0.55 | +0.47 | +0.61 | 581 | 384 | | 2016, web | +0.59 | +0.56 | +0.63 | 1,610 | 1,183 | | 2024, face-to-face | +0.70 | +0.63 | +0.75 | 550 | 296 | | 2024, web | +0.66 | +0.62 | +0.70 | 1,098 | 657 | Note: ANES 2020 has no mode weights, so it has no row. The 2024 panel and paper respondents are in neither mode. Note: ANES interviews were mainly in person before 2012; the mode weights exist from 2008. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2008-2024; weighted with the mode weights (weight_ftf for in-person rows, weight_web for web rows); white non-Hispanic respondents Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/mode_check.json ### Table 8. Each of the four resentment statements is more strongly correlated with conservative self-placement in 2024 than in 1986 Weighted correlation of each statement, recoded 0 to 1 so that 1 is the most resentful answer, and of the four-statement index, with seven-point self-placement, white non-Hispanic respondents | Row | Statement | Correlation, 1986 | Low | High | Respondents, 1986 | Correlation, 2024 | Low | High | Respondents, 2024 | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Slavery made it hard | Generations of slavery and discrimination have made it difficult for Black people to work their way up | +0.14 | +0.06 | +0.21 | 662 | +0.56 | +0.52 | +0.59 | 3,205 | | No special favors | Other minorities overcame prejudice without special favors, and Black people should do the same | +0.22 | +0.15 | +0.29 | 660 | +0.59 | +0.55 | +0.62 | 3,084 | | Try harder | If Black people would only try harder they could be just as well off as white people | +0.22 | +0.15 | +0.29 | 661 | +0.57 | +0.53 | +0.60 | 3,202 | | Got less than deserved | Over the past few years Black people have gotten less than they deserve | +0.24 | +0.17 | +0.31 | 654 | +0.58 | +0.54 | +0.61 | 3,200 | | Four-statement index | Mean of the statements answered (at least two), scaled from 0 to 100 | +0.27 | +0.19 | +0.34 | 664 | +0.66 | +0.63 | +0.69 | 3,204 | Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1986-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); white non-Hispanic respondents; interval from Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/item_check.json ### Table 9. By 2020 the resentment index correlated with the health-insurance, government-services and defense-spending items at +0.53, +0.48 and +0.53 Weighted correlation of the racial resentment index with three policy items, each oriented so that a high value is the conservative position, white non-Hispanic respondents | Year | Sample | Outcome | Correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1988 | All white respondents | Health insurance | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.09 | 1,164 | 1,164 | | 1992 | All white respondents | Health insurance | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.18 | 1,515 | 1,509 | | 1994 | All white respondents | Health insurance | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.21 | 1,266 | 1,052 | | 2000 | All white respondents | Health insurance | +0.10 | +0.02 | +0.19 | 618 | 504 | | 2004 | All white respondents | Health insurance | +0.18 | +0.10 | +0.26 | 710 | 589 | | 2008 | All white respondents | Health insurance | +0.21 | +0.12 | +0.31 | 476 | 384 | | 2012 | All white respondents | Health insurance | +0.37 | +0.33 | +0.40 | 3,120 | 2,001 | | 2016 | All white respondents | Health insurance | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.48 | 2,380 | 1,684 | | 2020 | All white respondents | Health insurance | +0.53 | +0.51 | +0.56 | 4,912 | 2,869 | | 2024 | All white respondents | Health insurance | +0.48 | +0.44 | +0.52 | 3,164 | 1,480 | | 1988 | Net of party identification | Health insurance | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.06 | 1,160 | 1,160 | | 1992 | Net of party identification | Health insurance | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.12 | 1,508 | 1,502 | | 1994 | Net of party identification | Health insurance | +0.08 | +0.02 | +0.14 | 1,261 | 1,047 | | 2000 | Net of party identification | Health insurance | +0.04 | −0.05 | +0.13 | 613 | 500 | | 2004 | Net of party identification | Health insurance | +0.09 | +0.01 | +0.17 | 701 | 581 | | 2008 | Net of party identification | Health insurance | +0.11 | +0.01 | +0.22 | 471 | 381 | | 2012 | Net of party identification | Health insurance | +0.17 | +0.13 | +0.22 | 3,113 | 1,996 | | 2016 | Net of party identification | Health insurance | +0.22 | +0.17 | +0.26 | 2,374 | 1,687 | | 2020 | Net of party identification | Health insurance | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.24 | 4,906 | 2,866 | | 2024 | Net of party identification | Health insurance | +0.23 | +0.17 | +0.30 | 3,157 | 1,477 | | 1988 | Inside Democrats | Health insurance | +0.04 | −0.05 | +0.13 | 457 | 457 | | 1992 | Inside Democrats | Health insurance | +0.13 | +0.05 | +0.20 | 679 | 676 | | 1994 | Inside Democrats | Health insurance | +0.07 | −0.02 | +0.17 | 510 | 419 | | 2000 | Inside Democrats | Health insurance | +0.07 | −0.06 | +0.20 | 280 | 228 | | 2004 | Inside Democrats | Health insurance | +0.13 | 0.00 | +0.26 | 282 | 231 | | 2008 | Inside Democrats | Health insurance | +0.24 | +0.09 | +0.38 | 199 | 160 | | 2012 | Inside Democrats | Health insurance | +0.24 | +0.17 | +0.30 | 1,232 | 782 | | 2016 | Inside Democrats | Health insurance | +0.37 | +0.30 | +0.43 | 943 | 661 | | 2020 | Inside Democrats | Health insurance | +0.28 | +0.23 | +0.33 | 2,094 | 1,189 | | 2024 | Inside Democrats | Health insurance | +0.37 | +0.30 | +0.44 | 1,429 | 671 | | 1988 | Inside Republicans | Health insurance | +0.01 | −0.07 | +0.10 | 581 | 581 | | 1992 | Inside Republicans | Health insurance | +0.05 | −0.03 | +0.12 | 659 | 657 | | 1994 | Inside Republicans | Health insurance | +0.15 | +0.06 | +0.23 | 628 | 529 | | 2000 | Inside Republicans | Health insurance | +0.06 | −0.07 | +0.19 | 266 | 226 | | 2004 | Inside Republicans | Health insurance | +0.07 | −0.04 | +0.19 | 358 | 302 | | 2008 | Inside Republicans | Health insurance | +0.02 | −0.13 | +0.16 | 217 | 177 | | 2012 | Inside Republicans | Health insurance | +0.17 | +0.11 | +0.23 | 1,473 | 950 | | 2016 | Inside Republicans | Health insurance | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.22 | 1,178 | 849 | | 2020 | Inside Republicans | Health insurance | +0.19 | +0.14 | +0.24 | 2,372 | 1,426 | | 2024 | Inside Republicans | Health insurance | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.23 | 1,590 | 746 | | 1986 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.06 | −0.01 | +0.13 | 769 | 769 | | 1988 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.07 | +0.01 | +0.13 | 1,105 | 1,105 | | 1990 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.12 | +0.04 | +0.19 | 633 | 633 | | 1992 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.15 | +0.10 | +0.20 | 1,463 | 1,458 | | 1994 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.19 | 1,222 | 1,009 | | 1998 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.12 | +0.05 | +0.19 | 875 | 744 | | 2000 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.16 | +0.07 | +0.24 | 574 | 470 | | 2004 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.17 | +0.09 | +0.25 | 674 | 564 | | 2008 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.13 | +0.02 | +0.23 | 450 | 366 | | 2012 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.35 | +0.31 | +0.39 | 3,027 | 1,939 | | 2016 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.45 | +0.41 | +0.49 | 2,300 | 1,629 | | 2020 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.48 | +0.45 | +0.51 | 4,693 | 2,735 | | 2024 | All white respondents | Government services | +0.50 | +0.46 | +0.54 | 3,131 | 1,468 | | 1986 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.04 | −0.04 | +0.11 | 764 | 764 | | 1988 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.05 | −0.01 | +0.11 | 1,101 | 1,101 | | 1990 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.09 | +0.01 | +0.17 | 632 | 632 | | 1992 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.14 | 1,459 | 1,454 | | 1994 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.06 | 0.00 | +0.13 | 1,215 | 1,003 | | 1998 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.08 | +0.01 | +0.15 | 870 | 740 | | 2000 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.07 | −0.03 | +0.16 | 570 | 467 | | 2004 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.07 | −0.02 | +0.16 | 666 | 556 | | 2008 | Net of party identification | Government services | −0.01 | −0.10 | +0.08 | 448 | 364 | | 2012 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.20 | 3,020 | 1,934 | | 2016 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.21 | +0.16 | +0.26 | 2,297 | 1,626 | | 2020 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.18 | +0.14 | +0.23 | 4,690 | 2,734 | | 2024 | Net of party identification | Government services | +0.23 | +0.18 | +0.29 | 3,125 | 1,465 | | 1986 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.15 | +0.04 | +0.25 | 335 | 335 | | 1988 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.12 | +0.03 | +0.21 | 436 | 436 | | 1990 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.22 | +0.11 | +0.33 | 293 | 293 | | 1992 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.14 | +0.07 | +0.22 | 656 | 654 | | 1994 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.12 | +0.02 | +0.22 | 488 | 398 | | 1998 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.13 | +0.02 | +0.23 | 388 | 335 | | 2000 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.04 | −0.09 | +0.18 | 261 | 209 | | 2004 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.07 | −0.06 | +0.20 | 273 | 227 | | 2008 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.10 | −0.07 | +0.25 | 185 | 150 | | 2012 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.24 | +0.17 | +0.30 | 1,193 | 758 | | 2016 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.34 | +0.27 | +0.40 | 930 | 650 | | 2020 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.25 | +0.20 | +0.31 | 2,042 | 1,147 | | 2024 | Inside Democrats | Government services | +0.32 | +0.25 | +0.38 | 1,424 | 663 | | 1986 | Inside Republicans | Government services | −0.08 | −0.18 | +0.03 | 330 | 330 | | 1988 | Inside Republicans | Government services | −0.02 | −0.10 | +0.06 | 556 | 556 | | 1990 | Inside Republicans | Government services | −0.03 | −0.15 | +0.09 | 275 | 275 | | 1992 | Inside Republicans | Government services | +0.10 | +0.02 | +0.17 | 656 | 653 | | 1994 | Inside Republicans | Government services | +0.05 | −0.04 | +0.13 | 615 | 516 | | 1998 | Inside Republicans | Government services | +0.09 | −0.02 | +0.20 | 381 | 322 | | 2000 | Inside Republicans | Government services | +0.07 | −0.06 | +0.20 | 251 | 214 | | 2004 | Inside Republicans | Government services | +0.05 | −0.07 | +0.16 | 338 | 287 | | 2008 | Inside Republicans | Government services | −0.09 | −0.24 | +0.06 | 213 | 174 | | 2012 | Inside Republicans | Government services | +0.15 | +0.08 | +0.21 | 1,454 | 936 | | 2016 | Inside Republicans | Government services | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.22 | 1,133 | 813 | | 2020 | Inside Republicans | Government services | +0.14 | +0.09 | +0.19 | 2,234 | 1,356 | | 2024 | Inside Republicans | Government services | +0.19 | +0.12 | +0.26 | 1,564 | 741 | | 1986 | All white respondents | Defense spending | +0.23 | +0.16 | +0.30 | 769 | 769 | | 1988 | All white respondents | Defense spending | +0.23 | +0.18 | +0.29 | 1,226 | 1,226 | | 1990 | All white respondents | Defense spending | +0.29 | +0.22 | +0.36 | 664 | 664 | | 1992 | All white respondents | Defense spending | +0.25 | +0.20 | +0.29 | 1,541 | 1,535 | | 1994 | All white respondents | Defense spending | +0.21 | +0.15 | +0.27 | 1,277 | 1,058 | | 2000 | All white respondents | Defense spending | +0.22 | +0.13 | +0.30 | 571 | 464 | | 2004 | All white respondents | Defense spending | +0.31 | +0.23 | +0.38 | 684 | 575 | | 2008 | All white respondents | Defense spending | +0.30 | +0.20 | +0.39 | 459 | 369 | | 2016 | All white respondents | Defense spending | +0.48 | +0.44 | +0.52 | 2,346 | 1,679 | | 2020 | All white respondents | Defense spending | +0.53 | +0.50 | +0.55 | 4,824 | 2,781 | | 2024 | All white respondents | Defense spending | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.48 | 3,099 | 1,450 | | 1986 | Net of party identification | Defense spending | +0.21 | +0.14 | +0.28 | 764 | 764 | | 1988 | Net of party identification | Defense spending | +0.21 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,224 | 1,224 | | 1990 | Net of party identification | Defense spending | +0.27 | +0.20 | +0.35 | 663 | 663 | | 1992 | Net of party identification | Defense spending | +0.21 | +0.16 | +0.26 | 1,539 | 1,533 | | 1994 | Net of party identification | Defense spending | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.22 | 1,271 | 1,053 | | 2000 | Net of party identification | Defense spending | +0.16 | +0.06 | +0.25 | 566 | 460 | | 2004 | Net of party identification | Defense spending | +0.21 | +0.11 | +0.30 | 677 | 569 | | 2008 | Net of party identification | Defense spending | +0.22 | +0.11 | +0.33 | 455 | 366 | | 2016 | Net of party identification | Defense spending | +0.35 | +0.30 | +0.40 | 2,343 | 1,676 | | 2020 | Net of party identification | Defense spending | +0.34 | +0.29 | +0.38 | 4,822 | 2,779 | | 2024 | Net of party identification | Defense spending | +0.31 | +0.25 | +0.37 | 3,096 | 1,449 | | 1986 | Inside Democrats | Defense spending | +0.32 | +0.22 | +0.41 | 339 | 339 | | 1988 | Inside Democrats | Defense spending | +0.27 | +0.18 | +0.35 | 478 | 478 | | 1990 | Inside Democrats | Defense spending | +0.37 | +0.27 | +0.46 | 302 | 302 | | 1992 | Inside Democrats | Defense spending | +0.29 | +0.22 | +0.35 | 690 | 687 | | 1994 | Inside Democrats | Defense spending | +0.24 | +0.15 | +0.33 | 516 | 422 | | 2000 | Inside Democrats | Defense spending | +0.17 | +0.03 | +0.30 | 259 | 207 | | 2004 | Inside Democrats | Defense spending | +0.33 | +0.21 | +0.44 | 274 | 229 | | 2008 | Inside Democrats | Defense spending | +0.27 | +0.12 | +0.41 | 193 | 155 | | 2016 | Inside Democrats | Defense spending | +0.46 | +0.40 | +0.52 | 933 | 664 | | 2020 | Inside Democrats | Defense spending | +0.42 | +0.37 | +0.46 | 2,029 | 1,136 | | 2024 | Inside Democrats | Defense spending | +0.35 | +0.28 | +0.42 | 1,397 | 656 | | 1986 | Inside Republicans | Defense spending | +0.10 | −0.01 | +0.20 | 332 | 332 | | 1988 | Inside Republicans | Defense spending | +0.22 | +0.14 | +0.29 | 618 | 618 | | 1990 | Inside Republicans | Defense spending | +0.20 | +0.09 | +0.30 | 297 | 297 | | 1992 | Inside Republicans | Defense spending | +0.10 | +0.03 | +0.18 | 681 | 679 | | 1994 | Inside Republicans | Defense spending | +0.17 | +0.09 | +0.25 | 634 | 533 | | 2000 | Inside Republicans | Defense spending | +0.14 | 0.00 | +0.26 | 255 | 217 | | 2004 | Inside Republicans | Defense spending | +0.13 | +0.02 | +0.24 | 349 | 297 | | 2008 | Inside Republicans | Defense spending | +0.23 | +0.08 | +0.36 | 215 | 174 | | 2016 | Inside Republicans | Defense spending | +0.23 | +0.16 | +0.29 | 1,158 | 835 | | 2020 | Inside Republicans | Defense spending | +0.22 | +0.17 | +0.27 | 2,374 | 1,410 | | 2024 | Inside Republicans | Defense spending | +0.23 | +0.16 | +0.30 | 1,570 | 739 | Views: All white respondents (conditioning = All white respondents); Net of party identification (conditioning = Net of party identification); Inside Democrats (conditioning = Inside Democrats); Inside Republicans (conditioning = Inside Republicans). Note: The left dashed rule marks 1998, when the index had two statements; the right dashed rule marks 2012, when ANES added web interviews. Note: The health-insurance item was not asked in 1986, 1990 or 1998, and the defense item was not asked in 1998 or 2012, so those lines join the years on either side. The resentment statements were not asked in 1996 and 2002. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1986-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); white non-Hispanic respondents; net-of-party slopes with HC3 intervals Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/spillover.json ### Table 10. In 2012 web respondents' correlations with the health-insurance and government-services items were +0.42 and +0.40, against +0.28 and +0.26 face-to-face Weighted correlation of the racial resentment index with each policy item, oriented so that a high value is the conservative position, by interview mode, white non-Hispanic respondents, years with mode weights | Item | Year and mode | Correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Health insurance | 2008, face-to-face | +0.21 | +0.12 | +0.31 | 476 | 384 | | Health insurance | 2012, face-to-face | +0.28 | +0.20 | +0.35 | 801 | 573 | | Health insurance | 2012, web | +0.42 | +0.37 | +0.46 | 2,319 | 1,470 | | Health insurance | 2016, face-to-face | +0.47 | +0.40 | +0.54 | 671 | 437 | | Health insurance | 2016, web | +0.43 | +0.38 | +0.47 | 1,709 | 1,252 | | Health insurance | 2024, face-to-face | +0.51 | +0.42 | +0.58 | 591 | 317 | | Health insurance | 2024, web | +0.47 | +0.41 | +0.53 | 1,120 | 677 | | Government services | 2008, face-to-face | +0.13 | +0.02 | +0.23 | 450 | 366 | | Government services | 2012, face-to-face | +0.26 | +0.18 | +0.34 | 755 | 539 | | Government services | 2012, web | +0.40 | +0.35 | +0.44 | 2,272 | 1,442 | | Government services | 2016, face-to-face | +0.43 | +0.35 | +0.51 | 631 | 410 | | Government services | 2016, web | +0.46 | +0.41 | +0.50 | 1,669 | 1,222 | | Government services | 2024, face-to-face | +0.53 | +0.44 | +0.61 | 545 | 294 | | Government services | 2024, web | +0.47 | +0.41 | +0.53 | 1,077 | 648 | Note: ANES 2020 has no mode weights, so it has no row. The 2024 panel and paper respondents are in neither mode. The defense item is left out because it was not asked in 2012. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2008-2024; weighted with the mode weights (weight_ftf for in-person rows, weight_web for web rows); white non-Hispanic respondents Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/spillover_mode.json ### Table 11. Holding party identification fixed removes 56% to 67% of the per-decade rise in the three policy items, against 97% for self-placement Change per decade in the standardized slope of each policy item on the racial resentment index, with 95% intervals, white non-Hispanic respondents, survey years 1986 to 2024 | Outcome | Sample | Change per decade | Interval low | Interval high | Survey years | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Health insurance | All white respondents | +0.135 | +0.106 | +0.165 | 10 | 19,264 | | Health insurance | Net of party identification | +0.060 | +0.045 | +0.075 | 10 | 19,264 | | Health insurance | Democrats | +0.092 | +0.067 | +0.117 | 10 | 8,105 | | Health insurance | Republicans | +0.038 | +0.016 | +0.060 | 10 | 9,322 | | Government services | All white respondents | +0.118 | +0.095 | +0.141 | 13 | 20,857 | | Government services | Net of party identification | +0.039 | +0.017 | +0.061 | 13 | 20,857 | | Government services | Democrats | +0.044 | +0.016 | +0.073 | 13 | 8,904 | | Government services | Republicans | +0.051 | +0.028 | +0.073 | 13 | 10,000 | | Defense spending | All white respondents | +0.073 | +0.045 | +0.101 | 11 | 17,420 | | Defense spending | Net of party identification | +0.032 | +0.009 | +0.054 | 11 | 17,420 | | Defense spending | Democrats | +0.031 | 0.000 | +0.061 | 11 | 7,410 | | Defense spending | Republicans | +0.024 | +0.004 | +0.044 | 11 | 8,483 | Note: The interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and an interval that clusters on survey year with t critical values. Note: The health-insurance item was asked in fewer survey years than the others, and the defense item was not asked in 1998 or 2012. Note: Each test pools the survey years and does not model the change in interview mode in 2012. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1986-2024; weighted (VCF0009z); white non-Hispanic respondents; year-interaction coefficients, each survey year counting equally Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/policy_trends.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (139), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | change_2008_2012 | +0.01 | change in the correlation coefficient, 2008 to 2012 | difference between two weighted correlations (delta-method interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −0.06 to 0.08 | 3,934 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_r_1986 | +0.41 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation inside the party between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI 0.31 to 0.50 | 292 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_r_2024 | +0.44 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation inside the party between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.37 to 0.49 | 1,447 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_r_max | +0.51 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | maximum of the yearly weighted correlations inside the Democratic Party | white non-Hispanic Democrats (leaners included) with an index score and a self-placement | 1986-2024, highest over the survey years | | | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_r_min | +0.35 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | minimum of the yearly weighted correlations inside the Democratic Party | white non-Hispanic Democrats (leaners included) with an index score and a self-placement | 1986-2024, lowest over the survey years | | | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | df_1986 | +0.23 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point defense-spending position (7 greatly increase), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.30 | 769 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | df_2020 | +0.53 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point defense-spending position (7 greatly increase), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2020 | 95% CI 0.50 to 0.55 | 4,824 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | df_2024 | +0.44 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point defense-spending position (7 greatly increase), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.40 to 0.48 | 3,099 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fall_dem | 26.0 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index (2012 minus 2024) | difference between two weighted means | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) with an index score | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 23.5 to 28.4 | 2,842 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | fall_rep | 8.1 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index (2012 minus 2024) | difference between two weighted means | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) with an index score | 2012 to 2024 | 95% CI 6.2 to 10.0 | 3,327 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_res_1986 | 4.2 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index (Republicans minus Democrats) | difference between two weighted means | white non-Hispanic partisans (leaners included) with an index score | 1986 | 95% CI 0.9 to 7.6 | 731 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_res_2024 | 37.6 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index (Republicans minus Democrats) | difference between two weighted means | white non-Hispanic partisans (leaners included) with an index score | 2024 | 95% CI 35.3 to 39.9 | 3,350 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_1988 | +0.03 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1988 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.09 | 1,164 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_2008 | +0.21 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2008 | 95% CI 0.12 to 0.31 | 476 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_2012 | +0.37 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2012 | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.40 | 3,120 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_2020 | +0.53 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2020 | 95% CI 0.51 to 0.56 | 4,912 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_2024 | +0.48 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.44 to 0.52 | 3,164 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_chg_0812 | +0.15 | change in the correlation coefficient, 2008 to 2012 | difference between two weighted correlations of the resentment index with seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan) (delta-method interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.26 | 3,596 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_dem_1988 | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic Democrats (leaners included) | 1988 | 95% CI −0.05 to 0.13 | 457 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_dem_2024 | +0.37 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic Democrats (leaners included) | 2024 | 95% CI 0.30 to 0.44 | 1,429 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_ftf_2008 | +0.21 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_ftf), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2008 | 95% CI 0.12 to 0.31 | 476 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_ftf_2012 | +0.28 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_ftf), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2012 | 95% CI 0.20 to 0.35 | 801 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_ftf_2016 | +0.47 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_ftf), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2016 | 95% CI 0.40 to 0.54 | 671 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_ftf_2024 | +0.51 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_ftf), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2024 | 95% CI 0.42 to 0.58 | 591 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_ftf_chg_0812 | +0.06 | change in the correlation coefficient, 2008 to 2012, face-to-face respondents only | difference between two weighted correlations of the resentment index with seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), both among face-to-face respondents with the mode weight (delta-method interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement, interviewed in person | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −0.06 to 0.19 | 1,277 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_gap_2012 | +0.14 | difference in the correlation coefficient, 2012 (web minus face-to-face) | difference between the web and face-to-face weighted correlations of the resentment index with seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), each with its mode weight (delta-method interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2012 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.23 | 3,120 | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_net_1988 | 0.00 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | standardized slope of seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan) on the resentment index with the seven party-identification categories held fixed (HC3 interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1988 | 95% CI −0.05 to 0.06 | 1,160 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_net_2024 | +0.23 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | standardized slope of seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan) on the resentment index with the seven party-identification categories held fixed (HC3 interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.30 | 3,157 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_rep_1988 | +0.01 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic Republicans (leaners included) | 1988 | 95% CI −0.07 to 0.10 | 581 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_rep_2024 | +0.16 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic Republicans (leaners included) | 2024 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.23 | 1,590 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_web_2012 | +0.42 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_web), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed on the web | 2012 | 95% CI 0.37 to 0.46 | 2,319 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_web_2016 | +0.43 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_web), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed on the web | 2016 | 95% CI 0.38 to 0.47 | 1,709 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | hl_web_2024 | +0.47 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_web), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed on the web | 2024 | 95% CI 0.41 to 0.53 | 1,120 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_deserve_1986 | +0.24 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between one of the four resentment statements (recoded 0 to 1) and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.31 | 654 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_deserve_2024 | +0.58 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between one of the four resentment statements (recoded 0 to 1) and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.54 to 0.61 | 3,200 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_difficulty_1986 | +0.14 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between one of the four resentment statements (recoded 0 to 1) and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI 0.06 to 0.21 | 662 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_difficulty_2024 | +0.56 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between one of the four resentment statements (recoded 0 to 1) and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.52 to 0.59 | 3,205 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_favors_1986 | +0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between one of the four resentment statements (recoded 0 to 1) and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.29 | 660 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_favors_2024 | +0.59 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between one of the four resentment statements (recoded 0 to 1) and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.55 to 0.62 | 3,084 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_try_1986 | +0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between one of the four resentment statements (recoded 0 to 1) and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.29 | 661 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | item_try_2024 | +0.57 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between one of the four resentment statements (recoded 0 to 1) and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.53 to 0.60 | 3,202 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_ftf_2008 | +0.43 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2008 | 95% CI 0.37 to 0.49 | 823 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_ftf_2012 | +0.43 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2012 | 95% CI 0.36 to 0.50 | 702 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_ftf_2016 | +0.55 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2016 | 95% CI 0.47 to 0.61 | 581 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_ftf_2024 | +0.70 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2024 | 95% CI 0.63 to 0.75 | 550 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_gap_max | 0.05 | absolute difference in correlation coefficients | largest absolute gap between the web and face-to-face correlations in a year with both | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2012, 2016 and 2024 | | 7,773 | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_web_2012 | +0.45 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed on the web | 2012 | 95% CI 0.41 to 0.49 | 2,409 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_web_2016 | +0.59 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed on the web | 2016 | 95% CI 0.56 to 0.63 | 1,610 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_web_2024 | +0.66 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed on the web | 2024 | 95% CI 0.62 to 0.70 | 1,098 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_terc | 13,305 | respondents | count of respondents in the four survey years used for the thirds | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2012-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_white | 20,658 | respondents | count of respondents pooled across survey years | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_years | 13 | survey years | count of years with at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100 or more | ANES survey years with a headline estimate | 1986-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | net_1986 | +0.23 | standardized slope (change in self-placement standard deviations per standard deviation of the index) | standardized slope of self-placement on the resentment index in a regression with seven party-identification categories held fixed (HC3 interval); not a correlation: both variables are standardized on the whole white sample of the year, not within party categories | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.31 | 662 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | net_2024 | +0.24 | standardized slope (change in self-placement standard deviations per standard deviation of the index) | standardized slope of self-placement on the resentment index in a regression with seven party-identification categories held fixed (HC3 interval); not a correlation: both variables are standardized on the whole white sample of the year, not within party categories | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.29 | 3,200 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_all_1986 | +0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | all respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.29 | 812 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_all_2024 | +0.63 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | all respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.65 | 4,263 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_pid_ideol_1986 | +0.37 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between seven-point party identification and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement | white non-Hispanic respondents with a party identification and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.42 | 1,316 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_pid_ideol_2024 | +0.79 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between seven-point party identification and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement | white non-Hispanic respondents with a party identification and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.77 to 0.81 | 3,528 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_res_pid_1986 | +0.06 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point party identification (1 strong Democrat, 7 strong Republican) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.12 | 838 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_res_pid_2024 | +0.62 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point party identification (1 strong Democrat, 7 strong Republican) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.59 to 0.65 | 3,540 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_white_1986 | +0.27 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.34 | 664 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_white_2008 | +0.43 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2008 | 95% CI 0.37 to 0.49 | 823 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_white_2012 | +0.44 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2012 | 95% CI 0.40 to 0.48 | 3,111 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_white_2016 | +0.58 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2016 | 95% CI 0.55 to 0.61 | 2,191 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_white_2020 | +0.67 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2020 | 95% CI 0.65 to 0.69 | 4,799 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_white_2024 | +0.66 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.63 to 0.69 | 3,204 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rep_r_1986 | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation inside the party between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI −0.07 to 0.16 | 298 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rep_r_2024 | +0.26 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation inside the party between the racial resentment index and seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (Fisher z interval on the Kish effective sample size) | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.20 to 0.33 | 1,631 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | res_dem_1986 | 57.0 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) with an index score | 1986 | 95% CI 54.4 to 59.6 | 375 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | res_dem_2012 | 55.5 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) with an index score | 2012 | 95% CI 53.8 to 57.2 | 1,295 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | res_dem_2024 | 29.6 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) with an index score | 2024 | 95% CI 27.8 to 31.4 | 1,547 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | res_rep_1986 | 61.2 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) with an index score | 1986 | 95% CI 59.1 to 63.4 | 356 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | res_rep_2012 | 75.3 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) with an index score | 2012 | 95% CI 74.1 to 76.5 | 1,524 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | res_rep_2024 | 67.1 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) with an index score | 2024 | 95% CI 65.7 to 68.6 | 1,803 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | resm_dem_2012_ftf | 52.4 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index with the mode-specific weight | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) interviewed in person with an index score | 2012 | 95% CI 49.3 to 55.6 | 363 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | resm_dem_2012_web | 57.2 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index with the mode-specific weight | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) interviewed on the web with an index score | 2012 | 95% CI 55.2 to 59.2 | 932 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | resm_dem_2024_ftf | 23.0 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index with the mode-specific weight | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) interviewed in person with an index score | 2024 | 95% CI 19.5 to 26.5 | 278 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | resm_dem_2024_web | 32.5 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index with the mode-specific weight | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) interviewed on the web with an index score | 2024 | 95% CI 29.8 to 35.1 | 543 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | resm_gap_max | 9.5 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index (web minus face-to-face) | largest of the four web-minus-face-to-face differences in mean resentment (Democrats and Republicans, 2012 and 2024) | white non-Hispanic Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) | 2012 and 2024 | | | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | resm_gap_min | 4.8 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index (web minus face-to-face) | smallest of the four web-minus-face-to-face differences in mean resentment (Democrats and Republicans, 2012 and 2024) | white non-Hispanic Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) | 2012 and 2024 | | | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | resm_rep_2012_ftf | 72.0 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index with the mode-specific weight | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) interviewed in person with an index score | 2012 | 95% CI 69.7 to 74.3 | 397 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | resm_rep_2012_web | 77.2 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index with the mode-specific weight | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) interviewed on the web with an index score | 2012 | 95% CI 75.9 to 78.6 | 1,127 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | resm_rep_2024_ftf | 63.8 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index with the mode-specific weight | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) interviewed in person with an index score | 2024 | 95% CI 60.4 to 67.2 | 314 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | resm_rep_2024_web | 69.9 | points on the 0 to 100 resentment index | weighted mean of the racial resentment index with the mode-specific weight | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) interviewed on the web with an index score | 2024 | 95% CI 67.7 to 72.1 | 599 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rise_2012_2020 | +0.23 | change in the correlation coefficient, 2012 to 2020 | difference between two weighted correlations (delta-method interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2012 to 2020 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.27 | 7,910 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_partial | 84% | percent of the per-decade rise in the total correlation | one minus the ratio of the per-decade change in the partial correlation given party identification (both variables residualized on year-specific party dummies and re-standardized) to the per-decade change in the total correlation; percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap (500 replicates, seed 12345) that resamples respondents inside each year; the share exceeds 100 percent in a replicate whose net trend is negative | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 74% to 96% | 20,614 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_party | 97% | percent of the per-decade rise in the total correlation | one minus the ratio of the per-decade change in the standardized slope net of party identification (year-specific party dummies) to the per-decade change in the total correlation; percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap (500 replicates, seed 12345) that resamples respondents inside each year; the share exceeds 100 percent in a replicate whose net trend is negative | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 86% to 109% | 20,614 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_pol_max | 67% | percent of the per-decade rise in the item's correlation with the resentment index | largest of the three policy items' shares (seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services)): one minus the ratio of the net-of-party to the total per-decade change; percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 59% to 77% | 20,857 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_pol_min | 56% | percent of the per-decade rise in the item's correlation with the resentment index | smallest of the three policy items' shares (seven-point health-insurance position (1 government plan, 7 private plan)): one minus the ratio of the net-of-party to the total per-decade change; percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 10 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 49% to 64% | 19,264 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | share_within | 72% | percent of the per-decade rise in the total correlation | one minus the ratio of the average of the two within-party per-decade changes (Democrats and Republicans, correlations standardized inside party and year) to the per-decade change in the total correlation; percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap (500 replicates, seed 12345) that resamples respondents inside each year; the share exceeds 100 percent in a replicate whose net trend is negative | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement, Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 63% to 83% | 20,614 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_1986 | +0.06 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 1986 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.13 | 769 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_2008 | +0.13 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2008 | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.23 | 450 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_2012 | +0.35 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2012 | 95% CI 0.31 to 0.39 | 3,027 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_2020 | +0.48 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2020 | 95% CI 0.45 to 0.51 | 4,693 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_2024 | +0.50 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2024 | 95% CI 0.46 to 0.54 | 3,131 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_chg_0812 | +0.22 | change in the correlation coefficient, 2008 to 2012 | difference between two weighted correlations of the resentment index with seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services) (delta-method interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI 0.11 to 0.33 | 3,477 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_ftf_2008 | +0.13 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_ftf), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2008 | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.23 | 450 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_ftf_2012 | +0.26 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_ftf), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2012 | 95% CI 0.18 to 0.34 | 755 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_ftf_2016 | +0.43 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_ftf), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2016 | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.51 | 631 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_ftf_2024 | +0.53 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_ftf), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed in person | 2024 | 95% CI 0.44 to 0.61 | 545 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_ftf_chg_0812 | +0.13 | change in the correlation coefficient, 2008 to 2012, face-to-face respondents only | difference between two weighted correlations of the resentment index with seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), both among face-to-face respondents with the mode weight (delta-method interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement, interviewed in person | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI 0.00 to 0.26 | 1,205 | weight_ftf (face-to-face rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_gap_2012 | +0.14 | difference in the correlation coefficient, 2012 (web minus face-to-face) | difference between the web and face-to-face weighted correlations of the resentment index with seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), each with its mode weight (delta-method interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2012 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.23 | 3,027 | weight_ftf and weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_web_2012 | +0.40 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_web), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed on the web | 2012 | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.44 | 2,272 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_web_2016 | +0.46 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_web), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed on the web | 2016 | 95% CI 0.41 to 0.50 | 1,669 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sv_web_2024 | +0.47 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation between the racial resentment index and seven-point government-services position (reversed: 7 fewer services), oriented so that a high value is the conservative pole (Fisher z interval); mode-specific weight (weight_web), only respondents interviewed in that mode | white non-Hispanic respondents interviewed on the web | 2024 | 95% CI 0.41 to 0.53 | 1,077 | weight_web (web rows) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_dem_gap | 1.1 | points on the seven-point self-placement scale (most minus least resentful third) | difference between two weighted means | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included) | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.9 to 1.2 | 4,249 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_dem_high_mean | 3.7 | points on the seven-point scale (1 extremely liberal, 7 extremely conservative) | weighted mean of seven-point self-placement | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included), most resentful third of the resentment index within each survey year | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 3.5 to 3.8 | 411 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_dem_low_mean | 2.6 | points on the seven-point scale (1 extremely liberal, 7 extremely conservative) | weighted mean of seven-point self-placement | white non-Hispanic democrats (leaners included), least resentful third of the resentment index within each survey year | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 2.5 to 2.6 | 3,838 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_gap | 2.1 | points on the seven-point self-placement scale (most minus least resentful third) | difference between two weighted means | white non-Hispanic respondents | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 2.0 to 2.2 | 8,643 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_high_con | 70% | percent calling themselves slightly conservative, conservative or extremely conservative | weighted share with self-placement of 5 to 7 | white non-Hispanic respondents, most resentful third | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 68% to 72% | 3,483 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_high_mean | 5.3 | points on the seven-point scale (1 extremely liberal, 7 extremely conservative) | weighted mean of seven-point self-placement | white non-Hispanic respondents, most resentful third of the resentment index within each survey year | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 5.2 to 5.3 | 3,483 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_low_con | 19% | percent calling themselves slightly conservative, conservative or extremely conservative | weighted share with self-placement of 5 to 7 | white non-Hispanic respondents, least resentful third | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 17% to 20% | 5,160 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_low_mean | 3.2 | points on the seven-point scale (1 extremely liberal, 7 extremely conservative) | weighted mean of seven-point self-placement | white non-Hispanic respondents, least resentful third of the resentment index within each survey year | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 3.1 to 3.2 | 5,160 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_n_dem_high | 411 | respondents | count of respondents in the cell | white non-Hispanic democrats in the most resentful third of the resentment index | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_n_rep_low | 926 | respondents | count of respondents in the cell | white non-Hispanic republicans in the least resentful third of the resentment index | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_rep_gap | 0.6 | points on the seven-point self-placement scale (most minus least resentful third) | difference between two weighted means | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included) | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.5 to 0.7 | 3,711 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_rep_high_mean | 5.6 | points on the seven-point scale (1 extremely liberal, 7 extremely conservative) | weighted mean of seven-point self-placement | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included), most resentful third of the resentment index within each survey year | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 5.6 to 5.7 | 2,785 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_rep_low_mean | 5.0 | points on the seven-point scale (1 extremely liberal, 7 extremely conservative) | weighted mean of seven-point self-placement | white non-Hispanic republicans (leaners included), least resentful third of the resentment index within each survey year | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 5.0 to 5.1 | 926 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_size_high | 28% | percent of white respondents in the most resentful third of the resentment index | weighted share of the pooled white sample that falls in the third (thirds are cut inside each survey year on the weighted distribution, and the index has few distinct values) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 27% to 29% | 13,305 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_size_low | 37% | percent of white respondents in the least resentful third of the resentment index | weighted share of the pooled white sample that falls in the third (thirds are cut inside each survey year on the weighted distribution, and the index has few distinct values) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 36% to 38% | 13,305 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | terc_size_mid | 36% | percent of white respondents in the middle third of the resentment index | weighted share of the pooled white sample that falls in the third (thirds are cut inside each survey year on the weighted distribution, and the index has few distinct values) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 34% to 37% | 13,305 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_1986 | −0.32 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 (negative: warmer feelings go with lower resentment) | weighted Pearson correlation between the resentment index and the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer toward Black Americans (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a thermometer rating of Black Americans | 1986 | 95% CI −0.38 to −0.25 | 798 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_2024 | −0.28 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 (negative: warmer feelings go with lower resentment) | weighted Pearson correlation between the resentment index and the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer toward Black Americans (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a thermometer rating of Black Americans | 2024 | 95% CI −0.32 to −0.23 | 3,370 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_strongest | −0.35 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 (negative: warmer feelings go with lower resentment) | weighted Pearson correlation between the resentment index and the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer toward Black Americans (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a thermometer rating of Black Americans | 2016, the year with the strongest correlation of the 13 survey years | 95% CI −0.39 to −0.30 | 2,590 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | therm_weakest | −0.10 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 (negative: warmer feelings go with lower resentment) | weighted Pearson correlation between the resentment index and the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer toward Black Americans (Fisher z interval) | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a thermometer rating of Black Americans | 1998, the year with the weakest correlation of the 13 survey years | 95% CI −0.17 to −0.03 | 874 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_dem | 0.018 | change in the standardized slope per decade (equal to the change in the correlation for the total and within-party rows) | change per decade in the standardized slope of self-placement on the racial resentment index: the coefficient on index x decade in a weighted regression, each survey year counting equally; the interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval | white non-Hispanic Democrats (leaners included) | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI −0.002 to 0.039 | 8,650 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_dem_cl | 0.018 | change in the standardized slope per decade (equal to the change in the correlation for the total and within-party rows) | change per decade in the standardized slope of self-placement on the racial resentment index: the coefficient on index x decade in a weighted regression, each survey year counting equally; the interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval; this fact prints the year-clustered interval (t critical values, one cluster per survey year), which is the narrower one for Democrats | white non-Hispanic Democrats (leaners included) | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.008 to 0.029 | 8,650 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_df_net | 0.032 | change in the standardized slope per decade (equal to the change in the correlation for the total and within-party rows) | change per decade in the standardized slope of the defense-spending item on the racial resentment index: the coefficient on index x decade in a weighted regression, each survey year counting equally; the interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval Net of party identification: the regression adds one dummy variable for each year-by-party-identification category (seven categories in every year), so the effect of party may differ by year. | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement, party-identification categories held fixed | 11 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.009 to 0.054 | 17,420 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_df_total | 0.073 | change in the standardized slope per decade (equal to the change in the correlation for the total and within-party rows) | change per decade in the standardized slope of the defense-spending item on the racial resentment index: the coefficient on index x decade in a weighted regression, each survey year counting equally; the interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 11 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.045 to 0.101 | 17,420 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_hl_net | 0.060 | change in the standardized slope per decade (equal to the change in the correlation for the total and within-party rows) | change per decade in the standardized slope of the health-insurance item on the racial resentment index: the coefficient on index x decade in a weighted regression, each survey year counting equally; the interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval Net of party identification: the regression adds one dummy variable for each year-by-party-identification category (seven categories in every year), so the effect of party may differ by year. | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement, party-identification categories held fixed | 10 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.045 to 0.075 | 19,264 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_hl_total | 0.135 | change in the standardized slope per decade (equal to the change in the correlation for the total and within-party rows) | change per decade in the standardized slope of the health-insurance item on the racial resentment index: the coefficient on index x decade in a weighted regression, each survey year counting equally; the interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 10 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.106 to 0.165 | 19,264 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_net | 0.004 | change in the standardized slope per decade (equal to the change in the correlation for the total and within-party rows) | change per decade in the standardized slope of self-placement on the racial resentment index: the coefficient on index x decade in a weighted regression, each survey year counting equally; the interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval Net of party identification: the regression adds one dummy variable for each year-by-party-identification category (seven categories in every year), so the effect of party may differ by year. | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement, party-identification categories held fixed | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI −0.011 to 0.018 | 20,614 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_partial | 0.018 | change in the partial correlation per decade | per-decade change in the correlation between self-placement and the resentment index after removing year-specific party-identification dummies from both, each survey year counting equally; percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap (500 replicates, seed 12345) that resamples respondents inside each year | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.004 to 0.032 | 20,614 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_party_diff | 0.026 | difference in the change per decade of the within-party correlation (Republicans minus Democrats) | coefficient on Republican x index x decade in one weighted regression of the standardized outcome (standardized inside party and year, each party-year counting equally); the interval is the wider of HC3 and a year-clustered interval | white non-Hispanic Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI −0.003 to 0.055 | 18,810 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_rep | 0.044 | change in the standardized slope per decade (equal to the change in the correlation for the total and within-party rows) | change per decade in the standardized slope of self-placement on the racial resentment index: the coefficient on index x decade in a weighted regression, each survey year counting equally; the interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval | white non-Hispanic Republicans (leaners included) | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.019 to 0.070 | 10,160 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_sv_net | 0.039 | change in the standardized slope per decade (equal to the change in the correlation for the total and within-party rows) | change per decade in the standardized slope of the government-services item on the racial resentment index: the coefficient on index x decade in a weighted regression, each survey year counting equally; the interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval Net of party identification: the regression adds one dummy variable for each year-by-party-identification category (seven categories in every year), so the effect of party may differ by year. | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement, party-identification categories held fixed | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.017 to 0.061 | 20,857 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_sv_total | 0.118 | change in the standardized slope per decade (equal to the change in the correlation for the total and within-party rows) | change per decade in the standardized slope of the government-services item on the racial resentment index: the coefficient on index x decade in a weighted regression, each survey year counting equally; the interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.095 to 0.141 | 20,857 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_total | 0.112 | change in the standardized slope per decade (equal to the change in the correlation for the total and within-party rows) | change per decade in the standardized slope of self-placement on the racial resentment index: the coefficient on index x decade in a weighted regression, each survey year counting equally; the interval is the wider of a respondent-level HC3 interval and a year-clustered interval | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.090 to 0.133 | 20,614 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | tr_within | 0.031 | change in the average within-party correlation per decade | average of the Democratic and Republican per-decade changes in the within-party correlation, each survey year counting equally; percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap (500 replicates, seed 12345) that resamples respondents inside each year | white non-Hispanic respondents with an index score and a self-placement, Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) | 13 years between 1986 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.017 to 0.045 | 20,614 | weight (VCF0009z); mode-specific weight_ftf or weight_web where stated | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Racial resentment: A survey scale, developed by Donald Kinder and Lynn Sanders, that measures moral judgments about the work ethic and deservingness of Black Americans. Higher scores mean more resentment. - Standardized coefficient: A regression coefficient measured in standard deviations of the variables involved. It lets effects on differently scaled variables be compared. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - HC3 robust standard errors: A way of computing standard errors that stays valid when the spread of the outcome differs across respondents, with a correction for small samples. The book uses it for regressions that have no clusters. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Feeling thermometer: A 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way. ## Methods Sample: white non-Hispanic respondents in the ANES Cumulative Data File, the 13 study years from 1986 to 2024 with at least two of the four resentment statements (none in 1996 and 2002, two in 1998); 20,658 respondents have an index score and a self-placement. Index: each statement recoded from 0 (least resentful answer) to 1 (most resentful), averaged over the statements answered and multiplied by 100. Weights: VCF0009z; mode estimates use weight_ftf and weight_web (2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024). Estimator: weighted Pearson correlation, equal to the standardized slope when both variables are standardized within the year; net of party means dummy variables for the seven party-identification categories, fitted in each year. Trends: change per decade from a weighted regression on index x decade, with the wider of an HC3 and a year-clustered interval. Intervals: 95%; Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size for correlations; percentile intervals from a seeded bootstrap (500 replicates, seed 12345) for shares; none reflects the survey design. Suppression: at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100 per year. Changes and shares use unrounded estimates. ## What these data cannot show - The ANES is a series of cross-sections. - A change from one year to the next mixes people who changed their answers, people who changed parties, and the replacement of older cohorts by younger ones, and this chapter cannot separate them. - The Republican rise in the within-party correlation, for example, could come from Republicans who changed their views or from a different set of people calling themselves Republican in 2024 than in 1986. - The direction of influence is not identified. - Resentment and party identification are measured in the same interview. - Holding party fixed compares respondents who share a party label, and it does not show that party identification is an outcome or a cause of resentment. - Engelhardt [12] reports, from panel studies in the 1990s and 2000s, that white respondents aligned their racial attitudes with their party loyalties, so a change in resentment scores can follow party as well as precede it. - The data also cannot show why the parties moved apart. - They hold no measures of the messages voters heard, no panel that follows the same people, and no experiment. - The share of the rise that is between the parties depends on how the association is measured, and the intervals reflect sampling error only. - Several other limits are about measurement and coverage. - The headline series describes white non-Hispanic respondents, and the toggle for all respondents pools every group as a comparison. - The resentment statements were not asked in 1996 and 2002, and only two were asked in 1998. - Intervals assume a simple random sample and ignore the ANES sampling design, which can raise or lower the variance. - The mode checks cover the years with mode weights and leave out 2020, mean resentment and the policy-item correlations differ by mode within a year, and the trend tests pool the survey years without modeling the change to web interviews in 2012. - The spillover comparison rests on policy items that the ANES asked in most years, it cannot separate the 2008 to 2012 change from the move to web interviews, and it cannot tell a racialized policy from one that became partisan for other reasons. - The Floyd period in 2020 is in Chapter 5.3, Racial attitudes after George Floyd's death (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-after-george-floyd; planned), and other racial attitudes, such as views on interracial marriage and aid to Black Americans, are in Chapter 5.1, Fifty years of racial attitudes (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/fifty-years-of-racial-attitudes). ## References 1. Kinder, Donald R.; Sanders, Lynn M. (1996). Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals. University of Chicago Press. 2. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 3. Fisher, Ronald A. (1921). On the Probable Error of a Coefficient of Correlation Deduced from a Small Sample. Metron 1(4): 3-32. 4. Sides, John; Tesler, Michael; Vavreck, Lynn (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America. Princeton University Press. https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691174198/identity-crisis 5. Tesler, Michael (2012). The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race. American Journal of Political Science 56(3): 690-704. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2011.00577.x 6. Tesler, Michael (2016). Post-Racial or Most-Racial? Race and Politics in the Obama Era. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/P/bo22961444.html 7. Kinder, Donald R.; Sears, David O. (1981). Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism Versus Racial Threats to the Good Life. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 40(3): 414-431. 8. Sears, David O.; Henry, P. J. (2003). The Origins of Symbolic Racism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85(2): 259-275. 9. Sniderman, Paul M.; Tetlock, Philip E. (1986). Symbolic Racism: Problems of Motive Attribution in Political Analysis. Journal of Social Issues 42(2): 129-150. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-4560.1986.tb00229.x 10. Feldman, Stanley; Huddy, Leonie (2005). Racial Resentment and White Opposition to Race-Conscious Programs: Principles or Prejudice?. American Journal of Political Science 49(1): 168-183. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00117.x 11. Carmines, Edward G.; Sniderman, Paul M.; Easter, Beth C. (2011). On the Meaning, Measurement, and Implications of Racial Resentment. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 634(1): 98-116. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716210387499 12. Engelhardt, Andrew M. (2021). Racial Attitudes Through a Partisan Lens. British Journal of Political Science 51(3): 1062-1079. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000437 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/build.py (sha256 2d588b0bcfb4d88c458c66d37aa978f36c28f544582ecfea5e9b74c8de9a0a6a) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | f76c19f06b6b87d4ec40996754c35c6229419a81a7373449eece925f70d3f0b6 | | figures/item_check.json | 81dd334ff9f0419ff2880a052419c46b741a4d12f1f194ff03fd14e6fddc1994 | | figures/loading_trend.json | cc3441bf09d51c087dce82f45f19ac405331f902472f165083c3e468ebc5f2fd | | figures/mode_check.json | b3c6c01e9062863d1e464133592d941aac3dc2faacfb0225ebfb26af8510ef11 | | figures/party_conditioning.json | 11c56dee00a52c70b67870420666768ce3a184ff24aceb8f51f02073b3742fc9 | | figures/policy_trends.json | 6e559efe67bf7ff904a347c40a75198d4a0495ef41e1f18e46f636b148edf81f | | figures/resentment_by_mode.json | b1a36a3a47c9fb20f1d677f539b91d3f644080dceedfb36491088ab2a1aedc20 | | figures/resentment_by_party.json | 5c10a983279a4d7efd79ef9b3bfe20f2cce5cefb0039062506d89417302cc58c | | figures/share_table.json | 6e2e27a800d0ca96afe6a25a6ded1774bed7760b60f3346afde0350d53861848 | | figures/spillover.json | 6774dd94f9268580539a8227b1ed4780ced80468b7addb96c8f727d953740592 | | figures/spillover_mode.json | 2f9cf067e9d711cbcf5f74437d452e0bd918866b2514e03d9b437246132f9356 | | figures/tercile_ideology.json | d9aebe6f25ddfecb1373e84f3288fad7d90c4d7631bf3fbc931c6786b221ca70 | | meta.json | c0de600c00a1cfaf176b608beed01f74ee0746b6890cbe2c834c26632278c1bf | | refs.json | bf2e01a7f067ea20cddc654fbcb948b9fbe7d5e6a891bd8be64b6c8e34c78316 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/facts.json - Table 1, figure "loading_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/loading_trend.json - Table 2, figure "resentment_by_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/resentment_by_party.json - Table 3, figure "resentment_by_mode" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/resentment_by_mode.json - Table 4, figure "party_conditioning" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/party_conditioning.json - Table 5, figure "share_table" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/share_table.json - Table 6, figure "tercile_ideology" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/tercile_ideology.json - Table 7, figure "mode_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/mode_check.json - Table 8, figure "item_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/item_check.json - Table 9, figure "spillover" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/spillover.json - Table 10, figure "spillover_mode" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/spillover_mode.json - Table 11, figure "policy_trends" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/racial-attitudes-and-ideology/figures/policy_trends.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Confidence in thirteen institutions: report Chapter 6.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/confidence-in-institutions. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Confidence in thirteen institutions - Chapter: 6.1 (Part VI, Trust, science and democracy; The great sorting) - Question: How do Democrats and Republicans differ in confidence across 13 institutions, and when did each gap open? - Dek: Among respondents interviewed in person, the average size of the gap between Democrats and Republicans in confidence across thirteen institutions was 4.8 points in 1973-1980 and 9.4 points in 2022-2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - General Social Survey. General Social Survey cumulative data, 1972-2024, confidence items fielded 1973-2024; interview mode and interview date from the raw file; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/confidence-in-institutions - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/confidence-in-institutions/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/confidence-in-institutions/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026confidenceininstitutions ```bibtex @misc{singh2026confidenceininstitutions, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Confidence in thirteen institutions}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/confidence-in-institutions}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap in the share with a great deal of confidence; in-person interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 1973-1980 | 4.8 | 95% CI 4.3 to 5.5 | 10,281 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | mag_1973_80 | | mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap; in-person interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 9.4 | 95% CI 8.0 to 11.8 | 1,980 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | mag_ip_22_24 | | suppression floor (constant) | minimum size of a party-by-year cell | 1973-2024, survey years with the confidence items | 150 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | floor_n | | suppression floor (constant) | minimum effective size of a party-by-year cell | 1973-2024, survey years with the confidence items | 100 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | floor_neff | | count of respondents | smallest party-by-year cell shown in the figures | 1973-2024, survey years with the confidence items | 198 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | min_cell_n | | count of respondents | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6), with at least one confidence answer | 1973-2024, survey years with the confidence items | 41,797 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_resp | | count of survey years | years in which the confidence items were fielded | 1973-2024, survey years with the confidence items | 33 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | n_years | ## Findings Among respondents interviewed in person, the average size of the gap between Democrats and Republicans in confidence across thirteen institutions was 4.8 (95% CI 4.3 to 5.5) points in 1973-1980 and 9.4 (95% CI 8.0 to 11.8) points in 2022-2024. The gaps run in both directions. In 2022-2024 Democrats are more confident than Republicans in science, medicine, education, the press, Congress and television, and Republicans are more confident in the military, the Supreme Court and organized religion, each with an interval that excludes zero. The executive branch gap takes the sign of the party that holds the White House, and the intervals for banks, major companies and organized labor include zero. The General Social Survey (GSS) asks about "the people running" each institution and offers three answers: a great deal of confidence, only some, or hardly any [1]. The item measures confidence in the people running one institution, not trust in other people and not support for democracy as a form of government. This chapter tracks the share answering "a great deal" among respondents who identify with a party or lean toward one (leaners are counted with the party they lean toward). A gap is the Democratic share minus the Republican share, in points, so a positive gap means Democrats are more confident and a negative gap means Republicans are. Every number and figure uses this sign. Where an estimate has a confidence interval, the text prints it in parentheses after the estimate. The GSS asked about twelve institutions in 1973 and 1974 and about thirteen from 1975, when banks were added. (Note: Shares are weighted. Intervals use the Kish effective sample size [2] and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample, and an interval for a share near zero is cut off at zero. Cells below the suppression floor (fewer than 150 respondents or an effective sample under 100) are not shown, and the smallest cell shown has 198 respondents. The estimates rest on 41,797 respondents in 33 survey years.) The classic account of falling confidence in business, labor and government in the 1960s and 1970s [3] described the level of confidence. This chapter describes the difference between the parties. Chapter 6.3, Trust in science (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/trust-in-science; planned) takes up the science gap in depth, and here science is one institution of thirteen. The GSS interviewed in person, with some telephone interviews, through 2018, on the web only in 2021, and in both modes in 2022 and 2024. A change in a gap after 2020 can therefore come from a change in survey mode. The text compares 2022-2024 with earlier periods using in-person interviews, because every earlier survey was in person or mostly so. The 2022-2024 value pools two surveys. The rise after 2018 rests on the in-person interviews of 2022 and on the web interviews, and the in-person interviews of 2024 do not establish it. ### The average gap rose after the 1990s The mean absolute gap averages the sizes of the thirteen gaps and ignores their direction. Among in-person respondents it was 4.8 points in 1973-1980 and 4.1 in 1991-2000, then 6.2 in 2001-2010, 6.7 in 2011-2018 and 9.4 (95% CI 8.0 to 11.8) in 2022-2024 (Table 1). The intervals for 2001-2010 and 2011-2018 lie above the interval for 1991-2000, and the interval for 2011-2018 lies above the interval for 1973-1980. Table 1. The mean absolute party gap rose from 4.8 points in 1973-1980 to 6.7 in 2011-2018 and was 9.4 in person in 2022-2024 An average of absolute values is inflated by sampling error, because a true gap of zero still produces a small absolute gap in a sample. The dashed line in the figure is the average that noise alone would produce. It is between 0.8 and 1.2 points in the pooled periods before 2022 and 2.6 points for the smaller in-person sample of 2022-2024, and every period sits above its floor. Annual values before 2022 rest on one survey each, have a higher floor and run above the period estimates. Across all modes in 2021-2024, when 63.9% of the respondents were interviewed on the web, the mean absolute gap was 10.6 (95% CI 9.8 to 11.5), and among web respondents in 2022-2024 it was 12.0 (95% CI 10.6 to 13.6). The pooled in-person value for 2022-2024 averages the surveys of 2022 and 2024, which differ. In person the average was 11.3 (95% CI 9.7 to 14.2) in 2022, and its interval lies above the interval for 2011-2018. In 2024 it was 7.3 (95% CI 5.6 to 10.7), an interval that overlaps the one for 2011-2018 and contains the 8.1 of 2018, and among web respondents it was 12.0 in 2024. The 2024 in-person average covers twelve institutions because organized labor falls below the suppression floor. The rise after 2018 therefore rests on the in-person interviews of 2022 and on the web interviews, and the in-person interviews of 2024 do not establish it. The pattern holds without leaners. Counting only strong and weak identifiers, the mean absolute gap was 5.4 (95% CI 4.8 to 6.1) points in 1973-1980 and 8.7 (95% CI 7.2 to 11.2) in 2022-2024 among in-person respondents. The number of institutions with an estimated gap of 10 points or more went from 1 in 1973-1980 to 2 in 2011-2018 and 7 among in-person respondents in 2022-2024. (Note: Counting by interval, the gap excludes zero on the Democratic side for 5 of the thirteen institutions in 1973-1980 and 7 in 2022-2024 in person, and on the Republican side for 6 and 3.) Those counts use point estimates, and medicine, at +10.4, sits just above the cutoff. ### Parties differ most on science and the Supreme Court Among respondents interviewed in person in 2022-2024, the science gap was +19.8 (95% CI 11.8 to 27.8) points and the Supreme Court gap −16.2 (95% CI −22.8 to −9.5) (Table 2). The estimated gap is 10 points or more for 7 institutions: science, the Supreme Court, the executive branch, education, the military, organized religion and medicine. The intervals for major companies, banks and organized labor include zero, but each reaches past the Congress gap of +5.0 points, so a gap of that size is not ruled out for any of the three. Web respondents give different results for companies and labor, reported below. Table 2. In person in 2022-2024 the estimated party gap is 10 points or more for 7 of thirteen institutions Congress, television and the press have gaps of +5.0, +7.1 and +7.8 points at low levels of confidence for both parties. In Congress, 8.0% of Democrats and 3.0% of Republicans had a great deal of confidence, and the press shares are 10.4% and 2.6%, so a press gap of that size is large next to them. Gaps are compared in points, so a gap of a given size means more at a low level of confidence than at a high one, and the averages above do not adjust for the level. The levels behind the gaps are lower than in the 1970s for most institutions (Table 3). From 1973-1980 to 2022-2024 among in-person respondents, the share with a great deal of confidence fell for both parties in 8 of the thirteen institutions, with intervals that do not overlap, and rose for both parties only in the military. Table 3. Between 1973-1980 and 2022-2024 the share with a great deal of confidence fell for both parties in 8 of thirteen institutions ### The gaps have lasted since different periods A gap has lasted since the earliest period from which its interval stays on the same side of zero in that period and in every later period through 2022-2024, counting in-person interviews only. Table 4 shows the gap for each institution in six periods, and Table 5 gives the 2022-2024 gap with its interval and the period from which each gap has lasted. Television is the only gap that has lasted since the first period, from +4.0 (95% CI 2.1 to 5.9) in 1973-1980 to +7.1 (95% CI 2.5 to 11.6) in 2022-2024, and because the survey began in 1973 it may have started earlier. The Republican advantage on the military has lasted since 1981-1990 and was −22.3 (95% CI −25.6 to −18.9) points in 2001-2010, the largest Republican advantage in any period, and −13.7 in 2022-2024. Organized religion has favored Republicans since 1991-2000, the press has favored Democrats since 2001-2010, and the education and science gaps have lasted since 2011-2018. The press gap has favored Democrats in every period, although its interval includes zero in 1991-2000. Table 4. From 2011-2018 to 2022-2024 the Supreme Court gap moved from +1.1 to −16.2 points and the medicine gap from −1.8 to +10.4 The science gap changed sign. Republicans were the more confident party in 1973-1980 (−5.5 (95% CI −8.1 to −2.9)), the interval for 2001-2010 includes zero (+2.4 (95% CI −1.1 to 5.9)), and Democrats led in 2011-2018 (+9.7 (95% CI 6.1 to 13.4)). In the annual data for all modes the point estimate has been positive in every survey year since 2008, when it was +7.5 (95% CI 0.4 to 14.6), and the interval excludes zero in 2008, in 2014 and in every survey year from 2016. An earlier study of the GSS found that self-identified conservatives went from the most to the least trusting of science between 1974 and 2010 [4], a reversal by ideology in the same direction as the reversal by party here. The medicine and Supreme Court gaps have lasted only since 2022-2024, and both institutions had earlier gaps. Medicine favored Republicans, with an interval below zero, in 1973-1980 and in the next two periods, and the Court favored Republicans in 1981-1990 and 2001-2010. Neither interval excluded zero in 2011-2018 (−1.8 (95% CI −5.4 to 1.7) and +1.1 (95% CI −2.2 to 4.4)). Among in-person respondents in 2022-2024 they were +10.4 (95% CI 2.5 to 18.3) and −16.2 (95% CI −22.8 to −9.5), so the Court gap has the sign it had in earlier periods and the medicine gap has the opposite sign. The Congress gap has lasted since 2022-2024. It was also present in 1973-1980, and its intervals included zero from 1981-1990 to 2011-2018. Table 5. The television gap has lasted since 1973-1980 and the medicine, Congress and Supreme Court gaps only since 2022-2024 Three gaps that existed in earlier periods no longer stand out among in-person respondents in 2022-2024. The major companies gap was −12.2 (95% CI −14.5 to −9.9) in 1973-1980 and −11.4 (95% CI −14.3 to −8.4) in 2011-2018, so Republicans were the more confident party about companies. The organized labor gap was +6.9 (95% CI 5.2 to 8.6) and +4.6 (95% CI 2.1 to 7.0) in the same periods, so Democrats were the more confident party about labor. Republicans also led on banks in 1973-1980. In 2022-2024 the in-person gaps for companies, labor and banks each have an interval that includes zero. Web respondents give −6.2 (95% CI −11.2 to −1.2) for major companies and +9.0 (95% CI 3.5 to 14.4) for labor, so whether these two gaps have closed depends on the mode. ### The executive branch gap changes sign with the president The executive branch does not fit a pattern of a gap that opens and stays (Table 6). Its gap is positive under Democratic presidents and negative under Republican presidents in 33 of 33 survey years, and its interval excludes zero on the side of the president's party in 32 of them. The exception is 1980, when the gap was +4.7 (95% CI −0.1 to 9.6) points. The gap was −20.4 points in 2006 under George W. Bush, +16.1 in 2010 under Barack Obama, −13.1 in 2018 under Donald Trump and +16.3 in 2024 under Joe Biden, each with an interval that excludes zero. The 2021 survey began interviewing in December 2020 [5], so 22.1% of its executive branch respondents were interviewed before the inauguration in January 2021. Their gap was −10.7 (95% CI −19.1 to −2.3) points, against +16.0 (95% CI 11.7 to 20.4) for the rest, so each part has the sign of the president in office when it was interviewed. An analysis of the GSS through 2006 described this party-in-power pattern for the executive branch [1], and the surveys since then continue it. Chapter 6.2, Trust in government (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/trust-in-government; planned) asks whether trust in the federal government follows the same pattern in the American National Election Studies. Table 6. The executive branch gap has the sign of the president's party in 33 of 33 survey years ### The web science gap is larger before correcting for comparisons In 2021 the GSS invited an address-based sample to answer online [5], in 2022 it interviewed in person and on the web side by side [6], and 2024 has both modes again. The web accounted for 87.3% of 2021 respondents, 46.1% of 2022 respondents and 53.2% of 2024 respondents. Table 7 compares in-person and web respondents in 2022 and 2024 pooled. The point estimates have the same sign for 13 of the thirteen institutions, and the web gap is larger in absolute value for 8 of them. Only the science difference has an interval that excludes zero: the gap is +34.3 (95% CI 27.8 to 40.7) points on the web and +19.8 (95% CI 11.8 to 27.8) in person, a difference of +14.5 (95% CI 4.2 to 24.7) points. Science is one of thirteen comparisons. Multiplying its p-value (the probability of a difference this large if the two modes gave the same gap) by thirteen gives about 0.07, so the difference is not established once the number of comparisons is counted. For the other institutions the interval of the difference includes zero, but the intervals are wide. The largest point difference among them is 8.6 points, for medicine, and its interval reaches 18.6 points. The data therefore cannot rule out mode differences for other institutions as large as the science difference. The interval of each difference is in the data table under the figure. The pooled science gap across both modes, +28.2 (95% CI 23.4 to 32.9) points, is a blend of the two. Table 7. The web science gap differs from the in-person gap by +14.5 points, before correcting for thirteen comparisons Table 8 follows four institutions year by year. In person, the science gap was +10.7 (95% CI 3.0 to 18.3) points in 2018, +24.1 (95% CI 13.7 to 34.6) in 2022 and +11.8 (95% CI 0.1 to 23.5) in 2024. On the web it was +38.0 in 2022 and +31.4 in 2024. The web estimate is higher in each year that has both modes, by +13.9 (95% CI −0.2 to 28.0) points in 2022 and +19.6 (95% CI 5.0 to 34.3) in 2024, so the difference is established for 2024 only. In person the gap changed by +13.5 (95% CI 0.5 to 26.4) points from 2018 to 2022 and by −12.3 (95% CI −28.0 to 3.4) from 2022 to 2024. The second interval includes zero, so the in-person data do not show whether the 2024 gap is lower than the 2022 gap, and the pooled in-person figure averages the surveys of 2022 and 2024, whose point estimates differ. The 2024 interval is wide, with a lower end close to zero. The medicine gap has the same shape in person, with a wide interval in 2024. It was −3.4 (95% CI −10.7 to 4.0) in 2018, +15.2 (95% CI 4.6 to 25.7) in 2022 and +1.8 (95% CI −9.1 to 12.8) in 2024, while the web gap in 2024 was +19.9 (95% CI 11.7 to 28.0). ### The military gap narrowed by 2024 In person the military gap went from −21.0 (95% CI −28.1 to −13.9) in 2018 to −17.5 in 2022 and −6.7 (95% CI −18.6 to 5.2) in 2024. The change from 2018 to 2024 is +14.3 (95% CI 0.4 to 28.1) points, and the change from 2022 to 2024 is +10.8 (95% CI −5.4 to 27.1), an interval that includes zero. On the web the gap went from −18.7 in 2022 to +2.2 in 2024, a change of +20.9 (95% CI 7.1 to 34.6), and across all modes the 2024 gap was +0.3 (95% CI −6.7 to 7.3). The in-person narrowing since 2018 comes mostly from Republicans. Their share with a great deal of confidence in the military went from 73.5% (95% CI 68.4% to 78.6%) in 2018 to 54.8% (95% CI 46.2% to 63.4%) in 2024, while the Democratic share went from 52.5% (95% CI 47.6% to 57.4%) to 48.1% (95% CI 39.9% to 56.3%). ### The Supreme Court gap opened by 2022 In person the Court gap was −3.9 (95% CI −11.2 to 3.3) in 2018 and −19.8 (95% CI −28.6 to −10.9) in 2022, and on the web it was −5.5 (95% CI −10.8 to −0.2) in 2021 and −19.7 (95% CI −27.6 to −11.9) in 2022. In person there is no survey between 2018 and 2022, so the timing rests on the web series. In 2024 the gap was −9.5 in person and −23.0 on the web (Table 8). Table 8. The Supreme Court gap was on the Republican side by 2022 in both interview modes Most of the change comes from Democrats. Among in-person respondents their share with a great deal of confidence in the Court fell from 32.7% in 2018 to 8.9% in 2022, and among web respondents it fell from 25.5% in 2021 to 7.1% in 2022. The Court decided *Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization* in June 2022 [7], but the 2022 survey does not date the fall to that decision. Web interviewing in 2022 began in May, after a news report in early May 2022 published the Court's draft opinion [8], so an interview before the ruling was not an interview before the news. Web interviews of Democrats before the ruling already show a low share, and its interval is cut off at zero and overlaps the interval for interviews after the ruling. (Note: Among Democrats interviewed on the web in 2022, the share with a great deal of confidence in the Court was 4.6% (95% CI 0.0% to 9.2%) before the ruling and 7.8% (95% CI 3.3% to 12.4%) from the day after it.) Too few in-person interviews were completed before the ruling to run the same check. ### What these data cannot show The GSS interviews a new sample each time and asks party identification and confidence in the same interview, so it cannot say whether individuals changed their confidence or whether the people who call themselves Democrats or Republicans changed. A gap between party identifiers can widen when the membership of the parties shifts along lines such as education or religion (party sorting, taken up in Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened)). The comparison of in-person and web respondents cannot separate an effect of the mode from a difference between the people who answered in each mode. In 2022 respondents were randomly assigned to a sequence of modes, face to face first or web first, and each sequence followed up nonrespondents in the other mode [6]. The two mode samples therefore reflect who answered which invitation. The 2021 survey was designed as a web survey, and its documentation cautions that changes in 2021 may reflect the change in method as well as changes in opinion [5]. The item asks about the people running an institution, with three answers, so a change in the share answering "a great deal" does not show where the other answers went. The executive branch item in particular follows the incumbent administration. The thirteen institutions are the ones the GSS asks about, and the survey has no items for others such as the police. Causes are outside the design. The rise after 2018 coincides with a change of president, a pandemic and a change of mode, and the data cannot say which of them, if any, moved the gaps. The same holds for the Court's ruling in 2022. The in-person cells of 2022 and 2024 are small, so the estimates for those years are less precise than those for earlier periods. The sample is national, and it supports no claims about states or counties. The intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents, but the GSS samples clusters of households within strata of areas. The intervals for the mean absolute gap come from resampling respondents and ignore the sampling design in the same way, and no design-based version of them has been run. (Note: A design-based standard error uses the survey's strata and clusters. Across 585 gap estimates, the median ratio of the design-based standard error to the one that assumes a simple random sample is 1.01, with most between 0.87 and 1.17, and in 15 of them the interval excludes zero under one method and not the other.) Chapter 6.5, Institutional trust outside the United States (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/institutional-trust-outside-the-united-states; planned) asks whether comparable gaps appear in other democracies, Chapter 6.4, Generalized and institutional trust (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/generalized-and-institutional-trust; planned) asks whether trust in other people moved with confidence in institutions, and Chapter 6.6, Tolerance of speech (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech) turns to another GSS battery. ## Tables ### Table 1. The mean absolute party gap rose from 4.8 points in 1973-1980 to 6.7 in 2011-2018 and was 9.4 in person in 2022-2024 Mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap in the share with a great deal of confidence, percentage points, by survey year (line) and by pooled period (steps), with 95% intervals; in-person, all-mode and web views | conf_high | conf_low | mode | n | series | value | year | | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | | 8.30 | 4.90 | all | 1,288 | Mean absolute gap | 6.10 | 1973 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1973 | | 9.30 | 6.10 | all | 1,258 | Mean absolute gap | 7.30 | 1974 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1974 | | 8.30 | 5.20 | all | 1,262 | Mean absolute gap | 6.50 | 1975 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1975 | | 9.10 | 5.80 | all | 1,250 | Mean absolute gap | 7.30 | 1976 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1976 | | 7.40 | 4.40 | all | 1,338 | Mean absolute gap | 5.50 | 1977 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1977 | | 6.60 | 3.80 | all | 1,296 | Mean absolute gap | 4.60 | 1978 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.50 | 1978 | | 7.40 | 3.30 | all | 1,210 | Mean absolute gap | 4.60 | 1980 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.50 | 1980 | | 9.90 | 5.90 | all | 1,612 | Mean absolute gap | 7.30 | 1982 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.40 | 1982 | | 6.90 | 4.30 | all | 1,388 | Mean absolute gap | 4.90 | 1983 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1983 | | 9.70 | 4.40 | all | 1,280 | Mean absolute gap | 6 | 1984 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 3 | 1984 | | 6.10 | 3.30 | all | 1,271 | Mean absolute gap | 3.80 | 1986 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.20 | 1986 | | 7 | 4.50 | all | 1,595 | Mean absolute gap | 5.10 | 1987 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.20 | 1987 | | 8.20 | 4.80 | all | 1,290 | Mean absolute gap | 6 | 1988 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.60 | 1988 | | 8.60 | 5.10 | all | 1,327 | Mean absolute gap | 6.50 | 1989 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.60 | 1989 | | 8.20 | 3.50 | all | 1,201 | Mean absolute gap | 5.20 | 1990 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.70 | 1990 | | 10.80 | 5.80 | all | 1,309 | Mean absolute gap | 7.90 | 1991 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.60 | 1991 | | 7.10 | 4.20 | all | 1,375 | Mean absolute gap | 5 | 1993 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1993 | | 5.50 | 3.30 | all | 2,530 | Mean absolute gap | 3.90 | 1994 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 1.80 | 1994 | | 6.10 | 3.90 | all | 2,398 | Mean absolute gap | 4.60 | 1996 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 1.80 | 1996 | | 6.30 | 3.80 | all | 2,283 | Mean absolute gap | 4.50 | 1998 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 1.90 | 1998 | | 6.40 | 4.10 | all | 2,191 | Mean absolute gap | 4.70 | 2000 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2 | 2000 | | 9.30 | 5.90 | all | 2,153 | Mean absolute gap | 6.60 | 2002 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.90 | 2002 | | 12.20 | 7.20 | all | 2,300 | Mean absolute gap | 9 | 2004 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.90 | 2004 | | 11.30 | 7.30 | all | 3,422 | Mean absolute gap | 8.90 | 2006 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2 | 2006 | | 7.40 | 4.70 | all | 1,650 | Mean absolute gap | 5.80 | 2008 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 2008 | | 8.70 | 5.60 | all | 1,619 | Mean absolute gap | 6.40 | 2010 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.40 | 2010 | | 9.90 | 6.90 | all | 1,533 | Mean absolute gap | 7.90 | 2012 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.40 | 2012 | | 8.70 | 5.90 | all | 1,948 | Mean absolute gap | 7.10 | 2014 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2 | 2014 | | 8.40 | 6 | all | 2,290 | Mean absolute gap | 7 | 2016 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 1.90 | 2016 | | 10 | 6.90 | all | 1,824 | Mean absolute gap | 8.10 | 2018 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.40 | 2018 | | 12.20 | 9.90 | all | 3,069 | Mean absolute gap | 11 | 2021 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 1.70 | 2021 | | 13.20 | 9.80 | all | 2,568 | Mean absolute gap | 11.50 | 2022 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.20 | 2022 | | 12.30 | 8.60 | all | 2,356 | Mean absolute gap | 10.10 | 2024 | | n/a | n/a | all | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.20 | 2024 | | 5.50 | 4.30 | all | 10,281 | Period estimate | 4.80 | 1973 | | 5.50 | 4.30 | all | 10,281 | Period estimate | 4.80 | 1980 | | 5.80 | 4.50 | all | 12,330 | Period estimate | 5.10 | 1981 | | 5.80 | 4.50 | all | 12,330 | Period estimate | 5.10 | 1990 | | 4.80 | 3.60 | all | 12,086 | Period estimate | 4.10 | 1991 | | 4.80 | 3.60 | all | 12,086 | Period estimate | 4.10 | 2000 | | 7.30 | 5.60 | all | 11,144 | Period estimate | 6.30 | 2001 | | 7.30 | 5.60 | all | 11,144 | Period estimate | 6.30 | 2010 | | 7.50 | 6 | all | 7,595 | Period estimate | 6.70 | 2011 | | 7.50 | 6 | all | 7,595 | Period estimate | 6.70 | 2018 | | 11.50 | 9.80 | all | 7,993 | Period estimate | 10.60 | 2021 | | 11.50 | 9.80 | all | 7,993 | Period estimate | 10.60 | 2024 | | 8.30 | 5 | inperson | 1,288 | Mean absolute gap | 6.10 | 1973 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1973 | | 9.20 | 6.10 | inperson | 1,258 | Mean absolute gap | 7.30 | 1974 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1974 | | 8.30 | 5.10 | inperson | 1,262 | Mean absolute gap | 6.50 | 1975 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1975 | | 9.10 | 5.90 | inperson | 1,250 | Mean absolute gap | 7.30 | 1976 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1976 | | 7.40 | 4.40 | inperson | 1,338 | Mean absolute gap | 5.50 | 1977 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1977 | | 6.60 | 3.90 | inperson | 1,296 | Mean absolute gap | 4.60 | 1978 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.50 | 1978 | | 7.40 | 3.30 | inperson | 1,210 | Mean absolute gap | 4.60 | 1980 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.50 | 1980 | | 9.80 | 5.90 | inperson | 1,612 | Mean absolute gap | 7.30 | 1982 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.40 | 1982 | | 7 | 4.30 | inperson | 1,388 | Mean absolute gap | 4.90 | 1983 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1983 | | 9.70 | 4.50 | inperson | 1,280 | Mean absolute gap | 6 | 1984 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 3 | 1984 | | 6.10 | 3.30 | inperson | 1,271 | Mean absolute gap | 3.80 | 1986 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.20 | 1986 | | 7 | 4.50 | inperson | 1,595 | Mean absolute gap | 5.10 | 1987 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.20 | 1987 | | 8.30 | 4.90 | inperson | 1,290 | Mean absolute gap | 6 | 1988 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.60 | 1988 | | 8.70 | 5.20 | inperson | 1,327 | Mean absolute gap | 6.50 | 1989 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.60 | 1989 | | 8.20 | 3.50 | inperson | 1,201 | Mean absolute gap | 5.20 | 1990 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.70 | 1990 | | 10.70 | 6 | inperson | 1,309 | Mean absolute gap | 7.90 | 1991 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.60 | 1991 | | 7.20 | 4.10 | inperson | 1,375 | Mean absolute gap | 5 | 1993 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.30 | 1993 | | 5.50 | 3.30 | inperson | 2,530 | Mean absolute gap | 3.90 | 1994 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 1.80 | 1994 | | 6.20 | 4 | inperson | 2,398 | Mean absolute gap | 4.60 | 1996 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 1.80 | 1996 | | 6.20 | 3.80 | inperson | 2,283 | Mean absolute gap | 4.50 | 1998 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 1.90 | 1998 | | 6.40 | 4.10 | inperson | 2,191 | Mean absolute gap | 4.70 | 2000 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2 | 2000 | | 9.40 | 5.90 | inperson | 2,153 | Mean absolute gap | 6.60 | 2002 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.90 | 2002 | | 12.60 | 7.20 | inperson | 1,796 | Mean absolute gap | 9.20 | 2004 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 3.10 | 2004 | | 11.20 | 7.30 | inperson | 3,190 | Mean absolute gap | 8.70 | 2006 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.10 | 2006 | | 7.40 | 4.40 | inperson | 1,456 | Mean absolute gap | 5.50 | 2008 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.40 | 2008 | | 9 | 5.80 | inperson | 1,440 | Mean absolute gap | 6.90 | 2010 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.60 | 2010 | | 10.40 | 6.90 | inperson | 1,326 | Mean absolute gap | 7.90 | 2012 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.70 | 2012 | | 9 | 6 | inperson | 1,700 | Mean absolute gap | 7.30 | 2014 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.10 | 2014 | | 8.60 | 6.10 | inperson | 2,125 | Mean absolute gap | 7.10 | 2016 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2 | 2016 | | 10.10 | 6.70 | inperson | 1,640 | Mean absolute gap | 8.10 | 2018 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.50 | 2018 | | 14.20 | 9.70 | inperson | 1,158 | Mean absolute gap | 11.30 | 2022 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 3.30 | 2022 | | 10.70 | 5.60 | inperson | 822 | Mean absolute gap | 7.30 | 2024 | | n/a | n/a | inperson | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 3.70 | 2024 | | 5.50 | 4.30 | inperson | 10,281 | Period estimate | 4.80 | 1973 | | 5.50 | 4.30 | inperson | 10,281 | Period estimate | 4.80 | 1980 | | 5.80 | 4.50 | inperson | 12,330 | Period estimate | 5.10 | 1981 | | 5.80 | 4.50 | inperson | 12,330 | Period estimate | 5.10 | 1990 | | 4.80 | 3.60 | inperson | 12,086 | Period estimate | 4.10 | 1991 | | 4.80 | 3.60 | inperson | 12,086 | Period estimate | 4.10 | 2000 | | 7.20 | 5.50 | inperson | 10,035 | Period estimate | 6.20 | 2001 | | 7.20 | 5.50 | inperson | 10,035 | Period estimate | 6.20 | 2010 | | 7.50 | 6 | inperson | 6,791 | Period estimate | 6.70 | 2011 | | 7.50 | 6 | inperson | 6,791 | Period estimate | 6.70 | 2018 | | 11.80 | 8 | inperson | 1,980 | Period estimate | 9.40 | 2022 | | 11.80 | 8 | inperson | 1,980 | Period estimate | 9.40 | 2024 | | 12.40 | 10 | web | 2,677 | Mean absolute gap | 11.20 | 2021 | | n/a | n/a | web | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 1.80 | 2021 | | 15.80 | 10.80 | web | 1,156 | Mean absolute gap | 13.40 | 2022 | | n/a | n/a | web | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.90 | 2022 | | 14.80 | 10 | web | 1,256 | Mean absolute gap | 12 | 2024 | | n/a | n/a | web | n/a | Sampling-noise floor | 2.70 | 2024 | | 13.60 | 10.60 | web | 2,412 | Period estimate | 12 | 2022 | | 13.60 | 10.60 | web | 2,412 | Period estimate | 12 | 2024 | Views: In-person interviews only (mode = inperson); All interview modes (mode = all); Web interviews only (mode = web). Note: Banks and financial institutions were first asked in 1975, so the averages for 1973 and 1974 cover twelve institutions. Organized labor is left out of the 2024 in-person average because its party cells fall below the suppression floor. Every other average covers thirteen institutions. Note: The mean of absolute values is pushed up by sampling error when true gaps are small, which is why the noise floor is shown. Note: The bootstrap resamples respondents and ignores the survey's sampling design, and a design-based version of these intervals has not been computed. Note: Lines are broken between 2018 and the next survey year in each view, because there is no 2020 survey and the 2021 survey had no in-person interviews. Source: General Social Survey, 1973-2024; weighted (weight_use); Democrats and Republicans include leaners; bootstrap intervals with 2,000 replicates and a fixed seed Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/mean_abs_gap.json ### Table 2. In person in 2022-2024 the estimated party gap is 10 points or more for 7 of thirteen institutions Share with a great deal of confidence in the people running each institution, percent, Democrats and Republicans including leaners, in-person interviews, 2022 and 2024 pooled, 95% intervals | Institution | Republican share (%) | Republican share, lower end | Republican share, upper end | Democratic share (%) | Democratic share, lower end | Democratic share, upper end | Gap (points) | Republican respondents | Democratic respondents | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Scientific community | 26.4 | 20.8 | 32.0 | 46.2 | 40.5 | 51.9 | +19.8 | 581 | 678 | | Executive branch | 5.1 | 2.3 | 7.8 | 19.7 | 15.2 | 24.2 | +14.6 | 604 | 691 | | Education | 15.4 | 10.8 | 19.9 | 29.7 | 24.6 | 34.8 | +14.4 | 607 | 698 | | Medicine | 28.5 | 22.9 | 34.2 | 39.0 | 33.5 | 44.4 | +10.4 | 607 | 702 | | Press | 2.6 | 0.6 | 4.5 | 10.4 | 6.9 | 13.8 | +7.8 | 604 | 693 | | Television | 4.9 | 2.2 | 7.6 | 12.0 | 8.3 | 15.6 | +7.1 | 603 | 688 | | Congress | 3.0 | 0.9 | 5.2 | 8.0 | 5.0 | 11.1 | +5.0 | 602 | 694 | | Organized labor | 17.9 | 12.1 | 23.7 | 18.7 | 13.5 | 23.9 | +0.8 | 444 | 520 | | Banks and finance | 19.4 | 14.4 | 24.4 | 19.7 | 15.3 | 24.2 | +0.3 | 607 | 700 | | Major companies | 16.6 | 11.8 | 21.3 | 15.7 | 11.6 | 19.9 | −0.8 | 587 | 678 | | Organized religion | 25.7 | 20.1 | 31.2 | 14.0 | 10.1 | 18.0 | −11.6 | 585 | 679 | | Military | 59.2 | 53.1 | 65.4 | 45.5 | 39.9 | 51.1 | −13.7 | 609 | 693 | | Supreme Court | 26.9 | 21.3 | 32.6 | 10.8 | 7.3 | 14.3 | −16.2 | 596 | 693 | Note: The dots pool the in-person interviews of 2022 and 2024, and there is no in-person survey in 2021. The number of respondents behind each dot is in the data table. Note: Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: General Social Survey, 1973-2024; weighted (weight_use); Democrats and Republicans include leaners (in-person interviews, 2022 and 2024 pooled); intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/party_shares_22_24.json ### Table 3. Between 1973-1980 and 2022-2024 the share with a great deal of confidence fell for both parties in 8 of thirteen institutions Share with "a great deal" of confidence in the people running each institution, percent, by survey year, Democrats (solid line) and Republicans (dashed line) including leaners, 95% intervals; in-person and all-mode views | conf_high | conf_low | institution | mode | n | party | share | web_pct | year | | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 43.90 | 36.20 | Scientific community | all | 740 | Democrats | 40.10 | 0 | 1973 | | 53.10 | 45.20 | Scientific community | all | 745 | Democrats | 49.20 | 0 | 1974 | | 44.80 | 36.90 | Scientific community | all | 730 | Democrats | 40.90 | 0 | 1975 | | 49.40 | 41.40 | Scientific community | all | 739 | Democrats | 45.40 | 0 | 1976 | | 45.90 | 38.30 | Scientific community | all | 810 | Democrats | 42.10 | 0 | 1977 | | 47.30 | 38.30 | Scientific community | all | 739 | Democrats | 42.80 | 0 | 1978 | | 46.60 | 37.40 | Scientific community | all | 683 | Democrats | 42 | 0 | 1980 | | 42.20 | 34.30 | Scientific community | all | 993 | Democrats | 38.30 | 0 | 1982 | | 49.40 | 40.50 | Scientific community | all | 789 | Democrats | 44.90 | 0 | 1983 | | 54 | 42.80 | Scientific community | all | 463 | Democrats | 48.40 | 0 | 1984 | | 44.20 | 36.20 | Scientific community | all | 697 | Democrats | 40.20 | 0 | 1986 | | 50.20 | 42.20 | Scientific community | all | 951 | Democrats | 46.20 | 0 | 1987 | | 50.50 | 40.20 | Scientific community | all | 443 | Democrats | 45.40 | 0 | 1988 | | 48.20 | 37.50 | Scientific community | all | 433 | Democrats | 42.90 | 0 | 1989 | | 45.30 | 34 | Scientific community | all | 379 | Democrats | 39.60 | 0 | 1990 | | 42.90 | 32.50 | Scientific community | all | 422 | Democrats | 37.70 | 0 | 1991 | | 45.40 | 35.10 | Scientific community | all | 451 | Democrats | 40.30 | 0 | 1993 | | 45.20 | 37.90 | Scientific community | all | 872 | Democrats | 41.50 | 0 | 1994 | | 47.70 | 40 | Scientific community | all | 807 | Democrats | 43.90 | 0 | 1996 | | 48 | 40.10 | Scientific community | all | 795 | Democrats | 44.10 | 0 | 1998 | | 51.30 | 43.20 | Scientific community | all | 754 | Democrats | 47.20 | 0 | 2000 | | 48.70 | 37 | Scientific community | all | 385 | Democrats | 42.90 | 0 | 2002 | | 48.90 | 36.80 | Scientific community | all | 387 | Democrats | 42.90 | 0 | 2004 | | 50.20 | 41.90 | Scientific community | all | 809 | Democrats | 46 | 0 | 2006 | | 48 | 38.90 | Scientific community | all | 639 | Democrats | 43.40 | 0 | 2008 | | 51.50 | 41.40 | Scientific community | all | 640 | Democrats | 46.50 | 0 | 2010 | | 51.80 | 41.90 | Scientific community | all | 612 | Democrats | 46.90 | 0 | 2012 | | 50.80 | 42.60 | Scientific community | all | 747 | Democrats | 46.70 | 0 | 2014 | | 53.80 | 45.80 | Scientific community | all | 904 | Democrats | 49.80 | 0 | 2016 | | 60.30 | 50.90 | Scientific community | all | 673 | Democrats | 55.60 | 0 | 2018 | | 67.20 | 60.20 | Scientific community | all | 1,194 | Democrats | 63.70 | 88 | 2021 | | 58 | 48.10 | Scientific community | all | 934 | Democrats | 53.10 | 47 | 2022 | | 55.60 | 45.70 | Scientific community | all | 812 | Democrats | 50.60 | 54 | 2024 | | 49.70 | 39.50 | Scientific community | all | 429 | Republicans | 44.60 | 0 | 1973 | | 60.90 | 50.20 | Scientific community | all | 384 | Republicans | 55.60 | 0 | 1974 | | 50.50 | 39.90 | Scientific community | all | 403 | Republicans | 45.20 | 0 | 1975 | | 60.70 | 49.80 | Scientific community | all | 379 | Republicans | 55.30 | 0 | 1976 | | 56.40 | 45.90 | Scientific community | all | 424 | Republicans | 51.20 | 0 | 1977 | | 46.30 | 34.70 | Scientific community | all | 452 | Republicans | 40.50 | 0 | 1978 | | 56.60 | 45.30 | Scientific community | all | 416 | Republicans | 50.90 | 0 | 1980 | | 57.70 | 46.30 | Scientific community | all | 460 | Republicans | 52 | 0 | 1982 | | 53.30 | 42.70 | Scientific community | all | 516 | Republicans | 48 | 0 | 1983 | | 60.30 | 47.10 | Scientific community | all | 336 | Republicans | 53.70 | 0 | 1984 | | 52 | 42.50 | Scientific community | all | 504 | Republicans | 47.20 | 0 | 1986 | | 57 | 47.10 | Scientific community | all | 535 | Republicans | 52 | 0 | 1987 | | 49.40 | 38.10 | Scientific community | all | 367 | Republicans | 43.70 | 0 | 1988 | | 55.90 | 45 | Scientific community | all | 385 | Republicans | 50.50 | 0 | 1989 | | 50.40 | 38.80 | Scientific community | all | 347 | Republicans | 44.60 | 0 | 1990 | | 55.80 | 45 | Scientific community | all | 401 | Republicans | 50.40 | 0 | 1991 | | 47.80 | 36.80 | Scientific community | all | 381 | Republicans | 42.30 | 0 | 1993 | | 47.80 | 39.80 | Scientific community | all | 743 | Republicans | 43.80 | 0 | 1994 | | 49.90 | 41.50 | Scientific community | all | 648 | Republicans | 45.70 | 0 | 1996 | | 50.10 | 41.60 | Scientific community | all | 635 | Republicans | 45.90 | 0 | 1998 | | 50.90 | 42.20 | Scientific community | all | 623 | Republicans | 46.50 | 0 | 2000 | | 48.20 | 35.30 | Scientific community | all | 290 | Republicans | 41.70 | 0 | 2002 | | 51.30 | 38.90 | Scientific community | all | 330 | Republicans | 45.10 | 0 | 2004 | | 52 | 42.80 | Scientific community | all | 640 | Republicans | 47.40 | 0 | 2006 | | 41.30 | 30.60 | Scientific community | all | 432 | Republicans | 36 | 0 | 2008 | | 46.20 | 34.80 | Scientific community | all | 416 | Republicans | 40.50 | 0 | 2010 | | 45.70 | 33.50 | Scientific community | all | 384 | Republicans | 39.60 | 0 | 2012 | | 44.10 | 34.30 | Scientific community | all | 499 | Republicans | 39.20 | 0 | 2014 | | 41.60 | 32.60 | Scientific community | all | 600 | Republicans | 37.10 | 0 | 2016 | | 49.40 | 37.80 | Scientific community | all | 516 | Republicans | 43.60 | 0 | 2018 | | 37.50 | 29.70 | Scientific community | all | 822 | Republicans | 33.60 | 85 | 2021 | | 27.40 | 18 | Scientific community | all | 761 | Republicans | 22.70 | 46 | 2022 | | 29.30 | 20.50 | Scientific community | all | 704 | Republicans | 24.90 | 57 | 2024 | | 26.10 | 19.70 | Executive branch | all | 785 | Democrats | 22.90 | 0 | 1973 | | 13.70 | 8.90 | Executive branch | all | 809 | Democrats | 11.30 | 0 | 1974 | | 13.90 | 9 | Executive branch | all | 799 | Democrats | 11.40 | 0 | 1975 | | 13.20 | 8.50 | Executive branch | all | 812 | Democrats | 10.80 | 0 | 1976 | | 34.20 | 27.20 | Executive branch | all | 852 | Democrats | 30.70 | 0 | 1977 | | 18.70 | 12.30 | Executive branch | all | 780 | Democrats | 15.50 | 0 | 1978 | | 19.60 | 13 | Executive branch | all | 730 | Democrats | 16.30 | 0 | 1980 | | 16.80 | 11.20 | Executive branch | all | 1,074 | Democrats | 14 | 0 | 1982 | | 12 | 6.90 | Executive branch | all | 821 | Democrats | 9.40 | 0 | 1983 | | 15.20 | 8 | Executive branch | all | 486 | Democrats | 11.60 | 0 | 1984 | | 20.30 | 14.20 | Executive branch | all | 724 | Democrats | 17.30 | 0 | 1986 | | 16.30 | 11 | Executive branch | all | 996 | Democrats | 13.70 | 0 | 1987 | | 14.50 | 8.10 | Executive branch | all | 469 | Democrats | 11.30 | 0 | 1988 | | 20.70 | 12.90 | Executive branch | all | 458 | Democrats | 16.80 | 0 | 1989 | | 24.50 | 15.60 | Executive branch | all | 404 | Democrats | 20.10 | 0 | 1990 | | 24.80 | 16.40 | Executive branch | all | 445 | Democrats | 20.60 | 0 | 1991 | | 19.80 | 12.40 | Executive branch | all | 476 | Democrats | 16.10 | 0 | 1993 | | 18.50 | 13.20 | Executive branch | all | 905 | Democrats | 15.90 | 0 | 1994 | | 17.90 | 12.40 | Executive branch | all | 847 | Democrats | 15.20 | 0 | 1996 | | 21.20 | 15.20 | Executive branch | all | 840 | Democrats | 18.20 | 0 | 1998 | | 22.40 | 16.20 | Executive branch | all | 791 | Democrats | 19.30 | 0 | 2000 | | 23.40 | 14.40 | Executive branch | all | 403 | Democrats | 18.90 | 0 | 2002 | | 15.60 | 7.80 | Executive branch | all | 395 | Democrats | 11.70 | 0 | 2004 | | 10.20 | 5.70 | Executive branch | all | 831 | Democrats | 8 | 0 | 2006 | | 11.50 | 6.30 | Executive branch | all | 660 | Democrats | 8.90 | 0 | 2008 | | 29.60 | 20.90 | Executive branch | all | 653 | Democrats | 25.30 | 0 | 2010 | | 22.90 | 15.20 | Executive branch | all | 629 | Democrats | 19 | 0 | 2012 | | 20.90 | 14.60 | Executive branch | all | 754 | Democrats | 17.70 | 0 | 2014 | | 22 | 15.80 | Executive branch | all | 917 | Democrats | 18.90 | 0 | 2016 | | 10.40 | 5.50 | Executive branch | all | 683 | Democrats | 7.90 | 0 | 2018 | | 21.70 | 16 | Executive branch | all | 1,191 | Democrats | 18.90 | 88 | 2021 | | 22.50 | 14.80 | Executive branch | all | 936 | Democrats | 18.60 | 47 | 2022 | | 25.20 | 17.20 | Executive branch | all | 820 | Democrats | 21.20 | 54 | 2024 | | 50.60 | 40.90 | Executive branch | all | 475 | Republicans | 45.80 | 0 | 1973 | | 24.70 | 16.30 | Executive branch | all | 424 | Republicans | 20.50 | 0 | 1974 | | 24.30 | 16.10 | Executive branch | all | 441 | Republicans | 20.20 | 0 | 1975 | | 22.80 | 14.50 | Executive branch | all | 406 | Republicans | 18.70 | 0 | 1976 | | 28.80 | 20 | Executive branch | all | 444 | Republicans | 24.40 | 0 | 1977 | | 11.60 | 5.30 | Executive branch | all | 478 | Republicans | 8.50 | 0 | 1978 | | 15.10 | 8.10 | Executive branch | all | 445 | Republicans | 11.60 | 0 | 1980 | | 38.50 | 28.10 | Executive branch | all | 496 | Republicans | 33.30 | 0 | 1982 | | 27 | 18.30 | Executive branch | all | 534 | Republicans | 22.70 | 0 | 1983 | | 37.30 | 25.30 | Executive branch | all | 348 | Republicans | 31.30 | 0 | 1984 | | 36.50 | 27.70 | Executive branch | all | 524 | Republicans | 32.10 | 0 | 1986 | | 33.70 | 24.80 | Executive branch | all | 550 | Republicans | 29.20 | 0 | 1987 | | 32.30 | 22.40 | Executive branch | all | 383 | Republicans | 27.30 | 0 | 1988 | | 34.50 | 24.60 | Executive branch | all | 398 | Republicans | 29.50 | 0 | 1989 | | 36.10 | 25.50 | Executive branch | all | 365 | Republicans | 30.80 | 0 | 1990 | | 42.50 | 32.30 | Executive branch | all | 419 | Republicans | 37.40 | 0 | 1991 | | 10 | 4.40 | Executive branch | all | 401 | Republicans | 7.20 | 0 | 1993 | | 9.20 | 5.10 | Executive branch | all | 766 | Republicans | 7.20 | 0 | 1994 | | 9.50 | 5.20 | Executive branch | all | 677 | Republicans | 7.30 | 0 | 1996 | | 12 | 7.10 | Executive branch | all | 660 | Republicans | 9.50 | 0 | 1998 | | 15.40 | 9.70 | Executive branch | all | 640 | Republicans | 12.50 | 0 | 2000 | | 51.70 | 38.90 | Executive branch | all | 300 | Republicans | 45.30 | 0 | 2002 | | 43.70 | 31.60 | Executive branch | all | 331 | Republicans | 37.70 | 0 | 2004 | | 32.50 | 24.30 | Executive branch | all | 654 | Republicans | 28.40 | 0 | 2006 | | 18.80 | 11 | Executive branch | all | 438 | Republicans | 14.90 | 0 | 2008 | | 12.50 | 5.90 | Executive branch | all | 427 | Republicans | 9.20 | 0 | 2010 | | 10.50 | 4.10 | Executive branch | all | 398 | Republicans | 7.30 | 0 | 2012 | | 5 | 1.40 | Executive branch | all | 512 | Republicans | 3.20 | 0 | 2014 | | 10 | 5.10 | Executive branch | all | 616 | Republicans | 7.60 | 0 | 2016 | | 25.70 | 16.40 | Executive branch | all | 528 | Republicans | 21 | 0 | 2018 | | 10.40 | 5.90 | Executive branch | all | 826 | Republicans | 8.10 | 85 | 2021 | | 5.40 | 1.30 | Executive branch | all | 777 | Republicans | 3.30 | 45 | 2022 | | 7.10 | 2.70 | Executive branch | all | 718 | Republicans | 4.90 | 56 | 2024 | | 42.80 | 35.40 | Education | all | 790 | Democrats | 39.10 | 0 | 1973 | | 58 | 50.50 | Education | all | 813 | Democrats | 54.20 | 0 | 1974 | | 36.20 | 29 | Education | all | 804 | Democrats | 32.60 | 0 | 1975 | | 44.40 | 36.90 | Education | all | 817 | Democrats | 40.60 | 0 | 1976 | | 45.50 | 38.10 | Education | all | 866 | Democrats | 41.80 | 0 | 1977 | | 36.10 | 27.90 | Education | all | 790 | Democrats | 32 | 0 | 1978 | | 37 | 28.60 | Education | all | 741 | Democrats | 32.80 | 0 | 1980 | | 37.50 | 30 | Education | all | 1,079 | Democrats | 33.70 | 0 | 1982 | | 34.50 | 26.50 | Education | all | 829 | Democrats | 30.50 | 0 | 1983 | | 34.60 | 24.50 | Education | all | 490 | Democrats | 29.60 | 0 | 1984 | | 33.20 | 25.90 | Education | all | 731 | Democrats | 29.60 | 0 | 1986 | | 41 | 33.50 | Education | all | 1,010 | Democrats | 37.20 | 0 | 1987 | | 33.40 | 24.30 | Education | all | 473 | Democrats | 28.90 | 0 | 1988 | | 37.30 | 27.50 | Education | all | 470 | Democrats | 32.40 | 0 | 1989 | | 31.30 | 21.60 | Education | all | 413 | Democrats | 26.40 | 0 | 1990 | | 39 | 29.10 | Education | all | 447 | Democrats | 34 | 0 | 1991 | | 27.90 | 19.30 | Education | all | 480 | Democrats | 23.60 | 0 | 1993 | | 30.30 | 23.80 | Education | all | 913 | Democrats | 27.10 | 0 | 1994 | | 30 | 23.40 | Education | all | 872 | Democrats | 26.70 | 0 | 1996 | | 32.80 | 25.80 | Education | all | 852 | Democrats | 29.30 | 0 | 1998 | | 34.40 | 27.20 | Education | all | 820 | Democrats | 30.80 | 0 | 2000 | | 33.80 | 23.40 | Education | all | 409 | Democrats | 28.60 | 0 | 2002 | | 34.40 | 23.60 | Education | all | 401 | Democrats | 29 | 0 | 2004 | | 31.40 | 24.10 | Education | all | 846 | Democrats | 27.70 | 0 | 2006 | | 36.40 | 27.90 | Education | all | 666 | Democrats | 32.10 | 0 | 2008 | | 32.70 | 23.70 | Education | all | 661 | Democrats | 28.20 | 0 | 2010 | | 34.50 | 25.60 | Education | all | 640 | Democrats | 30.10 | 0 | 2012 | | 33.20 | 25.70 | Education | all | 763 | Democrats | 29.50 | 0 | 2014 | | 33.20 | 26 | Education | all | 931 | Democrats | 29.60 | 0 | 2016 | | 32.60 | 24.20 | Education | all | 686 | Democrats | 28.40 | 0 | 2018 | | 22.50 | 16.70 | Education | all | 1,196 | Democrats | 19.60 | 88 | 2021 | | 27.80 | 19.40 | Education | all | 938 | Democrats | 23.60 | 47 | 2022 | | 29.50 | 21.10 | Education | all | 828 | Democrats | 25.30 | 53 | 2024 | | 42.20 | 32.80 | Education | all | 476 | Republicans | 37.50 | 0 | 1973 | | 47.40 | 37.20 | Education | all | 427 | Republicans | 42.30 | 0 | 1974 | | 34.90 | 25.50 | Education | all | 441 | Republicans | 30.20 | 0 | 1975 | | 41.30 | 31.10 | Education | all | 408 | Republicans | 36.20 | 0 | 1976 | | 43.70 | 33.90 | Education | all | 457 | Republicans | 38.80 | 0 | 1977 | | 30.70 | 20.70 | Education | all | 485 | Republicans | 25.70 | 0 | 1978 | | 33.40 | 23.50 | Education | all | 446 | Republicans | 28.50 | 0 | 1980 | | 40.60 | 30.20 | Education | all | 500 | Republicans | 35.40 | 0 | 1982 | | 36.30 | 26.60 | Education | all | 534 | Republicans | 31.50 | 0 | 1983 | | 34.40 | 22.60 | Education | all | 344 | Republicans | 28.50 | 0 | 1984 | | 31.90 | 23.50 | Education | all | 524 | Republicans | 27.70 | 0 | 1986 | | 37.10 | 28.10 | Education | all | 561 | Republicans | 32.60 | 0 | 1987 | | 37.70 | 27.30 | Education | all | 386 | Republicans | 32.50 | 0 | 1988 | | 35.60 | 25.70 | Education | all | 407 | Republicans | 30.60 | 0 | 1989 | | 33.90 | 23.60 | Education | all | 364 | Republicans | 28.70 | 0 | 1990 | | 31.80 | 22.40 | Education | all | 422 | Republicans | 27.10 | 0 | 1991 | | 25.90 | 17 | Education | all | 405 | Republicans | 21.50 | 0 | 1993 | | 29.40 | 22.40 | Education | all | 765 | Republicans | 25.90 | 0 | 1994 | | 25.40 | 18.60 | Education | all | 687 | Republicans | 22 | 0 | 1996 | | 27.20 | 20.20 | Education | all | 669 | Republicans | 23.70 | 0 | 1998 | | 27.40 | 20.10 | Education | all | 647 | Republicans | 23.80 | 0 | 2000 | | 29 | 18.10 | Education | all | 300 | Republicans | 23.50 | 0 | 2002 | | 34.20 | 23 | Education | all | 335 | Republicans | 28.60 | 0 | 2004 | | 32.90 | 24.70 | Education | all | 661 | Republicans | 28.80 | 0 | 2006 | | 34.90 | 24.80 | Education | all | 444 | Republicans | 29.80 | 0 | 2008 | | 32.40 | 22.30 | Education | all | 430 | Republicans | 27.40 | 0 | 2010 | | 22.50 | 13.10 | Education | all | 401 | Republicans | 17.80 | 0 | 2012 | | 21.90 | 14.20 | Education | all | 516 | Republicans | 18 | 0 | 2014 | | 25 | 17.40 | Education | all | 620 | Republicans | 21.20 | 0 | 2016 | | 23.80 | 14.80 | Education | all | 530 | Republicans | 19.30 | 0 | 2018 | | 17.90 | 12 | Education | all | 823 | Republicans | 14.90 | 85 | 2021 | | 13.90 | 7 | Education | all | 777 | Republicans | 10.50 | 45 | 2022 | | 16.80 | 9.80 | Education | all | 715 | Republicans | 13.30 | 55 | 2024 | | 56.80 | 49.20 | Medicine | all | 798 | Democrats | 53 | 0 | 1973 | | 64.50 | 57.20 | Medicine | all | 814 | Democrats | 60.80 | 0 | 1974 | | 54.10 | 46.40 | Medicine | all | 803 | Democrats | 50.30 | 0 | 1975 | | 58.30 | 50.70 | Medicine | all | 822 | Democrats | 54.50 | 0 | 1976 | | 57.10 | 49.60 | Medicine | all | 867 | Democrats | 53.30 | 0 | 1977 | | 50.70 | 42 | Medicine | all | 794 | Democrats | 46.40 | 0 | 1978 | | 59.50 | 50.70 | Medicine | all | 746 | Democrats | 55.10 | 0 | 1980 | | 49.70 | 41.90 | Medicine | all | 1,094 | Democrats | 45.80 | 0 | 1982 | | 57.30 | 48.50 | Medicine | all | 837 | Democrats | 52.90 | 0 | 1983 | | 55.40 | 44.40 | Medicine | all | 492 | Democrats | 49.90 | 0 | 1984 | | 50.40 | 42.30 | Medicine | all | 730 | Democrats | 46.30 | 0 | 1986 | | 56.30 | 48.50 | Medicine | all | 1,014 | Democrats | 52.40 | 0 | 1987 | | 54.90 | 44.80 | Medicine | all | 477 | Democrats | 49.80 | 0 | 1988 | | 51.70 | 41.30 | Medicine | all | 470 | Democrats | 46.50 | 0 | 1989 | | 49.90 | 39 | Medicine | all | 416 | Democrats | 44.40 | 0 | 1990 | | 47.90 | 37.70 | Medicine | all | 449 | Democrats | 42.80 | 0 | 1991 | | 44.80 | 34.90 | Medicine | all | 488 | Democrats | 39.90 | 0 | 1993 | | 45.60 | 38.40 | Medicine | all | 918 | Democrats | 42 | 0 | 1994 | | 47.80 | 40.40 | Medicine | all | 869 | Democrats | 44.10 | 0 | 1996 | | 48.60 | 40.90 | Medicine | all | 850 | Democrats | 44.70 | 0 | 1998 | | 50.40 | 42.60 | Medicine | all | 815 | Democrats | 46.50 | 0 | 2000 | | 45.30 | 34.10 | Medicine | all | 409 | Democrats | 39.70 | 0 | 2002 | | 41.80 | 30.30 | Medicine | all | 400 | Democrats | 36.10 | 0 | 2004 | | 44.20 | 36.20 | Medicine | all | 847 | Democrats | 40.20 | 0 | 2006 | | 43.50 | 34.60 | Medicine | all | 668 | Democrats | 39.10 | 0 | 2008 | | 47.80 | 37.90 | Medicine | all | 660 | Democrats | 42.90 | 0 | 2010 | | 46.40 | 36.90 | Medicine | all | 640 | Democrats | 41.70 | 0 | 2012 | | 44.30 | 36.30 | Medicine | all | 763 | Democrats | 40.30 | 0 | 2014 | | 41.20 | 33.60 | Medicine | all | 928 | Democrats | 37.40 | 0 | 2016 | | 42.80 | 33.70 | Medicine | all | 687 | Democrats | 38.20 | 0 | 2018 | | 48.50 | 41.30 | Medicine | all | 1,195 | Democrats | 44.90 | 88 | 2021 | | 46.40 | 36.70 | Medicine | all | 945 | Democrats | 41.50 | 46 | 2022 | | 39.30 | 30 | Medicine | all | 826 | Democrats | 34.60 | 53 | 2024 | | 62.20 | 52.60 | Medicine | all | 476 | Republicans | 57.40 | 0 | 1973 | | 69.70 | 59.90 | Medicine | all | 426 | Republicans | 64.80 | 0 | 1974 | | 63.40 | 53.40 | Medicine | all | 442 | Republicans | 58.40 | 0 | 1975 | | 62.80 | 52.30 | Medicine | all | 410 | Republicans | 57.50 | 0 | 1976 | | 62.10 | 52.10 | Medicine | all | 458 | Republicans | 57.10 | 0 | 1977 | | 55.70 | 44.40 | Medicine | all | 488 | Republicans | 50.10 | 0 | 1978 | | 60.50 | 49.60 | Medicine | all | 449 | Republicans | 55 | 0 | 1980 | | 54 | 43.10 | Medicine | all | 502 | Republicans | 48.50 | 0 | 1982 | | 58.60 | 48.30 | Medicine | all | 535 | Republicans | 53.50 | 0 | 1983 | | 61.70 | 48.80 | Medicine | all | 351 | Republicans | 55.20 | 0 | 1984 | | 56.30 | 46.90 | Medicine | all | 524 | Republicans | 51.60 | 0 | 1986 | | 60.60 | 50.90 | Medicine | all | 558 | Republicans | 55.80 | 0 | 1987 | | 65 | 54.20 | Medicine | all | 390 | Republicans | 59.60 | 0 | 1988 | | 58.20 | 47.50 | Medicine | all | 407 | Republicans | 52.90 | 0 | 1989 | | 54.30 | 42.90 | Medicine | all | 366 | Republicans | 48.60 | 0 | 1990 | | 60.20 | 49.70 | Medicine | all | 423 | Republicans | 54.90 | 0 | 1991 | | 48.40 | 37.70 | Medicine | all | 402 | Republicans | 43.10 | 0 | 1993 | | 50.50 | 42.60 | Medicine | all | 769 | Republicans | 46.50 | 0 | 1994 | | 51.90 | 43.70 | Medicine | all | 686 | Republicans | 47.80 | 0 | 1996 | | 51.90 | 43.60 | Medicine | all | 669 | Republicans | 47.80 | 0 | 1998 | | 51.10 | 42.70 | Medicine | all | 649 | Republicans | 46.90 | 0 | 2000 | | 46.10 | 33.60 | Medicine | all | 302 | Republicans | 39.90 | 0 | 2002 | | 47.20 | 35 | Medicine | all | 334 | Republicans | 41.10 | 0 | 2004 | | 48.70 | 39.60 | Medicine | all | 658 | Republicans | 44.10 | 0 | 2006 | | 47.90 | 37 | Medicine | all | 447 | Republicans | 42.40 | 0 | 2008 | | 50.20 | 38.90 | Medicine | all | 430 | Republicans | 44.60 | 0 | 2010 | | 48.90 | 36.70 | Medicine | all | 400 | Republicans | 42.80 | 0 | 2012 | | 44.60 | 34.90 | Medicine | all | 517 | Republicans | 39.80 | 0 | 2014 | | 42.10 | 33.20 | Medicine | all | 621 | Republicans | 37.70 | 0 | 2016 | | 44.80 | 33.70 | Medicine | all | 532 | Republicans | 39.20 | 0 | 2018 | | 38 | 30.20 | Medicine | all | 824 | Republicans | 34.10 | 85 | 2021 | | 31.40 | 21.50 | Medicine | all | 778 | Republicans | 26.40 | 45 | 2022 | | 24.60 | 16.40 | Medicine | all | 716 | Republicans | 20.50 | 56 | 2024 | | 29.60 | 22.90 | Press | all | 795 | Democrats | 26.20 | 0 | 1973 | | 33.60 | 26.60 | Press | all | 816 | Democrats | 30.10 | 0 | 1974 | | 32.50 | 25.50 | Press | all | 794 | Democrats | 29 | 0 | 1975 | | 36.90 | 29.70 | Press | all | 815 | Democrats | 33.30 | 0 | 1976 | | 31.30 | 24.50 | Press | all | 861 | Democrats | 27.90 | 0 | 1977 | | 25.60 | 18.40 | Press | all | 792 | Democrats | 22 | 0 | 1978 | | 28.80 | 21 | Press | all | 736 | Democrats | 24.90 | 0 | 1980 | | 25 | 18.40 | Press | all | 1,074 | Democrats | 21.70 | 0 | 1982 | | 17.50 | 11.30 | Press | all | 830 | Democrats | 14.40 | 0 | 1983 | | 22.10 | 13.60 | Press | all | 487 | Democrats | 17.90 | 0 | 1984 | | 24.10 | 17.50 | Press | all | 727 | Democrats | 20.80 | 0 | 1986 | | 25.90 | 19.30 | Press | all | 995 | Democrats | 22.60 | 0 | 1987 | | 26.80 | 18.40 | Press | all | 471 | Democrats | 22.60 | 0 | 1988 | | 27.50 | 18.70 | Press | all | 462 | Democrats | 23.10 | 0 | 1989 | | 19.60 | 11.50 | Press | all | 403 | Democrats | 15.60 | 0 | 1990 | | 18.20 | 10.90 | Press | all | 445 | Democrats | 14.60 | 0 | 1991 | | 15.90 | 9.20 | Press | all | 484 | Democrats | 12.60 | 0 | 1993 | | 14.90 | 10.10 | Press | all | 909 | Democrats | 12.50 | 0 | 1994 | | 15.80 | 10.70 | Press | all | 856 | Democrats | 13.20 | 0 | 1996 | | 11.30 | 6.90 | Press | all | 844 | Democrats | 9.10 | 0 | 1998 | | 12.60 | 7.80 | Press | all | 803 | Democrats | 10.20 | 0 | 2000 | | 18.10 | 10.10 | Press | all | 407 | Democrats | 14.10 | 0 | 2002 | | 16.10 | 8.30 | Press | all | 401 | Democrats | 12.20 | 0 | 2004 | | 14.90 | 9.50 | Press | all | 844 | Democrats | 12.20 | 0 | 2006 | | 14.60 | 8.70 | Press | all | 664 | Democrats | 11.60 | 0 | 2008 | | 17.50 | 10.50 | Press | all | 654 | Democrats | 14 | 0 | 2010 | | 15.90 | 9.40 | Press | all | 632 | Democrats | 12.70 | 0 | 2012 | | 13.50 | 8.30 | Press | all | 753 | Democrats | 10.90 | 0 | 2014 | | 12.30 | 7.60 | Press | all | 929 | Democrats | 10 | 0 | 2016 | | 24.10 | 16.60 | Press | all | 689 | Democrats | 20.30 | 0 | 2018 | | 21.20 | 15.50 | Press | all | 1,189 | Democrats | 18.40 | 88 | 2021 | | 14 | 7.90 | Press | all | 939 | Democrats | 11 | 47 | 2022 | | 18.20 | 11.30 | Press | all | 822 | Democrats | 14.70 | 54 | 2024 | | 24.80 | 16.90 | Press | all | 474 | Republicans | 20.80 | 0 | 1973 | | 21 | 13.30 | Press | all | 426 | Republicans | 17.10 | 0 | 1974 | | 23.20 | 15.10 | Press | all | 438 | Republicans | 19.10 | 0 | 1975 | | 25.90 | 17.20 | Press | all | 412 | Republicans | 21.50 | 0 | 1976 | | 26.90 | 18.40 | Press | all | 452 | Republicans | 22.70 | 0 | 1977 | | 25.20 | 16 | Press | all | 484 | Republicans | 20.60 | 0 | 1978 | | 27 | 17.80 | Press | all | 449 | Republicans | 22.40 | 0 | 1980 | | 17.20 | 9.70 | Press | all | 496 | Republicans | 13.40 | 0 | 1982 | | 14.40 | 7.90 | Press | all | 535 | Republicans | 11.20 | 0 | 1983 | | 26 | 15.50 | Press | all | 351 | Republicans | 20.80 | 0 | 1984 | | 20.40 | 13.40 | Press | all | 522 | Republicans | 16.90 | 0 | 1986 | | 16.90 | 10.30 | Press | all | 560 | Republicans | 13.60 | 0 | 1987 | | 20 | 11.80 | Press | all | 382 | Republicans | 15.90 | 0 | 1988 | | 16.80 | 9.60 | Press | all | 404 | Republicans | 13.20 | 0 | 1989 | | 18 | 10 | Press | all | 361 | Republicans | 14 | 0 | 1990 | | 21.90 | 13.80 | Press | all | 419 | Republicans | 17.80 | 0 | 1991 | | 12.10 | 5.80 | Press | all | 400 | Republicans | 8.90 | 0 | 1993 | | 11 | 6.50 | Press | all | 765 | Republicans | 8.80 | 0 | 1994 | | 12.30 | 7.40 | Press | all | 678 | Republicans | 9.90 | 0 | 1996 | | 11.40 | 6.60 | Press | all | 662 | Republicans | 9 | 0 | 1998 | | 12.70 | 7.50 | Press | all | 648 | Republicans | 10.10 | 0 | 2000 | | 9.90 | 3.50 | Press | all | 301 | Republicans | 6.70 | 0 | 2002 | | 8.40 | 2.70 | Press | all | 335 | Republicans | 5.60 | 0 | 2004 | | 9.50 | 4.90 | Press | all | 659 | Republicans | 7.20 | 0 | 2006 | | 7.10 | 2.40 | Press | all | 445 | Republicans | 4.80 | 0 | 2008 | | 10.90 | 4.80 | Press | all | 430 | Republicans | 7.90 | 0 | 2010 | | 7.30 | 2.10 | Press | all | 396 | Republicans | 4.70 | 0 | 2012 | | 5.20 | 1.60 | Press | all | 517 | Republicans | 3.40 | 0 | 2014 | | 6.30 | 2.50 | Press | all | 616 | Republicans | 4.40 | 0 | 2016 | | 9 | 3.50 | Press | all | 531 | Republicans | 6.20 | 0 | 2018 | | 4.20 | 1.50 | Press | all | 825 | Republicans | 2.80 | 85 | 2021 | | 4.90 | 1.10 | Press | all | 776 | Republicans | 3 | 45 | 2022 | | 4.60 | 1.20 | Press | all | 715 | Republicans | 2.90 | 56 | 2024 | | 23.20 | 17.10 | Television | all | 798 | Democrats | 20.10 | 0 | 1973 | | 30.60 | 23.90 | Television | all | 816 | Democrats | 27.30 | 0 | 1974 | | 24 | 17.70 | Television | all | 794 | Democrats | 20.80 | 0 | 1975 | | 23.70 | 17.60 | Television | all | 815 | Democrats | 20.70 | 0 | 1976 | | 21.90 | 16 | Television | all | 865 | Democrats | 19 | 0 | 1977 | | 18.70 | 12.40 | Television | all | 788 | Democrats | 15.50 | 0 | 1978 | | 22.10 | 15.20 | Television | all | 744 | Democrats | 18.70 | 0 | 1980 | | 20.50 | 14.40 | Television | all | 1,083 | Democrats | 17.40 | 0 | 1982 | | 17.80 | 11.50 | Television | all | 835 | Democrats | 14.70 | 0 | 1983 | | 16.30 | 8.90 | Television | all | 490 | Democrats | 12.60 | 0 | 1984 | | 17.90 | 12.10 | Television | all | 726 | Democrats | 15 | 0 | 1986 | | 14.60 | 9.50 | Television | all | 1,007 | Democrats | 12.10 | 0 | 1987 | | 20.70 | 13.20 | Television | all | 475 | Democrats | 16.90 | 0 | 1988 | | 20.30 | 12.60 | Television | all | 466 | Democrats | 16.50 | 0 | 1989 | | 19.60 | 11.60 | Television | all | 415 | Democrats | 15.60 | 0 | 1990 | | 19.60 | 12.10 | Television | all | 452 | Democrats | 15.90 | 0 | 1991 | | 17.50 | 10.50 | Television | all | 488 | Democrats | 14 | 0 | 1993 | | 14.90 | 10 | Television | all | 914 | Democrats | 12.40 | 0 | 1994 | | 15.60 | 10.50 | Television | all | 866 | Democrats | 13.10 | 0 | 1996 | | 12.60 | 7.90 | Television | all | 850 | Democrats | 10.20 | 0 | 1998 | | 11.80 | 7.20 | Television | all | 808 | Democrats | 9.50 | 0 | 2000 | | 15.20 | 7.90 | Television | all | 405 | Democrats | 11.50 | 0 | 2002 | | 16.10 | 8.30 | Television | all | 401 | Democrats | 12.20 | 0 | 2004 | | 12.80 | 7.80 | Television | all | 846 | Democrats | 10.30 | 0 | 2006 | | 12.90 | 7.40 | Television | all | 660 | Democrats | 10.10 | 0 | 2008 | | 15.90 | 9.30 | Television | all | 659 | Democrats | 12.60 | 0 | 2010 | | 13.50 | 7.50 | Television | all | 631 | Democrats | 10.50 | 0 | 2012 | | 15.30 | 9.90 | Television | all | 758 | Democrats | 12.60 | 0 | 2014 | | 12.70 | 7.90 | Television | all | 924 | Democrats | 10.30 | 0 | 2016 | | 13.10 | 7.40 | Television | all | 682 | Democrats | 10.20 | 0 | 2018 | | 14.10 | 9.40 | Television | all | 1,197 | Democrats | 11.80 | 88 | 2021 | | 13 | 7 | Television | all | 931 | Democrats | 10 | 47 | 2022 | | 12 | 6.40 | Television | all | 823 | Democrats | 9.20 | 54 | 2024 | | 21.10 | 13.70 | Television | all | 473 | Republicans | 17.40 | 0 | 1973 | | 19.60 | 12.10 | Television | all | 427 | Republicans | 15.90 | 0 | 1974 | | 20.70 | 13 | Television | all | 439 | Republicans | 16.80 | 0 | 1975 | | 17.60 | 10.20 | Television | all | 409 | Republicans | 13.90 | 0 | 1976 | | 21.70 | 13.90 | Television | all | 451 | Republicans | 17.80 | 0 | 1977 | | 21.50 | 12.90 | Television | all | 483 | Republicans | 17.20 | 0 | 1978 | | 18.90 | 11 | Television | all | 448 | Republicans | 15 | 0 | 1980 | | 15.40 | 8.30 | Television | all | 498 | Republicans | 11.90 | 0 | 1982 | | 13 | 6.80 | Television | all | 534 | Republicans | 9.90 | 0 | 1983 | | 18.10 | 9.20 | Television | all | 351 | Republicans | 13.70 | 0 | 1984 | | 18 | 11.30 | Television | all | 520 | Republicans | 14.60 | 0 | 1986 | | 14.60 | 8.40 | Television | all | 560 | Republicans | 11.50 | 0 | 1987 | | 16.70 | 9.30 | Television | all | 387 | Republicans | 13 | 0 | 1988 | | 15.40 | 8.40 | Television | all | 403 | Republicans | 11.90 | 0 | 1989 | | 17.40 | 9.60 | Television | all | 366 | Republicans | 13.50 | 0 | 1990 | | 18.50 | 11.10 | Television | all | 423 | Republicans | 14.80 | 0 | 1991 | | 11.70 | 5.60 | Television | all | 404 | Republicans | 8.60 | 0 | 1993 | | 9.80 | 5.60 | Television | all | 765 | Republicans | 7.70 | 0 | 1994 | | 12.20 | 7.30 | Television | all | 677 | Republicans | 9.70 | 0 | 1996 | | 11.30 | 6.60 | Television | all | 669 | Republicans | 8.90 | 0 | 1998 | | 12.50 | 7.40 | Television | all | 647 | Republicans | 9.90 | 0 | 2000 | | 10.60 | 3.90 | Television | all | 302 | Republicans | 7.20 | 0 | 2002 | | 11.10 | 4.40 | Television | all | 334 | Republicans | 7.80 | 0 | 2004 | | 7.70 | 3.60 | Television | all | 654 | Republicans | 5.60 | 0 | 2006 | | 10.80 | 4.90 | Television | all | 446 | Republicans | 7.90 | 0 | 2008 | | 17.40 | 9.60 | Television | all | 430 | Republicans | 13.50 | 0 | 2010 | | 12.20 | 5.20 | Television | all | 393 | Republicans | 8.70 | 0 | 2012 | | 10 | 4.80 | Television | all | 513 | Republicans | 7.40 | 0 | 2014 | | 10.90 | 5.80 | Television | all | 618 | Republicans | 8.30 | 0 | 2016 | | 10.30 | 4.40 | Television | all | 532 | Republicans | 7.30 | 0 | 2018 | | 8.20 | 4.20 | Television | all | 824 | Republicans | 6.20 | 85 | 2021 | | 5.40 | 1.30 | Television | all | 775 | Republicans | 3.40 | 45 | 2022 | | 6.90 | 2.60 | Television | all | 719 | Republicans | 4.70 | 56 | 2024 | | 30.20 | 23.40 | Congress | all | 787 | Democrats | 26.80 | 0 | 1973 | | 22.50 | 16.50 | Congress | all | 803 | Democrats | 19.50 | 0 | 1974 | | 18.60 | 13 | Congress | all | 794 | Democrats | 15.80 | 0 | 1975 | | 18 | 12.50 | Congress | all | 813 | Democrats | 15.30 | 0 | 1976 | | 24.40 | 18.30 | Congress | all | 859 | Democrats | 21.40 | 0 | 1977 | | 18.30 | 12 | Congress | all | 783 | Democrats | 15.10 | 0 | 1978 | | 13.50 | 7.90 | Congress | all | 727 | Democrats | 10.70 | 0 | 1980 | | 17.70 | 12 | Congress | all | 1,082 | Democrats | 14.90 | 0 | 1982 | | 17.30 | 11.10 | Congress | all | 822 | Democrats | 14.20 | 0 | 1983 | | 19.40 | 11.40 | Congress | all | 488 | Democrats | 15.40 | 0 | 1984 | | 20.70 | 14.50 | Congress | all | 723 | Democrats | 17.60 | 0 | 1986 | | 22.30 | 16.10 | Congress | all | 992 | Democrats | 19.20 | 0 | 1987 | | 23.10 | 15.10 | Congress | all | 468 | Democrats | 19.10 | 0 | 1988 | | 23.30 | 15.10 | Congress | all | 464 | Democrats | 19.20 | 0 | 1989 | | 18.10 | 10.30 | Congress | all | 402 | Democrats | 14.20 | 0 | 1990 | | 20.40 | 12.60 | Congress | all | 437 | Democrats | 16.50 | 0 | 1991 | | 11 | 5.50 | Congress | all | 484 | Democrats | 8.30 | 0 | 1993 | | 12.20 | 7.80 | Congress | all | 899 | Democrats | 10 | 0 | 1994 | | 9.50 | 5.50 | Congress | all | 854 | Democrats | 7.50 | 0 | 1996 | | 14.80 | 9.70 | Congress | all | 832 | Democrats | 12.20 | 0 | 1998 | | 16.50 | 11 | Congress | all | 791 | Democrats | 13.70 | 0 | 2000 | | 20.10 | 11.70 | Congress | all | 404 | Democrats | 15.90 | 0 | 2002 | | 20.40 | 11.70 | Congress | all | 399 | Democrats | 16.10 | 0 | 2004 | | 12.50 | 7.50 | Congress | all | 833 | Democrats | 10 | 0 | 2006 | | 14.60 | 8.80 | Congress | all | 661 | Democrats | 11.70 | 0 | 2008 | | 17.50 | 10.60 | Congress | all | 653 | Democrats | 14 | 0 | 2010 | | 10.20 | 5 | Congress | all | 628 | Democrats | 7.60 | 0 | 2012 | | 9.90 | 5.50 | Congress | all | 753 | Democrats | 7.70 | 0 | 2014 | | 7.20 | 3.60 | Congress | all | 923 | Democrats | 5.40 | 0 | 2016 | | 7.80 | 3.40 | Congress | all | 677 | Democrats | 5.60 | 0 | 2018 | | 11.40 | 7.20 | Congress | all | 1,193 | Democrats | 9.30 | 89 | 2021 | | 8.60 | 3.80 | Congress | all | 938 | Democrats | 6.20 | 47 | 2022 | | 9.70 | 4.70 | Congress | all | 825 | Democrats | 7.20 | 53 | 2024 | | 29.50 | 21 | Congress | all | 469 | Republicans | 25.30 | 0 | 1973 | | 18.90 | 11.50 | Congress | all | 420 | Republicans | 15.20 | 0 | 1974 | | 16.20 | 9.30 | Congress | all | 437 | Republicans | 12.70 | 0 | 1975 | | 16.30 | 9.20 | Congress | all | 410 | Republicans | 12.80 | 0 | 1976 | | 20.20 | 12.60 | Congress | all | 445 | Republicans | 16.40 | 0 | 1977 | | 12.90 | 6.20 | Congress | all | 478 | Republicans | 9.60 | 0 | 1978 | | 9.70 | 4.10 | Congress | all | 446 | Republicans | 6.90 | 0 | 1980 | | 19.50 | 11.60 | Congress | all | 494 | Republicans | 15.60 | 0 | 1982 | | 10.90 | 5.20 | Congress | all | 532 | Republicans | 8.10 | 0 | 1983 | | 19.90 | 10.60 | Congress | all | 349 | Republicans | 15.20 | 0 | 1984 | | 20.40 | 13.40 | Congress | all | 524 | Republicans | 16.90 | 0 | 1986 | | 17.70 | 10.90 | Congress | all | 555 | Republicans | 14.30 | 0 | 1987 | | 18.50 | 10.70 | Congress | all | 386 | Republicans | 14.60 | 0 | 1988 | | 22 | 13.80 | Congress | all | 402 | Republicans | 17.90 | 0 | 1989 | | 23.60 | 14.60 | Congress | all | 367 | Republicans | 19.10 | 0 | 1990 | | 25.50 | 16.90 | Congress | all | 417 | Republicans | 21.20 | 0 | 1991 | | 8.70 | 3.50 | Congress | all | 403 | Republicans | 6.10 | 0 | 1993 | | 9 | 5 | Congress | all | 762 | Republicans | 7 | 0 | 1994 | | 11.70 | 6.90 | Congress | all | 682 | Republicans | 9.30 | 0 | 1996 | | 13 | 7.90 | Congress | all | 663 | Republicans | 10.40 | 0 | 1998 | | 18.40 | 12.20 | Congress | all | 642 | Republicans | 15.30 | 0 | 2000 | | 19.10 | 10.10 | Congress | all | 301 | Republicans | 14.60 | 0 | 2002 | | 23.50 | 13.80 | Congress | all | 331 | Republicans | 18.60 | 0 | 2004 | | 18.40 | 11.90 | Congress | all | 655 | Republicans | 15.10 | 0 | 2006 | | 12.60 | 6.20 | Congress | all | 441 | Republicans | 9.40 | 0 | 2008 | | 10.10 | 4.20 | Congress | all | 429 | Republicans | 7.20 | 0 | 2010 | | 10.70 | 4.20 | Congress | all | 397 | Republicans | 7.40 | 0 | 2012 | | 4.80 | 1.30 | Congress | all | 509 | Republicans | 3.10 | 0 | 2014 | | 7.90 | 3.60 | Congress | all | 618 | Republicans | 5.80 | 0 | 2016 | | 9.70 | 3.90 | Congress | all | 529 | Republicans | 6.80 | 0 | 2018 | | 6.20 | 2.80 | Congress | all | 827 | Republicans | 4.50 | 85 | 2021 | | 4.50 | 0.900 | Congress | all | 775 | Republicans | 2.70 | 45 | 2022 | | 4.90 | 1.40 | Congress | all | 716 | Republicans | 3.10 | 56 | 2024 | | 22.10 | 16.10 | Organized labor | all | 770 | Democrats | 19.10 | 0 | 1973 | | 26.40 | 20 | Organized labor | all | 803 | Democrats | 23.20 | 0 | 1974 | | 15.50 | 10.30 | Organized labor | all | 765 | Democrats | 12.90 | 0 | 1975 | | 18.50 | 12.80 | Organized labor | all | 770 | Democrats | 15.70 | 0 | 1976 | | 21.10 | 15.30 | Organized labor | all | 847 | Democrats | 18.20 | 0 | 1977 | | 17.60 | 11.30 | Organized labor | all | 770 | Democrats | 14.50 | 0 | 1978 | | 21.80 | 14.70 | Organized labor | all | 714 | Democrats | 18.20 | 0 | 1980 | | 20.40 | 14.30 | Organized labor | all | 1,056 | Democrats | 17.30 | 0 | 1982 | | 13.90 | 8.30 | Organized labor | all | 817 | Democrats | 11.10 | 0 | 1983 | | 13 | 6.50 | Organized labor | all | 488 | Democrats | 9.70 | 0 | 1984 | | 14 | 8.80 | Organized labor | all | 704 | Democrats | 11.40 | 0 | 1986 | | 15.60 | 10.20 | Organized labor | all | 967 | Democrats | 12.90 | 0 | 1987 | | 15.70 | 9 | Organized labor | all | 461 | Democrats | 12.30 | 0 | 1988 | | 18.50 | 11.10 | Organized labor | all | 448 | Democrats | 14.80 | 0 | 1989 | | 17.30 | 9.60 | Organized labor | all | 400 | Democrats | 13.40 | 0 | 1990 | | 16.50 | 9.40 | Organized labor | all | 428 | Democrats | 12.90 | 0 | 1991 | | 13.10 | 6.90 | Organized labor | all | 463 | Democrats | 10 | 0 | 1993 | | 17.60 | 12.30 | Organized labor | all | 870 | Democrats | 14.90 | 0 | 1994 | | 19.70 | 13.90 | Organized labor | all | 799 | Democrats | 16.80 | 0 | 1996 | | 17.60 | 11.90 | Organized labor | all | 791 | Democrats | 14.70 | 0 | 1998 | | 19.40 | 13.40 | Organized labor | all | 746 | Democrats | 16.40 | 0 | 2000 | | 17.20 | 9.30 | Organized labor | all | 396 | Democrats | 13.20 | 0 | 2002 | | 19.90 | 11.10 | Organized labor | all | 384 | Democrats | 15.50 | 0 | 2004 | | 16.30 | 10.60 | Organized labor | all | 816 | Democrats | 13.40 | 0 | 2006 | | 19.50 | 12.80 | Organized labor | all | 643 | Democrats | 16.10 | 0 | 2008 | | 18.30 | 11 | Organized labor | all | 634 | Democrats | 14.70 | 0 | 2010 | | 20.10 | 12.80 | Organized labor | all | 619 | Democrats | 16.50 | 0 | 2012 | | 18 | 12 | Organized labor | all | 734 | Democrats | 15 | 0 | 2014 | | 19.50 | 13.60 | Organized labor | all | 908 | Democrats | 16.60 | 0 | 2016 | | 16.60 | 10.20 | Organized labor | all | 667 | Democrats | 13.40 | 0 | 2018 | | 17.70 | 12.50 | Organized labor | all | 1,187 | Democrats | 15.10 | 89 | 2021 | | 20.50 | 12.90 | Organized labor | all | 911 | Democrats | 16.70 | 48 | 2022 | | 25.50 | 14.10 | Organized labor | all | 409 | Democrats | 19.80 | 58 | 2024 | | 16.80 | 10.10 | Organized labor | all | 463 | Republicans | 13.40 | 0 | 1973 | | 18.60 | 11.20 | Organized labor | all | 419 | Republicans | 14.90 | 0 | 1974 | | 10 | 4.60 | Organized labor | all | 425 | Republicans | 7.30 | 0 | 1975 | | 9.90 | 4.30 | Organized labor | all | 390 | Republicans | 7.10 | 0 | 1976 | | 13.60 | 7.30 | Organized labor | all | 446 | Republicans | 10.40 | 0 | 1977 | The first 500 of 1680 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/confidence_by_party.json. Views: In-person interviews only (mode = inperson); All interview modes (mode = all). Note: Web interviews were 87.3% of all 2021 respondents, 46.1% of 2022 respondents and 53.2% of 2024 respondents. Before 2021 the survey was in person, with some telephone interviews from 2004. The data table gives the web share of each cell. Note: Banks and financial institutions were first asked in 1975. The confidence items were not fielded in 1972 or 1985. Organized labor has no in-person 2024 cell because both party cells fall below the suppression floor. Note: Lines are broken between 2018 and the next survey year in each view, because there is no 2020 survey and the 2021 survey had no in-person interviews. Note: Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: General Social Survey, 1973-2024; weighted (weight_use); Democrats and Republicans include leaners; intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/confidence_by_party.json ### Table 4. From 2011-2018 to 2022-2024 the Supreme Court gap moved from +1.1 to −16.2 points and the medicine gap from −1.8 to +10.4 Democratic share minus Republican share with a great deal of confidence, percentage points, by institution and period; positive means Democrats are more confident; in-person and all-mode views | conf_high | conf_low | era | gap | institution | mode | n | | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | | −2.90 | −8.10 | 1973-1980 | −5.50 | Scientific community | all | 8,073 | | −3.60 | −8.80 | 1981-1990 | −6.20 | Scientific community | all | 8,598 | | −0.100 | −5.20 | 1991-2000 | −2.70 | Scientific community | all | 7,532 | | 5.40 | −1.30 | 2001-2010 | 2.10 | Scientific community | all | 4,968 | | 13.40 | 6.50 | 2011-2018 | 9.90 | Scientific community | all | 4,935 | | 33.30 | 26.20 | 2021-2024 | 29.70 | Scientific community | all | 5,227 | | −2.50 | −6.50 | 1973-1980 | −4.50 | Executive branch | all | 8,680 | | −13.60 | −17.70 | 1981-1990 | −15.60 | Executive branch | all | 9,030 | | 6.90 | 3.40 | 1991-2000 | 5.10 | Executive branch | all | 7,867 | | −9 | −14.30 | 2001-2010 | −11.60 | Executive branch | all | 5,092 | | 8.50 | 3.90 | 2011-2018 | 6.20 | Executive branch | all | 5,037 | | 16.40 | 11.60 | 2021-2024 | 14 | Executive branch | all | 5,268 | | 7.60 | 2.80 | 1973-1980 | 5.20 | Education | all | 8,761 | | 2.80 | −1.80 | 1981-1990 | 0.500 | Education | all | 9,115 | | 6.60 | 2.30 | 1991-2000 | 4.40 | Education | all | 7,979 | | 4.10 | −1.80 | 2001-2010 | 1.20 | Education | all | 5,153 | | 13 | 7.30 | 2011-2018 | 10.10 | Education | all | 5,087 | | 12.40 | 6.70 | 2021-2024 | 9.50 | Education | all | 5,277 | | −1.20 | −6.10 | 1973-1980 | −3.60 | Medicine | all | 8,793 | | −1.80 | −6.80 | 1981-1990 | −4.30 | Medicine | all | 9,163 | | −1.60 | −6.50 | 1991-2000 | −4.10 | Medicine | all | 7,987 | | 0.300 | −6.20 | 2001-2010 | −2.90 | Medicine | all | 5,155 | | 2.90 | −3.80 | 2011-2018 | −0.400 | Medicine | all | 5,088 | | 17.40 | 10.30 | 2021-2024 | 13.80 | Medicine | all | 5,284 | | 9.20 | 5 | 1973-1980 | 7.10 | Press | all | 8,744 | | 7.20 | 3.40 | 1981-1990 | 5.30 | Press | all | 9,060 | | 3 | −0.100 | 1991-2000 | 1.40 | Press | all | 7,913 | | 8.10 | 4.30 | 2001-2010 | 6.20 | Press | all | 5,140 | | 10.30 | 6.60 | 2011-2018 | 8.50 | Press | all | 5,063 | | 14.30 | 10.10 | 2021-2024 | 12.20 | Press | all | 5,266 | | 5.90 | 2.10 | 1973-1980 | 4 | Television | all | 8,750 | | 4.40 | 1 | 1981-1990 | 2.70 | Television | all | 9,116 | | 4 | 0.900 | 1991-2000 | 2.40 | Television | all | 7,963 | | 5 | 1.10 | 2001-2010 | 3.10 | Television | all | 5,137 | | 5 | 1 | 2011-2018 | 3 | Television | all | 5,051 | | 7.70 | 3.80 | 2021-2024 | 5.80 | Television | all | 5,269 | | 5.50 | 1.90 | 1973-1980 | 3.70 | Congress | all | 8,671 | | 3.50 | −0.200 | 1981-1990 | 1.60 | Congress | all | 9,050 | | 1.50 | −1.70 | 1991-2000 | −0.100 | Congress | all | 7,866 | | 2.30 | −2.20 | 2001-2010 | 0.100 | Congress | all | 5,107 | | 2.40 | −0.900 | 2011-2018 | 0.800 | Congress | all | 5,034 | | 6 | 2.60 | 2021-2024 | 4.30 | Congress | all | 5,274 | | 8.60 | 5.20 | 1973-1980 | 6.90 | Organized labor | all | 8,486 | | 6.70 | 3.70 | 1981-1990 | 5.20 | Organized labor | all | 8,865 | | 6.70 | 3.40 | 1991-2000 | 5.10 | Organized labor | all | 7,513 | | 5.40 | 0.900 | 2001-2010 | 3.20 | Organized labor | all | 4,957 | | 7.10 | 2.50 | 2011-2018 | 4.80 | Organized labor | all | 4,920 | | 7.70 | 1.90 | 2021-2024 | 4.80 | Organized labor | all | 4,418 | | −3.10 | −8.90 | 1973-1980 | −6 | Banks and finance | all | 6,227 | | 0 | −4.40 | 1981-1990 | −2.20 | Banks and finance | all | 9,081 | | 0.100 | −4.10 | 1991-2000 | −2 | Banks and finance | all | 7,925 | | −3 | −8.70 | 2001-2010 | −5.90 | Banks and finance | all | 5,131 | | −3.10 | −8.20 | 2011-2018 | −5.70 | Banks and finance | all | 5,087 | | 1.70 | −4.30 | 2021-2024 | −1.30 | Banks and finance | all | 5,291 | | −9.90 | −14.50 | 1973-1980 | −12.20 | Major companies | all | 8,493 | | −9.90 | −14.50 | 1981-1990 | −12.20 | Major companies | all | 8,892 | | −10 | −14.40 | 1991-2000 | −12.20 | Major companies | all | 7,783 | | −5.10 | −10.30 | 2001-2010 | −7.70 | Major companies | all | 5,081 | | −8.10 | −13.80 | 2011-2018 | −10.90 | Major companies | all | 5,026 | | −2.50 | −8.20 | 2021-2024 | −5.30 | Major companies | all | 5,240 | | −0.800 | −5.70 | 1973-1980 | −3.20 | Organized religion | all | 8,534 | | 1.30 | −3.30 | 1981-1990 | −1 | Organized religion | all | 8,988 | | −1.90 | −6.40 | 1991-2000 | −4.10 | Organized religion | all | 7,850 | | −6.30 | −12 | 2001-2010 | −9.20 | Organized religion | all | 5,069 | | −6 | −11.70 | 2011-2018 | −8.80 | Organized religion | all | 5,012 | | −7.20 | −13 | 2021-2024 | −10.10 | Organized religion | all | 5,225 | | 2 | −2.80 | 1973-1980 | −0.400 | Military | all | 8,599 | | −1.80 | −6.60 | 1981-1990 | −4.20 | Military | all | 9,036 | | −6.50 | −11.40 | 1991-2000 | −8.90 | Military | all | 7,894 | | −18.60 | −25.10 | 2001-2010 | −21.90 | Military | all | 5,132 | | −12.10 | −18.70 | 2011-2018 | −15.40 | Military | all | 5,069 | | −10.20 | −17.80 | 2021-2024 | −14 | Military | all | 5,278 | | 2.40 | −2.40 | 1973-1980 | 0 | Supreme Court | all | 8,541 | | −2.80 | −7.70 | 1981-1990 | −5.30 | Supreme Court | all | 8,942 | | 1.80 | −2.90 | 1991-2000 | −0.600 | Supreme Court | all | 7,737 | | −3.80 | −10.20 | 2001-2010 | −7 | Supreme Court | all | 5,063 | | 5.10 | −1.20 | 2011-2018 | 2 | Supreme Court | all | 5,022 | | −9.70 | −16.10 | 2021-2024 | −12.90 | Supreme Court | all | 5,270 | | −2.90 | −8.10 | 1973-1980 | −5.50 | Scientific community | inperson | 8,073 | | −3.60 | −8.80 | 1981-1990 | −6.20 | Scientific community | inperson | 8,598 | | −0.100 | −5.20 | 1991-2000 | −2.70 | Scientific community | inperson | 7,532 | | 5.90 | −1.10 | 2001-2010 | 2.40 | Scientific community | inperson | 4,481 | | 13.40 | 6.10 | 2011-2018 | 9.70 | Scientific community | inperson | 4,412 | | 27.80 | 11.80 | 2022-2024 | 19.80 | Scientific community | inperson | 1,259 | | −2.50 | −6.50 | 1973-1980 | −4.50 | Executive branch | inperson | 8,680 | | −13.60 | −17.70 | 1981-1990 | −15.60 | Executive branch | inperson | 9,030 | | 6.90 | 3.40 | 1991-2000 | 5.10 | Executive branch | inperson | 7,867 | | −9.50 | −15.10 | 2001-2010 | −12.30 | Executive branch | inperson | 4,600 | | 8.30 | 3.50 | 2011-2018 | 5.90 | Executive branch | inperson | 4,508 | | 19.90 | 9.40 | 2022-2024 | 14.60 | Executive branch | inperson | 1,295 | | 7.60 | 2.80 | 1973-1980 | 5.20 | Education | inperson | 8,761 | | 2.80 | −1.80 | 1981-1990 | 0.500 | Education | inperson | 9,115 | | 6.60 | 2.30 | 1991-2000 | 4.40 | Education | inperson | 7,979 | | 4.40 | −1.90 | 2001-2010 | 1.30 | Education | inperson | 4,653 | | 12.70 | 6.60 | 2011-2018 | 9.70 | Education | inperson | 4,550 | | 21.20 | 7.60 | 2022-2024 | 14.40 | Education | inperson | 1,305 | | −1.20 | −6.10 | 1973-1980 | −3.60 | Medicine | inperson | 8,793 | | −1.80 | −6.80 | 1981-1990 | −4.30 | Medicine | inperson | 9,163 | | −1.60 | −6.50 | 1991-2000 | −4.10 | Medicine | inperson | 7,987 | | 0.800 | −6 | 2001-2010 | −2.60 | Medicine | inperson | 4,653 | | 1.70 | −5.40 | 2011-2018 | −1.80 | Medicine | inperson | 4,554 | | 18.30 | 2.50 | 2022-2024 | 10.40 | Medicine | inperson | 1,309 | | 9.20 | 5 | 1973-1980 | 7.10 | Press | inperson | 8,744 | | 7.20 | 3.40 | 1981-1990 | 5.30 | Press | inperson | 9,060 | | 3 | −0.100 | 1991-2000 | 1.40 | Press | inperson | 7,913 | | 7.60 | 3.60 | 2001-2010 | 5.60 | Press | inperson | 4,642 | | 10.20 | 6.30 | 2011-2018 | 8.30 | Press | inperson | 4,533 | | 11.80 | 3.80 | 2022-2024 | 7.80 | Press | inperson | 1,297 | | 5.90 | 2.10 | 1973-1980 | 4 | Television | inperson | 8,750 | | 4.40 | 1 | 1981-1990 | 2.70 | Television | inperson | 9,116 | | 4 | 0.900 | 1991-2000 | 2.40 | Television | inperson | 7,963 | | 4.70 | 0.800 | 2001-2010 | 2.70 | Television | inperson | 4,639 | | 5.40 | 1.20 | 2011-2018 | 3.30 | Television | inperson | 4,519 | | 11.60 | 2.50 | 2022-2024 | 7.10 | Television | inperson | 1,291 | | 5.50 | 1.90 | 1973-1980 | 3.70 | Congress | inperson | 8,671 | | 3.50 | −0.200 | 1981-1990 | 1.60 | Congress | inperson | 9,050 | | 1.50 | −1.70 | 1991-2000 | −0.100 | Congress | inperson | 7,866 | | 2.40 | −2.30 | 2001-2010 | 0.100 | Congress | inperson | 4,611 | | 2.50 | −1 | 2011-2018 | 0.800 | Congress | inperson | 4,511 | | 8.80 | 1.30 | 2022-2024 | 5 | Congress | inperson | 1,296 | | 8.60 | 5.20 | 1973-1980 | 6.90 | Organized labor | inperson | 8,486 | | 6.70 | 3.70 | 1981-1990 | 5.20 | Organized labor | inperson | 8,865 | | 6.70 | 3.40 | 1991-2000 | 5.10 | Organized labor | inperson | 7,513 | | 4.90 | 0.100 | 2001-2010 | 2.50 | Organized labor | inperson | 4,481 | | 7 | 2.10 | 2011-2018 | 4.60 | Organized labor | inperson | 4,405 | | 8.60 | −7 | 2022-2024 | 0.800 | Organized labor | inperson | 964 | | −3.10 | −8.90 | 1973-1980 | −6 | Banks and finance | inperson | 6,227 | | 0 | −4.40 | 1981-1990 | −2.20 | Banks and finance | inperson | 9,081 | | 0.100 | −4.10 | 1991-2000 | −2 | Banks and finance | inperson | 7,925 | | −3.10 | −9.10 | 2001-2010 | −6.10 | Banks and finance | inperson | 4,629 | | −2.60 | −7.90 | 2011-2018 | −5.20 | Banks and finance | inperson | 4,551 | | 7 | −6.30 | 2022-2024 | 0.300 | Banks and finance | inperson | 1,307 | | −9.90 | −14.50 | 1973-1980 | −12.20 | Major companies | inperson | 8,493 | | −9.90 | −14.50 | 1981-1990 | −12.20 | Major companies | inperson | 8,892 | | −10 | −14.40 | 1991-2000 | −12.20 | Major companies | inperson | 7,783 | | −5 | −10.40 | 2001-2010 | −7.70 | Major companies | inperson | 4,591 | | −8.40 | −14.30 | 2011-2018 | −11.40 | Major companies | inperson | 4,494 | | 5.50 | −7.10 | 2022-2024 | −0.800 | Major companies | inperson | 1,265 | | −0.800 | −5.70 | 1973-1980 | −3.20 | Organized religion | inperson | 8,534 | | 1.30 | −3.30 | 1981-1990 | −1 | Organized religion | inperson | 8,988 | | −1.90 | −6.40 | 1991-2000 | −4.10 | Organized religion | inperson | 7,850 | | −6.10 | −12.10 | 2001-2010 | −9.10 | Organized religion | inperson | 4,575 | | −6.50 | −12.60 | 2011-2018 | −9.50 | Organized religion | inperson | 4,490 | | −4.80 | −18.40 | 2022-2024 | −11.60 | Organized religion | inperson | 1,264 | | 2 | −2.80 | 1973-1980 | −0.400 | Military | inperson | 8,599 | | −1.80 | −6.60 | 1981-1990 | −4.20 | Military | inperson | 9,036 | | −6.50 | −11.40 | 1991-2000 | −8.90 | Military | inperson | 7,894 | | −18.90 | −25.60 | 2001-2010 | −22.30 | Military | inperson | 4,635 | | −11.70 | −18.70 | 2011-2018 | −15.20 | Military | inperson | 4,539 | | −5.40 | −22.10 | 2022-2024 | −13.70 | Military | inperson | 1,302 | | 2.40 | −2.40 | 1973-1980 | 0 | Supreme Court | inperson | 8,541 | | −2.80 | −7.70 | 1981-1990 | −5.30 | Supreme Court | inperson | 8,942 | | 1.80 | −2.90 | 1991-2000 | −0.600 | Supreme Court | inperson | 7,737 | | −3.10 | −9.80 | 2001-2010 | −6.50 | Supreme Court | inperson | 4,571 | | 4.40 | −2.20 | 2011-2018 | 1.10 | Supreme Court | inperson | 4,497 | | −9.50 | −22.80 | 2022-2024 | −16.20 | Supreme Court | inperson | 1,289 | Views: In-person interviews only (mode = inperson); All interview modes (mode = all). Note: Cells combine the surveys of a period; the 1973-1980 period has twelve institutions in 1973 and 1974 and thirteen after, because banks were first asked in 1975. Note: Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: General Social Survey, 1973-2024; weighted (weight_use); Democrats and Republicans include leaners; intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/gap_by_era.json ### Table 5. The television gap has lasted since 1973-1980 and the medicine, Congress and Supreme Court gaps only since 2022-2024 Democratic share minus Republican share with a great deal of confidence, percentage points with 95% interval, in 2022-2024 among in-person respondents, and the period from which the gap has lasted | Institution | Gap, 2022-2024, in person, points [95% interval] | Lasting gap | | --- | --- | --- | | Scientific community | +19.8 [+11.8, +27.8] | Democrats more confident since 2011-2018 | | Executive branch | +14.6 [+9.4, +19.9] | Reverses with the party in the White House | | Education | +14.4 [+7.6, +21.2] | Democrats more confident since 2011-2018 | | Medicine | +10.4 [+2.5, +18.3] | Democrats more confident since 2022-2024 | | Press | +7.8 [+3.8, +11.8] | Democrats more confident since 2001-2010 | | Television | +7.1 [+2.5, +11.6] | Democrats more confident since 1973-1980 | | Congress | +5.0 [+1.3, +8.8] | Democrats more confident since 2022-2024 | | Organized labor | +0.8 [−7.0, +8.6] | None in 2022-2024 (interval includes zero) | | Banks and finance | +0.3 [−6.3, +7.0] | None in 2022-2024 (interval includes zero) | | Major companies | −0.8 [−7.1, +5.5] | None in 2022-2024 (interval includes zero) | | Organized religion | −11.6 [−18.4, −4.8] | Republicans more confident since 1991-2000 | | Military | −13.7 [−22.1, −5.4] | Republicans more confident since 1981-1990 | | Supreme Court | −16.2 [−22.8, −9.5] | Republicans more confident since 2022-2024 | Note: The rule counts an institution as having no lasting gap when the 2022-2024 in-person interval includes zero, whatever the earlier periods show. The survey began in 1973, so a gap that has lasted since 1973-1980 may have started earlier. Source: General Social Survey, 1973-2024; weighted (weight_use); Democrats and Republicans include leaners; intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/gap_onset.json ### Table 6. The executive branch gap has the sign of the president's party in 33 of 33 survey years Democratic minus Republican share with a great deal of confidence in the executive branch of the federal government, percentage points, by survey year, 1973-2024, 95% intervals | conf_high | conf_low | gap | mode | n | president_party | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | −17.10 | −28.70 | −22.90 | all | 1,260 | Republican | 1973 | | −4.40 | −14 | −9.20 | all | 1,233 | Republican | 1974 | | −3.90 | −13.50 | −8.70 | all | 1,240 | Republican | 1975 | | −3 | −12.60 | −7.80 | all | 1,218 | Republican | 1976 | | 11.90 | 0.700 | 6.30 | all | 1,296 | Democratic | 1977 | | 11.50 | 2.50 | 7 | all | 1,258 | Democratic | 1978 | | 9.60 | −0.100 | 4.70 | all | 1,175 | Democratic | 1980 | | −13.40 | −25.20 | −19.30 | all | 1,570 | Republican | 1982 | | −8.20 | −18.30 | −13.30 | all | 1,355 | Republican | 1983 | | −12.70 | −26.70 | −19.70 | all | 834 | Republican | 1984 | | −9.50 | −20.20 | −14.80 | all | 1,248 | Republican | 1986 | | −10.40 | −20.80 | −15.60 | all | 1,546 | Republican | 1987 | | −10.10 | −21.90 | −16 | all | 852 | Republican | 1988 | | −6.40 | −19 | −12.70 | all | 856 | Republican | 1989 | | −3.80 | −17.70 | −10.70 | all | 769 | Republican | 1990 | | −10.20 | −23.50 | −16.90 | all | 864 | Republican | 1991 | | 13.60 | 4.20 | 8.90 | all | 877 | Democratic | 1993 | | 12 | 5.30 | 8.70 | all | 1,671 | Democratic | 1994 | | 11.30 | 4.30 | 7.80 | all | 1,524 | Democratic | 1996 | | 12.50 | 4.80 | 8.60 | all | 1,500 | Democratic | 1998 | | 11 | 2.50 | 6.70 | all | 1,431 | Democratic | 2000 | | −18.60 | −34.30 | −26.50 | all | 703 | Republican | 2002 | | −18.80 | −33.20 | −26 | all | 726 | Republican | 2004 | | −15.70 | −25.10 | −20.40 | all | 1,485 | Republican | 2006 | | −1.40 | −10.70 | −6 | all | 1,098 | Republican | 2008 | | 21.60 | 10.60 | 16.10 | all | 1,080 | Democratic | 2010 | | 16.80 | 6.80 | 11.80 | all | 1,027 | Democratic | 2012 | | 18.20 | 10.90 | 14.50 | all | 1,266 | Democratic | 2014 | | 15.30 | 7.40 | 11.40 | all | 1,533 | Democratic | 2016 | | −7.80 | −18.40 | −13.10 | all | 1,211 | Republican | 2018 | | 14.40 | 7.10 | 10.70 | all | 2,017 | Democratic | 2021 | | 19.70 | 10.90 | 15.30 | all | 1,713 | Democratic | 2022 | | 20.90 | 11.70 | 16.30 | all | 1,538 | Democratic | 2024 | | −17.10 | −28.70 | −22.90 | inperson | 1,260 | Republican | 1973 | | −4.40 | −14 | −9.20 | inperson | 1,233 | Republican | 1974 | | −3.90 | −13.50 | −8.70 | inperson | 1,240 | Republican | 1975 | | −3 | −12.60 | −7.80 | inperson | 1,218 | Republican | 1976 | | 11.90 | 0.700 | 6.30 | inperson | 1,296 | Democratic | 1977 | | 11.50 | 2.50 | 7 | inperson | 1,258 | Democratic | 1978 | | 9.60 | −0.100 | 4.70 | inperson | 1,175 | Democratic | 1980 | | −13.40 | −25.20 | −19.30 | inperson | 1,570 | Republican | 1982 | | −8.20 | −18.30 | −13.30 | inperson | 1,355 | Republican | 1983 | | −12.70 | −26.70 | −19.70 | inperson | 834 | Republican | 1984 | | −9.50 | −20.20 | −14.80 | inperson | 1,248 | Republican | 1986 | | −10.40 | −20.80 | −15.60 | inperson | 1,546 | Republican | 1987 | | −10.10 | −21.90 | −16 | inperson | 852 | Republican | 1988 | | −6.40 | −19 | −12.70 | inperson | 856 | Republican | 1989 | | −3.80 | −17.70 | −10.70 | inperson | 769 | Republican | 1990 | | −10.20 | −23.50 | −16.90 | inperson | 864 | Republican | 1991 | | 13.60 | 4.20 | 8.90 | inperson | 877 | Democratic | 1993 | | 12 | 5.30 | 8.70 | inperson | 1,671 | Democratic | 1994 | | 11.30 | 4.30 | 7.80 | inperson | 1,524 | Democratic | 1996 | | 12.50 | 4.80 | 8.60 | inperson | 1,500 | Democratic | 1998 | | 11 | 2.50 | 6.70 | inperson | 1,431 | Democratic | 2000 | | −18.60 | −34.30 | −26.50 | inperson | 703 | Republican | 2002 | | −18.20 | −33.60 | −25.90 | inperson | 579 | Republican | 2004 | | −16.40 | −26.10 | −21.20 | inperson | 1,387 | Republican | 2006 | | −0.700 | −10.60 | −5.70 | inperson | 974 | Republican | 2008 | | 20.50 | 8.70 | 14.60 | inperson | 957 | Democratic | 2010 | | 17.90 | 7.20 | 12.50 | inperson | 892 | Democratic | 2012 | | 18 | 10.40 | 14.20 | inperson | 1,098 | Democratic | 2014 | | 15 | 6.90 | 10.90 | inperson | 1,424 | Democratic | 2016 | | −8 | −19 | −13.50 | inperson | 1,094 | Republican | 2018 | | 23.20 | 9.70 | 16.40 | inperson | 762 | Democratic | 2022 | | 19.30 | 3.20 | 11.20 | inperson | 533 | Democratic | 2024 | | 14.20 | 6.60 | 10.40 | web | 1,756 | Democratic | 2021 | | 20.80 | 9 | 14.90 | web | 789 | Democratic | 2022 | | 25 | 13 | 19 | web | 839 | Democratic | 2024 | Views: All interview modes (mode = all); In-person interviews only (mode = inperson); Web interviews only (mode = web). Note: Presidential terms are assigned by the year of the inauguration; surveys fielded in an inauguration year are assigned to the new president. The shaded terms, from the left, are Nixon and Ford, Carter, Reagan and Bush, Clinton, Bush, Obama, Trump and Biden. Note: The interval excludes zero on the side of the president's party in 32 of the 33 years. In 1980 the gap was +4.7 points, an interval that includes zero. Note: The 2021 survey began interviewing in December 2020, and its point blends interviews before and after the inauguration of 20 January 2021 and is assigned to President Biden. Note: Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: General Social Survey, 1973-2024; weighted (weight_use); Democrats and Republicans include leaners; intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/executive_gap.json ### Table 7. The web science gap differs from the in-person gap by +14.5 points, before correcting for thirteen comparisons Democratic minus Republican share with a great deal of confidence, percentage points with 95% intervals, respondents interviewed in person and on the web, 2022 and 2024 pooled | Institution | In-person gap (points) | In-person gap, lower end | In-person gap, upper end | Web gap (points) | Web gap, lower end | Web gap, upper end | Web minus in person (points) | Difference, lower end | Difference, upper end | In-person respondents | Web respondents | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Scientific community | +19.8 | +11.8 | +27.8 | +34.3 | +27.8 | +40.7 | +14.5 | +4.2 | +24.7 | 1259 | 1630 | | Executive branch | +14.6 | +9.4 | +19.9 | +17.2 | +13.0 | +21.5 | +2.6 | −4.2 | +9.4 | 1295 | 1628 | | Education | +14.4 | +7.6 | +21.2 | +12.6 | +8.0 | +17.2 | −1.8 | −10.1 | +6.4 | 1305 | 1622 | | Medicine | +10.4 | +2.5 | +18.3 | +19.0 | +12.8 | +25.2 | +8.6 | −1.4 | +18.6 | 1309 | 1626 | | Press | +7.8 | +3.8 | +11.8 | +11.8 | +8.0 | +15.6 | +4.0 | −1.5 | +9.5 | 1297 | 1628 | | Television | +7.1 | +2.5 | +11.6 | +4.1 | +1.0 | +7.2 | −3.0 | −8.5 | +2.5 | 1291 | 1628 | | Congress | +5.0 | +1.3 | +8.8 | +2.0 | −0.4 | +4.5 | −3.0 | −7.5 | +1.5 | 1296 | 1629 | | Organized labor | +0.8 | −7.0 | +8.6 | +9.0 | +3.5 | +14.4 | +8.2 | −1.3 | +17.6 | 964 | 1223 | | Banks and finance | +0.3 | −6.3 | +7.0 | +1.0 | −4.0 | +6.0 | +0.6 | −7.7 | +9.0 | 1307 | 1632 | | Major companies | −0.8 | −7.1 | +5.5 | −6.2 | −11.2 | −1.2 | −5.4 | −13.5 | +2.7 | 1265 | 1629 | | Organized religion | −11.6 | −18.4 | −4.8 | −11.1 | −15.8 | −6.3 | +0.6 | −7.7 | +8.8 | 1264 | 1622 | | Military | −13.7 | −22.1 | −5.4 | −6.5 | −13.4 | +0.4 | +7.2 | −3.6 | +18.0 | 1302 | 1630 | | Supreme Court | −16.2 | −22.8 | −9.5 | −21.7 | −27.0 | −16.4 | −5.5 | −14.0 | +3.0 | 1289 | 1632 | Note: Telephone and other-mode interviews of 2022 and 2024 are left out of this figure; they are included in the all-modes estimates elsewhere in the chapter. The interval of each web-minus-in-person difference is in the data table. Note: Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: General Social Survey, 1973-2024; weighted (weight_use); Democrats and Republicans include leaners (2022 and 2024 pooled); intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/gap_by_mode.json ### Table 8. The Supreme Court gap was on the Republican side by 2022 in both interview modes Democratic minus Republican share with a great deal of confidence, percentage points, four institutions, in-person interviews (solid line) and web interviews (dashed line), 2014-2024, 95% intervals | conf_high | conf_low | gap | institution | interview | n | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | 14 | 0.300 | 7.10 | Scientific community | In person | 1,076 | 2014 | | 19.70 | 7.10 | 13.40 | Scientific community | In person | 1,397 | 2016 | | 18.30 | 3 | 10.70 | Scientific community | In person | 1,073 | 2018 | | 34.60 | 13.70 | 24.10 | Scientific community | In person | 747 | 2022 | | 23.50 | 0.100 | 11.80 | Scientific community | In person | 512 | 2024 | | 5.50 | −8 | −1.30 | Medicine | In person | 1,109 | 2014 | | 3.90 | −8.30 | −2.20 | Medicine | In person | 1,441 | 2016 | | 4 | −10.70 | −3.40 | Medicine | In person | 1,100 | 2018 | | 25.70 | 4.60 | 15.20 | Medicine | In person | 772 | 2022 | | 12.80 | −9.10 | 1.80 | Medicine | In person | 537 | 2024 | | −0.200 | −13.90 | −7.10 | Military | In person | 1,103 | 2014 | | −7.30 | −19.70 | −13.50 | Military | In person | 1,439 | 2016 | | −13.90 | −28.10 | −21 | Military | In person | 1,100 | 2018 | | −6.40 | −28.60 | −17.50 | Military | In person | 766 | 2022 | | 5.20 | −18.60 | −6.70 | Military | In person | 536 | 2024 | | 11.50 | −0.400 | 5.50 | Supreme Court | In person | 1,094 | 2014 | | 9.80 | −1.50 | 4.10 | Supreme Court | In person | 1,428 | 2016 | | 3.30 | −11.20 | −3.90 | Supreme Court | In person | 1,086 | 2018 | | −10.90 | −28.60 | −19.80 | Supreme Court | In person | 756 | 2022 | | −0.200 | −18.90 | −9.50 | Supreme Court | In person | 533 | 2024 | | 36.60 | 25.40 | 31 | Scientific community | Web | 1,755 | 2021 | | 47.40 | 28.60 | 38 | Scientific community | Web | 789 | 2022 | | 40.20 | 22.70 | 31.40 | Scientific community | Web | 841 | 2024 | | 15.80 | 4.40 | 10.10 | Medicine | Web | 1,759 | 2021 | | 27.10 | 8.20 | 17.70 | Medicine | Web | 788 | 2022 | | 28 | 11.70 | 19.90 | Medicine | Web | 838 | 2024 | | −21.60 | −32.90 | −27.30 | Military | Web | 1,757 | 2021 | | −8.50 | −28.80 | −18.70 | Military | Web | 791 | 2022 | | 11.50 | −7.10 | 2.20 | Military | Web | 839 | 2024 | | −0.200 | −10.80 | −5.50 | Supreme Court | Web | 1,762 | 2021 | | −11.90 | −27.60 | −19.70 | Supreme Court | Web | 790 | 2022 | | −15.80 | −30.20 | −23 | Supreme Court | Web | 842 | 2024 | Note: There are no web interviews before 2021. Note: Lines are broken between 2018 and the next survey year in each view, because there is no 2020 survey and the 2021 survey had no in-person interviews. Note: Intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents (the Kish effective sample size); they do not use the survey's sampling design. Source: General Social Survey, 1973-2024; weighted (weight_use); Democrats and Republicans include leaners; intervals on the Kish effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/gap_by_mode_year.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (121), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | big_cut | 10 | percentage points | cutoff on the absolute gap (constant) | threshold for a large gap | all periods | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | chg_military_ip_18_24 | +14.3 | percentage points (later gap minus earlier gap, or web gap minus in-person gap) | change in the in-person Democratic-minus-Republican gap in confidence in the military, 2018 to 2024; standard errors of the two gaps combined in quadrature | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2018 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.4 to 28.1 | 1,636 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | chg_military_ip_22_24 | +10.8 | percentage points (later gap minus earlier gap, or web gap minus in-person gap) | change in the in-person Democratic-minus-Republican gap in confidence in the military, 2022 to 2024; standard errors of the two gaps combined in quadrature | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI −5.4 to 27.1 | 1,302 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | chg_military_web_22_24 | +20.9 | percentage points (later gap minus earlier gap, or web gap minus in-person gap) | change in the web Democratic-minus-Republican gap in confidence in the military, 2022 to 2024; standard errors of the two gaps combined in quadrature | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI 7.1 to 34.6 | 1,630 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | chg_science_ip_18_22 | +13.5 | percentage points (later gap minus earlier gap, or web gap minus in-person gap) | change in the in-person Democratic-minus-Republican gap in confidence in the scientific community, 2018 to 2022; standard errors of the two gaps combined in quadrature | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2018 to 2022 | 95% CI 0.5 to 26.4 | 1,820 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | chg_science_ip_22_24 | −12.3 | percentage points (later gap minus earlier gap, or web gap minus in-person gap) | change in the in-person Democratic-minus-Republican gap in confidence in the scientific community, 2022 to 2024; standard errors of the two gaps combined in quadrature | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 to 2024 | 95% CI −28.0 to 3.4 | 1,259 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | court_dem_post_ruling_web | 7.8% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share of Democrats saying a great deal of confidence in the Supreme Court; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | Democrats (including leaners), interviewed on the web from 25 June 2022 | 2022 | 95% CI 3.3% to 12.4% | 304 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | court_dem_pre_ruling_web | 4.6% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share of Democrats saying a great deal of confidence in the Supreme Court; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | Democrats (including leaners), interviewed on the web before 25 June 2022, the day after the ruling of 24 June 2022 | 2022 | 95% CI 0.0% to 9.2% | 137 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_congress_ip | 8.0% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in congress; in-person interviews only | Democrats who identify with or lean toward the party | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 5.0% to 11.1% | 694 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_court_2018_ip | 32.7% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in supreme court; in-person interviews only | Democrats who identify with or lean toward the party | 2018 | 95% CI 28.1% to 37.4% | 605 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_court_2021_web | 25.5% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in supreme court; web interviews only | Democrats who identify with or lean toward the party | 2021 | 95% CI 22.1% to 28.9% | 1,058 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_court_2022_ip | 8.9% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in supreme court; in-person interviews only | Democrats who identify with or lean toward the party | 2022 | 95% CI 4.6% to 13.2% | 405 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_court_2022_web | 7.1% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in supreme court; web interviews only | Democrats who identify with or lean toward the party | 2022 | 95% CI 3.5% to 10.6% | 441 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_military_2018_ip | 52.5% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in military; in-person interviews only | Democrats who identify with or lean toward the party | 2018 | 95% CI 47.6% to 57.4% | 614 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_military_2024_ip | 48.1% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in military; in-person interviews only | Democrats who identify with or lean toward the party | 2024 | 95% CI 39.9% to 56.3% | 284 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | dem_press_ip | 10.4% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in press; in-person interviews only | Democrats who identify with or lean toward the party | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 6.9% to 13.8% | 693 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | design_n_cells | 585 | gap estimates | count of gap estimates compared | gap estimates: annual, period and pooled 2022-2024 by mode, from 1975 on | 1975-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | design_n_differs | 15 | gap estimates | count of gap estimates whose 95% interval excludes zero under one standard error and not the other | gap estimates: annual, period and pooled 2022-2024 by mode, from 1975 on | 1975-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | design_ratio_median | 1.01 | ratio of standard errors (using the survey design over assuming a simple random sample) | median across gap estimates of the ratio of the Taylor-linearized standard error (GSS strata and PSUs) to the standard error that assumes a simple random sample of the weighted respondents | gap estimates: annual, period and pooled 2022-2024 by mode, from 1975 on | 1975-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | design_ratio_p05 | 0.87 | ratio of standard errors (using the survey design over assuming a simple random sample) | 5th percentile across gap estimates of the ratio of the Taylor-linearized standard error (GSS strata and PSUs) to the standard error that assumes a simple random sample of the weighted respondents | gap estimates: annual, period and pooled 2022-2024 by mode, from 1975 on | 1975-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | design_ratio_p95 | 1.17 | ratio of standard errors (using the survey design over assuming a simple random sample) | 95th percentile across gap estimates of the ratio of the Taylor-linearized standard error (GSS strata and PSUs) to the standard error that assumes a simple random sample of the weighted respondents | gap estimates: annual, period and pooled 2022-2024 by mode, from 1975 on | 1975-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | diff_max_other | 8.6 | percentage points (absolute web-minus-in-person difference in the gap) | largest absolute difference between the web and in-person gaps among the twelve institutions other than science | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | diff_science | +14.5 | percentage points (web gap minus in-person gap) | difference between the web and in-person Democratic-minus-Republican gaps in confidence in the scientific community; standard errors of the two gaps combined in quadrature | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 4.2 to 24.7 | 2,889 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | diff_science_mode_2022 | +13.9 | percentage points (later gap minus earlier gap, or web gap minus in-person gap) | web gap minus in-person gap in confidence in the scientific community, 2022; standard errors of the two gaps combined in quadrature | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 | 95% CI −0.2 to 28.0 | 1,536 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | diff_science_mode_2024 | +19.6 | percentage points (later gap minus earlier gap, or web gap minus in-person gap) | web gap minus in-person gap in confidence in the scientific community, 2024; standard errors of the two gaps combined in quadrature | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI 5.0 to 34.3 | 1,353 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | diff_science_p_adj | 0.07 | p-value (the science difference in the gap, multiplied by thirteen for the thirteen comparisons) | two-sided normal p-value of the web-minus-in-person difference in the science gap, multiplied by the thirteen institutions compared (Bonferroni adjustment) and capped at 1 | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | diff_widest_end | 18.6 | percentage points (end of a 95% interval for a web-minus-in-person difference) | largest absolute end of the 95% interval of the web-minus-in-person difference in the gap among the twelve institutions other than science | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | exec_2021_pre_share | 22.1% | percent of respondents interviewed before the inauguration | share interviewed from December 2020 to 19 January 2021, before the inauguration of 20 January 2021 (unweighted count) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the executive branch item in 2021 | 2021 | | 1,793 | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | floor_ip_22_24 | 2.6 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean absolute gap expected from sampling noise alone if every true gap were zero; in-person interviews only | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | floor_max | 1.2 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | largest across the periods before 2022 of the mean absolute gap expected from sampling noise alone if every true gap were zero; in-person interviews only | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 1973-2018, by period | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | floor_min | 0.8 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | smallest across the periods before 2022 of the mean absolute gap expected from sampling noise alone if every true gap were zero (sqrt(2/pi) times the mean standard error of the gaps); in-person interviews only | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 1973-2018, by period | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | floor_n | 150 | respondents | suppression floor (constant) | minimum size of a party-by-year cell | 1973-2024, survey years with the confidence items | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | floor_neff | 100 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | suppression floor (constant) | minimum effective size of a party-by-year cell | 1973-2024, survey years with the confidence items | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | gap_companies_1973_80 | −12.2 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in major companies; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 1973-1980 | 95% CI −14.5 to −9.9 | 8,493 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_companies_2011_18 | −11.4 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in major companies; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2011-2018 | 95% CI −14.3 to −8.4 | 4,494 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_companies_web_22_24 | −6.2 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in major companies; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI −11.2 to −1.2 | 1,629 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_congress_ip | +5.0 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in congress; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 1.3 to 8.8 | 1,296 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_court_2011_18 | +1.1 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in supreme court; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2011-2018 | 95% CI −2.2 to 4.4 | 4,497 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_court_2018_ip | −3.9 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in supreme court; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2018 | 95% CI −11.2 to 3.3 | 1,086 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_court_2021_web | −5.5 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in supreme court; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2021 | 95% CI −10.8 to −0.2 | 1,762 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_court_2022_ip | −19.8 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in supreme court; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 | 95% CI −28.6 to −10.9 | 756 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_court_2022_web | −19.7 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in supreme court; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 | 95% CI −27.6 to −11.9 | 790 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_court_2024_ip | −9.5 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in supreme court; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI −18.9 to −0.2 | 533 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_court_2024_web | −23.0 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in supreme court; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI −30.2 to −15.8 | 842 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_court_ip | −16.2 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in supreme court; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI −22.8 to −9.5 | 1,289 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_exec_2021_post | +16.0 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in the executive branch; all interview modes; 2021 interviews interviewed from 20 January 2021 | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6), interviewed from 20 January 2021 | 2021 | 95% CI 11.7 to 20.4 | 1,397 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_exec_2021_pre | −10.7 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in the executive branch; all interview modes; 2021 interviews interviewed before the inauguration on 20 January 2021 | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6), interviewed before the inauguration on 20 January 2021 | 2021 | 95% CI −19.1 to −2.3 | 396 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_executive_1980_all | +4.7 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in executive branch; all interview modes; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 1980 | 95% CI −0.1 to 9.6 | 1,175 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_executive_2006_all | −20.4 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in executive branch; all interview modes; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2006 | 95% CI −25.1 to −15.7 | 1,485 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_executive_2010_all | +16.1 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in executive branch; all interview modes; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2010 | 95% CI 10.6 to 21.6 | 1,080 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_executive_2018_all | −13.1 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in executive branch; all interview modes; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2018 | 95% CI −18.4 to −7.8 | 1,211 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_executive_2024_all | +16.3 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in executive branch; all interview modes; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI 11.7 to 20.9 | 1,538 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_labor_1973_80 | +6.9 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in organized labor; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 1973-1980 | 95% CI 5.2 to 8.6 | 8,486 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_labor_2011_18 | +4.6 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in organized labor; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2011-2018 | 95% CI 2.1 to 7.0 | 4,405 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_labor_web_22_24 | +9.0 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in organized labor; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 3.5 to 14.4 | 1,223 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_medicine_2011_18 | −1.8 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in medicine; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2011-2018 | 95% CI −5.4 to 1.7 | 4,554 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_medicine_2018_ip | −3.4 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in medicine; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2018 | 95% CI −10.7 to 4.0 | 1,100 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_medicine_2022_ip | +15.2 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in medicine; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 | 95% CI 4.6 to 25.7 | 772 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_medicine_2024_ip | +1.8 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in medicine; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI −9.1 to 12.8 | 537 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_medicine_2024_web | +19.9 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in medicine; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI 11.7 to 28.0 | 838 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_medicine_ip | +10.4 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in medicine; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 2.5 to 18.3 | 1,309 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_military_2001_10 | −22.3 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in military; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2001-2010 | 95% CI −25.6 to −18.9 | 4,635 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_military_2018_ip | −21.0 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in military; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2018 | 95% CI −28.1 to −13.9 | 1,100 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_military_2022_ip | −17.5 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in military; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 | 95% CI −28.6 to −6.4 | 766 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_military_2022_web | −18.7 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in military; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 | 95% CI −28.8 to −8.5 | 791 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_military_2024_all | +0.3 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in military; all interview modes; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI −6.7 to 7.3 | 1,542 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_military_2024_ip | −6.7 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in military; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI −18.6 to 5.2 | 536 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_military_2024_web | +2.2 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in military; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI −7.1 to 11.5 | 839 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_military_ip | −13.7 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in military; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI −22.1 to −5.4 | 1,302 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_press_ip | +7.8 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in press; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 3.8 to 11.8 | 1,297 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_1973_80 | −5.5 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in the scientific community; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 1973-1980 | 95% CI −8.1 to −2.9 | 8,073 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_2001_10 | +2.4 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in the scientific community; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2001-2010 | 95% CI −1.1 to 5.9 | 4,481 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_2008_all | +7.5 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in scientific community; all interview modes; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2008 | 95% CI 0.4 to 14.6 | 1,071 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_2011_18 | +9.7 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in the scientific community; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2011-2018 | 95% CI 6.1 to 13.4 | 4,412 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_2018_ip | +10.7 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in scientific community; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2018 | 95% CI 3.0 to 18.3 | 1,073 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_2022_ip | +24.1 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in scientific community; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 | 95% CI 13.7 to 34.6 | 747 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_2022_web | +38.0 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in scientific community; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 | 95% CI 28.6 to 47.4 | 789 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_2024_ip | +11.8 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in scientific community; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI 0.1 to 23.5 | 512 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_2024_web | +31.4 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in scientific community; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI 22.7 to 40.2 | 841 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_all_22_24 | +28.2 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in the scientific community; all interview modes; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 23.4 to 32.9 | 3,211 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_ip | +19.8 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in the scientific community; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 11.8 to 27.8 | 1,259 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_science_web_22_24 | +34.3 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in the scientific community; web interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 27.8 to 40.7 | 1,630 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_television_1973_80 | +4.0 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in television; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 1973-1980 | 95% CI 2.1 to 5.9 | 8,750 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | gap_television_ip | +7.1 | percentage points (Democratic share minus Republican share; positive means Democrats are more confident) | weighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share with a great deal of confidence in television; in-person interviews only; normal interval on the Kish effective n | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 2.5 to 11.6 | 1,291 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_1973_80 | 4.8 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap in the share with a great deal of confidence; in-person interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 1973-1980 | 95% CI 4.3 to 5.5 | 10,281 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_1991_00 | 4.1 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap in the share with a great deal of confidence; in-person interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 1991-2000 | 95% CI 3.6 to 4.8 | 12,086 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_2001_10 | 6.2 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap in the share with a great deal of confidence; in-person interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2001-2010 | 95% CI 5.5 to 7.2 | 10,035 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_2011_18 | 6.7 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap in the share with a great deal of confidence; in-person interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2011-2018 | 95% CI 6.0 to 7.5 | 6,791 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_2021_24 | 10.6 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap; all interview modes (the pooled 2021, 2022 and 2024 surveys, mostly web); seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2021-2024 | 95% CI 9.8 to 11.5 | 7,993 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_ip_2018 | 8.1 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over the institutions that pass the suppression floor of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap; in-person interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2018 | 95% CI 6.7 to 10.1 | 1,640 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_ip_2022 | 11.3 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over the institutions that pass the suppression floor of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap; in-person interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022 | 95% CI 9.7 to 14.2 | 1,158 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_ip_2024 | 7.3 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over the institutions that pass the suppression floor of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap; in-person interviews only; organized labor is left out because its party cells fall below the suppression floor, so twelve institutions; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI 5.6 to 10.7 | 822 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_ip_22_24 | 9.4 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap; in-person interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 8.0 to 11.8 | 1,980 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_strict_1973_80 | 5.4 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute gap between strong and weak Democrats and strong and weak Republicans; in-person interviews (all surveys before 2004 were in person); seeded respondent bootstrap | strong and weak party identifiers only (Democrats: partyid 0-1, Republicans: partyid 5-6) | 1973-1980 | 95% CI 4.8 to 6.1 | 7,750 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_strict_ip_22_24 | 8.7 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute gap between strong and weak Democrats and strong and weak Republicans; in-person interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap | strong and weak party identifiers only (Democrats: partyid 0-1, Republicans: partyid 5-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 7.2 to 11.2 | 1,434 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_web_2024 | 12.0 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over the institutions that pass the suppression floor of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap; web interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2024 | 95% CI 10.0 to 14.8 | 1,256 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mag_web_22_24 | 12.0 | percentage points (mean over institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap) | mean over thirteen institutions of the absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap; web interviews only; seeded respondent bootstrap interval (2,000 replicates) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6) | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 10.6 to 13.6 | 2,412 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | min_cell_n | 198 | respondents | count of respondents | smallest party-by-year cell shown in the figures | 1973-2024, survey years with the confidence items | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_big_1973_80 | 1 | institutions | count of institutions whose estimated absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap (the point estimate, not its interval) is 10 points or more; in-person interviews | the thirteen institutions | 1973-1980 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_big_2011_18 | 2 | institutions | count of institutions whose estimated absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap (the point estimate, not its interval) is 10 points or more; in-person interviews | the thirteen institutions | 2011-2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_big_ip_22_24 | 7 | institutions | count of institutions whose estimated absolute Democratic-minus-Republican gap (the point estimate, not its interval) is 10 points or more; in-person interviews | the thirteen institutions | 2022-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_both_fell | 8 | institutions | count of institutions where the 95% interval of the share with a great deal of confidence in 2022-2024 lies below the interval for 1973-1980 for both Democrats and Republicans; in-person interviews | the thirteen institutions | 1973-1980 to 2022-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_dem_sig_1973_80 | 5 | institutions | count of institutions whose 95% interval for the Democratic-minus-Republican gap excludes zero on the Democratic side; in-person interviews | the thirteen institutions | 1973-1980 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_dem_sig_ip_22_24 | 7 | institutions | count of institutions whose 95% interval for the Democratic-minus-Republican gap excludes zero on the Democratic side; in-person interviews | the thirteen institutions | 2022-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_exec_match | 33 | survey years | count of years in which the sign of the Democratic-minus-Republican gap matches the party of the president (positive under a Democrat, negative under a Republican); all interview modes | survey years with the executive branch item | 1973-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_exec_sig | 32 | survey years | count of years in which the 95% interval of the Democratic-minus-Republican gap excludes zero on the side of the president's party; all interview modes | survey years with the executive branch item | 1973-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_exec_years | 33 | survey years | count of survey years | survey years with the executive branch item | 1973-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_rep_sig_1973_80 | 6 | institutions | count of institutions whose 95% interval for the Democratic-minus-Republican gap excludes zero on the Republican side; in-person interviews | the thirteen institutions | 1973-1980 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_rep_sig_ip_22_24 | 3 | institutions | count of institutions whose 95% interval for the Democratic-minus-Republican gap excludes zero on the Republican side; in-person interviews | the thirteen institutions | 2022-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_resp | 41,797 | respondents | count of respondents | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6), with at least one confidence answer | 1973-2024, survey years with the confidence items | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_same_sign | 13 | institutions | count of institutions where the in-person and web gaps have the same sign (point estimates) | the thirteen institutions | 2022-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_web_larger | 8 | institutions | count of institutions where the absolute web gap exceeds the absolute in-person gap | the thirteen institutions | 2022-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_years | 33 | survey years | count of survey years | years in which the confidence items were fielded | 1973-2024, survey years with the confidence items | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | rep_congress_ip | 3.0% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in congress; in-person interviews only | Republicans who identify with or lean toward the party | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 0.9% to 5.2% | 602 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rep_military_2018_ip | 73.5% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in military; in-person interviews only | Republicans who identify with or lean toward the party | 2018 | 95% CI 68.4% to 78.6% | 486 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rep_military_2024_ip | 54.8% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in military; in-person interviews only | Republicans who identify with or lean toward the party | 2024 | 95% CI 46.2% to 63.4% | 252 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rep_press_ip | 2.6% | percent of respondents answering a great deal of confidence | weighted share saying a great deal of confidence in press; in-person interviews only | Republicans who identify with or lean toward the party | 2022-2024 | 95% CI 0.6% to 4.5% | 604 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | web_share_2021 | 87.3% | percent of respondents interviewed on the web | share of respondents whose interview mode is web (unweighted count) | all GSS respondents in the year, not only party identifiers | 2021 | | 4,032 | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | web_share_2021_24 | 63.9% | percent of respondents interviewed on the web | share of the respondents behind the 2021-2024 estimates whose interview mode is web (unweighted count) | respondents who identify with or lean toward a party (Democrats: partyid 0-2, Republicans: partyid 4-6), with at least one confidence answer | 2021, 2022 and 2024 pooled | | 5,321 | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | web_share_2022 | 46.1% | percent of respondents interviewed on the web | share of respondents whose interview mode is web (unweighted count) | all GSS respondents in the year, not only party identifiers | 2022 | | 3,544 | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | web_share_2024 | 53.2% | percent of respondents interviewed on the web | share of respondents whose interview mode is web (unweighted count) | all GSS respondents in the year, not only party identifiers | 2024 | | 3,309 | none (count) | General Social Survey | | ## Definitions - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Party sorting: The alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. ## Methods Sample: General Social Survey (GSS) respondents from the analysis subset (gss_sub2024) in the 33 survey years from 1973 to 2024 in which the confidence items were fielded (they were not asked in 1972 or 1985), who identify with or lean toward a party: 41,797 respondents with at least one confidence answer. Each confidence item was asked of a random part of the sample, so cell sizes vary by year. Items: confidence in the people running thirteen institutions (the scientific community, medicine, the military, the Supreme Court, education, the executive branch of the federal government, Congress, the press, television, major companies, banks and financial institutions, organized labor and organized religion), answered a great deal, only some or hardly any. Banks and financial institutions were added in 1975. Measure: a 0/1 indicator for a great deal. Party: Democrats are partyid 0 to 2 and Republicans are partyid 4 to 6, so leaners are counted with the party they lean toward; independents (3) and other-party identifiers (7) are dropped. The robustness cut uses strong and weak identifiers only (0 to 1 against 5 to 6). Gap: Democratic share minus Republican share, in percentage points, throughout. Weights: weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before). Mode: interview mode is joined from the raw GSS file by verified row position; in person means mode coded face to face from 2004 and every interview before 2004, which was in person by design; web means mode coded web (2021, 2022, 2024). There were no in-person interviews in 2021. Periods: 1973-1980, 1981-1990, 1991-2000, 2001-2010, 2011-2018 and 2022-2024, all among in-person interviews, which the text uses for every period estimate, and, in the all-modes views, 2021-2024 (2021, 2022 and 2024 pooled; 64 percent of these respondents were interviewed on the web). Intervals: 95% normal intervals on the Kish effective sample size for shares and, with standard errors combined in quadrature, for gaps, for changes in a gap between surveys and for the web-minus-in-person difference; these assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents and ignore the survey's strata and clusters. A normal interval for a share near zero is cut off at zero, and a Wilson interval on the same effective sample size would be wider and asymmetric for shares under 10 percent. The mean absolute gap has a percentile bootstrap interval from resampling respondents (2,000 replicates, seed 12345), which also ignores strata and clusters; its noise floor is sqrt(2/pi) times the mean standard error of the gaps, the mean absolute gap expected if every true gap were zero, and an institution enters the average only when both of its party cells pass the suppression floor. The science web-minus-in-person difference is one of thirteen comparisons; its p-value is multiplied by thirteen (Bonferroni) in the text. Suppression: a party-by-year cell needs at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100; 2 party-by-year cells are suppressed (organized labor, democrats, 2024, in person; organized labor, republicans, 2024, in person); the smallest cell shown has 198 respondents, and the backstop of 30 respondents applies to every row. Design check: for every gap from 1975 on (annual, period and pooled 2022-2024 by mode; 585 estimates) a Taylor-linearized standard error using the GSS strata and PSUs (vstrat, vpsu; a PSU without domain respondents counts as zero) has a median ratio to the standard error that assumes a simple random sample of 1.01 (5th to 95th percentile 0.87 to 1.17); the 95% interval excludes zero under one method and not the other for 15 of them, and the lasting-gap classification of all 13 institutions is unchanged when the period intervals use the design-based standard errors. Because 1973 and 1974 carry no design variables, the 1973-1980 cells compare the design-based standard error with the standard error of the same 1975-1980 respondents. Lasting gap: the earliest period from which the 95% interval of the gap excludes zero on the same side in that period and every later period through 2022-2024 in person; an institution whose interval includes zero in 2022-2024 in person has none, and one whose significant gaps change sign at least twice is reported as reversing with the party in the White House. Presidential terms are assigned by inauguration year; the 2021 executive branch answers are also split at the inauguration of 20 January 2021 by interview date. Interview dates for the 2022 comparison are the raw dateintv values; interviews on or after 25 June 2022 are counted as after the ruling of 24 June 2022, and web interviewing in 2022 began in May, after the draft opinion was reported on 2 May 2022. ## What these data cannot show - The GSS interviews a new sample each time and asks party identification and confidence in the same interview, so it cannot say whether individuals changed their confidence or whether the people who call themselves Democrats or Republicans changed. - A gap between party identifiers can widen when the membership of the parties shifts along lines such as education or religion (party sorting, taken up in Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened)). - The comparison of in-person and web respondents cannot separate an effect of the mode from a difference between the people who answered in each mode. - In 2022 respondents were randomly assigned to a sequence of modes, face to face first or web first, and each sequence followed up nonrespondents in the other mode [6]. - The two mode samples therefore reflect who answered which invitation. - The 2021 survey was designed as a web survey, and its documentation cautions that changes in 2021 may reflect the change in method as well as changes in opinion [5]. - The item asks about the people running an institution, with three answers, so a change in the share answering "a great deal" does not show where the other answers went. - The executive branch item in particular follows the incumbent administration. - The thirteen institutions are the ones the GSS asks about, and the survey has no items for others such as the police. - Causes are outside the design. - The rise after 2018 coincides with a change of president, a pandemic and a change of mode, and the data cannot say which of them, if any, moved the gaps. - The same holds for the Court's ruling in 2022. - The in-person cells of 2022 and 2024 are small, so the estimates for those years are less precise than those for earlier periods. - The sample is national, and it supports no claims about states or counties. - The intervals assume a simple random sample of the weighted respondents, but the GSS samples clusters of households within strata of areas. - The intervals for the mean absolute gap come from resampling respondents and ignore the sampling design in the same way, and no design-based version of them has been run. - (Note: A design-based standard error uses the survey's strata and clusters. - Across 585 gap estimates, the median ratio of the design-based standard error to the one that assumes a simple random sample is 1.01, with most between 0.87 and 1.17, and in 15 of them the interval excludes zero under one method and not the other.) - Chapter 6.5, Institutional trust outside the United States (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/institutional-trust-outside-the-united-states; planned) asks whether comparable gaps appear in other democracies, Chapter 6.4, Generalized and institutional trust (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/generalized-and-institutional-trust; planned) asks whether trust in other people moved with confidence in institutions, and Chapter 6.6, Tolerance of speech (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech) turns to another GSS battery. ## References 1. Smith, Tom W. (2008). Trends in Confidence in Institutions, 1973-2006. GSS Social Change Report No. 54, NORC at the University of Chicago. https://gss.norc.org/content/dam/gss/get-documentation/pdf/reports/social-change-reports/SC54%20Trends%20in%20Confidence%20in%20Institutions.pdf 2. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 3. Lipset, Seymour Martin; Schneider, William (1983). The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor, and Government in the Public Mind. Free Press, New York. 4. Gauchat, Gordon (2012). Politicization of Science in the Public Sphere: A Study of Public Trust in the United States, 1974 to 2010. American Sociological Review 77(2): 167-187. https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122412438225 5. NORC at the University of Chicago (2021). 2021 GSS (Cross-section Study) Methodological Primer. General Social Survey documentation, NORC at the University of Chicago (November 2021). https://gss.norc.org/content/dam/gss/get-documentation/pdf/other/2021%20XSEC%20Methodological%20Primer.pdf 6. Wells, Brian M.; Christian, Leah; Bautista, René; Lafia, Sara; Davern, Michael (2024). Mode-Sequencing Insights from the General Social Survey. NORC at the University of Chicago (September 2024). https://www.norc.org/research/library/mode-sequencing-insights-from-the-general-social-survey.html 7. Supreme Court of the United States (2022). Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. 597 U.S. 215, decided 24 June 2022. https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/19-1392_6j37.pdf 8. Gerstein, Josh; Ward, Alexander (2022). Supreme Court has voted to overturn abortion rights, draft opinion shows. Politico, 2 May 2022. https://www.politico.com/news/2022/05/02/supreme-court-abortion-draft-opinion-00029473 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/confidence-in-institutions/build.py (sha256 d10df81d9bfd964990e8f89dd2244e66d922500b0ea2f5decf899188e1996a1c) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | cf1d1aff0533c798c03a89c4bd4243c9c11faf89428d135422733f89d36c455a | | figures/confidence_by_party.json | ce719ede9da4711a9e3908a8408548d3942dd8b9397efcb99c92b94433a202ac | | figures/executive_gap.json | e25b0ef7c2c71e16705d0b588eb12dd315af27e9a1add06f6dacecaf8b1cbae1 | | figures/gap_by_era.json | 013a8c52aa5423a6851e46e85dc050d8b0680a713735dc2b2a154a5554dcb294 | | figures/gap_by_mode.json | ad27e155a50be4e5e1cc02ca08a76c325bf7b139fe8d68ef5a00b6cab121b7c0 | | figures/gap_by_mode_year.json | c6485d47769f2c95113e5c2577b7d91c97b6758cc72a52f475eeeadb2cbb2ed9 | | figures/gap_onset.json | 2f16d5d1987837a8dd489133145e6ee9849a2b15d0137f0aa1aad413b6a2cb3f | | figures/mean_abs_gap.json | 2a329a9fdb108b48de23ec5649b70e49d0c1b0bc21a081fddb8b2d3f1e09cf9d | | figures/party_shares_22_24.json | 30f2137238ea76037c6e02ca5e63dbb85ead2e05523fec69df7d809df7578be0 | | meta.json | 2c10f9c5980050ed8d7f8913fca0042b68e84b792d046dc2989b527e102c26a2 | | refs.json | c6c7726faccb0e676f69334d0348310cb72d8492fb2a0127e5518bfe7742c59a | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/confidence-in-institutions/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/confidence-in-institutions/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/facts.json - Table 1, figure "mean_abs_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/mean_abs_gap.json - Table 2, figure "party_shares_22_24" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/party_shares_22_24.json - Table 3, figure "confidence_by_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/confidence_by_party.json - Table 4, figure "gap_by_era" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/gap_by_era.json - Table 5, figure "gap_onset" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/gap_onset.json - Table 6, figure "executive_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/executive_gap.json - Table 7, figure "gap_by_mode" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/gap_by_mode.json - Table 8, figure "gap_by_mode_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/confidence-in-institutions/figures/gap_by_mode_year.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Tolerance of speech: report Chapter 6.6 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Tolerance of speech - Chapter: 6.6 (Part VI, Trust, science and democracy; The great sorting) - Question: Whom would Americans allow to speak in public, and how do the answers differ by party and ideology? - Dek: In 2008 to 2018 Democrats allowed a racist speaker 6.8 points less often than Republicans did, while the party gaps on four speakers that conservatives are expected to object to were within 2.1 points of zero. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - General Social Survey. General Social Survey cumulative file 1972-2024, allow-to-speak items (spk), college-teaching items (col) and library-book items (lib); interview mode from the raw file; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026toleranceofspeech ```bibtex @misc{singh2026toleranceofspeech, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Tolerance of speech}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | difference in weighted shares who would allow the racist speaker to speak, Republicans minus Democrats (the party gap with its sign reversed) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 6.8 | 95% CI 4.0 to 9.7 | 7,054 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | rac_rep_lead_late | | largest absolute party gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 2.1 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | max_abs_pg_other | | weighted share who would allow the racist speaker to speak | Democrats answering the racist item (leaners included) | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 56.1% | | 4,175 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | rac_dem_late | | weighted share who would allow the racist speaker to speak | Republicans answering the racist item (leaners included) | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 63.0% | | 2,879 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | rac_rep_late | | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | −6.8 | 95% CI −9.7 to −4.0 | 7,054 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | pg_rac_late | | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | −3.8 | 95% CI −6.4 to −1.1 | 7,069 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | pg_mil_late | | difference between the racist and militarist party gaps in the share who would allow the speech (same period, standard errors in quadrature) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | −3.1 | 95% CI −6.9 to 0.8 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | pgdiff_rac_mil_late | | smallest ideology gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 7.2 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | ig_con_min | | largest ideology gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 13.7 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | ig_con_max | | smallest absolute party gap among the five speakers asked | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 2.4 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | pg_early_abs_min | | largest absolute party gap among the five speakers asked | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 6.3 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | pg_early_abs_max | | smallest adjusted party gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items (adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 3.0 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | adjpg_con_min | | largest adjusted party gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items (adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 5.8 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | adjpg_con_max | ## Findings Whether Democrats or Republicans allowed a speaker more often depended on the speaker. In 2008 to 2018, 56.1% of Democrats and 63.0% of Republicans said that a person who believes Blacks are genetically inferior should be allowed to speak in their community. The party gap, Democrats minus Republicans, was −6.8 (95% CI −9.7 to −4.0) points (a negative gap means that Republicans allowed the speaker more often), the largest in size of the six speakers in the General Social Survey (GSS) battery, a set of questions asked in the same wording across survey years. The militarist gap was −3.8 (95% CI −6.4 to −1.1), and the interval on the difference between the racist and militarist gaps (−3.1 (95% CI −6.9 to 0.8)) includes zero. The party gaps for the Communist, the anti-religionist, the homosexual man and the Muslim clergyman, the four speakers that the chapter codes as objectionable to conservatives, had point estimates within 2.1 points of zero. Ideology separates the sides on those four speakers, and liberals allowed them 7.2 to 13.7 points more often than conservatives did. The section on measurement gives the wording of each item. In 1976 to 1994 the party gap was negative for every speaker asked, so Republicans allowed each one more often than Democrats did, by 2.4 to 6.3 points. Among people of the same age, education, race and sex, Democrats allowed the Communist, the anti-religionist, the homosexual man and the Muslim clergyman 3.0 to 5.8 points more often than Republicans did in 2008 to 2018. These comparisons also change with the action asked about, the interview mode and the wave that opens the 2008 to 2018 window, and the sections below report each check beside its evidence. ### Measurement: the six speakers and the three actions The battery asks about six speakers, listed in Table 1. Two are people whom liberals are expected to object to, a racist and a militarist who wants the army to run the country. Four are people whom conservatives are expected to object to: a Communist, someone against all churches and religion (called the anti-religionist here), a man who admits he is a homosexual and a Muslim clergyman who preaches hatred of the United States. The chapter calls the first pair the speakers objectionable to liberals and the second group the speakers objectionable to conservatives. The grouping is a coding choice, drawing on work that finds people on each side less tolerant of targets linked with the other side [1], and the speaker-level figures let a reader regroup the speakers. Respondents are asked whether each speaker should be allowed to speak in their community. The question is whether he should be allowed to speak, not whether the respondent agrees with him. In all, 44,878 respondents gave 217,422 answers in 31 survey years. (Note: The design descends from Stouffer's national survey of 1954 [2]. A fixed list of speakers measures tolerance of groups that some respondents do not mind, so Sullivan, Piereson and Marcus asked each respondent to name the group he or she likes least and then asked about that group [3]. The GSS keeps the fixed list, which makes the answers comparable across years and across groups of respondents.) Table 1. The six speaker items began between 1972 and 2008, and the militarist and homosexual man items ended in 2021 Two more questions ask about the same six speakers: whether a book the speaker wrote should be removed from the public library, and whether he should be allowed to teach in a college. For each action the tolerant answer is the one that lets the speaker speak, teach or stay on the shelf, and each action is analyzed separately. The Communist teaching item is worded differently from the other teaching items, as a question about firing him from a college post, and the section on actions returns to it. ### Groups, gaps and interview mode Party groups Democrats and Republicans with their leaners. Ideology uses the seven-point self-placement, with liberals at the three left points and conservatives at the three right points, and Chapter 7.1, The conservative label (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-conservative-label; planned) asks who takes the conservative label. Independents and moderates drop out of the group comparisons and stay in the all-adult shares. A gap is the first group minus the second, so a negative party gap means that Republicans allowed the speaker more often. (Note: Shares are weighted with the survey weights. Intervals are 95% confidence intervals built from the effective sample size [4], which treat the sample as a weighted simple random sample and ignore clustering, so they can be narrower or wider than intervals that follow the sampling design. An annual cell needs 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100.) Interviews before 2021 were conducted by an interviewer, mostly in person. In 2021, 86% of the respondents who answered the racist item were interviewed on the web, and in 2022 and 2024 51% were. The survey mode can change answers to sensitive questions [5], and answers to one speaker item differ by mode in 2022 and 2024. Estimates from 2021 on therefore carry a mode label, and the mode split appears where the sample allows one. Chapter 6.1, Confidence in thirteen institutions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/confidence-in-institutions) meets the same break in the GSS confidence items. ### Tolerance rose for most speakers, but not for the racist In 2008 to 2018 a majority of adults would allow every speaker except the Muslim clergyman, for whom the share was 42.5% (95% CI 41.3% to 43.8%). Table 2 sets the shares against 1976 to 1994. The share rose by 6.3 to 15.2 points for the militarist, the Communist, the anti-religionist and the homosexual man, and changed by −3.2 (95% CI −4.7 to −1.7) points for the racist. Table 2. Tolerance rose for most speakers between 1976 to 1994 and 2008 to 2018, but not for the racist ### Republican leads shrank for three speakers Table 3 plots the share allowing each speaker in every survey year. For the Communist, the anti-religionist and the homosexual man, the Republican line usually lay above the Democratic line in the 1970s and 1980s, and the two lines cross each other in the years since 2008. For the militarist and the racist the Republican estimate is above the Democratic estimate in every survey year from 2010, though single-year intervals are wide. Table 3. Party lines converged for three speakers and stayed apart for the racist and the militarist Table 4 reduces the annual series to two periods. A negative party gap is a Republican lead, so a gap that moves toward zero is a shrinking lead. In 1976 to 1994 every party gap was negative and every interval lay below zero, from −2.4 for the homosexual man to −6.3 for the anti-religionist. By 2008 to 2018 the Communist gap was +0.8 (95% CI −1.9 to 3.5), the anti-religionist gap −1.4 (95% CI −3.8 to 1.0) and the Muslim clergyman gap +0.5 (95% CI −2.4 to 3.4), all with intervals that include zero, and the homosexual man gap was +2.1 (95% CI 0.1 to 4.0). The change from the earlier period was +5.1 (95% CI 1.8 to 8.4) points for the Communist, +4.9 (95% CI 1.9 to 7.8) for the anti-religionist and +4.5 (95% CI 1.9 to 7.0) for the homosexual man. Table 4. Republicans allowed every speaker more often in 1976 to 1994, and by 2008 to 2018 only the racist and militarist leads remained The two speakers whom liberals are expected to object to kept a Republican lead. The militarist gap was −4.6 in 1976 to 1994 and −3.8 (95% CI −6.4 to −1.1) in 2008 to 2018, a change of +0.8 (95% CI −2.4 to 4.0) points, an interval that includes zero. The racist gap was −4.5 and −6.8, a change of −2.4 (95% CI −5.8 to 1.0) points, an interval that includes zero. The Republican leads that shrank are the leads on speakers whom conservatives are expected to object to. The 2008 wave, the first wave of the Muslim clergyman item, opens the 2008 to 2018 window. In that wave alone the party gaps for the racist, the Communist, the anti-religionist, the homosexual man and the Muslim clergyman ran from +1.6 to +7.6 points, and only the militarist gap was negative (−3.6). The party view without 2008 in Table 4 leaves that wave out. In 2010 to 2018 the racist change from 1976 to 1994 is −3.9 (95% CI −7.5 to −0.3) points, an interval that excludes zero, the anti-religionist gap has an interval below zero, and the homosexual man gap has an interval that includes zero. The verdicts on the racist change, the anti-religionist gap and the homosexual man gap therefore depend on one wave, while the rise for the Communist and the persistence of the racist and militarist gaps do not. ### Ideology separates the sides on four speakers The ideology gap, liberals minus conservatives, follows a different pattern. In 2008 to 2018 it was +10.3 (95% CI 7.4 to 13.2) points for the Communist, +7.2 (95% CI 4.7 to 9.8) for the anti-religionist, +7.9 (95% CI 5.9 to 9.9) for the homosexual man and +13.7 (95% CI 10.4 to 17.0) for the Muslim clergyman. These gaps are close to the ones in 1976 to 1994: +11.0 for the Communist, +8.5 for the anti-religionist and +10.5 for the homosexual man, and the changes have intervals that include zero. The Muslim clergyman item has the largest ideology gap of the six, and the interval on its difference from the Communist gap (+3.4 (95% CI −1.0 to 7.7)) includes zero. The party gap for each of these four speakers is smaller than the ideology gap. The militarist follows the same pattern at a lower level, with an ideology gap of +6.3 (95% CI 3.4 to 9.2) in 2008 to 2018. Switch Table 3 or Table 4 to the ideology view to see the difference. Party identification with leaners includes moderates, which self-placed liberals and conservatives do not, and the groups differ in age, education, race and sex, which the next section holds fixed. The racist speaker is the one case in which the liberal lead is absent in 2008 to 2018. The ideology gap was +6.2 (95% CI 4.1 to 8.4) in 1976 to 1994 and +1.0 (95% CI −2.2 to 4.2) in 2008 to 2018, a change of −5.2 (95% CI −9.1 to −1.3) points. ### Among similar adults, Democrats lead on four speakers The raw party gaps mix party with the traits that differ between the parties. The adjusted views of Table 4 compare Democrats with Republicans of the same age, education, race and sex in the same survey year, using a weighted linear probability model with robust standard errors. In 1976 to 1994 the adjusted party gaps are within 1.7 points of zero for all five speakers asked, against raw Republican leads of 2.4 to 6.3 points. The raw Republican lead of that period is therefore smaller among people of the same age, education, race and sex. In 2008 to 2018 the adjusted gaps for the Communist, the anti-religionist, the homosexual man and the Muslim clergyman run from 3.0 to 5.8 points, each with an interval above zero, where the raw gaps were smaller. The adjusted racist gap is −3.9 (95% CI −6.9 to −0.8) points, against −1.3 (95% CI −3.1 to 0.6) in 1976 to 1994, and the adjusted militarist gap is −0.3 (95% CI −2.9 to 2.4). The ideology gaps change little with adjustment. For the four speakers that conservatives are expected to object to they run from 6.7 to 13.4 points in 2008 to 2018. The adjustment holds four traits fixed and no others. ### Web respondents allowed the racist speaker less often Table 5 follows the party and ideology gaps on the racist speaker year by year, one view for each. The party estimate is below zero in 27 of 28 survey years since 1976, with 2008 the exception, and 7 of the annual intervals lie entirely below zero. The estimate is farthest below zero in 2021, at −22.9 (95% CI −30.3 to −15.4), which differs from the 2008 to 2018 gap by −16.0 (95% CI −24.0 to −8.0) points. The 2021 wave was mostly web. The ideology estimate is positive in most years before 2010, around zero in the 2010s and negative in 2021, 2022 and 2024. The intervals for 2021 and 2022 lie below zero, and the interval for 2024 includes zero. Table 5. Republicans allowed the racist speaker more often than Democrats did in 27 of 28 survey years, with the largest estimated leads in 2021, 2022 and 2024 Table 6 splits 2022 and 2024 by mode. Interviewer-administered respondents were interviewed in person, by phone or in a residual mode that the file does not label. In the web sample 40.7% (95% CI 36.5% to 44.9%) would allow the racist speaker, and in the interviewer-administered sample 54.7% (95% CI 50.0% to 59.4%), a difference of −14.0 (95% CI −20.3 to −7.7) points. The difference is similar in both parties: −16.4 (95% CI −26.2 to −6.5) points among Democrats and −12.6 (95% CI −23.9 to −1.3) among Republicans. For the Communist, the anti-religionist and the Muslim clergyman the differences in the share allowing the speech have intervals that include zero. Table 6. Web respondents allowed the racist speaker 14.0 points less often; the other three speakers show no detectable mode difference The party gap on the racist speaker is negative in both modes: −11.8 (95% CI −23.0 to −0.5) among interviewer-administered respondents and −15.5 (95% CI −25.4 to −5.6) on the web, and the difference between the two, −3.7 (95% CI −18.7 to 11.2), includes zero. Pooled across modes, the 2022 to 2024 gap is −14.2 (95% CI −21.9 to −6.5), which differs from the 2008 to 2018 gap by −7.3 (95% CI −15.5 to 0.9) points, an interval that includes zero. Every estimate reported here for 2021 to 2024 is more negative than the 2008 to 2018 gap, but only the 2021 wave on its own separates from it, and the data do not separate mode from period. The mode difference that the data can detect is in the share allowing the racist speaker, not in the size of the gap. The Party gap and Ideology gap views of Table 6 show the other speakers and the ideology gap by mode. The mode difference in the party gap has an interval that excludes zero only for the Muslim clergyman, at +15.5 points, with a lower bound of 0.4 points that is close to zero. The design-based interval in the last section includes zero. That difference sits on the Republican side: the web minus interviewer difference in the share allowing the Muslim clergyman is −12.1 (95% CI −23.3 to −0.9) points among Republicans and +3.4 (95% CI −6.6 to 13.5) among Democrats. The racist ideology gap is negative in both modes, although the interviewer-administered interval includes zero, and the difference between modes, −12.2 (95% CI −28.4 to 3.9) points, includes zero. The data cannot say whether web respondents answer differently or are different people. ### The average gap depends on which speakers are counted In 2008 to 2018 the ideology gap was +8.3 (95% CI 6.3 to 10.2) points for the speakers objectionable to conservatives and +3.5 (95% CI 1.0 to 6.1) for the speakers objectionable to liberals. Table 7 averages each respondent's answers over the five speakers that were asked in every period, split into these two families. In 1976 to 1994 the two values were +9.7 and +7.7. The gap for the first family changed by −1.4 (95% CI −4.0 to 1.2) points and the gap for the second family by −4.2 (95% CI −7.3 to −1.0), and the difference between the two changes, −2.7 (95% CI −6.9 to 1.4), includes zero. One account links conservatism to needs for order and certainty [6]. Another holds that liberals and conservatives are each intolerant of the groups that threaten their values [7], and studies that vary the target find that conservatism predicts intolerance of left-wing targets and liberalism of right-wing targets [1]. The GSS battery cannot test the dispositions behind either account, but it shows how a summary depends on the speakers it counts. The second family has two speakers, and the racist item has the larger change in size, −5.2 (95% CI −9.1 to −1.3) points, against −2.9 (95% CI −6.6 to 0.7) for the militarist item, an interval that includes zero. The party gap for the first family went from −4.2 (95% CI −5.7 to −2.8) to +0.4 (95% CI −1.4 to 2.3), and for the second family it stayed negative, at −4.5 and −5.2. Table 7. By 2008 to 2018 the party gap on speakers that conservatives object to was +0.4 points, and on speakers that liberals object to −5.2 A single average lies between the family values, and where it lies depends on the count of speakers on each side. Counting each of the five speakers once gives an ideology gap of +6.3 (95% CI 4.3 to 8.3) in 2008 to 2018, and counting each family once gives +5.8 (95% CI 3.8 to 7.9). Each estimate lies inside the other's interval, so the choice of weighting moves the ideology average by less than its uncertainty. The party gap is less stable. Counting each speaker once gives −1.8 (95% CI −3.7 to 0.0) in 2008 to 2018 and −4.6 (95% CI −9.3 to 0.2) in the 2021 wave, and counting each family once gives −2.4 (95% CI −4.3 to −0.5) and −6.6 (95% CI −11.5 to −1.6). The intervals for the first weighting include zero, and the 2008 to 2018 interval reaches zero at its upper end. The intervals for the second weighting lie below zero, so whether the interval on the pooled party gap excludes zero depends on the weighting. The battery has three speakers in one family and two in the other, so the first weighting gives the larger family more say, and adding the Muslim clergyman would change the count again. Leaving the homosexual man out of the first family gives an ideology gap of +9.0 (95% CI 6.6 to 11.3) for that family in 2008 to 2018, against +8.3 with him. The 2021 wave is the only one after 2018 with all five speakers, and it is mostly web. In that wave the party gap for the speakers objectionable to liberals was −16.3 (95% CI −22.5 to −10.0) and the ideology gap was −5.0 (95% CI −11.9 to 1.8). ### The racist party gap is negative on every action Table 8 repeats the gap comparison for 2008 to 2018 with the other two actions. For the racist speaker the party gap is negative on all three: −6.8 (95% CI −9.7 to −4.0) for speech, −4.4 (95% CI −7.3 to −1.4) for teaching and −4.9 (95% CI −7.7 to −2.1) for keeping the book in the library. Fewer adults would let the racist teach (46.3%) than would let him speak (58.5%) or would keep his book (63.7%). The racist ideology gap has an interval above zero only for the library: +4.6 (95% CI 1.5 to 7.7) for the library, +1.0 (95% CI −2.2 to 4.2) for speech and +0.2 (95% CI −3.1 to 3.5) for teaching. Table 8. The racist party gap is negative on speech, teaching and the library, and party gaps on teaching are positive for three other speakers On teaching, the party gap is positive for three other speakers: +8.4 (95% CI 5.5 to 11.2) for the Communist, +4.2 (95% CI 1.4 to 7.0) for the anti-religionist and +3.7 (95% CI 1.7 to 5.7) for the homosexual man, each with an interval above zero. Their speech gaps were +0.8 (95% CI −1.9 to 3.5), −1.4 (95% CI −3.8 to 1.0) and +2.1 (95% CI 0.1 to 4.0). The Communist teaching item asks whether a college teacher should be fired, a different wording from the other teaching items. The anti-religionist and homosexual man items use the standard wording, so wording does not account for all of the difference. The small party gaps on speech therefore do not carry over to teaching. For the four speakers objectionable to conservatives the ideology gap is positive on every action. It runs from 9.0 to 18.4 points for teaching and from 12.1 to 14.8 for the library. ### What these data cannot show The gaps are differences between groups in one survey question, so they do not show why the groups differ, whether party or ideology shapes tolerance, or whether tolerance shapes party or ideology. The adjusted gaps hold age, education, race and sex fixed and no other trait, and they assume a linear model, so they compare similar people and do not test what party or ideology does. Periods pool many waves, so a period value averages over years, and the annual figures have wide intervals. The intervals use the effective sample size and ignore the sampling design. Across the 64 period gaps and mode contrasts checked, standard errors that use the survey strata and primary sampling units were between 0.87 and 1.27 times the published ones, so the published intervals are sometimes narrower and sometimes wider. The annual cells, the adjusted gaps and the family gaps were not checked this way. Two verdicts sit near the edge. The homosexual man party gap in 2008 to 2018 is +2.1 (95% CI 0.1 to 4.0) with the published interval and +2.1 (95% CI 0.0 to 4.1) with a design-based one, and the Muslim clergyman mode difference in the party gap is +15.5 (95% CI 0.4 to 30.6) with the published interval and +15.5 (95% CI −3.0 to 34.0) with a design-based one, which includes zero. The mode of interview is tied to time after 2020. The 2021 wave has too few interviewer-administered respondents to split, and the 2022 and 2024 samples are small once cut by party or ideology, so the size of the racist gap after 2020 is uncertain. Two speaker items were not asked after 2021, so the militarist and the homosexual man cannot be followed into the web era. The battery has limits as a measure of tolerance. It asks about a fixed list of speakers, and the racist and Muslim clergyman items describe the speech itself, so the levels of the items are not comparable with one another. Grouping the speakers by which side is expected to object is a coding choice. Willingness to let a speaker speak in principle is not the same as behavior toward a speaker, and the militarist item asks about speech, not about support for army rule, which Chapter 6.7, Support for democracy (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy) takes up. Willingness to justify political violence is a separate question, taken up in Chapter 6.8, Political violence and democratic norms (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms). The data hold no measure of dogmatism or need for closure, so they cannot say whether one side is more rigid in the sense of the psychological literature. ## Tables ### Table 1. The six speaker items began between 1972 and 2008, and the militarist and homosexual man items ended in 2021 Item wording, the side expected to object to each speaker in this chapter's coding, GSS variable and first and last survey year | Speaker | Item wording | Expected to object | GSS variable | First asked | Last asked | | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | Racist | A person who believes that Blacks are genetically inferior | Liberals | spkrac | 1976 | 2024 | | Militarist | A person who advocates doing away with elections and letting the military run the country | Liberals | spkmil | 1976 | 2021 | | Communist | A man who admits he is a Communist | Conservatives | spkcom | 1972 | 2024 | | Anti-religionist | Someone who is against all churches and religion | Conservatives | spkath | 1972 | 2024 | | Homosexual man | A man who admits that he is a homosexual | Conservatives | spkhomo | 1973 | 2021 | | Muslim clergyman | A Muslim clergyman who preaches hatred of the United States | Conservatives | spkmslm | 2008 | 2024 | Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024 cumulative file; item wording and years asked, so no estimates and no weights needed Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/speaker_items.json ### Table 2. Tolerance rose for most speakers between 1976 to 1994 and 2008 to 2018, but not for the racist Share of all adults who would allow each speaker to speak in their community, independents included, by period, with 95% intervals | Speaker | Period | Share allowing (%) | Low | High | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Homosexual man | 1976 to 1994 | 72.5 | 71.7 | 73.3 | 17,535 | | Homosexual man | 2008 to 2018 | 87.7 | 86.8 | 88.5 | 8,964 | | Anti-religionist | 1976 to 1994 | 69.5 | 68.7 | 70.3 | 17,936 | | Anti-religionist | 2008 to 2018 | 78.3 | 77.3 | 79.4 | 9,025 | | Militarist | 1976 to 1994 | 59.0 | 58.1 | 59.8 | 17,693 | | Militarist | 2008 to 2018 | 70.0 | 68.8 | 71.2 | 8,952 | | Communist | 1976 to 1994 | 62.4 | 61.6 | 63.3 | 17,660 | | Communist | 2008 to 2018 | 68.7 | 67.5 | 69.9 | 8,806 | | Racist | 1976 to 1994 | 61.7 | 60.9 | 62.6 | 17,711 | | Racist | 2008 to 2018 | 58.5 | 57.3 | 59.8 | 8,955 | | Muslim clergyman | 2008 to 2018 | 42.5 | 41.3 | 43.8 | 8,970 | Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024 cumulative file; weighted (weight_use); 95% intervals on the effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/allow_levels.json ### Table 3. Party lines converged for three speakers and stayed apart for the racist and the militarist Share who would allow each speaker to speak in their community, by survey year, with 95% intervals | Speaker | Year | Group | Share allowing (%) | Low | High | Respondents | | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Racist | 1976 | Democrats | 59.7 | 56.0 | 63.5 | 818 | | Racist | 1976 | Republicans | 65.9 | 60.9 | 71.0 | 407 | | Racist | 1976 | Liberals | 70.7 | 65.7 | 75.7 | 399 | | Racist | 1976 | Conservatives | 63.3 | 58.3 | 68.3 | 431 | | Racist | 1977 | Democrats | 59.0 | 55.3 | 62.7 | 859 | | Racist | 1977 | Republicans | 62.4 | 57.5 | 67.3 | 451 | | Racist | 1977 | Liberals | 67.6 | 62.5 | 72.6 | 414 | | Racist | 1977 | Conservatives | 60.2 | 55.4 | 65.1 | 463 | | Racist | 1980 | Democrats | 61.3 | 56.9 | 65.6 | 739 | | Racist | 1980 | Republicans | 64.3 | 58.9 | 69.6 | 445 | | Racist | 1980 | Liberals | 71.7 | 66.0 | 77.5 | 360 | | Racist | 1980 | Conservatives | 65.1 | 59.8 | 70.3 | 470 | | Racist | 1982 | Democrats | 57.8 | 53.8 | 61.7 | 1,074 | | Racist | 1982 | Republicans | 64.4 | 59.0 | 69.7 | 487 | | Racist | 1982 | Liberals | 71.7 | 66.5 | 77.0 | 503 | | Racist | 1982 | Conservatives | 62.5 | 57.3 | 67.8 | 519 | | Racist | 1984 | Democrats | 56.6 | 52.1 | 61.0 | 740 | | Racist | 1984 | Republicans | 63.1 | 58.0 | 68.3 | 517 | | Racist | 1984 | Liberals | 65.2 | 58.8 | 71.6 | 335 | | Racist | 1984 | Conservatives | 60.7 | 55.4 | 65.9 | 495 | | Racist | 1985 | Democrats | 56.4 | 51.9 | 61.0 | 737 | | Racist | 1985 | Republicans | 61.5 | 56.7 | 66.3 | 599 | | Racist | 1985 | Liberals | 66.7 | 60.3 | 73.2 | 361 | | Racist | 1985 | Conservatives | 57.9 | 52.9 | 63.0 | 519 | | Racist | 1987 | Democrats | 61.5 | 57.7 | 65.3 | 1,001 | | Racist | 1987 | Republicans | 61.8 | 57.1 | 66.5 | 557 | | Racist | 1987 | Liberals | 68.8 | 63.8 | 73.9 | 498 | | Racist | 1987 | Conservatives | 59.2 | 54.1 | 64.2 | 520 | | Racist | 1988 | Democrats | 58.6 | 53.6 | 63.6 | 474 | | Racist | 1988 | Republicans | 64.3 | 58.8 | 69.7 | 361 | | Racist | 1988 | Liberals | 66.4 | 59.9 | 72.8 | 267 | | Racist | 1988 | Conservatives | 60.6 | 54.7 | 66.5 | 327 | | Racist | 1989 | Democrats | 59.2 | 54.1 | 64.3 | 467 | | Racist | 1989 | Republicans | 62.4 | 57.2 | 67.7 | 409 | | Racist | 1989 | Liberals | 66.3 | 60.1 | 72.4 | 276 | | Racist | 1989 | Conservatives | 67.2 | 61.2 | 73.2 | 297 | | Racist | 1990 | Democrats | 60.1 | 54.5 | 65.8 | 371 | | Racist | 1990 | Republicans | 68.8 | 63.7 | 73.9 | 406 | | Racist | 1990 | Liberals | 66.0 | 58.8 | 73.2 | 228 | | Racist | 1990 | Conservatives | 66.5 | 60.9 | 72.2 | 321 | | Racist | 1991 | Democrats | 60.4 | 55.0 | 65.7 | 421 | | Racist | 1991 | Republicans | 64.6 | 59.6 | 69.7 | 412 | | Racist | 1991 | Liberals | 66.6 | 60.2 | 73.1 | 261 | | Racist | 1991 | Conservatives | 68.5 | 62.6 | 74.5 | 300 | | Racist | 1993 | Democrats | 62.3 | 57.4 | 67.1 | 497 | | Racist | 1993 | Republicans | 63.9 | 58.6 | 69.2 | 405 | | Racist | 1993 | Liberals | 71.5 | 65.5 | 77.6 | 271 | | Racist | 1993 | Conservatives | 62.0 | 56.3 | 67.8 | 354 | | Racist | 1994 | Democrats | 60.9 | 57.4 | 64.5 | 925 | | Racist | 1994 | Republicans | 65.2 | 61.3 | 69.0 | 736 | | Racist | 1994 | Liberals | 68.7 | 64.2 | 73.1 | 534 | | Racist | 1994 | Conservatives | 62.0 | 57.8 | 66.1 | 676 | | Racist | 1996 | Democrats | 59.1 | 55.4 | 62.8 | 855 | | Racist | 1996 | Republicans | 63.0 | 59.0 | 66.9 | 699 | | Racist | 1996 | Liberals | 65.2 | 60.2 | 70.1 | 444 | | Racist | 1996 | Conservatives | 62.5 | 58.4 | 66.6 | 650 | | Racist | 1998 | Democrats | 60.0 | 56.3 | 63.7 | 865 | | Racist | 1998 | Republicans | 64.5 | 60.2 | 68.7 | 617 | | Racist | 1998 | Liberals | 69.9 | 65.5 | 74.3 | 531 | | Racist | 1998 | Conservatives | 61.7 | 57.3 | 66.2 | 594 | | Racist | 2000 | Democrats | 58.1 | 54.2 | 62.0 | 813 | | Racist | 2000 | Republicans | 63.1 | 58.9 | 67.3 | 616 | | Racist | 2000 | Liberals | 66.4 | 61.5 | 71.2 | 459 | | Racist | 2000 | Conservatives | 64.6 | 60.3 | 68.9 | 574 | | Racist | 2002 | Democrats | 62.5 | 57.0 | 68.1 | 401 | | Racist | 2002 | Republicans | 65.7 | 59.7 | 71.7 | 320 | | Racist | 2002 | Liberals | 69.7 | 62.7 | 76.7 | 224 | | Racist | 2002 | Conservatives | 60.9 | 54.4 | 67.3 | 298 | | Racist | 2004 | Democrats | 59.8 | 54.1 | 65.4 | 397 | | Racist | 2004 | Republicans | 65.3 | 59.5 | 71.1 | 330 | | Racist | 2004 | Liberals | 61.6 | 53.9 | 69.4 | 219 | | Racist | 2004 | Conservatives | 64.8 | 58.9 | 70.8 | 311 | | Racist | 2006 | Democrats | 62.9 | 58.8 | 66.9 | 846 | | Racist | 2006 | Republicans | 64.4 | 60.1 | 68.7 | 666 | | Racist | 2006 | Liberals | 69.7 | 64.7 | 74.6 | 516 | | Racist | 2006 | Conservatives | 59.8 | 55.3 | 64.2 | 674 | | Racist | 2008 | Democrats | 60.6 | 55.9 | 65.2 | 630 | | Racist | 2008 | Republicans | 59.0 | 53.6 | 64.3 | 440 | | Racist | 2008 | Liberals | 66.4 | 60.6 | 72.1 | 354 | | Racist | 2008 | Conservatives | 57.2 | 51.5 | 62.9 | 418 | | Racist | 2010 | Democrats | 53.2 | 48.2 | 58.3 | 579 | | Racist | 2010 | Republicans | 60.9 | 55.1 | 66.7 | 411 | | Racist | 2010 | Liberals | 58.9 | 52.5 | 65.4 | 351 | | Racist | 2010 | Conservatives | 60.4 | 54.6 | 66.2 | 397 | | Racist | 2012 | Democrats | 55.2 | 50.3 | 60.1 | 590 | | Racist | 2012 | Republicans | 62.0 | 55.8 | 68.1 | 393 | | Racist | 2012 | Liberals | 59.1 | 52.9 | 65.4 | 357 | | Racist | 2012 | Conservatives | 60.1 | 54.3 | 66.0 | 408 | | Racist | 2014 | Democrats | 55.1 | 51.0 | 59.3 | 786 | | Racist | 2014 | Republicans | 67.1 | 62.5 | 71.7 | 525 | | Racist | 2014 | Liberals | 59.8 | 54.7 | 65.0 | 465 | | Racist | 2014 | Conservatives | 65.5 | 60.9 | 70.0 | 538 | | Racist | 2016 | Democrats | 56.1 | 52.0 | 60.2 | 897 | | Racist | 2016 | Republicans | 65.2 | 60.6 | 69.8 | 600 | | Racist | 2016 | Liberals | 62.3 | 57.1 | 67.5 | 512 | | Racist | 2016 | Conservatives | 59.0 | 54.2 | 63.8 | 603 | | Racist | 2018 | Democrats | 56.3 | 51.5 | 61.0 | 693 | | Racist | 2018 | Republicans | 61.8 | 56.2 | 67.4 | 510 | | Racist | 2018 | Liberals | 63.1 | 57.1 | 69.1 | 438 | | Racist | 2018 | Conservatives | 60.7 | 54.9 | 66.5 | 461 | | Racist | 2021 | Democrats | 38.2 | 33.4 | 43.0 | 590 | | Racist | 2021 | Republicans | 61.1 | 55.4 | 66.8 | 400 | | Racist | 2021 | Liberals | 42.0 | 36.2 | 47.7 | 429 | | Racist | 2021 | Conservatives | 57.0 | 51.2 | 62.7 | 406 | | Racist | 2022 | Democrats | 44.0 | 36.8 | 51.1 | 483 | | Racist | 2022 | Republicans | 59.0 | 49.7 | 68.3 | 334 | | Racist | 2022 | Liberals | 41.6 | 33.6 | 49.6 | 366 | | Racist | 2022 | Conservatives | 58.7 | 49.0 | 68.4 | 331 | | Racist | 2024 | Democrats | 39.5 | 32.6 | 46.3 | 429 | | Racist | 2024 | Republicans | 53.0 | 46.1 | 59.9 | 368 | | Racist | 2024 | Liberals | 48.7 | 41.0 | 56.4 | 322 | | Racist | 2024 | Conservatives | 53.7 | 46.9 | 60.5 | 361 | | Militarist | 1976 | Democrats | 55.1 | 51.3 | 58.9 | 824 | | Militarist | 1976 | Republicans | 58.6 | 53.4 | 63.9 | 406 | | Militarist | 1976 | Liberals | 68.4 | 63.3 | 73.5 | 398 | | Militarist | 1976 | Conservatives | 53.2 | 48.0 | 58.4 | 426 | | Militarist | 1977 | Democrats | 49.3 | 45.6 | 53.1 | 866 | | Militarist | 1977 | Republicans | 56.9 | 51.8 | 61.9 | 454 | | Militarist | 1977 | Liberals | 61.2 | 56.0 | 66.5 | 418 | | Militarist | 1977 | Conservatives | 51.5 | 46.6 | 56.5 | 462 | | Militarist | 1980 | Democrats | 57.8 | 53.5 | 62.2 | 740 | | Militarist | 1980 | Republicans | 57.6 | 52.2 | 63.1 | 450 | | Militarist | 1980 | Liberals | 69.3 | 63.4 | 75.1 | 363 | | Militarist | 1980 | Conservatives | 57.5 | 52.2 | 62.9 | 471 | | Militarist | 1982 | Democrats | 52.2 | 48.2 | 56.2 | 1,063 | | Militarist | 1982 | Republicans | 62.1 | 56.7 | 67.4 | 494 | | Militarist | 1982 | Liberals | 69.1 | 63.8 | 74.5 | 501 | | Militarist | 1982 | Conservatives | 56.0 | 50.6 | 61.4 | 520 | | Militarist | 1984 | Democrats | 57.1 | 52.7 | 61.6 | 743 | | Militarist | 1984 | Republicans | 58.9 | 53.5 | 64.3 | 518 | | Militarist | 1984 | Liberals | 64.8 | 58.0 | 71.5 | 339 | | Militarist | 1984 | Conservatives | 55.6 | 50.3 | 60.9 | 496 | | Militarist | 1985 | Democrats | 55.1 | 50.5 | 59.6 | 741 | | Militarist | 1985 | Republicans | 59.1 | 54.3 | 64.0 | 602 | | Militarist | 1985 | Liberals | 64.5 | 58.1 | 71.0 | 367 | | Militarist | 1985 | Conservatives | 52.6 | 47.5 | 57.7 | 517 | | Militarist | 1987 | Democrats | 57.7 | 53.9 | 61.6 | 993 | | Militarist | 1987 | Republicans | 55.9 | 51.0 | 60.7 | 552 | | Militarist | 1987 | Liberals | 62.4 | 57.2 | 67.7 | 494 | | Militarist | 1987 | Conservatives | 58.3 | 53.2 | 63.3 | 516 | | Militarist | 1988 | Democrats | 57.1 | 52.1 | 62.1 | 472 | | Militarist | 1988 | Republicans | 59.7 | 54.2 | 65.3 | 358 | | Militarist | 1988 | Liberals | 69.5 | 63.2 | 75.9 | 260 | | Militarist | 1988 | Conservatives | 59.0 | 53.0 | 64.9 | 328 | | Militarist | 1989 | Democrats | 59.2 | 54.2 | 64.3 | 474 | | Militarist | 1989 | Republicans | 62.4 | 57.2 | 67.7 | 411 | | Militarist | 1989 | Liberals | 67.5 | 61.3 | 73.6 | 277 | | Militarist | 1989 | Conservatives | 64.4 | 58.3 | 70.6 | 296 | | Militarist | 1990 | Democrats | 53.9 | 48.1 | 59.6 | 369 | | Militarist | 1990 | Republicans | 63.5 | 58.2 | 68.8 | 404 | | Militarist | 1990 | Liberals | 62.6 | 55.3 | 69.9 | 229 | | Militarist | 1990 | Conservatives | 60.8 | 54.9 | 66.7 | 318 | | Militarist | 1991 | Democrats | 60.2 | 54.9 | 65.5 | 421 | | Militarist | 1991 | Republicans | 66.7 | 61.7 | 71.7 | 413 | | Militarist | 1991 | Liberals | 73.0 | 67.0 | 79.0 | 267 | | Militarist | 1991 | Conservatives | 62.5 | 56.2 | 68.7 | 297 | | Militarist | 1993 | Democrats | 63.8 | 59.0 | 68.6 | 496 | | Militarist | 1993 | Republicans | 68.1 | 62.9 | 73.2 | 407 | | Militarist | 1993 | Liberals | 77.3 | 71.7 | 82.8 | 274 | | Militarist | 1993 | Conservatives | 62.3 | 56.5 | 68.1 | 351 | | Militarist | 1994 | Democrats | 63.8 | 60.3 | 67.3 | 924 | | Militarist | 1994 | Republicans | 68.0 | 64.2 | 71.7 | 734 | | Militarist | 1994 | Liberals | 70.6 | 66.3 | 75.0 | 539 | | Militarist | 1994 | Conservatives | 65.7 | 61.7 | 69.8 | 674 | | Militarist | 1996 | Democrats | 60.8 | 57.0 | 64.5 | 854 | | Militarist | 1996 | Republicans | 65.3 | 61.4 | 69.1 | 704 | | Militarist | 1996 | Liberals | 70.7 | 66.0 | 75.5 | 446 | | Militarist | 1996 | Conservatives | 62.2 | 58.1 | 66.3 | 655 | | Militarist | 1998 | Democrats | 65.7 | 62.1 | 69.3 | 863 | | Militarist | 1998 | Republicans | 69.2 | 65.1 | 73.2 | 626 | | Militarist | 1998 | Liberals | 75.8 | 71.7 | 80.0 | 528 | | Militarist | 1998 | Conservatives | 65.3 | 61.0 | 69.6 | 601 | | Militarist | 2000 | Democrats | 60.2 | 56.3 | 64.0 | 811 | | Militarist | 2000 | Republicans | 68.1 | 64.0 | 72.2 | 613 | | Militarist | 2000 | Liberals | 70.1 | 65.3 | 74.8 | 460 | | Militarist | 2000 | Conservatives | 62.8 | 58.4 | 67.2 | 569 | | Militarist | 2002 | Democrats | 68.0 | 62.7 | 73.3 | 406 | | Militarist | 2002 | Republicans | 69.8 | 64.1 | 75.6 | 323 | | Militarist | 2002 | Liberals | 75.9 | 69.5 | 82.4 | 227 | | Militarist | 2002 | Conservatives | 62.5 | 56.1 | 68.8 | 302 | | Militarist | 2004 | Democrats | 64.5 | 59.0 | 70.1 | 397 | | Militarist | 2004 | Republicans | 68.1 | 62.4 | 73.7 | 331 | | Militarist | 2004 | Liberals | 70.8 | 63.6 | 78.0 | 219 | | Militarist | 2004 | Conservatives | 65.6 | 59.8 | 71.5 | 313 | | Militarist | 2006 | Democrats | 67.2 | 63.3 | 71.2 | 841 | | Militarist | 2006 | Republicans | 69.1 | 64.9 | 73.2 | 671 | | Militarist | 2006 | Liberals | 73.9 | 69.1 | 78.6 | 514 | | Militarist | 2006 | Conservatives | 63.7 | 59.4 | 68.1 | 676 | | Militarist | 2008 | Democrats | 65.7 | 61.1 | 70.2 | 629 | | Militarist | 2008 | Republicans | 69.3 | 64.3 | 74.3 | 442 | | Militarist | 2008 | Liberals | 73.8 | 68.4 | 79.1 | 355 | | Militarist | 2008 | Conservatives | 65.3 | 59.8 | 70.8 | 418 | | Militarist | 2010 | Democrats | 65.6 | 60.8 | 70.4 | 578 | | Militarist | 2010 | Republicans | 71.9 | 66.6 | 77.2 | 413 | | Militarist | 2010 | Liberals | 73.9 | 68.2 | 79.7 | 350 | | Militarist | 2010 | Conservatives | 71.5 | 66.2 | 76.9 | 398 | | Militarist | 2012 | Democrats | 69.5 | 65.0 | 74.0 | 595 | | Militarist | 2012 | Republicans | 71.9 | 66.3 | 77.6 | 399 | | Militarist | 2012 | Liberals | 73.1 | 67.5 | 78.8 | 356 | | Militarist | 2012 | Conservatives | 70.3 | 64.9 | 75.7 | 413 | | Militarist | 2014 | Democrats | 70.0 | 66.2 | 73.9 | 784 | | Militarist | 2014 | Republicans | 72.2 | 67.8 | 76.6 | 525 | | Militarist | 2014 | Liberals | 77.5 | 73.1 | 81.9 | 460 | | Militarist | 2014 | Conservatives | 69.8 | 65.4 | 74.2 | 539 | | Militarist | 2016 | Democrats | 71.1 | 67.3 | 74.8 | 897 | | Militarist | 2016 | Republicans | 75.8 | 71.6 | 79.9 | 600 | | Militarist | 2016 | Liberals | 78.7 | 74.3 | 83.1 | 512 | | Militarist | 2016 | Conservatives | 70.6 | 66.2 | 75.0 | 602 | | Militarist | 2018 | Democrats | 71.0 | 66.7 | 75.3 | 699 | | Militarist | 2018 | Republicans | 74.6 | 69.6 | 79.6 | 508 | | Militarist | 2018 | Liberals | 78.1 | 73.0 | 83.2 | 442 | | Militarist | 2018 | Conservatives | 71.7 | 66.3 | 77.1 | 457 | | Militarist | 2021 | Democrats | 57.5 | 52.6 | 62.4 | 584 | | Militarist | 2021 | Republicans | 67.4 | 61.9 | 72.9 | 400 | | Militarist | 2021 | Liberals | 66.0 | 60.5 | 71.5 | 430 | | Militarist | 2021 | Conservatives | 61.0 | 55.3 | 66.6 | 404 | | Communist | 1972 | Democrats | 52.0 | 48.4 | 55.7 | 884 | | Communist | 1972 | Republicans | 55.9 | 51.0 | 60.8 | 450 | | Communist | 1973 | Democrats | 62.7 | 59.1 | 66.4 | 787 | | Communist | 1973 | Republicans | 59.5 | 54.8 | 64.3 | 472 | | Communist | 1974 | Democrats | 61.3 | 57.6 | 65.0 | 799 | | Communist | 1974 | Republicans | 57.3 | 52.2 | 62.4 | 427 | | Communist | 1974 | Liberals | 73.2 | 68.5 | 77.9 | 423 | | Communist | 1974 | Conservatives | 57.0 | 51.8 | 62.3 | 404 | | Communist | 1976 | Democrats | 55.0 | 51.2 | 58.8 | 815 | | Communist | 1976 | Republicans | 60.9 | 55.7 | 66.1 | 410 | | Communist | 1976 | Liberals | 70.7 | 65.7 | 75.6 | 399 | | Communist | 1976 | Conservatives | 53.8 | 48.6 | 58.9 | 426 | | Communist | 1977 | Democrats | 55.5 | 51.8 | 59.3 | 852 | | Communist | 1977 | Republicans | 59.7 | 54.8 | 64.7 | 457 | | Communist | 1977 | Liberals | 69.4 | 64.5 | 74.4 | 415 | | Communist | 1977 | Conservatives | 54.4 | 49.5 | 59.4 | 459 | | Communist | 1980 | Democrats | 54.4 | 50.0 | 58.9 | 738 | | Communist | 1980 | Republicans | 57.6 | 52.2 | 63.1 | 447 | | Communist | 1980 | Liberals | 66.2 | 60.2 | 72.1 | 363 | | Communist | 1980 | Conservatives | 54.9 | 49.4 | 60.3 | 472 | | Communist | 1982 | Democrats | 55.8 | 51.8 | 59.8 | 1,045 | | Communist | 1982 | Republicans | 63.6 | 58.3 | 68.9 | 492 | | Communist | 1982 | Liberals | 72.7 | 67.6 | 77.8 | 492 | | Communist | 1982 | Conservatives | 55.7 | 50.3 | 61.1 | 519 | | Communist | 1984 | Democrats | 60.6 | 56.2 | 64.9 | 737 | | Communist | 1984 | Republicans | 61.8 | 56.5 | 67.1 | 518 | | Communist | 1984 | Liberals | 67.2 | 60.5 | 73.9 | 333 | | Communist | 1984 | Conservatives | 61.2 | 56.0 | 66.4 | 497 | | Communist | 1985 | Democrats | 60.5 | 56.0 | 65.0 | 726 | | Communist | 1985 | Republicans | 60.6 | 55.8 | 65.4 | 603 | | Communist | 1985 | Liberals | 71.0 | 64.8 | 77.3 | 358 | | Communist | 1985 | Conservatives | 57.0 | 52.0 | 62.1 | 519 | | Communist | 1987 | Democrats | 59.1 | 55.2 | 62.9 | 1,004 | | Communist | 1987 | Republicans | 62.5 | 57.8 | 67.2 | 556 | | Communist | 1987 | Liberals | 70.3 | 65.3 | 75.2 | 500 | | Communist | 1987 | Conservatives | 61.5 | 56.5 | 66.4 | 525 | | Communist | 1988 | Democrats | 60.3 | 55.3 | 65.2 | 475 | | Communist | 1988 | Republicans | 65.3 | 59.9 | 70.7 | 363 | | Communist | 1988 | Liberals | 70.6 | 64.4 | 76.7 | 267 | | Communist | 1988 | Conservatives | 61.4 | 55.6 | 67.2 | 330 | | Communist | 1989 | Democrats | 64.5 | 59.6 | 69.5 | 466 | | Communist | 1989 | Republicans | 65.0 | 59.8 | 70.1 | 409 | | Communist | 1989 | Liberals | 72.8 | 67.0 | 78.7 | 275 | | Communist | 1989 | Conservatives | 68.4 | 62.5 | 74.4 | 297 | | Communist | 1990 | Democrats | 63.0 | 57.4 | 68.5 | 373 | | Communist | 1990 | Republicans | 70.5 | 65.5 | 75.5 | 401 | | Communist | 1990 | Liberals | 71.1 | 64.2 | 77.9 | 229 | | Communist | 1990 | Conservatives | 69.2 | 63.7 | 74.8 | 321 | | Communist | 1991 | Democrats | 68.6 | 63.6 | 73.7 | 417 | | Communist | 1991 | Republicans | 69.2 | 64.3 | 74.1 | 414 | | Communist | 1991 | Liberals | 76.9 | 71.2 | 82.6 | 267 | | Communist | 1991 | Conservatives | 69.3 | 63.3 | 75.3 | 295 | | Communist | 1993 | Democrats | 71.0 | 66.5 | 75.6 | 491 | | Communist | 1993 | Republicans | 72.4 | 67.4 | 77.3 | 412 | | Communist | 1993 | Liberals | 80.0 | 74.7 | 85.4 | 272 | | Communist | 1993 | Conservatives | 69.4 | 64.0 | 74.9 | 358 | | Communist | 1994 | Democrats | 66.4 | 63.0 | 69.8 | 924 | | Communist | 1994 | Republicans | 70.7 | 66.9 | 74.4 | 730 | | Communist | 1994 | Liberals | 78.1 | 74.1 | 82.0 | 541 | | Communist | 1994 | Conservatives | 66.1 | 62.1 | 70.2 | 676 | | Communist | 1996 | Democrats | 64.4 | 60.8 | 68.0 | 851 | | Communist | 1996 | Republicans | 65.3 | 61.5 | 69.2 | 696 | | Communist | 1996 | Liberals | 72.0 | 67.3 | 76.7 | 446 | | Communist | 1996 | Conservatives | 62.9 | 58.8 | 67.0 | 652 | | Communist | 1998 | Democrats | 65.7 | 62.1 | 69.3 | 864 | | Communist | 1998 | Republicans | 69.2 | 65.1 | 73.3 | 613 | | Communist | 1998 | Liberals | 75.3 | 71.1 | 79.4 | 528 | | Communist | 1998 | Conservatives | 66.1 | 61.7 | 70.4 | 596 | | Communist | 2000 | Democrats | 63.1 | 59.3 | 67.0 | 798 | | Communist | 2000 | Republicans | 72.2 | 68.3 | 76.1 | 610 | | Communist | 2000 | Liberals | 76.3 | 71.9 | 80.7 | 460 | | Communist | 2000 | Conservatives | 67.0 | 62.7 | 71.3 | 560 | | Communist | 2002 | Democrats | 69.2 | 63.9 | 74.5 | 402 | | Communist | 2002 | Republicans | 70.6 | 64.8 | 76.3 | 322 | | Communist | 2002 | Liberals | 76.8 | 70.4 | 83.2 | 225 | | Communist | 2002 | Conservatives | 67.5 | 61.4 | 73.6 | 303 | | Communist | 2004 | Democrats | 68.0 | 62.7 | 73.4 | 396 | | Communist | 2004 | Republicans | 71.5 | 65.9 | 77.0 | 326 | | Communist | 2004 | Liberals | 73.1 | 66.1 | 80.1 | 221 | | Communist | 2004 | Conservatives | 67.8 | 61.9 | 73.6 | 308 | | Communist | 2006 | Democrats | 69.0 | 65.2 | 72.9 | 839 | | Communist | 2006 | Republicans | 73.5 | 69.5 | 77.4 | 670 | | Communist | 2006 | Liberals | 76.9 | 72.4 | 81.5 | 509 | | Communist | 2006 | Conservatives | 67.1 | 62.9 | 71.4 | 671 | | Communist | 2008 | Democrats | 70.3 | 65.9 | 74.6 | 625 | | Communist | 2008 | Republicans | 64.6 | 59.4 | 69.8 | 445 | | Communist | 2008 | Liberals | 77.1 | 72.0 | 82.3 | 352 | | Communist | 2008 | Conservatives | 63.8 | 58.3 | 69.3 | 424 | | Communist | 2010 | Democrats | 66.2 | 61.4 | 71.0 | 565 | | Communist | 2010 | Republicans | 65.7 | 60.1 | 71.3 | 416 | | Communist | 2010 | Liberals | 71.7 | 65.7 | 77.6 | 348 | | Communist | 2010 | Conservatives | 69.2 | 63.7 | 74.6 | 396 | | Communist | 2012 | Democrats | 69.4 | 64.8 | 74.0 | 583 | | Communist | 2012 | Republicans | 65.2 | 59.2 | 71.2 | 392 | | Communist | 2012 | Liberals | 74.7 | 69.1 | 80.3 | 348 | | Communist | 2012 | Conservatives | 69.1 | 63.6 | 74.7 | 402 | | Communist | 2014 | Democrats | 67.6 | 63.7 | 71.5 | 775 | | Communist | 2014 | Republicans | 71.6 | 67.2 | 76.0 | 522 | | Communist | 2014 | Liberals | 77.5 | 73.0 | 81.9 | 453 | | Communist | 2014 | Conservatives | 70.3 | 65.9 | 74.7 | 532 | | Communist | 2016 | Democrats | 74.1 | 70.5 | 77.8 | 874 | | Communist | 2016 | Republicans | 70.8 | 66.4 | 75.2 | 599 | | Communist | 2016 | Liberals | 85.5 | 81.6 | 89.3 | 505 | | Communist | 2016 | Conservatives | 67.3 | 62.7 | 71.8 | 594 | | Communist | 2018 | Democrats | 69.0 | 64.6 | 73.4 | 685 | | Communist | 2018 | Republicans | 73.4 | 68.3 | 78.6 | 500 | | Communist | 2018 | Liberals | 78.3 | 73.2 | 83.4 | 437 | | Communist | 2018 | Conservatives | 66.6 | 60.9 | 72.2 | 449 | | Communist | 2021 | Democrats | 73.4 | 69.1 | 77.8 | 588 | | Communist | 2021 | Republicans | 71.0 | 65.6 | 76.3 | 399 | | Communist | 2021 | Liberals | 84.2 | 80.0 | 88.4 | 430 | | Communist | 2021 | Conservatives | 66.9 | 61.4 | 72.4 | 404 | | Communist | 2022 | Democrats | 68.3 | 61.6 | 75.0 | 479 | | Communist | 2022 | Republicans | 65.8 | 56.6 | 74.9 | 328 | | Communist | 2022 | Liberals | 67.7 | 60.1 | 75.3 | 364 | | Communist | 2024 | Democrats | 66.9 | 60.3 | 73.5 | 425 | | Communist | 2024 | Republicans | 63.3 | 56.6 | 70.0 | 364 | | Communist | 2024 | Liberals | 83.1 | 77.3 | 88.9 | 318 | | Communist | 2024 | Conservatives | 59.9 | 53.2 | 66.7 | 357 | | Anti-religionist | 1972 | Democrats | 65.1 | 61.6 | 68.5 | 901 | | Anti-religionist | 1972 | Republicans | 69.7 | 65.2 | 74.3 | 450 | | Anti-religionist | 1973 | Democrats | 66.1 | 62.5 | 69.7 | 799 | | Anti-religionist | 1973 | Republicans | 64.8 | 60.2 | 69.4 | 481 | | Anti-religionist | 1974 | Democrats | 64.5 | 60.9 | 68.1 | 813 | | Anti-religionist | 1974 | Republicans | 61.0 | 56.0 | 66.0 | 428 | | Anti-religionist | 1974 | Liberals | 75.8 | 71.3 | 80.3 | 425 | | Anti-religionist | 1974 | Conservatives | 62.3 | 57.2 | 67.4 | 409 | | Anti-religionist | 1976 | Democrats | 63.2 | 59.6 | 66.9 | 829 | | Anti-religionist | 1976 | Republicans | 68.7 | 63.8 | 73.6 | 410 | | Anti-religionist | 1976 | Liberals | 77.7 | 73.1 | 82.3 | 400 | | Anti-religionist | 1976 | Conservatives | 67.1 | 62.2 | 71.9 | 431 | | Anti-religionist | 1977 | Democrats | 62.4 | 58.7 | 66.0 | 868 | | Anti-religionist | 1977 | Republicans | 65.2 | 60.4 | 70.0 | 463 | | Anti-religionist | 1977 | Liberals | 73.3 | 68.6 | 78.1 | 417 | | Anti-religionist | 1977 | Conservatives | 59.7 | 54.8 | 64.5 | 466 | | Anti-religionist | 1980 | Democrats | 63.5 | 59.2 | 67.7 | 753 | | Anti-religionist | 1980 | Republicans | 68.5 | 63.4 | 73.7 | 452 | | Anti-religionist | 1980 | Liberals | 75.3 | 69.9 | 80.8 | 365 | | Anti-religionist | 1980 | Conservatives | 64.3 | 59.1 | 69.5 | 479 | | Anti-religionist | 1982 | Democrats | 60.4 | 56.5 | 64.3 | 1,089 | | Anti-religionist | 1982 | Republicans | 71.8 | 66.8 | 76.7 | 496 | | Anti-religionist | 1982 | Liberals | 76.1 | 71.1 | 81.0 | 506 | | Anti-religionist | 1982 | Conservatives | 64.3 | 59.1 | 69.5 | 526 | | Anti-religionist | 1984 | Democrats | 66.2 | 62.0 | 70.4 | 749 | | Anti-religionist | 1984 | Republicans | 71.2 | 66.3 | 76.2 | 523 | | Anti-religionist | 1984 | Liberals | 74.9 | 68.8 | 81.0 | 339 | | Anti-religionist | 1984 | Conservatives | 69.0 | 64.1 | 73.9 | 500 | | Anti-religionist | 1985 | Democrats | 63.3 | 58.9 | 67.7 | 747 | | Anti-religionist | 1985 | Republicans | 73.3 | 68.9 | 77.6 | 605 | | Anti-religionist | 1985 | Liberals | 71.9 | 65.8 | 78.0 | 367 | | Anti-religionist | 1985 | Conservatives | 68.2 | 63.5 | 73.0 | 523 | | Anti-religionist | 1987 | Democrats | 69.5 | 66.0 | 73.1 | 1,016 | | Anti-religionist | 1987 | Republicans | 70.9 | 66.5 | 75.3 | 563 | | Anti-religionist | 1987 | Liberals | 76.7 | 72.2 | 81.3 | 502 | | Anti-religionist | 1987 | Conservatives | 70.2 | 65.6 | 74.9 | 527 | | Anti-religionist | 1988 | Democrats | 65.2 | 60.4 | 69.9 | 480 | | Anti-religionist | 1988 | Republicans | 74.2 | 69.3 | 79.2 | 361 | | Anti-religionist | 1988 | Liberals | 76.1 | 70.3 | 81.9 | 266 | | Anti-religionist | 1988 | Conservatives | 70.5 | 65.0 | 75.9 | 331 | | Anti-religionist | 1989 | Democrats | 69.1 | 64.3 | 73.8 | 473 | | Anti-religionist | 1989 | Republicans | 74.5 | 69.8 | 79.2 | 414 | | Anti-religionist | 1989 | Liberals | 80.0 | 74.8 | 85.3 | 276 | | Anti-religionist | 1989 | Conservatives | 70.1 | 64.3 | 75.9 | 301 | | Anti-religionist | 1990 | Democrats | 72.1 | 66.9 | 77.2 | 375 | | Anti-religionist | 1990 | Republicans | 75.6 | 70.9 | 80.3 | 409 | | Anti-religionist | 1990 | Liberals | 78.4 | 72.2 | 84.6 | 230 | | Anti-religionist | 1990 | Conservatives | 70.6 | 65.2 | 76.0 | 327 | | Anti-religionist | 1991 | Democrats | 69.5 | 64.5 | 74.5 | 423 | | Anti-religionist | 1991 | Republicans | 76.4 | 71.9 | 80.9 | 416 | | Anti-religionist | 1991 | Liberals | 80.1 | 74.7 | 85.5 | 269 | | Anti-religionist | 1991 | Conservatives | 76.6 | 71.2 | 82.0 | 301 | | Anti-religionist | 1993 | Democrats | 71.0 | 66.5 | 75.5 | 498 | | Anti-religionist | 1993 | Republicans | 74.2 | 69.3 | 79.0 | 409 | | Anti-religionist | 1993 | Liberals | 82.1 | 77.0 | 87.2 | 274 | | Anti-religionist | 1993 | Conservatives | 69.2 | 63.7 | 74.6 | 356 | | Anti-religionist | 1994 | Democrats | 71.2 | 67.9 | 74.4 | 940 | | Anti-religionist | 1994 | Republicans | 75.3 | 71.8 | 78.8 | 736 | | Anti-religionist | 1994 | Liberals | 78.6 | 74.7 | 82.5 | 543 | | Anti-religionist | 1994 | Conservatives | 71.3 | 67.5 | 75.2 | 682 | | Anti-religionist | 1996 | Democrats | 72.1 | 68.7 | 75.5 | 862 | | Anti-religionist | 1996 | Republicans | 73.4 | 69.9 | 77.0 | 703 | | Anti-religionist | 1996 | Liberals | 77.0 | 72.6 | 81.4 | 448 | | Anti-religionist | 1996 | Conservatives | 72.8 | 69.1 | 76.6 | 658 | | Anti-religionist | 1998 | Democrats | 72.7 | 69.3 | 76.1 | 870 | | Anti-religionist | 1998 | Republicans | 76.9 | 73.2 | 80.6 | 625 | | Anti-religionist | 1998 | Liberals | 81.3 | 77.6 | 85.1 | 536 | | Anti-religionist | 1998 | Conservatives | 75.0 | 71.1 | 79.0 | 597 | | Anti-religionist | 2000 | Democrats | 71.8 | 68.3 | 75.4 | 813 | | Anti-religionist | 2000 | Republicans | 79.2 | 75.7 | 82.7 | 615 | | Anti-religionist | 2000 | Liberals | 82.2 | 78.2 | 86.1 | 459 | | Anti-religionist | 2000 | Conservatives | 74.5 | 70.5 | 78.4 | 576 | | Anti-religionist | 2002 | Democrats | 72.5 | 67.4 | 77.6 | 409 | | Anti-religionist | 2002 | Republicans | 77.7 | 72.4 | 82.9 | 323 | | Anti-religionist | 2002 | Liberals | 80.5 | 74.5 | 86.5 | 227 | | Anti-religionist | 2002 | Conservatives | 69.3 | 63.2 | 75.3 | 305 | | Anti-religionist | 2004 | Democrats | 73.2 | 68.1 | 78.3 | 397 | | Anti-religionist | 2004 | Republicans | 79.5 | 74.6 | 84.5 | 331 | | Anti-religionist | 2004 | Liberals | 74.6 | 67.7 | 81.5 | 220 | | Anti-religionist | 2004 | Conservatives | 77.2 | 72.0 | 82.4 | 312 | | Anti-religionist | 2006 | Democrats | 76.6 | 73.1 | 80.1 | 848 | | Anti-religionist | 2006 | Republicans | 82.5 | 79.0 | 85.9 | 672 | | Anti-religionist | 2006 | Liberals | 84.0 | 80.1 | 88.0 | 515 | | Anti-religionist | 2006 | Conservatives | 75.3 | 71.4 | 79.2 | 678 | | Anti-religionist | 2008 | Democrats | 80.2 | 76.4 | 84.0 | 635 | | Anti-religionist | 2008 | Republicans | 74.2 | 69.4 | 78.9 | 444 | | Anti-religionist | 2008 | Liberals | 86.9 | 82.8 | 91.0 | 355 | | Anti-religionist | 2008 | Conservatives | 73.5 | 68.4 | 78.5 | 424 | | Anti-religionist | 2010 | Democrats | 73.2 | 68.7 | 77.7 | 577 | | Anti-religionist | 2010 | Republicans | 77.0 | 72.0 | 81.9 | 416 | | Anti-religionist | 2010 | Liberals | 79.7 | 74.4 | 84.9 | 353 | | Anti-religionist | 2010 | Conservatives | 77.5 | 72.5 | 82.4 | 401 | | Anti-religionist | 2012 | Democrats | 78.8 | 74.8 | 82.8 | 593 | | Anti-religionist | 2012 | Republicans | 76.6 | 71.3 | 81.9 | 401 | | Anti-religionist | 2012 | Liberals | 84.2 | 79.5 | 88.8 | 357 | | Anti-religionist | 2012 | Conservatives | 74.5 | 69.3 | 79.6 | 415 | | Anti-religionist | 2014 | Democrats | 77.6 | 74.1 | 81.1 | 784 | | Anti-religionist | 2014 | Republicans | 84.2 | 80.6 | 87.7 | 528 | | Anti-religionist | 2014 | Liberals | 84.0 | 80.2 | 87.9 | 463 | | Anti-religionist | 2014 | Conservatives | 79.0 | 75.1 | 82.9 | 541 | | Anti-religionist | 2016 | Democrats | 78.0 | 74.5 | 81.4 | 901 | | Anti-religionist | 2016 | Republicans | 81.1 | 77.3 | 84.8 | 603 | | Anti-religionist | 2016 | Liberals | 85.9 | 82.1 | 89.6 | 512 | | Anti-religionist | 2016 | Conservatives | 77.8 | 73.8 | 81.9 | 604 | | Anti-religionist | 2018 | Democrats | 81.7 | 78.0 | 85.3 | 704 | | Anti-religionist | 2018 | Republicans | 82.8 | 78.5 | 87.2 | 512 | | Anti-religionist | 2018 | Liberals | 85.5 | 81.1 | 89.8 | 444 | | Anti-religionist | 2018 | Conservatives | 80.2 | 75.5 | 84.9 | 464 | | Anti-religionist | 2021 | Democrats | 83.4 | 79.7 | 87.0 | 588 | | Anti-religionist | 2021 | Republicans | 80.9 | 76.3 | 85.6 | 401 | | Anti-religionist | 2021 | Liberals | 88.8 | 85.2 | 92.5 | 429 | | Anti-religionist | 2021 | Conservatives | 77.3 | 72.4 | 82.1 | 407 | | Anti-religionist | 2022 | Democrats | 80.6 | 74.9 | 86.3 | 487 | | Anti-religionist | 2022 | Republicans | 71.9 | 63.4 | 80.5 | 334 | | Anti-religionist | 2022 | Liberals | 83.4 | 77.4 | 89.4 | 367 | | Anti-religionist | 2022 | Conservatives | 75.8 | 67.4 | 84.2 | 331 | | Anti-religionist | 2024 | Democrats | 80.2 | 74.6 | 85.7 | 432 | | Anti-religionist | 2024 | Republicans | 77.7 | 72.0 | 83.4 | 371 | | Anti-religionist | 2024 | Liberals | 88.1 | 83.1 | 93.0 | 323 | | Anti-religionist | 2024 | Conservatives | 76.5 | 70.7 | 82.3 | 361 | | Homosexual man | 1973 | Democrats | 64.8 | 61.2 | 68.5 | 775 | | Homosexual man | 1973 | Republicans | 61.2 | 56.4 | 66.0 | 465 | | Homosexual man | 1974 | Democrats | 65.7 | 62.1 | 69.3 | 791 | | Homosexual man | 1974 | Republicans | 62.9 | 57.9 | 68.0 | 413 | | Homosexual man | 1974 | Liberals | 75.8 | 71.3 | 80.4 | 421 | | Homosexual man | 1974 | Conservatives | 62.2 | 57.0 | 67.5 | 393 | | Homosexual man | 1976 | Democrats | 63.3 | 59.6 | 67.0 | 812 | | Homosexual man | 1976 | Republicans | 68.9 | 63.9 | 73.8 | 401 | | Homosexual man | 1976 | Liberals | 78.6 | 74.1 | 83.1 | 400 | | Homosexual man | 1976 | Conservatives | 62.7 | 57.7 | 67.7 | 425 | | Homosexual man | 1977 | Democrats | 63.2 | 59.6 | 66.9 | 845 | | Homosexual man | 1977 | Republicans | 66.7 | 61.8 | 71.5 | 446 | | Homosexual man | 1977 | Liberals | 73.3 | 68.5 | 78.1 | 409 | | Homosexual man | 1977 | Conservatives | 58.8 | 53.8 | 63.7 | 450 | | Homosexual man | 1980 | Democrats | 67.1 | 62.9 | 71.3 | 740 | | Homosexual man | 1980 | Republicans | 69.6 | 64.4 | 74.8 | 434 | | Homosexual man | 1980 | Liberals | 75.8 | 70.4 | 81.2 | 361 | | Homosexual man | 1980 | Conservatives | 67.0 | 61.8 | 72.2 | 467 | | Homosexual man | 1982 | Democrats | 66.4 | 62.6 | 70.2 | 1,048 | | Homosexual man | 1982 | Republicans | 70.5 | 65.4 | 75.5 | 489 | | Homosexual man | 1982 | Liberals | 80.7 | 76.1 | 85.3 | 498 | | Homosexual man | 1982 | Conservatives | 66.2 | 61.0 | 71.4 | 507 | | Homosexual man | 1984 | Democrats | 71.6 | 67.5 | 75.6 | 727 | | Homosexual man | 1984 | Republicans | 69.9 | 64.8 | 75.0 | 508 | | Homosexual man | 1984 | Liberals | 74.0 | 67.8 | 80.3 | 334 | | Homosexual man | 1984 | Conservatives | 70.8 | 66.0 | 75.7 | 484 | | Homosexual man | 1985 | Democrats | 68.7 | 64.4 | 73.0 | 722 | | Homosexual man | 1985 | Republicans | 73.9 | 69.6 | 78.3 | 599 | | Homosexual man | 1985 | Liberals | 77.5 | 71.7 | 83.2 | 358 | | Homosexual man | 1985 | Conservatives | 65.0 | 60.1 | 69.9 | 513 | | Homosexual man | 1987 | Democrats | 72.6 | 69.2 | 76.1 | 1,006 | | Homosexual man | 1987 | Republicans | 69.9 | 65.4 | 74.4 | 549 | | Homosexual man | 1987 | Liberals | 74.8 | 70.1 | 79.6 | 500 | | Homosexual man | 1987 | Conservatives | 68.8 | 64.1 | 73.6 | 516 | | Homosexual man | 1988 | Democrats | 71.6 | 67.0 | 76.1 | 468 | | Homosexual man | 1988 | Republicans | 73.2 | 68.1 | 78.2 | 357 | | Homosexual man | 1988 | Liberals | 79.7 | 74.3 | 85.2 | 264 | | Homosexual man | 1988 | Conservatives | 65.8 | 60.1 | 71.6 | 325 | | Homosexual man | 1989 | Democrats | 77.0 | 72.7 | 81.4 | 469 | | Homosexual man | 1989 | Republicans | 78.9 | 74.4 | 83.3 | 404 | | Homosexual man | 1989 | Liberals | 82.9 | 78.0 | 87.8 | 274 | | Homosexual man | 1989 | Conservatives | 76.7 | 71.2 | 82.1 | 293 | | Homosexual man | 1990 | Democrats | 78.5 | 73.8 | 83.2 | 372 | | Homosexual man | 1990 | Republicans | 78.7 | 74.1 | 83.2 | 397 | | Homosexual man | 1990 | Liberals | 84.4 | 78.9 | 89.9 | 229 | The first 500 of 600 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/allow_by_year.json. Views: By party (grouping = party); By ideology (grouping = ideology). Note: The GSS moved mostly online in 2021 (see the methods note at the end of the chapter). Estimates from 2021 on mix web and interviewer-administered respondents unless a figure says otherwise. Note: Annual cells with fewer than 150 respondents or an effective sample below 100 are left out. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024 cumulative file; weighted (weight_use); 95% intervals on the effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/allow_by_year.json ### Table 4. Republicans allowed every speaker more often in 1976 to 1994, and by 2008 to 2018 only the racist and militarist leads remained Gap in the share who would allow the speaker to speak, in points, by speaker and period, with 95% intervals; the axis names the two groups | Speaker | Period | Grouping | Gap (points) | Low | High | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Racist | 1976 to 1994 | party | −4.5 | −6.3 | −2.6 | 15,315 | | Militarist | 1976 to 1994 | party | −4.6 | −6.4 | −2.7 | 15,329 | | Communist | 1976 to 1994 | party | −4.3 | −6.2 | −2.5 | 15,275 | | Anti-religionist | 1976 to 1994 | party | −6.3 | −8.0 | −4.5 | 15,497 | | Homosexual man | 1976 to 1994 | party | −2.4 | −4.1 | −0.7 | 15,167 | | Racist | 2008 to 2018 | party | −6.8 | −9.7 | −4.0 | 7,054 | | Militarist | 2008 to 2018 | party | −3.8 | −6.4 | −1.1 | 7,069 | | Communist | 2008 to 2018 | party | +0.8 | −1.9 | +3.5 | 6,981 | | Anti-religionist | 2008 to 2018 | party | −1.4 | −3.8 | +1.0 | 7,098 | | Homosexual man | 2008 to 2018 | party | +2.1 | +0.1 | +4.0 | 7,063 | | Muslim clergyman | 2008 to 2018 | party | +0.5 | −2.4 | +3.4 | 7,062 | | Racist | 1976 to 1994 | party_no2008 | −4.5 | −6.3 | −2.6 | 15,315 | | Militarist | 1976 to 1994 | party_no2008 | −4.6 | −6.4 | −2.7 | 15,329 | | Communist | 1976 to 1994 | party_no2008 | −4.3 | −6.2 | −2.5 | 15,275 | | Anti-religionist | 1976 to 1994 | party_no2008 | −6.3 | −8.0 | −4.5 | 15,497 | | Homosexual man | 1976 to 1994 | party_no2008 | −2.4 | −4.1 | −0.7 | 15,167 | | Racist | 2010 to 2018 (2008 left out) | party_no2008 | −8.4 | −11.5 | −5.2 | 5,984 | | Militarist | 2010 to 2018 (2008 left out) | party_no2008 | −3.8 | −6.6 | −0.9 | 5,998 | | Communist | 2010 to 2018 (2008 left out) | party_no2008 | −0.1 | −3.0 | +2.8 | 5,911 | | Anti-religionist | 2010 to 2018 (2008 left out) | party_no2008 | −2.7 | −5.3 | −0.2 | 6,019 | | Homosexual man | 2010 to 2018 (2008 left out) | party_no2008 | +1.1 | −0.9 | +3.1 | 5,994 | | Muslim clergyman | 2010 to 2018 (2008 left out) | party_no2008 | −0.2 | −3.4 | +2.9 | 5,990 | | Racist | 1976 to 1994 | ideology | +6.2 | +4.1 | +8.4 | 10,399 | | Militarist | 1976 to 1994 | ideology | +9.2 | +7.1 | +11.4 | 10,398 | | Communist | 1976 to 1994 | ideology | +11.0 | +8.8 | +13.1 | 10,405 | | Anti-religionist | 1976 to 1994 | ideology | +8.5 | +6.5 | +10.5 | 10,504 | | Homosexual man | 1976 to 1994 | ideology | +10.5 | +8.6 | +12.5 | 10,322 | | Racist | 2008 to 2018 | ideology | +1.0 | −2.2 | +4.2 | 5,302 | | Militarist | 2008 to 2018 | ideology | +6.3 | +3.4 | +9.2 | 5,302 | | Communist | 2008 to 2018 | ideology | +10.3 | +7.4 | +13.2 | 5,240 | | Anti-religionist | 2008 to 2018 | ideology | +7.2 | +4.7 | +9.8 | 5,333 | | Homosexual man | 2008 to 2018 | ideology | +7.9 | +5.9 | +9.9 | 5,293 | | Muslim clergyman | 2008 to 2018 | ideology | +13.7 | +10.4 | +17.0 | 5,293 | | Racist | 1976 to 1994 | party_adjusted | −1.3 | −3.1 | +0.6 | 15,228 | | Militarist | 1976 to 1994 | party_adjusted | −0.7 | −2.5 | +1.2 | 15,243 | | Communist | 1976 to 1994 | party_adjusted | +0.2 | −1.6 | +2.0 | 15,190 | | Anti-religionist | 1976 to 1994 | party_adjusted | −1.7 | −3.4 | 0.0 | 15,406 | | Homosexual man | 1976 to 1994 | party_adjusted | +1.0 | −0.6 | +2.7 | 15,080 | | Racist | 2008 to 2018 | party_adjusted | −3.9 | −6.9 | −0.8 | 7,037 | | Militarist | 2008 to 2018 | party_adjusted | −0.3 | −2.9 | +2.4 | 7,052 | | Communist | 2008 to 2018 | party_adjusted | +4.8 | +2.1 | +7.5 | 6,965 | | Anti-religionist | 2008 to 2018 | party_adjusted | +3.0 | +0.5 | +5.4 | 7,082 | | Homosexual man | 2008 to 2018 | party_adjusted | +4.7 | +2.7 | +6.8 | 7,046 | | Muslim clergyman | 2008 to 2018 | party_adjusted | +5.8 | +2.9 | +8.7 | 7,045 | | Racist | 1976 to 1994 | ideology_adjusted | +5.7 | +3.5 | +7.9 | 10,338 | | Militarist | 1976 to 1994 | ideology_adjusted | +6.8 | +4.7 | +8.8 | 10,338 | | Communist | 1976 to 1994 | ideology_adjusted | +9.3 | +7.3 | +11.4 | 10,343 | | Anti-religionist | 1976 to 1994 | ideology_adjusted | +6.9 | +4.9 | +8.8 | 10,441 | | Homosexual man | 1976 to 1994 | ideology_adjusted | +8.7 | +6.8 | +10.6 | 10,261 | | Racist | 2008 to 2018 | ideology_adjusted | +1.9 | −1.4 | +5.1 | 5,289 | | Militarist | 2008 to 2018 | ideology_adjusted | +5.0 | +2.1 | +7.8 | 5,289 | | Communist | 2008 to 2018 | ideology_adjusted | +8.6 | +5.8 | +11.5 | 5,227 | | Anti-religionist | 2008 to 2018 | ideology_adjusted | +6.7 | +4.1 | +9.3 | 5,321 | | Homosexual man | 2008 to 2018 | ideology_adjusted | +6.7 | +4.6 | +8.7 | 5,280 | | Muslim clergyman | 2008 to 2018 | ideology_adjusted | +13.4 | +10.3 | +16.5 | 5,280 | Views: By party (grouping = party); By party, without 2008 (grouping = party_no2008); By ideology (grouping = ideology); By party, adjusted (grouping = party_adjusted); By ideology, adjusted (grouping = ideology_adjusted). Note: The speakers are grouped by which side is expected to object to them: liberals for the racist and the militarist, conservatives for the other four. The grouping is a coding choice, and the rows let a reader regroup them. Note: The Muslim clergyman was first asked about in 2008. Note: Raw intervals use the effective sample size. Adjusted intervals come from a weighted linear regression with robust (HC3) errors on respondents with complete age, education, race and sex. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024 cumulative file; weighted (weight_use); 95% intervals on the effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/gap_by_speaker.json ### Table 5. Republicans allowed the racist speaker more often than Democrats did in 27 of 28 survey years, with the largest estimated leads in 2021, 2022 and 2024 Gap in the share who would allow a racist to speak in their community, in points, by survey year, all interview modes, with 95% intervals | Year | Gap | Gap (points) | Low | High | Respondents | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1976 | Party gap | −6.2 | −12.5 | +0.1 | 1,225 | | 1976 | Ideology gap | +7.4 | +0.3 | +14.4 | 830 | | 1977 | Party gap | −3.4 | −9.5 | +2.7 | 1,310 | | 1977 | Ideology gap | +7.4 | +0.4 | +14.4 | 877 | | 1980 | Party gap | −3.0 | −9.8 | +3.9 | 1,184 | | 1980 | Ideology gap | +6.7 | −1.1 | +14.4 | 830 | | 1982 | Party gap | −6.6 | −13.2 | 0.0 | 1,561 | | 1982 | Ideology gap | +9.2 | +1.8 | +16.6 | 1,022 | | 1984 | Party gap | −6.6 | −13.4 | +0.2 | 1,257 | | 1984 | Ideology gap | +4.6 | −3.7 | +12.8 | 830 | | 1985 | Party gap | −5.1 | −11.7 | +1.5 | 1,336 | | 1985 | Ideology gap | +8.8 | +0.6 | +17.0 | 880 | | 1987 | Party gap | −0.3 | −6.3 | +5.8 | 1,558 | | 1987 | Ideology gap | +9.7 | +2.5 | +16.8 | 1,018 | | 1988 | Party gap | −5.6 | −13.0 | +1.7 | 835 | | 1988 | Ideology gap | +5.8 | −2.9 | +14.5 | 594 | | 1989 | Party gap | −3.2 | −10.5 | +4.1 | 876 | | 1989 | Ideology gap | −1.0 | −9.6 | +7.6 | 573 | | 1990 | Party gap | −8.7 | −16.3 | −1.1 | 777 | | 1990 | Ideology gap | −0.5 | −9.7 | +8.6 | 549 | | 1991 | Party gap | −4.3 | −11.7 | +3.1 | 833 | | 1991 | Ideology gap | −1.9 | −10.7 | +6.9 | 561 | | 1993 | Party gap | −1.6 | −8.8 | +5.5 | 902 | | 1993 | Ideology gap | +9.5 | +1.2 | +17.9 | 625 | | 1994 | Party gap | −4.3 | −9.5 | +1.0 | 1,661 | | 1994 | Ideology gap | +6.7 | +0.6 | +12.8 | 1,210 | | 1996 | Party gap | −3.9 | −9.3 | +1.5 | 1,554 | | 1996 | Ideology gap | +2.6 | −3.8 | +9.1 | 1,094 | | 1998 | Party gap | −4.5 | −10.1 | +1.1 | 1,482 | | 1998 | Ideology gap | +8.2 | +1.9 | +14.4 | 1,125 | | 2000 | Party gap | −5.0 | −10.8 | +0.7 | 1,429 | | 2000 | Ideology gap | +1.8 | −4.8 | +8.3 | 1,033 | | 2002 | Party gap | −3.1 | −11.3 | +5.0 | 721 | | 2002 | Ideology gap | +8.8 | −0.7 | +18.4 | 522 | | 2004 | Party gap | −5.5 | −13.7 | +2.6 | 727 | | 2004 | Ideology gap | −3.2 | −13.0 | +6.6 | 530 | | 2006 | Party gap | −1.5 | −7.4 | +4.4 | 1,512 | | 2006 | Ideology gap | +9.9 | +3.2 | +16.5 | 1,190 | | 2008 | Party gap | +1.6 | −5.5 | +8.7 | 1,070 | | 2008 | Ideology gap | +9.2 | +1.1 | +17.3 | 772 | | 2010 | Party gap | −7.7 | −15.4 | 0.0 | 990 | | 2010 | Ideology gap | −1.5 | −10.1 | +7.2 | 748 | | 2012 | Party gap | −6.8 | −14.7 | +1.0 | 983 | | 2012 | Ideology gap | −1.0 | −9.5 | +7.6 | 765 | | 2014 | Party gap | −12.0 | −18.1 | −5.8 | 1,311 | | 2014 | Ideology gap | −5.6 | −12.5 | +1.2 | 1,003 | | 2016 | Party gap | −9.1 | −15.2 | −2.9 | 1,497 | | 2016 | Ideology gap | +3.3 | −3.7 | +10.4 | 1,115 | | 2018 | Party gap | −5.6 | −12.9 | +1.8 | 1,203 | | 2018 | Ideology gap | +2.4 | −6.0 | +10.7 | 899 | | 2021 | Party gap | −22.9 | −30.3 | −15.4 | 990 | | 2021 | Ideology gap | −15.0 | −23.1 | −6.9 | 835 | | 2022 | Party gap | −15.0 | −26.8 | −3.3 | 817 | | 2022 | Ideology gap | −17.1 | −29.6 | −4.6 | 697 | | 2024 | Party gap | −13.6 | −23.3 | −3.8 | 797 | | 2024 | Ideology gap | −5.0 | −15.3 | +5.2 | 683 | Views: By party (series = Party gap); By ideology (series = Ideology gap). Note: The GSS moved mostly online in 2021 (see the methods note at the end of the chapter). Estimates from 2021 on mix web and interviewer-administered respondents unless a figure says otherwise. Note: Years in which either group has fewer than 150 respondents or an effective sample below 100 are left out. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024 cumulative file; weighted (weight_use); 95% intervals on the effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/racist_gap_by_year.json ### Table 6. Web respondents allowed the racist speaker 14.0 points less often; the other three speakers show no detectable mode difference Share who would allow the speaker to speak (percent) or the gap in that share between groups (points), by interview mode, 2022 and 2024, with 95% intervals | Measure | Speaker | Interviewer-administered | Low | High | Web | Low | High | Respondents, interviewer | Respondents, web | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | all | Racist | 54.7 | 50.0 | 59.4 | 40.7 | 36.5 | 44.9 | 1,118 | 1,153 | | all | Communist | 65.7 | 61.1 | 70.2 | 67.7 | 63.7 | 71.7 | 1,081 | 1,151 | | all | Anti-religionist | 79.4 | 75.6 | 83.2 | 78.0 | 74.4 | 81.6 | 1,130 | 1,150 | | all | Muslim clergyman | 46.3 | 41.6 | 50.9 | 44.0 | 39.7 | 48.3 | 1,111 | 1,148 | | dem | Racist | 49.8 | 42.6 | 57.0 | 33.4 | 26.8 | 40.1 | 443 | 469 | | dem | Communist | 65.9 | 59.0 | 72.7 | 69.5 | 62.9 | 76.0 | 437 | 467 | | dem | Anti-religionist | 79.1 | 73.2 | 84.9 | 81.9 | 76.4 | 87.3 | 451 | 468 | | dem | Muslim clergyman | 46.5 | 39.3 | 53.6 | 49.9 | 42.8 | 57.0 | 440 | 468 | | rep | Racist | 61.5 | 53.0 | 70.1 | 48.9 | 41.6 | 56.3 | 360 | 342 | | rep | Communist | 65.1 | 56.5 | 73.6 | 63.9 | 56.9 | 70.9 | 350 | 342 | | rep | Anti-religionist | 77.5 | 70.2 | 84.8 | 71.1 | 64.5 | 77.7 | 364 | 341 | | rep | Muslim clergyman | 47.6 | 38.8 | 56.4 | 35.5 | 28.5 | 42.5 | 361 | 342 | | party_gap | Racist | −11.8 | −23.0 | −0.5 | −15.5 | −25.4 | −5.6 | 803 | 811 | | party_gap | Communist | 0.8 | −10.2 | 11.8 | 5.6 | −4.0 | 15.2 | 787 | 809 | | party_gap | Anti-religionist | 1.6 | −7.7 | 10.9 | 10.8 | 2.2 | 19.4 | 815 | 809 | | party_gap | Muslim clergyman | −1.1 | −12.5 | 10.2 | 14.4 | 4.4 | 24.3 | 801 | 810 | | ideology_gap | Racist | −5.1 | −17.6 | 7.5 | −17.3 | −27.4 | −7.2 | 649 | 731 | | ideology_gap | Communist | 9.3 | −2.9 | 21.5 | 10.5 | 1.5 | 19.5 | 637 | 730 | | ideology_gap | Anti-religionist | 5.8 | −4.4 | 16.1 | 12.9 | 5.2 | 20.6 | 657 | 725 | | ideology_gap | Muslim clergyman | 6.6 | −6.0 | 19.3 | 16.8 | 6.6 | 27.0 | 644 | 726 | Views: All adults (measure = all); Party gap (measure = party_gap); Ideology gap (measure = ideology_gap). Note: Only the racist, Communist, anti-religionist and Muslim clergyman items were asked in 2022 and 2024. Phone and other-mode respondents are counted as interviewer-administered because in-person cells alone fall below the effective-sample floor for Republicans and conservatives. Note: The 2021 wave is left out: it has too few interviewer-administered respondents. Note: Shares among Democrats and among Republicans separately are in the data table only. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024 cumulative file; weighted (weight_use); 95% intervals on the effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/mode_comparison.json ### Table 7. By 2008 to 2018 the party gap on speakers that conservatives object to was +0.4 points, and on speakers that liberals object to −5.2 Gap between groups in the average share of a family of speakers a respondent would allow to speak, in points, by family and period, with 95% intervals | Family | Period | Grouping | Gap (points) | Low | High | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Objectionable to liberals | 1976 to 1994 | party | −4.5 | −6.1 | −2.9 | 15,078 | | Objectionable to liberals | 1976 to 1994 | ideology | +7.7 | +5.8 | +9.6 | 10,246 | | Objectionable to liberals | 2008 to 2018 | party | −5.2 | −7.6 | −2.9 | 6,991 | | Objectionable to liberals | 2008 to 2018 | ideology | +3.5 | +1.0 | +6.1 | 5,250 | | Objectionable to liberals | 2021 (mostly web) | party | −16.3 | −22.5 | −10.0 | 982 | | Objectionable to liberals | 2021 (mostly web) | ideology | −5.0 | −11.9 | +1.8 | 833 | | Objectionable to conservatives | 1976 to 1994 | party | −4.2 | −5.7 | −2.8 | 14,809 | | Objectionable to conservatives | 1976 to 1994 | ideology | +9.7 | +8.0 | +11.4 | 10,130 | | Objectionable to conservatives | 2008 to 2018 | party | +0.4 | −1.4 | +2.3 | 6,885 | | Objectionable to conservatives | 2008 to 2018 | ideology | +8.3 | +6.3 | +10.2 | 5,169 | | Objectionable to conservatives | 2021 (mostly web) | party | +3.2 | −1.4 | +7.7 | 976 | | Objectionable to conservatives | 2021 (mostly web) | ideology | +13.6 | +9.0 | +18.1 | 826 | | All five, each speaker counts once | 1976 to 1994 | party | −4.3 | −5.7 | −2.9 | 14,468 | | All five, each speaker counts once | 1976 to 1994 | ideology | +8.9 | +7.2 | +10.5 | 9,907 | | All five, each speaker counts once | 2008 to 2018 | party | −1.8 | −3.7 | 0.0 | 6,780 | | All five, each speaker counts once | 2008 to 2018 | ideology | +6.3 | +4.3 | +8.3 | 5,102 | | All five, each speaker counts once | 2021 (mostly web) | party | −4.6 | −9.3 | +0.2 | 969 | | All five, each speaker counts once | 2021 (mostly web) | ideology | +6.2 | +1.3 | +11.0 | 824 | | All five, each side counts once | 1976 to 1994 | party | −4.3 | −5.7 | −2.9 | 14,468 | | All five, each side counts once | 1976 to 1994 | ideology | +8.7 | +7.0 | +10.3 | 9,907 | | All five, each side counts once | 2008 to 2018 | party | −2.4 | −4.3 | −0.5 | 6,780 | | All five, each side counts once | 2008 to 2018 | ideology | +5.8 | +3.8 | +7.9 | 5,102 | | All five, each side counts once | 2021 (mostly web) | party | −6.6 | −11.5 | −1.6 | 969 | | All five, each side counts once | 2021 (mostly web) | ideology | +4.3 | −0.8 | +9.4 | 824 | Views: By party (grouping = party, plotted = yes); By ideology (grouping = ideology, plotted = yes). Note: The family of speakers objectionable to conservatives is the Communist, the anti-religionist and the homosexual man, and the family objectionable to liberals is the racist and the militarist. A respondent's family value is the share of that family's speakers he or she would allow, for respondents who answered all of the family's items. The Muslim clergyman is left out because the item began in 2008. Note: The data table also lists two combined averages of all five speakers that are not plotted: one counts each speaker once and one counts each family once. Note: The GSS moved mostly online in 2021 (see the methods note at the end of the chapter). Estimates from 2021 on mix web and interviewer-administered respondents unless a figure says otherwise. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024 cumulative file; weighted (weight_use); 95% intervals on the effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/family_gaps.json ### Table 8. The racist party gap is negative on speech, teaching and the library, and party gaps on teaching are positive for three other speakers Gap between groups in the share giving the tolerant answer, in points, by speaker and action, 2008 to 2018, with 95% intervals; the axis names the groups | Speaker | Action | Grouping | Gap (points) | Low | High | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Racist | Allow to speak | party | −6.8 | −9.7 | −4.0 | 7,054 | | Racist | Allow to speak | ideology | +1.0 | −2.2 | +4.2 | 5,302 | | Militarist | Allow to speak | party | −3.8 | −6.4 | −1.1 | 7,069 | | Militarist | Allow to speak | ideology | +6.3 | +3.4 | +9.2 | 5,302 | | Communist | Allow to speak | party | +0.8 | −1.9 | +3.5 | 6,981 | | Communist | Allow to speak | ideology | +10.3 | +7.4 | +13.2 | 5,240 | | Anti-religionist | Allow to speak | party | −1.4 | −3.8 | +1.0 | 7,098 | | Anti-religionist | Allow to speak | ideology | +7.2 | +4.7 | +9.8 | 5,333 | | Homosexual man | Allow to speak | party | +2.1 | +0.1 | +4.0 | 7,063 | | Homosexual man | Allow to speak | ideology | +7.9 | +5.9 | +9.9 | 5,293 | | Muslim clergyman | Allow to speak | party | +0.5 | −2.4 | +3.4 | 7,062 | | Muslim clergyman | Allow to speak | ideology | +13.7 | +10.4 | +17.0 | 5,293 | | Racist | Allow to teach in a college | party | −4.4 | −7.3 | −1.4 | 6,975 | | Racist | Allow to teach in a college | ideology | +0.2 | −3.1 | +3.5 | 5,251 | | Militarist | Allow to teach in a college | party | −0.3 | −3.2 | +2.6 | 6,979 | | Militarist | Allow to teach in a college | ideology | +10.6 | +7.3 | +13.8 | 5,238 | | Communist | Allow to teach in a college | party | +8.4 | +5.5 | +11.2 | 6,810 | | Communist | Allow to teach in a college | ideology | +18.4 | +15.4 | +21.5 | 5,128 | | Anti-religionist | Allow to teach in a college | party | +4.2 | +1.4 | +7.0 | 6,983 | | Anti-religionist | Allow to teach in a college | ideology | +13.8 | +10.7 | +16.8 | 5,247 | | Homosexual man | Allow to teach in a college | party | +3.7 | +1.7 | +5.7 | 7,031 | | Homosexual man | Allow to teach in a college | ideology | +9.0 | +6.8 | +11.1 | 5,274 | | Muslim clergyman | Allow to teach in a college | party | +1.7 | −1.0 | +4.5 | 7,021 | | Muslim clergyman | Allow to teach in a college | ideology | +12.4 | +9.3 | +15.6 | 5,268 | | Racist | Keep the book in the public library | party | −4.9 | −7.7 | −2.1 | 7,017 | | Racist | Keep the book in the public library | ideology | +4.6 | +1.5 | +7.7 | 5,277 | | Militarist | Keep the book in the public library | party | −2.1 | −4.7 | +0.4 | 7,034 | | Militarist | Keep the book in the public library | ideology | +9.0 | +6.2 | +11.8 | 5,279 | | Communist | Keep the book in the public library | party | +0.1 | −2.4 | +2.7 | 6,977 | | Communist | Keep the book in the public library | ideology | +12.1 | +9.3 | +14.9 | 5,247 | | Anti-religionist | Keep the book in the public library | party | +0.8 | −1.7 | +3.2 | 7,042 | | Anti-religionist | Keep the book in the public library | ideology | +12.3 | +9.7 | +15.0 | 5,287 | | Homosexual man | Keep the book in the public library | party | +2.7 | +0.4 | +5.0 | 7,055 | | Homosexual man | Keep the book in the public library | ideology | +12.7 | +10.2 | +15.1 | 5,282 | | Muslim clergyman | Keep the book in the public library | party | −1.1 | −4.0 | +1.8 | 7,077 | | Muslim clergyman | Keep the book in the public library | ideology | +14.8 | +11.5 | +18.0 | 5,303 | Views: By party (grouping = party); By ideology (grouping = ideology). Note: Independents and moderates are left out of the group comparisons. The 2008 to 2018 waves pool six survey years. Note: The Communist teaching item asks about firing a teacher; the coding treats not firing as the tolerant answer. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024 cumulative file; weighted (weight_use); 95% intervals on the effective sample size Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/action_gaps.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (121), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | adjig_con_max | 13.4 | points | largest adjusted ideology gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items (adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | adjig_con_min | 6.7 | points | smallest adjusted ideology gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items (adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | adjpg_con_max | 5.8 | points | largest adjusted party gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items (adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | adjpg_con_min | 3.0 | points | smallest adjusted party gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items (adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | adjpg_early_abs_max | 1.7 | points | largest absolute adjusted party gap among the five speakers asked (adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | adjpg_mil_late | −0.3 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in the share who would allow the speaker to speak, Democrats minus Republicans, adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year (weighted linear probability model, HC3 errors) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −2.9 to 2.4 | 7,052 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | adjpg_rac_early | −1.3 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in the share who would allow the speaker to speak, Democrats minus Republicans, adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year (weighted linear probability model, HC3 errors) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI −3.1 to 0.6 | 15,228 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | adjpg_rac_late | −3.9 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in the share who would allow the speaker to speak, Democrats minus Republicans, adjusted for age, education, race, sex and survey year (weighted linear probability model, HC3 errors) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −6.9 to −0.8 | 7,037 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | annual_min_n | 150 | respondents | minimum respondents for an annual cell | annual party and ideology cells | 1972-2024 | | | none (constant) | General Social Survey | | | chg_other_max | 15.2 | points | largest rise among the militarist, Communist, anti-religionist and homosexual man items | adults answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | chg_other_min | 6.3 | points | smallest rise among the militarist, Communist, anti-religionist and homosexual man items | adults answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | chg_rac | −3.2 | points (2008-2018 minus 1976-1994) | difference between the two periods in the weighted share who would allow the speech (independent samples) | adults answering the item (Racist) | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | 95% CI −4.7 to −1.7 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | design_n | 64 | contrasts | count of contrasts checked against design-based standard errors | period gaps and mode contrasts in this chapter | 1976-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | design_ratio_max | 1.27 | ratio of standard errors | largest ratio of the design-based to the published standard error | period gaps and mode contrasts in this chapter | 1976-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | design_ratio_min | 0.87 | ratio of standard errors | smallest ratio of the design-based to the published standard error | period gaps and mode contrasts in this chapter | 1976-2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_con2_ig_late | +9.0 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the Communist and anti-religionist items a respondent would allow (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 6.6 to 11.3 | 5,219 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_con_ig_chg | −1.4 | points (2008-2018 gap minus 1976-1994 gap) | change in the ideology gap in the mean share of the family's speakers allowed (independent samples) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | 95% CI −4.0 to 1.2 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_con_ig_early | +9.7 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI 8.0 to 11.4 | 10,130 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_con_ig_late | +8.3 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 6.3 to 10.2 | 5,169 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_con_pg_early | −4.2 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI −5.7 to −2.8 | 14,809 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_con_pg_late | +0.4 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −1.4 to 2.3 | 6,885 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_eq_ig_late | +5.8 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 3.8 to 7.9 | 5,102 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_eq_pg_2021 | −6.6 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2021 wave | 95% CI −11.5 to −1.6 | 969 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_eq_pg_late | −2.4 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −4.3 to −0.5 | 6,780 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_five_ig_late | +6.3 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 4.3 to 8.3 | 5,102 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_five_pg_2021 | −4.6 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2021 wave | 95% CI −9.3 to 0.2 | 969 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_five_pg_late | −1.8 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −3.7 to 0.0 | 6,780 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_ig_chg_diff | −2.7 | points (change for the family objectionable to liberals minus change for the other family) | difference between the two families' changes in the ideology gap (independent samples) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | 95% CI −6.9 to 1.4 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_lib_ig_2021 | −5.0 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2021 wave | 95% CI −11.9 to 1.8 | 833 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_lib_ig_chg | −4.2 | points (2008-2018 gap minus 1976-1994 gap) | change in the ideology gap in the mean share of the family's speakers allowed (independent samples) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | 95% CI −7.3 to −1.0 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_lib_ig_early | +7.7 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI 5.8 to 9.6 | 10,246 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_lib_ig_late | +3.5 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 1.0 to 6.1 | 5,250 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_lib_pg_2021 | −16.3 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2021 wave | 95% CI −22.5 to −10.0 | 982 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_lib_pg_early | −4.5 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI −6.1 to −2.9 | 15,078 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | fam_lib_pg_late | −5.2 | points (first group minus second group) | difference between groups in the mean share of the family's speakers a respondent would allow (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −7.6 to −2.9 | 6,991 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_book_con_max | 14.8 | points | largest gap in keeping the book among the four speakers objectionable to conservatives | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_book_con_min | 12.1 | points | smallest gap in keeping the book among the four speakers objectionable to conservatives | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_com_early | +11.0 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI 8.8 to 13.1 | 10,405 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_com_late | +10.3 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 7.4 to 13.2 | 5,240 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_con_max | 13.7 | points | largest ideology gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_con_min | 7.2 | points | smallest ideology gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_homo_early | +10.5 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI 8.6 to 12.5 | 10,322 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_homo_late | +7.9 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 5.9 to 9.9 | 5,293 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_mil_late | +6.3 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 3.4 to 9.2 | 5,302 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_mslm_late | +13.7 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 10.4 to 17.0 | 5,293 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_rac_book_late | +4.6 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would keep the speaker's book in the public library (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 1.5 to 7.7 | 5,277 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_rac_early | +6.2 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI 4.1 to 8.4 | 10,399 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_rac_late | +1.0 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −2.2 to 4.2 | 5,302 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_rac_modechg | −12.2 | points (web gap minus interviewer-administered gap) | difference between modes in the racist ideology gap (independent samples) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI −28.4 to 3.9 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_rac_teach_late | +0.2 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to teach in a college (Communist: not fire the teacher) (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −3.1 to 3.5 | 5,251 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_rel_early | +8.5 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI 6.5 to 10.5 | 10,504 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_rel_late | +7.2 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (liberals minus conservatives) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 4.7 to 9.8 | 5,333 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_teach_con_max | 18.4 | points | largest gap in allowing the speaker to teach among the four speakers objectionable to conservatives | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | ig_teach_con_min | 9.0 | points | smallest gap in allowing the speaker to teach among the four speakers objectionable to conservatives | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | igchg_mil | −2.9 | points (2008-2018 gap minus 1976-1994 gap) | change between the two periods in the ideology gap (independent samples) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | 95% CI −6.6 to 0.7 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | igchg_rac | −5.2 | points (2008-2018 gap minus 1976-1994 gap) | change between the two periods in the ideology gap (independent samples) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | 95% CI −9.1 to −1.3 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | igdiff_mslm_com_late | +3.4 | points (Muslim clergyman ideology gap minus Communist ideology gap) | difference between the Muslim clergyman and Communist ideology gaps in the share who would allow the speech (same period, standard errors in quadrature) | liberals and conservatives (self-placed) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −1.0 to 7.7 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | lev_mslm_late | 42.5% | percent who would allow the speaker to speak | weighted share who would allow the speech | adults answering the item (Muslim clergyman) | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 41.3% to 43.8% | 8,970 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | lev_rac_book_late | 63.7% | percent giving the tolerant answer | weighted share who would keep the speaker's book in the public library | adults answering the item (racist) | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 62.4% to 64.9% | 8,908 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | lev_rac_late | 58.5% | percent who would allow the speaker to speak | weighted share who would allow the speech | adults answering the item (Racist) | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 57.3% to 59.8% | 8,955 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | lev_rac_teach_late | 46.3% | percent giving the tolerant answer | weighted share who would allow the speaker to teach in a college (Communist: not fire the teacher) | adults answering the item (racist) | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 45.0% to 47.5% | 8,869 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | max_abs_pg_other | 2.1 | points | largest absolute party gap among the Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mslm_mode_diff_dem | +3.4 | points (web minus interviewer-administered) | difference in the weighted share who would allow the Muslim clergyman, web against interviewer-administered respondents | Democrats (leaners included) interviewed in 2022 and 2024 | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI −6.6 to 13.5 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | mslm_mode_diff_rep | −12.1 | points (web minus interviewer-administered) | difference in the weighted share who would allow the Muslim clergyman, web against interviewer-administered respondents | Republicans (leaners included) interviewed in 2022 and 2024 | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI −23.3 to −0.9 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | n_answers | 217,422 | answers | count of non-missing answers to the six speak items | all answers to the six speak items | 1972-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_pg_ci_neg | 7 | survey years | count of survey years in which the whole 95% interval is below zero | survey years with an annual racist party gap | 1976-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_pg_neg | 27 | survey years | count of survey years in which the estimate is below zero | survey years with an annual racist party gap | 1976-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_pg_years | 28 | survey years | count of survey years with a published annual party gap | survey years with an annual racist party gap | 1976-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_respondents | 44,878 | respondents | count of respondents | respondents who answered at least one speak item | 1972-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_years | 31 | survey years | count of survey years | years in which at least one speak item was asked | 1972-2024 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | neff_floor | 100 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | minimum effective sample for a cell to appear | party, ideology and mode cells | 1972-2024 | | | none (constant) | General Social Survey | | | pg_2008_max | +7.6 | points (first group minus second group) | largest party gap among the racist, Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008 wave | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_2008_min | +1.6 | points (first group minus second group) | smallest party gap among the racist, Communist, anti-religionist, homosexual man and Muslim clergyman items | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008 wave | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_com_late | +0.8 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −1.9 to 3.5 | 6,981 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_com_teach_late | +8.4 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to teach in a college (Communist: not fire the teacher) (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 5.5 to 11.2 | 6,810 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_early_abs_max | 6.3 | points | largest absolute party gap among the five speakers asked | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_early_abs_min | 2.4 | points | smallest absolute party gap among the five speakers asked | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_homo_early | −2.4 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI −4.1 to −0.7 | 15,167 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_homo_late | +2.1 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 0.1 to 4.0 | 7,063 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_homo_late_design | +2.1 | points (first group minus second group) | party gap for the homosexual man item with a design-based interval (Taylor linearization, strata and primary sampling units by survey year) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 0.0 to 4.1 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_homo_late_lo | 0.1 | points | lower end of the 95% interval on the homosexual man party gap, Democrats minus Republicans | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_homo_teach_late | +3.7 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to teach in a college (Communist: not fire the teacher) (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 1.7 to 5.7 | 7,031 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_mil_2008 | −3.6 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008 wave | 95% CI −10.4 to 3.1 | 1,071 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_mil_early | −4.6 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI −6.4 to −2.7 | 15,329 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_mil_late | −3.8 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −6.4 to −1.1 | 7,069 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_mslm_late | +0.5 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −2.4 to 3.4 | 7,062 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_mslm_modechg | +15.5 | points (web gap minus interviewer-administered gap) | difference between modes in the party gap (independent samples) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI 0.4 to 30.6 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_mslm_modechg_design | +15.5 | points (web gap minus interviewer-administered gap) | difference between modes in the Muslim clergyman party gap with a design-based interval (Taylor linearization, strata and primary sampling units by survey year) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2022 and 2024 waves pooled | 95% CI −3.0 to 34.0 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_mslm_modechg_lo | 0.4 | points | lower end of the 95% interval on the difference between modes in the Muslim clergyman party gap (web gap minus interviewer-administered gap) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2022 and 2024 | | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rac_2021 | −22.9 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2021 wave | 95% CI −30.3 to −15.4 | 990 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rac_all | −14.2 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speech, Democrats minus Republicans | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI −21.9 to −6.5 | 1,614 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rac_book_late | −4.9 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would keep the speaker's book in the public library (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −7.7 to −2.1 | 7,017 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rac_early | −4.5 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI −6.3 to −2.6 | 15,315 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rac_int | −11.8 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speech, Democrats minus Republicans | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2022 and 2024, interviewer-administered respondents | 95% CI −23.0 to −0.5 | 803 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rac_late | −6.8 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −9.7 to −4.0 | 7,054 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rac_modechg | −3.7 | points (web gap minus interviewer-administered gap) | difference between modes in the racist party gap (independent samples) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI −18.7 to 11.2 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rac_teach_late | −4.4 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to teach in a college (Communist: not fire the teacher) (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −7.3 to −1.4 | 6,975 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rac_web | −15.5 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speech, Democrats minus Republicans | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2022 and 2024, web respondents | 95% CI −25.4 to −5.6 | 811 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rel_early | −6.3 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 waves pooled | 95% CI −8.0 to −4.5 | 15,497 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rel_late | −1.4 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to speak in the community (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −3.8 to 1.0 | 7,098 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pg_rel_teach_late | +4.2 | points (first group minus second group) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the speaker to teach in a college (Communist: not fire the teacher) (Democrats minus Republicans) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 1.4 to 7.0 | 6,983 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pgchg_com | +5.1 | points (2008-2018 gap minus 1976-1994 gap) | change between the two periods in the party gap (independent samples) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | 95% CI 1.8 to 8.4 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pgchg_homo | +4.5 | points (2008-2018 gap minus 1976-1994 gap) | change between the two periods in the party gap (independent samples) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | 95% CI 1.9 to 7.0 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pgchg_mil | +0.8 | points (2008-2018 gap minus 1976-1994 gap) | change between the two periods in the party gap (independent samples) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | 95% CI −2.4 to 4.0 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pgchg_rac | −2.4 | points (2008-2018 gap minus 1976-1994 gap) | change between the two periods in the party gap (independent samples) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | 95% CI −5.8 to 1.0 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pgchg_rac_2010 | −3.9 | points (2010-2018 gap minus 1976-1994 gap) | change between the two periods in the party gap, 2008 wave left out (independent samples) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2010-2018 | 95% CI −7.5 to −0.3 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pgchg_rac_2224 | −7.3 | points (2022-2024 party gap minus 2008-2018 party gap) | difference between the pooled 2022-2024 and the 2008-2018 racist party gaps, all interview modes (independent samples) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2022 and 2024 against 2008-2018 | 95% CI −15.5 to 0.9 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pgchg_rel | +4.9 | points (2008-2018 gap minus 1976-1994 gap) | change between the two periods in the party gap (independent samples) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 1976-1994 to 2008-2018 | 95% CI 1.9 to 7.8 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pgdiff_rac_2021_late | −16.0 | points (2021 party gap minus 2008-2018 party gap) | difference between the 2021 and 2008-2018 racist party gaps (independent samples) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2021 wave against 2008-2018 | 95% CI −24.0 to −8.0 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | pgdiff_rac_mil_late | −3.1 | points (racist party gap minus militarist party gap) | difference between the racist and militarist party gaps in the share who would allow the speech (same period, standard errors in quadrature) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI −6.9 to 0.8 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rac_dem_late | 56.1% | percent who would allow the speaker to speak | weighted share who would allow the racist speaker to speak | Democrats answering the racist item (leaners included) | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | 4,175 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rac_int | 54.7% | percent who would allow the speaker to speak | weighted share who would allow the speech | adults interviewed by an interviewer (Racist) | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI 50.0% to 59.4% | 1,118 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rac_mode_diff | −14.0 | points (web minus interviewer-administered) | difference in the weighted share who would allow the speech, web against interviewer-administered respondents (independent samples) | adults interviewed in 2022 and 2024 | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI −20.3 to −7.7 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rac_mode_diff_abs | 14.0 | points (interviewer-administered minus web) | difference in the weighted share who would allow the racist speaker, interviewer-administered minus web respondents (independent samples) | adults interviewed in 2022 and 2024 | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI 7.7 to 20.3 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rac_mode_diff_dem | −16.4 | points (web minus interviewer-administered) | difference in the weighted share who would allow the racist speaker, web against interviewer-administered respondents | Democrats (leaners included) interviewed in 2022 and 2024 | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI −26.2 to −6.5 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rac_mode_diff_rep | −12.6 | points (web minus interviewer-administered) | difference in the weighted share who would allow the racist speaker, web against interviewer-administered respondents | Republicans (leaners included) interviewed in 2022 and 2024 | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI −23.9 to −1.3 | | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rac_rep_late | 63.0% | percent who would allow the speaker to speak | weighted share who would allow the racist speaker to speak | Republicans answering the racist item (leaners included) | 2008-2018 waves pooled | | 2,879 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rac_rep_lead_late | 6.8 | points (Republicans minus Democrats) | difference in weighted shares who would allow the racist speaker to speak, Republicans minus Democrats (the party gap with its sign reversed) | Democrats and Republicans (leaners included) answering the item | 2008-2018 waves pooled | 95% CI 4.0 to 9.7 | 7,054 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | rac_web | 40.7% | percent who would allow the speaker to speak | weighted share who would allow the speech | adults interviewed on the web (Racist) | 2022 and 2024 | 95% CI 36.5% to 44.9% | 1,153 | weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before) | General Social Survey | | | web_share_2021 | 86% | percent of respondents | share interviewed on the web (unweighted count) | respondents who answered the racist speak item | 2021 | | 1,310 | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | web_share_2224 | 51% | percent of respondents | share interviewed on the web (unweighted count) | respondents who answered the racist speak item | 2022 and 2024 | | 2,271 | none (count) | General Social Survey | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors. - HC3 robust standard errors: A way of computing standard errors that stays valid when the spread of the outcome differs across respondents, with a correction for small samples. The book uses it for regressions that have no clusters. ## Methods Sample: respondents to the General Social Survey (cumulative file, 1972-2024) who answered at least one of six speak items (44,878 respondents, 217,422 answers; the racist and militarist items start in 1976, the homosexual man item in 1973, the Communist and anti-religionist items in 1972 and the Muslim clergyman item in 2008; the militarist and homosexual man items were last asked in 2021). Outcomes: 1 if the respondent would allow the speaker to speak in the community, would allow him to teach in a college (for the Communist, would not fire him from a college post), or would not remove his book from the public library; direction is taken from the item wording and checked by the agreement of the three items within each speaker. Groups: Democrats (party identification 0 to 2) and Republicans (4 to 6), leaners included; liberals (self-placement 1 to 3) and conservatives (5 to 7); independents, other-party identifiers and moderates are left out of group comparisons. Weights: weight_use (wtssnrps from 2004, wtssps before). Estimator: weighted share; a gap is the first group minus the second, with the two standard errors combined in quadrature. Adjusted gaps: a weighted linear probability model per speaker and period, on the two compared groups with complete covariates, of the 0 or 100 outcome on a group indicator, age, age squared, degree (five categories), race (three), sex and survey-year effects, with HC3 robust errors; the group coefficient is the adjusted gap. Family values average a respondent's answers over the family's speakers (five speakers asked in every period) for respondents who answered all of them. Intervals: 95% normal intervals on the Kish effective sample size, which are model based and ignore stratification and clustering. Periods: 1976-1994, 1996-2006 and 2008-2018, each pooled across waves; the 2021 wave alone for the family comparison; 2022 and 2024 pooled for the mode comparison. Sensitivity: the 2010-2018 waves (2008 left out) and the 2008 wave alone for the party and ideology gaps, the 2021 wave alone for the racist gap, and the family comparison without the homosexual man. Design check: Taylor-linearized standard errors with strata (survey year by vstrat) and primary sampling units (survey year by vstrat by vpsu), for the period gaps and the mode contrasts only; a stratum with one unit contributes its squared score. Suppression: annual party and ideology cells need 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100; period, mode and family cells need 100 and 100; adjusted models need 100 respondents. Mode: interviewer-administered means in person, by phone or the unlabelled residual mode (code 3); web is self-completion; before 2004 the file records no mode and interviews were in person. The GSS moved mostly online in 2021 (86% of the 2021 respondents on the racist item), and 2022 and 2024 mix interviewer-administered and web respondents. ## What these data cannot show - The gaps are differences between groups in one survey question, so they do not show why the groups differ, whether party or ideology shapes tolerance, or whether tolerance shapes party or ideology. - The adjusted gaps hold age, education, race and sex fixed and no other trait, and they assume a linear model, so they compare similar people and do not test what party or ideology does. - Periods pool many waves, so a period value averages over years, and the annual figures have wide intervals. - The intervals use the effective sample size and ignore the sampling design. - Across the 64 period gaps and mode contrasts checked, standard errors that use the survey strata and primary sampling units were between 0.87 and 1.27 times the published ones, so the published intervals are sometimes narrower and sometimes wider. - The annual cells, the adjusted gaps and the family gaps were not checked this way. - Two verdicts sit near the edge. - The homosexual man party gap in 2008 to 2018 is +2.1 (95% CI 0.1 to 4.0) with the published interval and +2.1 (95% CI 0.0 to 4.1) with a design-based one, and the Muslim clergyman mode difference in the party gap is +15.5 (95% CI 0.4 to 30.6) with the published interval and +15.5 (95% CI −3.0 to 34.0) with a design-based one, which includes zero. - The mode of interview is tied to time after 2020. - The 2021 wave has too few interviewer-administered respondents to split, and the 2022 and 2024 samples are small once cut by party or ideology, so the size of the racist gap after 2020 is uncertain. - Two speaker items were not asked after 2021, so the militarist and the homosexual man cannot be followed into the web era. - The battery has limits as a measure of tolerance. - It asks about a fixed list of speakers, and the racist and Muslim clergyman items describe the speech itself, so the levels of the items are not comparable with one another. - Grouping the speakers by which side is expected to object is a coding choice. - Willingness to let a speaker speak in principle is not the same as behavior toward a speaker, and the militarist item asks about speech, not about support for army rule, which Chapter 6.7, Support for democracy (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy) takes up. - Willingness to justify political violence is a separate question, taken up in Chapter 6.8, Political violence and democratic norms (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms). - The data hold no measure of dogmatism or need for closure, so they cannot say whether one side is more rigid in the sense of the psychological literature. ## References 1. Crawford, Jarret T.; Pilanski, Jane M. (2014). Political Intolerance, Right and Left. Political Psychology 35(6): 841-851. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2012.00926.x 2. Stouffer, Samuel A. (1955). Communism, Conformity, and Civil Liberties: A Cross-Section of the Nation Speaks Its Mind. Doubleday. 3. Sullivan, John L.; Piereson, James; Marcus, George E. (1982). Political Tolerance and American Democracy. University of Chicago Press. 4. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 5. Tourangeau, Roger; Yan, Ting (2007). Sensitive Questions in Surveys. Psychological Bulletin 133(5): 859-883. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.133.5.859 6. Jost, John T.; Glaser, Jack; Kruglanski, Arie W.; Sulloway, Frank J. (2003). Political Conservatism as Motivated Social Cognition. Psychological Bulletin 129(3): 339-375. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339 7. Brandt, Mark J.; Reyna, Christine; Chambers, John R.; Crawford, Jarret T.; Wetherell, Geoffrey (2014). The Ideological-Conflict Hypothesis: Intolerance Among Both Liberals and Conservatives. Current Directions in Psychological Science 23(1): 27-34. https://doi.org/10.1177/0963721413510932 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/tolerance-of-speech/build.py (sha256 67504a9be858471faa06530db0a6718b13e536ae67372da310cb0c82654696eb) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 858da2ce7d8ae950f57c12e6b46c63a4db276415649d0ddc41e624aa1782bc4e | | figures/action_gaps.json | 119c9f79083a4a2cd2af2f64a62c97f0d90cc170fa1e822a13e52966ca4e36e9 | | figures/allow_by_year.json | c3c661faa63796f7625dafbf31d0c361964835049d374d8899b811a17e2bd428 | | figures/allow_levels.json | e909a91733c66db3c0c1885e69e2e70fd96f4111683b8ffc88709125a53c5e6e | | figures/family_gaps.json | 5b423b90ba5c086a9346b400be175b2911de47c756a58e72c2a2c1905a8fa8e6 | | figures/gap_by_speaker.json | ee76d831afbad815e22d18e2584ec2219c59c05e7485ad4fc5efe361f728ea17 | | figures/mode_comparison.json | fa055ac130e1fd3eaeef2bad9a0e4e390c2ace60633e6cafbed7c5c94371453a | | figures/racist_gap_by_year.json | 074d4bd2717cea5539dae2500da718a5d057e0f6426f13df2edbc5431f387f71 | | figures/speaker_items.json | c9a5c507e84fea4ec9244d9e7ffb8650edad1d0b1bd81cbab25e2721a5519259 | | meta.json | 5c09a54f3eef451dc46ed3eee88b68b38d0e546601cc8e4e7e742249feb4acfd | | refs.json | c7cbf0b29113b62e9f1a744b46fd382ff1b061ef258c328c0f38d7cb49132365 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/facts.json - Table 1, figure "speaker_items" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/speaker_items.json - Table 2, figure "allow_levels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/allow_levels.json - Table 3, figure "allow_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/allow_by_year.json - Table 4, figure "gap_by_speaker" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/gap_by_speaker.json - Table 5, figure "racist_gap_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/racist_gap_by_year.json - Table 6, figure "mode_comparison" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/mode_comparison.json - Table 7, figure "family_gaps" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/family_gaps.json - Table 8, figure "action_gaps" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/tolerance-of-speech/figures/action_gaps.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Support for democracy: report Chapter 6.7 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Support for democracy - Chapter: 6.7 (Part VI, Trust, science and democracy; The great sorting) - Question: Is stated support for democracy falling, and is appetite for strong-leader or army rule rising? - Dek: In a fixed set of countries, support for a democratic system changed by +1.2 points between 1995 to 1998 and 2017 to 2023, while approval of a strong leader rose by 9.9 points and army rule by 7.6 points. - Grain: countries - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - World Values Survey and EVS. World Values Survey and European Values Study, Waves 3 to 7 (1995 to 2023): political-system battery, importance of democracy, perceived democraticness, left-right placement, age; years: 1981-2023 (7 unified waves); weights: weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries - European Social Survey. European Social Survey, Round 6 (2012 to 2013) and Round 10 (2020 to 2022): democracy evaluations and satisfaction with democracy; years: 2002-2023 (rounds 1 to 11; round 11 was fielded in 2023 and 2024); weights: weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026supportfordemocracy ```bibtex @misc{singh2026supportfordemocracy, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Support for democracy}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | +1.2 | 95% CI −1.0 to 3.4 | 114,207 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | dem_chg | | equal-weight mean across countries of the rise in the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 9.9 | 95% CI 4.9 to 14.9 | 112,906 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | lead_rise | | equal-weight mean across countries of the rise in the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 7.6 | 95% CI 3.7 to 11.5 | 113,803 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | army_rise | | count of countries | countries with every political-system item above the floor in Waves 3, 5 and 7 | Waves 3, 5 and 7 | 39 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | k_panel | | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 88.5% | 95% CI 86.1% to 90.8% | 49,767 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | dem3 | | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 89.7% | 95% CI 87.7% to 91.7% | 64,440 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | dem7 | | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 38.2% | 95% CI 32.9% to 43.4% | 49,235 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | lead3 | | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 48.1% | 95% CI 41.1% to 55.0% | 63,671 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | lead7 | | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | +9.9 | 95% CI 4.9 to 14.9 | 112,906 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | lead_chg | | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 13.0% | 95% CI 9.7% to 16.4% | 50,168 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | army3 | | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 20.7% | 95% CI 15.8% to 25.5% | 63,635 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | army7 | | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | +7.6 | 95% CI 3.7 to 11.5 | 113,803 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | army_chg | | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 14 countries whose survey program stayed the same between Wave 3 and Wave 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | −2.8 | 95% CI −5.6 to 0.1 | 39,829 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | prog_same_dem | | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 25 countries whose survey program switched between Wave 3 and Wave 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | +3.5 | 95% CI 0.7 to 6.2 | 74,378 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | prog_sw_dem | | weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 1995 | 90.6% | 95% CI 88.9% to 92.3% | 1,433 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | us_dem95 | | weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 2017 | 85.0% | 95% CI 83.2% to 86.8% | 2,509 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | us_dem17 | | weighted share in 2017 minus 1995; independent samples, standard errors combined | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 1995 to 2017 | −5.6 | 95% CI −8.1 to −3.1 | 3,942 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | us_dem_chg | | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 38 other countries of the fixed set, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | +1.4 | 95% CI −0.8 to 3.6 | 114,207 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | oth_dem_chg | | count of countries | the countries of the fixed set other than the United States | Waves 3, 5 and 7 | 38 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | k_others | | lowest age of the young group | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | 18 | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | age_young_min | | highest age of the young group | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | 34 | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | age_young_max | | weighted share in 2017 minus 1995 calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country; independent samples, standard errors combined | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 1995 to 2017 | −9.9 | 95% CI −14.9 to −4.8 | 1,319 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | us_young_dem_chg | | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 1995 | 7.1% | 95% CI 4.2% to 10.1% | 390 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | us_young_army95 | | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 2017 | 29.9% | 95% CI 26.3% to 33.6% | 951 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | us_young_army17 | | lowest age in the sample | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | 18 | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | age_adult_min | | minimum Kish effective sample size of a country cell (b3.stats.FLOORS wvs_ess_mean) | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | 100 | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | floor_neff | | median across the fixed-set estimates of the country-clustered standard error over the standard error that counts only within-country sampling | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Waves 3, 5 and 7 | 11.0 | | | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | ratio_med | ## Findings In a fixed set of 39 countries, the share of adults who called a democratic political system a good way of governing their country was 88.5% in 1995 to 1998 and 89.7% in 2017 to 2023, a change of +1.2 (95% CI −1.0 to 3.4) points. The share who called a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing rose from 38.2% to 48.1% (+9.9 (95% CI 4.9 to 14.9) points), and the share who called army rule a good way rose from 13.0% to 20.7% (+7.6 (95% CI 3.7 to 11.5) points). The pooled change in support averages two groups of countries whose changes have opposite signs, −2.8 (95% CI −5.6 to 0.1) points where the survey program stayed the same and +3.5 (95% CI 0.7 to 6.2) where it switched. The United States moved differently on support. The share of Americans who called a democratic system good fell from 90.6% in 1995 to 85.0% in 2017, a change of −5.6 (95% CI −8.1 to −3.1) points, against +1.4 (95% CI −0.8 to 3.6) in the other 38 countries of the set. Among Americans aged 18 to 34 the fall was −9.9 (95% CI −14.9 to −4.8) points, and the share of that age group who called army rule good rose from 7.1% to 29.9%. The American surveys changed mode over these years, from face-to-face interviews in 1995 to a web survey in 2006 and web and telephone interviews in 2017, and part of the change could come from the mode. The data are the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS), pooled by the cleaned file into seven waves; the political-system questions were asked from Wave 3 on. Respondents rate four ways of governing their country as very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad: a democratic political system, a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, army rule, and experts rather than government making decisions. "Good" here means fairly or very good, and the sample is respondents aged 18 or older. Each way of governing is rated on its own, so a respondent can call a democratic system good and also call a strong leader or army rule good. Countries are surveyed at different points inside a wave. In the fixed set, Wave 3 was fielded in 1995 to 1998, Wave 5 in 2004 to 2009 and Wave 7 in 2017 to 2023. A country is in the set when it has at least 100 effective respondents on every item in all three waves, so each wave compares the same countries. One country that meets the rule is removed for the reason given below (Table 9). (Note: Each country's share uses the WVS weight and carries an interval from the Kish effective sample size [1]. A figure for the fixed set gives every country equal weight, and its interval is clustered by country: it comes from how much the country values differ and treats the countries as a sample of countries like them. That interval is about 11.0 times as wide as one that counts only sampling error inside countries. The WVS file has no strata or sampling units, so no interval includes design effects.) ### Pooled support for a democratic system did not change The pooled share hides movements in opposite directions, by country and by survey program. Table 1 plots the fixed set. The share calling a democratic system good was 88.5% in Wave 3, 88.4% in Wave 5 and 89.7% in Wave 7. No difference between waves has an interval that excludes zero: the change is 0.0 (95% CI −2.3 to 2.2) points from Wave 3 to Wave 5, +1.3 (95% CI −0.6 to 3.2) from Wave 5 to Wave 7 and +1.2 (95% CI −1.0 to 3.4) over the whole period. The interval for the whole period rules out an average fall of more than 1.0 points. The share starts near the top of the scale, so it has less room to rise than to fall. Table 1. Stated support for a democratic system held at 89.7% in the fixed set of countries while approval of a strong leader rose to 48.1% Using each country's own interval, the share calling a democratic system good rose in 18 of the 39 countries, fell in 10 and changed by less than sampling error in 11 (Table 2, democratic system view). South Korea, Colombia and India have the largest falls, followed by Montenegro and the United States. Three features of the data bear on the pooled comparison. The first is the survey program. The Wave 3 survey is a WVS survey in every country of the set, and the Wave 7 survey is a WVS survey in 14 countries and an EVS survey in 25. Where the program stayed the same, support for a democratic system changed by −2.8 (95% CI −5.6 to 0.1) points and approval of a strong leader by +16.0 (95% CI 7.9 to 24.0). Where it switched, the changes are +3.5 (95% CI 0.7 to 6.2) and +6.5 (95% CI 0.2 to 12.8). The first group minus the second differs by −6.2 (95% CI −10.1 to −2.4) points on support. Every country that switched is in Europe and Central Asia and none of the others is, so program cannot be separated from region (program views of Table 1). The second is weighting. In 32 of the 39 countries the Wave 3 survey gives every respondent the same weight, against 6 in Wave 5 and 4 in Wave 7, so Wave 3 shares are in effect unweighted and later shares are weighted. Without weights the change is +1.6 (95% CI −0.6 to 3.7) points for a democratic system, +8.8 (95% CI 3.9 to 13.8) for a strong leader and +7.0 (95% CI 3.2 to 10.8) for army rule, with the same signs as the weighted changes. The third is Albania, which meets the rule for the set and is left out. Its Wave 3 survey, from 1998, shows an implausible response pattern. In it 39.5% of respondents call all four ways of governing good, against a median of 2.9% in the other countries of the set, and no other country is above 24.7%. A further 42.5% rate both army rule and a democratic system very good, against 1.2% in Wave 5. It is the only country in which any of the four shares changes by more than 40 points between adjacent waves: army rule is 82.0% in 1998 and 11.6% in 2002. The file does not say whether the cause is fieldwork, coding or response style. With Albania in, the change in approval of army rule is +5.8 (95% CI 0.5 to 11.1) points, against +7.6 (95% CI 3.7 to 11.5) without it, and the democracy-only share changes by −8.9 (95% CI −15.0 to −2.7) points (−10.4 (95% CI −15.8 to −5.0) without). The signs do not change. A second question, asked from Wave 5 on, rates how important it is to live in a democracy on a ten-point scale. In the 46 countries that have it in both Wave 5 and Wave 7, the share giving the top rating was 50.6% and then 53.2%, a change of +2.6 (95% CI −1.0 to 6.3) points. The 17 countries observed in every wave from Wave 3 to Wave 7 give changes of +1.1 (95% CI −3.1 to 5.3) points for a democratic system, +11.4 (95% CI 2.8 to 20.0) for a strong leader and +5.4 (95% CI 1.1 to 9.6) for army rule, with the same signs as the main set. ### Approval of a strong leader and army rule rose after Wave 5 The share calling a strong leader good was 38.2%, 41.5% and 48.1% in the three waves. The change from Wave 3 to Wave 5 is +3.3 (95% CI −0.6 to 7.2) points, an interval that includes zero, and from Wave 5 to Wave 7 it is +6.6 (95% CI 3.3 to 9.9) points. Army rule follows the same timing, at 13.0%, 15.2% and 20.7%, with changes of +2.1 (95% CI −0.2 to 4.4) and +5.5 (95% CI 3.0 to 8.0) points. Approval of experts making decisions moved less than approval of a strong leader, by 7.0 (95% CI 1.3 to 12.7) points, from 61.0% to 63.9%, a change of +2.9 (95% CI −1.3 to 7.0) points whose interval includes zero. Some Wave 7 surveys outside the United States used web or self-completion modes, so the rise from Wave 5 to Wave 7 carries a mode caveat too. Inside countries the rise is common but not general. A strong leader gained approval in 25 countries, lost it in 8 and changed by less than sampling error in 6. Army rule gained in 22, lost in 3 and did not change by more than sampling error in 14. The largest gains in approval of a strong leader are in Montenegro, Argentina, South Korea, Peru and Romania, and the losses are in Estonia, Finland and Switzerland. Table 2. The share calling a democratic system good rose in 18 countries, fell in 10 and held within sampling error in 11 ### Fewer respondents rule out both alternatives Among respondents who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items, Table 3 sorts people into three groups: those who call a democratic system good and call neither a strong leader nor army rule good (democracy only), those who call a democratic system good and also call at least one of the two good (democracy and an alternative), and those who do not call a democratic system good. Table 3. The share calling a democratic system good and rejecting both alternatives fell from 55.3% to 44.9% in the fixed set In the fixed set the democracy-only share fell from 55.3% to 44.9%, a change of −10.4 (95% CI −15.8 to −5.0) points, and the democracy-and-an-alternative share rose from 33.2% to 44.5% (+11.3 (95% CI 6.7 to 15.8) points). The share that does not call a democratic system good was 11.5% and 10.6%, a change of −0.9 (95% CI −3.1 to 1.4) points with an interval that includes zero. The first two moved by similar amounts in opposite directions. The democracy-only share fell in 24 countries and rose in 7. In the United States it fell from 68.2% to 51.5% (−16.7 (95% CI −20.4 to −12.9) points), a larger fall than in all but 11 of the other countries. ### The United States differs on support and on army rule Americans in 1995 were less approving of both alternatives than the average country in the set, at 24.9% for a strong leader and 6.6% for army rule. By 2017 they matched the set on army rule, at 20.9% against 20.7%, and stayed below it on a strong leader, at 38.1% against 48.1%. The share calling a democratic system good was 90.6% in 1995, 82.3% in 2011 and 85.0% in 2017, below the set's 89.7% in the last year. Set against the change in the other 38 countries, the United States differs on the democratic system, army rule and experts but not on a strong leader (Table 1, United States view). Its change in the democratic-system share is −7.0 (95% CI −10.3 to −3.7) points relative to theirs, and only 4 countries in the set have a larger fall. For army rule the difference is +6.9 (95% CI 2.3 to 11.5) points, against +8.7 (95% CI 3.0 to 14.5) with Albania in, and for experts +13.5 (95% CI 7.9 to 19.0). For a strong leader it is +3.4 (95% CI −2.7 to 9.4) points. That interval includes zero but also permits a difference as large as the army-rule one, so the data neither show nor rule out that Americans moved more than others on that item. Each interval combines the sampling error of the American change with the clustered error of the others' average. In 2017 the United States is below the median country on support for a democratic system and on approval of a strong leader, and at the median on army rule and on the importance question (Table 4). Across the 92 countries surveyed in Wave 7 (90 for army rule), the median share calling a democratic system good is 90.5%, against 85.0% in the United States. For a strong leader the median is 51.7%, which is 13.6 points above the 38.1% for Americans. For army rule it is 20.3%, and for the top rating on importance 50.2%, against 49.9%. On how democratically their country is governed, rated on a ten-point scale, Americans averaged 6.05 and the median country 6.08. Table 4. In Wave 7 the United States is below the median country on a democratic system and a strong leader and at the median on army rule ### Young adults closed the gap with older adults on a strong leader Whether younger cohorts are less supportive of democracy is debated. Foa and Mounk read a lower share of top importance ratings among people born since 1980 as a cohort effect [2] [3]. Voeten found flat trends for groups of established democracies and, for the most part, an age difference among young adults, with the United States an exception that rested on one survey [4]. Norris noted that pooling waves cannot separate generational, life-cycle and period effects [5], and Alexander and Welzel argued that Foa and Mounk overstate the age differences [6]. Wuttke, Gavras and Schoen separated age, cohort and period in European countries from 1981 to 2018 and found continued endorsement of self-governance, with more "democrats in name only" among the young in some countries [7]. Age, period and cohort cannot all be separated, because birth year equals survey year minus age. A cross-section such as Wave 7 mixes age with birth cohort. Comparing the same age group across waves mixes cohort with period, and following one cohort across waves mixes age with period. A comparison speaks to cohorts only if a period change is the same at every age and the way support varies with age has not itself changed, and neither can be tested here. The age and cohort figures use 30 of the 39 countries, those with at least 100 respondents and effective respondents in every age-group and cohort cell they use, marked in Table 9. Young adults are those aged 18 to 34 and older adults those aged 55 or more. Table 5. Young adults went from less approving of a strong leader than older adults to level with them between Wave 3 and Wave 7 In Wave 7 the three age groups give nearly the same share calling a democratic system good: the difference between young and older adults is −1.3 (95% CI −2.6 to 0.0) points. For a strong leader it is +0.4 (95% CI −1.9 to 2.6) points, for army rule +2.2 (95% CI −0.5 to 4.9) and for expert decisions +5.4 (95% CI 1.8 to 9.0). Wave 3 looked different. Young adults then approved of a strong leader 6.6 (95% CI 3.6 to 9.7) points less than older adults did, and of army rule 3.2 (95% CI 1.7 to 4.8) points less. Between Wave 3 and Wave 7 approval of a strong leader rose by +11.1 (95% CI 5.8 to 16.3) points among young adults and +4.1 (95% CI −1.0 to 9.1) among older adults, and approval of army rule by +10.0 (95% CI 5.4 to 14.6) and +4.5 (95% CI −0.4 to 9.4). The age gap therefore changed by +7.0 (95% CI 3.8 to 10.2) points for a strong leader and +5.4 (95% CI 2.1 to 8.8) for army rule, against −1.4 (95% CI −3.1 to 0.4) for a democratic system. Table 6. Every birth cohort followed across waves became more approving of a strong leader, and the cohorts ended close together Read as a difference between cohorts, those results need the two assumptions above. Table 6 follows birth cohorts across waves and every cohort rises. The newest cohort, born 1987 or later, stands at 48.0% in Wave 7, within a point of the oldest cohort. A rise that reaches every cohort resembles a period change, and a gap between age groups that closes resembles a difference between cohorts. The data do not decide between the two, and both can hold. The importance question gives a different picture. Young adults are less likely than older adults to give the top rating, by 6.9 (95% CI 3.5 to 10.4) points in Wave 5 and 9.5 (95% CI 4.9 to 14.0) in Wave 7 across 37 countries, and the gap changed by −2.5 (95% CI −5.7 to 0.6) points, an interval that includes zero. Young adults gave the top rating at 45.1% in Wave 5 and 47.0% in Wave 7, a change of +1.8 (95% CI −2.2 to 5.8) points, so they were not measurably less likely to give it in 2017 to 2023 than in 2004 to 2009. The cohort born 1978 to 1986 went from 44.2% to 51.6%, a change of +7.4 (95% CI 2.8 to 12.0) points that combines ageing with any period change. The cohort born 1987 or later was at 46.4% in Wave 7, a difference of +2.2 (95% CI −2.1 to 6.5) points from the earlier cohort at a similar age. If no period change moved the waves, the gradient looks like a difference between ages. The United States is where the age results and the trend point the same way, with the mode caveat above. Among young Americans the share calling a democratic system good fell from 87.6% in 1995 to 77.7% in 2017, a change of −9.9 (95% CI −14.9 to −4.8) points. The share of young Americans calling army rule good rose in each of the five surveys, from 7.1% in 1995 to 11.1%, 18.1%, 23.5% and 29.9% in 1999, 2006, 2011 and 2017, a change of +22.8 (95% CI 18.1 to 27.5) points. That series runs through the changes of mode, so it shows a steady rise across modes and cannot show that mode played no part. The gap between young and older Americans in approval of army rule went from +1.1 (95% CI −2.5 to 4.7) points in 1995 to +17.1 (95% CI 12.3 to 21.9) in 2017. On the importance question, young Americans give the top rating 35.5 (95% CI 29.8 to 41.3) points less often than older Americans in 2017, against 9.5 in the set. ### Right and left differ on the alternatives The left-right question asks respondents to place themselves on a ten-point scale from left to right. The right end is placements 7 and up, and the left end is placements up to 4. In Wave 7, in the 73 countries where both groups meet the floors (71 for army rule), adults at the right end were more likely than adults at the left end to call a strong leader good, by +7.1 (95% CI 4.9 to 9.3) points on average with equal weight per country. For army rule the difference is +4.5 (95% CI 2.7 to 6.4) points. For a democratic system it is −0.6 (95% CI −1.6 to 0.4) points, an interval that includes zero. The strong-leader difference is above zero in 38 countries and below zero in 3, and in 32 its interval includes zero (Table 7). Table 7. In 38 of 73 countries the interval for the right-minus-left difference in approval of a strong leader lies above zero The label does not mean the same thing everywhere, so gaps are not the same quantity across countries; Chapter 7.4, Left and right across countries (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries) shows which attitudes it tracks in each. In the median country 13.5% of respondents do not place themselves, against 2.3% in the United States, and they are outside these comparisons. In the United States the right-left difference in approval of a strong leader is +16.2 (95% CI 10.4 to 22.0) points, larger than in all but 12 of the other countries. For army rule it is +13.2 (95% CI 8.6 to 17.8) points, and for a democratic system −7.1 (95% CI −11.1 to −3.2) points, so the right is less likely than the left to call a democratic system good. In 1995 the three differences were +0.6 (95% CI −6.7 to 7.9), −0.7 (95% CI −4.7 to 3.3) and −0.9 (95% CI −6.0 to 4.1) points, and each interval includes zero. Self-placement describes a group of respondents and not a party, and the file does not date the change or tie it to an election. Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology) covers how left-right placement and party identification line up in the United States. ### Among European countries that kept face-to-face interviews, media freedom ratings fell The European Social Survey (ESS) asks how far features of democracy apply in the respondent's own country, on an eleven-point scale, in Round 6 (2012 to 2013) and Round 10 (2020 to 2022). It does not ask about a strong leader or army rule. In Round 10, 9 ESS countries switched from face-to-face interviews to self-completion by web and paper because of the pandemic, and the ESS advises caution about comparisons over time in those countries. Of the 24 countries with every item in both rounds, 6 switched. In the 18 that kept face-to-face interviews, the mean rating of whether the media are free to criticize the government fell from 7.21 to 6.83, a change of −0.38 (95% CI −0.72 to −0.04) points. It fell in 10 of them by each country's own interval. Satisfaction with how democracy works rose by +0.39 (95% CI 0.11 to 0.67) points. The ratings of free and fair elections (+0.13 (95% CI −0.15 to 0.41)), minority rights (+0.14 (95% CI −0.11 to 0.39)) and citizens' final say (−0.08 (95% CI −0.37 to 0.21)) have intervals that include zero. Table 8. Where interviews stayed face to face, European ratings of whether the media are free to criticize the government fell by 0.38 points between Round 6 and Round 10 Across all 24 countries the media-freedom rating fell by 0.63 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.99) points. In the 6 countries that switched mode the change is −1.38 (95% CI −2.38 to −0.38) points, and satisfaction with democracy changed by −0.68 (95% CI −1.53 to 0.16) points. The two largest falls in the media-freedom rating, in Cyprus and Poland, are both countries that switched. The fall appears in both groups and is larger among the switchers, and the two intervals overlap, so mode and country differences cannot be separated here. ### Countries and fieldwork years Table 9 lists the fixed set with the survey program, fieldwork years and respondents of each country in each wave. The set is not a sample of the world: it has post-communist countries of Europe and Central Asia, Latin American countries, Western and Northern European countries, the United States and a few countries in Asia and Oceania, and none in Africa or the Middle East. Albania is out for the reason above. Turkey is out because its Wave 7 survey has no army-rule item, and China, Poland and the United Kingdom are out because they were not surveyed in Wave 3. Table 9. The fixed set has 39 countries, and 30 of them meet the floors for the age and cohort comparisons ### What these data cannot show The questions ask whether four ways of governing the country would be good, not whether a respondent would act on the view, and a rating of a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections may mean different things to different respondents. Items on the legitimacy of elections and on political violence, which come closer to behavior, are in Chapter 6.8, Political violence and democratic norms (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms). Confidence in institutions outside the United States is the subject of Chapter 6.5, Institutional trust outside the United States (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/institutional-trust-outside-the-united-states; planned), and Chapter 6.1, Confidence in thirteen institutions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/confidence-in-institutions) covers the United States. Each wave interviews different people, so the chapter describes how distributions changed and not how individuals did. The data end in 2023 and say nothing about the period since the 2024 United States election. Differences in how the surveys were run can look like change. The WVS file carries no interview-mode variable. The American survey was face to face in 1995, on the web in 2006 and by web and telephone in 2017, and the 2011 documentation describes an online panel while listing face-to-face interviews as the program standard. Part of the American change could therefore come from a change of mode. The program switch between Wave 3 and Wave 7 is confounded with region, the Wave 3 surveys are in effect unweighted, and Albania shows that a country-wave can look unlike its neighbors for reasons the file does not record. The top rating on the importance question depends on how respondents use a ten-point scale, which varies by country and age. The age and cohort comparisons rest on assumptions that repeated cross-sections cannot test, and the left-right comparisons leave out respondents who do not place themselves. The ESS items measure evaluations of a country's democracy and not preferences among regimes, so the ESS cannot say whether appetite for an alternative rose in Europe. Nothing here is causal. The chapter does not say why approval of a strong leader rose or why young Americans differ. ## Tables ### Table 1. Stated support for a democratic system held at 89.7% in the fixed set of countries while approval of a strong leader rose to 48.1% Share of adults calling each way of governing the country good (fairly or very good), equal-weight mean across the fixed set of countries, by wave, 1995 to 2023 | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | item | n | n_countries | scope | wave | x | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | | 16.42 | 9.66 | 13.04 | Army rule | 50,168 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 18.85 | 11.46 | 15.16 | Army rule | 67,524 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 25.50 | 15.81 | 20.66 | Army rule | 63,635 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 90.84 | 86.13 | 88.49 | Democratic system | 49,767 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 90.30 | 86.59 | 88.44 | Democratic system | 67,236 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 91.74 | 87.70 | 89.72 | Democratic system | 64,440 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 65.99 | 56.09 | 61.04 | Experts decide | 47,936 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 66.08 | 56.64 | 61.36 | Experts decide | 64,933 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 69.00 | 58.84 | 63.92 | Experts decide | 62,657 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 43.39 | 32.94 | 38.16 | Strong leader | 49,235 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 47.53 | 35.41 | 41.47 | Strong leader | 66,325 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 55.03 | 41.08 | 48.05 | Strong leader | 63,671 | 39 | Fixed set | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 13.01 | 7.67 | 10.34 | Army rule | 29,377 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 16.96 | 8.88 | 12.92 | Army rule | 49,579 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 26.21 | 13.32 | 19.76 | Army rule | 44,952 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 91.76 | 84.74 | 88.25 | Democratic system | 28,820 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 90.57 | 85.35 | 87.96 | Democratic system | 49,112 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 93.49 | 89.92 | 91.70 | Democratic system | 45,558 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 70.46 | 57.48 | 63.97 | Experts decide | 27,649 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 70.75 | 58.35 | 64.55 | Experts decide | 47,282 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 72.09 | 57.48 | 64.79 | Experts decide | 44,232 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 45.56 | 31.29 | 38.43 | Strong leader | 28,854 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 49.90 | 32.88 | 41.39 | Strong leader | 48,577 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 54.47 | 35.36 | 44.91 | Strong leader | 45,071 | 25 | Program switched | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 26.06 | 9.66 | 17.86 | Army rule | 20,791 | 14 | Same program | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 26.81 | 11.49 | 19.15 | Army rule | 17,945 | 14 | Same program | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 30.41 | 14.10 | 22.25 | Army rule | 18,683 | 14 | Same program | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 91.52 | 86.32 | 88.92 | Democratic system | 20,947 | 14 | Same program | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 91.93 | 86.69 | 89.31 | Democratic system | 18,124 | 14 | Same program | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 90.56 | 81.78 | 86.17 | Democratic system | 18,882 | 14 | Same program | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 63.55 | 48.06 | 55.80 | Experts decide | 20,287 | 14 | Same program | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 62.71 | 48.61 | 55.66 | Experts decide | 17,651 | 14 | Same program | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 69.10 | 55.66 | 62.38 | Experts decide | 18,425 | 14 | Same program | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 46.01 | 29.37 | 37.69 | Strong leader | 20,381 | 14 | Same program | Wave 3 | 1996 | | 50.51 | 32.73 | 41.62 | Strong leader | 17,748 | 14 | Same program | Wave 5 | 2007 | | 63.84 | 43.47 | 53.65 | Strong leader | 18,600 | 14 | Same program | Wave 7 | 2018 | | 8.02 | 5.14 | 6.58 | Army rule | 1,476 | 1 | United States | Wave 3 | 1995 | | 10.41 | 7.12 | 8.77 | Army rule | 1,179 | 1 | United States | Wave 4 | 1999 | | 16.84 | 11.95 | 14.40 | Army rule | 1,203 | 1 | United States | Wave 5 | 2006 | | 19.35 | 15.57 | 17.46 | Army rule | 2,170 | 1 | United States | Wave 6 | 2011 | | 22.94 | 18.88 | 20.91 | Army rule | 2,528 | 1 | United States | Wave 7 | 2017 | | 92.32 | 88.87 | 90.60 | Democratic system | 1,433 | 1 | United States | Wave 3 | 1995 | | 90.95 | 87.28 | 89.12 | Democratic system | 1,153 | 1 | United States | Wave 4 | 1999 | | 88.07 | 83.19 | 85.63 | Democratic system | 1,200 | 1 | United States | Wave 5 | 2006 | | 84.22 | 80.42 | 82.32 | Democratic system | 2,164 | 1 | United States | Wave 6 | 2011 | | 86.77 | 83.18 | 84.98 | Democratic system | 2,509 | 1 | United States | Wave 7 | 2017 | | 39.38 | 33.69 | 36.53 | Experts decide | 1,427 | 1 | United States | Wave 3 | 1995 | | 46.88 | 41.07 | 43.97 | Experts decide | 1,167 | 1 | United States | Wave 4 | 1999 | | 48.96 | 42.01 | 45.49 | Experts decide | 1,202 | 1 | United States | Wave 5 | 2006 | | 53.66 | 48.70 | 51.18 | Experts decide | 2,177 | 1 | United States | Wave 6 | 2011 | | 55.05 | 50.06 | 52.55 | Experts decide | 2,535 | 1 | United States | Wave 7 | 2017 | | 27.45 | 22.36 | 24.90 | Strong leader | 1,441 | 1 | United States | Wave 3 | 1995 | | 32.22 | 26.91 | 29.56 | Strong leader | 1,179 | 1 | United States | Wave 4 | 1999 | | 36.13 | 29.61 | 32.87 | Strong leader | 1,208 | 1 | United States | Wave 5 | 2006 | | 37.42 | 32.68 | 35.05 | Strong leader | 2,178 | 1 | United States | Wave 6 | 2011 | | 40.49 | 35.64 | 38.06 | Strong leader | 2,541 | 1 | United States | Wave 7 | 2017 | Views: Fixed set of countries (scope = Fixed set); Same survey program (scope = Same program); Survey program switched (scope = Program switched); United States (scope = United States). Note: Fixed set: countries with an effective sample of at least the floor on every item in Waves 3, 5 and 7, less Albania, whose Wave 3 survey has an implausible response pattern (see the text and the country table at the end of the chapter). Intervals for the fixed set are clustered by country (t critical value on one fewer degree of freedom than the number of countries); intervals for one country use the Kish effective sample size. The WVS file has no strata or sampling units, so no interval includes design effects. Note: The position of a wave on the horizontal axis is the mean fieldwork year of the countries in it. In most countries the Wave 3 survey gives every respondent the same weight, so Wave 3 shares are in effect unweighted. Note: Program: the program (WVS or EVS) with more respondents in the country and wave. Every country whose program switched is in Europe and Central Asia, and none of the others is. The American surveys differed in mode: face to face in 1995, web in 2006 and web and telephone in 2017. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, Waves 3, 5 and 7 (1995 to 2023); weighted (weight, S017 within country; equal weight per country across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/trend_items.json ### Table 2. The share calling a democratic system good rose in 18 countries, fell in 10 and held within sampling error in 11 Change from Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) to Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) in the share calling the way of governing good, percentage points, by country, with 95% intervals | conf_high | conf_low | country | estimate | group | item | n | share_w3 | share_w7 | | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 47.78 | 39.62 | North Macedonia | 43.70 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,814 | 10.45 | 54.15 | | 42.86 | 36.06 | Serbia | 39.46 | Other countries | Army rule | 3,251 | 10.19 | 49.65 | | 41.82 | 30.36 | Montenegro | 36.09 | Other countries | Army rule | 954 | 9.63 | 45.72 | | 22.94 | 16.09 | Mexico | 19.51 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,954 | 26.07 | 45.58 | | 21.50 | 15.99 | Georgia | 18.74 | Other countries | Army rule | 3,854 | 11.07 | 29.81 | | 21.64 | 14.37 | Peru | 18.01 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,383 | 18.04 | 36.04 | | 20.09 | 14.22 | Armenia | 17.16 | Other countries | Army rule | 4,186 | 17.36 | 34.52 | | 16.83 | 11.84 | United States | 14.33 | United States | Army rule | 4,004 | 6.58 | 20.91 | | 17.53 | 10.33 | Bosnia Herzegovina | 13.93 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,760 | 24.08 | 38.01 | | 14.83 | 9.96 | South Korea | 12.40 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,477 | 5.03 | 17.43 | | 14.14 | 8.46 | Belarus | 11.30 | Other countries | Army rule | 3,195 | 14.40 | 25.70 | | 15.09 | 7.42 | Uruguay | 11.26 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,860 | 8.16 | 19.42 | | 14.57 | 7.87 | Romania | 11.22 | Other countries | Army rule | 3,464 | 24.77 | 35.99 | | 12.96 | 8.83 | Slovakia | 10.90 | Other countries | Army rule | 3,489 | 4.90 | 15.80 | | 13.64 | 6.52 | Ukraine | 10.08 | Other countries | Army rule | 4,623 | 11.84 | 21.92 | | 12.15 | 5.40 | Croatia | 8.78 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,564 | 14.27 | 23.05 | | 10.00 | 6.23 | Czechia | 8.11 | Other countries | Army rule | 3,910 | 5.07 | 13.19 | | 10.33 | 5.46 | Lithuania | 7.90 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,260 | 5.79 | 13.69 | | 6.66 | 2.15 | Australia | 4.40 | Other countries | Army rule | 3,648 | 6.36 | 10.77 | | 7.48 | 0.447 | Argentina | 3.96 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,940 | 12.89 | 16.85 | | 4.91 | 0.808 | Latvia | 2.86 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,368 | 5.21 | 8.07 | | 6.12 | −1.39 | India | 2.37 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,707 | 36.62 | 38.99 | | 4.26 | −0.173 | Hungary | 2.04 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,051 | 4.93 | 6.98 | | 3.83 | 0.021 | Sweden | 1.93 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,151 | 3.75 | 5.68 | | 3.47 | −1.50 | Spain | 0.981 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,227 | 9.14 | 10.12 | | 1.48 | −1.21 | New Zealand | 0.137 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,000 | 2.34 | 2.47 | | 0.739 | −0.600 | Germany | 0.070 | Other countries | Army rule | 5,585 | 1.46 | 1.52 | | 0.982 | −1.65 | Japan | −0.335 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,096 | 2.53 | 2.19 | | 1.13 | −2.31 | Norway | −0.589 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,220 | 4.59 | 4.00 | | 1.03 | −2.65 | Estonia | −0.812 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,112 | 4.99 | 4.18 | | 0.639 | −2.52 | Switzerland | −0.938 | Other countries | Army rule | 4,237 | 4.86 | 3.92 | | 1.48 | −3.71 | Russia | −1.12 | Other countries | Army rule | 4,879 | 20.98 | 19.86 | | 0.965 | −3.27 | Slovenia | −1.15 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,995 | 6.43 | 5.28 | | 2.60 | −5.28 | Brazil | −1.34 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,504 | 45.46 | 44.12 | | 1.70 | −5.27 | Bulgaria | −1.79 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,123 | 16.93 | 15.15 | | 0.369 | −6.58 | Taiwan ROC | −3.11 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,926 | 15.58 | 12.48 | | −0.471 | −5.92 | Finland | −3.19 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,057 | 11.36 | 8.17 | | −5.91 | −10.92 | Colombia | −8.42 | Other countries | Army rule | 7,208 | 33.61 | 25.20 | | −6.60 | −16.80 | Chile | −11.70 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,767 | 30.81 | 19.11 | | 25.07 | 19.08 | Russia | 22.07 | Other countries | Democratic system | 4,738 | 57.61 | 79.68 | | 20.62 | 14.29 | Finland | 17.46 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,036 | 76.57 | 94.03 | | 15.84 | 11.24 | Belarus | 13.54 | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,161 | 79.78 | 93.32 | | 13.49 | 7.58 | North Macedonia | 10.53 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,886 | 83.69 | 94.22 | | 10.81 | 5.12 | Bulgaria | 7.97 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,211 | 85.58 | 93.55 | | 8.35 | 1.63 | Ukraine | 4.99 | Other countries | Democratic system | 4,458 | 80.16 | 85.14 | | 7.40 | 2.17 | Latvia | 4.79 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,285 | 86.62 | 91.41 | | 7.16 | 2.06 | Estonia | 4.61 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,074 | 88.64 | 93.25 | | 7.16 | 1.32 | Slovenia | 4.24 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,960 | 86.19 | 90.43 | | 6.07 | 1.36 | Armenia | 3.72 | Other countries | Democratic system | 4,196 | 84.36 | 88.07 | | 4.76 | 1.15 | Switzerland | 2.96 | Other countries | Democratic system | 4,203 | 93.23 | 96.18 | | 5.49 | 0.054 | Brazil | 2.77 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,564 | 84.84 | 87.61 | | 3.68 | 1.71 | Germany | 2.70 | Other countries | Democratic system | 5,547 | 95.74 | 98.44 | | 5.05 | 0.317 | New Zealand | 2.68 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,912 | 91.08 | 93.76 | | 5.03 | 0.268 | Japan | 2.65 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,090 | 90.52 | 93.17 | | 5.23 | −0.337 | Lithuania | 2.45 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,162 | 87.60 | 90.05 | | 3.97 | 0.895 | Sweden | 2.43 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,148 | 95.71 | 98.14 | | 4.71 | −0.687 | Hungary | 2.01 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,040 | 90.92 | 92.94 | | 3.85 | 0.021 | Georgia | 1.94 | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,804 | 90.62 | 92.55 | | 4.24 | −0.645 | Australia | 1.80 | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,604 | 87.96 | 89.76 | | 3.01 | 0.171 | Norway | 1.59 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,217 | 96.30 | 97.89 | | 2.10 | −1.58 | Spain | 0.262 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,316 | 94.64 | 94.90 | | 2.20 | −2.89 | Taiwan ROC | −0.347 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,943 | 93.14 | 92.79 | | 1.59 | −3.16 | Peru | −0.786 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,430 | 91.41 | 90.62 | | 1.19 | −2.99 | Romania | −0.898 | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,672 | 91.38 | 90.48 | | 0.565 | −4.15 | Uruguay | −1.79 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,898 | 96.09 | 94.30 | | 0.176 | −3.93 | Bosnia Herzegovina | −1.87 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,839 | 93.38 | 91.50 | | 0.631 | −4.65 | Argentina | −2.01 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,015 | 92.94 | 90.93 | | −0.173 | −4.48 | Czechia | −2.33 | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,895 | 90.75 | 88.42 | | −0.456 | −5.63 | Serbia | −3.04 | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,271 | 90.44 | 87.40 | | −0.688 | −6.74 | Mexico | −3.72 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,988 | 79.55 | 75.83 | | 0.786 | −8.35 | Chile | −3.78 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,845 | 84.89 | 81.11 | | −2.41 | −5.67 | Croatia | −4.04 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,592 | 98.44 | 94.40 | | −3.22 | −7.57 | Slovakia | −5.39 | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,515 | 92.41 | 87.02 | | −3.13 | −8.11 | United States | −5.62 | United States | Democratic system | 3,942 | 90.60 | 84.98 | | −2.72 | −9.89 | Montenegro | −6.31 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,152 | 95.45 | 89.15 | | −5.27 | −10.22 | India | −7.74 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,843 | 91.94 | 84.20 | | −5.81 | −10.41 | Colombia | −8.11 | Other countries | Democratic system | 7,279 | 85.34 | 77.24 | | −11.28 | −17.77 | South Korea | −14.53 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,476 | 84.57 | 70.04 | | 38.30 | 31.36 | Romania | 34.83 | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,586 | 49.05 | 83.89 | | 30.46 | 19.66 | Uruguay | 25.06 | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,804 | 39.90 | 64.96 | | 28.97 | 20.28 | Estonia | 24.62 | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,972 | 45.25 | 69.87 | | 20.39 | 12.66 | Australia | 16.53 | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,612 | 42.03 | 58.56 | | 19.80 | 12.24 | United States | 16.02 | United States | Experts decide | 3,962 | 36.53 | 52.55 | | 19.14 | 12.37 | Belarus | 15.75 | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,011 | 56.83 | 72.58 | | 17.94 | 11.16 | Mexico | 14.55 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,951 | 61.69 | 76.24 | | 18.45 | 10.30 | Latvia | 14.37 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,219 | 55.90 | 70.27 | | 18.54 | 10.03 | Bulgaria | 14.28 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,065 | 66.71 | 81.00 | | 17.86 | 9.76 | Peru | 13.81 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,328 | 56.24 | 70.05 | | 15.68 | 8.30 | North Macedonia | 11.99 | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,847 | 75.55 | 87.54 | | 13.20 | 6.30 | Armenia | 9.75 | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,998 | 53.66 | 63.41 | | 11.12 | 4.32 | Georgia | 7.72 | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,671 | 58.41 | 66.13 | | 11.83 | 2.21 | Taiwan ROC | 7.02 | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,924 | 59.86 | 66.88 | | 12.16 | −0.117 | Chile | 6.02 | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,764 | 44.32 | 50.35 | | 9.60 | 2.23 | India | 5.91 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,462 | 66.61 | 72.53 | | 8.87 | 2.73 | Croatia | 5.80 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,559 | 81.98 | 87.78 | | 10.51 | 0.495 | Argentina | 5.50 | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,825 | 53.48 | 58.99 | | 9.24 | 0.778 | Spain | 5.01 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,090 | 58.75 | 63.75 | | 6.49 | 1.54 | Colombia | 4.01 | Other countries | Experts decide | 7,246 | 70.92 | 74.93 | | 7.07 | −0.052 | Slovenia | 3.51 | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,936 | 79.59 | 83.10 | | 5.89 | −2.21 | Norway | 1.84 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,208 | 33.82 | 35.65 | | 4.78 | −4.04 | New Zealand | 0.367 | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,960 | 43.71 | 44.08 | | 2.75 | −6.02 | Sweden | −1.64 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,128 | 39.05 | 37.42 | | 1.10 | −4.93 | Brazil | −1.92 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,524 | 83.09 | 81.17 | | 0.953 | −5.68 | Bosnia Herzegovina | −2.36 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,776 | 78.16 | 75.80 | | 0.596 | −5.39 | Serbia | −2.40 | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,374 | 84.84 | 82.44 | | −0.375 | −11.35 | Montenegro | −5.86 | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,088 | 86.10 | 80.23 | | −3.71 | −12.80 | Japan | −8.25 | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,875 | 57.27 | 49.01 | | −5.70 | −11.54 | Slovakia | −8.62 | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,440 | 84.46 | 75.84 | | −4.32 | −13.32 | Finland | −8.82 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,043 | 64.60 | 55.78 | | −5.41 | −12.89 | Hungary | −9.15 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,007 | 84.73 | 75.58 | | −5.25 | −14.19 | Lithuania | −9.72 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,038 | 49.88 | 40.16 | | −5.59 | −15.11 | Ukraine | −10.35 | Other countries | Experts decide | 4,052 | 61.24 | 50.89 | | −8.35 | −16.00 | Switzerland | −12.17 | Other countries | Experts decide | 4,093 | 46.57 | 34.40 | | −8.76 | −16.44 | South Korea | −12.60 | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,475 | 65.61 | 53.01 | | −13.19 | −19.82 | Russia | −16.51 | Other countries | Experts decide | 4,560 | 59.21 | 42.70 | | −16.47 | −22.53 | Czechia | −19.50 | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,777 | 82.26 | 62.76 | | −19.24 | −24.74 | Germany | −21.99 | Other countries | Experts decide | 5,343 | 62.67 | 40.68 | | 56.07 | 42.43 | Montenegro | 49.25 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,101 | 25.37 | 74.62 | | 40.90 | 31.49 | Argentina | 36.19 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,860 | 29.28 | 65.47 | | 38.69 | 31.32 | South Korea | 35.00 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,483 | 31.74 | 66.75 | | 38.45 | 30.49 | Peru | 34.47 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,331 | 34.76 | 69.23 | | 36.06 | 29.10 | Romania | 32.58 | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,595 | 47.24 | 79.82 | | 32.96 | 25.22 | Serbia | 29.09 | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,350 | 31.07 | 60.16 | | 31.63 | 22.05 | Taiwan ROC | 26.84 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,931 | 40.99 | 67.83 | | 29.83 | 22.77 | Mexico | 26.30 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,939 | 45.35 | 71.65 | | 28.40 | 17.66 | Uruguay | 23.03 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,770 | 27.24 | 50.27 | | 22.91 | 14.31 | North Macedonia | 18.61 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,805 | 62.38 | 80.99 | | 17.57 | 11.01 | Armenia | 14.29 | Other countries | Strong leader | 4,199 | 54.21 | 68.50 | | 18.32 | 9.80 | Ukraine | 14.06 | Other countries | Strong leader | 4,598 | 54.46 | 68.52 | | 16.67 | 9.65 | United States | 13.16 | United States | Strong leader | 3,982 | 24.90 | 38.06 | | 16.14 | 9.42 | Belarus | 12.78 | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,232 | 55.20 | 67.99 | | 17.27 | 5.23 | Chile | 11.25 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,776 | 35.21 | 46.46 | | 14.26 | 8.12 | Georgia | 11.19 | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,850 | 65.90 | 77.09 | | 13.30 | 7.03 | Slovakia | 10.17 | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,429 | 19.02 | 29.19 | | 14.07 | 5.83 | Croatia | 9.95 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,563 | 30.28 | 40.23 | | 10.81 | 6.62 | Germany | 8.72 | Other countries | Strong leader | 5,407 | 13.75 | 22.46 | | 11.42 | 5.79 | Czechia | 8.61 | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,800 | 15.89 | 24.50 | | 11.44 | 4.35 | Australia | 7.89 | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,627 | 24.15 | 32.04 | | 11.91 | 3.54 | Latvia | 7.72 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,287 | 46.13 | 53.85 | | 8.57 | 2.99 | Colombia | 5.78 | Other countries | Strong leader | 7,193 | 53.50 | 59.28 | | 8.68 | 1.09 | Brazil | 4.89 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,555 | 60.57 | 65.45 | | 8.29 | 0.212 | Slovenia | 4.25 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,970 | 25.13 | 29.38 | | 7.41 | −0.356 | Hungary | 3.53 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,033 | 18.75 | 22.28 | | 4.77 | −2.53 | India | 1.12 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,575 | 68.03 | 69.15 | | 3.83 | −2.13 | Norway | 0.851 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,220 | 13.94 | 14.79 | | 4.00 | −4.29 | Japan | −0.149 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,999 | 32.40 | 32.25 | | 4.38 | −4.87 | Bulgaria | −0.243 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,083 | 62.33 | 62.09 | | 1.14 | −5.72 | New Zealand | −2.29 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,960 | 19.54 | 17.25 | | −0.651 | −8.30 | Spain | −4.48 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,138 | 29.56 | 25.08 | | −2.49 | −8.88 | Russia | −5.68 | Other countries | Strong leader | 4,935 | 50.41 | 44.72 | | −2.13 | −10.05 | Bosnia Herzegovina | −6.09 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,756 | 53.27 | 47.18 | | −3.27 | −10.79 | Sweden | −7.03 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,143 | 26.45 | 19.42 | | −4.06 | −12.45 | Lithuania | −8.25 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,222 | 63.75 | 55.50 | | −7.18 | −14.20 | Switzerland | −10.69 | Other countries | Strong leader | 4,082 | 31.19 | 20.50 | | −8.96 | −16.36 | Finland | −12.66 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,069 | 27.52 | 14.86 | | −14.47 | −22.36 | Estonia | −18.41 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,058 | 37.54 | 19.13 | Views: Democratic system (item = Democratic system); Strong leader (item = Strong leader); Army rule (item = Army rule); Experts decide (item = Experts decide). Note: Intervals are for each country alone and treat its weighted sample as a simple random sample; they omit design effects. Albania is left out of the set (see the text). Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, Waves 3, 5 and 7 (1995 to 2023); weighted (weight, S017 within country; equal weight per country across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/change_by_country.json ### Table 3. The share calling a democratic system good and rejecting both alternatives fell from 55.3% to 44.9% in the fixed set Share of adults by combination of answers on the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items, equal-weight mean across the fixed set of countries, by wave | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | group | n | n_countries | scope | x | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | | 37.95 | 28.44 | 33.19 | Democracy and an alternative | 45,779 | 39 | Fixed set | 1996 | | 43.22 | 31.83 | 37.52 | Democracy and an alternative | 61,691 | 39 | Fixed set | 2007 | | 51.01 | 37.95 | 44.48 | Democracy and an alternative | 59,782 | 39 | Fixed set | 2018 | | 60.96 | 49.72 | 55.34 | Democracy only | 45,779 | 39 | Fixed set | 1996 | | 57.00 | 44.42 | 50.71 | Democracy only | 61,691 | 39 | Fixed set | 2007 | | 52.39 | 37.42 | 44.90 | Democracy only | 59,782 | 39 | Fixed set | 2018 | | 13.81 | 9.12 | 11.47 | Does not call a democratic system good | 45,779 | 39 | Fixed set | 1996 | | 13.68 | 9.86 | 11.77 | Does not call a democratic system good | 61,691 | 39 | Fixed set | 2007 | | 12.71 | 8.53 | 10.62 | Does not call a democratic system good | 59,782 | 39 | Fixed set | 2018 | | 24.87 | 19.83 | 22.35 | Democracy and an alternative | 1,370 | 1 | United States | 1995 | | 29.30 | 24.06 | 26.68 | Democracy and an alternative | 1,138 | 1 | United States | 1999 | | 31.29 | 25.01 | 28.15 | Democracy and an alternative | 1,193 | 1 | United States | 2006 | | 31.60 | 27.04 | 29.32 | Democracy and an alternative | 2,145 | 1 | United States | 2011 | | 35.82 | 31.05 | 33.43 | Democracy and an alternative | 2,479 | 1 | United States | 2017 | | 71.00 | 65.37 | 68.18 | Democracy only | 1,370 | 1 | United States | 1995 | | 65.16 | 59.41 | 62.29 | Democracy only | 1,138 | 1 | United States | 1999 | | 60.92 | 54.01 | 57.46 | Democracy only | 1,193 | 1 | United States | 2006 | | 55.39 | 50.40 | 52.90 | Democracy only | 2,145 | 1 | United States | 2011 | | 54.06 | 48.99 | 51.52 | Democracy only | 2,479 | 1 | United States | 2017 | | 11.24 | 7.70 | 9.47 | Does not call a democratic system good | 1,370 | 1 | United States | 1995 | | 12.89 | 9.17 | 11.03 | Does not call a democratic system good | 1,138 | 1 | United States | 1999 | | 16.84 | 11.94 | 14.39 | Does not call a democratic system good | 1,193 | 1 | United States | 2006 | | 19.70 | 15.87 | 17.79 | Does not call a democratic system good | 2,145 | 1 | United States | 2011 | | 16.85 | 13.23 | 15.04 | Does not call a democratic system good | 2,479 | 1 | United States | 2017 | Views: Fixed set of countries (scope = Fixed set); United States (scope = United States). Note: Respondents who answered all three items. Intervals for the fixed set are clustered by country (t critical value on one fewer degree of freedom than the number of countries); intervals for one country use the Kish effective sample size. The WVS file has no strata or sampling units, so no interval includes design effects. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, Waves 3, 5 and 7 (1995 to 2023); weighted (weight, S017 within country; equal weight per country across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/committed.json ### Table 4. In Wave 7 the United States is below the median country on a democratic system and a strong leader and at the median on army rule Weighted share of adults calling each way of governing good, or giving the top rating on importance, by country, Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | country | group | measure | n | panel_view | value | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | Albania | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,413 | Shares | 98.01 | | Andorra | Other countries | Democratic system | 998 | Shares | 96.59 | | Argentina | Other countries | Democratic system | 973 | Shares | 90.93 | | Armenia | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,566 | Shares | 88.07 | | Australia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,732 | Shares | 89.76 | | Austria | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,622 | Shares | 95.95 | | Azerbaijan | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,690 | Shares | 96.47 | | Bangladesh | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,100 | Shares | 89.73 | | Belarus | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,435 | Shares | 93.32 | | Bolivia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,963 | Shares | 88.39 | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,676 | Shares | 91.50 | | Brazil | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,469 | Shares | 87.61 | | Bulgaria | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,372 | Shares | 93.55 | | Canada | Other countries | Democratic system | 4,018 | Shares | 89.16 | | Chile | Other countries | Democratic system | 910 | Shares | 81.11 | | China | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,980 | Shares | 91.87 | | Colombia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,520 | Shares | 77.24 | | Croatia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,437 | Shares | 94.40 | | Cyprus | Other countries | Democratic system | 950 | Shares | 93.39 | | Czechia | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,803 | Shares | 88.42 | | Denmark | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,320 | Shares | 96.92 | | Ecuador | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,164 | Shares | 83.76 | | Egypt | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,013 | Shares | 97.53 | | Estonia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,141 | Shares | 93.25 | | Ethiopia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,188 | Shares | 93.35 | | Finland | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,131 | Shares | 94.03 | | France | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,799 | Shares | 92.99 | | Georgia | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,003 | Shares | 92.55 | | Germany | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,573 | Shares | 98.44 | | Greece | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,193 | Shares | 97.98 | | Guatemala | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,229 | Shares | 84.62 | | Hong Kong SAR | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,022 | Shares | 81.56 | | Hungary | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,445 | Shares | 92.94 | | Iceland | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,594 | Shares | 98.94 | | India | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,267 | Shares | 84.20 | | Indonesia | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,123 | Shares | 90.83 | | Iran | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,476 | Shares | 96.95 | | Iraq | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,167 | Shares | 59.30 | | Italy | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,203 | Shares | 96.65 | | Japan | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,172 | Shares | 93.17 | | Jordan | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,016 | Shares | 75.20 | | Kazakhstan | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,107 | Shares | 82.20 | | Kenya | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,222 | Shares | 77.99 | | Kyrgyzstan | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,023 | Shares | 76.90 | | Latvia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,186 | Shares | 91.41 | | Lebanon | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,183 | Shares | 76.75 | | Libya | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,139 | Shares | 91.22 | | Lithuania | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,315 | Shares | 90.05 | | Macau SAR | Other countries | Democratic system | 806 | Shares | 80.15 | | Malaysia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,312 | Shares | 88.34 | | Maldives | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,016 | Shares | 69.29 | | Mexico | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,702 | Shares | 75.83 | | Mongolia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,638 | Shares | 73.67 | | Montenegro | Other countries | Democratic system | 932 | Shares | 89.15 | | Morocco | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,200 | Shares | 87.75 | | Myanmar | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,200 | Shares | 95.33 | | Netherlands | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,977 | Shares | 95.58 | | New Zealand | Other countries | Democratic system | 914 | Shares | 93.76 | | Nicaragua | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,137 | Shares | 84.61 | | Nigeria | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,233 | Shares | 88.19 | | North Macedonia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,034 | Shares | 94.22 | | Northern Ireland | Other countries | Democratic system | 400 | Shares | 93.29 | | Norway | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,109 | Shares | 97.89 | | Pakistan | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,873 | Shares | 75.97 | | Peru | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,336 | Shares | 90.62 | | Philippines | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,196 | Shares | 73.92 | | Poland | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,244 | Shares | 89.94 | | Portugal | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,071 | Shares | 96.11 | | Puerto Rico | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,099 | Shares | 86.81 | | Romania | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,582 | Shares | 90.48 | | Russia | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,148 | Shares | 79.68 | | Serbia | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,183 | Shares | 87.40 | | Singapore | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,885 | Shares | 91.37 | | Slovakia | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,474 | Shares | 87.02 | | Slovenia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,033 | Shares | 90.43 | | South Korea | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,245 | Shares | 70.04 | | Spain | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,176 | Shares | 94.90 | | Sweden | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,170 | Shares | 98.14 | | Switzerland | Other countries | Democratic system | 3,111 | Shares | 96.18 | | Taiwan ROC | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,200 | Shares | 92.79 | | Tajikistan | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,200 | Shares | 94.50 | | Thailand | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,467 | Shares | 87.68 | | Tunisia | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,175 | Shares | 73.28 | | Turkey | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,244 | Shares | 82.62 | | Ukraine | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,523 | Shares | 85.14 | | United Kingdom | Other countries | Democratic system | 4,102 | Shares | 92.60 | | United States | United States | Democratic system | 2,509 | Shares | 84.98 | | Uruguay | Other countries | Democratic system | 933 | Shares | 94.30 | | Uzbekistan | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,071 | Shares | 77.03 | | Venezuela | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,190 | Shares | 88.49 | | Vietnam | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,130 | Shares | 91.59 | | Zimbabwe | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,192 | Shares | 91.78 | | Albania | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,398 | Shares | 23.35 | | Andorra | Other countries | Strong leader | 997 | Shares | 22.67 | | Argentina | Other countries | Strong leader | 881 | Shares | 65.47 | | Armenia | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,535 | Shares | 68.50 | | Australia | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,732 | Shares | 32.04 | | Austria | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,572 | Shares | 14.87 | | Azerbaijan | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,619 | Shares | 74.72 | | Bangladesh | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,059 | Shares | 22.76 | | Belarus | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,397 | Shares | 67.99 | | Bolivia | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,895 | Shares | 65.75 | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,641 | Shares | 47.18 | | Brazil | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,462 | Shares | 65.45 | | Bulgaria | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,284 | Shares | 62.09 | | Canada | Other countries | Strong leader | 4,018 | Shares | 24.17 | | Chile | Other countries | Strong leader | 849 | Shares | 46.46 | | China | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,975 | Shares | 41.63 | | Colombia | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,520 | Shares | 59.28 | | Croatia | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,427 | Shares | 40.23 | | Cyprus | Other countries | Strong leader | 860 | Shares | 51.22 | | Czechia | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,730 | Shares | 24.50 | | Denmark | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,298 | Shares | 21.04 | | Ecuador | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,167 | Shares | 76.35 | | Egypt | Other countries | Strong leader | 935 | Shares | 35.08 | | Estonia | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,131 | Shares | 19.13 | | Ethiopia | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,156 | Shares | 42.91 | | Finland | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,146 | Shares | 14.86 | | France | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,769 | Shares | 24.40 | | Georgia | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,076 | Shares | 77.09 | | Germany | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,443 | Shares | 22.46 | | Greece | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,174 | Shares | 9.21 | | Guatemala | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,229 | Shares | 72.50 | | Hong Kong SAR | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,023 | Shares | 33.70 | | Hungary | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,441 | Shares | 22.28 | | Iceland | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,584 | Shares | 11.66 | | India | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,252 | Shares | 69.15 | | Indonesia | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,129 | Shares | 60.49 | | Iran | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,461 | Shares | 53.39 | | Iraq | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,174 | Shares | 67.89 | | Italy | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,156 | Shares | 33.16 | | Japan | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,141 | Shares | 32.25 | | Jordan | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,058 | Shares | 52.17 | | Kazakhstan | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,110 | Shares | 77.93 | | Kenya | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,227 | Shares | 55.75 | | Kyrgyzstan | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,042 | Shares | 72.21 | | Latvia | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,190 | Shares | 53.85 | | Lebanon | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,178 | Shares | 37.69 | | Libya | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,135 | Shares | 53.74 | | Lithuania | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,320 | Shares | 55.50 | | Macau SAR | Other countries | Strong leader | 809 | Shares | 40.05 | | Malaysia | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,312 | Shares | 69.89 | | Maldives | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,015 | Shares | 34.48 | | Mexico | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,691 | Shares | 71.65 | | Mongolia | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,638 | Shares | 75.03 | | Montenegro | Other countries | Strong leader | 896 | Shares | 74.62 | | Morocco | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,200 | Shares | 57.67 | | Myanmar | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,200 | Shares | 73.17 | | Netherlands | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,880 | Shares | 35.56 | | New Zealand | Other countries | Strong leader | 916 | Shares | 17.25 | | Nicaragua | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,137 | Shares | 61.92 | | Nigeria | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,222 | Shares | 60.17 | | North Macedonia | Other countries | Strong leader | 973 | Shares | 80.99 | | Northern Ireland | Other countries | Strong leader | 397 | Shares | 29.35 | | Norway | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,108 | Shares | 14.79 | | Pakistan | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,843 | Shares | 49.48 | | Peru | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,304 | Shares | 69.23 | | Philippines | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,199 | Shares | 75.20 | | Poland | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,265 | Shares | 17.30 | | Portugal | Other countries | Strong leader | 951 | Shares | 54.17 | | Puerto Rico | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,107 | Shares | 55.10 | | Romania | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,545 | Shares | 79.82 | | Russia | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,211 | Shares | 44.72 | | Serbia | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,214 | Shares | 60.16 | | Singapore | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,801 | Shares | 31.47 | | Slovakia | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,409 | Shares | 29.19 | | Slovenia | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,027 | Shares | 29.38 | | South Korea | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,245 | Shares | 66.75 | | Spain | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,101 | Shares | 25.08 | | Sweden | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,160 | Shares | 19.42 | | Switzerland | Other countries | Strong leader | 3,062 | Shares | 20.50 | | Taiwan ROC | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,187 | Shares | 67.83 | | Tajikistan | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,200 | Shares | 73.33 | | Thailand | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,460 | Shares | 91.18 | | Tunisia | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,164 | Shares | 21.65 | | Turkey | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,138 | Shares | 55.85 | | Ukraine | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,604 | Shares | 68.52 | | United Kingdom | Other countries | Strong leader | 4,088 | Shares | 25.92 | | United States | United States | Strong leader | 2,541 | Shares | 38.06 | | Uruguay | Other countries | Strong leader | 879 | Shares | 50.27 | | Uzbekistan | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,081 | Shares | 77.15 | | Venezuela | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,190 | Shares | 55.63 | | Vietnam | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,094 | Shares | 92.87 | | Zimbabwe | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,187 | Shares | 39.26 | | Albania | Other countries | Army rule | 1,377 | Shares | 17.04 | | Andorra | Other countries | Army rule | 982 | Shares | 5.80 | | Argentina | Other countries | Army rule | 941 | Shares | 16.85 | | Armenia | Other countries | Army rule | 2,498 | Shares | 34.52 | | Australia | Other countries | Army rule | 1,735 | Shares | 10.77 | | Austria | Other countries | Army rule | 1,595 | Shares | 5.35 | | Azerbaijan | Other countries | Army rule | 1,566 | Shares | 10.85 | | Bangladesh | Other countries | Army rule | 1,079 | Shares | 38.92 | | Belarus | Other countries | Army rule | 1,376 | Shares | 25.70 | | Bolivia | Other countries | Army rule | 1,949 | Shares | 17.65 | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Other countries | Army rule | 1,622 | Shares | 38.01 | | Brazil | Other countries | Army rule | 1,413 | Shares | 44.12 | | Bulgaria | Other countries | Army rule | 1,314 | Shares | 15.15 | | Canada | Other countries | Army rule | 4,018 | Shares | 13.48 | | Chile | Other countries | Army rule | 870 | Shares | 19.11 | | China | Other countries | Army rule | 2,956 | Shares | 41.18 | | Colombia | Other countries | Army rule | 1,520 | Shares | 25.20 | | Croatia | Other countries | Army rule | 1,408 | Shares | 23.05 | | Cyprus | Other countries | Army rule | 461 | Shares | 8.24 | | Czechia | Other countries | Army rule | 2,806 | Shares | 13.19 | | Denmark | Other countries | Army rule | 3,320 | Shares | 5.15 | | Ecuador | Other countries | Army rule | 1,166 | Shares | 23.93 | | Estonia | Other countries | Army rule | 1,151 | Shares | 4.18 | | Ethiopia | Other countries | Army rule | 1,170 | Shares | 33.33 | | Finland | Other countries | Army rule | 1,133 | Shares | 8.17 | | France | Other countries | Army rule | 1,800 | Shares | 13.06 | | Georgia | Other countries | Army rule | 2,038 | Shares | 29.81 | | Germany | Other countries | Army rule | 3,592 | Shares | 1.52 | | Greece | Other countries | Army rule | 1,181 | Shares | 5.90 | | Guatemala | Other countries | Army rule | 1,229 | Shares | 35.56 | | Hong Kong SAR | Other countries | Army rule | 2,028 | Shares | 12.66 | | Hungary | Other countries | Army rule | 1,443 | Shares | 6.98 | | Iceland | Other countries | Army rule | 1,590 | Shares | 1.06 | | India | Other countries | Army rule | 1,186 | Shares | 38.99 | | Indonesia | Other countries | Army rule | 3,134 | Shares | 65.14 | | Iran | Other countries | Army rule | 1,473 | Shares | 43.04 | | Iraq | Other countries | Army rule | 1,160 | Shares | 48.28 | | Italy | Other countries | Army rule | 2,160 | Shares | 10.43 | | Japan | Other countries | Army rule | 1,186 | Shares | 2.19 | | Jordan | Other countries | Army rule | 1,053 | Shares | 38.94 | | Kazakhstan | Other countries | Army rule | 1,031 | Shares | 39.38 | | Kenya | Other countries | Army rule | 1,209 | Shares | 39.29 | | Kyrgyzstan | Other countries | Army rule | 1,026 | Shares | 47.16 | | Latvia | Other countries | Army rule | 1,236 | Shares | 8.07 | | Lebanon | Other countries | Army rule | 1,176 | Shares | 65.39 | | Libya | Other countries | Army rule | 1,131 | Shares | 57.56 | | Lithuania | Other countries | Army rule | 1,345 | Shares | 13.69 | | Macau SAR | Other countries | Army rule | 808 | Shares | 19.80 | | Malaysia | Other countries | Army rule | 1,312 | Shares | 45.88 | | Maldives | Other countries | Army rule | 1,015 | Shares | 16.55 | | Mexico | Other countries | Army rule | 1,692 | Shares | 45.58 | | Mongolia | Other countries | Army rule | 1,638 | Shares | 39.11 | | Montenegro | Other countries | Army rule | 736 | Shares | 45.72 | | Morocco | Other countries | Army rule | 1,200 | Shares | 25.50 | | Myanmar | Other countries | Army rule | 1,200 | Shares | 71.58 | | Netherlands | Other countries | Army rule | 4,060 | Shares | 3.72 | | New Zealand | Other countries | Army rule | 930 | Shares | 2.47 | | Nicaragua | Other countries | Army rule | 1,137 | Shares | 17.85 | | Nigeria | Other countries | Army rule | 1,223 | Shares | 40.38 | | North Macedonia | Other countries | Army rule | 972 | Shares | 54.15 | | Northern Ireland | Other countries | Army rule | 397 | Shares | 11.21 | | Norway | Other countries | Army rule | 1,108 | Shares | 4.00 | | Pakistan | Other countries | Army rule | 1,895 | Shares | 60.53 | | Peru | Other countries | Army rule | 1,324 | Shares | 36.04 | | Philippines | Other countries | Army rule | 1,200 | Shares | 63.44 | | Poland | Other countries | Army rule | 1,223 | Shares | 21.41 | | Portugal | Other countries | Army rule | 940 | Shares | 16.27 | | Puerto Rico | Other countries | Army rule | 1,105 | Shares | 15.38 | | Romania | Other countries | Army rule | 2,386 | Shares | 35.99 | | Russia | Other countries | Army rule | 3,177 | Shares | 19.86 | | Serbia | Other countries | Army rule | 2,152 | Shares | 49.65 | | Singapore | Other countries | Army rule | 1,873 | Shares | 9.51 | | Slovakia | Other countries | Army rule | 2,448 | Shares | 15.80 | | Slovenia | Other countries | Army rule | 1,046 | Shares | 5.28 | | South Korea | Other countries | Army rule | 1,245 | Shares | 17.43 | | Spain | Other countries | Army rule | 1,134 | Shares | 10.12 | | Sweden | Other countries | Army rule | 1,165 | Shares | 5.68 | | Switzerland | Other countries | Army rule | 3,121 | Shares | 3.92 | | Taiwan ROC | Other countries | Army rule | 1,188 | Shares | 12.48 | | Tajikistan | Other countries | Army rule | 1,200 | Shares | 65.25 | | Thailand | Other countries | Army rule | 1,462 | Shares | 61.58 | | Tunisia | Other countries | Army rule | 1,156 | Shares | 29.76 | | Ukraine | Other countries | Army rule | 2,545 | Shares | 21.92 | | United Kingdom | Other countries | Army rule | 4,127 | Shares | 13.70 | | United States | United States | Army rule | 2,528 | Shares | 20.91 | | Uruguay | Other countries | Army rule | 925 | Shares | 19.42 | | Uzbekistan | Other countries | Army rule | 1,000 | Shares | 50.50 | | Venezuela | Other countries | Army rule | 1,190 | Shares | 20.76 | | Vietnam | Other countries | Army rule | 1,105 | Shares | 83.89 | | Zimbabwe | Other countries | Army rule | 1,176 | Shares | 26.19 | | Albania | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,396 | Shares | 89.74 | | Andorra | Other countries | Experts decide | 991 | Shares | 60.85 | | Argentina | Other countries | Experts decide | 875 | Shares | 58.99 | | Armenia | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,496 | Shares | 63.41 | | Australia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,728 | Shares | 58.56 | | Austria | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,504 | Shares | 56.85 | | Azerbaijan | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,545 | Shares | 47.09 | | Bangladesh | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,026 | Shares | 55.56 | | Belarus | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,371 | Shares | 72.58 | | Bolivia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,922 | Shares | 74.51 | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,645 | Shares | 75.80 | | Brazil | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,436 | Shares | 81.17 | | Bulgaria | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,344 | Shares | 81.00 | | Canada | Other countries | Experts decide | 4,018 | Shares | 55.21 | | Chile | Other countries | Experts decide | 842 | Shares | 50.35 | | China | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,961 | Shares | 37.40 | | Colombia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,520 | Shares | 74.93 | | Croatia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,438 | Shares | 87.78 | | Cyprus | Other countries | Experts decide | 827 | Shares | 55.49 | | Czechia | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,695 | Shares | 62.76 | | Denmark | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,272 | Shares | 39.93 | | Ecuador | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,174 | Shares | 74.62 | | Egypt | Other countries | Experts decide | 908 | Shares | 72.36 | | Estonia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,046 | Shares | 69.87 | | Ethiopia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,160 | Shares | 60.69 | | Finland | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,125 | Shares | 55.78 | | France | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,724 | Shares | 51.97 | | Georgia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,988 | Shares | 66.13 | | Germany | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,414 | Shares | 40.68 | | Greece | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,094 | Shares | 22.18 | | Guatemala | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,229 | Shares | 80.07 | | Hong Kong SAR | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,017 | Shares | 46.23 | | Hungary | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,411 | Shares | 75.58 | | Iceland | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,555 | Shares | 55.86 | | India | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,201 | Shares | 72.53 | | Indonesia | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,119 | Shares | 69.91 | | Iran | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,474 | Shares | 73.34 | | Iraq | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,160 | Shares | 60.43 | | Italy | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,093 | Shares | 41.77 | | Japan | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,063 | Shares | 49.01 | | Jordan | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,049 | Shares | 50.52 | | Kazakhstan | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,011 | Shares | 66.17 | | Kenya | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,225 | Shares | 65.22 | | Kyrgyzstan | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,006 | Shares | 62.97 | | Latvia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,185 | Shares | 70.27 | | Lebanon | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,180 | Shares | 65 | | Libya | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,144 | Shares | 58.30 | | Lithuania | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,230 | Shares | 40.16 | | Macau SAR | Other countries | Experts decide | 808 | Shares | 54.08 | | Malaysia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,312 | Shares | 77.21 | | Maldives | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,019 | Shares | 62.12 | | Mexico | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,693 | Shares | 76.24 | | Mongolia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,638 | Shares | 67.93 | | Montenegro | Other countries | Experts decide | 865 | Shares | 80.23 | | Morocco | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,200 | Shares | 61.92 | | Myanmar | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,200 | Shares | 68.83 | | Netherlands | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,821 | Shares | 53.96 | | New Zealand | Other countries | Experts decide | 903 | Shares | 44.08 | | Nicaragua | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,137 | Shares | 70.01 | | Nigeria | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,217 | Shares | 66.52 | | North Macedonia | Other countries | Experts decide | 988 | Shares | 87.54 | | Northern Ireland | Other countries | Experts decide | 391 | Shares | 64.63 | | Norway | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,102 | Shares | 35.65 | | Pakistan | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,867 | Shares | 58.44 | | Peru | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,286 | Shares | 70.05 | | Philippines | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,200 | Shares | 65.78 | | Poland | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,182 | Shares | 67.58 | | Portugal | Other countries | Experts decide | 867 | Shares | 61.77 | | Puerto Rico | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,109 | Shares | 64.92 | | Romania | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,581 | Shares | 83.89 | | Russia | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,045 | Shares | 42.70 | | Serbia | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,213 | Shares | 82.44 | | Singapore | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,789 | Shares | 46.69 | | Slovakia | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,423 | Shares | 75.84 | | Slovenia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,015 | Shares | 83.10 | | South Korea | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,245 | Shares | 53.01 | | Spain | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,066 | Shares | 63.75 | | Sweden | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,155 | Shares | 37.42 | | Switzerland | Other countries | Experts decide | 3,060 | Shares | 34.40 | | Taiwan ROC | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,184 | Shares | 66.88 | | Tajikistan | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,200 | Shares | 60.42 | | Thailand | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,455 | Shares | 69.70 | | Tunisia | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,162 | Shares | 42.77 | | Turkey | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,144 | Shares | 53.87 | | Ukraine | Other countries | Experts decide | 2,331 | Shares | 50.89 | | United Kingdom | Other countries | Experts decide | 4,086 | Shares | 59.15 | | United States | United States | Experts decide | 2,535 | Shares | 52.55 | | Uruguay | Other countries | Experts decide | 914 | Shares | 64.96 | | Uzbekistan | Other countries | Experts decide | 995 | Shares | 55.38 | | Venezuela | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,190 | Shares | 75.38 | | Vietnam | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,094 | Shares | 87.39 | | Zimbabwe | Other countries | Experts decide | 1,182 | Shares | 64.30 | | Albania | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,424 | Shares | 89.33 | | Andorra | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,003 | Shares | 59.92 | | Argentina | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 989 | Shares | 54.08 | | Armenia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,677 | Shares | 50.35 | | Australia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,771 | Shares | 56.45 | | Austria | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,630 | Shares | 64.10 | | Azerbaijan | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,753 | Shares | 44.31 | | Bangladesh | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,200 | Shares | 34.33 | | Belarus | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,486 | Shares | 33.81 | | Bolivia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,037 | Shares | 48.90 | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,688 | Shares | 44.06 | | Brazil | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,545 | Shares | 57.88 | | Bulgaria | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,456 | Shares | 41.38 | | Canada | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 4,018 | Shares | 50.03 | | Chile | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 961 | Shares | 30.27 | | China | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 3,013 | Shares | 47.29 | | Colombia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,520 | Shares | 56.12 | | Croatia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,462 | Shares | 51.46 | | Cyprus | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 988 | Shares | 64.85 | | Czechia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,908 | Shares | 34.78 | | Denmark | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 3,347 | Shares | 78.03 | | Ecuador | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,189 | Shares | 49.87 | | Egypt | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,149 | Shares | 63.10 | | Estonia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,245 | Shares | 51.87 | | Ethiopia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,220 | Shares | 85.57 | | Finland | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,153 | Shares | 60.44 | | France | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,844 | Shares | 50.55 | | Georgia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,142 | Shares | 68.30 | | Germany | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 3,651 | Shares | 75.31 | | Greece | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,195 | Shares | 62.82 | | Guatemala | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,200 | Shares | 38.50 | | Hong Kong SAR | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,047 | Shares | 27.26 | | Hungary | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,498 | Shares | 63.14 | | Iceland | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,601 | Shares | 75.30 | | India | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,309 | Shares | 50.67 | | Indonesia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 3,164 | Shares | 44.03 | | Iran | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,482 | Shares | 64.17 | | Iraq | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,200 | Shares | 26.17 | | Italy | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,267 | Shares | 63.93 | | Japan | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,220 | Shares | 47.70 | | Jordan | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,172 | Shares | 48.81 | | Kazakhstan | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,267 | Shares | 37.17 | | Kenya | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,246 | Shares | 45.18 | | Kyrgyzstan | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,178 | Shares | 68.72 | | Latvia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,297 | Shares | 35.95 | | Lebanon | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,189 | Shares | 23.97 | | Libya | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,185 | Shares | 61.27 | | Lithuania | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,374 | Shares | 42.13 | | Macau SAR | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 807 | Shares | 25.40 | | Malaysia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,313 | Shares | 34.73 | | Maldives | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,031 | Shares | 30.84 | | Mexico | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,729 | Shares | 48.02 | | Mongolia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,638 | Shares | 20.40 | | Montenegro | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 977 | Shares | 45.47 | | Morocco | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,200 | Shares | 60.25 | | Myanmar | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,200 | Shares | 61.58 | | Netherlands | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 4,202 | Shares | 46.53 | | New Zealand | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 986 | Shares | 64.10 | | Nicaragua | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,137 | Shares | 60.60 | | Nigeria | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,231 | Shares | 44.24 | | North Macedonia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,064 | Shares | 62.90 | | Northern Ireland | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 410 | Shares | 58.76 | | Norway | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,117 | Shares | 78.24 | | Pakistan | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,958 | Shares | 52.04 | | Peru | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,382 | Shares | 47.86 | | Philippines | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,200 | Shares | 32.46 | | Poland | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,323 | Shares | 64.44 | | Portugal | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,150 | Shares | 41.28 | | Puerto Rico | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,107 | Shares | 68.74 | | Romania | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,674 | Shares | 51.44 | | Russia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 3,415 | Shares | 24.90 | | Serbia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,428 | Shares | 27.63 | | Singapore | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,975 | Shares | 28.70 | | Slovakia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,586 | Shares | 31.50 | | Slovenia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,055 | Shares | 38.72 | | South Korea | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,245 | Shares | 15.18 | | Spain | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,195 | Shares | 54.53 | | Sweden | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,178 | Shares | 74.18 | | Switzerland | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 3,145 | Shares | 67.37 | | Taiwan ROC | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,222 | Shares | 54.17 | | Tajikistan | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,200 | Shares | 40.17 | | Thailand | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,481 | Shares | 33.97 | | Tunisia | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,184 | Shares | 43.24 | | Turkey | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,363 | Shares | 35.84 | | Ukraine | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,777 | Shares | 47.23 | | United Kingdom | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 4,151 | Shares | 60.08 | | United States | United States | Top rating on importance of democracy | 2,552 | Shares | 49.87 | | Uruguay | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 972 | Shares | 75.97 | | Uzbekistan | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,228 | Shares | 57.74 | | Venezuela | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,190 | Shares | 44.29 | | Vietnam | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,200 | Shares | 53.17 | | Zimbabwe | Other countries | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,204 | Shares | 75.17 | | Albania | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,424 | Means | 9.64 | | Andorra | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,003 | Means | 9.11 | | Argentina | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 989 | Means | 8.82 | | Armenia | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 2,677 | Means | 8.27 | | Australia | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,771 | Means | 8.71 | | Austria | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,630 | Means | 9.09 | | Azerbaijan | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,753 | Means | 8.69 | | Bangladesh | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,200 | Means | 8.11 | | Belarus | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,486 | Means | 8.01 | | Bolivia | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 2,037 | Means | 8.51 | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,688 | Means | 8.35 | | Brazil | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,545 | Means | 8.20 | | Bulgaria | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,456 | Means | 7.99 | | Canada | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 4,018 | Means | 8.65 | | Chile | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 961 | Means | 7.60 | | China | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 3,013 | Means | 8.71 | | Colombia | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,520 | Means | 8.31 | | Croatia | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,462 | Means | 8.34 | | Cyprus | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 988 | Means | 8.96 | | Czechia | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 2,908 | Means | 8.01 | | Denmark | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 3,347 | Means | 9.47 | | Ecuador | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,189 | Means | 8.21 | | Egypt | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,149 | Means | 9.13 | | Estonia | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,245 | Means | 8.65 | | Ethiopia | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,220 | Means | 9.49 | | Finland | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,153 | Means | 9.09 | | France | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,844 | Means | 8.61 | | Georgia | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 2,142 | Means | 8.91 | | Germany | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 3,651 | Means | 9.41 | | Greece | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,195 | Means | 9.32 | | Guatemala | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,200 | Means | 7.51 | | Hong Kong SAR | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 2,047 | Means | 7.82 | | Hungary | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,498 | Means | 8.86 | | Iceland | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,601 | Means | 9.48 | | India | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,309 | Means | 8.42 | | Indonesia | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 3,164 | Means | 8.23 | | Iran | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,482 | Means | 8.81 | | Iraq | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,200 | Means | 7.34 | | Italy | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 2,267 | Means | 9.14 | | Japan | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,220 | Means | 8.70 | | Jordan | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,172 | Means | 8.18 | | Kazakhstan | Other countries | Importance of living in a democracy (mean) | 1,267 | Means | 7.92 | The first 500 of 642 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/us_vs_world.json. Views: Shares (percent) (panel_view = Shares); Importance and perceived democracy (mean) (panel_view = Means). Note: Countries with an effective sample at or above the floor in Wave 7; the set differs from the fixed set. Each country's estimate omits design effects. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, Wave 7 (2017 to 2023); weighted (weight, S017 within country) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/us_vs_world.json ### Table 5. Young adults went from less approving of a strong leader than older adults to level with them between Wave 3 and Wave 7 Share among adults aged 18 to 34 minus share among adults aged 55 or older, percentage points, equal-weight mean across countries, by wave | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | item | n | n_countries | scope | x | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | | −1.67 | −4.78 | −3.22 | Army rule | 40,439 | 30 | Fixed set | 1996 | | 0.790 | −2.42 | −0.813 | Army rule | 56,429 | 30 | Fixed set | 2007 | | 4.92 | −0.484 | 2.22 | Army rule | 51,485 | 30 | Fixed set | 2018 | | 1.67 | −1.49 | 0.089 | Democratic system | 40,085 | 30 | Fixed set | 1996 | | 0.804 | −2.56 | −0.876 | Democratic system | 56,147 | 30 | Fixed set | 2007 | | 0.039 | −2.59 | −1.27 | Democratic system | 51,979 | 30 | Fixed set | 2018 | | 3.70 | −1.39 | 1.15 | Experts decide | 38,991 | 30 | Fixed set | 1996 | | 4.48 | 0.025 | 2.25 | Experts decide | 54,321 | 30 | Fixed set | 2007 | | 8.98 | 1.75 | 5.37 | Experts decide | 50,829 | 30 | Fixed set | 2018 | | −3.56 | −9.68 | −6.62 | Strong leader | 39,946 | 30 | Fixed set | 1996 | | −0.153 | −4.65 | −2.40 | Strong leader | 55,473 | 30 | Fixed set | 2007 | | 2.60 | −1.88 | 0.364 | Strong leader | 51,421 | 30 | Fixed set | 2018 | | −3.47 | −10.39 | −6.93 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 51,271 | 37 | Fixed set | 2007 | | −4.92 | −14.04 | −9.48 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 72,171 | 37 | Fixed set | 2018 | | 4.66 | −2.52 | 1.07 | Army rule | 938 | 1 | United States | 1995 | | 8.31 | −0.580 | 3.86 | Army rule | 678 | 1 | United States | 1999 | | 13.51 | 0.517 | 7.01 | Army rule | 724 | 1 | United States | 2006 | | 15.98 | 6.11 | 11.05 | Army rule | 1,413 | 1 | United States | 2011 | | 21.90 | 12.25 | 17.08 | Army rule | 1,658 | 1 | United States | 2017 | | −0.872 | −9.77 | −5.32 | Democratic system | 906 | 1 | United States | 1995 | | −4.45 | −13.71 | −9.08 | Democratic system | 664 | 1 | United States | 1999 | | −3.87 | −16.40 | −10.13 | Democratic system | 722 | 1 | United States | 2006 | | −4.43 | −14.51 | −9.47 | Democratic system | 1,408 | 1 | United States | 2011 | | −7.21 | −16.05 | −11.63 | Democratic system | 1,642 | 1 | United States | 2017 | | 16.03 | 2.10 | 9.06 | Experts decide | 912 | 1 | United States | 1995 | | 23.29 | 8.12 | 15.71 | Experts decide | 676 | 1 | United States | 1999 | | 16.18 | −1.84 | 7.17 | Experts decide | 724 | 1 | United States | 2006 | | 21.43 | 8.98 | 15.21 | Experts decide | 1,414 | 1 | United States | 2011 | | 28.52 | 16.54 | 22.53 | Experts decide | 1,665 | 1 | United States | 2017 | | 16.87 | 4.13 | 10.50 | Strong leader | 920 | 1 | United States | 1995 | | 16.99 | 2.67 | 9.83 | Strong leader | 679 | 1 | United States | 1999 | | 12.29 | −4.74 | 3.77 | Strong leader | 728 | 1 | United States | 2006 | | 26.03 | 13.91 | 19.97 | Strong leader | 1,417 | 1 | United States | 2011 | | 20.13 | 8.44 | 14.29 | Strong leader | 1,671 | 1 | United States | 2017 | | −21.30 | −38.58 | −29.94 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 727 | 1 | United States | 2006 | | −24.09 | −35.90 | −30.00 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,423 | 1 | United States | 2011 | | −29.79 | −41.26 | −35.52 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 1,677 | 1 | United States | 2017 | Views: Fixed set of countries (scope = Fixed set); United States (scope = United States). Note: Fixed set: the countries of the fixed set with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor (n at least 100 and an effective sample of at least 100); the importance line uses its own set of countries observed in Waves 5 and 7. Age groups are 18 to 34 and 55 or older; the 35 to 54 group is not plotted. Intervals for the fixed set are clustered by country (t critical value on one fewer degree of freedom than the number of countries); intervals for one country use the Kish effective sample size. The WVS file has no strata or sampling units, so no interval includes design effects. Note: A cross-section confounds age with cohort, and a change in the gap between waves identifies a cohort difference only if period changes are the same at every age. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, Waves 3, 5 and 7 (1995 to 2023); weighted (weight, S017 within country; equal weight per country across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/age_gaps.json ### Table 6. Every birth cohort followed across waves became more approving of a strong leader, and the cohorts ended close together Share of adults calling a strong leader a good way of governing the country, by birth cohort and wave, equal-weight mean across countries | cohort | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | item | n | n_countries | x | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 15.30 | 8.38 | 11.84 | Army rule | 16,646 | 30 | 1996 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 18.03 | 9.80 | 13.92 | Army rule | 19,092 | 30 | 2007 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 24.26 | 13.19 | 18.73 | Army rule | 16,021 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1978 to 1986 | 18.80 | 10.35 | 14.58 | Army rule | 9,338 | 30 | 2007 | | Born 1978 to 1986 | 25.66 | 14.54 | 20.10 | Army rule | 7,820 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1987 or later | 28.13 | 16.71 | 22.42 | Army rule | 11,374 | 30 | 2018 | | Born before 1960 | 17.29 | 9.34 | 13.32 | Army rule | 22,560 | 30 | 1996 | | Born before 1960 | 19.45 | 10.76 | 15.10 | Army rule | 24,919 | 30 | 2007 | | Born before 1960 | 26.46 | 13.96 | 20.21 | Army rule | 16,270 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 90.60 | 85.27 | 87.93 | Democratic system | 16,536 | 30 | 1996 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 90.98 | 86.18 | 88.58 | Democratic system | 19,041 | 30 | 2007 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 92.79 | 87.52 | 90.16 | Democratic system | 16,175 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1978 to 1986 | 90.17 | 84.85 | 87.51 | Democratic system | 9,321 | 30 | 2007 | | Born 1978 to 1986 | 92.83 | 88.20 | 90.52 | Democratic system | 7,929 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1987 or later | 91.58 | 86.07 | 88.83 | Democratic system | 11,509 | 30 | 2018 | | Born before 1960 | 91.14 | 85.00 | 88.07 | Democratic system | 22,309 | 30 | 1996 | | Born before 1960 | 90.78 | 86.31 | 88.55 | Democratic system | 24,714 | 30 | 2007 | | Born before 1960 | 93.14 | 87.95 | 90.54 | Democratic system | 16,366 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 67.43 | 56.98 | 62.20 | Experts decide | 16,226 | 30 | 1996 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 67.21 | 56.31 | 61.76 | Experts decide | 18,455 | 30 | 2007 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 71.09 | 57.84 | 64.47 | Experts decide | 15,883 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1978 to 1986 | 68.80 | 58.59 | 63.70 | Experts decide | 9,025 | 30 | 2007 | | Born 1978 to 1986 | 71.73 | 60.97 | 66.35 | Experts decide | 7,770 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1987 or later | 72.36 | 62.24 | 67.30 | Experts decide | 11,296 | 30 | 2018 | | Born before 1960 | 66.86 | 54.82 | 60.84 | Experts decide | 21,556 | 30 | 1996 | | Born before 1960 | 66.94 | 55.22 | 61.08 | Experts decide | 23,865 | 30 | 2007 | | Born before 1960 | 68.51 | 54.08 | 61.30 | Experts decide | 15,880 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 43.02 | 30.95 | 36.98 | Strong leader | 16,481 | 30 | 1996 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 47.45 | 33.21 | 40.33 | Strong leader | 18,834 | 30 | 2007 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 54.57 | 37.20 | 45.89 | Strong leader | 15,998 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1978 to 1986 | 48.72 | 34.75 | 41.74 | Strong leader | 9,147 | 30 | 2007 | | Born 1978 to 1986 | 55.95 | 39.60 | 47.77 | Strong leader | 7,853 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1987 or later | 55.54 | 40.43 | 47.98 | Strong leader | 11,332 | 30 | 2018 | | Born before 1960 | 46.70 | 34.25 | 40.48 | Strong leader | 22,234 | 30 | 1996 | | Born before 1960 | 50.66 | 36.16 | 43.41 | Strong leader | 24,471 | 30 | 2007 | | Born before 1960 | 56.50 | 39.41 | 47.95 | Strong leader | 16,238 | 30 | 2018 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 53.84 | 45.16 | 49.50 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 18,739 | 37 | 2007 | | Born 1960 to 1977 | 59.69 | 50.10 | 54.90 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 22,845 | 37 | 2018 | | Born 1978 to 1986 | 48.79 | 39.58 | 44.18 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 9,803 | 37 | 2007 | | Born 1978 to 1986 | 56.29 | 46.82 | 51.55 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 11,913 | 37 | 2018 | | Born 1987 or later | 50.84 | 41.92 | 46.38 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 16,196 | 37 | 2018 | | Born before 1960 | 57.38 | 47.29 | 52.34 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 20,364 | 37 | 2007 | | Born before 1960 | 62.35 | 51.02 | 56.69 | Top rating on importance of democracy | 21,217 | 37 | 2018 | Views: Strong leader (item = Strong leader); Army rule (item = Army rule); Democratic system (item = Democratic system); Top rating on importance of democracy (item = Top rating on importance of democracy). Note: Countries: the countries of the fixed set with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor (n at least 100 and an effective sample of at least 100). Intervals for the fixed set are clustered by country (t critical value on one fewer degree of freedom than the number of countries); intervals for one country use the Kish effective sample size. The WVS file has no strata or sampling units, so no interval includes design effects. Note: The first three cohorts are shown in a wave only if all their members were 18 or older at the earliest fieldwork year of the wave; the cohort born 1987 or later is open-ended and holds respondents born from 1987 who were 18 or older at interview in Wave 7. Ages at interview: cohort born 1978 to 1986 in Wave 5, 18 to 31; cohort born 1987 or later in Wave 7, 18 to 36. Birth year is the survey year minus age, so it can be off by one. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, Waves 3, 5 and 7 (1995 to 2023); weighted (weight, S017 within country; equal weight per country across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/cohort_lines.json ### Table 7. In 38 of 73 countries the interval for the right-minus-left difference in approval of a strong leader lies above zero Share calling a strong leader a good way of governing among adults placing themselves at the right end of the left-right scale minus the share at the left end, percentage points, by country, Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | conf_high | conf_low | country | estimate | group | item | n | | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | | 35.99 | 17.48 | Malaysia | 26.73 | Other countries | Army rule | 530 | | 33.49 | 16.98 | Uruguay | 25.23 | Other countries | Army rule | 601 | | 32.31 | 15.66 | Brazil | 23.99 | Other countries | Army rule | 523 | | 25.66 | 10.79 | Bosnia Herzegovina | 18.23 | Other countries | Army rule | 762 | | 23.87 | 11.71 | Spain | 17.79 | Other countries | Army rule | 611 | | 27.25 | 6.85 | Tajikistan | 17.05 | Other countries | Army rule | 909 | | 25.21 | 8.11 | Serbia | 16.66 | Other countries | Army rule | 971 | | 19.02 | 12.20 | Canada | 15.61 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,234 | | 22.40 | 7.80 | Croatia | 15.10 | Other countries | Army rule | 662 | | 21.02 | 9.17 | Colombia | 15.10 | Other countries | Army rule | 878 | | 21.15 | 5.92 | Argentina | 13.54 | Other countries | Army rule | 446 | | 17.77 | 8.63 | United States | 13.20 | United States | Army rule | 1,644 | | 18.27 | 7.40 | South Korea | 12.83 | Other countries | Army rule | 749 | | 13.82 | 6.10 | Italy | 9.96 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,052 | | 13.65 | 5.99 | Finland | 9.82 | Other countries | Army rule | 734 | | 16.57 | 1.48 | Ecuador | 9.03 | Other countries | Army rule | 546 | | 16.74 | −0.111 | Belarus | 8.32 | Other countries | Army rule | 334 | | 12.68 | 3.84 | Slovakia | 8.26 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,216 | | 15.55 | 0.770 | Poland | 8.16 | Other countries | Army rule | 555 | | 11.94 | 2.58 | Greece | 7.26 | Other countries | Army rule | 571 | | 11.93 | 1.62 | Slovenia | 6.78 | Other countries | Army rule | 405 | | 13.18 | 0.187 | Zimbabwe | 6.69 | Other countries | Army rule | 747 | | 13.14 | −0.168 | Armenia | 6.49 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,261 | | 11.02 | 0.622 | France | 5.82 | Other countries | Army rule | 847 | | 12.93 | −1.61 | Mongolia | 5.66 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,010 | | 11.61 | −1.49 | Mexico | 5.06 | Other countries | Army rule | 943 | | 9.13 | −0.390 | Andorra | 4.37 | Other countries | Army rule | 486 | | 7.25 | 1.32 | Norway | 4.29 | Other countries | Army rule | 724 | | 9.58 | −1.35 | Maldives | 4.12 | Other countries | Army rule | 691 | | 13.54 | −5.42 | Ethiopia | 4.06 | Other countries | Army rule | 447 | | 7.95 | −0.009 | Austria | 3.97 | Other countries | Army rule | 753 | | 8.19 | −0.261 | Singapore | 3.97 | Other countries | Army rule | 889 | | 12.21 | −4.40 | Georgia | 3.90 | Other countries | Army rule | 882 | | 7.21 | 0.575 | United Kingdom | 3.89 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,076 | | 7.96 | −0.449 | Australia | 3.75 | Other countries | Army rule | 896 | | 9.80 | −3.13 | Russia | 3.34 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,053 | | 4.57 | 1.92 | Netherlands | 3.24 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,598 | | 8.44 | −2.82 | Latvia | 2.81 | Other countries | Army rule | 492 | | 11.63 | −6.15 | Philippines | 2.74 | Other countries | Army rule | 784 | | 9.56 | −4.97 | Nicaragua | 2.30 | Other countries | Army rule | 527 | | 12.26 | −7.95 | North Macedonia | 2.15 | Other countries | Army rule | 462 | | 11.32 | −7.26 | India | 2.03 | Other countries | Army rule | 604 | | 7.35 | −3.49 | Bolivia | 1.93 | Other countries | Army rule | 897 | | 3.62 | 0.220 | Switzerland | 1.92 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,816 | | 7.24 | −3.50 | Puerto Rico | 1.87 | Other countries | Army rule | 725 | | 10.58 | −6.99 | Portugal | 1.80 | Other countries | Army rule | 401 | | 2.88 | −0.216 | Germany | 1.33 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,744 | | 3.60 | −1.27 | Denmark | 1.16 | Other countries | Army rule | 2,219 | | 4.28 | −2.15 | Sweden | 1.06 | Other countries | Army rule | 776 | | 6.47 | −4.47 | Albania | 1.00 | Other countries | Army rule | 816 | | 2.07 | −0.945 | Iceland | 0.561 | Other countries | Army rule | 994 | | 7.05 | −6.89 | Lithuania | 0.079 | Other countries | Army rule | 493 | | 6.24 | −6.64 | Indonesia | −0.199 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,730 | | 6.89 | −7.50 | Kenya | −0.306 | Other countries | Army rule | 728 | | 1.57 | −2.33 | New Zealand | −0.383 | Other countries | Army rule | 529 | | 7.38 | −8.25 | Guatemala | −0.435 | Other countries | Army rule | 625 | | 1.95 | −3.67 | Japan | −0.860 | Other countries | Army rule | 536 | | 5.22 | −7.46 | Hong Kong SAR | −1.12 | Other countries | Army rule | 666 | | 8.98 | −11.73 | Thailand | −1.37 | Other countries | Army rule | 459 | | 2.76 | −6.44 | Hungary | −1.84 | Other countries | Army rule | 679 | | 4.38 | −9.50 | Romania | −2.56 | Other countries | Army rule | 976 | | 1.44 | −7.46 | Estonia | −3.01 | Other countries | Army rule | 417 | | 4.47 | −10.87 | Tunisia | −3.20 | Other countries | Army rule | 609 | | 3.24 | −10.04 | Venezuela | −3.40 | Other countries | Army rule | 757 | | 0.475 | −7.65 | Czechia | −3.59 | Other countries | Army rule | 1,471 | | 3.57 | −13.04 | Libya | −4.74 | Other countries | Army rule | 545 | | 0.034 | −11.06 | Azerbaijan | −5.51 | Other countries | Army rule | 770 | | 0.289 | −12.92 | Morocco | −6.31 | Other countries | Army rule | 695 | | −1.29 | −14.72 | Bulgaria | −8.00 | Other countries | Army rule | 669 | | −3.59 | −22.87 | Peru | −13.23 | Other countries | Army rule | 567 | | −6.37 | −20.10 | Nigeria | −13.23 | Other countries | Army rule | 853 | | 16.77 | 2.39 | Hong Kong SAR | 9.58 | Other countries | Democratic system | 663 | | 18.09 | 0.867 | Philippines | 9.48 | Other countries | Democratic system | 782 | | 12.30 | 2.77 | Indonesia | 7.54 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,721 | | 11.27 | 2.96 | Turkey | 7.11 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,417 | | 12.60 | 0.573 | Colombia | 6.58 | Other countries | Democratic system | 878 | | 11.94 | −0.628 | Latvia | 5.65 | Other countries | Democratic system | 486 | | 11.78 | −0.590 | Tajikistan | 5.59 | Other countries | Democratic system | 909 | | 10.72 | 0.321 | Morocco | 5.52 | Other countries | Democratic system | 695 | | 11.43 | −3.01 | India | 4.21 | Other countries | Democratic system | 630 | | 8.73 | −0.963 | Ethiopia | 3.88 | Other countries | Democratic system | 451 | | 7.83 | −0.871 | Croatia | 3.48 | Other countries | Democratic system | 670 | | 10.56 | −3.63 | Russia | 3.46 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,049 | | 8.37 | −1.47 | Bulgaria | 3.45 | Other countries | Democratic system | 693 | | 8.23 | −1.72 | Libya | 3.25 | Other countries | Democratic system | 548 | | 6.84 | −0.627 | Hungary | 3.11 | Other countries | Democratic system | 684 | | 4.76 | 0.583 | United Kingdom | 2.67 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,085 | | 8.28 | −3.27 | Poland | 2.51 | Other countries | Democratic system | 566 | | 6.07 | −1.73 | Romania | 2.17 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,035 | | 8.58 | −4.41 | South Korea | 2.08 | Other countries | Democratic system | 749 | | 6.85 | −3.22 | Bosnia Herzegovina | 1.81 | Other countries | Democratic system | 774 | | 6.08 | −2.89 | Portugal | 1.60 | Other countries | Democratic system | 434 | | 6.48 | −3.56 | Georgia | 1.46 | Other countries | Democratic system | 855 | | 6.27 | −3.67 | Estonia | 1.30 | Other countries | Democratic system | 421 | | 6.87 | −4.41 | Guatemala | 1.23 | Other countries | Democratic system | 625 | | 2.27 | −0.608 | Iceland | 0.833 | Other countries | Democratic system | 998 | | 4.26 | −2.61 | Czechia | 0.823 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,475 | | 2.42 | −1.27 | Denmark | 0.578 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,222 | | 2.25 | −1.33 | Sweden | 0.459 | Other countries | Democratic system | 777 | | 3.27 | −2.64 | Austria | 0.314 | Other countries | Democratic system | 769 | | 2.30 | −1.88 | Albania | 0.212 | Other countries | Democratic system | 832 | | 1.92 | −1.94 | Norway | −0.008 | Other countries | Democratic system | 726 | | 2.64 | −3.40 | Azerbaijan | −0.379 | Other countries | Democratic system | 816 | | 3.45 | −4.54 | Zimbabwe | −0.543 | Other countries | Democratic system | 757 | | 3.67 | −4.94 | Australia | −0.637 | Other countries | Democratic system | 904 | | 3.80 | −5.13 | North Macedonia | −0.660 | Other countries | Democratic system | 474 | | 3.58 | −5.16 | Nigeria | −0.788 | Other countries | Democratic system | 857 | | 2.48 | −4.22 | Japan | −0.871 | Other countries | Democratic system | 537 | | 4.28 | −6.15 | Cyprus | −0.937 | Other countries | Democratic system | 440 | | 0.779 | −2.68 | Switzerland | −0.952 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,814 | | 4.48 | −6.86 | Serbia | −1.19 | Other countries | Democratic system | 988 | | 0.119 | −2.51 | Germany | −1.20 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,733 | | 5.15 | −7.97 | Ecuador | −1.41 | Other countries | Democratic system | 550 | | 0.686 | −4.22 | Italy | −1.77 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,069 | | 2.50 | −6.68 | Uruguay | −2.09 | Other countries | Democratic system | 608 | | 4.43 | −8.62 | Argentina | −2.10 | Other countries | Democratic system | 461 | | 2.46 | −7.13 | Venezuela | −2.33 | Other countries | Democratic system | 757 | | 3.03 | −8.26 | Peru | −2.62 | Other countries | Democratic system | 569 | | 0.267 | −5.53 | Greece | −2.63 | Other countries | Democratic system | 576 | | 1.00 | −6.28 | Andorra | −2.64 | Other countries | Democratic system | 487 | | −1.38 | −4.25 | Netherlands | −2.81 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,579 | | 2.71 | −8.84 | Brazil | −3.06 | Other countries | Democratic system | 535 | | 1.21 | −7.34 | Belarus | −3.07 | Other countries | Democratic system | 347 | | 2.23 | −8.49 | Lithuania | −3.13 | Other countries | Democratic system | 482 | | 0.885 | −7.21 | New Zealand | −3.16 | Other countries | Democratic system | 533 | | 2.67 | −9.11 | Malaysia | −3.22 | Other countries | Democratic system | 530 | | 1.07 | −7.62 | Bolivia | −3.27 | Other countries | Democratic system | 905 | | 0.537 | −7.26 | France | −3.36 | Other countries | Democratic system | 848 | | −0.081 | −7.01 | Singapore | −3.55 | Other countries | Democratic system | 889 | | −0.539 | −7.03 | Finland | −3.78 | Other countries | Democratic system | 731 | | 3.46 | −11.41 | Tunisia | −3.98 | Other countries | Democratic system | 611 | | 1.50 | −10.64 | Kenya | −4.57 | Other countries | Democratic system | 740 | | 1.84 | −12.19 | Maldives | −5.18 | Other countries | Democratic system | 696 | | −0.660 | −9.81 | Armenia | −5.23 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,290 | | 2.04 | −13.59 | Thailand | −5.78 | Other countries | Democratic system | 459 | | −0.413 | −11.65 | Mexico | −6.03 | Other countries | Democratic system | 946 | | −2.26 | −9.85 | Slovakia | −6.06 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,230 | | 0.094 | −12.25 | Nicaragua | −6.08 | Other countries | Democratic system | 527 | | −0.273 | −12.93 | Mongolia | −6.60 | Other countries | Democratic system | 1,010 | | −2.26 | −11.15 | Spain | −6.71 | Other countries | Democratic system | 634 | | −3.24 | −11.06 | United States | −7.15 | United States | Democratic system | 1,633 | | −2.98 | −12.90 | Puerto Rico | −7.94 | Other countries | Democratic system | 717 | | −5.32 | −10.75 | Canada | −8.04 | Other countries | Democratic system | 2,234 | | −1.44 | −15.30 | Slovenia | −8.37 | Other countries | Democratic system | 400 | | 32.42 | 21.42 | Turkey | 26.92 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,346 | | 37.03 | 16.76 | Uruguay | 26.89 | Other countries | Strong leader | 580 | | 33.25 | 17.79 | Spain | 25.52 | Other countries | Strong leader | 604 | | 26.64 | 15.28 | Italy | 20.96 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,054 | | 26.74 | 14.74 | Poland | 20.74 | Other countries | Strong leader | 566 | | 29.91 | 11.21 | Malaysia | 20.56 | Other countries | Strong leader | 530 | | 24.16 | 15.85 | Canada | 20.01 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,234 | | 22.27 | 14.77 | Netherlands | 18.52 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,517 | | 25.32 | 9.54 | Andorra | 17.43 | Other countries | Strong leader | 489 | | 24.34 | 10.09 | Maldives | 17.21 | Other countries | Strong leader | 692 | | 24.89 | 9.51 | Bosnia Herzegovina | 17.20 | Other countries | Strong leader | 767 | | 25.90 | 7.90 | Croatia | 16.90 | Other countries | Strong leader | 665 | | 22.04 | 10.41 | United States | 16.23 | United States | Strong leader | 1,649 | | 26.87 | 4.94 | Argentina | 15.91 | Other countries | Strong leader | 426 | | 23.22 | 6.71 | Serbia | 14.97 | Other countries | Strong leader | 988 | | 20.74 | 8.27 | Austria | 14.51 | Other countries | Strong leader | 749 | | 25.36 | 3.59 | Cyprus | 14.48 | Other countries | Strong leader | 412 | | 21.12 | 7.70 | Hungary | 14.41 | Other countries | Strong leader | 681 | | 20.94 | 7.24 | Colombia | 14.09 | Other countries | Strong leader | 878 | | 20.79 | 7.27 | France | 14.03 | Other countries | Strong leader | 841 | | 23.88 | 4.14 | Slovenia | 14.01 | Other countries | Strong leader | 401 | | 23.07 | 3.93 | Ethiopia | 13.50 | Other countries | Strong leader | 449 | | 20.68 | 6.29 | Puerto Rico | 13.48 | Other countries | Strong leader | 723 | | 18.32 | 7.46 | Finland | 12.89 | Other countries | Strong leader | 740 | | 20.76 | 4.91 | Australia | 12.83 | Other countries | Strong leader | 894 | | 17.03 | 7.66 | Germany | 12.34 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,697 | | 16.52 | 7.35 | United Kingdom | 11.94 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,064 | | 15.73 | 4.61 | Slovakia | 10.17 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,209 | | 17.79 | 2.35 | Venezuela | 10.07 | Other countries | Strong leader | 757 | | 16.90 | 3.17 | Mongolia | 10.03 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,010 | | 17.23 | 1.62 | Azerbaijan | 9.43 | Other countries | Strong leader | 796 | | 16.88 | 1.25 | North Macedonia | 9.06 | Other countries | Strong leader | 459 | | 13.54 | 4.21 | Denmark | 8.88 | Other countries | Strong leader | 2,214 | | 14.96 | 1.50 | Indonesia | 8.23 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,724 | | 14.61 | 0.263 | Kenya | 7.44 | Other countries | Strong leader | 740 | | 10.76 | 3.46 | Switzerland | 7.11 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,799 | | 14.86 | −1.03 | Japan | 6.91 | Other countries | Strong leader | 524 | | 12.54 | 0.992 | New Zealand | 6.76 | Other countries | Strong leader | 518 | | 11.81 | 1.15 | Norway | 6.48 | Other countries | Strong leader | 725 | | 14.71 | −2.47 | India | 6.12 | Other countries | Strong leader | 622 | | 12.60 | −1.15 | Nigeria | 5.72 | Other countries | Strong leader | 852 | | 11.39 | −1.49 | Singapore | 4.95 | Other countries | Strong leader | 884 | | 13.02 | −3.18 | Nicaragua | 4.92 | Other countries | Strong leader | 527 | | 12.73 | −3.66 | Brazil | 4.54 | Other countries | Strong leader | 540 | | 15.92 | −7.54 | Portugal | 4.19 | Other countries | Strong leader | 413 | | 9.49 | −1.97 | Sweden | 3.76 | Other countries | Strong leader | 772 | | 12.76 | −5.88 | Peru | 3.44 | Other countries | Strong leader | 558 | | 7.61 | −1.24 | Iceland | 3.19 | Other countries | Strong leader | 992 | | 10.39 | −5.90 | Philippines | 2.24 | Other countries | Strong leader | 784 | | 7.03 | −2.62 | Greece | 2.20 | Other countries | Strong leader | 570 | | 8.86 | −6.13 | Georgia | 1.37 | Other countries | Strong leader | 890 | | 9.95 | −9.11 | Tajikistan | 0.423 | Other countries | Strong leader | 909 | | 6.33 | −6.03 | Bolivia | 0.151 | Other countries | Strong leader | 879 | | 5.97 | −6.29 | Thailand | −0.162 | Other countries | Strong leader | 459 | | 8.14 | −8.61 | Libya | −0.232 | Other countries | Strong leader | 549 | | 7.55 | −8.69 | Russia | −0.572 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,073 | | 6.03 | −8.45 | Guatemala | −1.21 | Other countries | Strong leader | 625 | | 5.67 | −8.38 | Ecuador | −1.35 | Other countries | Strong leader | 551 | | 5.12 | −8.37 | Armenia | −1.63 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,251 | | 4.23 | −8.08 | Albania | −1.93 | Other countries | Strong leader | 826 | | 4.68 | −9.42 | Zimbabwe | −2.37 | Other countries | Strong leader | 751 | | 4.10 | −9.45 | South Korea | −2.67 | Other countries | Strong leader | 749 | | 6.88 | −13.55 | Latvia | −3.34 | Other countries | Strong leader | 483 | | 5.20 | −11.93 | Hong Kong SAR | −3.36 | Other countries | Strong leader | 667 | | 1.66 | −9.48 | Romania | −3.91 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,016 | | 1.90 | −10.00 | Mexico | −4.05 | Other countries | Strong leader | 942 | | 6.58 | −14.82 | Belarus | −4.12 | Other countries | Strong leader | 337 | | 2.20 | −12.34 | Tunisia | −5.07 | Other countries | Strong leader | 610 | | 3.79 | −16.18 | Lithuania | −6.19 | Other countries | Strong leader | 488 | | 0.458 | −14.24 | Morocco | −6.89 | Other countries | Strong leader | 695 | | −4.26 | −14.37 | Czechia | −9.32 | Other countries | Strong leader | 1,446 | | −3.48 | −20.15 | Estonia | −11.81 | Other countries | Strong leader | 420 | | −8.77 | −26.75 | Bulgaria | −17.76 | Other countries | Strong leader | 656 | Views: Strong leader (item = Strong leader); Army rule (item = Army rule); Democratic system (item = Democratic system). Note: Left is placements 1 to 4 and right is placements 7 to 10 on the ten-point scale; the centre is left out. A country needs at least 100 respondents and 100 effective respondents in each group. Intervals are for each country alone and omit design effects. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, Wave 7 (2017 to 2023); weighted (weight, S017 within country) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/left_right_gap.json ### Table 8. Where interviews stayed face to face, European ratings of whether the media are free to criticize the government fell by 0.38 points between Round 6 and Round 10 Change in the mean rating of how far each feature of democracy applies in the country, and in satisfaction with democracy, ESS Round 6 (2012 to 2013) to Round 10 (2020 to 2022), points on the eleven-point scale, by country, countries that kept face-to-face interviews | change | conf_high | conf_low | country | item | mode | n | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | | −0.269 | −0.082 | −0.456 | Belgium | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,170 | | −0.340 | −0.134 | −0.546 | Bulgaria | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,733 | | 0.135 | 0.270 | 0.001 | Switzerland | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,852 | | −1.69 | −1.39 | −1.99 | Cyprus | Elections free and fair | Self-completion in Round 10 | 1,918 | | −0.178 | 0.006 | −0.362 | Czechia | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,303 | | −0.573 | −0.474 | −0.673 | Germany | Elections free and fair | Self-completion in Round 10 | 11,321 | | 0.810 | 0.993 | 0.627 | Estonia | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,794 | | 0.530 | 0.708 | 0.352 | Spain | Elections free and fair | Self-completion in Round 10 | 4,063 | | 0.201 | 0.289 | 0.114 | Finland | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,742 | | −0.188 | −0.030 | −0.346 | France | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,827 | | −0.025 | 0.157 | −0.207 | United Kingdom | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,331 | | −0.682 | −0.482 | −0.882 | Hungary | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,578 | | −0.272 | −0.096 | −0.449 | Ireland | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,239 | | −1.08 | −0.840 | −1.33 | Israel | Elections free and fair | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,596 | | 0.333 | 0.548 | 0.117 | Iceland | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 1,615 | | −0.135 | 0.090 | −0.360 | Italy | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,463 | | 1.63 | 1.86 | 1.40 | Lithuania | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,580 | | −0.154 | −0.009 | −0.299 | Netherlands | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,275 | | 0.176 | 0.314 | 0.039 | Norway | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,996 | | −1.77 | −1.58 | −1.96 | Poland | Elections free and fair | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,828 | | 1.09 | 1.26 | 0.923 | Portugal | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,780 | | −0.427 | −0.309 | −0.546 | Sweden | Elections free and fair | Self-completion in Round 10 | 4,073 | | 0.283 | 0.503 | 0.064 | Slovenia | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,400 | | −0.097 | 0.146 | −0.340 | Slovakia | Elections free and fair | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,182 | | −0.216 | −0.046 | −0.387 | Belgium | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,161 | | −2.07 | −1.86 | −2.28 | Bulgaria | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,778 | | −0.198 | −0.044 | −0.352 | Switzerland | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,872 | | −2.77 | −2.44 | −3.11 | Cyprus | Media free to criticize the government | Self-completion in Round 10 | 1,927 | | 0.008 | 0.179 | −0.163 | Czechia | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,313 | | −0.633 | −0.534 | −0.732 | Germany | Media free to criticize the government | Self-completion in Round 10 | 11,331 | | 0.131 | 0.297 | −0.035 | Estonia | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,825 | | −0.567 | −0.381 | −0.753 | Spain | Media free to criticize the government | Self-completion in Round 10 | 4,060 | | 0.316 | 0.433 | 0.200 | Finland | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,706 | | −0.626 | −0.451 | −0.802 | France | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,880 | | −0.232 | −0.027 | −0.438 | United Kingdom | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,309 | | −1.13 | −0.929 | −1.34 | Hungary | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,673 | | −0.786 | −0.609 | −0.964 | Ireland | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,284 | | −1.19 | −0.940 | −1.45 | Israel | Media free to criticize the government | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,574 | | 0.150 | 0.371 | −0.071 | Iceland | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 1,609 | | −0.648 | −0.414 | −0.881 | Italy | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,472 | | 0.405 | 0.617 | 0.192 | Lithuania | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,619 | | −0.121 | 0.022 | −0.263 | Netherlands | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,275 | | −0.064 | 0.104 | −0.233 | Norway | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,003 | | −2.36 | −2.17 | −2.54 | Poland | Media free to criticize the government | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,860 | | 0.572 | 0.742 | 0.403 | Portugal | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,793 | | −0.747 | −0.609 | −0.885 | Sweden | Media free to criticize the government | Self-completion in Round 10 | 4,080 | | −0.948 | −0.732 | −1.16 | Slovenia | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,426 | | −1.34 | −1.09 | −1.58 | Slovakia | Media free to criticize the government | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,173 | | 0.099 | 0.256 | −0.057 | Belgium | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,158 | | −0.401 | −0.183 | −0.620 | Bulgaria | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,779 | | 0.043 | 0.183 | −0.098 | Switzerland | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,843 | | −2.16 | −1.83 | −2.48 | Cyprus | Minority rights protected | Self-completion in Round 10 | 1,915 | | 0.841 | 1.01 | 0.668 | Czechia | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,216 | | −0.320 | −0.219 | −0.422 | Germany | Minority rights protected | Self-completion in Round 10 | 11,140 | | 0.657 | 0.826 | 0.489 | Estonia | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,695 | | 0.907 | 1.08 | 0.732 | Spain | Minority rights protected | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,990 | | 0.338 | 0.455 | 0.221 | Finland | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,682 | | −0.163 | −0.010 | −0.315 | France | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,807 | | −0.258 | −0.052 | −0.463 | United Kingdom | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,206 | | −0.403 | −0.222 | −0.584 | Hungary | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,700 | | −0.176 | −0.003 | −0.350 | Ireland | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,177 | | −0.749 | −0.479 | −1.02 | Israel | Minority rights protected | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,517 | | 0.399 | 0.627 | 0.171 | Iceland | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 1,597 | | 0.359 | 0.567 | 0.150 | Italy | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,477 | | 0.763 | 0.959 | 0.566 | Lithuania | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,443 | | −0.097 | 0.041 | −0.234 | Netherlands | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,235 | | 0.273 | 0.444 | 0.102 | Norway | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,967 | | −1.15 | −0.971 | −1.32 | Poland | Minority rights protected | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,627 | | 1.26 | 1.44 | 1.07 | Portugal | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,754 | | −0.689 | −0.545 | −0.833 | Sweden | Minority rights protected | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,997 | | −0.613 | −0.412 | −0.814 | Slovenia | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,318 | | −0.387 | −0.158 | −0.615 | Slovakia | Minority rights protected | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,136 | | −0.183 | 0.044 | −0.409 | Belgium | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,125 | | −1.05 | −0.848 | −1.26 | Bulgaria | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,733 | | −0.111 | 0.036 | −0.258 | Switzerland | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,851 | | −1.33 | −0.963 | −1.69 | Cyprus | Citizens have the final say | Self-completion in Round 10 | 1,899 | | 0.848 | 1.06 | 0.635 | Czechia | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,148 | | 0.381 | 0.532 | 0.230 | Germany | Citizens have the final say | Self-completion in Round 10 | 11,106 | | 0.035 | 0.231 | −0.160 | Estonia | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,729 | | 0.234 | 0.448 | 0.020 | Spain | Citizens have the final say | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,964 | | −0.195 | −0.014 | −0.377 | Finland | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,672 | | −0.654 | −0.461 | −0.847 | France | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,814 | | 0.426 | 0.676 | 0.176 | United Kingdom | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,212 | | −0.027 | 0.174 | −0.227 | Hungary | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,666 | | −0.487 | −0.293 | −0.681 | Ireland | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,227 | | −0.008 | 0.274 | −0.291 | Israel | Citizens have the final say | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,518 | | −0.931 | −0.628 | −1.23 | Iceland | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 1,575 | | 0.303 | 0.533 | 0.072 | Italy | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,450 | | 0.922 | 1.14 | 0.702 | Lithuania | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,518 | | −0.156 | 0.061 | −0.374 | Netherlands | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,204 | | 0.037 | 0.272 | −0.199 | Norway | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,960 | | −1.16 | −0.958 | −1.36 | Poland | Citizens have the final say | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,783 | | 0.801 | 1.01 | 0.597 | Portugal | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,650 | | −1.24 | −1.05 | −1.43 | Sweden | Citizens have the final say | Self-completion in Round 10 | 4,015 | | −0.649 | −0.425 | −0.874 | Slovenia | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,383 | | −0.361 | −0.093 | −0.629 | Slovakia | Citizens have the final say | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,147 | | −0.338 | −0.176 | −0.499 | Belgium | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,181 | | 0.175 | 0.341 | 0.008 | Bulgaria | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,822 | | 0.273 | 0.394 | 0.153 | Switzerland | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,954 | | −0.740 | −0.430 | −1.05 | Cyprus | Satisfaction with democracy | Self-completion in Round 10 | 1,957 | | 0.682 | 0.850 | 0.514 | Czechia | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,367 | | −0.338 | −0.230 | −0.446 | Germany | Satisfaction with democracy | Self-completion in Round 10 | 11,487 | | 0.746 | 0.898 | 0.595 | Estonia | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,772 | | 0.684 | 0.853 | 0.515 | Spain | Satisfaction with democracy | Self-completion in Round 10 | 4,089 | | 0.464 | 0.584 | 0.345 | Finland | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,706 | | 0.117 | 0.286 | −0.053 | France | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,870 | | −0.364 | −0.162 | −0.567 | United Kingdom | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,249 | | 0.503 | 0.686 | 0.321 | Hungary | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,696 | | 0.791 | 0.970 | 0.612 | Ireland | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 4,223 | | −1.64 | −1.38 | −1.89 | Israel | Satisfaction with democracy | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,716 | | 0.875 | 1.09 | 0.658 | Iceland | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 1,605 | | 1.08 | 1.27 | 0.892 | Italy | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,525 | | 0.133 | 0.327 | −0.062 | Lithuania | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,559 | | −0.166 | −0.026 | −0.306 | Netherlands | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,254 | | 0.378 | 0.548 | 0.209 | Norway | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,016 | | −1.24 | −1.07 | −1.41 | Poland | Satisfaction with democracy | Self-completion in Round 10 | 3,827 | | 1.64 | 1.81 | 1.47 | Portugal | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,813 | | −0.831 | −0.686 | −0.977 | Sweden | Satisfaction with democracy | Self-completion in Round 10 | 4,082 | | 0.699 | 0.892 | 0.505 | Slovenia | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 2,427 | | −0.642 | −0.419 | −0.864 | Slovakia | Satisfaction with democracy | Face to face in Round 10 | 3,210 | Views: Face to face in Round 10 (mode = Face to face in Round 10); All countries; Self-completion in Round 10 (mode = Self-completion in Round 10). Note: Round 10 fieldwork ran from 2020 to 2022. Countries that switched to self-completion in Round 10: Cyprus, Germany, Israel, Poland, Spain and Sweden. The ESS advises caution about comparisons over time in those countries. Note: Intervals are for each country alone and omit design effects. A country needs an effective sample of at least 100 in each round on every item. Source: European Social Survey, Round 6 (2012 to 2013) and Round 10 (2020 to 2022); weighted (weight, design and population weights within country; equal weight per country across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/ess_change.json ### Table 9. The fixed set has 39 countries, and 30 of them meet the floors for the age and cohort comparisons Fieldwork years, survey program and respondents answering the democratic-system question, by country and wave, for the countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7 | Country | Wave 3 survey | Wave 3 respondents | Wave 5 survey | Wave 5 respondents | Wave 7 survey | Wave 7 respondents | Program, Wave 3 to Wave 7 | In the age and cohort figures | | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | Argentina | 1995, WVS* | 1,042 | 2006, WVS* | 917 | 2017, WVS* | 973 | Same program | Yes | | Armenia | 1997, WVS* | 1,630 | 2008, EVS* | 1,361 | 2018 to 2021, EVS* | 2,566 | Program switched | Yes | | Australia | 1995, WVS* | 1,872 | 2005, WVS* | 1,376 | 2018, WVS* | 1,732 | Same program | Yes | | Belarus | 1996, WVS* | 1,726 | 2008, EVS* | 1,236 | 2018, EVS* | 1,435 | Program switched | Yes | | Bosnia Herzegovina | 1998, WVS* | 1,163 | 2008, EVS* | 1,399 | 2019, EVS* | 1,676 | Program switched | Yes | | Brazil | 1997, WVS* | 1,095 | 2006, WVS* | 1,443 | 2018, WVS* | 1,469 | Same program | Yes | | Bulgaria | 1997, WVS* | 839 | 2006 to 2008, EVS* | 2,048 | 2017, EVS* | 1,372 | Program switched | Yes | | Chile | 1996, WVS* | 935 | 2006, WVS* | 915 | 2018, WVS* | 910 | Same program | No | | Colombia | 1997 to 1998, WVS* | 5,759 | 2005, WVS* | 2,826 | 2018, WVS* | 1,520 | Same program | Yes | | Croatia | 1996, WVS* | 1,155 | 2008, EVS* | 1,368 | 2017, EVS* | 1,437 | Program switched | Yes | | Czechia | 1998, WVS* | 1,092 | 2008, EVS* | 1,592 | 2017 to 2022, EVS* | 2,803 | Program switched | Yes | | Estonia | 1996, WVS* | 933 | 2008, EVS* | 1,342 | 2018, EVS* | 1,141 | Program switched | Yes | | Finland | 1996, WVS* | 905 | 2005 to 2009, EVS* | 1,998 | 2017, EVS* | 1,131 | Program switched | Yes | | Georgia | 1996, WVS* | 1,801 | 2008 to 2009, WVS* | 2,680 | 2018, EVS* | 2,003 | Program switched | Yes | | Germany | 1997, WVS* | 1,974 | 2006 to 2008, WVS* | 3,874 | 2017 to 2018, EVS* | 3,573 | Program switched | Yes | | Hungary | 1998, WVS* | 595 | 2008 to 2009, EVS* | 2,392 | 2018, EVS* | 1,445 | Program switched | Yes | | India | 1995, WVS* | 1,576 | 2006, WVS* | 1,527 | 2023, WVS* | 1,267 | Same program | No | | Japan | 1995, WVS* | 918 | 2005, WVS* | 964 | 2019, WVS* | 1,172 | Same program | No | | Latvia | 1996, WVS* | 1,099 | 2008, EVS* | 1,320 | 2021, EVS* | 1,186 | Program switched | Yes | | Lithuania | 1997, WVS* | 847 | 2008, EVS* | 1,164 | 2018, EVS* | 1,315 | Program switched | Yes | | Mexico | 1996, WVS* | 1,286 | 2005, WVS* | 1,456 | 2018, WVS* | 1,702 | Same program | Yes | | Montenegro | 1996, WVS* | 220 | 2008, EVS* | 1,315 | 2019, EVS* | 932 | Program switched | No | | New Zealand | 1998, WVS* | 998 | 2004, WVS* | 762 | 2020, WVS* | 914 | Same program | No | | North Macedonia | 1998, WVS* | 852 | 2008, EVS* | 1,358 | 2019, EVS* | 1,034 | Program switched | Yes | | Norway | 1996, WVS* | 1,108 | 2007 to 2008, EVS* | 2,090 | 2018, EVS* | 1,109 | Program switched | Yes | | Peru | 1996, WVS* | 1,094 | 2006, WVS* | 1,392 | 2018, WVS* | 1,336 | Same program | No | | Romania | 1998, WVS* | 1,090 | 2005 to 2008, WVS* | 2,848 | 2018, EVS* | 2,582 | Program switched | Yes | | Russia | 1995, WVS* | 1,590 | 2006 to 2008, WVS* | 2,821 | 2017, EVS* | 3,148 | Program switched | Yes | | Serbia | 1996, WVS* | 1,088 | 2006 to 2008, EVS* | 2,374 | 2017 to 2018, EVS* | 2,183 | Program switched | Yes | | Slovakia | 1998, WVS* | 1,041 | 2008, EVS* | 1,285 | 2017 to 2022, EVS* | 2,474 | Program switched | No | | Slovenia | 1995, WVS* | 927 | 2005 to 2008, EVS* | 2,212 | 2017, EVS* | 1,033 | Program switched | Yes | | South Korea | 1996, WVS* | 1,231 | 2005, WVS* | 1,199 | 2018, WVS* | 1,245 | Same program | Yes | | Spain | 1995, WVS* | 1,140 | 2007 to 2008, EVS* | 2,582 | 2017, EVS* | 1,176 | Program switched | Yes | | Sweden | 1996, WVS* | 978 | 2006 to 2009, EVS* | 2,022 | 2017, EVS* | 1,170 | Program switched | Yes | | Switzerland | 1996, WVS* | 1,092 | 2007 to 2008, EVS* | 2,433 | 2017, EVS* | 3,111 | Program switched | Yes | | Taiwan ROC | 1995, WVS* | 743 | 2006, WVS* | 1,216 | 2019, WVS* | 1,200 | Same program | Yes | | Ukraine | 1996, WVS* | 1,935 | 2006 to 2008, EVS* | 1,998 | 2020, EVS* | 2,523 | Program switched | No | | United States | 1995, WVS* | 1,433 | 2006, WVS* | 1,200 | 2017, WVS* | 2,509 | Same program | Yes | | Uruguay | 1996, WVS* | 965 | 2006, WVS* | 931 | 2022, WVS* | 933 | Same program | No | Note: A country is in the set when its effective sample is at least 100 on each of the four political-system items in Waves 3, 5 and 7. The respondent counts are unweighted. Countries with fewer than the floor in some age or cohort cell are left out of the age and cohort figures. Note: An asterisk marks a country and wave in which both programs appear; the program shown has more respondents. Albania also meets the rule for the set and is left out because of its Wave 3 response pattern. Turkey is left out because its Wave 7 survey has no army-rule item. China, Poland and the United Kingdom were not surveyed in Wave 3. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, Waves 3, 5 and 7 (1995 to 2023); weighted (weight, S017 within country; equal weight per country across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/country_set.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (189), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | age_adult_min | 18 | years of age | lowest age in the sample | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | age_old_min | 55 | years of age | lowest age of the older group | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | age_young_max | 34 | years of age | highest age of the young group | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | age_young_min | 18 | years of age | lowest age of the young group | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | alb_all4 | 39.5% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling all four ways of governing good | adults aged 18 or older in Albania who answered all four political-system items | 1998 | 95% CI 35.9% to 43.2% | 688 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | alb_all4_med | 2.9% | percent of respondents | median across countries of the weighted share calling all four ways of governing good | median across the 39 other countries of the fixed set | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | | | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | alb_all4_next | 24.7% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling all four ways of governing good | the country of the fixed set with the highest share after Albania (Brazil) | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | | | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | alb_army3 | 82.0% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in Albania | 1998 | 95% CI 79.4% to 84.5% | 871 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | alb_army4 | 11.6% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in Albania | 2002 | 95% CI 9.5% to 13.6% | 908 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | alb_vg3 | 42.5% | percent of respondents | weighted share rating both army rule and a democratic system very good | adults aged 18 or older in Albania who answered the army-rule and democratic-system items | 1998 | 95% CI 39.2% to 45.9% | 844 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | alb_vg5 | 1.2% | percent of respondents | weighted share rating both army rule and a democratic system very good | adults aged 18 or older in Albania who answered the army-rule and democratic-system items | 2008 | 95% CI 0.5% to 2.0% | 1,255 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | alb_w4_year | 2002 | year | year of fieldwork | Albania, Wave 4 | 2002 | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | alt3 | 33.2% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a democratic system good and at least one of a strong leader and army rule good | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 95% CI 28.4% to 38.0% | 45,779 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | alt7 | 44.5% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a democratic system good and at least one of a strong leader and army rule good | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 37.9% to 51.0% | 59,782 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | alt_chg | +11.3 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic system good and at least one of a strong leader and army rule good | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 6.7 to 15.8 | 105,561 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | army3 | 13.0% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 95% CI 9.7% to 16.4% | 50,168 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | army5 | 15.2% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 5 (2004 to 2009) | 95% CI 11.5% to 18.9% | 67,524 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | army7 | 20.7% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 15.8% to 25.5% | 63,635 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | army_chg | +7.6 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 3.7 to 11.5 | 113,803 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | army_chg_35 | +2.1 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 5 | 95% CI −0.2 to 4.4 | 117,692 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | army_chg_57 | +5.5 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 5 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 3.0 to 8.0 | 131,159 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | army_chg_alb | +5.8 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 40 countries of the fixed set with Albania, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 0.5 to 11.1 | 116,051 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | army_rise | 7.6 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the rise in the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 3.7 to 11.5 | 113,803 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | The same estimate as army_chg, printed without a sign. | | chg_army_o | +4.5 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the share calling army rule a good way of governing the country among adults aged 55 or older | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −0.4 to 9.4 | 29,283 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | chg_army_y | +10.0 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the share calling army rule a good way of governing the country among adults aged 18 to 34 | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 5.4 to 14.6 | 29,621 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | chg_lead_o | +4.1 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country among adults aged 55 or older | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −1.0 to 9.1 | 29,082 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | chg_lead_y | +11.1 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country among adults aged 18 to 34 | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 5.8 to 16.3 | 29,420 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | coh_lead_c7 | 48.0% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country for respondents born 1987 or later | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 40.4% to 55.5% | 11,332 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | const_w3 | 32 | countries | count of countries | countries of the fixed set whose survey gives every respondent the same weight | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | const_w5 | 6 | countries | count of countries | countries of the fixed set whose survey gives every respondent the same weight | Wave 5 (2004 to 2009) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | const_w7 | 4 | countries | count of countries | countries of the fixed set whose survey gives every respondent the same weight | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | dem3 | 88.5% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 95% CI 86.1% to 90.8% | 49,767 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | dem5 | 88.4% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 5 (2004 to 2009) | 95% CI 86.6% to 90.3% | 67,236 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | dem7 | 89.7% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 87.7% to 91.7% | 64,440 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | dem_chg | +1.2 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −1.0 to 3.4 | 114,207 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | dem_chg_35 | 0.0 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 5 | 95% CI −2.3 to 2.2 | 117,003 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | dem_chg_57 | +1.3 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 5 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −0.6 to 3.2 | 131,676 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | dem_chg_lo_abs | 1.0 | percentage points | size of the average fall at the lower end of the 95% interval for the change in the share calling a democratic system good | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Positive number: the lower end of the interval is a fall of this size. | | dmc_med | 6.08 | points on the 1 to 10 scale | median across countries of the weighted mean rating of how democratically the country is governed | median across the 92 countries surveyed in Wave 7 | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | dmc_us | 6.05 | points on the 1 to 10 scale | weighted mean rating of how democratically the country is governed | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 2017 | | | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | down_army | 3 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval below zero | countries of the fixed set, each judged by its own 95% interval for the change in calling army rule a good way of governing the country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | down_dem | 10 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval below zero | countries of the fixed set, each judged by its own 95% interval for the change in calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | down_lead | 8 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval below zero | countries of the fixed set, each judged by its own 95% interval for the change in calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | ess_elec_f2f | +0.13 | points on the 0 to 10 scale | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the mean rating of how far elections are free and fair in the country | adults in the 18 ESS countries of the set whose Round 10 interviews were face-to-face, equal weight per country | Round 6 to Round 10 | 95% CI −0.15 to 0.41 | 61,860 | weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries | European Social Survey | | | ess_media_chg_abs | 0.63 | points on the 0 to 10 scale | equal-weight mean across countries of the fall in the mean rating of how far the media are free to criticize the government applies in the country | adults in the 24 countries with every item in ESS Rounds 6 and 10, equal weight per country | Round 6 to Round 10 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.99 | 91,003 | weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries | European Social Survey | Positive number: a fall of this size. | | ess_media_f2f | −0.38 | points on the 0 to 10 scale | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the mean rating of how far the media are free to criticize the government applies in the country | adults in the 18 ESS countries of the set whose Round 10 interviews were face-to-face, equal weight per country | Round 6 to Round 10 | 95% CI −0.72 to −0.04 | 62,171 | weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries | European Social Survey | | | ess_media_f2f_abs | 0.38 | points on the 0 to 10 scale | equal-weight mean across countries of the fall in the mean rating of how far the media are free to criticize the government applies in the country | adults in the 18 ESS countries of the set whose Round 10 interviews were face-to-face, equal weight per country | Round 6 to Round 10 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.72 | 62,171 | weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries | European Social Survey | Positive number: a fall of this size. | | ess_media_f2f_down | 10 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval below zero | ESS countries in the set that kept face-to-face interviews, each judged by its own 95% interval for the change in the media-freedom rating | Round 6 to Round 10 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | ess_media_f2f_r10 | 6.83 | points on the 0 to 10 scale | equal-weight mean across countries of the mean rating of how far the media are free to criticize the government applies in the country | adults in the 18 ESS countries of the set whose Round 10 interviews were face-to-face, equal weight per country | Round 10 (2020 to 2022) | | 29,724 | weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries | European Social Survey | | | ess_media_f2f_r6 | 7.21 | points on the 0 to 10 scale | equal-weight mean across countries of the mean rating of how far the media are free to criticize the government applies in the country | adults in the 18 ESS countries of the set whose Round 10 interviews were face-to-face, equal weight per country | Round 6 (2012 to 2013) | | 32,447 | weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries | European Social Survey | | | ess_media_self | −1.38 | points on the 0 to 10 scale | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the mean rating of how far the media are free to criticize the government applies in the country | adults in the 6 ESS countries of the set whose Round 10 interviews were self-completion, equal weight per country | Round 6 to Round 10 | 95% CI −2.38 to −0.38 | 28,832 | weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries | European Social Survey | | | ess_min_f2f | +0.14 | points on the 0 to 10 scale | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the mean rating of how far minority rights are protected in the country | adults in the 18 ESS countries of the set whose Round 10 interviews were face-to-face, equal weight per country | Round 6 to Round 10 | 95% CI −0.11 to 0.39 | 61,190 | weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries | European Social Survey | | | ess_sat_f2f | +0.39 | points on the 0 to 10 scale | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the mean satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country | adults in the 18 ESS countries of the set whose Round 10 interviews were face-to-face, equal weight per country | Round 6 to Round 10 | 95% CI 0.11 to 0.67 | 62,249 | weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries | European Social Survey | | | ess_sat_self | −0.68 | points on the 0 to 10 scale | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the mean satisfaction with the way democracy works in the country | adults in the 6 ESS countries of the set whose Round 10 interviews were self-completion, equal weight per country | Round 6 to Round 10 | 95% CI −1.53 to 0.16 | 29,158 | weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries | European Social Survey | | | ess_say_f2f | −0.08 | points on the 0 to 10 scale | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the mean rating of how far citizens have the final say through voting in the country | adults in the 18 ESS countries of the set whose Round 10 interviews were face-to-face, equal weight per country | Round 6 to Round 10 | 95% CI −0.37 to 0.21 | 61,064 | weight (anweight) within country; equal weight per country across countries | European Social Survey | | | exp3 | 61.0% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling experts making decisions a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 95% CI 56.1% to 66.0% | 47,936 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | exp7 | 63.9% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling experts making decisions a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 58.8% to 69.0% | 62,657 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | exp_chg | +2.9 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling experts making decisions a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −1.3 to 7.0 | 110,593 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | exp_vs_lead_abs | 7.0 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the share calling a strong leader good minus the change in the share calling experts making decisions good | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 1.3 to 12.7 | 110,593 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | floor_neff | 100 | effective respondents | minimum Kish effective sample size of a country cell (b3.stats.FLOORS wvs_ess_mean) | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | floor_sub | 100 | respondents and effective respondents | minimum size of a country cell for an age group, cohort or left-right group (b3.stats.FLOORS subgroup_year) | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | fw_army | +5.4 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 17 countries observed in every wave from 3 to 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 1.1 to 9.6 | 50,559 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | fw_dem | +1.1 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 17 countries observed in every wave from 3 to 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −3.1 to 5.3 | 50,703 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | fw_lead | +11.4 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 17 countries observed in every wave from 3 to 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 2.8 to 20.0 | 50,021 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_army3_abs | 3.2 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share calling army rule a good way of governing the country among adults aged 55 or older minus that among adults aged 18 to 34 | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 95% CI 1.7 to 4.8 | 40,439 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_army7 | +2.2 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share calling army rule a good way of governing the country among adults aged 18 to 34 minus that among adults aged 55 or older | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI −0.5 to 4.9 | 51,485 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_dem7 | −1.3 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country among adults aged 18 to 34 minus that among adults aged 55 or older | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI −2.6 to 0.0 | 51,979 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_exp7 | +5.4 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share calling experts making decisions a good way of governing the country among adults aged 18 to 34 minus that among adults aged 55 or older | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 1.8 to 9.0 | 50,829 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_lead3_abs | 6.6 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country among adults aged 55 or older minus that among adults aged 18 to 34 | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 95% CI 3.6 to 9.7 | 39,946 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_lead7 | +0.4 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country among adults aged 18 to 34 minus that among adults aged 55 or older | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI −1.9 to 2.6 | 51,421 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gapchg_army | +5.4 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the gap between adults aged 18 to 34 and adults aged 55 or older in the share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 2.1 to 8.8 | 58,904 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gapchg_dem | −1.4 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the gap between adults aged 18 to 34 and adults aged 55 or older in the share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −3.1 to 0.4 | 58,931 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gapchg_lead | +7.0 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the gap between adults aged 18 to 34 and adults aged 55 or older in the share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 30 countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 3.8 to 10.2 | 58,502 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp5 | 50.6% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share giving the top rating (10) to the importance of living in a democracy | adults aged 18 or older in the 46 countries with the importance question in Waves 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 5 (2004 to 2009) | 95% CI 46.5% to 54.6% | 62,332 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp7 | 53.2% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share giving the top rating (10) to the importance of living in a democracy | adults aged 18 or older in the 46 countries with the importance question in Waves 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 48.9% to 57.6% | 85,854 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_chg | +2.6 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the share giving the top rating on the importance question | adults aged 18 or older in the 46 countries with the importance question in Waves 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 5 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −1.0 to 6.3 | 148,186 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_cohb5 | 44.2% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share giving the top rating (10) on the importance question for respondents born 1978 to 1986 | adults aged 18 or older in the 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 5 (2004 to 2009) | 95% CI 39.6% to 48.8% | 9,803 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_cohb7 | 51.6% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share giving the top rating (10) on the importance question for respondents born 1978 to 1986 | adults aged 18 or older in the 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 46.8% to 56.3% | 11,913 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_cohb_chg | +7.4 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the share giving the top rating on the importance question for respondents born 1978 to 1986 | adults aged 18 or older in the 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 5 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 2.8 to 12.0 | 21,716 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_cohc7 | 46.4% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share giving the top rating (10) on the importance question for respondents born 1987 or later | adults aged 18 or older in the 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 41.9% to 50.8% | 16,196 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_gap5_abs | 6.9 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share giving the top rating (10) on the importance question among adults aged 55 or older minus that among adults aged 18 to 34 | adults aged 18 or older in the 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 5 (2004 to 2009) | 95% CI 3.5 to 10.4 | 51,271 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_gap7_abs | 9.5 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share giving the top rating (10) on the importance question among adults aged 55 or older minus that among adults aged 18 to 34 | adults aged 18 or older in the 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 4.9 to 14.0 | 72,171 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_gapchg | −2.5 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the gap between adults aged 18 to 34 and adults aged 55 or older in the share giving the top rating on the importance question | adults aged 18 or older in the 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 5 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −5.7 to 0.6 | 123,442 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_same_age | +2.2 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share giving the top rating on the importance question for respondents born 1987 or later in Wave 7 minus that for respondents born 1978 to 1986 in Wave 5 | adults aged 18 or older in the 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 5 and Wave 7 | 95% CI −2.1 to 6.5 | 25,999 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_y5 | 45.1% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share giving the top rating (10) on the importance question among adults aged 18 to 34 | adults aged 18 or older in the 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 5 (2004 to 2009) | 95% CI 40.8% to 49.5% | 18,201 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_y7 | 47.0% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share giving the top rating (10) on the importance question among adults aged 18 to 34 | adults aged 18 or older in the 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 42.5% to 51.4% | 19,664 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | imp_y_chg | +1.8 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the share giving the top rating on the importance question among adults aged 18 to 34 | adults aged 18 or older in the 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 5 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −2.2 to 5.8 | 37,865 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | in_army | 14 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval includes zero | countries of the fixed set, each judged by its own 95% interval for the change in calling army rule a good way of governing the country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | in_dem | 11 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval includes zero | countries of the fixed set, each judged by its own 95% interval for the change in calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | in_lead | 6 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval includes zero | countries of the fixed set, each judged by its own 95% interval for the change in calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | jump_cut | 40 | percentage points | size of a change between adjacent waves that only Albania reaches among the countries of the set | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_ess | 24 | countries | count of countries | ESS countries with every item above the floor in Rounds 6 and 10 | Rounds 6 and 10 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_ess_f2f | 18 | countries | count of countries | ESS countries in the set that kept face-to-face interviews in Round 10 | Round 10 (2020 to 2022) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_ess_self | 6 | countries | count of countries | ESS countries in the set that switched to self-completion in Round 10 | Round 10 (2020 to 2022) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_ess_switch_all | 9 | countries | count of countries named in the ESS data-release note | ESS countries that switched to self-completion in Round 10 (ESS data-release note, December 2022) | Round 10 (2020 to 2022) | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | k_five | 17 | countries | count of countries | countries with every political-system item above the floor in every wave from 3 to 7 | Waves 3 to 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_imp | 46 | countries | count of countries | countries with the importance question above the floor in Waves 5 and 7 | Waves 5 and 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_imp_sub | 37 | countries | count of countries | countries with every importance cell above the floor | Waves 5 and 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_lr | 73 | countries | count of countries | countries in Wave 7 with a left group and a right group above the floor | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_lr_army | 71 | countries | count of countries | countries in Wave 7 with a left group and a right group above the floor on the army-rule item | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_others | 38 | countries | count of countries | the countries of the fixed set other than the United States | Waves 3, 5 and 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_panel | 39 | countries | count of countries | countries with every political-system item above the floor in Waves 3, 5 and 7 | Waves 3, 5 and 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_same | 14 | countries | count of countries | countries of the fixed set whose survey program (WVS or EVS) with the most respondents is the same in Wave 3 and Wave 7 | Wave 3 and Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_sub | 30 | countries | count of countries | countries with every age-group and cohort cell above the floor | Waves 3, 5 and 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_sw | 25 | countries | count of countries | countries of the fixed set whose survey program changed from WVS in Wave 3 to EVS in Wave 7 | Wave 3 and Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_xs7 | 92 | countries | count of countries | countries surveyed in Wave 7 with an effective sample at or above the floor | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_xs7_army | 90 | countries | count of countries | countries surveyed in Wave 7 with an effective sample at or above the floor on the army-rule item | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lead3 | 38.2% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 95% CI 32.9% to 43.4% | 49,235 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lead5 | 41.5% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 5 (2004 to 2009) | 95% CI 35.4% to 47.5% | 66,325 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lead7 | 48.1% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 41.1% to 55.0% | 63,671 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lead_chg | +9.9 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 4.9 to 14.9 | 112,906 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lead_chg_35 | +3.3 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 5 | 95% CI −0.6 to 7.2 | 115,560 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lead_chg_57 | +6.6 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 5 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 3.3 to 9.9 | 129,996 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lead_rise | 9.9 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the rise in the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 4.9 to 14.9 | 112,906 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | The same estimate as lead_chg, printed without a sign. | | lr_army | +4.5 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share calling army rule a good way of governing the country among the right group (placements 7 to 10) minus that among the left group (placements 1 to 4) | adults placing themselves on the left-right scale in the 71 countries with both groups above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 2.7 to 6.4 | 61,267 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lr_dem | −0.6 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country among the right group (placements 7 to 10) minus that among the left group (placements 1 to 4) | adults placing themselves on the left-right scale in the 73 countries with both groups above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI −1.6 to 0.4 | 63,522 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lr_lead | +7.1 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country among the right group (placements 7 to 10) minus that among the left group (placements 1 to 4) | adults placing themselves on the left-right scale in the 73 countries with both groups above the floor, equal weight per country | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 4.9 to 9.3 | 62,897 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lr_lead_down | 3 | countries | count of countries whose difference has an interval below zero | countries in Wave 7 with a left group and a right group above the floor, each judged by its own 95% interval for the right minus left difference in approval of a strong leader | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lr_lead_in | 32 | countries | count of countries whose difference has an interval that includes zero | countries in Wave 7 with a left group and a right group above the floor, each judged by its own 95% interval for the right minus left difference in approval of a strong leader | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lr_lead_up | 38 | countries | count of countries whose difference has an interval above zero | countries in Wave 7 with a left group and a right group above the floor, each judged by its own 95% interval for the right minus left difference in approval of a strong leader | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lr_left_max | 4 | position on the 1 to 10 left-right scale | highest placement counted as left | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lr_missing_med | 13.5% | percent of respondents | median across countries of the weighted share who did not place themselves on the left-right scale | adults aged 18 or older, median across the countries surveyed in Wave 7 that asked the left-right question | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lr_missing_us | 2.3% | percent of respondents | weighted share who did not place themselves on the left-right scale | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 2017 | | | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lr_right_min | 7 | position on the 1 to 10 left-right scale | lowest placement counted as right | definition used in the chapter | not applicable | | | none (definition) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | nod3 | 11.5% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share not calling a democratic system good | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 95% CI 9.1% to 13.8% | 45,779 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | nod7 | 10.6% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share not calling a democratic system good | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 8.5% to 12.7% | 59,782 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | nod_chg | −0.9 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share not calling a democratic system good | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −3.1 to 1.4 | 105,561 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | only3 | 55.3% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a democratic system good and neither a strong leader nor army rule good | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | Wave 3 (1995 to 1998) | 95% CI 49.7% to 61.0% | 45,779 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | only7 | 44.9% | percent of respondents | equal-weight mean across countries of the weighted share calling a democratic system good and neither a strong leader nor army rule good | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | 95% CI 37.4% to 52.4% | 59,782 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | only_chg | −10.4 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic system good and neither a strong leader nor army rule good | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −15.8 to −5.0 | 105,561 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | only_chg_alb | −8.9 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic system good and neither a strong leader nor army rule good | adults aged 18 or older in the 40 countries of the fixed set with Albania, equal weight per country, who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −15.0 to −2.7 | 107,652 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | only_down | 24 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval below zero | countries of the fixed set, each judged by its own interval for the change in the democracy-only share | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | only_up | 7 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval above zero | countries of the fixed set, each judged by its own interval for the change in the democracy-only share | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | oth_dem_chg | +1.4 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 38 other countries of the fixed set, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −0.8 to 3.6 | 114,207 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | prog_diff_dem | −6.2 | percentage points | difference between the two groups of the equal-weight mean change in the share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country (Welch interval) | countries whose survey program stayed the same minus countries whose program switched | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −10.1 to −2.4 | 114,207 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | prog_same_dem | −2.8 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 14 countries whose survey program stayed the same between Wave 3 and Wave 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −5.6 to 0.1 | 39,829 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | prog_same_lead | +16.0 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 14 countries whose survey program stayed the same between Wave 3 and Wave 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 7.9 to 24.0 | 38,981 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | prog_sw_dem | +3.5 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 25 countries whose survey program switched between Wave 3 and Wave 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 0.7 to 6.2 | 74,378 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | prog_sw_lead | +6.5 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 25 countries whose survey program switched between Wave 3 and Wave 7, equal weight per country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 0.2 to 12.8 | 73,925 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | ratio_med | 11.0 | ratio of interval widths | median across the fixed-set estimates of the country-clustered standard error over the standard error that counts only within-country sampling | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country | Waves 3, 5 and 7 | | | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | unw_army | +7.0 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the unweighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country (unweighted within country) | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 3.2 to 10.8 | 113,803 | none (unweighted within country); equal weight per country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | unw_dem | +1.6 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the unweighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country (unweighted within country) | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −0.6 to 3.7 | 114,207 | none (unweighted within country); equal weight per country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | unw_lead | +8.8 | percentage points | equal-weight mean across countries of the change in the unweighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the 39 countries observed in Waves 3, 5 and 7, equal weight per country (unweighted within country) | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 3.9 to 13.8 | 112,906 | none (unweighted within country); equal weight per country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | up_army | 22 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval above zero | countries of the fixed set, each judged by its own 95% interval for the change in calling army rule a good way of governing the country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | up_dem | 18 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval above zero | countries of the fixed set, each judged by its own 95% interval for the change in calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | up_lead | 25 | countries | count of countries whose change has an interval above zero | countries of the fixed set, each judged by its own 95% interval for the change in calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_age_army_gap17 | +17.1 | percentage points | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country among adults aged 18 to 34 minus that among adults aged 55 or older; independent groups, standard errors combined | adults in the United States | 2017 | 95% CI 12.3 to 21.9 | 1,658 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_age_army_gap95 | +1.1 | percentage points | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country among adults aged 18 to 34 minus that among adults aged 55 or older; independent groups, standard errors combined | adults in the United States | 1995 | 95% CI −2.5 to 4.7 | 938 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_army17 | 20.9% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 2017 | 95% CI 18.9% to 22.9% | 2,528 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_army95 | 6.6% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 1995 | 95% CI 5.1% to 8.0% | 1,476 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_dem11 | 82.3% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 2011 | 95% CI 80.4% to 84.2% | 2,164 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_dem17 | 85.0% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 2017 | 95% CI 83.2% to 86.8% | 2,509 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_dem95 | 90.6% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 1995 | 95% CI 88.9% to 92.3% | 1,433 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_dem_chg | −5.6 | percentage points | weighted share in 2017 minus 1995; independent samples, standard errors combined | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 1995 to 2017 | 95% CI −8.1 to −3.1 | 3,942 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_dem_fewer | 4 | countries | count of countries | countries of the fixed set other than the United States with a larger fall in the share calling a democratic system good | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_imp_gap17_abs | 35.5 | percentage points | weighted share giving the top rating (10) on the importance question among adults aged 55 or older minus that among adults aged 18 to 34 | adults in the United States | 2017 | 95% CI 29.8 to 41.3 | 1,677 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_lead17 | 38.1% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 2017 | 95% CI 35.6% to 40.5% | 2,541 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_lead95 | 24.9% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 1995 | 95% CI 22.4% to 27.4% | 1,441 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_lr_army | +13.2 | percentage points | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country among the right group minus that among the left group; independent groups, standard errors combined | adults placing themselves on the left-right scale in the United States | 2017 | 95% CI 8.6 to 17.8 | 1,644 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_lr_army95 | −0.7 | percentage points | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country among the right group minus that among the left group; independent groups, standard errors combined | adults placing themselves on the left-right scale in the United States | 1995 | 95% CI −4.7 to 3.3 | 623 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_lr_dem | −7.1 | percentage points | weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country among the right group minus that among the left group; independent groups, standard errors combined | adults placing themselves on the left-right scale in the United States | 2017 | 95% CI −11.1 to −3.2 | 1,633 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_lr_dem95 | −0.9 | percentage points | weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country among the right group minus that among the left group; independent groups, standard errors combined | adults placing themselves on the left-right scale in the United States | 1995 | 95% CI −6.0 to 4.1 | 618 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_lr_lead | +16.2 | percentage points | weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country among the right group minus that among the left group; independent groups, standard errors combined | adults placing themselves on the left-right scale in the United States | 2017 | 95% CI 10.4 to 22.0 | 1,649 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_lr_lead95 | +0.6 | percentage points | weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country among the right group minus that among the left group; independent groups, standard errors combined | adults placing themselves on the left-right scale in the United States | 1995 | 95% CI −6.7 to 7.9 | 614 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_lr_lead_more | 12 | countries | count of countries | countries in Wave 7 with a larger right minus left difference in approval of a strong leader than the United States | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_only17 | 51.5% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling a democratic system good and neither a strong leader nor army rule good | adults aged 18 or older in the United States who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | 2017 | 95% CI 49.0% to 54.1% | 2,479 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_only95 | 68.2% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling a democratic system good and neither a strong leader nor army rule good | adults aged 18 or older in the United States who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | 1995 | 95% CI 65.4% to 71.0% | 1,370 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_only_chg | −16.7 | percentage points | weighted share in 2017 minus 1995; independent samples, standard errors combined | adults aged 18 or older in the United States who answered the democratic-system, strong-leader and army items | 1995 to 2017 | 95% CI −20.4 to −12.9 | 3,849 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_only_rank | 11 | countries | count of countries | countries of the fixed set other than the United States with a larger fall in the democracy-only share | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_young_army06 | 18.1% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 2006 | 95% CI 12.7% to 23.4% | 296 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_young_army11 | 23.5% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 2011 | 95% CI 19.3% to 27.7% | 510 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_young_army17 | 29.9% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 2017 | 95% CI 26.3% to 33.6% | 951 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_young_army95 | 7.1% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 1995 | 95% CI 4.2% to 10.1% | 390 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_young_army99 | 11.1% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 1999 | 95% CI 8.0% to 14.3% | 409 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_young_army_chg | +22.8 | percentage points | weighted share in 2017 minus 1995 calling army rule a good way of governing the country; independent samples, standard errors combined | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 1995 to 2017 | 95% CI 18.1 to 27.5 | 1,341 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_young_dem17 | 77.7% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 2017 | 95% CI 74.4% to 81.0% | 947 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_young_dem95 | 87.6% | percent of respondents | weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 1995 | 95% CI 83.8% to 91.4% | 372 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_young_dem_chg | −9.9 | percentage points | weighted share in 2017 minus 1995 calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country; independent samples, standard errors combined | adults aged 18 to 34 in the United States | 1995 to 2017 | 95% CI −14.9 to −4.8 | 1,319 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | vs_army | +6.9 | percentage points | United States change minus the equal-weight mean change of the other countries (standard errors combined) in the share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | United States against the 38 other countries of the fixed set | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 2.3 to 11.5 | 117,807 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | vs_army_alb | +8.7 | percentage points | United States change minus the equal-weight mean change of the other countries (standard errors combined) in the share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | United States against the 39 other countries of the fixed set with Albania | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 3.0 to 14.5 | 120,055 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | vs_dem | −7.0 | percentage points | United States change minus the equal-weight mean change of the other countries (standard errors combined) in the share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | United States against the 38 other countries of the fixed set | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −10.3 to −3.7 | 118,149 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | vs_exp | +13.5 | percentage points | United States change minus the equal-weight mean change of the other countries (standard errors combined) in the share calling experts making decisions a good way of governing the country | United States against the 38 other countries of the fixed set | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI 7.9 to 19.0 | 114,555 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | vs_lead | +3.4 | percentage points | United States change minus the equal-weight mean change of the other countries (standard errors combined) in the share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | United States against the 38 other countries of the fixed set | Wave 3 to Wave 7 | 95% CI −2.7 to 9.4 | 116,888 | weight (S017) within country; equal weight per country across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | xs_army_med | 20.3% | percent of respondents | median across countries of the weighted share calling army rule a good way of governing the country | median across the 90 countries surveyed in Wave 7 | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | xs_dem_med | 90.5% | percent of respondents | median across countries of the weighted share calling a democratic political system a good way of governing the country | median across the 92 countries surveyed in Wave 7 | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | xs_imp_med | 50.2% | percent of respondents | median across countries of the weighted share giving the top rating (10) to the importance of living in a democracy | median across the 92 countries surveyed in Wave 7 | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | xs_imp_us | 49.9% | percent of respondents | weighted share giving the top rating (10) to the importance of living in a democracy | adults aged 18 or older in the United States | 2017 | 95% CI 47.4% to 52.4% | 2,552 | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | xs_lead_gap | 13.6 | percentage points | median across countries of the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country minus the United States share | median across the 92 countries surveyed in Wave 7 minus the United States | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | xs_lead_med | 51.7% | percent of respondents | median across countries of the weighted share calling a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections a good way of governing the country | median across the 92 countries surveyed in Wave 7 | Wave 7 (2017 to 2023) | | | weight (S017) within country | World Values Survey and EVS | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Cohort: People born in the same period, such as the same decade. Comparing cohorts shows whether a difference comes from when people were born, as distinct from their age or the year they were surveyed. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. ## Methods Sample: respondents aged 18 or older in the cleaned World Values Survey and European Values Study file (WVS/EVS, 666,907 respondents in all, seven unified waves; 657,686 adult respondents with a positive weight). The political-system questions (E114 strong leader, E115 experts, E116 army rule and E117 a democratic political system) were asked from Wave 3 on; importance of living in a democracy (E235) and how democratically the country is governed (E236) from Wave 5. "Good" is a rating of fairly good or very good (codes 3 and 4 of the cleaned file, where the dictionary direction is low = very bad and high = very good); the top rating on importance is 10. Fixed set: the countries with an effective sample of at least 100 on every one of the four political-system items in each of Waves 3, 5 and 7 (Wave 3 fieldwork 1995 to 1998, Wave 5 2004 to 2009, Wave 7 2017 to 2023), less Albania, which meets that rule: 39 countries. Turkey is out because its Wave 7 survey has no army-rule item; China, Poland and the United Kingdom are out because they were not surveyed in Wave 3. Albania is out because its Wave 3 survey (1998) has an implausible response pattern: 39.5 percent of respondents call all four ways of governing good against a median of 2.9 percent in the other countries of the set (the next highest is 24.7 percent), 42.5 percent rate both army rule and a democratic system very good against 1.2 percent in Wave 5, and it is the only country with a change above 40 points between adjacent waves on any of the four shares. The chapter reports the set with Albania (40 countries) as a check. Other sets: 17 countries observed in every wave from 3 to 7 (a check); 46 countries with the importance question in Waves 5 and 7; 30 countries of the fixed set with every age-group and cohort cell at or above the floor for the four political-system items (the age and cohort comparisons); 37 countries with every importance cell above the floor; all 92 countries surveyed in Wave 7 for the cross-section (90 for the army-rule item); 73 countries with a left group and a right group above the floor in Wave 7 (71 for the army-rule item); 24 ESS countries. Weights: the WVS weight (S017) within each country. In 32 of the 39 countries of the fixed set the Wave 3 survey gives every respondent the same weight (6 in Wave 5 and 4 in Wave 7), so Wave 3 shares are in effect unweighted and later shares are weighted; the chapter reports the unweighted change as a check. A country cell is a weighted share or mean with a normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, which treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample. A figure for a set of countries gives every country the same weight: it is the mean of the country cells. Its interval is clustered by country, the standard deviation of the country values over the square root of the number of countries with a t critical value on one fewer degree of freedom. That interval is a median of 11.0 times as wide as one that counts only the sampling error inside the countries (range 6.6 to 15.3), because it also carries differences between countries and treats the countries as a sample of countries like them. The WVS file has no strata or primary sampling units, so no interval includes design effects. Contrasts between two waves or two groups (young minus older adults, right minus left, a later wave minus an earlier one) are computed country by country and then averaged over the countries that have both cells, so the paired design is kept; a contrast within one country combines the standard errors of two independent groups. The United States against the other countries is the American change (Kish standard error of two independent samples) minus the equal-weight mean change of the other countries (standard error clustered by country); the two standard errors combine in quadrature. The difference between two groups of countries (same survey program against switched program) uses a Welch t interval. A country is counted as having risen, fallen or held steady when its own interval for the change lies above zero, below zero or includes zero. Survey program: the program (WVS or EVS) with more respondents in the country and wave; Wave 3 is WVS in every country of the set and Wave 7 is WVS in 14 and EVS in 25; both programs appear in 117 country-waves. Every country whose program switched is in the World Bank region Europe and Central Asia and none of the others is, so program and region cannot be separated. Age groups are 18 to 34, 35 to 54 and 55 or older at interview. Birth year is the survey year minus age, so it can be wrong by one. Cohorts: born before 1960, 1960 to 1977, 1978 to 1986 and 1987 or later. The first three are shown in a wave only if every member was 18 or older at that wave's earliest fieldwork year in the set (1995, 2004 and 2017, so last birth years of at most 1977, 1986 and 1999); the last is open-ended and is shown in Wave 7 only, where it holds respondents born from 1987 who were 18 or older at interview. Left is placement 1 to 4 and right is 7 to 10 on the ten-point scale. Floors: a country cell for a whole-country share needs an effective sample of at least 100 (b3.stats wvs_ess_mean); a cell for an age group, cohort or left-right group needs at least 100 respondents and 100 effective respondents (b3.stats subgroup_year); no published cell rests on fewer than 30 respondents. Democracy only means a democratic system is good and neither a strong leader nor army rule is good; democracy and an alternative means a democratic system is good and at least one of the two is good; the third group does not call a democratic system good; all three require an answer to all three items. ESS: Round 6 (2012 to 2013) and Round 10 (2020 to 2022), the evaluation items (how far a feature of democracy applies in the country, 0 to 10) and satisfaction with democracy; the clean file keeps no importance battery. Round 10 used self-completion instead of face-to-face interviews in nine countries, six of them in the ESS set (Cyprus, Germany, Israel, Poland, Spain and Sweden), so the ESS figure leads with the 18 face-to-face countries and has a mode split. Interview mode in the WVS: the file has no interview-mode variable. The WVS documentation lists face-to-face interviews for the American 1995 survey, a self-administered web survey by Knowledge Networks for 2006, web and telephone interviews for 2017 (fieldwork 28 April to 31 May 2017), and for 2011 a Knowledge Networks online panel while the catalog's mode field gives the program standard of face-to-face interviews. Some Wave 7 surveys in other countries also used web or self-completion modes. Rounding: displays round half up from the unrounded estimate and differences are computed before rounding, so a printed difference can differ by 0.1 from the difference of two printed shares, and the average of country differences differs from the difference of two averages when a country has a cell in one wave only. ## What these data cannot show - The questions ask whether four ways of governing the country would be good, not whether a respondent would act on the view, and a rating of a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections may mean different things to different respondents. - Items on the legitimacy of elections and on political violence, which come closer to behavior, are in Chapter 6.8, Political violence and democratic norms (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms). - Confidence in institutions outside the United States is the subject of Chapter 6.5, Institutional trust outside the United States (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/institutional-trust-outside-the-united-states; planned), and Chapter 6.1, Confidence in thirteen institutions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/confidence-in-institutions) covers the United States. - Each wave interviews different people, so the chapter describes how distributions changed and not how individuals did. - The data end in 2023 and say nothing about the period since the 2024 United States election. - Differences in how the surveys were run can look like change. - The WVS file carries no interview-mode variable. - The American survey was face to face in 1995, on the web in 2006 and by web and telephone in 2017, and the 2011 documentation describes an online panel while listing face-to-face interviews as the program standard. - Part of the American change could therefore come from a change of mode. - The program switch between Wave 3 and Wave 7 is confounded with region, the Wave 3 surveys are in effect unweighted, and Albania shows that a country-wave can look unlike its neighbors for reasons the file does not record. - The top rating on the importance question depends on how respondents use a ten-point scale, which varies by country and age. - The age and cohort comparisons rest on assumptions that repeated cross-sections cannot test, and the left-right comparisons leave out respondents who do not place themselves. - The ESS items measure evaluations of a country's democracy and not preferences among regimes, so the ESS cannot say whether appetite for an alternative rose in Europe. - Nothing here is causal. - The chapter does not say why approval of a strong leader rose or why young Americans differ. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Foa, Roberto Stefan; Mounk, Yascha (2016). The Danger of Deconsolidation: The Democratic Disconnect. Journal of Democracy 27(3): 5-17. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2016.0049 3. Foa, Roberto Stefan; Mounk, Yascha (2017). The Signs of Deconsolidation. Journal of Democracy 28(1): 5-15. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2017.0000 4. Voeten, Erik (2017). Are People Really Turning Away from Democracy?. Journal of Democracy Web Exchange, Online Exchange on Democratic Deconsolidation. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Journal-of-Democracy-Web-Exchange-Voeten_0.pdf 5. Norris, Pippa (2017). Is Western Democracy Backsliding? Diagnosing the Risks. Journal of Democracy Web Exchange, Online Exchange on Democratic Deconsolidation (also HKS Faculty Research Working Paper RWP17-012). https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Journal-of-Democracy-Web-Exchange-Norris_0.pdf 6. Alexander, Amy C.; Welzel, Christian (2017). The Myth of Deconsolidation: Rising Liberalism and the Populist Reaction. Journal of Democracy Web Exchange, Online Exchange on Democratic Deconsolidation. https://www.journalofdemocracy.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Journal-of-Democracy-Web-Exchange-Alexander-and-Welzel.pdf 7. Wuttke, Alexander; Gavras, Konstantin; Schoen, Harald (2022). Have Europeans Grown Tired of Democracy? New Evidence from Eighteen Consolidated Democracies, 1981-2018. British Journal of Political Science 52(1): 416-428. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123420000149 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/support-for-democracy/build.py (sha256 ec9100773195fff4b7b07c9f99844ae10f65c884905876b8edc31d676a0d2d76) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/ess/ess_clean.parquet | 45,592,290 | 9487eead6817f028f5dd525709aa1b989ccd384384ef3700b9657cf68dd0b529 | 6def6b8c99fe6dbaf6abc744db6cabf584b900084600909b651870d99208e338 | | data/wvs/wvs_clean.parquet | 71,974,374 | cef4479481f8a48d6c765d39dc5438d31daa32fcecee3f181aaaf8e257f41f0b | 59a8e3c369176b7e1a2cb37fc10b87985ed79b02fab2eae1cca08e7a972db061 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 79f8eb679b13e7700bff701b688519e55ab8f1f702e6dcbdfda0e69290f91b72 | | figures/age_gaps.json | 0f84eb10a8b5365e8f3a1a7ec5927a0b822e14496a10fac704dd2851bb9b9735 | | figures/change_by_country.json | 9ea944c671cc596b60cfe120665852d56f8aba4de431828e907d3d5a0de6697d | | figures/cohort_lines.json | fd28c817beae19f91211c3e85d4d71f186cf3bccdc8bb06bb5591452a4999b60 | | figures/committed.json | 0ef0289abc9ce5d2e2d0a69b7517d66da6f636885bc402c2a2c591ab0e177c41 | | figures/country_set.json | 082b96cbb58b09bb1c12c9800c7836ccf19d367d06a4c958a21836727ed0549e | | figures/ess_change.json | c82d1562b6f513feee5ecb74e43eb15f43d9ded6e0f42211dec975ab50941726 | | figures/left_right_gap.json | 2c9892d4b470aad5700b5c73f00e32217c5be1e10d9b41feaca6d08c4cf8071e | | figures/trend_items.json | 9e27e7c09e306ca077fd5183fc2e5180e4096d6393ee4df07a7628a16ccb037b | | figures/us_vs_world.json | e19aa854b4a107d16330daf58fcec85e611c505492510612ba3d5b6c178659c1 | | meta.json | 45eccaab95904b9a8a9ae698ab9b6a5ceba00b146d36b674d9b66c9b199b9718 | | refs.json | b2b506c637591ac38319e738a0790eea952158843bdffba37c21c584f4895bde | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/facts.json - Table 1, figure "trend_items" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/trend_items.json - Table 2, figure "change_by_country" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/change_by_country.json - Table 3, figure "committed" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/committed.json - Table 4, figure "us_vs_world" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/us_vs_world.json - Table 5, figure "age_gaps" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/age_gaps.json - Table 6, figure "cohort_lines" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/cohort_lines.json - Table 7, figure "left_right_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/left_right_gap.json - Table 8, figure "ess_change" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/ess_change.json - Table 9, figure "country_set" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/support-for-democracy/figures/country_set.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Political violence and democratic norms: report Chapter 6.8 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Political violence and democratic norms - Chapter: 6.8 (Part VI, Trust, science and democracy; The great sorting) - Question: How many Americans justify political violence or doubt vote counts, and how does it differ by party? - Dek: In the 2024 ANES, 17.2% of adult citizens said violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little, with no party gap that the data separate from zero. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES 2024 Time Series. 2024 Time Series full release (May 19, 2026): political violence, vote counts, election legitimacy, the events of January 2021 and democratic norms, with party identification, age, education, race, sex and party thermometers; years: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews); weights: V240107a (pre-election) and V240107b (post-election) with PSU V240107c and stratum V240107d; sample-group weights V240101, V240102 and V240106 - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026politicalviolenceanddemocraticnorms ```bibtex @misc{singh2026politicalviolenceanddemocraticnorms, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Political violence and democratic norms}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 17.2% | 95% CI 15.6% to 18.9% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | viol_any_all | | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified a lot or a great deal (V241579 answers 4 and 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 4.6% | 95% CI 3.7% to 5.4% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | viol_lot_all | | Democratic share minus Republican share saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 2.2 | 95% CI −0.9 to 5.3 | 4,822 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | viol_gap_any | | upper end of the 95% interval on the Democratic minus Republican gap in the share saying violence is justified at least a little | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 5.3 | | | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | viol_gap_any_hi | | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 15.0% | 95% CI 13.0% to 17.1% | 2,290 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | viol_any_rep | | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 35.1% | 95% CI 32.3% to 37.9% | 2,444 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | acc_low_rep | | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 8.2% | 95% CI 6.7% to 9.7% | 2,638 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | acc_low_dem | | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 55.5% | 95% CI 52.6% to 58.5% | 2,009 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | trump20_rep | | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 4.5% | 95% CI 3.3% to 5.7% | 2,297 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | trump20_dem | | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 14.7% | 95% CI 12.4% to 16.9% | 2,283 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | harris24_dem | | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 2.3% | 95% CI 1.2% to 3.4% | 2,042 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | harris24_rep | | respondents in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample (V240003 equal to 1) | panel respondents | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 2,171 | | | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series | n_panel | ## Findings In the 2024 American National Election Studies (ANES), 17.2% of adult citizens said it is justified at least a little for people to use violence to pursue their political goals in this country, and 4.6% said it is justified a lot or a great deal. The answer scale runs from not at all to a great deal in five steps, and "at least a little" means any answer above not at all. The data show no gap between Democrats and Republicans that is distinguishable from zero: the Democratic share minus the Republican share was 2.2 (95% CI −0.9 to 5.3) points, so a Democratic excess of up to 5.3 points over the Republican share of 15.0% is not ruled out. Beliefs about elections divided the parties. Before the election, 35.1% of Republicans and 8.2% of Democrats expected the November votes to be counted not at all or only a little accurately. After it, 55.5% of Republicans and 4.5% of Democrats said Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election, and 14.7% of Democrats and 2.3% of Republicans said Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election. These are answers about approval, expectation and belief. The ANES records no violent act, threat or harassment by a respondent, so the chapter cannot say how many people have acted or would act, and the survey does not say whom the violence would be against or for what goal. The chapter uses one survey, so it describes 2024 and cannot show change over time. The estimates describe adult U.S. citizens at residential addresses. Each interval is a 95% confidence interval that uses the strata and primary sampling units in the file, so it does not treat respondents as independent draws. (Note: The 2024 file combines a fresh sample interviewed mainly in person, a fresh sample interviewed mainly on the web and a panel of 2,171 respondents who were also interviewed in 2016 and 2020. The ANES asks analysts to use the variance strata and primary sampling units in the file [1]. The intervals here use the t distribution with the design degrees of freedom and describe sampling variation only. Question wording, interview mode and nonresponse are other sources of error, and a later section takes up mode.) Party means party identification, with leaners counted with the party they lean toward, unless the text says without leaners. Adults who name neither party and do not lean toward one are called neither party. Without leaners, Democrats and Republicans are the strong and not very strong identifiers, and the remaining adults are independents and leaners. The party question comes from the pre-election interview, so post-election answers are grouped by the party the respondent reported before the election. ### What each question asks Table 1 quotes every question the chapter uses, with its answer scale, what it measures and what it is about. Table 1. The ANES questions measure approval, expectation, perception and belief, and none records an action The violence question asks, "How much do you feel it is justified for people to use violence to pursue their political goals in this country?" Its target is unspecified: the violence is by people in general, for any political goal, against anyone, and the wording does not say what act counts as violence. It asks nothing about what the respondent has done or would do. Westwood and co-authors report from four survey experiments that attitudes toward political violence measured this way are biased upward by respondent disengagement and by wording that allows more than one interpretation [2]. Kalmoe and Mason study partisan violence with questions about one's own party and the other party [3], targets that the ANES item leaves open. A follow-up question asks whether violence used to pursue political goals in the United States has increased, decreased or stayed the same over a four-year comparison period (the table gives the wording), which records a perception and not approval. The vote-count questions differ in their targets. Before the election the ANES asked how accurately the respondent expected the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted, an expectation about one election given before its result was known. After it, the ANES asked how often votes are counted fairly in this country's elections, a belief about elections in general. A further pre-election question asks how much the respondent trusts the officials who oversee elections where the respondent lives, which concerns local officials and not the count. Three paired statements ask which of two claims is most likely to be true. They concern who was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election, who planned and carried out the events of January 2021 that the item names by date, and who was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election. The January 2021 item offers pro-Trump protesters or FBI agents posing as protesters, and this chapter calls the second answer the FBI account. Each offers two answers, so a respondent who is unsure still chooses one, and a follow-up asks how confident the respondent is. Legitimacy is a judgment about an election and not a count of votes, and the question does not define the term. Six further questions ask about norms for officeholders and the press. Four ask how important each of four practices is to the United States maintaining a strong democracy. The other two ask whether it would be helpful if presidents could work on the country's problems without paying attention to what Congress and the courts say, and whether the respondent favors elected officials restricting journalists' access to information about government decision-making. They ask about officials in general and name no president or party. Pre-election interviews ran from August to Election Day in November 2024, and post-election interviews from the week after the election to February 2025. Pre-election questions use the pre-election weight and post-election questions the post-election weight. A short paper questionnaire, completed by 245 pre-election respondents and 200 post-election respondents, leaves out most of these questions, so those items describe adults who answered on the web or in person. Of the 5,521 respondents in the file, 5,192 gave a usable answer to the violence question. A further 84 refused or broke off before it, and they are left out of its shares. ### No party gap in approval of violence is distinguishable from zero Most adult citizens, 82.8%, said violence to pursue political goals is not at all justified. At the three cut points of the five-point answer scale, 17.2% (95% CI 15.6% to 18.9%) said it is justified at least a little, 10.8% (95% CI 9.5% to 12.1%) a moderate amount or more and 4.6% (95% CI 3.7% to 5.4%) a lot or a great deal (Table 2). Among Democrats the shares at the first and last cut points were 17.3% (95% CI 14.9% to 19.7%) and 4.1% (95% CI 3.0% to 5.3%), and among Republicans 15.0% (95% CI 13.0% to 17.1%) and 4.8% (95% CI 3.5% to 6.2%). The Democratic-minus-Republican gap was 2.2 (95% CI −0.9 to 5.3) points at the first cut point, 0.1 (95% CI −2.4 to 2.6) at the second and −0.7 (95% CI −2.5 to 1.1) at the third, and each interval includes zero. Table 2. Most adult citizens said violence for political goals is not at all justified, and the data show no party gap distinguishable from zero Without leaners the Democratic share at the first cut point is 14.8% (95% CI 12.5% to 17.2%) and the Republican share 15.1% (95% CI 12.4% to 17.8%), a gap of −0.3 (95% CI −3.9 to 3.4) points, and the independents and leaners who remain are at 21.3% (95% CI 18.0% to 24.6%). The sign of the gap at the first cut point differs between the two groupings, and neither interval excludes zero. The highest share is among adults who name neither party and do not lean: 30.5% (95% CI 23.4% to 37.7%) of the 346 who answered said violence is justified at least a little. They are 6.7% (95% CI 5.8% to 7.7%) of adult citizens. They are also the group least likely to say they follow government and politics always or most of the time, at 27.8% against 56.5% of Democrats and 52.8% of Republicans. Adults who follow politics less often than that said violence is justified at least a little more often, at 20.9% (95% CI 18.3% to 23.5%) against 13.9% (95% CI 12.1% to 15.7%). This pattern fits the finding that respondent disengagement inflates estimates of this kind [2], and it fits other differences between these groups. The attention question cannot tell the explanations apart. On the perception question, 62.7% (95% CI 60.6% to 64.7%) of adult citizens said political violence had increased over the four-year comparison period, as did 62.3% (95% CI 59.3% to 65.4%) of Democrats and 64.4% (95% CI 61.8% to 67.1%) of Republicans, and the two party intervals overlap. ### Younger and less educated adults approve of violence more often Table 3 splits the share saying violence is justified at least a little by age and by education. In the youngest of the four age groups 31.3% (95% CI 26.1% to 36.4%) gave that answer, against 11.0% (95% CI 8.9% to 13.0%) in the oldest, a difference of 20.3 (95% CI 14.7 to 26.0) points. Among adults with a high school education or less 22.8% (95% CI 19.7% to 25.8%) gave it, against 11.4% (95% CI 9.3% to 13.6%) among adults with a bachelor's degree or more, a difference of 11.4 (95% CI 7.9 to 14.8) points. Both intervals lie above the upper end of the party gap in the previous section. Table 3. Younger and less educated adults were more likely to say violence is justified than older and college-educated adults, in both parties The age pattern appears in both parties. In the youngest group the share is 32.1% (95% CI 25.2% to 39.1%) among Democrats and 27.1% (95% CI 19.3% to 35.0%) among Republicans, and in the oldest group 13.0% (95% CI 9.6% to 16.3%) and 8.5% (95% CI 5.7% to 11.2%). Within every age group and every education group the Democratic and Republican intervals overlap. Age, education and attention to politics overlap with one another, and the figure does not separate them. ### Republicans doubt the count and the 2020 result more often Table 4 shows six measures by party. Before the election 35.1% (95% CI 32.3% to 37.9%) of Republicans expected the votes to be counted not at all or only a little accurately, against 8.2% (95% CI 6.7% to 9.7%) of Democrats, a gap of 26.9 (95% CI 23.9 to 30.0) points with Republicans higher. After the election 33.2% (95% CI 30.5% to 35.8%) of Republicans and 19.9% (95% CI 17.5% to 22.2%) of Democrats said votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time, a gap of 13.3 (95% CI 9.7 to 16.8) points. The two gaps come from different questions with different targets, so the smaller post-election gap is not a measured change. Little or no trust in local election officials was 33.0% (95% CI 30.2% to 35.8%) among Republicans and 11.9% (95% CI 10.0% to 13.8%) among Democrats. Table 4. Republicans doubted the count and the 2020 result more often than Democrats did, and Democrats doubted the 2024 result more often On the 2020 election, 55.5% (95% CI 52.6% to 58.5%) of Republicans said Trump was the legitimate winner, against 4.5% (95% CI 3.3% to 5.7%) of Democrats, a gap of 51.0 (95% CI 47.9 to 54.1) points. Without leaners the Republican share is 59.9% (95% CI 56.2% to 63.6%). Of the Republicans who said Trump was the legitimate winner, 52.5% (95% CI 48.2% to 56.8%) were very or extremely confident in that answer, which is 29.1% (95% CI 26.2% to 32.0%) of all Republicans. On the events of January 2021, 46.4% (95% CI 43.0% to 49.7%) of Republicans chose the FBI account, against 4.7% (95% CI 3.5% to 6.0%) of Democrats, and 19.0% (95% CI 16.4% to 21.5%) of Republicans chose it and were very or extremely confident. The 2024 question points the other way. Among Democrats, 14.7% (95% CI 12.4% to 16.9%) said Harris was the legitimate winner of the election that Trump won, against 2.3% (95% CI 1.2% to 3.4%) of Republicans, a Republican-minus-Democratic gap of −12.3 (95% CI −14.8 to −9.9) points. The gap on the 2024 question is smaller in absolute value than the gap on the 2020 question, and 7.2% (95% CI 5.6% to 8.8%) of Democrats chose Harris and were very or extremely confident. Adults who name neither party have estimates between those of the two parties on the pre-election count, trust in local officials, the 2020 result and the FBI account, and above both parties on how often votes are counted fairly. On that question 44.8% (95% CI 36.4% to 53.1%) chose the less-than-most-of-the-time answers. Their distance from the midpoint of the two parties' estimates is positive when they are closer to the Republican answer. It is 8.2 (95% CI 1.4 to 15.1) points on the count and 8.4 (95% CI 0.6 to 16.2) on trust in local officials, so on those two they are closer to the Republican answer. On the 2020 result and the FBI account the distances are 2.5 (95% CI −5.8 to 10.7) and 2.5 (95% CI −5.8 to 10.8) points, intervals that include zero, so the data do not place the group nearer either party there. The group is small and its intervals are wide. ### Losing voters disputed the 2020 result more often than the 2024 result A respondent's view of an election differs with whether the respondent's candidate won, a pattern that has been described as a winner effect in voter confidence [4] and, across countries, as losers' consent [5]. Table 5 puts the two elections on the same footing by showing the share of voters who said the candidate who lost was the legitimate winner. In 2020, 60.6% (95% CI 57.4% to 63.9%) of respondents who recalled voting for Trump said so, against 4.2% (95% CI 3.0% to 5.4%) of those who recalled voting for Biden. In 2024, 12.7% (95% CI 10.3% to 15.0%) of Harris voters said Harris was the legitimate winner, against 1.4% (95% CI 0.4% to 2.4%) of Trump voters. Among the losing side's voters the difference between the two elections is 48.0 (95% CI 44.0 to 52.0) points, and the very or extremely confident answers show the same order (33.3% (95% CI 29.9% to 36.8%) for Trump voters in 2020 and 6.8% (95% CI 5.1% to 8.5%) for Harris voters in 2024). Table 5. Trump voters called Trump the legitimate 2020 winner more often (60.6%) than Harris voters called Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (12.7%) The comparison does not isolate a difference between the parties. The 2020 question was asked years after that election and the 2024 question in the months after it, and the survey does not measure what candidates and officials said about either result in between. Winning does not remove all doubt about counts either. After the 2024 election 31.6% (95% CI 28.3% to 34.9%) of Trump voters said votes are counted fairly less often than most of the time, against 13.6% (95% CI 11.3% to 15.8%) of Harris voters. On that question the difference between the sides was in place after the result, although the data cannot show how much it changed. ### Strong Republicans differ from Republican leaners on the 2020 result only Table 6 uses the seven categories of the party identification question: strong, not very strong and leaning for each party, and neither party. Approval of violence at the first cut point is not higher among strong identifiers than among the other identifiers of their party: strong Democrats minus other Democrats is −4.7 (95% CI −9.2 to −0.2) points and strong Republicans minus other Republicans is −1.2 (95% CI −5.7 to 3.3). Among Democrats the leaners are above the strong identifiers, at 23.4% (95% CI 17.2% to 29.6%), a difference of 8.6 (95% CI 1.9 to 15.3) points, and adults who name neither party have the highest estimate, 30.5% (95% CI 23.4% to 37.7%). Table 6. Strong Republicans stood apart from Republican leaners on the 2020 result only, and approval of violence did not rise with strength of identification The three election measures are low and close together across the three Democratic categories and higher among Republicans, where strong identifiers differ from leaners on only one measure. Strong Republicans said Trump was the legitimate winner of 2020 at 67.7% (95% CI 63.4% to 71.9%), against 45.7% (95% CI 39.6% to 51.9%) among Republican leaners, a difference of 21.9 (95% CI 14.6 to 29.2) points. On the expected count the two categories are at 39.9% (95% CI 35.9% to 44.0%) and 33.9% (95% CI 28.7% to 39.2%), a difference of 6.0 (95% CI −0.7 to 12.7) points, and on the FBI account at 51.8% (95% CI 47.3% to 56.3%) and 46.9% (95% CI 40.8% to 53.0%), a difference of 4.9 (95% CI −2.6 to 12.4) points. Both of those difference intervals include zero. Strong Republicans have the highest estimate of the seven categories on all three measures, but the data distinguish them from Republican leaners only on the 2020 result. The categories do not form a ladder either. Not very strong Republicans chose the FBI account less often than Republican leaners, by 11.4 (95% CI 2.1 to 20.6) points. ### Cold out-party feelings go with count doubts, not with approval of violence The feeling thermometer rates a party from the coldest to the warmest answer. Chapter 2.1, Feelings toward the other party (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/feelings-toward-the-other-party) follows those ratings over time and owns that trend. Here the out-party rating is a Democrat's rating of the Republican Party or a Republican's rating of the Democratic Party, taken in the same pre-election interview as the violence and count questions. Any pattern below is an association measured at one time, and it does not say which came first or whether one produced the other. Chapter 2.2, Negative partisanship (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/negative-partisanship) asks that question for voting. The coldest bin, defined in Table 7, holds 37.6% (95% CI 35.0% to 40.1%) of Democrats and 40.9% (95% CI 38.5% to 43.3%) of Republicans. Among Republicans in the coldest bin, 47.9% (95% CI 43.6% to 52.2%) expected the votes to be counted not at all or only a little accurately, against 32.4% (95% CI 26.8% to 38.0%) in the middle bin and 17.5% (95% CI 13.0% to 22.0%) in the least cold bin. Each ten-point step colder goes with 5.6 (95% CI 4.4 to 6.8) points more Republican doubt about the count, and with 5.9 (95% CI 4.7 to 7.2) points after holding age, education, sex, race and ethnicity and strength of party identification fixed in a linear probability model. Among Democrats the slope is −0.6 (95% CI −1.5 to 0.2) points, an interval that includes zero. Table 7. Colder ratings of the other party went with more doubt about the count among Republicans, and with no more approval of violence in either party For approval of violence at the first cut point the slope per ten-point step colder is −0.4 (95% CI −1.5 to 0.6) points among Republicans and −1.8 (95% CI −3.2 to −0.4) among Democrats, and 0.3 (95% CI −0.9 to 1.5) and −0.9 (95% CI −2.3 to 0.5) after the same adjustment. The Democratic estimate without adjustment has an interval below zero, so each step colder goes with fewer Democrats saying violence is justified, the opposite of what an account in which hostility produces approval would predict. The adjusted Democratic interval includes zero. No interval for violence reaches past 3.2 points per step in either direction. The link between cold ratings and count doubts among Republicans is not evidence that hostility produces doubt. Republicans who rate the Democratic Party coldest also differ from other Republicans in ways the adjustment does not hold fixed, such as what they have heard about the count, which the survey does not measure. ### Answers differ by sample group on some items The 2024 ANES interviewed three groups separately: a fresh sample interviewed mainly in person, a fresh sample interviewed mainly on the web and a panel interviewed on the web. Each has its own weight and design variables. The user guide cautions against attributing differences among interview modes to the mode itself, because respondents within a sample group were not assigned a mode at random [1]. Table 8 repeats four estimates for each group. Table 8. Republican doubt about the count and Democratic doubt about the 2024 result were lower in the in-person sample than in the web sample, and the party gap on the 2020 result did not differ Republican doubt about the count differs with the sample group. In the in-person sample 26.2% (95% CI 20.3% to 32.1%) expected an inaccurate count, against 40.1% (95% CI 35.9% to 44.4%) in the web sample and 40.0% (95% CI 35.9% to 44.1%) in the panel, and the web sample minus the in-person sample is 13.9 (95% CI 6.7 to 21.1) points. The Democratic answer that Harris was the legitimate winner of 2024 is lower in the in-person sample than in the web sample, at 9.3% (95% CI 5.2% to 13.4%) against 20.4% (95% CI 16.2% to 24.5%), a difference of 11.1 (95% CI 5.3 to 16.8) points, and the panel lies between them at 14.3% (95% CI 10.7% to 18.0%). The Republican-minus-Democratic gap on the 2020 result is similar across the groups, at 51.3 (95% CI 46.1 to 56.5), 50.3 (95% CI 45.2 to 55.4) and 53.6 (95% CI 47.7 to 59.6) points in the in-person, web and panel groups. The gap on the expected count is smaller in the in-person group, at 19.3 (95% CI 13.4 to 25.3) points, than in the web and panel groups, at 32.4 (95% CI 27.6 to 37.3) and 31.3 (95% CI 26.3 to 36.2). Approval of violence at the first cut point is lower in the panel, at 13.4% (95% CI 10.8% to 15.9%), than in the web sample, at 18.5% (95% CI 16.2% to 20.8%). Interviewer presence can change answers to sensitive questions [6]. The panel members also differ from fresh respondents in having been interviewed in 2016 and 2020, so the data cannot say whether these differences come from the interview mode or from the people in each group. The estimates in the rest of the chapter pool the groups with the full-sample weights, so a pooled share on an item that differs by group averages over that spread. ### Both parties call the norms important, with gaps of different sizes Table 9 gives the share who said each of four practices is very or extremely important to the United States maintaining a strong democracy, and the shares answering the questions about presidents and the press. For news organizations being free to criticize political leaders the Democratic share is 65.4% (95% CI 62.7% to 68.1%) and the Republican share 50.8% (95% CI 47.4% to 54.2%), a Republican-minus-Democratic difference of −14.6 (95% CI −18.8 to −10.3) points. For the other three practices the Republican shares run from 69.6% to 86.1% and the Democratic shares from 78.2% to 91.7%, with Republicans lower on each. Table 9. Republicans were less likely than Democrats to rate four democratic practices important and more likely to favor presidential freedom from Congress and the courts or limits on journalists Among Democrats 16.0% (95% CI 13.7% to 18.4%) and among Republicans 20.0% (95% CI 17.7% to 22.3%) said it would be helpful if presidents could work without paying attention to what Congress and the courts say, a difference of 4.0 (95% CI 0.9 to 7.0) points. Among Democrats 11.1% (95% CI 9.1% to 13.2%) and among Republicans 15.8% (95% CI 13.6% to 18.0%) favored restricting journalists' access to information, a difference of 4.7 (95% CI 1.8 to 7.6) points. The presidential question is related to the strong-leader questions asked in other surveys, and Chapter 6.7, Support for democracy (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy) takes up those questions across countries. Chapter 6.6, Tolerance of speech (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/tolerance-of-speech) covers willingness to let speakers speak. These are stated commitments to a practice in general. A respondent can call a practice important and still accept a violation by a favored official, and the survey has no question that pairs a norm with a violation by the respondent's own side. ### What these data cannot show One cross-section cannot show change. The cumulative ANES file used elsewhere in this book has no item on political violence, on votes counted accurately or on the legitimacy of an election, so no earlier ANES study on disk is comparable. The 2024 file carries identifiers that link panel respondents to the 2016 and 2020 studies, but those studies are not in the data used here. Whether approval of violence or doubt about counts rose or fell needs surveys that repeat the questions over time. Projects that field repeated survey questions on political violence, democratic norms and the legitimacy of elections include the Polarization Research Lab (America's Political Pulse) and Bright Line Watch. This chapter does not use them and reports nothing from them. The file records no action. It has no question about violence, threats or harassment by the respondent, or about taking part in the events of January 2021. The only actions it records are ordinary participation such as voting and joining a protest march, rally or demonstration. Approval in the abstract is not evidence that a respondent would act, and an estimate of how many have acted would need administrative records, such as law-enforcement case files, that the survey cannot supply. The violence question does not say who would be hurt, for what goal or by what act, so the shares cannot be sorted into approval of attacks on officials, on the other party or on no one in particular. The answer "a little" accounts for 6.4% (95% CI 5.3% to 7.6%) of adult citizens, about as many as the 6.2% (95% CI 5.1% to 7.3%) who chose "a moderate amount", and it is the answer whose meaning the wording leaves most open. The data cannot separate respondents who read the question carefully from respondents who did not, and the attention pattern above is a description and not a correction. The thermometer, strength and age results are associations and make no claim about cause. Neither the party gap nor the gaps by age and education are adjusted for one another, except where the text says so. The 2020 and 2024 legitimacy questions were asked at different distances from their elections and carry different histories of statements by candidates and officials, which the survey did not measure, so a difference between them mixes timing, who won and party. The population is adult citizens at residential addresses. It leaves out noncitizens, people in institutions and group quarters, and, for the in-person sample, residents of Alaska and Hawaii. Respondents who refused a question, and paper respondents who were not asked, are left out of its shares, and nonresponse to the survey itself is handled only through the weights. The intervals describe sampling variation. They do not include the differences among sample groups shown above or the effect of question wording. ## Tables ### Table 1. The ANES questions measure approval, expectation, perception and belief, and none records an action Each question used in this chapter, with its variable, exact wording, answer scale, what it measures and what it is about; 2024 pre-election and post-election interviews | Question | Variable | Wording | Answers | What it measures | What it is about | Asked | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | | Violence justified | V241579 | On another topic: How much do you feel it is justified for people to use violence to pursue their political goals in this country? | Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; A great deal | Hypothetical approval, in the abstract | People in general, any political goal, no act or victim named | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,192 | | Violence increased or decreased | V241580 | Compared to four years ago, do you think violence used to pursue political goals in the United States has: | Increased; Decreased; Stayed the same (a follow-up asks how much) | Perception of change | Violence to pursue political goals in the United States, by anyone | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,181 | | Votes counted accurately | V241314 | In the November 2024 general election, how accurately do you think the votes will be counted? | Not at all accurately; A little accurately; Moderately accurately; Very accurately; Completely accurately | Expectation, before the result was known | Votes in the 2024 general election, anywhere in the country | Pre-election; all modes | 5,478 | | Trust in election officials | V241315 | How much do you trust the officials who oversee elections where you live? | Not at all; A little; A moderate amount; A lot; A great deal | Trust | Officials who run elections where the respondent lives | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,243 | | Votes counted fairly | V242207 | In your view, how often do the following things occur in this country's elections: Votes are counted fairly? | All of the time; Most of the time; About half of the time; Some of the time; Never | Belief about elections in general, after the result | Elections in this country in general | Post-election; all modes | 4,926 | | Legitimate winner of 2020 | V242567 | Which of these two statements do you think is most likely to be true? Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 presidential election / Joe Biden was the legitimate winner of the 2020 presidential election | One of the two statements; a follow-up (V242568) asks how confident, from Not at all to Extremely | Belief about a past result | The 2020 presidential election | Post-election; not on paper | 4,612 | | Who carried out January 6 | V242571 | Which of these two statements do you think is most likely to be true? The events on January 6, 2021 were planned and carried out by pro-Trump protesters / The events on January 6, 2021 were planned and carried out by FBI agents posing as pro-Trump protesters | One of the two statements; a follow-up (V242572) asks how confident, from Not at all to Extremely | Belief about who acted | Who planned and carried out the events of that day | Post-election; not on paper | 4,551 | | Legitimate winner of 2024 | V242575 | Which of these two statements do you think is most likely to be true? Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2024 presidential election / Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 presidential election | One of the two statements; a follow-up (V242576) asks how confident, from Not at all to Extremely | Belief about a result just decided | The 2024 presidential election | Post-election; not on paper | 4,633 | | Free news organizations | V241324 | For the next few items, we would like to know how important you think each one is to the United States maintaining a strong democracy. First, how important is it that news organizations are free to criticize political leaders? | Not important at all to Extremely important (five answers) | Stated importance of a named practice | News organizations and political leaders in general | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,241 | | Branches check one another | V241325 | How important is it that the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government keep one another from having too much power? | Not important at all to Extremely important (five answers) | Stated importance of a named practice | The three branches in general | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,242 | | Consequences for misconduct | V241326 | How important is it that elected officials face serious consequences if they engage in misconduct? | Not important at all to Extremely important (five answers) | Stated importance of a named practice | Elected officials in general | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,250 | | Agreement on basic facts | V241327 | How important is it that people agree on basic facts even if they disagree politically? | Not important at all to Extremely important (five answers) | Stated importance of a named practice | People in general | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,233 | | Presidents and Congress and the courts | V241328 | Would it be helpful, harmful, or neither helpful nor harmful if U.S. presidents could work on the country's problems without paying attention to what Congress and the courts say? | Helpful; Harmful; Neither helpful nor harmful (a follow-up asks how much) | Stated view of a hypothetical change | U.S. presidents in general, no president named | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,210 | | Journalists' access | V241331 | Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose elected officials restricting journalists' access to information about government decision-making? | Favor; Oppose; Neither favor nor oppose (a follow-up asks how much) | Stated view of a hypothetical change | Elected officials in general | Pre-election; not on paper | 5,219 | Note: Variable names are those of the ANES 2024 Time Series file. The paper questionnaire omitted every question marked not on paper. Note: The file also holds a version of the violence question for the spouses and partners of respondents. That version is answered by a different set of people and is not used. Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election and post-election questionnaires, 2024; counts are unweighted numbers of respondents Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/items.json ### Table 2. Most adult citizens said violence for political goals is not at all justified, and the data show no party gap distinguishable from zero Share of adult citizens saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at three cut points of the five-point answer scale, by party identification; pre-election 2024 | Grouping | Cut point | Group | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | with leaners | At least a little justified | All adult citizens | 17.2 | 15.6 | 18.9 | 5,192 | | with leaners | At least a little justified | Democrats | 17.3 | 14.9 | 19.7 | 2,532 | | with leaners | At least a little justified | Neither party | 30.5 | 23.4 | 37.7 | 346 | | with leaners | At least a little justified | Republicans | 15.0 | 13.0 | 17.1 | 2,290 | | with leaners | A moderate amount or more | All adult citizens | 10.8 | 9.5 | 12.1 | 5,192 | | with leaners | A moderate amount or more | Democrats | 10.0 | 8.4 | 11.6 | 2,532 | | with leaners | A moderate amount or more | Neither party | 21.7 | 14.8 | 28.7 | 346 | | with leaners | A moderate amount or more | Republicans | 9.9 | 8.0 | 11.9 | 2,290 | | with leaners | A lot or a great deal | All adult citizens | 4.6 | 3.7 | 5.4 | 5,192 | | with leaners | A lot or a great deal | Democrats | 4.1 | 3.0 | 5.3 | 2,532 | | with leaners | A lot or a great deal | Neither party | 6.3 | 2.5 | 10.1 | 346 | | with leaners | A lot or a great deal | Republicans | 4.8 | 3.5 | 6.2 | 2,290 | | without leaners | At least a little justified | All adult citizens | 17.2 | 15.6 | 18.9 | 5,192 | | without leaners | At least a little justified | Democrats | 14.8 | 12.5 | 17.2 | 1,848 | | without leaners | At least a little justified | Independents and leaners | 21.3 | 18.0 | 24.6 | 1,695 | | without leaners | At least a little justified | Republicans | 15.1 | 12.4 | 17.8 | 1,625 | | without leaners | A moderate amount or more | All adult citizens | 10.8 | 9.5 | 12.1 | 5,192 | | without leaners | A moderate amount or more | Democrats | 8.9 | 7.0 | 10.8 | 1,848 | | without leaners | A moderate amount or more | Independents and leaners | 13.1 | 10.7 | 15.6 | 1,695 | | without leaners | A moderate amount or more | Republicans | 10.2 | 7.8 | 12.5 | 1,625 | | without leaners | A lot or a great deal | All adult citizens | 4.6 | 3.7 | 5.4 | 5,192 | | without leaners | A lot or a great deal | Democrats | 4.1 | 2.8 | 5.3 | 1,848 | | without leaners | A lot or a great deal | Independents and leaners | 4.8 | 3.4 | 6.2 | 1,695 | | without leaners | A lot or a great deal | Republicans | 4.9 | 3.3 | 6.4 | 1,625 | Views: With leaners (variant = with leaners); Without leaners (variant = without leaners). Note: The first view counts leaners with the party they lean toward and shows adults who name neither party separately. The second view counts only strong and not very strong identifiers as Democrats or Republicans and groups the remaining adults as independents and leaners. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor. Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions. Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews, 2024; weighted (V240107a); 95% design-based intervals Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/violence_levels.json ### Table 3. Younger and less educated adults were more likely to say violence is justified than older and college-educated adults, in both parties Share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little, by age group and education, for all adult citizens and for Democrats and Republicans with leaners; pre-election 2024 | Dimension | Category | Group | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Age | 18 to 29 | All adult citizens | 31.3 | 26.1 | 36.4 | 513 | | Age | 18 to 29 | Democrats | 32.1 | 25.2 | 39.1 | 275 | | Age | 18 to 29 | Republicans | 27.1 | 19.3 | 35.0 | 188 | | Age | 30 to 44 | All adult citizens | 18.0 | 15.1 | 20.9 | 1,268 | | Age | 30 to 44 | Democrats | 14.1 | 10.4 | 17.7 | 610 | | Age | 30 to 44 | Republicans | 19.5 | 15.0 | 23.9 | 541 | | Age | 45 to 59 | All adult citizens | 14.1 | 11.4 | 16.9 | 1,155 | | Age | 45 to 59 | Democrats | 14.0 | 10.0 | 17.9 | 558 | | Age | 45 to 59 | Republicans | 12.1 | 8.2 | 16.0 | 508 | | Age | 60 or older | All adult citizens | 11.0 | 8.9 | 13.0 | 2,027 | | Age | 60 or older | Democrats | 13.0 | 9.6 | 16.3 | 1,004 | | Age | 60 or older | Republicans | 8.5 | 5.7 | 11.2 | 935 | | Education | High school or less | All adult citizens | 22.8 | 19.7 | 25.8 | 1,148 | | Education | High school or less | Democrats | 23.6 | 18.6 | 28.6 | 441 | | Education | High school or less | Republicans | 18.7 | 14.9 | 22.5 | 581 | | Education | Some college | All adult citizens | 17.7 | 14.8 | 20.6 | 1,632 | | Education | Some college | Democrats | 18.1 | 13.7 | 22.4 | 703 | | Education | Some college | Republicans | 16.0 | 11.5 | 20.5 | 796 | | Education | Bachelor's degree or more | All adult citizens | 11.4 | 9.3 | 13.6 | 2,370 | | Education | Bachelor's degree or more | Democrats | 12.8 | 9.8 | 15.7 | 1,371 | | Education | Bachelor's degree or more | Republicans | 9.0 | 6.2 | 11.8 | 893 | Note: Age is age on Election Day in four groups; education is the five-category ANES summary collapsed to high school or less, some college, and a bachelor's degree or more. Respondents with no age or education answer are left out of those panels. Note: Democrats and Republicans include leaners. Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor. Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews, 2024; weighted (V240107a); 95% design-based intervals Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/violence_by_age_edu.json ### Table 4. Republicans doubted the count and the 2020 result more often than Democrats did, and Democrats doubted the 2024 result more often Share giving the doubting answer on six measures, by party identification; two measures from the pre-election interview and four from the post-election interview, 2024 | Grouping | Measure | Group | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | with leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | All adult citizens | 21.8 | 20.2 | 23.4 | 5,478 | | with leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Democrats | 8.2 | 6.7 | 9.7 | 2,638 | | with leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Neither party | 29.9 | 23.1 | 36.7 | 373 | | with leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Republicans | 35.1 | 32.3 | 37.9 | 2,444 | | with leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | All adult citizens | 27.7 | 26.0 | 29.4 | 4,926 | | with leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Democrats | 19.9 | 17.5 | 22.2 | 2,407 | | with leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Neither party | 44.8 | 36.4 | 53.1 | 320 | | with leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Republicans | 33.2 | 30.5 | 35.8 | 2,177 | | with leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | All adult citizens | 22.5 | 20.9 | 24.2 | 5,243 | | with leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Democrats | 11.9 | 10.0 | 13.8 | 2,551 | | with leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Neither party | 30.9 | 23.3 | 38.4 | 349 | | with leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Republicans | 33.0 | 30.2 | 35.8 | 2,323 | | with leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | All adult citizens | 29.2 | 27.3 | 31.0 | 4,612 | | with leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Democrats | 4.5 | 3.3 | 5.7 | 2,297 | | with leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Neither party | 32.5 | 24.5 | 40.5 | 289 | | with leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Republicans | 55.5 | 52.6 | 58.5 | 2,009 | | with leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | All adult citizens | 24.5 | 22.6 | 26.4 | 4,551 | | with leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Democrats | 4.7 | 3.5 | 6.0 | 2,291 | | with leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Neither party | 28.1 | 20.1 | 36.0 | 284 | | with leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Republicans | 46.4 | 43.0 | 49.7 | 1,965 | | with leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | All adult citizens | 9.3 | 8.0 | 10.6 | 4,633 | | with leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Democrats | 14.7 | 12.4 | 16.9 | 2,283 | | with leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Neither party | 16.4 | 9.5 | 23.2 | 293 | | with leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Republicans | 2.3 | 1.2 | 3.4 | 2,042 | | without leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | All adult citizens | 21.8 | 20.2 | 23.4 | 5,478 | | without leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Democrats | 7.2 | 5.4 | 9.0 | 1,926 | | without leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Independents and leaners | 24.0 | 20.8 | 27.1 | 1,795 | | without leaners | Expected count inaccurate (before the election) | Republicans | 35.7 | 32.5 | 38.8 | 1,734 | | without leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | All adult citizens | 27.7 | 26.0 | 29.4 | 4,926 | | without leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Democrats | 18.7 | 15.9 | 21.5 | 1,765 | | without leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Independents and leaners | 31.0 | 27.2 | 34.7 | 1,597 | | without leaners | Votes counted fairly less than most of the time (after) | Republicans | 33.9 | 30.4 | 37.3 | 1,542 | | without leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | All adult citizens | 22.5 | 20.9 | 24.2 | 5,243 | | without leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Democrats | 9.9 | 7.7 | 12.1 | 1,863 | | without leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Independents and leaners | 26.5 | 23.1 | 29.8 | 1,715 | | without leaners | Little or no trust in local election officials (before) | Republicans | 32.7 | 29.4 | 36.1 | 1,645 | | without leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | All adult citizens | 29.2 | 27.3 | 31.0 | 4,612 | | without leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Democrats | 3.9 | 2.5 | 5.3 | 1,684 | | without leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Independents and leaners | 27.4 | 23.7 | 31.0 | 1,487 | | without leaners | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner (after) | Republicans | 59.9 | 56.2 | 63.6 | 1,424 | | without leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | All adult citizens | 24.5 | 22.6 | 26.4 | 4,551 | | without leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Democrats | 5.0 | 3.3 | 6.6 | 1,681 | | without leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Independents and leaners | 25.8 | 22.2 | 29.5 | 1,459 | | without leaners | FBI account of the January 2021 events (after) | Republicans | 46.1 | 42.3 | 50.0 | 1,400 | | without leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | All adult citizens | 9.3 | 8.0 | 10.6 | 4,633 | | without leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Democrats | 15.6 | 13.0 | 18.2 | 1,675 | | without leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Independents and leaners | 8.8 | 6.7 | 10.9 | 1,497 | | without leaners | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (after) | Republicans | 2.5 | 1.1 | 3.8 | 1,446 | Views: With leaners (variant = with leaners); Without leaners (variant = without leaners). Note: The first view counts leaners with the party they lean toward and shows adults who name neither party separately. The second view counts only strong and not very strong identifiers as Democrats or Republicans and groups the remaining adults as independents and leaners. Note: Two measures come from the pre-election interview and use the pre-election weight; the other four come from the post-election interview and use the post-election weight. Party identification comes from the pre-election interview in all six. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor. Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions. Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews (August to November 2024) and post-election interviews (November 2024 to February 2025); weighted (V240107a and V240107b); 95% design-based intervals Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/counts_and_legitimacy.json ### Table 5. Trump voters called Trump the legitimate 2020 winner more often (60.6%) than Harris voters called Harris the legitimate 2024 winner (12.7%) Share saying the candidate who lost was the legitimate winner, by the voter's choice in each election; post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | Election and voters | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2020 election: Trump voters | 60.6 | 57.4 | 63.9 | 1,495 | | 2020 election: Biden voters | 4.2 | 3.0 | 5.4 | 2,135 | | 2024 election: Harris voters | 12.7 | 10.3 | 15.0 | 1,976 | | 2024 election: Trump voters | 1.4 | 0.4 | 2.4 | 1,547 | Note: The 2020 vote is the vote recalled in the 2024 pre-election interview (V241106x), restricted to Biden and Trump voters. The 2024 vote is the post-election report of the presidential vote (V242067), restricted to Harris and Trump voters. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor. Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions. Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025; weighted (V240107b); 95% design-based intervals Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/losers.json ### Table 6. Strong Republicans stood apart from Republican leaners on the 2020 result only, and approval of violence did not rise with strength of identification Share giving the answer named above each panel, by the seven categories of party identification; pre-election and post-election interviews, 2024 | Measure | Party identification | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Violence justified at least a little | Strong Democrat | 14.8 | 11.8 | 17.8 | 1,252 | | Violence justified at least a little | Not very strong Democrat | 15.0 | 10.9 | 19.0 | 596 | | Violence justified at least a little | Leans Democratic | 23.4 | 17.2 | 29.6 | 684 | | Violence justified at least a little | Neither party | 30.5 | 23.4 | 37.7 | 346 | | Violence justified at least a little | Leans Republican | 14.9 | 11.6 | 18.2 | 665 | | Violence justified at least a little | Not very strong Republican | 16.5 | 11.4 | 21.5 | 539 | | Violence justified at least a little | Strong Republican | 14.4 | 11.1 | 17.6 | 1,086 | | Expected count inaccurate | Strong Democrat | 6.9 | 4.7 | 9.1 | 1,311 | | Expected count inaccurate | Not very strong Democrat | 7.8 | 4.8 | 10.8 | 615 | | Expected count inaccurate | Leans Democratic | 10.7 | 7.4 | 14.1 | 712 | | Expected count inaccurate | Neither party | 29.9 | 23.1 | 36.7 | 373 | | Expected count inaccurate | Leans Republican | 33.9 | 28.7 | 39.2 | 710 | | Expected count inaccurate | Not very strong Republican | 27.6 | 22.5 | 32.7 | 577 | | Expected count inaccurate | Strong Republican | 39.9 | 35.9 | 44.0 | 1,157 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Strong Democrat | 2.9 | 1.7 | 4.0 | 1,154 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Not very strong Democrat | 5.8 | 2.7 | 9.0 | 530 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Leans Democratic | 6.2 | 3.9 | 8.5 | 613 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Neither party | 32.5 | 24.5 | 40.5 | 289 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Leans Republican | 45.7 | 39.6 | 51.9 | 585 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Not very strong Republican | 45.0 | 38.0 | 52.0 | 466 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Strong Republican | 67.7 | 63.4 | 71.9 | 958 | | FBI account of the January 2021 events | Strong Democrat | 5.0 | 3.0 | 7.0 | 1,152 | | FBI account of the January 2021 events | Not very strong Democrat | 4.8 | 2.2 | 7.5 | 529 | | FBI account of the January 2021 events | Leans Democratic | 4.1 | 2.5 | 5.8 | 610 | | FBI account of the January 2021 events | Neither party | 28.1 | 20.1 | 36.0 | 284 | | FBI account of the January 2021 events | Leans Republican | 46.9 | 40.8 | 53.0 | 565 | | FBI account of the January 2021 events | Not very strong Republican | 35.5 | 28.1 | 42.9 | 466 | | FBI account of the January 2021 events | Strong Republican | 51.8 | 47.3 | 56.3 | 934 | Note: The count and violence measures come from the pre-election interview and the 2020 and FBI measures from the post-election interview. Each uses the weight for its interview. Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor. Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions. Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews (August to November 2024) and post-election interviews (November 2024 to February 2025); weighted (V240107a and V240107b); 95% design-based intervals Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/by_strength.json ### Table 7. Colder ratings of the other party went with more doubt about the count among Republicans, and with no more approval of violence in either party Share giving each answer by the party member's rating of the other party on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometer, Democrats and Republicans with leaners; pre-election 2024 | Measure | Out-party rating | Party | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 0 to 10 (coldest) | Democrats | 15.5 | 11.8 | 19.2 | 1,024 | | Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 0 to 10 (coldest) | Republicans | 14.3 | 11.1 | 17.5 | 1,013 | | Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 11 to 30 | Democrats | 14.2 | 10.8 | 17.6 | 933 | | Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 11 to 30 | Republicans | 14.2 | 10.2 | 18.2 | 737 | | Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 31 to 100 (least cold) | Democrats | 23.1 | 17.0 | 29.2 | 565 | | Violence justified at least a little | Out-party rating 31 to 100 (least cold) | Republicans | 17.6 | 12.5 | 22.6 | 532 | | Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 0 to 10 (coldest) | Democrats | 7.2 | 4.7 | 9.8 | 1,077 | | Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 0 to 10 (coldest) | Republicans | 47.9 | 43.6 | 52.2 | 1,095 | | Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 11 to 30 | Democrats | 6.5 | 4.0 | 9.1 | 960 | | Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 11 to 30 | Republicans | 32.4 | 26.8 | 38.0 | 774 | | Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 31 to 100 (least cold) | Democrats | 10.7 | 7.4 | 14.0 | 590 | | Expected count inaccurate | Out-party rating 31 to 100 (least cold) | Republicans | 17.5 | 13.0 | 22.0 | 567 | Note: The out-party rating is the Democratic Party rating (V241166) for Republicans and the Republican Party rating (V241167) for Democrats. The top bin runs from 31 to 100, and so includes ratings at the scale midpoint of 50 and above, because the narrower top bins had too few respondents to plot. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor. Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews, 2024; weighted (V240107a); 95% design-based intervals Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/thermometer.json ### Table 8. Republican doubt about the count and Democratic doubt about the 2024 result were lower in the in-person sample than in the web sample, and the party gap on the 2020 result did not differ Share giving the answer named above each panel, by ANES sample group, Democrats and Republicans with leaners; 2024 pre-election and post-election interviews | Measure | Sample group | Party | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Violence justified at least a little | Fresh in-person sample | Democrats | 17.5 | 12.8 | 22.3 | 522 | | Violence justified at least a little | Fresh in-person sample | Republicans | 14.7 | 11.0 | 18.3 | 436 | | Violence justified at least a little | Fresh web sample | Democrats | 19.0 | 15.7 | 22.4 | 956 | | Violence justified at least a little | Fresh web sample | Republicans | 15.2 | 12.0 | 18.5 | 862 | | Violence justified at least a little | Panel (web) | Democrats | 12.7 | 9.2 | 16.3 | 1,054 | | Violence justified at least a little | Panel (web) | Republicans | 12.9 | 9.6 | 16.3 | 992 | | Expected count inaccurate | Fresh in-person sample | Democrats | 6.9 | 3.9 | 9.8 | 524 | | Expected count inaccurate | Fresh in-person sample | Republicans | 26.2 | 20.3 | 32.1 | 437 | | Expected count inaccurate | Fresh web sample | Democrats | 7.7 | 5.4 | 10.1 | 969 | | Expected count inaccurate | Fresh web sample | Republicans | 40.1 | 35.9 | 44.4 | 882 | | Expected count inaccurate | Panel (web) | Democrats | 8.7 | 6.1 | 11.3 | 1,058 | | Expected count inaccurate | Panel (web) | Republicans | 40.0 | 35.9 | 44.1 | 999 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Fresh in-person sample | Democrats | 3.8 | 1.7 | 5.9 | 465 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Fresh in-person sample | Republicans | 55.1 | 49.7 | 60.5 | 381 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Fresh web sample | Democrats | 4.9 | 3.2 | 6.6 | 831 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Fresh web sample | Republicans | 55.2 | 50.4 | 60.0 | 712 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Panel (web) | Democrats | 5.1 | 2.6 | 7.6 | 1,001 | | Trump the legitimate 2020 winner | Panel (web) | Republicans | 58.7 | 53.4 | 64.0 | 916 | | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Fresh in-person sample | Democrats | 9.3 | 5.2 | 13.4 | 457 | | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Fresh in-person sample | Republicans | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.7 | 389 | | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Fresh web sample | Democrats | 20.4 | 16.2 | 24.5 | 826 | | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Fresh web sample | Republicans | 3.5 | 1.7 | 5.3 | 722 | | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Panel (web) | Democrats | 14.3 | 10.7 | 18.0 | 1,000 | | Harris the legitimate 2024 winner | Panel (web) | Republicans | 1.6 | 0.3 | 2.9 | 931 | Note: Each sample group uses its own weights and variance variables: V240101 for the fresh in-person sample, V240102 for the fresh web sample (web interviews, without the paper cases) and V240106 for the panel. The in-person sample excludes Alaska and Hawaii. Intervals use the t distribution with each group's own design degrees of freedom, which are smallest for the in-person sample and the panel. Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions. Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews (August to November 2024) and post-election interviews (November 2024 to February 2025); weighted (V240107a and V240107b); 95% design-based intervals Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/sample_groups.json ### Table 9. Republicans were less likely than Democrats to rate four democratic practices important and more likely to favor presidential freedom from Congress and the courts or limits on journalists Share giving the stated answer on six norm questions, by party identification with leaners; pre-election 2024 | Question and answer | Group | Share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | News organizations free to criticize leaders: very or extremely important | Democrats | 65.4 | 62.7 | 68.1 | 2,548 | | News organizations free to criticize leaders: very or extremely important | Neither party | 42.9 | 35.0 | 50.8 | 347 | | News organizations free to criticize leaders: very or extremely important | Republicans | 50.8 | 47.4 | 54.2 | 2,320 | | Branches check one another: very or extremely important | Democrats | 83.9 | 81.9 | 86.0 | 2,545 | | Branches check one another: very or extremely important | Neither party | 57.7 | 50.4 | 65.0 | 351 | | Branches check one another: very or extremely important | Republicans | 78.5 | 75.6 | 81.4 | 2,325 | | Consequences for misconduct: very or extremely important | Democrats | 91.7 | 90.0 | 93.4 | 2,549 | | Consequences for misconduct: very or extremely important | Neither party | 74.6 | 68.1 | 81.0 | 352 | | Consequences for misconduct: very or extremely important | Republicans | 86.1 | 83.7 | 88.5 | 2,325 | | Agreement on basic facts: very or extremely important | Democrats | 78.2 | 75.7 | 80.6 | 2,540 | | Agreement on basic facts: very or extremely important | Neither party | 53.4 | 45.2 | 61.6 | 352 | | Agreement on basic facts: very or extremely important | Republicans | 69.6 | 66.5 | 72.8 | 2,321 | | Helpful if presidents could ignore Congress and the courts | Democrats | 16.0 | 13.7 | 18.4 | 2,531 | | Helpful if presidents could ignore Congress and the courts | Neither party | 17.9 | 11.8 | 24.1 | 347 | | Helpful if presidents could ignore Congress and the courts | Republicans | 20.0 | 17.7 | 22.3 | 2,315 | | Favor officials restricting journalists' access | Democrats | 11.1 | 9.1 | 13.2 | 2,537 | | Favor officials restricting journalists' access | Neither party | 13.2 | 8.0 | 18.4 | 349 | | Favor officials restricting journalists' access | Republicans | 15.8 | 13.6 | 18.0 | 2,314 | Note: Democrats and Republicans include leaners. The four importance questions ask how important each practice is to the United States maintaining a strong democracy; very or extremely important are the top two of five answers. Intervals are 95% intervals from a Taylor-series variance that uses the survey strata and primary sampling units, with the t distribution and the design degrees of freedom. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; no plotted cell fell below that floor. Note: Refusals, break-offs and respondents not asked are left out of each share. The paper questionnaire omitted most of these questions. Source: ANES 2024 Time Series, pre-election interviews, 2024; weighted (V240107a); 95% design-based intervals Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/norms.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (136), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | acc_low_dem | 8.2% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 6.7% to 9.7% | 2,638 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | acc_low_gap | 26.9 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share expecting the votes to be counted not at all or a little accurately; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 23.9 to 30.0 | 5,082 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | acc_low_rep | 35.1% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 32.3% to 37.9% | 2,444 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | age_gap | 20.3 | percentage points | share saying violence is justified at least a little among the youngest age group (18 to 29) minus the oldest (60 or older); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 14.7 to 26.0 | 2,540 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | among_trump20_rep | 52.5% | percent of the group | weighted share very or extremely confident (V242568 answers 4 and 5) among Republicans who said Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election | Republicans including leaners who said Trump was the legitimate winner of 2020 and gave a confidence answer | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 48.2% to 56.8% | 1,110 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | attn_hi_viol | 13.9% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence is justified at least a little among those who pay attention to government and politics always or most of the time | adult U.S. citizens who follow government and politics always or most of the time and answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 12.1% to 15.7% | 2,999 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | attn_lo_viol | 20.9% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence is justified at least a little among those who pay attention to government and politics about half the time, some of the time or never | adult U.S. citizens who follow government and politics about half the time or less and answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 18.3% to 23.5% | 2,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | dem_attn_hi | 56.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying they pay attention to government and politics always or most of the time (V241004 answers 1 and 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 53.8% to 59.2% | 2,644 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | edu_gap | 11.4 | percentage points | share saying violence is justified at least a little among adults with a high school education or less minus adults with a bachelor's degree or more; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 7.9 to 14.8 | 3,518 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | fair_harrisvoters | 13.6% | percent of the group | weighted share saying votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time (V242207 answers 3 to 5) | Harris voters by reported 2024 vote (V242067), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 11.3% to 15.8% | 2,007 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | fair_low_dem | 19.9% | percent of the group | weighted share saying votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time (V242207 answers 3 to 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 17.5% to 22.2% | 2,407 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | fair_low_gap | 13.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying votes are counted fairly less often than most of the time; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 9.7 to 16.8 | 4,584 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | fair_low_nei | 44.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time (V242207 answers 3 to 5) | adults naming neither party and not leaning, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 36.4% to 53.1% | 320 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | fair_low_rep | 33.2% | percent of the group | weighted share saying votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time (V242207 answers 3 to 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 30.5% to 35.8% | 2,177 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | fair_trumpvoters | 31.6% | percent of the group | weighted share saying votes in this country's elections are counted fairly less often than most of the time (V242207 answers 3 to 5) | Trump voters by reported 2024 vote (V242067), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 28.3% to 34.9% | 1,570 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | fbi_dem | 4.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying the events of January 2021 were planned and carried out by FBI agents posing as pro-Trump protesters (V242571 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 3.5% to 6.0% | 2,291 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | fbi_firm_rep | 19.0% | percent of the group | weighted share choosing the FBI account of the events of January 2021 and very or extremely confident (V242571 answer 2 with V242572 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 16.4% to 21.5% | 1,965 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | fbi_rep | 46.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying the events of January 2021 were planned and carried out by FBI agents posing as pro-Trump protesters (V242571 answer 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 43.0% to 49.7% | 1,965 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | firm_lose20 | 33.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election and very or extremely confident, among recalled 2020 Trump voters | Trump voters by recalled 2020 vote (V241106x), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 29.9% to 36.8% | 1,495 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | firm_lose24 | 6.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election and very or extremely confident, among 2024 Harris voters | Harris voters by reported 2024 vote (V242067), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 5.1% to 8.5% | 1,976 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | harris24_dem | 14.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 12.4% to 16.9% | 2,283 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | harris24_firm_dem | 7.2% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election and very or extremely confident (V242575 answer 2 with V242576 answers 4 and 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 5.6% to 8.8% | 2,283 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | harris24_gap | −12.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI −14.8 to −9.9 | 4,325 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | harris24_rep | 2.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 1.2% to 3.4% | 2,042 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | lose20_biden | 4.2% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Biden voters by recalled 2020 vote (V241106x), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 3.0% to 5.4% | 2,135 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | lose20_trump | 60.6% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Trump voters by recalled 2020 vote (V241106x), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 57.4% to 63.9% | 1,495 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | lose24_harris | 12.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Harris voters by reported 2024 vote (V242067), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 10.3% to 15.0% | 1,976 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | lose24_trump | 1.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Trump voters by reported 2024 vote (V242067), among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 0.4% to 2.4% | 1,547 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | losers_gap | 48.0 | percentage points | share of 2020 Trump voters saying Trump was the legitimate 2020 winner minus share of 2024 Harris voters saying Harris was the legitimate 2024 winner; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | voters on the losing side of each election among adult U.S. citizens who answered the items | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 44.0 to 52.0 | 3,471 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | n_file | 5,521 | respondents | respondents in the ANES 2024 Time Series file | all respondents in the file | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | | | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | n_nei_viol | 346 | respondents | respondents naming neither party and not leaning who answered V241579 | adults naming neither party and not leaning, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | | | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | n_panel | 2,171 | respondents | respondents in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample (V240003 equal to 1) | panel respondents | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | | | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | n_paper_post | 200 | respondents | respondents interviewed by paper-and-pencil in the post-election study (V240002b equal to 3) | post-election paper respondents | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | | | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | n_paper_pre | 245 | respondents | respondents interviewed by paper-and-pencil in the pre-election study (V240002a equal to 3) | pre-election paper respondents | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | | | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | n_viol_declined | 84 | respondents | respondents who refused V241579 or broke off before it, among those not interviewed on paper | pre-election respondents asked the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | | | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | n_viol_valid | 5,192 | respondents | respondents with a usable answer to V241579 (violence justified) | pre-election respondents asked the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | | | none (unweighted count of respondents) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | nei_attn_hi | 27.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying they pay attention to government and politics always or most of the time (V241004 answers 1 and 2) | adults naming neither party and not leaning, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 21.5% to 34.1% | 379 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | nei_mid_acc | 8.2 | percentage points | share of adults naming neither party minus the midpoint of the Democratic and Republican shares expecting the count to be inaccurate (positive means closer to the Republican share); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adults naming neither party and Democrats and Republicans including leaners, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 1.4 to 15.1 | 5,455 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | nei_mid_fbi | 2.5 | percentage points | share of adults naming neither party minus the midpoint of the Democratic and Republican shares choosing the FBI account (positive means closer to the Republican share); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adults naming neither party and Democrats and Republicans including leaners, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI −5.8 to 10.8 | 4,540 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | nei_mid_t20 | 2.5 | percentage points | share of adults naming neither party minus the midpoint of the Democratic and Republican shares saying Trump was the legitimate winner of 2020 (positive means closer to the Republican share); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adults naming neither party and Democrats and Republicans including leaners, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI −5.8 to 10.7 | 4,595 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | nei_mid_trust | 8.4 | percentage points | share of adults naming neither party minus the midpoint of the Democratic and Republican shares little or no trust in local election officials (positive means closer to the Republican share); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | adults naming neither party and Democrats and Republicans including leaners, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 0.6 to 16.2 | 5,223 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_conseq_dem | 91.7% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that elected officials face serious consequences for misconduct (V241326 answers 4 and 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 90.0% to 93.4% | 2,549 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_conseq_rep | 86.1% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that elected officials face serious consequences for misconduct (V241326 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 83.7% to 88.5% | 2,325 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_facts_dem | 78.2% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that people agree on basic facts even if they disagree politically (V241327 answers 4 and 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 75.7% to 80.6% | 2,540 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_facts_rep | 69.6% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that people agree on basic facts even if they disagree politically (V241327 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 66.5% to 72.8% | 2,321 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_journ_dem | 11.1% | percent of the group | weighted share favoring elected officials restricting journalists' access to information about government decision-making (V241331 answer 1) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 9.1% to 13.2% | 2,537 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_journ_gap | 4.7 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share favoring elected officials restricting journalists' access to information; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 1.8 to 7.6 | 4,851 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_journ_rep | 15.8% | percent of the group | weighted share favoring elected officials restricting journalists' access to information about government decision-making (V241331 answer 1) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 13.6% to 18.0% | 2,314 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_media_dem | 65.4% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that news organizations are free to criticize political leaders (V241324 answers 4 and 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 62.7% to 68.1% | 2,548 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_media_gap | −14.6 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share calling it very or extremely important that news organizations are free to criticize political leaders; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −18.8 to −10.3 | 4,868 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_media_rep | 50.8% | percent of the group | weighted share calling it very or extremely important that news organizations are free to criticize political leaders (V241324 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 47.4% to 54.2% | 2,320 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_pres_dem | 16.0% | percent of the group | weighted share saying it would be helpful if presidents could work without paying attention to what Congress and the courts say (V241328 answer 1) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 13.7% to 18.4% | 2,531 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_pres_gap | 4.0 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying it would be helpful if presidents could work without paying attention to Congress and the courts; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 0.9 to 7.0 | 4,846 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | norm_pres_rep | 20.0% | percent of the group | weighted share saying it would be helpful if presidents could work without paying attention to what Congress and the courts say (V241328 answer 1) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 17.7% to 22.3% | 2,315 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | rep_attn_hi | 52.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying they pay attention to government and politics always or most of the time (V241004 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 50.3% to 55.3% | 2,459 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_acc_diff | 13.9 | percentage points | Republican share expecting an inaccurate count in the fresh web sample minus the fresh in-person sample (independent samples; Welch degrees of freedom); the two estimates come from independent samples, so the interval adds their variances and uses Welch-Satterthwaite degrees of freedom | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 6.7 to 21.1 | 1,319 | sample-specific weights V240102a and V240101a | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_acc_gap_ftf | 19.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share expecting an inaccurate count, in the fresh in-person sample; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 13.4 to 25.3 | 961 | V240101a and V240101b (fresh in-person sample weights); strata and PSUs V240101d and V240101c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_acc_gap_panel | 31.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share expecting an inaccurate count, in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 26.3 to 36.2 | 2,057 | V240106a and V240106b (panel sample weights); strata and PSUs V240106d and V240106c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_acc_gap_web | 32.4 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share expecting an inaccurate count, in the fresh web sample (web interviews); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 27.6 to 37.3 | 1,851 | V240102a and V240102b (fresh web sample weights); strata and PSUs V240102d and V240102c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_acc_rep_ftf | 26.2% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners in the fresh in-person sample, among those who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 20.3% to 32.1% | 437 | V240101a and V240101b (fresh in-person sample weights); strata and PSUs V240101d and V240101c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_acc_rep_panel | 40.0% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample, among those who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 35.9% to 44.1% | 999 | V240106a and V240106b (panel sample weights); strata and PSUs V240106d and V240106c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_acc_rep_web | 40.1% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners in the fresh web sample (web interviews), among those who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 35.9% to 44.4% | 882 | V240102a and V240102b (fresh web sample weights); strata and PSUs V240102d and V240102c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_h24_dem_ftf | 9.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners in the fresh in-person sample, among those who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 5.2% to 13.4% | 457 | V240101a and V240101b (fresh in-person sample weights); strata and PSUs V240101d and V240101c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_h24_dem_panel | 14.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample, among those who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 10.7% to 18.0% | 1,000 | V240106a and V240106b (panel sample weights); strata and PSUs V240106d and V240106c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_h24_dem_web | 20.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Kamala Harris was the legitimate winner of the 2024 election (V242575 answer 2) | Democrats including leaners in the fresh web sample (web interviews), among those who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 16.2% to 24.5% | 826 | V240102a and V240102b (fresh web sample weights); strata and PSUs V240102d and V240102c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_h24_diff | 11.1 | percentage points | Democratic share saying Harris was the legitimate 2024 winner in the fresh web sample minus the fresh in-person sample (independent samples; Welch degrees of freedom); the two estimates come from independent samples, so the interval adds their variances and uses Welch-Satterthwaite degrees of freedom | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 5.3 to 16.8 | 1,283 | sample-specific weights V240102b and V240101b | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_t20_gap_ftf | 51.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election, in the fresh in-person sample; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 46.1 to 56.5 | 846 | V240101a and V240101b (fresh in-person sample weights); strata and PSUs V240101d and V240101c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_t20_gap_panel | 53.6 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election, in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 47.7 to 59.6 | 1,917 | V240106a and V240106b (panel sample weights); strata and PSUs V240106d and V240106c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_t20_gap_web | 50.3 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election, in the fresh web sample (web interviews); the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 45.2 to 55.4 | 1,543 | V240102a and V240102b (fresh web sample weights); strata and PSUs V240102d and V240102c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_viol_panel | 13.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item in the 2016-2020-2024 panel sample, among those who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 10.8% to 15.9% | 2,153 | V240106a and V240106b (panel sample weights); strata and PSUs V240106d and V240106c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | samp_viol_web | 18.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item in the fresh web sample (web interviews), among those who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 16.2% to 20.8% | 2,015 | V240102a and V240102b (fresh web sample weights); strata and PSUs V240102d and V240102c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | share_nei | 6.7% | percent of the group | weighted share of adult citizens who name neither party and do not lean toward one (V241227x answer 4), among those with a party identification answer | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 5.8% to 7.7% | 5,483 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | slope_acc_dem | −0.6 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of expecting the count to be inaccurate; no adjustment; Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −1.5 to 0.2 | 2,627 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | slope_acc_rep | 5.6 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of expecting the count to be inaccurate; no adjustment; Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 4.4 to 6.8 | 2,436 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | slope_acc_rep_adj | 5.9 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of expecting the count to be inaccurate; adjusted for age group, education, sex, race and ethnicity and strength of party identification (leaner, not very strong, strong); Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 4.7 to 7.2 | 2,264 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | slope_viol_bound | 3.2 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | largest absolute interval end among the four slopes of the share saying violence is justified at least a little on out-party coldness (two parties, with and without adjustment) | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | | | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | slope_viol_dem | −1.8 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of saying violence is justified at least a little; no adjustment; Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −3.2 to −0.4 | 2,522 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | slope_viol_dem_adj | −0.9 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of saying violence is justified at least a little; adjusted for age group, education, sex, race and ethnicity and strength of party identification (leaner, not very strong, strong); Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −2.3 to 0.5 | 2,407 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | slope_viol_rep | −0.4 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of saying violence is justified at least a little; no adjustment; Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −1.5 to 0.6 | 2,282 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | slope_viol_rep_adj | 0.3 | percentage points per ten-point step colder | coefficient on the out-party feeling thermometer, in ten-point steps from warmer to colder, in a weighted linear probability model of saying violence is justified at least a little; adjusted for age group, education, sex, race and ethnicity and strength of party identification (leaner, not very strong, strong); Taylor-series sandwich variance with strata and primary sampling units | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −0.9 to 1.5 | 2,134 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_acc_gap_sl | 6.0 | percentage points | share of strong Republicans minus share of Republican leaners expecting the count to be inaccurate; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | strong and leaning Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −0.7 to 12.7 | 1,867 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_acc_lrep | 33.9% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republican leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 28.7% to 39.2% | 710 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_acc_srep | 39.9% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | strong Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 35.9% to 44.0% | 1,157 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_fbi_gap_ln | 11.4 | percentage points | share of Republican leaners minus share of not very strong Republicans choosing the FBI account; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | leaning and not very strong Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 2.1 to 20.6 | 1,031 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_fbi_gap_sl | 4.9 | percentage points | share of strong Republicans minus share of Republican leaners choosing the FBI account; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | strong and leaning Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI −2.6 to 12.4 | 1,499 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_fbi_lrep | 46.9% | percent of the group | weighted share saying the events of January 2021 were planned and carried out by FBI agents posing as pro-Trump protesters (V242571 answer 2) | Republican leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 40.8% to 53.0% | 565 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_fbi_srep | 51.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying the events of January 2021 were planned and carried out by FBI agents posing as pro-Trump protesters (V242571 answer 2) | strong Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 47.3% to 56.3% | 934 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_t20_gap_sl | 21.9 | percentage points | share of strong Republicans minus share of Republican leaners saying Trump was the legitimate winner of 2020; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | strong and leaning Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 14.6 to 29.2 | 1,543 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_t20_lrep | 45.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Republican leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 39.6% to 51.9% | 585 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_t20_srep | 67.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | strong Republicans among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 63.4% to 71.9% | 958 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_viol_gap_ld | 8.6 | percentage points | share of Democratic leaners minus share of strong Democrats saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democratic leaners and strong Democrats among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 1.9 to 15.3 | 1,936 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_viol_gap_sdem | −4.7 | percentage points | share of strong Democrats minus share of other Democrats (not very strong and leaners) saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −9.2 to −0.2 | 2,532 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_viol_gap_srep | −1.2 | percentage points | share of strong Republicans minus share of other Republicans (not very strong and leaners) saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −5.7 to 3.3 | 2,290 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | str_viol_ldem | 23.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Democratic leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 17.2% to 29.6% | 684 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | therm_acc_cold | 47.9% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners rating the Democratic Party 0 to 10 on the feeling thermometer | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 43.6% to 52.2% | 1,095 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | therm_acc_mid | 32.4% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners rating the Democratic Party 11 to 30 on the feeling thermometer | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 26.8% to 38.0% | 774 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | therm_acc_warm | 17.5% | percent of the group | weighted share expecting the votes in the November 2024 election to be counted not at all or a little accurately (V241314 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners rating the Democratic Party 31 to 100 on the feeling thermometer | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 13.0% to 22.0% | 567 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | therm_share_dem | 37.6% | percent of the group | weighted share rating the Republican Party 0 to 10 on the feeling thermometer (V241167) | Democrats including leaners with a Republican Party rating | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 35.0% to 40.1% | 2,632 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | therm_share_rep | 40.9% | percent of the group | weighted share rating the Democratic Party 0 to 10 on the feeling thermometer (V241166) | Republicans including leaners with a Democratic Party rating | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 38.5% to 43.3% | 2,451 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | trump20_dem | 4.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 3.3% to 5.7% | 2,297 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | trump20_firm_rep | 29.1% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election and very or extremely confident (V242567 answer 1 with V242568 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 26.2% to 32.0% | 2,009 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | trump20_gap | 51.0 | percentage points | Republican share minus Democratic share saying Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 47.9 to 54.1 | 4,306 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | trump20_rep | 55.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 52.6% to 58.5% | 2,009 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | trump20_rep_nl | 59.9% | percent of the group | weighted share saying Donald Trump was the legitimate winner of the 2020 election (V242567 answer 1) | Republicans without leaners (strong and not very strong identifiers) among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 post-election interviews, November 2024 to February 2025 | 95% CI 56.2% to 63.6% | 1,424 | V240107b (post-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | trust_low_dem | 11.9% | percent of the group | weighted share trusting the officials who oversee elections where they live not at all or a little (V241315 answers 1 and 2) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 10.0% to 13.8% | 2,551 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | trust_low_rep | 33.0% | percent of the group | weighted share trusting the officials who oversee elections where they live not at all or a little (V241315 answers 1 and 2) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 30.2% to 35.8% | 2,323 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_age_old | 11.0% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens in the oldest age group (60 or older) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 8.9% to 13.0% | 2,027 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_age_old_dem | 13.0% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Democrats including leaners in the oldest age group (60 or older) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 9.6% to 16.3% | 1,004 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_age_old_rep | 8.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Republicans including leaners in the oldest age group (60 or older) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 5.7% to 11.2% | 935 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_age_young | 31.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens in the youngest age group (18 to 29) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 26.1% to 36.4% | 513 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_age_young_dem | 32.1% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Democrats including leaners in the youngest age group (18 to 29) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 25.2% to 39.1% | 275 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_age_young_rep | 27.1% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Republicans including leaners in the youngest age group (18 to 29) who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 19.3% to 35.0% | 188 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_any_all | 17.2% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 15.6% to 18.9% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_any_dem | 17.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 14.9% to 19.7% | 2,532 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_any_dem_nl | 14.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Democrats without leaners (strong and not very strong identifiers) among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 12.5% to 17.2% | 1,848 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_any_ind_nl | 21.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | independents and leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 18.0% to 24.6% | 1,695 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_any_nei | 30.5% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adults naming neither party and not leaning, among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 23.4% to 37.7% | 346 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_any_rep | 15.0% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 13.0% to 17.1% | 2,290 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_any_rep_nl | 15.1% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | Republicans without leaners (strong and not very strong identifiers) among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 12.4% to 17.8% | 1,625 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_edu_ba | 11.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens with a bachelor's degree or more who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 9.3% to 13.6% | 2,370 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_edu_hs | 22.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified at least a little (V241579 answers 2 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens with a high school education or less who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 19.7% to 25.8% | 1,148 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_gap_any | 2.2 | percentage points | Democratic share minus Republican share saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −0.9 to 5.3 | 4,822 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_gap_any_hi | 5.3 | percentage points | upper end of the 95% interval on the Democratic minus Republican gap in the share saying violence is justified at least a little | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | | | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_gap_any_nl | −0.3 | percentage points | Democratic share minus Republican share without leaners saying violence is justified at least a little; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans without leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −3.9 to 3.4 | 3,473 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_gap_lot | −0.7 | percentage points | Democratic share minus Republican share saying violence is justified a lot or a great deal; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −2.5 to 1.1 | 4,822 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_gap_mod | 0.1 | percentage points | Democratic share minus Republican share saying violence is justified a moderate amount or more; the interval comes from the linearized variance of the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared primary sampling units create | Democrats and Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI −2.4 to 2.6 | 4,822 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_inc_all | 62.7% | percent of the group | weighted share saying political violence has increased compared to four years ago (V241580 answer 1) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 60.6% to 64.7% | 5,181 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_inc_dem | 62.3% | percent of the group | weighted share saying political violence has increased compared to four years ago (V241580 answer 1) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 59.3% to 65.4% | 2,526 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_inc_rep | 64.4% | percent of the group | weighted share saying political violence has increased compared to four years ago (V241580 answer 1) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 61.8% to 67.1% | 2,285 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_little_all | 6.4% | percent of the group | weighted share answering that violence to pursue political goals is justified a little (V241579 answer 2) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 5.3% to 7.6% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_lot_all | 4.6% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified a lot or a great deal (V241579 answers 4 and 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 3.7% to 5.4% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_lot_dem | 4.1% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified a lot or a great deal (V241579 answers 4 and 5) | Democrats including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 3.0% to 5.3% | 2,532 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_lot_rep | 4.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified a lot or a great deal (V241579 answers 4 and 5) | Republicans including leaners among adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 3.5% to 6.2% | 2,290 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_mod_all | 10.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is justified a moderate amount or more (V241579 answers 3 to 5) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 9.5% to 12.1% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_moderate_all | 6.2% | percent of the group | weighted share answering that violence to pursue political goals is justified a moderate amount (V241579 answer 3) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 5.1% to 7.3% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | viol_none_all | 82.8% | percent of the group | weighted share saying violence to pursue political goals is not at all justified (V241579 answer 1) | adult U.S. citizens who answered the item | 2024 pre-election interviews, August to November 2024 | 95% CI 81.1% to 84.4% | 5,192 | V240107a (pre-election full-sample weight); design-based interval with strata V240107d and PSUs V240107c | ANES 2024 Time Series | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Feeling thermometer: A 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way. - Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors. ## Methods Sample. ANES 2024 Time Series, full release of May 19, 2026: 5,521 respondents in the pre-election study, 4,964 of whom completed the post-election interview. The target population is U.S. citizens aged 18 or older at residential addresses (48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia for the fresh in-person sample, 50 states and the District for the fresh web sample and the panel). The file has a fresh in-person sample (1,042 respondents), a fresh web sample (2,308, including paper cases) and a panel of 2016 and 2020 respondents (2,171). Paper-and-pencil respondents (245 before the election, 200 after) were not asked most of the questions used here. Weights and design. Pre-election items use V240107a and post-election items V240107b, with variance PSU V240107c and variance stratum V240107d, as the user guide directs for the full release. The sample-group figure uses each sample group's own weight, PSU and stratum (V240101a, V240101b, V240101c and V240101d for the fresh in-person sample; V240102 for the fresh web sample, which excludes the paper cases; V240106 for the panel). Estimates and intervals are not computed with the model-based Kish formula used in other chapters. Estimator and intervals. A share is the weighted ratio of an indicator within a domain. The variance is a Taylor-series linearization with one-stage stratified cluster sampling and no finite-population correction. Domains stay inside the design (a subpopulation), so a stratum is never left with one PSU by dropping rows. A difference of two shares in one sample linearizes the difference, which keeps the covariance that shared PSUs create. Intervals are 95% intervals from the t distribution with the design degrees of freedom: PSU-stratum units minus strata, 2,339 for the pre-election design (2,473 units, 134 strata) and 2,000 for the post-election design (2,134 units, 134 strata). A difference between two sample groups combines two independent variances and uses Welch-Satterthwaite degrees of freedom. An interval is cut at 0 and 100 for a share; one cell, Republicans in the fresh in-person sample on the 2024 winner, is cut at 0. For the 161 shares plotted in the figures, the design effect (the design-based variance divided by the model-based variance with the same weights) runs from 0.5 to 1.7 with a median of 1.1, so design-based intervals are narrower than model-based intervals for some cells and wider for others. Items and cut points. Violence justified (V241579): at least a little is answers 2 to 5, a moderate amount or more is 3 to 5, a lot or a great deal is 4 and 5. Expected count (V241314): not at all or a little accurately is answers 1 and 2. Votes counted fairly (V242207): less often than most of the time is answers 3 to 5. Trust in local election officials (V241315): not at all or a little is 1 and 2. 2020 winner (V242567): answer 1 is Trump. Events of January 2021 (V242571): answer 2 is the FBI account. 2024 winner (V242575): answer 2 is Harris. Very or extremely confident is answers 4 and 5 of the follow-up (V242568, V242572, V242576). Norm items: very or extremely important is answers 4 and 5 (V241324 to V241327); helpful is answer 1 of V241328; favor is answer 1 of V241331. Refusals, don't-know answers, break-offs and respondents not asked are missing (the loader sets negative codes to missing) and are excluded from the denominator of each share. Groups. Party is the pre-election seven-point summary (V241227x): with leaners, answers 1 to 3 are Democrats, 5 to 7 Republicans and 4 neither party; without leaners, answers 1 and 2 are Democrats, 6 and 7 Republicans and 3 to 5 independents and leaners. Age is age on Election Day (V241458x, with the paper age V241457 where only that was given) in four groups; education is V241465x collapsed to high school or less, some college, and a bachelor's degree or more. The 2020 vote is the recalled vote (V241106x), the 2024 vote the post-election report (V242067). Attention to politics is V241004 (always or most of the time against about half the time or less). Thermometer and regressions. The out-party rating is V241166 for Republicans and V241167 for Democrats, grouped as 0 to 10, 11 to 30 and 31 to 100 (the top bin of 51 to 100 had an effective sample under 100 for some cells and was merged). Slopes come from weighted linear probability models fit separately within each party, with the Taylor-series sandwich variance on the same strata and PSUs. The adjusted model adds age group, education, sex (V241550, which was also asked on paper), race and ethnicity (V241501x) and strength of party identification (strong, not very strong, leaner). Suppression. A cell needs at least 100 respondents and a Kish effective sample of at least 100; no plotted cell fell below the floor. Checks. A set of 66 estimates and intervals (headline shares, party, age and education gaps, losing-side shares, strength-of-identification contrasts, neither-party distances from the party midpoint, sample-group cells and five regression slopes) was reproduced with the survey package in R (svydesign with nest = TRUE, subset domains, svycontrast and svyglm); every estimate and interval end agrees to the digits printed, and verify_independent.py in the chapter folder repeats the comparison. Within a sample group the interview mode was not assigned at random, so mode effects are not separated from sample differences. ## What these data cannot show - One cross-section cannot show change. - The cumulative ANES file used elsewhere in this book has no item on political violence, on votes counted accurately or on the legitimacy of an election, so no earlier ANES study on disk is comparable. - The 2024 file carries identifiers that link panel respondents to the 2016 and 2020 studies, but those studies are not in the data used here. - Whether approval of violence or doubt about counts rose or fell needs surveys that repeat the questions over time. - Projects that field repeated survey questions on political violence, democratic norms and the legitimacy of elections include the Polarization Research Lab (America's Political Pulse) and Bright Line Watch. - This chapter does not use them and reports nothing from them. - The file records no action. - It has no question about violence, threats or harassment by the respondent, or about taking part in the events of January 2021. - The only actions it records are ordinary participation such as voting and joining a protest march, rally or demonstration. - Approval in the abstract is not evidence that a respondent would act, and an estimate of how many have acted would need administrative records, such as law-enforcement case files, that the survey cannot supply. - The violence question does not say who would be hurt, for what goal or by what act, so the shares cannot be sorted into approval of attacks on officials, on the other party or on no one in particular. - The answer "a little" accounts for 6.4% (95% CI 5.3% to 7.6%) of adult citizens, about as many as the 6.2% (95% CI 5.1% to 7.3%) who chose "a moderate amount", and it is the answer whose meaning the wording leaves most open. - The data cannot separate respondents who read the question carefully from respondents who did not, and the attention pattern above is a description and not a correction. - The thermometer, strength and age results are associations and make no claim about cause. - Neither the party gap nor the gaps by age and education are adjusted for one another, except where the text says so. - The 2020 and 2024 legitimacy questions were asked at different distances from their elections and carry different histories of statements by candidates and officials, which the survey did not measure, so a difference between them mixes timing, who won and party. - The population is adult citizens at residential addresses. - It leaves out noncitizens, people in institutions and group quarters, and, for the in-person sample, residents of Alaska and Hawaii. - Respondents who refused a question, and paper respondents who were not asked, are left out of its shares, and nonresponse to the survey itself is handled only through the weights. - The intervals describe sampling variation. - They do not include the differences among sample groups shown above or the effect of question wording. ## References 1. American National Election Studies (2026). ANES 2024 Time Series Study Full Release [dataset and documentation], May 19, 2026 version. Stanford University and the University of Michigan. https://electionstudies.org/data-center/ 2. Westwood, Sean J.; Grimmer, Justin; Tyler, Matthew; Nall, Clayton (2022). Current research overstates American support for political violence. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 119(12): e2116870119. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2116870119 3. Kalmoe, Nathan P.; Mason, Lilliana (2022). Radical American Partisanship: Mapping Violent Hostility, Its Causes, and the Consequences for Democracy. University of Chicago Press. 4. Sinclair, Betsy; Smith, Steven S.; Tucker, Patrick D. (2018). "It's Largely a Rigged System": Voter Confidence and the Winner Effect in 2016. Political Research Quarterly 71(4): 854-868. https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912918768006 5. Anderson, Christopher J.; Blais, Andre; Bowler, Shaun; Donovan, Todd; Listhaug, Ola (2005). Losers' Consent: Elections and Democratic Legitimacy. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/0199276382.001.0001 6. Tourangeau, Roger; Yan, Ting (2007). Sensitive Questions in Surveys. Psychological Bulletin 133(5): 859-883. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.133.5.859 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/build.py (sha256 bdd42c2c0da5cdb701ae668ef421db5e5995278d481e9becd2f1e7308492a46c) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes2024_ts/anes_timeseries_2024_spss_20260519.sav | 12,757,094 | 3107c838755f88353d0e3e39b2c3d5f76a2888cf56a179e3acac84ab431335d2 | bb318a018a39b4cf87ccc91b50a5b7c5b41746d28c0226f4a6c176e8c74966d6 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | b121e31f8c9f36df289ff59de20bcc7acb3d62ddbc3e7c5eaae6c796c9d14ff6 | | figures/by_strength.json | 60ca8f17b876490dbe8d1eacdc5d63992f9e96d3534a1be72fd6badd0b5d8200 | | figures/counts_and_legitimacy.json | 1ddb721cf3a19f1fdc195e88a7efc1dfa3736703c296db9bd3d1ff0ce8a1295d | | figures/items.json | 3e903b6900c375d1f35a797b54b1659effe22b381d017158a14009f4bc3e35f0 | | figures/losers.json | bcc6718e2944649d2c1229a41d2615fb9164883311bbc678034db33bba941096 | | figures/norms.json | eae9a812e94761e5df23afe61d7b3a455351c72daf90e5c2e4a8b86e32e3d646 | | figures/sample_groups.json | da508e001304e61c9f006e070119dd390f9146534b137cbeb895636fa99177e3 | | figures/thermometer.json | ea7aa784778a158cb3ef31b85f619461dba363de0b053ba2a778176666b98172 | | figures/violence_by_age_edu.json | accc3e9a28e22d0b18a8004f90cc9702115261d9b1fd29f37e7b152c7faf9934 | | figures/violence_levels.json | 5b20587af1fbf34228c3d0e1e4463ddad0b138cc50f6f97ba8c5936ec39e36d7 | | meta.json | 32fdfa9c7a3ff4822686ad68789f23a670e933b588109af6aa4de802e6fa220c | | refs.json | 22560c39d68a3b814a36074364419b7234093a56c3eba22359d0808fc4792a79 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/facts.json - Table 1, figure "items" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/items.json - Table 2, figure "violence_levels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/violence_levels.json - Table 3, figure "violence_by_age_edu" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/violence_by_age_edu.json - Table 4, figure "counts_and_legitimacy" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/counts_and_legitimacy.json - Table 5, figure "losers" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/losers.json - Table 6, figure "by_strength" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/by_strength.json - Table 7, figure "thermometer" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/thermometer.json - Table 8, figure "sample_groups" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/sample_groups.json - Table 9, figure "norms" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/political-violence-and-democratic-norms/figures/norms.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Economic and cultural dimensions: report Chapter 7.2 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Economic and cultural dimensions - Chapter: 7.2 (Part VII, What left and right mean; Ideology, values and religion) - Question: Are economic and cultural conservatism one dimension or two, and how has their correlation changed? - Dek: Among American adults, the correlation between an index of economic conservatism and an index of cultural conservatism rose from +0.10 in the 1984 ANES to +0.51 in 2024. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File, studies 1984 to 2024: jobs (VCF0809), services and spending (VCF0839), health insurance (VCF0806), abortion (VCF0838), gay and lesbian thermometer (VCF0232), traditional values (VCF0853), party identification (VCF0301), liberal-conservative self-placement (VCF0803); years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the interview-mode comparison - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026economicandculturaldimensions ```bibtex @misc{singh2026economicandculturaldimensions, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Economic and cultural dimensions}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984 | +0.10 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.15 | 1,508 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | r_1984 | | weighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | +0.51 | 95% CI 0.48 to 0.55 | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | r_2024 | | weighted least squares slope of the standardized cultural index on the standardized economic index, which equals the correlation (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 0.51 | 95% CI 0.48 to 0.55 | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | slope_2024 | | weighted correlation net of seven-point party identification (Fisher z interval, effective n less six party dummies) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | +0.23 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.27 | 4,373 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | r7_2024 | | count of studies | studies with both indices | 1984-2024 | 15 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_studies | | count of respondents in the analysis sample | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984-2024 | 33,257 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_respondents | ## Findings Among American adults, the correlation between an index of economic conservatism and an index of cultural conservatism was +0.10 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.15) in the 1984 American National Election Studies (ANES) and +0.51 (95% CI 0.48 to 0.55) in 2024. In a linear fit, adults one standard deviation more conservative on the economic index were on average 0.51 standard deviations more conservative on the cultural index in 2024. Part of the correlation is between the parties, and among adults with the same seven-point party identification it is +0.23 (95% CI 0.19 to 0.27) in 2024. Web interviewing began in 2012, and the rise after 2012 appears in both interview modes. The ANES asked three economic and three cultural questions in most studies from 1984 to 2024, which gives 15 studies and 33,257 respondents with both indices. The indices are built in advance from fixed items, so the chapter measures how closely two given attitudes go together and not how many dimensions the public holds. This chapter follows the correlation across those studies, asks how much of it remains within party identification and after allowing for measurement error, compares how closely each index goes with liberal-conservative self-placement, and restates the correlation as the share of adults on opposite sides of the medians. The Chapter 7.4, Left and right across countries (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries) chapter asks a related question across countries. ### Earlier work on two dimensions Studies of the American public describe a structure that differs from the one the parties offer. Feldman and Johnston found that economic and social ideology are the minimum needed to account for domestic policy preferences [1], and Treier and Hillygus found that many adults hold liberal preferences on one dimension and conservative preferences on the other [2]. Carmines, Ensley and Wagner report that the policy preferences of party elites lie on one dimension while those of citizens lie on two, and that adults whose preferences do not match either party's package are more likely to shift party allegiance [3]. Roll-call voting in Congress is described well by one main dimension [4]. A cross-national study of mass publics that includes the United States found that a positive correlation between cultural and economic conservatism was uncommon across nations and that a negative correlation was more common [5]. ### How the indices are built Each index averages up to three ANES answers. Every answer is converted to a z-score, its distance from the item's average in standard deviations, and oriented so that a higher value is more conservative. A respondent needs at least two of an index's three answers. Table 1 lists the items, their scales and the direction used, including a feeling thermometer rating of gays and lesbians. (Note: In the cleaned ANES file the thermometer's top category, which covers a range of degrees near the top of the scale, is stored as the top value. The methods note gives the detail.) The direction of each item is read from the value labels of the ANES Cumulative Data File, was not chosen from a correlation with self-placement or with the other index, and the two indices share no answers. The items were not asked in every study, and 4 studies have an index with only two components; those studies are shaded in the trend figures. (Note: An index is a respondent's average z-score over the items answered, and the correlation does not depend on its unit. The party means and the self-placement regression use the index re-standardized over all respondents in the analysis sample, and the cross-pressure band and the 2024 cells use the standard deviation of the index within one study. Each figure says which.) Table 1. Each index averages three ANES items, and a higher value always marks the conservative end ### The correlation rose from 2008 to 2020 The correlation was +0.10 in 1984, in a study where the cultural index has only two components and its items agree less closely than in later studies (see the section on measurement error). From 1992 through 2008 the estimates stayed between +0.12 in 2000 and +0.23 in 2008. They then rose to +0.52 in 2020. The intervals for 2008 and 2012 overlap, and so do those for 2012 and 2016, so the rise is best read across the whole period from 2008 to 2020, without a claim about any single step. The 2020 interval lies above the 2008 interval. The 2024 estimate of +0.51 contains the 2020 value, so the series has not risen further since 2020. Table 2 shows every study. Correlation intervals in this chapter are 95% confidence intervals that treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample, which leaves out the ANES sampling design and can move an interval either way. (Note: Each interval uses Fisher's z transformation [6] on the Kish effective sample size [7].) Table 2. The correlation between economic and cultural conservatism was at most +0.23 through 2008 and rose to +0.52 by 2020 Two checks support the rise. Adults who answered every item give +0.11 in 1988 and +0.56 in 2024, and the six-item view of the figure shows the same rise. Interview mode is the second check. Web interviews began in 2012, and the step from +0.23 in 2008 to +0.32 in 2012 appears only in the web sample (+0.24 face-to-face, +0.37 web). The step therefore cannot be told apart from the change of mode, and the rise is better dated from 2012. In each mode the 2024 correlation is above the 2012 correlation, so the rise after 2012 is present in both, and the pairs for 2016 and 2024 are in the caption of the mode view. The 2020 study has no mode weights, and the step from 2016 to 2020 cannot be split by mode. ### Part of the correlation is between the parties Comparing adults with the same party identification removes differences between the parties. Both indices are compared within each of the seven ANES party categories, which run from strong Democrat to strong Republican and keep leaners apart from weak partisans. The correlation of what remains is +0.23 in 2024 against the observed +0.51. The same comparison gives +0.04 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.10) in 1984, an interval that includes zero, and +0.08 in 2008. A three-category control (Democrat, independent and Republican, with leaners counted as partisans) gives +0.24 in 2024, close to the seven-point figure. A correlation remains within party identification, and the estimate rose from 2008 to 2024. Part of the observed correlation sits between the parties, which moved apart on both indices. Table 3 plots the mean of each index for Democrats and Republicans, with leaners counted with their party, and for all adults. The Republican minus Democratic gap on the economic index grew from +0.69 in 1984 to +1.29 in 2024, and on the cultural index from +0.30 to +1.27, in standard deviations of the index over all respondents from 1984 to 2024. The lines are group means for each study on one fixed scale, so they compare groups between studies and do not follow individuals. The cultural panel is less steady in 1984, 1986 and 1990, the studies in which the cultural index has only two components. The item mix changes there (1984 has no traditional-values item, and 1986 and 1990 have no thermometer), and a two-item index is noisier. Built from abortion and the thermometer alone, the items asked in every study except 1986 and 1990, the cultural gap is +0.28 in 1984 and +1.11 in 2024. The Republican mean went from +0.61 to +0.31 and the Democratic mean from +0.33 to −0.81, so the widening and the fall in both party means do not depend on the third item. Table 3. The Republican minus Democratic gap grew from +0.69 to +1.29 on the economic index and from +0.30 to +1.27 on the cultural index The movement was mostly on the Democratic side. Democrats went from −0.24 to −0.80 on the economic index and from +0.33 to −0.93 on the cultural index. Republicans went from +0.45 to +0.49 on the economic index and from +0.63 to +0.33 on the cultural index, so the Republican mean on the cultural index also fell. The mean of all adults on the cultural index fell as well, from +0.48 to −0.33, so part of each party's cultural change is a shift of the whole sample and the gap measures the distance between the parties. When two groups differ on both indices, a correlation appears in the pooled sample even if the indices are unrelated inside each group. That is party sorting for these two indices, and the Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology) chapter follows it for ideology more broadly. Comparing within party identification is a descriptive comparison. Adults may take positions from the party they support, or support the party that matches their positions, and these data cannot separate the two. ### Correcting for measurement error Indices built from a few answers measure their topic with error, and error in either index lowers the observed correlation. The standard summary of how closely the items of one index agree is Cronbach's alpha [8], which runs from zero, when the items are unrelated, to one, when they agree perfectly. Table 4 gives alpha for each study. The economic index went from 0.60 in 1984 to a peak of 0.83 in 2020 and 0.79 in 2024, and the cultural index from 0.44 in 1988, the first study in which the cultural index has three components, to 0.69 in 2024. The cultural index has the lower alpha in 14 of the 15 studies, the exception being 1998, and each index has its lowest alpha in a study where it has only two components. Alpha is computed only on adults who answered every item of an index. The correlation also uses adults with two of three answers, who are measured less reliably than alpha suggests. On the economic index they are 58.3% of the 1984 sample, because the health-insurance item was answered by only part of that sample, and 15.4% of the 2024 sample. Table 4. Items in each index agree more in recent studies, and the cultural items agree less than the economic items in 14 of 15 studies Alpha rises when the items of an index measure the same thing with less noise, and it also rises when opinions on the items become more consistent across adults. A rise in alpha can therefore come from a fall in error, from a rise in the consistency of opinion, or from both, and the corrected series below inherits that mix. If the two kinds of conservatism were one dimension measured without error, the correlation would be one. Dividing the observed correlation by the square root of the product of the two alphas gives the correlation the indices would show if their items were error-free, a correction proposed by Spearman [9]. In 2024 it gives +0.69, at which the two indices share 48.1% of their variance, against +0.35 in 2008 and +0.18 in 1988. The corrected view of Table 2 draws it only where both alphas are at least 0.4, which leaves out 1984, 1986 and 1990, studies in which the cultural index has only two components and a lower alpha. The corrected series rises as well and lies above the observed series in every study where it is drawn, and even the corrected indices leave the rest of the variation in each attitude unshared. ### Self-placement follows the economic and cultural indices about equally The seven-point liberal-conservative scale, on which adults place themselves, is a label and not a bundle of positions. Regressing self-placement on both indices at once shows how closely each goes with the label when the other is held fixed. For 1984 to 1996, adults one standard deviation apart on the economic index differ by 0.50 points on the scale, and adults one standard deviation apart on the cultural index by 0.53 points, with the other index held fixed. For 2012 to 2024 the coefficients are 0.66 and 0.67. The cultural minus economic difference is +0.02 (95% CI −0.03 to 0.08) in the early period and +0.01 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.06) in the recent one, both intervals include zero, and neither extends beyond 0.08 points in either direction (Table 5). Both coefficients are larger in the recent period, and the intervals for the two periods do not overlap. The studies from 1998 to 2008 are left out so that the two periods do not touch. The data do not separate the two indices in how closely each goes with the label. Two cautions apply to that reading. An index with lower alpha carries more measurement error, which lowers its coefficient, and the cultural index has the lower alpha. Equal coefficients are therefore consistent with a cultural attitude that goes with the label somewhat more closely than the economic attitude does. Alpha also rose for both indices between the two periods, so part of the rise in both coefficients may be less measurement error, as the section on measurement error describes. (Note: The regression includes a fixed effect for each study and uses HC3 robust standard errors.) The Chapter 7.1, The conservative label (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-conservative-label; planned) chapter separates the label from policy preferences. Table 5. Self-placed conservatism follows the economic and cultural indices about equally, and both coefficients grew ### Adults on opposite sides of the medians A correlation can be restated as a count of people. Splitting each index at its weighted median within a study puts equal numbers of adults on each side of each index. An adult is cross-pressured when right of the median on one index and left of it on the other, that is, conservative on one index and liberal on the other. That share was 46.2% (95% CI 43.8% to 48.6%) in 1984 and 30.0% (95% CI 28.0% to 31.9%) in 2024 (Table 6), and it moves with the correlation. For two bell-shaped indices with the observed correlation, the share on opposite sides of the medians would be 46.8% in 1984 and 32.8% in 2024. (Note: A bell-shaped (normal) pair with a given correlation is the reference case in which the correlation alone fixes how the two indices are spread jointly. The methods note gives the formula.) The observed share is within 3.3 points of the implied value in every study, so a median split gives little evidence beyond the correlation itself. The difference has the same sign from 2008. The observed share is 2.1 to 3.3 points below the implied share in each study from 2008, and in 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 the implied share lies above the observed 95% interval. More adults sit on the same side of both medians than the correlation implies, which is the same feature as the excess in the corner cells shown below. Table 6. The share of adults on opposite sides of the medians fell from 46.2% to 30.0% and stays within 3.3 points of the share the correlation implies A median split also counts as cross-pressured an adult who is barely across a median, which overstates how many hold strong views in opposite directions. A stricter definition puts a tolerance band around each median: an adult is strongly cross-pressured when the adult is at least 0.5 standard deviations right of the median on one index and at least that far left of it on the other. That share was 18.2% in 1984 and 6.6% in 2024, and a narrower band and a wider band give the same fall (see the notes under the figure). In 2024 70.0% of adults are on the same side of both medians. A median split also makes the two split groups equal in size, and the two consistent groups equal in size, so shares from the split cannot show whether cross-pressure runs more toward economic left with cultural right or the reverse. #### In 2024, more adults sit in the corners than expected Table 7 divides the 4,387 adults with both indices in 2024 into cells 0.5 standard deviations wide on each index, measured from each index's median, with open-ended outer bins that collect every adult beyond 1.0 standard deviations. The corner cell for adults more than 1.0 standard deviations left of the median on both indices holds 8.2% of adults, and the corner cell for adults at least that far right on both holds 8.5%. Two bell-shaped indices with the observed correlation would put 6.4% of adults in each corner, and the 95% intervals of both observed corners lie above that reference. The reference uses the same open bins, so the bin width does not explain the difference. Table 7. In 2024 the two corner cells with both indices far left or far right hold more adults than the correlation implies The off-diagonal corners hold adults far to opposite sides of the two medians. The corner for economic left and cultural right holds 1.4% of adults, against 0.3% in the normal reference. 2 cells have fewer than 30 respondents and are left blank, and both lie where the cultural index is far left and the economic index is right of the median. Together they hold 0.5% of adults, less than the economic-left, cultural-right corner alone, so adults far to opposite sides are more often economic left with cultural right than the reverse in 2024. The normal reference does not separate the way the two indices go together from the shape of each index. The indices average a few bounded, discrete answers, so their own distributions are not exactly bell-shaped, and the excess in the corners may come from that shape as much as from the joint pattern. The excess describes one study and is not evidence of polarization. The Chapter 7.3, Class, church and the two axes (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/class-church-and-the-two-axes; planned) chapter takes up how income, education and church attendance sort the two axes. ### What these data cannot show The correlation is between two indices built in advance from a fixed set of items, so these data cannot show how many dimensions the public holds. A factor model or an item-response model fitted to a wider set of questions could find a different number, and a different choice of items would change the level of the correlation. The chapter also leaves out issues that fall outside both indices, such as immigration and race, which may form a third dimension. The corrected correlation assumes that the errors in the two indices are unrelated to each other and that alpha measures reliability, which holds only if the items of an index measure the same attitude. It is an upper bound for the correlation between the underlying attitudes only if errors are also unrelated across the items of one index. A shared response format or response style would raise alpha, make the correction too small and remove the bound, and the corrected series inherits the ambiguity in what a rise in alpha means. The interval for the corrected value, +0.69 (95% CI 0.65 to 0.74) in 2024, comes from resampling respondents within a study and is wide in the early studies, where the indices have two components and low alpha. Each study interviews different adults, so the series cannot show whether individuals' attitudes moved together or whether the population changed as cohorts replaced one another. The comparison within party identification uses party identification measured in the same interview and shaped by the same attitudes, so it does not measure an effect of party. Interview mode changed over the period, and the interview-mode comparison covers only 4 studies. The intervals are model based and ignore the ANES clustering and stratification. The 2002 study has no cultural index, and 4 studies have two components in one or both indices. A comparison with the Cooperative Election Study is not included. Its economic index contains only health-care questions and its cultural index mixes abortion, guns, immigration and the environment, so a higher correlation there would confound item content with survey. A matched comparison needs an index built from the same kinds of questions in both surveys. A rising correlation fits an account in which the public has moved toward the alignment that the parties present, and the party gaps in Table 3 are consistent with it, but nothing in these data tests that account. ## Tables ### Table 1. Each index averages three ANES items, and a higher value always marks the conservative end Items in the economic and cultural conservatism indices: ANES variable, scale as fielded, direction used and studies that asked the item, 1984 to 2024 | Index | Item | ANES variable | Scale as fielded | Direction used | Studies asking it | Not asked in | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | | Economic | Government guarantee of jobs and a good standard of living | VCF0809 | 1 = government sees to jobs and living standards; 7 = each person on their own | Kept: a higher code is economic right | 15 | none | | Economic | Government services and spending | VCF0839 | 1 = many fewer services, reduce spending; 7 = many more services, increase spending | Reversed: a lower code (fewer services) is economic right | 15 | none | | Economic | Government or private health insurance | VCF0806 | 1 = government insurance plan; 7 = private insurance plan | Kept: a higher code is economic right | 12 | 1986, 1990, 1998 | | Cultural | Legal status of abortion | VCF0838 | 1 = never permitted by law; 4 = always a matter of personal choice | Reversed: a lower code (more restriction) is cultural right | 15 | none | | Cultural | Feeling thermometer toward gays and lesbians | VCF0232 | 0 = coldest feeling; 100 = warmest feeling | Reversed: a lower code (colder) is cultural right | 13 | 1986, 1990 | | Cultural | Should be more emphasis on traditional values (variable label in the Cumulative Data File) | VCF0853 | 1 = agree strongly; 5 = disagree strongly | Reversed: a lower code (agreement) is cultural right | 14 | 1984 | Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1984 to 2024; item wording and coding only, no weights needed Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/items_coding.json ### Table 2. The correlation between economic and cultural conservatism was at most +0.23 through 2008 and rose to +0.52 by 2020 Weighted correlation between the economic and cultural conservatism indices by ANES study, 1984 to 2024, adults with at least two of three items on each index; 95% intervals | Study | Series | Correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | Economic items | Cultural items | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1984 | As observed | 0.102 | 0.052 | 0.152 | 1,508 | 1,508 | 3 | 2 | | 1986 | As observed | 0.069 | 0.004 | 0.134 | 914 | 914 | 2 | 2 | | 1988 | As observed | 0.095 | 0.045 | 0.144 | 1,551 | 1,551 | 3 | 3 | | 1990 | As observed | 0.033 | −0.040 | 0.105 | 729 | 729 | 2 | 2 | | 1992 | As observed | 0.156 | 0.113 | 0.198 | 2,005 | 1,996 | 3 | 3 | | 1994 | As observed | 0.198 | 0.146 | 0.248 | 1,659 | 1,358 | 3 | 3 | | 1996 | As observed | 0.193 | 0.136 | 0.248 | 1,413 | 1,139 | 3 | 3 | | 1998 | As observed | 0.162 | 0.097 | 0.225 | 1,055 | 892 | 2 | 3 | | 2000 | As observed | 0.117 | 0.041 | 0.192 | 811 | 652 | 3 | 3 | | 2004 | As observed | 0.180 | 0.113 | 0.244 | 1,006 | 834 | 3 | 3 | | 2008 | As observed | 0.228 | 0.152 | 0.301 | 954 | 620 | 3 | 3 | | 2012 | As observed | 0.325 | 0.292 | 0.357 | 5,203 | 2,880 | 3 | 3 | | 2016 | As observed | 0.391 | 0.356 | 0.425 | 3,325 | 2,297 | 3 | 3 | | 2020 | As observed | 0.517 | 0.493 | 0.540 | 6,737 | 3,696 | 3 | 3 | | 2024 | As observed | 0.514 | 0.482 | 0.546 | 4,387 | 2,059 | 3 | 3 | | 1984 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.045 | −0.006 | 0.095 | 1,499 | 1,499 | 3 | 2 | | 1986 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.075 | 0.010 | 0.140 | 907 | 907 | 2 | 2 | | 1988 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.034 | −0.016 | 0.084 | 1,542 | 1,542 | 3 | 3 | | 1990 | Same party ID (7-pt) | −0.011 | −0.084 | 0.062 | 727 | 727 | 2 | 2 | | 1992 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.066 | 0.022 | 0.110 | 1,997 | 1,988 | 3 | 3 | | 1994 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.107 | 0.054 | 0.159 | 1,652 | 1,352 | 3 | 3 | | 1996 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.072 | 0.014 | 0.130 | 1,408 | 1,135 | 3 | 3 | | 1998 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.090 | 0.024 | 0.155 | 1,047 | 886 | 2 | 3 | | 2000 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.031 | −0.046 | 0.109 | 806 | 648 | 3 | 3 | | 2004 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.030 | −0.039 | 0.098 | 993 | 822 | 3 | 3 | | 2008 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.082 | 0.002 | 0.160 | 944 | 615 | 3 | 3 | | 2012 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.106 | 0.069 | 0.142 | 5,189 | 2,872 | 3 | 3 | | 2016 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.155 | 0.115 | 0.195 | 3,314 | 2,288 | 3 | 3 | | 2020 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.227 | 0.197 | 0.258 | 6,725 | 3,689 | 3 | 3 | | 2024 | Same party ID (7-pt) | 0.227 | 0.186 | 0.268 | 4,373 | 2,051 | 3 | 3 | | 1984 | As observed | 0.102 | 0.052 | 0.152 | 1,508 | 1,508 | 3 | 2 | | 1986 | As observed | 0.069 | 0.004 | 0.134 | 914 | 914 | 2 | 2 | | 1988 | As observed | 0.095 | 0.045 | 0.144 | 1,551 | 1,551 | 3 | 3 | | 1990 | As observed | 0.033 | −0.040 | 0.105 | 729 | 729 | 2 | 2 | | 1992 | As observed | 0.156 | 0.113 | 0.198 | 2,005 | 1,996 | 3 | 3 | | 1994 | As observed | 0.198 | 0.146 | 0.248 | 1,659 | 1,358 | 3 | 3 | | 1996 | As observed | 0.193 | 0.136 | 0.248 | 1,413 | 1,139 | 3 | 3 | | 1998 | As observed | 0.162 | 0.097 | 0.225 | 1,055 | 892 | 2 | 3 | | 2000 | As observed | 0.117 | 0.041 | 0.192 | 811 | 652 | 3 | 3 | | 2004 | As observed | 0.180 | 0.113 | 0.244 | 1,006 | 834 | 3 | 3 | | 2008 | As observed | 0.228 | 0.152 | 0.301 | 954 | 620 | 3 | 3 | | 2012 | As observed | 0.325 | 0.292 | 0.357 | 5,203 | 2,880 | 3 | 3 | | 2016 | As observed | 0.391 | 0.356 | 0.425 | 3,325 | 2,297 | 3 | 3 | | 2020 | As observed | 0.517 | 0.493 | 0.540 | 6,737 | 3,696 | 3 | 3 | | 2024 | As observed | 0.514 | 0.482 | 0.546 | 4,387 | 2,059 | 3 | 3 | | 1984 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.051 | 0.000 | 0.101 | 1,499 | 1,499 | 3 | 2 | | 1986 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.068 | 0.003 | 0.133 | 907 | 907 | 2 | 2 | | 1988 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.050 | 0.000 | 0.099 | 1,542 | 1,542 | 3 | 3 | | 1990 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.003 | −0.070 | 0.076 | 727 | 727 | 2 | 2 | | 1992 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.070 | 0.026 | 0.114 | 1,997 | 1,988 | 3 | 3 | | 1994 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.126 | 0.073 | 0.178 | 1,652 | 1,352 | 3 | 3 | | 1996 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.094 | 0.036 | 0.151 | 1,408 | 1,135 | 3 | 3 | | 1998 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.101 | 0.036 | 0.166 | 1,047 | 886 | 2 | 3 | | 2000 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.039 | −0.038 | 0.116 | 806 | 648 | 3 | 3 | | 2004 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.050 | −0.019 | 0.118 | 993 | 822 | 3 | 3 | | 2008 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.104 | 0.025 | 0.181 | 944 | 615 | 3 | 3 | | 2012 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.127 | 0.091 | 0.163 | 5,189 | 2,872 | 3 | 3 | | 2016 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.180 | 0.140 | 0.219 | 3,314 | 2,288 | 3 | 3 | | 2020 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.241 | 0.211 | 0.272 | 6,725 | 3,689 | 3 | 3 | | 2024 | Same party ID (3 cat.) | 0.242 | 0.201 | 0.282 | 4,373 | 2,051 | 3 | 3 | | 1984 | As observed | 0.102 | 0.052 | 0.152 | 1,508 | 1,508 | 3 | 2 | | 1986 | As observed | 0.069 | 0.004 | 0.134 | 914 | 914 | 2 | 2 | | 1988 | As observed | 0.095 | 0.045 | 0.144 | 1,551 | 1,551 | 3 | 3 | | 1990 | As observed | 0.033 | −0.040 | 0.105 | 729 | 729 | 2 | 2 | | 1992 | As observed | 0.156 | 0.113 | 0.198 | 2,005 | 1,996 | 3 | 3 | | 1994 | As observed | 0.198 | 0.146 | 0.248 | 1,659 | 1,358 | 3 | 3 | | 1996 | As observed | 0.193 | 0.136 | 0.248 | 1,413 | 1,139 | 3 | 3 | | 1998 | As observed | 0.162 | 0.097 | 0.225 | 1,055 | 892 | 2 | 3 | | 2000 | As observed | 0.117 | 0.041 | 0.192 | 811 | 652 | 3 | 3 | | 2004 | As observed | 0.180 | 0.113 | 0.244 | 1,006 | 834 | 3 | 3 | | 2008 | As observed | 0.228 | 0.152 | 0.301 | 954 | 620 | 3 | 3 | | 2012 | As observed | 0.325 | 0.292 | 0.357 | 5,203 | 2,880 | 3 | 3 | | 2016 | As observed | 0.391 | 0.356 | 0.425 | 3,325 | 2,297 | 3 | 3 | | 2020 | As observed | 0.517 | 0.493 | 0.540 | 6,737 | 3,696 | 3 | 3 | | 2024 | As observed | 0.514 | 0.482 | 0.546 | 4,387 | 2,059 | 3 | 3 | | 1988 | Reliability-corrected | 0.181 | 0.083 | 0.277 | 1,551 | 1,551 | 3 | 3 | | 1992 | Reliability-corrected | 0.273 | 0.201 | 0.349 | 2,005 | 1,996 | 3 | 3 | | 1994 | Reliability-corrected | 0.332 | 0.253 | 0.415 | 1,659 | 1,358 | 3 | 3 | | 1996 | Reliability-corrected | 0.316 | 0.229 | 0.408 | 1,413 | 1,139 | 3 | 3 | | 1998 | Reliability-corrected | 0.317 | 0.191 | 0.454 | 1,055 | 892 | 2 | 3 | | 2000 | Reliability-corrected | 0.213 | 0.062 | 0.364 | 811 | 652 | 3 | 3 | | 2004 | Reliability-corrected | 0.276 | 0.180 | 0.371 | 1,006 | 834 | 3 | 3 | | 2008 | Reliability-corrected | 0.349 | 0.241 | 0.461 | 954 | 620 | 3 | 3 | | 2012 | Reliability-corrected | 0.471 | 0.427 | 0.516 | 5,203 | 2,880 | 3 | 3 | | 2016 | Reliability-corrected | 0.550 | 0.496 | 0.602 | 3,325 | 2,297 | 3 | 3 | | 2020 | Reliability-corrected | 0.680 | 0.648 | 0.710 | 6,737 | 3,696 | 3 | 3 | | 2024 | Reliability-corrected | 0.693 | 0.653 | 0.738 | 4,387 | 2,059 | 3 | 3 | | 1984 | As observed | 0.102 | 0.052 | 0.152 | 1,508 | 1,508 | 3 | 2 | | 1986 | As observed | 0.069 | 0.004 | 0.134 | 914 | 914 | 2 | 2 | | 1988 | As observed | 0.095 | 0.045 | 0.144 | 1,551 | 1,551 | 3 | 3 | | 1990 | As observed | 0.033 | −0.040 | 0.105 | 729 | 729 | 2 | 2 | | 1992 | As observed | 0.156 | 0.113 | 0.198 | 2,005 | 1,996 | 3 | 3 | | 1994 | As observed | 0.198 | 0.146 | 0.248 | 1,659 | 1,358 | 3 | 3 | | 1996 | As observed | 0.193 | 0.136 | 0.248 | 1,413 | 1,139 | 3 | 3 | | 1998 | As observed | 0.162 | 0.097 | 0.225 | 1,055 | 892 | 2 | 3 | | 2000 | As observed | 0.117 | 0.041 | 0.192 | 811 | 652 | 3 | 3 | | 2004 | As observed | 0.180 | 0.113 | 0.244 | 1,006 | 834 | 3 | 3 | | 2008 | As observed | 0.228 | 0.152 | 0.301 | 954 | 620 | 3 | 3 | | 2012 | As observed | 0.325 | 0.292 | 0.357 | 5,203 | 2,880 | 3 | 3 | | 2016 | As observed | 0.391 | 0.356 | 0.425 | 3,325 | 2,297 | 3 | 3 | | 2020 | As observed | 0.517 | 0.493 | 0.540 | 6,737 | 3,696 | 3 | 3 | | 2024 | As observed | 0.514 | 0.482 | 0.546 | 4,387 | 2,059 | 3 | 3 | | 1988 | All six items answered | 0.111 | 0.052 | 0.169 | 1,107 | 1,107 | 3 | 3 | | 1992 | All six items answered | 0.203 | 0.154 | 0.251 | 1,513 | 1,507 | 3 | 3 | | 1994 | All six items answered | 0.243 | 0.187 | 0.297 | 1,384 | 1,132 | 3 | 3 | | 1996 | All six items answered | 0.221 | 0.158 | 0.281 | 1,132 | 923 | 3 | 3 | | 2000 | All six items answered | 0.154 | 0.068 | 0.237 | 634 | 512 | 3 | 3 | | 2004 | All six items answered | 0.209 | 0.135 | 0.280 | 803 | 664 | 3 | 3 | | 2008 | All six items answered | 0.261 | 0.176 | 0.342 | 740 | 488 | 3 | 3 | | 2012 | All six items answered | 0.370 | 0.335 | 0.403 | 4,422 | 2,472 | 3 | 3 | | 2016 | All six items answered | 0.435 | 0.398 | 0.471 | 2,719 | 1,894 | 3 | 3 | | 2020 | All six items answered | 0.563 | 0.538 | 0.587 | 5,374 | 2,991 | 3 | 3 | | 2024 | All six items answered | 0.560 | 0.526 | 0.592 | 3,516 | 1,635 | 3 | 3 | | 2008 | All respondents | 0.228 | 0.152 | 0.301 | 954 | 620 | 3 | 3 | | 2012 | All respondents | 0.325 | 0.292 | 0.357 | 5,203 | 2,880 | 3 | 3 | | 2016 | All respondents | 0.391 | 0.356 | 0.425 | 3,325 | 2,297 | 3 | 3 | | 2024 | All respondents | 0.514 | 0.482 | 0.546 | 4,387 | 2,059 | 3 | 3 | | 2008 | Face-to-face | 0.228 | 0.152 | 0.301 | 954 | 620 | 3 | 3 | | 2012 | Face-to-face | 0.236 | 0.174 | 0.296 | 1,769 | 926 | 3 | 3 | | 2016 | Face-to-face | 0.385 | 0.317 | 0.448 | 988 | 649 | 3 | 3 | | 2024 | Face-to-face | 0.542 | 0.473 | 0.605 | 874 | 443 | 3 | 3 | | 2012 | Web | 0.368 | 0.329 | 0.406 | 3,434 | 1,963 | 3 | 3 | | 2016 | Web | 0.396 | 0.354 | 0.436 | 2,337 | 1,648 | 3 | 3 | | 2024 | Web | 0.473 | 0.421 | 0.523 | 1,589 | 895 | 3 | 3 | Views: Observed and same 7-point party ID (basis = party7); Same 3-category party ID (basis = party3); Corrected for error (basis = corrected); Six items answered (basis = six); By interview mode (basis = mode). Note: Shaded studies have only two items on one or both indices: the cultural index in 1984, both indices in 1986 and 1990, and the economic index in 1998. Note: The 2002 study has no cultural index, since only the gay and lesbian thermometer was asked, and is omitted. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1984 to 2024; weighted (VCF0009z), and weight_ftf and weight_web in the mode view; intervals are model based Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/corr_trend.json ### Table 3. The Republican minus Democratic gap grew from +0.69 to +1.29 on the economic index and from +0.30 to +1.27 on the cultural index Mean of each index by party identification, leaners counted with their party, and for all adults, in standard deviations of the pooled 1984 to 2024 sample, by ANES study; 95% intervals | Study | Index | Group | Mean | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Effective n | Items in the index | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1984 | Economic index | All adults | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.12 | 1,508 | 1,508 | 3 | | 1986 | Economic index | All adults | 0.01 | −0.05 | 0.07 | 914 | 914 | 2 | | 1988 | Economic index | All adults | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.11 | 1,551 | 1,551 | 3 | | 1990 | Economic index | All adults | −0.05 | −0.12 | 0.01 | 729 | 729 | 2 | | 1992 | Economic index | All adults | −0.05 | −0.08 | −0.01 | 2,005 | 1,996 | 3 | | 1994 | Economic index | All adults | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.19 | 1,659 | 1,358 | 3 | | 1996 | Economic index | All adults | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 1,413 | 1,139 | 3 | | 1998 | Economic index | All adults | −0.07 | −0.13 | 0.00 | 1,055 | 892 | 2 | | 2000 | Economic index | All adults | 0.01 | −0.06 | 0.07 | 811 | 652 | 3 | | 2004 | Economic index | All adults | −0.11 | −0.17 | −0.05 | 1,006 | 834 | 3 | | 2008 | Economic index | All adults | −0.06 | −0.14 | 0.01 | 954 | 620 | 3 | | 2012 | Economic index | All adults | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.23 | 5,203 | 2,880 | 3 | | 2016 | Economic index | All adults | 0.09 | 0.05 | 0.13 | 3,325 | 2,297 | 3 | | 2020 | Economic index | All adults | −0.11 | −0.15 | −0.08 | 6,737 | 3,696 | 3 | | 2024 | Economic index | All adults | −0.20 | −0.25 | −0.16 | 4,387 | 2,059 | 3 | | 1984 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.24 | −0.30 | −0.18 | 699 | 699 | 3 | | 1986 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.26 | −0.34 | −0.17 | 459 | 459 | 2 | | 1988 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.26 | −0.32 | −0.19 | 731 | 731 | 3 | | 1990 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.32 | −0.41 | −0.22 | 368 | 368 | 2 | | 1992 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.35 | −0.40 | −0.31 | 975 | 971 | 3 | | 1994 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.21 | −0.27 | −0.15 | 768 | 621 | 3 | | 1996 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.20 | −0.26 | −0.14 | 734 | 593 | 3 | | 1998 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.33 | −0.42 | −0.25 | 544 | 464 | 2 | | 2000 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.27 | −0.36 | −0.19 | 414 | 331 | 3 | | 2004 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.50 | −0.58 | −0.43 | 476 | 389 | 3 | | 2008 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.51 | −0.59 | −0.42 | 553 | 338 | 3 | | 2012 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.33 | −0.37 | −0.30 | 2,722 | 1,397 | 3 | | 2016 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.45 | −0.50 | −0.40 | 1,540 | 1,039 | 3 | | 2020 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.85 | −0.89 | −0.81 | 3,209 | 1,672 | 3 | | 2024 | Economic index | Democrats | −0.80 | −0.85 | −0.75 | 2,196 | 1,022 | 3 | | 1984 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.45 | 0.39 | 0.51 | 633 | 633 | 3 | | 1986 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.40 | 0.31 | 0.49 | 334 | 334 | 2 | | 1988 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.43 | 0.37 | 0.49 | 664 | 664 | 3 | | 1990 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.28 | 0.18 | 0.38 | 291 | 291 | 2 | | 1992 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.38 | 0.32 | 0.43 | 790 | 787 | 3 | | 1994 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.59 | 0.52 | 0.66 | 726 | 605 | 3 | | 1996 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.64 | 0.56 | 0.71 | 561 | 454 | 3 | | 1998 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.37 | 0.27 | 0.47 | 395 | 333 | 2 | | 2000 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.48 | 0.39 | 0.57 | 304 | 254 | 3 | | 2004 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.35 | 0.26 | 0.44 | 425 | 361 | 3 | | 2008 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.52 | 0.40 | 0.64 | 282 | 214 | 3 | | 2012 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.85 | 0.81 | 0.90 | 1,802 | 1,097 | 3 | | 2016 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.77 | 0.72 | 0.83 | 1,389 | 983 | 3 | | 2020 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.72 | 0.67 | 0.76 | 2,813 | 1,642 | 3 | | 2024 | Economic index | Republicans | 0.49 | 0.43 | 0.55 | 1,942 | 920 | 3 | | 1984 | Cultural index | All adults | 0.48 | 0.44 | 0.53 | 1,508 | 1,508 | 2 | | 1986 | Cultural index | All adults | 0.20 | 0.14 | 0.26 | 914 | 914 | 2 | | 1988 | Cultural index | All adults | 0.51 | 0.47 | 0.55 | 1,551 | 1,551 | 3 | | 1990 | Cultural index | All adults | 0.21 | 0.15 | 0.27 | 729 | 729 | 2 | | 1992 | Cultural index | All adults | 0.28 | 0.24 | 0.31 | 2,005 | 1,996 | 3 | | 1994 | Cultural index | All adults | 0.46 | 0.41 | 0.50 | 1,659 | 1,358 | 3 | | 1996 | Cultural index | All adults | 0.35 | 0.30 | 0.40 | 1,413 | 1,139 | 3 | | 1998 | Cultural index | All adults | 0.23 | 0.17 | 0.28 | 1,055 | 892 | 3 | | 2000 | Cultural index | All adults | 0.29 | 0.23 | 0.36 | 811 | 652 | 3 | | 2004 | Cultural index | All adults | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.24 | 1,006 | 834 | 3 | | 2008 | Cultural index | All adults | 0.09 | 0.02 | 0.16 | 954 | 620 | 3 | | 2012 | Cultural index | All adults | −0.01 | −0.05 | 0.02 | 5,203 | 2,880 | 3 | | 2016 | Cultural index | All adults | −0.23 | −0.27 | −0.19 | 3,325 | 2,297 | 3 | | 2020 | Cultural index | All adults | −0.33 | −0.36 | −0.29 | 6,737 | 3,696 | 3 | | 2024 | Cultural index | All adults | −0.33 | −0.38 | −0.29 | 4,387 | 2,059 | 3 | | 1984 | Cultural index | Democrats | 0.33 | 0.27 | 0.40 | 699 | 699 | 2 | | 1986 | Cultural index | Democrats | 0.19 | 0.10 | 0.28 | 459 | 459 | 2 | | 1988 | Cultural index | Democrats | 0.42 | 0.36 | 0.48 | 731 | 731 | 3 | | 1990 | Cultural index | Democrats | 0.10 | 0.01 | 0.19 | 368 | 368 | 2 | | 1992 | Cultural index | Democrats | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.14 | 975 | 971 | 3 | | 1994 | Cultural index | Democrats | 0.27 | 0.19 | 0.34 | 768 | 621 | 3 | | 1996 | Cultural index | Democrats | 0.18 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 734 | 593 | 3 | | 1998 | Cultural index | Democrats | 0.03 | −0.05 | 0.12 | 544 | 464 | 3 | | 2000 | Cultural index | Democrats | 0.13 | 0.03 | 0.22 | 414 | 331 | 3 | | 2004 | Cultural index | Democrats | −0.10 | −0.20 | −0.01 | 476 | 389 | 3 | | 2008 | Cultural index | Democrats | −0.17 | −0.27 | −0.07 | 553 | 338 | 3 | | 2012 | Cultural index | Democrats | −0.41 | −0.46 | −0.37 | 2,722 | 1,397 | 3 | | 2016 | Cultural index | Democrats | −0.69 | −0.74 | −0.63 | 1,540 | 1,039 | 3 | | 2020 | Cultural index | Democrats | −0.89 | −0.93 | −0.85 | 3,209 | 1,672 | 3 | | 2024 | Cultural index | Democrats | −0.93 | −0.99 | −0.88 | 2,196 | 1,022 | 3 | | 1984 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.63 | 0.56 | 0.71 | 633 | 633 | 2 | | 1986 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.19 | 0.10 | 0.29 | 334 | 334 | 2 | | 1988 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.63 | 0.58 | 0.69 | 664 | 664 | 3 | | 1990 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.29 | 0.19 | 0.39 | 291 | 291 | 2 | | 1992 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.52 | 0.47 | 0.58 | 790 | 787 | 3 | | 1994 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.65 | 0.59 | 0.72 | 726 | 605 | 3 | | 1996 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.61 | 0.54 | 0.69 | 561 | 454 | 3 | | 1998 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.48 | 0.39 | 0.56 | 395 | 333 | 3 | | 2000 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.51 | 0.41 | 0.60 | 304 | 254 | 3 | | 2004 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.49 | 0.40 | 0.57 | 425 | 361 | 3 | | 2008 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.41 | 0.29 | 0.52 | 282 | 214 | 3 | | 2012 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.41 | 0.36 | 0.46 | 1,802 | 1,097 | 3 | | 2016 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.35 | 1,389 | 983 | 3 | | 2020 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.30 | 0.26 | 0.34 | 2,813 | 1,642 | 3 | | 2024 | Cultural index | Republicans | 0.33 | 0.28 | 0.38 | 1,942 | 920 | 3 | Note: A party-by-study cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; pure independents fall below that in most studies and are counted only in the line for all adults. Note: Shaded studies have only two items on one or both indices: the cultural index in 1984, both indices in 1986 and 1990, and the economic index in 1998. The cultural panel is noisier in those studies because an index of two items has lower alpha. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1984 to 2024; weighted (VCF0009z); intervals are model based Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/party_positions.json ### Table 4. Items in each index agree more in recent studies, and the cultural items agree less than the economic items in 14 of 15 studies Standardized Cronbach alpha of each index by ANES study, adults who answered every item of the index that year, 1984 to 2024; 95% intervals from resampling respondents | Study | Index | Alpha | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents with every item | Items in the index | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1984 | Economic index | 0.60 | 0.53 | 0.66 | 629 | 3 | | 1986 | Economic index | 0.43 | 0.33 | 0.51 | 914 | 2 | | 1988 | Economic index | 0.62 | 0.57 | 0.66 | 1,171 | 3 | | 1990 | Economic index | 0.47 | 0.37 | 0.56 | 729 | 2 | | 1992 | Economic index | 0.62 | 0.59 | 0.66 | 1,588 | 3 | | 1994 | Economic index | 0.67 | 0.63 | 0.71 | 1,451 | 3 | | 1996 | Economic index | 0.66 | 0.62 | 0.71 | 1,185 | 3 | | 1998 | Economic index | 0.47 | 0.37 | 0.55 | 1,055 | 2 | | 2000 | Economic index | 0.60 | 0.53 | 0.66 | 675 | 3 | | 2004 | Economic index | 0.69 | 0.64 | 0.73 | 832 | 3 | | 2008 | Economic index | 0.73 | 0.68 | 0.77 | 765 | 3 | | 2012 | Economic index | 0.76 | 0.74 | 0.78 | 4,486 | 3 | | 2016 | Economic index | 0.79 | 0.77 | 0.81 | 2,772 | 3 | | 2020 | Economic index | 0.83 | 0.82 | 0.84 | 5,691 | 3 | | 2024 | Economic index | 0.79 | 0.77 | 0.81 | 3,743 | 3 | | 1984 | Cultural index | 0.35 | 0.28 | 0.41 | 1,508 | 2 | | 1986 | Cultural index | 0.37 | 0.29 | 0.44 | 914 | 2 | | 1988 | Cultural index | 0.44 | 0.38 | 0.49 | 1,462 | 3 | | 1990 | Cultural index | 0.17 | 0.04 | 0.29 | 729 | 2 | | 1992 | Cultural index | 0.52 | 0.48 | 0.56 | 1,900 | 3 | | 1994 | Cultural index | 0.53 | 0.48 | 0.57 | 1,582 | 3 | | 1996 | Cultural index | 0.56 | 0.51 | 0.60 | 1,346 | 3 | | 1998 | Cultural index | 0.56 | 0.51 | 0.60 | 989 | 3 | | 2000 | Cultural index | 0.50 | 0.43 | 0.57 | 759 | 3 | | 2004 | Cultural index | 0.61 | 0.57 | 0.66 | 971 | 3 | | 2008 | Cultural index | 0.58 | 0.52 | 0.64 | 924 | 3 | | 2012 | Cultural index | 0.62 | 0.60 | 0.65 | 5,118 | 3 | | 2016 | Cultural index | 0.64 | 0.61 | 0.67 | 3,251 | 3 | | 2020 | Cultural index | 0.69 | 0.68 | 0.71 | 6,354 | 3 | | 2024 | Cultural index | 0.69 | 0.67 | 0.72 | 4,109 | 3 | Note: Alpha uses adults who answered every item of the index that year. Note: Shaded studies have only two items on one or both indices: the cultural index in 1984, both indices in 1986 and 1990, and the economic index in 1998. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1984 to 2024; weighted (VCF0009z); intervals are model based Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/reliability.json ### Table 5. Self-placed conservatism follows the economic and cultural indices about equally, and both coefficients grew Coefficient on each index in a regression of 7-point liberal-conservative self-placement on both indices (in pooled standard deviations) with study fixed effects, 1984 to 1996 and 2012 to 2024; 95% intervals | early | early_hi | early_lo | index | n_early | n_recent | recent | recent_hi | recent_lo | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 0.502 | 0.536 | 0.467 | Economic index | 7,815 | 17,452 | 0.664 | 0.690 | 0.638 | | 0.526 | 0.558 | 0.495 | Cultural index | 7,815 | 17,452 | 0.673 | 0.698 | 0.647 | Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1984 to 1996 and 2012 to 2024; weighted (VCF0009z); HC3 intervals Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/selfplacement.json ### Table 6. The share of adults on opposite sides of the medians fell from 46.2% to 30.0% and stays within 3.3 points of the share the correlation implies Weighted share of adults by ANES study, 1984 to 2024; 95% intervals | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | series | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | | 48.62 | 43.82 | 46.22 | 1,508 | Opposite sides of the medians | 1984 | | 50.19 | 44.14 | 47.17 | 914 | Opposite sides of the medians | 1986 | | 49.48 | 44.54 | 47.01 | 1,551 | Opposite sides of the medians | 1988 | | 54.07 | 47.22 | 50.65 | 729 | Opposite sides of the medians | 1990 | | 46.19 | 41.84 | 44.01 | 2,005 | Opposite sides of the medians | 1992 | | 45.58 | 40.36 | 42.97 | 1,659 | Opposite sides of the medians | 1994 | | 45.85 | 40.11 | 42.98 | 1,413 | Opposite sides of the medians | 1996 | | 51.25 | 44.80 | 48.02 | 1,055 | Opposite sides of the medians | 1998 | | 51.60 | 44.00 | 47.80 | 811 | Opposite sides of the medians | 2000 | | 48.17 | 41.47 | 44.82 | 1,006 | Opposite sides of the medians | 2004 | | 44.43 | 36.75 | 40.59 | 954 | Opposite sides of the medians | 2008 | | 38.80 | 35.35 | 37.08 | 5,203 | Opposite sides of the medians | 2012 | | 36.76 | 32.92 | 34.84 | 3,325 | Opposite sides of the medians | 2016 | | 30.84 | 27.95 | 29.39 | 6,737 | Opposite sides of the medians | 2020 | | 31.92 | 28.00 | 29.96 | 4,387 | Opposite sides of the medians | 2024 | | 20.12 | 16.22 | 18.17 | 1,508 | Strongly cross-pressured | 1984 | | 19.74 | 14.83 | 17.29 | 914 | Strongly cross-pressured | 1986 | | 19.77 | 15.95 | 17.86 | 1,551 | Strongly cross-pressured | 1988 | | 22.21 | 16.47 | 19.34 | 729 | Strongly cross-pressured | 1990 | | 18.40 | 15.13 | 16.77 | 2,005 | Strongly cross-pressured | 1992 | | 16.09 | 12.37 | 14.23 | 1,659 | Strongly cross-pressured | 1994 | | 15.96 | 11.93 | 13.95 | 1,413 | Strongly cross-pressured | 1996 | | 16.74 | 12.12 | 14.43 | 1,055 | Strongly cross-pressured | 1998 | | 19.30 | 13.60 | 16.45 | 811 | Strongly cross-pressured | 2000 | | 19.11 | 14.06 | 16.58 | 1,006 | Strongly cross-pressured | 2004 | | 17.02 | 11.51 | 14.27 | 954 | Strongly cross-pressured | 2008 | | 13.10 | 10.73 | 11.92 | 5,203 | Strongly cross-pressured | 2012 | | 11.09 | 8.65 | 9.87 | 3,325 | Strongly cross-pressured | 2016 | | 7.35 | 5.75 | 6.55 | 6,737 | Strongly cross-pressured | 2020 | | 7.69 | 5.54 | 6.62 | 4,387 | Strongly cross-pressured | 2024 | | n/a | n/a | 46.75 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 1984 | | n/a | n/a | 47.79 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 1986 | | n/a | n/a | 46.99 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 1988 | | n/a | n/a | 48.96 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 1990 | | n/a | n/a | 45.02 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 1992 | | n/a | n/a | 43.66 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 1994 | | n/a | n/a | 43.83 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 1996 | | n/a | n/a | 44.83 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 1998 | | n/a | n/a | 46.26 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 2000 | | n/a | n/a | 44.25 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 2004 | | n/a | n/a | 42.69 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 2008 | | n/a | n/a | 39.47 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 2012 | | n/a | n/a | 37.21 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 2016 | | n/a | n/a | 32.71 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 2020 | | n/a | n/a | 32.80 | n/a | Implied by the correlation | 2024 | Note: Each index is split at its weighted median within the study, so each index divides adults into two equal groups. The implied share is the value for two normally distributed (bell-shaped) indices with the observed correlation. It has no interval because it is a function of the correlation. Note: Strongly cross-pressured means at least 0.5 standard deviations right of the median on one index and at least that far left of it on the other, in standard deviations of the index within the study. A band of 0.25 gives 27.5% in 1984 and 15.9% in 2024, and a band of 0.75 gives 10.3% and 3.2%. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1984 to 2024; weighted (VCF0009z); intervals are model based Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/cross_pressure.json ### Table 7. In 2024 the two corner cells with both indices far left or far right hold more adults than the correlation implies Share of adults in each cell (columns: economic index; rows: cultural index), in standard deviations from each index's 2024 median, ANES 2024; 95% intervals | Cultural index (SD from median) | Economic index (SD from median) | Share of adults (%) | Interval low | Interval high | Normal reference (%) | Observed minus reference (points) | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | below −1 | below −1 | 8.2 | 7.1 | 9.5 | 6.4 | +1.8 | 353 | | below −1 | −1 to −0.5 | 5.4 | 4.5 | 6.5 | 3.5 | +1.9 | 244 | | below −1 | −0.5 to 0 | 3.6 | 2.8 | 4.5 | 3.0 | +0.6 | 148 | | below −1 | 0 to 0.5 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 2.6 | 1.8 | 0.0 | 106 | | −1 to −0.5 | below −1 | 2.7 | 2.1 | 3.5 | 3.5 | −0.8 | 102 | | −1 to −0.5 | −1 to −0.5 | 2.3 | 1.8 | 3.1 | 3.1 | −0.8 | 112 | | −1 to −0.5 | −0.5 to 0 | 2.1 | 1.6 | 2.8 | 3.4 | −1.3 | 91 | | −1 to −0.5 | 0 to 0.5 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 3.2 | 2.6 | −0.2 | 121 | | −1 to −0.5 | 0.5 to 1 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 1.3 | 1.5 | −0.6 | 35 | | −1 to −0.5 | above 1 | 0.7 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 0.8 | −0.1 | 31 | | −0.5 to 0 | below −1 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 3.9 | 3.0 | +0.1 | 127 | | −0.5 to 0 | −1 to −0.5 | 2.4 | 1.9 | 3.2 | 3.4 | −0.9 | 105 | | −0.5 to 0 | −0.5 to 0 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 4.2 | 4.3 | −1.0 | 150 | | −0.5 to 0 | 0 to 0.5 | 3.4 | 2.7 | 4.3 | 4.0 | −0.6 | 155 | | −0.5 to 0 | 0.5 to 1 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 2.4 | 2.6 | −0.9 | 71 | | −0.5 to 0 | above 1 | 1.8 | 1.3 | 2.5 | 1.8 | 0.0 | 78 | | 0 to 0.5 | below −1 | 2.2 | 1.6 | 2.9 | 1.8 | +0.4 | 96 | | 0 to 0.5 | −1 to −0.5 | 3.0 | 2.4 | 3.8 | 2.6 | +0.4 | 118 | | 0 to 0.5 | −0.5 to 0 | 3.3 | 2.6 | 4.1 | 4.0 | −0.7 | 141 | | 0 to 0.5 | 0 to 0.5 | 4.8 | 3.9 | 5.8 | 4.3 | +0.5 | 205 | | 0 to 0.5 | 0.5 to 1 | 4.1 | 3.3 | 5.0 | 3.4 | +0.7 | 158 | | 0 to 0.5 | above 1 | 4.0 | 3.3 | 5.0 | 3.0 | +1.1 | 200 | | 0.5 to 1 | below −1 | 0.9 | 0.6 | 1.4 | 0.8 | +0.1 | 37 | | 0.5 to 1 | −1 to −0.5 | 1.2 | 0.8 | 1.8 | 1.5 | −0.2 | 49 | | 0.5 to 1 | −0.5 to 0 | 1.7 | 1.2 | 2.4 | 2.6 | −0.9 | 64 | | 0.5 to 1 | 0 to 0.5 | 3.3 | 2.6 | 4.1 | 3.4 | −0.1 | 114 | | 0.5 to 1 | 0.5 to 1 | 2.0 | 1.5 | 2.7 | 3.1 | −1.1 | 93 | | 0.5 to 1 | above 1 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 4.9 | 3.5 | +0.5 | 213 | | above 1 | below −1 | 1.4 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 0.3 | +1.1 | 47 | | above 1 | −1 to −0.5 | 1.0 | 0.7 | 1.5 | 0.8 | +0.2 | 39 | | above 1 | −0.5 to 0 | 1.9 | 1.4 | 2.6 | 1.8 | +0.1 | 70 | | above 1 | 0 to 0.5 | 2.5 | 1.9 | 3.2 | 3.0 | −0.5 | 116 | | above 1 | 0.5 to 1 | 3.6 | 2.9 | 4.5 | 3.5 | +0.1 | 144 | | above 1 | above 1 | 8.5 | 7.3 | 9.8 | 6.4 | +2.1 | 416 | Views: Share of adults, percent; Observed minus normal reference, percentage points. Note: Columns run from the most liberal economic bin on the left to the most conservative on the right, and rows from the most conservative cultural bin at the top to the most liberal at the bottom. The middle cut of each axis is the median. The outer bins are open-ended and collect every adult beyond 1.0 standard deviations, so they are larger than the interior bins, which are 0.5 standard deviations wide. The normal reference uses the same bins. Note: Cells with fewer than 30 respondents are left blank: 2 cells, holding 0.5% of adults. Both are in the bottom-right corner region, where the cultural index is far left and the economic index is right of the median. Note: Bins are measured from the 2024 weighted median of each index, in units of that index's 2024 standard deviation. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2024; weighted (VCF0009z); intervals are model based Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/joint_2024.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (95), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | all_cult_1984 | +0.48 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the cultural index | all adults in the analysis sample, independents without a lean included | 1984 | 95% CI 0.44 to 0.53 | 1,508 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | all_cult_2024 | −0.33 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the cultural index | all adults in the analysis sample, independents without a lean included | 2024 | 95% CI −0.38 to −0.29 | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | alpha_cult_1988 | 0.44 | standardized Cronbach alpha, from 0 to 1 (higher is more consistent) | standardized alpha from the weighted mean inter-item correlation (bootstrap percentile interval) | adults who answered every item of the cultural index | 1988 | 95% CI 0.38 to 0.49 | 1,462 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | alpha_cult_2024 | 0.69 | standardized Cronbach alpha, from 0 to 1 (higher is more consistent) | standardized alpha from the weighted mean inter-item correlation (bootstrap percentile interval) | adults who answered every item of the cultural index | 2024 | 95% CI 0.67 to 0.72 | 4,109 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | alpha_econ_1984 | 0.60 | standardized Cronbach alpha, from 0 to 1 (higher is more consistent) | standardized alpha from the weighted mean inter-item correlation (bootstrap percentile interval) | adults who answered every item of the economic index | 1984 | 95% CI 0.53 to 0.66 | 629 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | alpha_econ_2020 | 0.83 | standardized Cronbach alpha, from 0 to 1 (higher is more consistent) | standardized alpha from the weighted mean inter-item correlation (bootstrap percentile interval) | adults who answered every item of the economic index | 2020 | 95% CI 0.82 to 0.84 | 5,691 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | alpha_econ_2024 | 0.79 | standardized Cronbach alpha, from 0 to 1 (higher is more consistent) | standardized alpha from the weighted mean inter-item correlation (bootstrap percentile interval) | adults who answered every item of the economic index | 2024 | 95% CI 0.77 to 0.81 | 3,743 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | alpha_floor | 0.4 | standardized Cronbach alpha, from 0 to 1 (higher is more consistent) | smallest alpha at which the corrected correlation is shown | indices whose correlation is corrected | 1984-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | band_narrow_sd | 0.25 | standard deviations of the index within one study | half-width of the narrow tolerance band used as a sensitivity check | alternative tolerance band around each median | 1984-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | band_sd | 0.5 | standard deviations of the index within one study | half-width of the tolerance band | tolerance band around each median | 1984-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | band_wide_sd | 0.75 | standard deviations of the index within one study | half-width of the wide tolerance band used as a sensitivity check | alternative tolerance band around each median | 1984-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | blank_share | 0.5% | percent of adults | weighted share of adults in the blank cells | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_left_2024 | 8.2% | percent of adults | weighted share of adults in one cell of the joint distribution (Wilson interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 7.1% to 9.5% | 353 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_offdiag_2024 | 1.4% | percent of adults | weighted share of adults below the economic median by more than one standard deviation and above the cultural median by at least one (Wilson interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 1.0% to 2.0% | 47 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cell_right_2024 | 8.5% | percent of adults | weighted share of adults in one cell of the joint distribution (Wilson interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 7.3% to 9.8% | 416 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | consistent_2024 | 70.0% | percent of adults | weighted share on the same side of both medians | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 68.1% to 72.0% | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_cult_1984 | +0.33 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the cultural index | Democrats, leaners included | 1984 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.40 | 699 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_cult_2024 | −0.93 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the cultural index | Democrats, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI −0.99 to −0.88 | 2,196 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_cult_common_1984 | +0.33 | pooled standard deviations of the two-item cultural index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the cultural index built from abortion and the gay and lesbian thermometer only, standardized over 1984-2024 | Democrats, leaners included | 1984 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.40 | 699 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_cult_common_2024 | −0.81 | pooled standard deviations of the two-item cultural index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the cultural index built from abortion and the gay and lesbian thermometer only, standardized over 1984-2024 | Democrats, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI −0.85 to −0.76 | 2,094 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_econ_1984 | −0.24 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the economic index | Democrats, leaners included | 1984 | 95% CI −0.30 to −0.18 | 699 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | dem_econ_2024 | −0.80 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the economic index | Democrats, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI −0.85 to −0.75 | 2,196 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | diff_left_2024 | +1.8 | percentage points | weighted share in the corner beyond one standard deviation left of both medians minus the share for two normally distributed indices with the observed correlation (Wilson interval of the observed share less the reference) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 0.7 to 3.1 | 353 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | diff_offdiag_2024 | +1.1 | percentage points | weighted share in the corner far left on the economic index and far right on the cultural index minus the share for two normally distributed indices with the observed correlation (Wilson interval of the observed share less the reference) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 0.6 to 1.7 | 47 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | diff_right_2024 | +2.1 | percentage points | weighted share in the corner at least one standard deviation right of both medians minus the share for two normally distributed indices with the observed correlation (Wilson interval of the observed share less the reference) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 1.0 to 3.4 | 416 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_two_items_1984 | 58.3% | percent of adults | weighted share whose economic index averages two answers instead of three | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984 | 95% CI 55.8% to 60.8% | 1,508 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | econ_two_items_2024 | 15.4% | percent of adults | weighted share whose economic index averages two answers instead of three | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 13.8% to 16.9% | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_cult_1984 | +0.30 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | difference in weighted means of the cultural index | Republicans minus Democrats, leaners included | 1984 | 95% CI 0.20 to 0.40 | 1,332 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_cult_2024 | +1.27 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | difference in weighted means of the cultural index | Republicans minus Democrats, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 1.20 to 1.34 | 4,138 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_cult_common_1984 | +0.28 | pooled standard deviations of the two-item cultural index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | difference in weighted means of the cultural index built from abortion and the gay and lesbian thermometer only, standardized over 1984-2024 | Republicans minus Democrats, leaners included | 1984 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.37 | 1,332 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_cult_common_2024 | +1.11 | pooled standard deviations of the two-item cultural index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | difference in weighted means of the cultural index built from abortion and the gay and lesbian thermometer only, standardized over 1984-2024 | Republicans minus Democrats, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 1.04 to 1.18 | 3,903 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_econ_1984 | +0.69 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | difference in weighted means of the economic index | Republicans minus Democrats, leaners included | 1984 | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.78 | 1,332 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | gap_econ_2024 | +1.29 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | difference in weighted means of the economic index | Republicans minus Democrats, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 1.21 to 1.36 | 4,138 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | implied_1984 | 46.8% | percent of adults | share on opposite sides of the medians implied by the correlation if the two indices were bivariate normal | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | implied_2024 | 32.8% | percent of adults | share on opposite sides of the medians implied by the correlation if the two indices were bivariate normal | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | implied_below_max | 3.3 | percentage points | largest amount by which the observed split share falls below the share implied by the correlation, over the studies from 2008 | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2008-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | implied_below_min | 2.1 | percentage points | smallest amount by which the observed split share falls below the share implied by the correlation, over the studies from 2008 | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2008-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | implied_corner_2024 | 6.4% | percent of adults | share in each corner cell (both indices beyond one standard deviation on the same side) for two normally distributed indices centred at the medians with the observed correlation | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | implied_gap_max | 3.3 | percentage points | largest absolute difference between the observed split share and the share implied by the correlation, over all studies | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | implied_offdiag_2024 | 0.3% | percent of adults | share in each off-diagonal corner cell (beyond one standard deviation on opposite sides) for two normally distributed indices centred at the medians with the observed correlation | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | min_cell | 30 | respondents | smallest cell that is shown | cells of the 2024 joint distribution | 2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_2024 | 4,387 | respondents | count of respondents | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_cells_blank | 2 | cells | count of cells left blank for fewer than 30 respondents | cells of the 2024 joint distribution | 2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_cult_lower | 14 | ANES studies | count of studies in which the cultural index has the lower alpha | studies with both indices | 1984-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_mode_studies | 4 | ANES studies | count of studies with weight_ftf and weight_web | studies with mode-specific weights (face-to-face and web) | 1984-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_respondents | 33,257 | respondents | count of respondents in the analysis sample | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_studies | 15 | ANES studies | count of studies | studies with both indices | 1984-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_two_component_studies | 4 | ANES studies | count of studies in which the economic or the cultural index has only two items | studies in which an index has two components, not three | 1984-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | outer_sd | 1.0 | standard deviations of the index within one study | distance from the median at which the open outer bins begin | outermost bins of the 2024 joint distribution | 2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r3_2024 | +0.24 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation net of three-category party identification (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 0.20 to 0.28 | 4,373 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r6_1988 | +0.11 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation among respondents with every item | adults who answered all six items | 1988 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.17 | 1,107 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r6_2024 | +0.56 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation among respondents with every item | adults who answered all six items | 2024 | 95% CI 0.53 to 0.59 | 3,516 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r7_1984 | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation net of seven-point party identification (Fisher z interval, effective n less six party dummies) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.10 | 1,499 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r7_2008 | +0.08 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation net of seven-point party identification (Fisher z interval, effective n less six party dummies) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2008 | 95% CI 0.00 to 0.16 | 944 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r7_2024 | +0.23 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation net of seven-point party identification (Fisher z interval, effective n less six party dummies) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.27 | 4,373 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_1984 | +0.10 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.15 | 1,508 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_2000 | +0.12 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2000 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.19 | 811 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_2008 | +0.23 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2008 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.30 | 954 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_2012 | +0.32 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2012 | 95% CI 0.29 to 0.36 | 5,203 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_2020 | +0.52 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2020 | 95% CI 0.49 to 0.54 | 6,737 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_2024 | +0.51 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 0.48 to 0.55 | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_ftf_2012 | +0.24 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation with the mode-specific weight | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index, interviewed face-to-face | 2012 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.30 | 1,769 | weight_ftf or weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_ftf_2016 | +0.38 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation with the mode-specific weight | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index, interviewed face-to-face | 2016 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.45 | 988 | weight_ftf or weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_ftf_2024 | +0.54 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation with the mode-specific weight | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index, interviewed face-to-face | 2024 | 95% CI 0.47 to 0.60 | 874 | weight_ftf or weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_web_2012 | +0.37 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation with the mode-specific weight | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index, interviewed on the web | 2012 | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.41 | 3,434 | weight_ftf or weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_web_2016 | +0.40 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation with the mode-specific weight | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index, interviewed on the web | 2016 | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.44 | 2,337 | weight_ftf or weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | r_web_2024 | +0.47 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation with the mode-specific weight | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index, interviewed on the web | 2024 | 95% CI 0.42 to 0.52 | 1,589 | weight_ftf or weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rc2_2024 | 48.1% | percent of adults (share of variance) | square of the corrected correlation: the share of variance the two error-free indices would have in common | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 42.7% to 54.5% | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rc_1988 | +0.18 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | observed correlation divided by the square root of the product of the two alphas (bootstrap percentile interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1988 | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.28 | 1,551 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rc_2008 | +0.35 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | observed correlation divided by the square root of the product of the two alphas (bootstrap percentile interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2008 | 95% CI 0.24 to 0.46 | 954 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rc_2024 | +0.69 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | observed correlation divided by the square root of the product of the two alphas (bootstrap percentile interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 0.65 to 0.74 | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rep_cult_1984 | +0.63 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the cultural index | Republicans, leaners included | 1984 | 95% CI 0.56 to 0.71 | 633 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rep_cult_2024 | +0.33 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the cultural index | Republicans, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 0.28 to 0.38 | 1,942 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rep_cult_common_1984 | +0.61 | pooled standard deviations of the two-item cultural index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the cultural index built from abortion and the gay and lesbian thermometer only, standardized over 1984-2024 | Republicans, leaners included | 1984 | 95% CI 0.55 to 0.68 | 633 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rep_cult_common_2024 | +0.31 | pooled standard deviations of the two-item cultural index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the cultural index built from abortion and the gay and lesbian thermometer only, standardized over 1984-2024 | Republicans, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.36 | 1,809 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rep_econ_1984 | +0.45 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the economic index | Republicans, leaners included | 1984 | 95% CI 0.39 to 0.51 | 633 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rep_econ_2024 | +0.49 | pooled standard deviations of the index (0 is the mean of all 1984-2024 respondents) | weighted mean of the economic index | Republicans, leaners included | 2024 | 95% CI 0.43 to 0.55 | 1,942 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | slope_2024 | 0.51 | standard deviations of the cultural index per standard deviation of the economic index | weighted least squares slope of the standardized cultural index on the standardized economic index, which equals the correlation (Fisher z interval) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 0.48 to 0.55 | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sp_cult_early | 0.53 | points on the 1 to 7 self-placement scale per pooled standard deviation of the index | weighted least squares coefficient on the cultural index with study fixed effects (HC3 interval) | adults with both indices and a 7-point self-placement | 1984-1996 | 95% CI 0.49 to 0.56 | 7,815 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sp_cult_recent | 0.67 | points on the 1 to 7 self-placement scale per pooled standard deviation of the index | weighted least squares coefficient on the cultural index with study fixed effects (HC3 interval) | adults with both indices and a 7-point self-placement | 2012-2024 | 95% CI 0.65 to 0.70 | 17,452 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sp_cult_rise | 0.15 | points on the 1 to 7 self-placement scale per pooled standard deviation of the index | recent minus early weighted least squares coefficient on the cultural index (normal interval from the two HC3 standard errors, independent periods) | adults with both indices and a 7-point self-placement | 1984-1996 and 2012-2024 | 95% CI 0.11 to 0.19 | 17,452 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sp_diff_bound | 0.08 | points on the 1 to 7 self-placement scale per pooled standard deviation of the index | largest absolute end of the two intervals for the cultural minus economic coefficient | adults with both indices and a 7-point self-placement | 1984-1996 and 2012-2024 | | | none (count or constant) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sp_diff_early | +0.02 | points on the 1 to 7 self-placement scale per pooled standard deviation of the index | cultural coefficient minus economic coefficient (HC3 interval) | adults with both indices and a 7-point self-placement | 1984-1996 | 95% CI −0.03 to 0.08 | 7,815 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sp_diff_recent | +0.01 | points on the 1 to 7 self-placement scale per pooled standard deviation of the index | cultural coefficient minus economic coefficient (HC3 interval) | adults with both indices and a 7-point self-placement | 2012-2024 | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.06 | 17,452 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sp_econ_early | 0.50 | points on the 1 to 7 self-placement scale per pooled standard deviation of the index | weighted least squares coefficient on the economic index with study fixed effects (HC3 interval) | adults with both indices and a 7-point self-placement | 1984-1996 | 95% CI 0.47 to 0.54 | 7,815 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sp_econ_recent | 0.66 | points on the 1 to 7 self-placement scale per pooled standard deviation of the index | weighted least squares coefficient on the economic index with study fixed effects (HC3 interval) | adults with both indices and a 7-point self-placement | 2012-2024 | 95% CI 0.64 to 0.69 | 17,452 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | sp_econ_rise | 0.16 | points on the 1 to 7 self-placement scale per pooled standard deviation of the index | recent minus early weighted least squares coefficient on the economic index (normal interval from the two HC3 standard errors, independent periods) | adults with both indices and a 7-point self-placement | 1984-1996 and 2012-2024 | 95% CI 0.12 to 0.21 | 17,452 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_1984 | 18.2% | percent of adults | weighted share at least 0.5 standard deviations from the median on both indices and on opposite sides | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984 | 95% CI 16.2% to 20.1% | 1,508 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_2024 | 6.6% | percent of adults | weighted share at least 0.5 standard deviations from the median on both indices and on opposite sides | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 5.5% to 7.7% | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_narrow_1984 | 27.5% | percent of adults | weighted share at least 0.25 standard deviations from the median on both indices and on opposite sides | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984 | 95% CI 25.3% to 29.8% | 1,508 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_narrow_2024 | 15.9% | percent of adults | weighted share at least 0.25 standard deviations from the median on both indices and on opposite sides | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 14.3% to 17.5% | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_wide_1984 | 10.3% | percent of adults | weighted share at least 0.75 standard deviations from the median on both indices and on opposite sides | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984 | 95% CI 8.8% to 11.9% | 1,508 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | strong_wide_2024 | 3.2% | percent of adults | weighted share at least 0.75 standard deviations from the median on both indices and on opposite sides | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 2.5% to 4.0% | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | xp_1984 | 46.2% | percent of adults | weighted share on opposite sides of the two weighted medians (economic right and cultural left, or the reverse) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 1984 | 95% CI 43.8% to 48.6% | 1,508 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | xp_2024 | 30.0% | percent of adults | weighted share on opposite sides of the two weighted medians (economic right and cultural left, or the reverse) | adults with at least two of three items answered on each index | 2024 | 95% CI 28.0% to 31.9% | 4,387 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Feeling thermometer: A 0 to 100 rating of a group or person, where 0 is the coldest feeling and 100 the warmest. The American National Election Studies ask respondents to rate parties, candidates and social groups this way. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Party sorting: The alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. - Fixed effects: Regression terms that give each group, such as each country or each year, its own baseline. The other coefficients then compare respondents within the same group. - HC3 robust standard errors: A way of computing standard errors that stays valid when the spread of the outcome differs across respondents, with a correction for small samples. The book uses it for regressions that have no clusters. ## Methods Sample: respondents in the ANES Cumulative Data File with a positive weight and at least two of three items on each index, 15 studies from 1984 to 2024 (33,257 respondents). The 2002 study has no cultural index, since only the gay and lesbian thermometer was asked. Indices: each item is oriented so that a higher value is more conservative (the direction comes from the value labels of the Cumulative Data File, see the items table, never from a correlation), converted to a z-score with the weighted mean and standard deviation over all ANES years in which it was asked, and averaged over the items the respondent answered (the share of adults whose index averages two answers is the weighted share of a study's respondents who answered two of the three items). The economic index uses guaranteed jobs (VCF0809), services and spending (VCF0839) and health insurance (VCF0806); the cultural index uses abortion (VCF0838), the gay and lesbian thermometer (VCF0232) and the traditional-values item (VCF0853). The cleaned ANES file stores the Cumulative Data File thermometer code 97 (97 to 100 degrees) as 100. An index is the mean of the standardized items a respondent answered; the correlation does not depend on its unit, and each figure names its own yardstick: the party means and the self-placement regression use the index re-standardized to mean 0 and standard deviation 1 over all respondents in the analysis sample, and the cross-pressure band and the 2024 joint distribution use the standard deviation of the index within the study. Estimand: the survey-weighted Pearson correlation of the two indices within each study, weight VCF0009z. Net of party: both indices are residualized on the party identification categories within the study (weighted group means; three categories, and seven points with leaners kept apart, VCF0301) and the residuals are correlated; the Fisher z interval uses the Kish effective sample size less the number of party dummies. Reliability: standardized Cronbach alpha from the weighted mean inter-item correlation among respondents who answered every item of the index in that study (respondents with two of three items enter the correlation but not alpha, so alpha overstates their reliability); the corrected correlation divides the observed correlation by the square root of the product of the two alphas and is shown where both alphas are at least 0.4; intervals for alpha and the corrected correlation are 95% percentile intervals from 1000 bootstrap resamples of respondents within each study (each resample draws respondents with replacement and recomputes the estimate; seed 12345 plus the study year). Cross-pressure: an adult is cross-pressured when right of the median on one index and left of it on the other; each index is split at its weighted median within the study, respondents tied at the median are divided so that each side holds exactly half of the weighted population, and the tolerance band is 0.5 standard deviations of the index within the study around the median; the implied share is 50% minus arcsin(r) divided by pi, the value for two normally distributed (bell-shaped) indices with correlation r. Party means use party identification with leaners counted with their party and are expressed in standard deviations of the pooled analysis sample; the line for all adults is the weighted mean of every respondent in the analysis sample, independents without a lean included; the common-item check on the cultural party means and gap uses abortion and the thermometer only, which were asked in every study except 1986 and 1990. The reference for each cell of the 2024 joint distribution is the share of a bivariate normal distribution with the observed correlation, centred at the medians, inside the same bin; the second view of the figure subtracts it from the observed share and from both ends of the observed interval. Self-placement: weighted least squares of seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement (VCF0803) on both standardized indices with study fixed effects and HC3 errors, for 1984 to 1996 and 2012 to 2024; the rise in a coefficient between the two periods is the difference of the two coefficients with a normal interval from the two HC3 standard errors, treating the periods as independent samples. The slope of the standardized cultural index on the standardized economic index equals their correlation. Interview mode: face-to-face and web estimates use weight_ftf and weight_web, which exist for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024; web interviews began in 2012 and the 2020 study mixes modes without mode weights. Intervals: 95% Fisher z intervals on the Kish effective sample size, normal intervals for shares (Wilson intervals for cells of the joint distribution); all are model based and ignore clustering and stratification. Suppression: a study-level cell needs at least 150 respondents and an effective sample of 100; a party-by-study cell needs 100 and 100; a cell of the joint distribution needs 30 respondents. ## What these data cannot show - The correlation is between two indices built in advance from a fixed set of items, so these data cannot show how many dimensions the public holds. - A factor model or an item-response model fitted to a wider set of questions could find a different number, and a different choice of items would change the level of the correlation. - The chapter also leaves out issues that fall outside both indices, such as immigration and race, which may form a third dimension. - The corrected correlation assumes that the errors in the two indices are unrelated to each other and that alpha measures reliability, which holds only if the items of an index measure the same attitude. - It is an upper bound for the correlation between the underlying attitudes only if errors are also unrelated across the items of one index. - A shared response format or response style would raise alpha, make the correction too small and remove the bound, and the corrected series inherits the ambiguity in what a rise in alpha means. - The interval for the corrected value, +0.69 (95% CI 0.65 to 0.74) in 2024, comes from resampling respondents within a study and is wide in the early studies, where the indices have two components and low alpha. - Each study interviews different adults, so the series cannot show whether individuals' attitudes moved together or whether the population changed as cohorts replaced one another. - The comparison within party identification uses party identification measured in the same interview and shaped by the same attitudes, so it does not measure an effect of party. - Interview mode changed over the period, and the interview-mode comparison covers only 4 studies. - The intervals are model based and ignore the ANES clustering and stratification. - The 2002 study has no cultural index, and 4 studies have two components in one or both indices. - A comparison with the Cooperative Election Study is not included. - Its economic index contains only health-care questions and its cultural index mixes abortion, guns, immigration and the environment, so a higher correlation there would confound item content with survey. - A matched comparison needs an index built from the same kinds of questions in both surveys. - A rising correlation fits an account in which the public has moved toward the alignment that the parties present, and the party gaps in Table 3 are consistent with it, but nothing in these data tests that account. ## References 1. Feldman, Stanley; Johnston, Christopher (2014). Understanding the Determinants of Political Ideology: Implications of Structural Complexity. Political Psychology 35(3): 337-358. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12055 2. Treier, Shawn; Hillygus, D. Sunshine (2009). The Nature of Political Ideology in the Contemporary Electorate. Public Opinion Quarterly 73(4): 679-703. https://academic.oup.com/poq/article-abstract/73/4/679/1829142 3. Carmines, Edward G.; Ensley, Michael J.; Wagner, Michael W. (2012). Who Fits the Left-Right Divide? Partisan Polarization in the American Electorate. American Behavioral Scientist 56(12): 1631-1653. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764212463353 4. Poole, Keith T.; Rosenthal, Howard (2007). Ideology and Congress: A Political Economic History of Roll Call Voting. Transaction Publishers (second edition). 5. Malka, Ariel; Lelkes, Yphtach; Soto, Christopher J. (2019). Are Cultural and Economic Conservatism Positively Correlated? A Large-Scale Cross-National Test. British Journal of Political Science 49(3): 1045-1069. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/are-cultural-and-economic-conservatism-positively-correlated-a-largescale-crossnational-test/83AFEDEA5E004CF23631C5388E7C9F67 6. Fisher, Ronald A. (1921). On the Probable Error of a Coefficient of Correlation Deduced from a Small Sample. Metron 1(4): 3-32. 7. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 8. Cronbach, Lee J. (1951). Coefficient Alpha and the Internal Structure of Tests. Psychometrika 16(3): 297-334. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02310555 9. Spearman, Charles (1904). The Proof and Measurement of Association between Two Things. American Journal of Psychology 15(1): 72-101. https://doi.org/10.2307/1412159 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/build.py (sha256 3a2ec97e03051310d96aac2a142100947fce8484db3e34965ee689e56cd16e2b) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 2951ffeac47b3a0909e6cf2b156c5681801216a36579844a0e6d0a3aee736495 | | figures/corr_trend.json | b806a9e74fea23086d2057d1fa51cfc65bf0eec4819039cada7f809d0a75ccb9 | | figures/cross_pressure.json | e6fa4acefcf1477ae31e9821d592007472f9d2a892f2ac15f5a2334fa13d0180 | | figures/items_coding.json | 32d68b0c176b6c1a2218fa26a1de7a7b7989d16a04b2d1aadcecbd31b4e3664e | | figures/joint_2024.json | 8b244abc7ed70e8dd6e4b735a2c895919b02f3dd8c04382696cd764ed4dc1a63 | | figures/party_positions.json | cf6ce8c11f0da1c737a7cb61d9f34f951fd23295364d0fccb8b6e5598c19489b | | figures/reliability.json | 068fc448d8cd6a334b7a03ca2445e803f262ca6fc3d92f5a4f7e155ee70bd6bb | | figures/selfplacement.json | 759720fab597e9d01db783e13ae600127d4ba021bb7c49a59e4d082414f38ed7 | | meta.json | e3dd1062472adccfb63de9399fbaa52e1c702e5096d18c1fd659146b3d81bf2b | | refs.json | 498cdfce73433570710806a2c6ae0b097f8d13c6136220acbbe53f48f2c67454 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/facts.json - Table 1, figure "items_coding" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/items_coding.json - Table 2, figure "corr_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/corr_trend.json - Table 3, figure "party_positions" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/party_positions.json - Table 4, figure "reliability" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/reliability.json - Table 5, figure "selfplacement" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/selfplacement.json - Table 6, figure "cross_pressure" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/cross_pressure.json - Table 7, figure "joint_2024" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/economic-and-cultural-dimensions/figures/joint_2024.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Left and right across countries: report Chapter 7.4 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Left and right across countries - Chapter: 7.4 (Part VII, What left and right mean; Ideology, values and religion) - Question: What attitudes does left-right self-placement track in each country? - Dek: The attitude that left-right self-placement follows most closely differs by country, and across countries surveyed in 2005 or later the median correlation on each of three attitudes lies between +0.07 and +0.09. - Grain: countries - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - World Values Survey and EVS. World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; Human Development Index from the country context file; years: 1981-2023 (7 unified waves); weights: weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries - European Social Survey. European Social Survey rounds 3 to 11 (rounds 4 and 8 for the welfare items), countries also in the WVS/EVS; years: 2002-2023 (rounds 1 to 11; round 11 was fielded in 2023 and 2024); weights: weight (analysis weight) within each country - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026leftandrightacrosscountries ```bibtex @misc{singh2026leftandrightacrosscountries, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Left and right across countries}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | median across countries of the economic loading (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | +0.07 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.10 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | median_econ | | median across countries of the religious loading (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | +0.09 | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.11 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | median_rel | | count of countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on at least one axis | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | 104 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | n_countries_used | | median across countries of the moral loading (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | +0.07 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.11 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | median_moral | | count of countries where the lower bound of the leading loading exceeds the other axes point estimates | countries where an axis has an interval above zero | fieldwork 2005 or later | 51 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | n_lead_clear | | count of countries where the economic axis leads and the lead is clear (the lower bound of its interval exceeds the other axes point estimates) | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | 29 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | n_clear_econ | | count of countries where the religious axis leads and the lead is clear (the lower bound of its interval exceeds the other axes point estimates) | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | 16 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | n_clear_rel | | count of countries where the moral axis leads and the lead is clear (the lower bound of its interval exceeds the other axes point estimates) | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | 6 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | n_clear_moral | | count of countries where one axis has the largest loading but the lead is not clear | countries where an axis has an interval above zero | fieldwork 2005 or later | 42 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | n_lead_unclear | | count of countries where no loading has an interval above zero | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | 11 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | n_strong_none | | minimum effective sample for a country to appear | country-axis cells | fieldwork 2005 or later | 300 | | | none (constant) | World Values Survey and EVS | neff_floor | | median across countries of the mean pairwise correlation among the four economic items after orientation | respondents within a country, median across countries | fieldwork 2005 or later | +0.06 | | | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | item_r_econ | ## Findings The attitude that left-right self-placement follows most closely differs from country to country, and the correlations are small. Across the 104 countries and territories with World Values Survey or European Values Study fieldwork in 2005 or later, the median correlation between self-placement and an attitude is +0.07 for economic attitudes, +0.07 for moral attitudes and +0.09 for the importance of God. One attitude leads clearly, meaning that the lower end of its confidence interval lies above the estimates for the other two, in 51 of those countries: economic attitudes in 29, religion in 16 and moral attitudes in 6. In 42 more, one attitude has the largest correlation but its lead is not clear, and in 11 none of the three has an interval above zero. The left-right question asks respondents to place themselves on a ten-point scale from left to right. This chapter takes it from the World Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Study (EVS), pooling each country's waves with fieldwork in 2005 or later, and sets it against three attitudes, each of which is an axis: an economic index (questions on income differences, government responsibility, state ownership and competition), a moral index (how justifiable homosexuality, abortion and divorce are) and the importance of God. The loading of an axis is its correlation with left-right inside one country, computed on survey-weighted answers. A loading of zero means that the attitude has no straight-line association with where people place themselves, and a positive loading means that people on the conservative, market-oriented or religious side place themselves further right on average. (Note: A country appears on an axis only when its effective sample size [1] is 300 or more, and its interval is a Fisher z interval [2], both defined in the methods note at the end of the chapter.) The chapter works in two steps. A loading is computed inside each country, and the countries are then compared by their loadings. The axes rest on different numbers of items (Table 5), and the four economic items agree only weakly, with a median pairwise correlation of +0.06 (see the section on definitions), so a lead compares loadings from measures of unequal quality. Chapter 7.2, Economic and cultural dimensions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions) looks at the economic and cultural dimensions inside the United States. ### Which attitude leads differs by country Table 1 shades every country by the axis with the largest loading among the axes whose interval lies above zero, and it colors a country only when the lead is clear. A lead is clear when the lower end of the leading interval lies above the point estimate of every other axis. Otherwise the order of the top two could change in a new sample, and in 28 of the 104 countries the two largest loadings differ by less than 0.02. The other views of the map show the largest loading whether or not the lead is clear, and each loading with its interval. Table 1. One attitude clearly leads in 51 of 104 countries, most often economic attitudes Economic attitudes are the clear leader in the United States, Australia, the Nordic countries, the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Religion is the clear leader in Spain, Turkey, Russia, Mexico and India, and moral attitudes in South Korea. Canada, Portugal, Greece, Brazil, Poland and Japan each have a leader that is not clear. Earlier work on Western Europe found that the label tracked both religious-secular values and economic left-right values [3], and the economic and religious loading views of the map show how the two compare in each country. The moral and religious loadings resemble each other. Inside a country, the moral index and the importance of God have a median correlation of +0.21, and across countries the two loadings correlate at +0.72 (95% CI 0.61 to 0.80), so a country with a high loading on one usually has a high loading on the other. The economic index is a separate matter, with a median correlation with the moral index inside a country of −0.01. A cross-national study of survey data from many nations likewise found that economically and culturally right-wing attitudes seldom line up as one right-left dimension [4]. ### Countries with different patterns Table 2 shows the three loadings and their intervals for Sweden, Czechia, the United States, Poland, Spain and India. In Sweden the economic loading is +0.59 (95% CI 0.57 to 0.61), while the religious loading is +0.03 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.06), an interval that includes zero. Czechia has the same pattern, with an economic loading of +0.37 (95% CI 0.35 to 0.40), and it adds a reversal. The moral loading is −0.11 (95% CI −0.14 to −0.07), so people who take the conservative side on homosexuality, abortion and divorce place themselves further left on average than other Czechs do. Table 2. Left-right follows economic attitudes in Sweden and Czechia, and religion and moral attitudes in Poland and Spain In the United States all three loadings are positive, from +0.28 for the importance of God to +0.41 for economic attitudes. In Poland the pattern runs the other way. The moral loading is +0.28 and the religious loading is +0.28, while the economic loading is 0.00 (95% CI −0.03 to 0.03), an interval that includes zero. Spain has moral and religious loadings of +0.32 and +0.36 and a lower economic one. In India all three loadings are small, from 0.00 to +0.12. Poland and Czechia are both post-communist and differ from each other, so the region is not uniform on this scale. One account holds that economic left and right meant something different in post-communist party systems, where left-wing governments were the ones to cut spending [5]. A comparison of European countries found that basic personal values explained left-right orientation poorly in post-communist countries [6]. This chapter tests neither account, and Chapter 8.1, Basic values and left-right (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/basic-values-and-left-right) takes up the values. ### Most loadings are small and above zero Table 3 counts the countries by where the interval of each loading falls. An attitude is tied to left-right in a country when the 95% interval of its loading lies above zero. The importance of God is tied in 75 of 104 countries, economic attitudes in 61 of 104 and moral attitudes in 57 of 103. Intervals below zero are rare. On the religious axis only Estonia has one (−0.06 (95% CI −0.10 to −0.03)), and the economic axis has 7 such countries and the moral axis 11. Table 3. Each loading has an interval above zero in most countries and below zero in a few In Mongolia the economic loading is −0.16 (95% CI −0.20 to −0.10), so people who give market-oriented answers place themselves further left on average than others do. Most loadings are small (Table 4). The median is +0.09 (95% CI 0.07 to 0.11) for religion, +0.07 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.10) for economic attitudes and +0.07 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.11) for moral attitudes, and 14 countries have an economic loading above +0.30, against 3 for the moral axis and 3 for religion. The axes rest on different numbers of items, so those counts compare measures as well as attitudes. The economic loading is largest in Sweden, at +0.59 (95% CI 0.57 to 0.61), and Iceland, New Zealand, Denmark, Norway and Finland follow with intervals that overlap one another. Table 4. Most country loadings are small and positive, and the largest are economic ### The economic loading depends on the items The four economic items agree only weakly. The median across countries of their average pairwise correlation is +0.06, against +0.48 for the three moral items. The choice of items therefore matters, and Table 6 shows by how much. The median economic loading runs from +0.02 to +0.12 across definitions, and the four-item index used here has +0.07 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.10). The economic axis has no single agreed measure. This chapter averages the four economic items on the ten-point agreement format in the WVS and EVS, listed in Table 5. Which end of each question counts as economic right is fixed by the wording of the answer scale, not by how the item correlates with left-right. Table 5. The right-wing end of every item is fixed in advance from the wording of its answer scale Two narrower definitions are possible: the items on income differences and government responsibility, and the items on government responsibility, state ownership and competition. The two definitions share the government responsibility item, which raises the correlation between their loadings across countries to +0.80 (95% CI 0.72 to 0.86). Items with nothing in common agree less across countries: the loadings on income differences and on state ownership correlate at +0.53 (95% CI 0.37 to 0.65), and those on income differences and competition at +0.58 (95% CI 0.43 to 0.69). The definitions therefore order the countries partly alike and disagree about the level. Table 6 traces the disagreement to the items. The definitions that include income differences sit to the right of those built from state ownership or competition. Table 6. The median economic loading runs from +0.02 to +0.12 depending on the items The moral items agree more closely than the economic ones, and singly, homosexuality, abortion and divorce give medians of +0.05, +0.06 and +0.05, close to the median of +0.07 for the moral index. Claims in this chapter about the economic axis therefore rest on the comparison between countries and between definitions, and less on the size of any one loading. ### Loadings rise with human development Table 7 plots each loading against the Human Development Index (HDI) and marks the median loading in each third of countries by HDI. The economic loading has a median of +0.04 in the third of countries with the lowest HDI, +0.05 in the middle third and +0.26 in the highest third. The moral loading runs from 0.00 to +0.04 to +0.18, and the religious loading from +0.06 to +0.10 to +0.13. The economic and moral loadings therefore rise mostly in the top third, while the religious loading rises across all three. The correlation between HDI and the loading across countries is positive on all three axes and the three intervals overlap, and the caption of the figure gives the values. (Note: The HDI is a single value per country from the context file joined to the survey. The file does not record the year, and 4 countries with loadings (Kosovo, Macau, Puerto Rico and Taiwan) have no value.) Table 7. Loadings on all three axes are higher in countries with higher human development The median loading in the highest third minus the median in the lowest third is +0.07 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.13) for religion, +0.17 (95% CI 0.13 to 0.20) for moral attitudes and +0.22 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.32) for economic attitudes, so the religious loading differs least between the two ends of the range. The interval for economic attitudes lies above the interval for religion, and the interval for moral attitudes just overlaps it. The comparison is a cross-section of countries, so it cannot say whether development changes what the scale means or whether HDI stands in for party systems, education or the age of the democracy. Whether the loadings change over time within countries is not examined here. ### The pattern reappears in the ESS The European Social Survey (ESS) asks a left-right question of its own and covers many of the same countries, with separate samples and interviewers. Table 8 compares the loadings in the two projects and opens on religion, where the mean absolute difference between the two surveys is smallest (0.04). For the 37 countries in both, the religious loadings correlate at +0.88 (95% CI 0.77 to 0.93), and the two surveys give a loading with the same sign in 34 of the countries. The correlation leans on a few countries with high loadings. Without the 5 countries whose WVS and EVS religious loading is 0.25 or higher (Croatia, Greece, Poland, Slovenia and Spain), it is +0.73 (95% CI 0.51 to 0.86) across 32 countries. The ESS measures religious practice by attendance and prayer, not by the importance of God, so the agreement is not a repeat of one question. Table 8. Country loadings on religion in the ESS track those in the WVS and EVS, with a correlation of +0.88 The moral loadings agree at +0.89 (95% CI 0.79 to 0.94) across 37 countries, using a single ESS question on the freedom of gay and lesbian people to live as they wish. The economic loadings correlate at +0.88 (95% CI 0.76 to 0.94) across 32 countries, using six ESS questions on welfare and income differences that were fielded in two rounds. The ESS loading is lower than the WVS and EVS loading in 26 of them, by a median of −0.07. The surveys therefore agree on the order of the countries on the economic axis and not on the size of the loading. The weakness of the WVS index does not explain the gap. In these countries the economic items of the WVS and EVS agree with one another about as much as the ESS items do, at median pairwise correlations of +0.15 and +0.13. The two surveys differ in items and in years, and this chapter does not test which of the two accounts for the gap. ### What these data cannot show The loadings are associations between two answers given by the same person in one interview, so they do not show whether attitudes shape self-placement, self-placement shapes attitudes, or a third influence such as a party system shapes both. Waves from 2005 to 2023 are pooled inside each country, so a loading blends years, and the economic index is a weak measure whose loadings depend on which items are averaged (Table 6). The scale itself may mean different things to different respondents. In a German survey with open-ended questions, the associations people attached to left and right varied with self-placement, education and region of residence [7], and a study in Mexico and Argentina found different conceptions of the labels across individuals and contexts [8]. A loading therefore describes the association between the label and an attitude among people who answer the question. Chapter 7.5, Non-placement on the left-right scale (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/non-placement-on-the-left-right-scale; planned) asks who declines to answer, and Chapter 7.6, Education and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-and-ideology; planned) asks how the association differs by education. The intervals are model based and ignore clustering in the sample design (answers from the same place resemble one another) and stratification, which can raise or lower the variance of a correlation. The analysis does not use strata or sampling units, so the chapter gives a sensitivity check in place of a design-based interval, and the design effect in that check is assumed, not estimated. If clustering multiplied the variance of every correlation by 2 (a design effect of 2), the number of countries with an interval above zero would fall to 66 for religion, 56 for economic attitudes and 55 for moral attitudes, and 18 countries would have no axis above zero. The countries are the ones the surveys reached, not a random sample of the world, and the correlations across countries treat each loading as if it were measured without error. The agreement between the two surveys has a limit. Both projects ask for self-placement on a left-right scale, with a ten-point form in the WVS and EVS, an eleven-point form in the ESS and different wording, so part of the agreement could come from how the label works in each country rather than from the attitudes. The data hold no party manifestos, expert placements of parties or vote choices, so they cannot say why the label attaches to religion in one country and to economics in another. ## Tables ### Table 1. One attitude clearly leads in 51 of 104 countries, most often economic attitudes Axis with the largest correlation with left-right self-placement among the axes whose 95% interval is above zero, shown where the lead is clear, by country, fieldwork 2005-2023 | Country | View | Axis with the largest loading | Status of the lead | Axis with a clear lead | Economic loading | Moral loading | Religious loading | Loading | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Albania | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | +0.01 | +0.02 | +0.13 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Algeria | strongest | No axis above zero | No axis above zero | No clear lead | −0.08 | −0.09 | −0.02 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Andorra | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.22 | +0.21 | +0.22 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Argentina | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.18 | +0.16 | +0.22 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Armenia | strongest | Economic | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.04 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Australia | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.33 | +0.22 | +0.20 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Austria | strongest | Economic | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.21 | +0.19 | +0.13 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Azerbaijan | strongest | No axis above zero | No axis above zero | No clear lead | −0.06 | −0.03 | +0.04 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Bangladesh | strongest | Moral | Clear | Moral | −0.01 | +0.17 | +0.01 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Belarus | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.07 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Belgium | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.25 | +0.08 | +0.12 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Bolivia | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.05 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Bosnia Herzegovina | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | −0.03 | +0.13 | +0.19 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Brazil | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.07 | +0.09 | +0.09 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Bulgaria | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.25 | −0.08 | +0.05 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Burkina Faso | strongest | No axis above zero | No axis above zero | No clear lead | −0.02 | −0.09 | −0.04 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Canada | strongest | Economic | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.29 | +0.29 | +0.25 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Chile | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.26 | +0.14 | +0.09 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Colombia | strongest | Moral | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.04 | +0.14 | +0.12 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Croatia | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.02 | +0.33 | +0.36 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Cyprus | strongest | Moral | Not clear | No clear lead | 0.00 | +0.09 | +0.07 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Czechia | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.37 | −0.11 | +0.01 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Denmark | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.46 | +0.12 | +0.06 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Ecuador | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.05 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Egypt | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.18 | n/a | 0.00 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Estonia | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.26 | −0.03 | −0.06 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Ethiopia | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.23 | −0.11 | +0.11 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Finland | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.44 | +0.16 | +0.19 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | France | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.34 | +0.19 | +0.18 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Georgia | strongest | Moral | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.03 | +0.06 | +0.05 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Germany | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.14 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Ghana | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.25 | −0.08 | +0.03 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Greece | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.19 | +0.29 | +0.29 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Guatemala | strongest | Moral | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.04 | +0.06 | +0.06 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Haiti | strongest | No axis above zero | No axis above zero | No clear lead | −0.03 | +0.02 | +0.01 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Hong Kong SAR | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | −0.01 | −0.06 | +0.06 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Hungary | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | 0.00 | +0.09 | +0.15 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Iceland | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.50 | +0.16 | +0.13 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | India | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | +0.06 | 0.00 | +0.12 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Indonesia | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.04 | −0.02 | +0.07 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Iraq | strongest | Moral | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.01 | +0.13 | +0.07 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Ireland | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.07 | +0.22 | +0.22 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Italy | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.24 | +0.17 | +0.19 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Japan | strongest | Moral | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.10 | +0.14 | +0.13 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Kazakhstan | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.10 | +0.04 | +0.11 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Kenya | strongest | Moral | Clear | Moral | −0.10 | +0.10 | −0.04 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Kosovo | strongest | No axis above zero | No axis above zero | No clear lead | +0.03 | −0.02 | −0.06 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Kyrgyzstan | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.11 | +0.18 | +0.18 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Latvia | strongest | Economic | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.05 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Lebanon | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | −0.03 | 0.00 | +0.11 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Libya | strongest | No axis above zero | No axis above zero | No clear lead | −0.01 | 0.00 | +0.03 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Lithuania | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.10 | +0.04 | +0.12 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Luxembourg | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.16 | +0.23 | +0.27 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Macau SAR | strongest | No axis above zero | No axis above zero | No clear lead | −0.01 | +0.02 | +0.06 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Malaysia | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | −0.03 | +0.09 | +0.15 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Maldives | strongest | Moral | Clear | Moral | +0.02 | +0.17 | +0.09 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Mali | strongest | No axis above zero | No axis above zero | No clear lead | +0.02 | +0.02 | +0.01 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Malta | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.26 | +0.16 | +0.07 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Mexico | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | +0.02 | +0.06 | +0.10 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Moldova | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.10 | −0.02 | +0.05 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Mongolia | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | −0.16 | +0.01 | +0.20 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Montenegro | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | −0.04 | +0.09 | +0.15 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Morocco | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.04 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Netherlands | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.39 | +0.16 | +0.13 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | New Zealand | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.46 | +0.19 | +0.13 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Nicaragua | strongest | No axis above zero | No axis above zero | No clear lead | −0.07 | −0.06 | +0.02 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Nigeria | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | 0.00 | 0.00 | +0.04 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | North Macedonia | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.02 | +0.07 | +0.09 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Norway | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.45 | +0.12 | +0.09 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Pakistan | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.15 | +0.15 | +0.17 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Palestine | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | −0.03 | +0.09 | +0.09 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Peru | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.07 | −0.02 | +0.08 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Philippines | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.07 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Poland | strongest | Moral | Not clear | No clear lead | 0.00 | +0.28 | +0.28 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Portugal | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.12 | +0.04 | +0.15 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Puerto Rico | strongest | Moral | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.11 | +0.11 | +0.03 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Romania | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.11 | −0.06 | +0.01 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Russia | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | +0.06 | −0.01 | +0.11 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Rwanda | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.11 | 0.00 | 0.00 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Serbia | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.01 | +0.07 | +0.08 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Singapore | strongest | Moral | Clear | Moral | −0.04 | +0.18 | +0.11 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Slovakia | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.12 | −0.04 | −0.01 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Slovenia | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | −0.03 | +0.30 | +0.33 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | South Africa | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.05 | −0.07 | +0.07 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | South Korea | strongest | Moral | Clear | Moral | +0.02 | +0.20 | +0.06 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Spain | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | +0.20 | +0.32 | +0.36 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Sweden | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.59 | +0.05 | +0.03 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Switzerland | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.34 | +0.20 | +0.09 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Taiwan ROC | strongest | Moral | Clear | Moral | −0.09 | +0.12 | +0.02 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Tajikistan | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | +0.11 | −0.03 | +0.27 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Thailand | strongest | Economic | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.04 | −0.04 | +0.02 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Trinidad and Tobago | strongest | No axis above zero | No axis above zero | No clear lead | +0.04 | −0.02 | +0.02 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Tunisia | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | −0.03 | +0.09 | +0.11 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Turkey | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | +0.08 | +0.19 | +0.21 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Ukraine | strongest | Religious | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.08 | +0.01 | +0.10 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | United Kingdom | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.36 | +0.17 | +0.12 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | United States | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.41 | +0.37 | +0.28 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Uruguay | strongest | Economic | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.21 | +0.19 | +0.20 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Uzbekistan | strongest | Religious | Clear | Religious | −0.13 | −0.01 | +0.19 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Venezuela | strongest | Economic | Clear | Economic | +0.24 | +0.02 | −0.04 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Vietnam | strongest | Moral | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.10 | +0.13 | +0.09 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Zambia | strongest | Economic | Not clear | No clear lead | +0.08 | +0.03 | −0.02 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Zimbabwe | strongest | No axis above zero | No axis above zero | No clear lead | −0.08 | −0.02 | −0.04 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | Albania | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.06 | 2,211 | | Algeria | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.08 | −0.16 | +0.01 | 532 | | Andorra | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.22 | +0.17 | +0.26 | 1,822 | | Argentina | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.18 | +0.14 | +0.23 | 2,293 | | Armenia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.09 | 3,788 | | Australia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.33 | +0.30 | +0.36 | 4,426 | | Austria | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.21 | +0.17 | +0.25 | 2,705 | | Azerbaijan | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.01 | 2,158 | | Bangladesh | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.01 | −0.06 | +0.05 | 1,200 | | Belarus | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,213 | | Belgium | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.25 | +0.20 | +0.30 | 1,414 | | Bolivia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 1,778 | | Bosnia Herzegovina | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.02 | 2,298 | | Brazil | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.10 | 3,642 | | Bulgaria | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.25 | +0.21 | +0.29 | 2,773 | | Burkina Faso | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.02 | −0.08 | +0.04 | 1,058 | | Canada | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.29 | +0.26 | +0.32 | 5,629 | | Chile | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.26 | +0.21 | +0.31 | 2,103 | | Colombia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | +0.01 | +0.07 | 5,016 | | Croatia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.07 | 2,352 | | Cyprus | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 3,266 | | Czechia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.37 | +0.35 | +0.40 | 3,991 | | Denmark | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.46 | +0.43 | +0.49 | 4,679 | | Ecuador | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,238 | | Egypt | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.18 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 4,238 | | Estonia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.26 | +0.23 | +0.29 | 3,302 | | Ethiopia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.23 | +0.19 | +0.28 | 1,917 | | Finland | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.47 | 2,932 | | France | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.34 | +0.31 | +0.37 | 3,827 | | Georgia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.03 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 4,227 | | Germany | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.19 | +0.17 | +0.22 | 8,683 | | Ghana | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.25 | +0.21 | +0.30 | 2,333 | | Greece | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.24 | 2,184 | | Guatemala | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.10 | 1,213 | | Haiti | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.02 | 1,944 | | Hong Kong SAR | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 3,946 | | Hungary | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 3,447 | | Iceland | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.50 | +0.46 | +0.53 | 2,307 | | India | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 5,436 | | Indonesia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 4,061 | | Iraq | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.01 | −0.06 | +0.07 | 975 | | Ireland | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | −0.01 | +0.15 | 687 | | Italy | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.24 | +0.21 | +0.27 | 3,509 | | Japan | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.14 | 3,446 | | Kazakhstan | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 1,500 | | Kenya | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.10 | −0.15 | −0.04 | 1,161 | | Kosovo | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.03 | −0.05 | +0.11 | 654 | | Kyrgyzstan | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.06 | +0.16 | 1,461 | | Latvia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.11 | 2,056 | | Lebanon | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.03 | −0.10 | +0.04 | 834 | | Libya | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.01 | −0.06 | +0.04 | 2,447 | | Lithuania | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 1,871 | | Luxembourg | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.22 | 1,257 | | Macau SAR | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.01 | −0.07 | +0.05 | 995 | | Malaysia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.01 | 2,613 | | Maldives | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,023 | | Mali | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,147 | | Malta | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.26 | +0.19 | +0.33 | 750 | | Mexico | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.04 | 4,752 | | Moldova | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 1,651 | | Mongolia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.16 | −0.20 | −0.10 | 1,613 | | Montenegro | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.04 | −0.10 | +0.02 | 1,250 | | Morocco | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.14 | 1,909 | | Netherlands | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.39 | +0.37 | +0.41 | 7,741 | | New Zealand | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.46 | +0.42 | +0.50 | 1,372 | | Nicaragua | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.07 | −0.13 | 0.00 | 871 | | Nigeria | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,927 | | North Macedonia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.07 | 1,759 | | Norway | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.45 | +0.42 | +0.48 | 3,148 | | Pakistan | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.20 | 1,200 | | Palestine | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.03 | −0.10 | +0.05 | 727 | | Peru | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 3,280 | | Philippines | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 2,389 | | Poland | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.03 | 3,718 | | Portugal | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.12 | +0.06 | +0.17 | 1,895 | | Puerto Rico | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.05 | +0.17 | 1,047 | | Romania | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.08 | +0.14 | 4,705 | | Russia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 4,564 | | Rwanda | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.15 | 2,552 | | Serbia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.04 | 3,746 | | Singapore | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.00 | 1,743 | | Slovakia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 3,336 | | Slovenia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.03 | −0.07 | 0.00 | 3,138 | | South Africa | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.08 | 5,541 | | South Korea | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.07 | 3,637 | | Spain | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.20 | +0.17 | +0.23 | 4,200 | | Sweden | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.59 | +0.57 | +0.61 | 4,213 | | Switzerland | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.34 | +0.32 | +0.37 | 5,154 | | Taiwan ROC | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.09 | −0.13 | −0.06 | 3,554 | | Tajikistan | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.05 | +0.17 | 1,200 | | Thailand | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 3,758 | | Trinidad and Tobago | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.10 | 1,211 | | Tunisia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.02 | 1,682 | | Turkey | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.08 | +0.05 | +0.10 | 6,325 | | Ukraine | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.08 | +0.03 | +0.12 | 4,667 | | United Kingdom | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.36 | +0.34 | +0.39 | 6,124 | | United States | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.41 | +0.38 | +0.44 | 5,866 | | Uruguay | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.21 | +0.17 | +0.25 | 2,571 | | Uzbekistan | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.13 | −0.21 | −0.05 | 591 | | Venezuela | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.24 | +0.19 | +0.30 | 1,190 | | Vietnam | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.16 | 1,376 | | Zambia | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.08 | +0.01 | +0.14 | 948 | | Zimbabwe | economic | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.08 | −0.13 | −0.04 | 2,627 | | Albania | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 2,220 | | Algeria | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.09 | −0.17 | 0.00 | 521 | | Andorra | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.21 | +0.16 | +0.25 | 1,821 | | Argentina | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.21 | 2,240 | | Armenia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.06 | 3,780 | | Australia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.22 | +0.18 | +0.25 | 4,430 | | Austria | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,681 | | Azerbaijan | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.02 | 2,138 | | Bangladesh | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.17 | +0.11 | +0.22 | 1,200 | | Belarus | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 3,202 | | Belgium | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.08 | +0.02 | +0.13 | 1,419 | | Bolivia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.05 | 1,780 | | Bosnia Herzegovina | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.17 | 2,285 | | Brazil | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.12 | 3,624 | | Bulgaria | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.08 | −0.12 | −0.04 | 2,709 | | Burkina Faso | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.09 | −0.15 | −0.03 | 1,084 | | Canada | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.29 | +0.26 | +0.32 | 5,604 | | Chile | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.14 | +0.08 | +0.19 | 2,077 | | Colombia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.16 | 5,015 | | Croatia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.33 | +0.29 | +0.37 | 2,358 | | Cyprus | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.13 | 3,262 | | Czechia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.11 | −0.14 | −0.07 | 3,909 | | Denmark | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 4,701 | | Ecuador | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 2,235 | | Estonia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.01 | 3,240 | | Ethiopia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.11 | −0.15 | −0.06 | 1,902 | | Finland | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.20 | 2,910 | | France | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 3,818 | | Georgia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 4,271 | | Germany | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.18 | 8,668 | | Ghana | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.08 | −0.13 | −0.04 | 2,324 | | Greece | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.29 | +0.25 | +0.33 | 2,188 | | Guatemala | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.06 | +0.01 | +0.12 | 1,213 | | Haiti | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 1,932 | | Hong Kong SAR | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.02 | 3,955 | | Hungary | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.12 | 3,448 | | Iceland | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.16 | +0.11 | +0.20 | 2,306 | | India | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.03 | 5,618 | | Indonesia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.02 | 4,086 | | Iraq | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.19 | 968 | | Ireland | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.22 | +0.14 | +0.30 | 665 | | Italy | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.17 | +0.14 | +0.21 | 3,452 | | Japan | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.17 | 3,354 | | Kazakhstan | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.09 | 1,500 | | Kenya | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.16 | 1,127 | | Kosovo | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.02 | −0.10 | +0.06 | 655 | | Kyrgyzstan | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.18 | +0.13 | +0.23 | 1,459 | | Latvia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 2,028 | | Lebanon | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.07 | +0.07 | 837 | | Libya | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.04 | 2,514 | | Lithuania | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 1,829 | | Luxembourg | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.23 | +0.17 | +0.29 | 1,254 | | Macau SAR | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 997 | | Malaysia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.12 | 2,613 | | Maldives | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.17 | +0.11 | +0.23 | 1,023 | | Mali | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,081 | | Malta | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.24 | 751 | | Mexico | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.08 | 4,734 | | Moldova | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.03 | 1,638 | | Mongolia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.06 | 1,613 | | Montenegro | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.15 | 1,250 | | Morocco | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 1,904 | | Netherlands | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.18 | 7,801 | | New Zealand | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.19 | +0.14 | +0.24 | 1,352 | | Nicaragua | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.06 | −0.12 | +0.01 | 871 | | Nigeria | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.05 | 2,928 | | North Macedonia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.12 | 1,763 | | Norway | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 3,142 | | Pakistan | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.21 | 1,200 | | Palestine | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.02 | +0.16 | 725 | | Peru | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.02 | 2,183 | | Philippines | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.05 | 2,389 | | Poland | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 3,646 | | Portugal | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.10 | 1,915 | | Puerto Rico | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.05 | +0.17 | 1,049 | | Romania | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.03 | 4,615 | | Russia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 4,507 | | Rwanda | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 2,554 | | Serbia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.11 | 3,654 | | Singapore | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.18 | +0.13 | +0.22 | 1,737 | | Slovakia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 3,260 | | Slovenia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.30 | +0.26 | +0.33 | 3,127 | | South Africa | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 5,512 | | South Korea | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.24 | 3,637 | | Spain | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.32 | +0.30 | +0.35 | 4,220 | | Sweden | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.08 | 4,155 | | Switzerland | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.20 | +0.17 | +0.23 | 5,159 | | Taiwan ROC | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.12 | +0.08 | +0.15 | 3,536 | | Tajikistan | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.03 | −0.09 | +0.03 | 1,200 | | Thailand | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.04 | −0.07 | −0.01 | 3,751 | | Trinidad and Tobago | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.04 | 1,206 | | Tunisia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.13 | 1,696 | | Turkey | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.21 | 6,427 | | Ukraine | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 4,550 | | United Kingdom | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.17 | +0.14 | +0.20 | 6,116 | | United States | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.37 | +0.34 | +0.40 | 5,823 | | Uruguay | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,600 | | Uzbekistan | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.01 | −0.09 | +0.07 | 615 | | Venezuela | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.08 | 1,190 | | Vietnam | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.18 | 1,381 | | Zambia | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.03 | −0.03 | +0.10 | 945 | | Zimbabwe | moral | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.02 | 2,626 | | Albania | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.13 | +0.09 | +0.18 | 2,209 | | Algeria | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.02 | −0.11 | +0.06 | 536 | | Andorra | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.22 | +0.17 | +0.26 | 1,813 | | Argentina | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.22 | +0.18 | +0.26 | 2,326 | | Armenia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.08 | 3,758 | | Australia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.23 | 4,456 | | Austria | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.13 | +0.09 | +0.17 | 2,710 | | Azerbaijan | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 2,152 | | Bangladesh | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.01 | −0.05 | +0.06 | 1,200 | | Belarus | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,186 | | Belgium | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.17 | 1,421 | | Bolivia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.10 | 1,803 | | Bosnia Herzegovina | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,269 | | Brazil | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.12 | 3,673 | | Bulgaria | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.09 | 2,670 | | Burkina Faso | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.04 | −0.09 | +0.02 | 1,109 | | Canada | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.25 | +0.22 | +0.28 | 5,628 | | Chile | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.15 | 2,085 | | Colombia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.14 | 5,005 | | Croatia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.40 | 2,354 | | Cyprus | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,279 | | Czechia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,856 | | Denmark | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 4,678 | | Ecuador | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.09 | 2,243 | | Egypt | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,721 | | Estonia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 3,216 | | Ethiopia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,914 | | Finland | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,897 | | France | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.18 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 3,845 | | Georgia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.08 | 4,283 | | Germany | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.16 | 8,654 | | Ghana | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.07 | 2,330 | | Greece | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.29 | +0.25 | +0.33 | 2,118 | | Guatemala | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.06 | 0.00 | +0.11 | 1,211 | | Haiti | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.05 | 1,929 | | Hong Kong SAR | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.06 | +0.02 | +0.09 | 3,801 | | Hungary | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.15 | +0.12 | +0.19 | 3,432 | | Iceland | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.17 | 2,299 | | India | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.12 | +0.10 | +0.15 | 5,785 | | Indonesia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 4,082 | | Iraq | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | +0.01 | +0.13 | 978 | | Ireland | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.22 | +0.14 | +0.29 | 682 | | Italy | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.23 | 3,515 | | Japan | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.13 | +0.10 | +0.16 | 3,386 | | Kazakhstan | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.06 | +0.16 | 1,500 | | Kenya | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.04 | −0.10 | +0.02 | 1,160 | | Kosovo | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.06 | −0.13 | +0.02 | 650 | | Kyrgyzstan | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.18 | +0.13 | +0.23 | 1,458 | | Latvia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.10 | 2,033 | | Lebanon | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.04 | +0.17 | 834 | | Libya | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.08 | 2,594 | | Lithuania | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,812 | | Luxembourg | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.27 | +0.21 | +0.33 | 1,261 | | Macau SAR | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.06 | −0.01 | +0.12 | 996 | | Malaysia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.15 | +0.11 | +0.18 | 2,613 | | Maldives | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.15 | 1,023 | | Mali | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.07 | 1,140 | | Malta | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | −0.01 | +0.15 | 770 | | Mexico | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.13 | 4,781 | | Moldova | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.10 | 1,657 | | Mongolia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.20 | +0.15 | +0.25 | 1,611 | | Montenegro | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.21 | 1,218 | | Morocco | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 1,914 | | Netherlands | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.13 | +0.10 | +0.15 | 7,785 | | New Zealand | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.18 | 1,361 | | Nicaragua | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.05 | +0.08 | 871 | | Nigeria | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.08 | 2,929 | | North Macedonia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.14 | 1,729 | | Norway | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 3,144 | | Pakistan | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.17 | +0.11 | +0.22 | 1,200 | | Palestine | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.02 | +0.16 | 728 | | Peru | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,339 | | Philippines | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.12 | 2,388 | | Poland | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 3,703 | | Portugal | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.20 | 1,954 | | Puerto Rico | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.03 | −0.03 | +0.09 | 1,042 | | Romania | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.04 | 4,728 | | Russia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.14 | 4,411 | | Rwanda | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,554 | | Serbia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.12 | 3,715 | | Singapore | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.06 | +0.15 | 1,740 | | Slovakia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.03 | 3,257 | | Slovenia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.33 | +0.30 | +0.36 | 3,098 | | South Africa | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 5,568 | | South Korea | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.06 | +0.02 | +0.10 | 3,631 | | Spain | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.36 | +0.33 | +0.39 | 4,244 | | Sweden | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.06 | 4,155 | | Switzerland | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.07 | +0.12 | 5,138 | | Taiwan ROC | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,561 | | Tajikistan | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.27 | +0.22 | +0.32 | 1,200 | | Thailand | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,656 | | Trinidad and Tobago | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,210 | | Tunisia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,681 | | Turkey | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.21 | +0.19 | +0.24 | 6,438 | | Ukraine | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.10 | +0.06 | +0.15 | 4,601 | | United Kingdom | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.15 | 6,155 | | United States | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 5,858 | | Uruguay | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.24 | 2,586 | | Uzbekistan | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.19 | +0.11 | +0.27 | 615 | | Venezuela | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.04 | −0.09 | +0.02 | 1,190 | | Vietnam | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.14 | 1,373 | | Zambia | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.02 | −0.08 | +0.04 | 946 | | Zimbabwe | religious | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.00 | 2,627 | Views: Clear leads (axis = strongest); Largest loading (axis = strongest); Is the lead clear? (axis = strongest); Economic loading (axis = economic); Moral loading (axis = moral); Religious loading (axis = religious). Note: Northern Ireland shares the United Kingdom outline and is left off the map, but it is counted in the totals (its largest loading is on the economic axis and the lead is not clear). Jordan, Northern Cyprus and Yemen have too few effective respondents for a stable estimate and draw as no data. Note: The classification uses point estimates and compares axes measured with different numbers of items, so a lead compares loadings of unequal reliability. Note: In the loading views, loadings beyond the ends of the scale draw in the end class, and the key says so. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted (weight, S017 within each country); countries with an effective sample of 300 or more Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/strongest_axis_map.json ### Table 2. Left-right follows economic attitudes in Sweden and Czechia, and religion and moral attitudes in Poland and Spain Weighted correlation between left-right self-placement (1 to 10, 10 = right) and the axis, within country; 95% intervals; six countries; fieldwork 2005-2023 | axis | conf_high | conf_low | country | estimate | n | | --- | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | | Economic | 0.612 | 0.569 | Sweden | 0.591 | 4,213 | | Moral | 0.082 | 0.016 | Sweden | 0.049 | 4,155 | | Religious | 0.059 | −0.007 | Sweden | 0.026 | 4,155 | | Economic | 0.402 | 0.345 | Czechia | 0.374 | 3,991 | | Moral | −0.073 | −0.139 | Czechia | −0.106 | 3,909 | | Religious | 0.048 | −0.020 | Czechia | 0.014 | 3,856 | | Economic | 0.437 | 0.385 | United States | 0.411 | 5,866 | | Moral | 0.397 | 0.342 | United States | 0.370 | 5,823 | | Religious | 0.313 | 0.254 | United States | 0.284 | 5,858 | | Economic | 0.033 | −0.034 | Poland | 0.000 | 3,718 | | Moral | 0.315 | 0.253 | Poland | 0.284 | 3,646 | | Religious | 0.311 | 0.249 | Poland | 0.280 | 3,703 | | Economic | 0.225 | 0.166 | Spain | 0.196 | 4,200 | | Moral | 0.351 | 0.296 | Spain | 0.323 | 4,220 | | Religious | 0.386 | 0.333 | Spain | 0.360 | 4,244 | | Economic | 0.085 | 0.031 | India | 0.058 | 5,436 | | Moral | 0.030 | −0.023 | India | 0.003 | 5,618 | | Religious | 0.150 | 0.099 | India | 0.125 | 5,785 | Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted (weight, S017 within each country); countries with an effective sample of 300 or more Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/six_country_panels.json ### Table 3. Each loading has an interval above zero in most countries and below zero in a few Countries by the position of the 95% interval of the left-right loading relative to zero, by axis, fieldwork 2005-2023 | axis | n_countries | relation | | --- | ---: | --- | | Economic | 61 | Interval above zero | | Economic | 36 | Interval includes zero | | Economic | 7 | Interval below zero | | Moral | 57 | Interval above zero | | Moral | 35 | Interval includes zero | | Moral | 11 | Interval below zero | | Religious | 75 | Interval above zero | | Religious | 28 | Interval includes zero | | Religious | 1 | Interval below zero | Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted (weight, S017 within each country); countries with an effective sample of 300 or more Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/axes_relation_to_zero.json ### Table 4. Most country loadings are small and positive, and the largest are economic Weighted correlation between left-right self-placement (1 to 10, 10 = right) and the axis, within country; 95% intervals; fieldwork 2005-2023 #### Table 4.1. All three axes The economic loadings reach furthest to the right One dot per country in each row; the vertical mark in each row is the median across countries | Country | Axis | Loading | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Interval relative to zero | Region | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | Albania | Economic | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.06 | 2,211 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Algeria | Economic | −0.08 | −0.16 | +0.01 | 532 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Andorra | Economic | +0.22 | +0.17 | +0.26 | 1,822 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Argentina | Economic | +0.18 | +0.14 | +0.23 | 2,293 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Armenia | Economic | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.09 | 3,788 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Australia | Economic | +0.33 | +0.30 | +0.36 | 4,426 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Austria | Economic | +0.21 | +0.17 | +0.25 | 2,705 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Azerbaijan | Economic | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.01 | 2,158 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bangladesh | Economic | −0.01 | −0.06 | +0.05 | 1,200 | Interval includes zero | South Asia | | Belarus | Economic | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,213 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Belgium | Economic | +0.25 | +0.20 | +0.30 | 1,414 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bolivia | Economic | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 1,778 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Economic | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.02 | 2,298 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Brazil | Economic | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.10 | 3,642 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bulgaria | Economic | +0.25 | +0.21 | +0.29 | 2,773 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Burkina Faso | Economic | −0.02 | −0.08 | +0.04 | 1,058 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Canada | Economic | +0.29 | +0.26 | +0.32 | 5,629 | Interval above zero | North America | | Chile | Economic | +0.26 | +0.21 | +0.31 | 2,103 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Colombia | Economic | +0.04 | +0.01 | +0.07 | 5,016 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Croatia | Economic | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.07 | 2,352 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Cyprus | Economic | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 3,266 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Czechia | Economic | +0.37 | +0.35 | +0.40 | 3,991 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Denmark | Economic | +0.46 | +0.43 | +0.49 | 4,679 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ecuador | Economic | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,238 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Egypt | Economic | +0.18 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 4,238 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Estonia | Economic | +0.26 | +0.23 | +0.29 | 3,302 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ethiopia | Economic | +0.23 | +0.19 | +0.28 | 1,917 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Finland | Economic | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.47 | 2,932 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | France | Economic | +0.34 | +0.31 | +0.37 | 3,827 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Georgia | Economic | +0.03 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 4,227 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Germany | Economic | +0.19 | +0.17 | +0.22 | 8,683 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ghana | Economic | +0.25 | +0.21 | +0.30 | 2,333 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Greece | Economic | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.24 | 2,184 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Guatemala | Economic | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.10 | 1,213 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Haiti | Economic | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.02 | 1,944 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Hong Kong SAR | Economic | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 3,946 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Hungary | Economic | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 3,447 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Iceland | Economic | +0.50 | +0.46 | +0.53 | 2,307 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | India | Economic | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 5,436 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Indonesia | Economic | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 4,061 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Iraq | Economic | +0.01 | −0.06 | +0.07 | 975 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Ireland | Economic | +0.07 | −0.01 | +0.15 | 687 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Italy | Economic | +0.24 | +0.21 | +0.27 | 3,509 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Japan | Economic | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.14 | 3,446 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Kazakhstan | Economic | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 1,500 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kenya | Economic | −0.10 | −0.15 | −0.04 | 1,161 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Kosovo | Economic | +0.03 | −0.05 | +0.11 | 654 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kyrgyzstan | Economic | +0.11 | +0.06 | +0.16 | 1,461 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Latvia | Economic | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.11 | 2,056 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Lebanon | Economic | −0.03 | −0.10 | +0.04 | 834 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Libya | Economic | −0.01 | −0.06 | +0.04 | 2,447 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Lithuania | Economic | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 1,871 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Luxembourg | Economic | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.22 | 1,257 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Macau SAR | Economic | −0.01 | −0.07 | +0.05 | 995 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Malaysia | Economic | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.01 | 2,613 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Maldives | Economic | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,023 | Interval includes zero | South Asia | | Mali | Economic | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,147 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Malta | Economic | +0.26 | +0.19 | +0.33 | 750 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Mexico | Economic | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.04 | 4,752 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Moldova | Economic | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 1,651 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Mongolia | Economic | −0.16 | −0.20 | −0.10 | 1,613 | Interval below zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Montenegro | Economic | −0.04 | −0.10 | +0.02 | 1,250 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Morocco | Economic | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.14 | 1,909 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Netherlands | Economic | +0.39 | +0.37 | +0.41 | 7,741 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | New Zealand | Economic | +0.46 | +0.42 | +0.50 | 1,372 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Nicaragua | Economic | −0.07 | −0.13 | 0.00 | 871 | Interval below zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Nigeria | Economic | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,927 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | North Macedonia | Economic | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.07 | 1,759 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Northern Ireland | Economic | +0.30 | +0.22 | +0.38 | 760 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Norway | Economic | +0.45 | +0.42 | +0.48 | 3,148 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Pakistan | Economic | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.20 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Palestine | Economic | −0.03 | −0.10 | +0.05 | 727 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Peru | Economic | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 3,280 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Philippines | Economic | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 2,389 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Poland | Economic | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.03 | 3,718 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Portugal | Economic | +0.12 | +0.06 | +0.17 | 1,895 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Puerto Rico | Economic | +0.11 | +0.05 | +0.17 | 1,047 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Romania | Economic | +0.11 | +0.08 | +0.14 | 4,705 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Russia | Economic | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 4,564 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Rwanda | Economic | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.15 | 2,552 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Serbia | Economic | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.04 | 3,746 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Singapore | Economic | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.00 | 1,743 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Slovakia | Economic | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 3,336 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Slovenia | Economic | −0.03 | −0.07 | 0.00 | 3,138 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | South Africa | Economic | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.08 | 5,541 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | South Korea | Economic | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.07 | 3,637 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Spain | Economic | +0.20 | +0.17 | +0.23 | 4,200 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Sweden | Economic | +0.59 | +0.57 | +0.61 | 4,213 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Switzerland | Economic | +0.34 | +0.32 | +0.37 | 5,154 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Taiwan ROC | Economic | −0.09 | −0.13 | −0.06 | 3,554 | Interval below zero | Not classified | | Tajikistan | Economic | +0.11 | +0.05 | +0.17 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Thailand | Economic | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 3,758 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Trinidad and Tobago | Economic | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.10 | 1,211 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Tunisia | Economic | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.02 | 1,682 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Turkey | Economic | +0.08 | +0.05 | +0.10 | 6,325 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ukraine | Economic | +0.08 | +0.03 | +0.12 | 4,667 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United Kingdom | Economic | +0.36 | +0.34 | +0.39 | 6,124 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United States | Economic | +0.41 | +0.38 | +0.44 | 5,866 | Interval above zero | North America | | Uruguay | Economic | +0.21 | +0.17 | +0.25 | 2,571 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Uzbekistan | Economic | −0.13 | −0.21 | −0.05 | 591 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Venezuela | Economic | +0.24 | +0.19 | +0.30 | 1,190 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Vietnam | Economic | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.16 | 1,376 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Zambia | Economic | +0.08 | +0.01 | +0.14 | 948 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Zimbabwe | Economic | −0.08 | −0.13 | −0.04 | 2,627 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Albania | Moral | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 2,220 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Algeria | Moral | −0.09 | −0.17 | 0.00 | 521 | Interval below zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Andorra | Moral | +0.21 | +0.16 | +0.25 | 1,821 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Argentina | Moral | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.21 | 2,240 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Armenia | Moral | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.06 | 3,780 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Australia | Moral | +0.22 | +0.18 | +0.25 | 4,430 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Austria | Moral | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,681 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Azerbaijan | Moral | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.02 | 2,138 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bangladesh | Moral | +0.17 | +0.11 | +0.22 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Belarus | Moral | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 3,202 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Belgium | Moral | +0.08 | +0.02 | +0.13 | 1,419 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bolivia | Moral | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.05 | 1,780 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Moral | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.17 | 2,285 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Brazil | Moral | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.12 | 3,624 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bulgaria | Moral | −0.08 | −0.12 | −0.04 | 2,709 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Burkina Faso | Moral | −0.09 | −0.15 | −0.03 | 1,084 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Canada | Moral | +0.29 | +0.26 | +0.32 | 5,604 | Interval above zero | North America | | Chile | Moral | +0.14 | +0.08 | +0.19 | 2,077 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Colombia | Moral | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.16 | 5,015 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Croatia | Moral | +0.33 | +0.29 | +0.37 | 2,358 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Cyprus | Moral | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.13 | 3,262 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Czechia | Moral | −0.11 | −0.14 | −0.07 | 3,909 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Denmark | Moral | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 4,701 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ecuador | Moral | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 2,235 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Estonia | Moral | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.01 | 3,240 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ethiopia | Moral | −0.11 | −0.15 | −0.06 | 1,902 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Finland | Moral | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.20 | 2,910 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | France | Moral | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 3,818 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Georgia | Moral | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 4,271 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Germany | Moral | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.18 | 8,668 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ghana | Moral | −0.08 | −0.13 | −0.04 | 2,324 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Greece | Moral | +0.29 | +0.25 | +0.33 | 2,188 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Guatemala | Moral | +0.06 | +0.01 | +0.12 | 1,213 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Haiti | Moral | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 1,932 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Hong Kong SAR | Moral | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.02 | 3,955 | Interval below zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Hungary | Moral | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.12 | 3,448 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Iceland | Moral | +0.16 | +0.11 | +0.20 | 2,306 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | India | Moral | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.03 | 5,618 | Interval includes zero | South Asia | | Indonesia | Moral | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.02 | 4,086 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Iraq | Moral | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.19 | 968 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Ireland | Moral | +0.22 | +0.14 | +0.30 | 665 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Italy | Moral | +0.17 | +0.14 | +0.21 | 3,452 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Japan | Moral | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.17 | 3,354 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Kazakhstan | Moral | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.09 | 1,500 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kenya | Moral | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.16 | 1,127 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Kosovo | Moral | −0.02 | −0.10 | +0.06 | 655 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kyrgyzstan | Moral | +0.18 | +0.13 | +0.23 | 1,459 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Latvia | Moral | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 2,028 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Lebanon | Moral | 0.00 | −0.07 | +0.07 | 837 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Libya | Moral | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.04 | 2,514 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Lithuania | Moral | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 1,829 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Luxembourg | Moral | +0.23 | +0.17 | +0.29 | 1,254 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Macau SAR | Moral | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 997 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Malaysia | Moral | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.12 | 2,613 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Maldives | Moral | +0.17 | +0.11 | +0.23 | 1,023 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Mali | Moral | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,081 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Malta | Moral | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.24 | 751 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Mexico | Moral | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.08 | 4,734 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Moldova | Moral | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.03 | 1,638 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Mongolia | Moral | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.06 | 1,613 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Montenegro | Moral | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.15 | 1,250 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Morocco | Moral | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 1,904 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Netherlands | Moral | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.18 | 7,801 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | New Zealand | Moral | +0.19 | +0.14 | +0.24 | 1,352 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Nicaragua | Moral | −0.06 | −0.12 | +0.01 | 871 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Nigeria | Moral | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.05 | 2,928 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | North Macedonia | Moral | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.12 | 1,763 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Northern Ireland | Moral | +0.25 | +0.17 | +0.33 | 749 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Norway | Moral | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 3,142 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Pakistan | Moral | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.21 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Palestine | Moral | +0.09 | +0.02 | +0.16 | 725 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Peru | Moral | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.02 | 2,183 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Philippines | Moral | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.05 | 2,389 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Poland | Moral | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 3,646 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Portugal | Moral | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.10 | 1,915 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Puerto Rico | Moral | +0.11 | +0.05 | +0.17 | 1,049 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Romania | Moral | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.03 | 4,615 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Russia | Moral | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 4,507 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Rwanda | Moral | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 2,554 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Serbia | Moral | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.11 | 3,654 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Singapore | Moral | +0.18 | +0.13 | +0.22 | 1,737 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Slovakia | Moral | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 3,260 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Slovenia | Moral | +0.30 | +0.26 | +0.33 | 3,127 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | South Africa | Moral | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 5,512 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | South Korea | Moral | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.24 | 3,637 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Spain | Moral | +0.32 | +0.30 | +0.35 | 4,220 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Sweden | Moral | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.08 | 4,155 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Switzerland | Moral | +0.20 | +0.17 | +0.23 | 5,159 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Taiwan ROC | Moral | +0.12 | +0.08 | +0.15 | 3,536 | Interval above zero | Not classified | | Tajikistan | Moral | −0.03 | −0.09 | +0.03 | 1,200 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Thailand | Moral | −0.04 | −0.07 | −0.01 | 3,751 | Interval below zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Trinidad and Tobago | Moral | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.04 | 1,206 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Tunisia | Moral | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.13 | 1,696 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Turkey | Moral | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.21 | 6,427 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ukraine | Moral | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 4,550 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United Kingdom | Moral | +0.17 | +0.14 | +0.20 | 6,116 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United States | Moral | +0.37 | +0.34 | +0.40 | 5,823 | Interval above zero | North America | | Uruguay | Moral | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,600 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Uzbekistan | Moral | −0.01 | −0.09 | +0.07 | 615 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Venezuela | Moral | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.08 | 1,190 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Vietnam | Moral | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.18 | 1,381 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Zambia | Moral | +0.03 | −0.03 | +0.10 | 945 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Zimbabwe | Moral | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.02 | 2,626 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Albania | Religious | +0.13 | +0.09 | +0.18 | 2,209 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Algeria | Religious | −0.02 | −0.11 | +0.06 | 536 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Andorra | Religious | +0.22 | +0.17 | +0.26 | 1,813 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Argentina | Religious | +0.22 | +0.18 | +0.26 | 2,326 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Armenia | Religious | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.08 | 3,758 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Australia | Religious | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.23 | 4,456 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Austria | Religious | +0.13 | +0.09 | +0.17 | 2,710 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Azerbaijan | Religious | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 2,152 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bangladesh | Religious | +0.01 | −0.05 | +0.06 | 1,200 | Interval includes zero | South Asia | | Belarus | Religious | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,186 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Belgium | Religious | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.17 | 1,421 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bolivia | Religious | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.10 | 1,803 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Religious | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,269 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Brazil | Religious | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.12 | 3,673 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bulgaria | Religious | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.09 | 2,670 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Burkina Faso | Religious | −0.04 | −0.09 | +0.02 | 1,109 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Canada | Religious | +0.25 | +0.22 | +0.28 | 5,628 | Interval above zero | North America | | Chile | Religious | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.15 | 2,085 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Colombia | Religious | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.14 | 5,005 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Croatia | Religious | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.40 | 2,354 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Cyprus | Religious | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,279 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Czechia | Religious | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,856 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Denmark | Religious | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 4,678 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ecuador | Religious | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.09 | 2,243 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Egypt | Religious | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,721 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Estonia | Religious | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 3,216 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ethiopia | Religious | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,914 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Finland | Religious | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,897 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | France | Religious | +0.18 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 3,845 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Georgia | Religious | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.08 | 4,283 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Germany | Religious | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.16 | 8,654 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ghana | Religious | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.07 | 2,330 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Greece | Religious | +0.29 | +0.25 | +0.33 | 2,118 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Guatemala | Religious | +0.06 | 0.00 | +0.11 | 1,211 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Haiti | Religious | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.05 | 1,929 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Hong Kong SAR | Religious | +0.06 | +0.02 | +0.09 | 3,801 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Hungary | Religious | +0.15 | +0.12 | +0.19 | 3,432 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Iceland | Religious | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.17 | 2,299 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | India | Religious | +0.12 | +0.10 | +0.15 | 5,785 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Indonesia | Religious | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 4,082 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Iraq | Religious | +0.07 | +0.01 | +0.13 | 978 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Ireland | Religious | +0.22 | +0.14 | +0.29 | 682 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Italy | Religious | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.23 | 3,515 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Japan | Religious | +0.13 | +0.10 | +0.16 | 3,386 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Kazakhstan | Religious | +0.11 | +0.06 | +0.16 | 1,500 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kenya | Religious | −0.04 | −0.10 | +0.02 | 1,160 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Kosovo | Religious | −0.06 | −0.13 | +0.02 | 650 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kyrgyzstan | Religious | +0.18 | +0.13 | +0.23 | 1,458 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Latvia | Religious | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.10 | 2,033 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Lebanon | Religious | +0.11 | +0.04 | +0.17 | 834 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Libya | Religious | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.08 | 2,594 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Lithuania | Religious | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,812 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Luxembourg | Religious | +0.27 | +0.21 | +0.33 | 1,261 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Macau SAR | Religious | +0.06 | −0.01 | +0.12 | 996 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Malaysia | Religious | +0.15 | +0.11 | +0.18 | 2,613 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Maldives | Religious | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.15 | 1,023 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Mali | Religious | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.07 | 1,140 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Malta | Religious | +0.07 | −0.01 | +0.15 | 770 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Mexico | Religious | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.13 | 4,781 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Moldova | Religious | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.10 | 1,657 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Mongolia | Religious | +0.20 | +0.15 | +0.25 | 1,611 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Montenegro | Religious | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.21 | 1,218 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Morocco | Religious | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 1,914 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Netherlands | Religious | +0.13 | +0.10 | +0.15 | 7,785 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | New Zealand | Religious | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.18 | 1,361 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Nicaragua | Religious | +0.02 | −0.05 | +0.08 | 871 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Nigeria | Religious | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.08 | 2,929 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | North Macedonia | Religious | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.14 | 1,729 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Northern Ireland | Religious | +0.16 | +0.08 | +0.24 | 763 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Norway | Religious | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 3,144 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Pakistan | Religious | +0.17 | +0.11 | +0.22 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Palestine | Religious | +0.09 | +0.02 | +0.16 | 728 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Peru | Religious | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,339 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Philippines | Religious | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.12 | 2,388 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Poland | Religious | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 3,703 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Portugal | Religious | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.20 | 1,954 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Puerto Rico | Religious | +0.03 | −0.03 | +0.09 | 1,042 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Romania | Religious | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.04 | 4,728 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Russia | Religious | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.14 | 4,411 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Rwanda | Religious | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,554 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Serbia | Religious | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.12 | 3,715 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Singapore | Religious | +0.11 | +0.06 | +0.15 | 1,740 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Slovakia | Religious | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.03 | 3,257 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Slovenia | Religious | +0.33 | +0.30 | +0.36 | 3,098 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | South Africa | Religious | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 5,568 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | South Korea | Religious | +0.06 | +0.02 | +0.10 | 3,631 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Spain | Religious | +0.36 | +0.33 | +0.39 | 4,244 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Sweden | Religious | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.06 | 4,155 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Switzerland | Religious | +0.09 | +0.07 | +0.12 | 5,138 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Taiwan ROC | Religious | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,561 | Interval includes zero | Not classified | | Tajikistan | Religious | +0.27 | +0.22 | +0.32 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Thailand | Religious | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,656 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Trinidad and Tobago | Religious | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,210 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Tunisia | Religious | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,681 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Turkey | Religious | +0.21 | +0.19 | +0.24 | 6,438 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ukraine | Religious | +0.10 | +0.06 | +0.15 | 4,601 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United Kingdom | Religious | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.15 | 6,155 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United States | Religious | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 5,858 | Interval above zero | North America | | Uruguay | Religious | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.24 | 2,586 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Uzbekistan | Religious | +0.19 | +0.11 | +0.27 | 615 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Venezuela | Religious | −0.04 | −0.09 | +0.02 | 1,190 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Vietnam | Religious | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.14 | 1,373 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Zambia | Religious | −0.02 | −0.08 | +0.04 | 946 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Zimbabwe | Religious | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.00 | 2,627 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | #### Table 4.2. Economic Sweden has the largest economic loading and Mongolia the smallest Each dot is a country with its 95% interval, largest loading first | Country | Axis | Loading | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Interval relative to zero | Region | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | Albania | Economic | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.06 | 2,211 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Algeria | Economic | −0.08 | −0.16 | +0.01 | 532 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Andorra | Economic | +0.22 | +0.17 | +0.26 | 1,822 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Argentina | Economic | +0.18 | +0.14 | +0.23 | 2,293 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Armenia | Economic | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.09 | 3,788 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Australia | Economic | +0.33 | +0.30 | +0.36 | 4,426 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Austria | Economic | +0.21 | +0.17 | +0.25 | 2,705 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Azerbaijan | Economic | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.01 | 2,158 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bangladesh | Economic | −0.01 | −0.06 | +0.05 | 1,200 | Interval includes zero | South Asia | | Belarus | Economic | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,213 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Belgium | Economic | +0.25 | +0.20 | +0.30 | 1,414 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bolivia | Economic | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 1,778 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Economic | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.02 | 2,298 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Brazil | Economic | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.10 | 3,642 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bulgaria | Economic | +0.25 | +0.21 | +0.29 | 2,773 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Burkina Faso | Economic | −0.02 | −0.08 | +0.04 | 1,058 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Canada | Economic | +0.29 | +0.26 | +0.32 | 5,629 | Interval above zero | North America | | Chile | Economic | +0.26 | +0.21 | +0.31 | 2,103 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Colombia | Economic | +0.04 | +0.01 | +0.07 | 5,016 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Croatia | Economic | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.07 | 2,352 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Cyprus | Economic | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 3,266 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Czechia | Economic | +0.37 | +0.35 | +0.40 | 3,991 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Denmark | Economic | +0.46 | +0.43 | +0.49 | 4,679 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ecuador | Economic | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,238 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Egypt | Economic | +0.18 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 4,238 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Estonia | Economic | +0.26 | +0.23 | +0.29 | 3,302 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ethiopia | Economic | +0.23 | +0.19 | +0.28 | 1,917 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Finland | Economic | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.47 | 2,932 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | France | Economic | +0.34 | +0.31 | +0.37 | 3,827 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Georgia | Economic | +0.03 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 4,227 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Germany | Economic | +0.19 | +0.17 | +0.22 | 8,683 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ghana | Economic | +0.25 | +0.21 | +0.30 | 2,333 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Greece | Economic | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.24 | 2,184 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Guatemala | Economic | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.10 | 1,213 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Haiti | Economic | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.02 | 1,944 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Hong Kong SAR | Economic | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 3,946 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Hungary | Economic | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 3,447 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Iceland | Economic | +0.50 | +0.46 | +0.53 | 2,307 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | India | Economic | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 5,436 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Indonesia | Economic | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 4,061 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Iraq | Economic | +0.01 | −0.06 | +0.07 | 975 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Ireland | Economic | +0.07 | −0.01 | +0.15 | 687 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Italy | Economic | +0.24 | +0.21 | +0.27 | 3,509 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Japan | Economic | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.14 | 3,446 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Kazakhstan | Economic | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 1,500 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kenya | Economic | −0.10 | −0.15 | −0.04 | 1,161 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Kosovo | Economic | +0.03 | −0.05 | +0.11 | 654 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kyrgyzstan | Economic | +0.11 | +0.06 | +0.16 | 1,461 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Latvia | Economic | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.11 | 2,056 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Lebanon | Economic | −0.03 | −0.10 | +0.04 | 834 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Libya | Economic | −0.01 | −0.06 | +0.04 | 2,447 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Lithuania | Economic | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 1,871 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Luxembourg | Economic | +0.16 | +0.10 | +0.22 | 1,257 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Macau SAR | Economic | −0.01 | −0.07 | +0.05 | 995 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Malaysia | Economic | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.01 | 2,613 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Maldives | Economic | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,023 | Interval includes zero | South Asia | | Mali | Economic | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,147 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Malta | Economic | +0.26 | +0.19 | +0.33 | 750 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Mexico | Economic | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.04 | 4,752 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Moldova | Economic | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 1,651 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Mongolia | Economic | −0.16 | −0.20 | −0.10 | 1,613 | Interval below zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Montenegro | Economic | −0.04 | −0.10 | +0.02 | 1,250 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Morocco | Economic | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.14 | 1,909 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Netherlands | Economic | +0.39 | +0.37 | +0.41 | 7,741 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | New Zealand | Economic | +0.46 | +0.42 | +0.50 | 1,372 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Nicaragua | Economic | −0.07 | −0.13 | 0.00 | 871 | Interval below zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Nigeria | Economic | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,927 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | North Macedonia | Economic | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.07 | 1,759 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Northern Ireland | Economic | +0.30 | +0.22 | +0.38 | 760 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Norway | Economic | +0.45 | +0.42 | +0.48 | 3,148 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Pakistan | Economic | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.20 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Palestine | Economic | −0.03 | −0.10 | +0.05 | 727 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Peru | Economic | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 3,280 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Philippines | Economic | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 2,389 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Poland | Economic | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.03 | 3,718 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Portugal | Economic | +0.12 | +0.06 | +0.17 | 1,895 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Puerto Rico | Economic | +0.11 | +0.05 | +0.17 | 1,047 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Romania | Economic | +0.11 | +0.08 | +0.14 | 4,705 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Russia | Economic | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 4,564 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Rwanda | Economic | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.15 | 2,552 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Serbia | Economic | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.04 | 3,746 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Singapore | Economic | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.00 | 1,743 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Slovakia | Economic | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 3,336 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Slovenia | Economic | −0.03 | −0.07 | 0.00 | 3,138 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | South Africa | Economic | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.08 | 5,541 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | South Korea | Economic | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.07 | 3,637 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Spain | Economic | +0.20 | +0.17 | +0.23 | 4,200 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Sweden | Economic | +0.59 | +0.57 | +0.61 | 4,213 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Switzerland | Economic | +0.34 | +0.32 | +0.37 | 5,154 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Taiwan ROC | Economic | −0.09 | −0.13 | −0.06 | 3,554 | Interval below zero | Not classified | | Tajikistan | Economic | +0.11 | +0.05 | +0.17 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Thailand | Economic | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 3,758 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Trinidad and Tobago | Economic | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.10 | 1,211 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Tunisia | Economic | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.02 | 1,682 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Turkey | Economic | +0.08 | +0.05 | +0.10 | 6,325 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ukraine | Economic | +0.08 | +0.03 | +0.12 | 4,667 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United Kingdom | Economic | +0.36 | +0.34 | +0.39 | 6,124 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United States | Economic | +0.41 | +0.38 | +0.44 | 5,866 | Interval above zero | North America | | Uruguay | Economic | +0.21 | +0.17 | +0.25 | 2,571 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Uzbekistan | Economic | −0.13 | −0.21 | −0.05 | 591 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Venezuela | Economic | +0.24 | +0.19 | +0.30 | 1,190 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Vietnam | Economic | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.16 | 1,376 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Zambia | Economic | +0.08 | +0.01 | +0.14 | 948 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Zimbabwe | Economic | −0.08 | −0.13 | −0.04 | 2,627 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | #### Table 4.3. Moral The moral loadings are largest in the United States, Croatia and Spain Each dot is a country with its 95% interval, largest loading first | Country | Axis | Loading | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Interval relative to zero | Region | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | Albania | Moral | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 2,220 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Algeria | Moral | −0.09 | −0.17 | 0.00 | 521 | Interval below zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Andorra | Moral | +0.21 | +0.16 | +0.25 | 1,821 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Argentina | Moral | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.21 | 2,240 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Armenia | Moral | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.06 | 3,780 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Australia | Moral | +0.22 | +0.18 | +0.25 | 4,430 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Austria | Moral | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,681 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Azerbaijan | Moral | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.02 | 2,138 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bangladesh | Moral | +0.17 | +0.11 | +0.22 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Belarus | Moral | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 3,202 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Belgium | Moral | +0.08 | +0.02 | +0.13 | 1,419 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bolivia | Moral | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.05 | 1,780 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Moral | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.17 | 2,285 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Brazil | Moral | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.12 | 3,624 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bulgaria | Moral | −0.08 | −0.12 | −0.04 | 2,709 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Burkina Faso | Moral | −0.09 | −0.15 | −0.03 | 1,084 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Canada | Moral | +0.29 | +0.26 | +0.32 | 5,604 | Interval above zero | North America | | Chile | Moral | +0.14 | +0.08 | +0.19 | 2,077 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Colombia | Moral | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.16 | 5,015 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Croatia | Moral | +0.33 | +0.29 | +0.37 | 2,358 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Cyprus | Moral | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.13 | 3,262 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Czechia | Moral | −0.11 | −0.14 | −0.07 | 3,909 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Denmark | Moral | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 4,701 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ecuador | Moral | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 2,235 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Estonia | Moral | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.01 | 3,240 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ethiopia | Moral | −0.11 | −0.15 | −0.06 | 1,902 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Finland | Moral | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.20 | 2,910 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | France | Moral | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 3,818 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Georgia | Moral | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 4,271 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Germany | Moral | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.18 | 8,668 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ghana | Moral | −0.08 | −0.13 | −0.04 | 2,324 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Greece | Moral | +0.29 | +0.25 | +0.33 | 2,188 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Guatemala | Moral | +0.06 | +0.01 | +0.12 | 1,213 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Haiti | Moral | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 1,932 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Hong Kong SAR | Moral | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.02 | 3,955 | Interval below zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Hungary | Moral | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.12 | 3,448 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Iceland | Moral | +0.16 | +0.11 | +0.20 | 2,306 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | India | Moral | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.03 | 5,618 | Interval includes zero | South Asia | | Indonesia | Moral | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.02 | 4,086 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Iraq | Moral | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.19 | 968 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Ireland | Moral | +0.22 | +0.14 | +0.30 | 665 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Italy | Moral | +0.17 | +0.14 | +0.21 | 3,452 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Japan | Moral | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.17 | 3,354 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Kazakhstan | Moral | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.09 | 1,500 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kenya | Moral | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.16 | 1,127 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Kosovo | Moral | −0.02 | −0.10 | +0.06 | 655 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kyrgyzstan | Moral | +0.18 | +0.13 | +0.23 | 1,459 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Latvia | Moral | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 2,028 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Lebanon | Moral | 0.00 | −0.07 | +0.07 | 837 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Libya | Moral | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.04 | 2,514 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Lithuania | Moral | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 1,829 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Luxembourg | Moral | +0.23 | +0.17 | +0.29 | 1,254 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Macau SAR | Moral | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 997 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Malaysia | Moral | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.12 | 2,613 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Maldives | Moral | +0.17 | +0.11 | +0.23 | 1,023 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Mali | Moral | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,081 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Malta | Moral | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.24 | 751 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Mexico | Moral | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.08 | 4,734 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Moldova | Moral | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.03 | 1,638 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Mongolia | Moral | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.06 | 1,613 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Montenegro | Moral | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.15 | 1,250 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Morocco | Moral | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 1,904 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Netherlands | Moral | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.18 | 7,801 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | New Zealand | Moral | +0.19 | +0.14 | +0.24 | 1,352 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Nicaragua | Moral | −0.06 | −0.12 | +0.01 | 871 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Nigeria | Moral | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.05 | 2,928 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | North Macedonia | Moral | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.12 | 1,763 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Northern Ireland | Moral | +0.25 | +0.17 | +0.33 | 749 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Norway | Moral | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 3,142 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Pakistan | Moral | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.21 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Palestine | Moral | +0.09 | +0.02 | +0.16 | 725 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Peru | Moral | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.02 | 2,183 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Philippines | Moral | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.05 | 2,389 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Poland | Moral | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 3,646 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Portugal | Moral | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.10 | 1,915 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Puerto Rico | Moral | +0.11 | +0.05 | +0.17 | 1,049 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Romania | Moral | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.03 | 4,615 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Russia | Moral | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 4,507 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Rwanda | Moral | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 2,554 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Serbia | Moral | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.11 | 3,654 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Singapore | Moral | +0.18 | +0.13 | +0.22 | 1,737 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Slovakia | Moral | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 3,260 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Slovenia | Moral | +0.30 | +0.26 | +0.33 | 3,127 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | South Africa | Moral | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 5,512 | Interval below zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | South Korea | Moral | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.24 | 3,637 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Spain | Moral | +0.32 | +0.30 | +0.35 | 4,220 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Sweden | Moral | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.08 | 4,155 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Switzerland | Moral | +0.20 | +0.17 | +0.23 | 5,159 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Taiwan ROC | Moral | +0.12 | +0.08 | +0.15 | 3,536 | Interval above zero | Not classified | | Tajikistan | Moral | −0.03 | −0.09 | +0.03 | 1,200 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Thailand | Moral | −0.04 | −0.07 | −0.01 | 3,751 | Interval below zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Trinidad and Tobago | Moral | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.04 | 1,206 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Tunisia | Moral | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.13 | 1,696 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Turkey | Moral | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.21 | 6,427 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ukraine | Moral | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 4,550 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United Kingdom | Moral | +0.17 | +0.14 | +0.20 | 6,116 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United States | Moral | +0.37 | +0.34 | +0.40 | 5,823 | Interval above zero | North America | | Uruguay | Moral | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,600 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Uzbekistan | Moral | −0.01 | −0.09 | +0.07 | 615 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Venezuela | Moral | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.08 | 1,190 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Vietnam | Moral | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.18 | 1,381 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Zambia | Moral | +0.03 | −0.03 | +0.10 | 945 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Zimbabwe | Moral | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.02 | 2,626 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | #### Table 4.4. Religious The religious loadings are largest in Spain and Croatia Each dot is a country with its 95% interval, largest loading first | Country | Axis | Loading | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Interval relative to zero | Region | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | Albania | Religious | +0.13 | +0.09 | +0.18 | 2,209 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Algeria | Religious | −0.02 | −0.11 | +0.06 | 536 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Andorra | Religious | +0.22 | +0.17 | +0.26 | 1,813 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Argentina | Religious | +0.22 | +0.18 | +0.26 | 2,326 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Armenia | Religious | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.08 | 3,758 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Australia | Religious | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.23 | 4,456 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Austria | Religious | +0.13 | +0.09 | +0.17 | 2,710 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Azerbaijan | Religious | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 2,152 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bangladesh | Religious | +0.01 | −0.05 | +0.06 | 1,200 | Interval includes zero | South Asia | | Belarus | Religious | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,186 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Belgium | Religious | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.17 | 1,421 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Bolivia | Religious | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.10 | 1,803 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Religious | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,269 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Brazil | Religious | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.12 | 3,673 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Bulgaria | Religious | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.09 | 2,670 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Burkina Faso | Religious | −0.04 | −0.09 | +0.02 | 1,109 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Canada | Religious | +0.25 | +0.22 | +0.28 | 5,628 | Interval above zero | North America | | Chile | Religious | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.15 | 2,085 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Colombia | Religious | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.14 | 5,005 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Croatia | Religious | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.40 | 2,354 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Cyprus | Religious | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,279 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Czechia | Religious | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,856 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Denmark | Religious | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 4,678 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ecuador | Religious | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.09 | 2,243 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Egypt | Religious | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,721 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Estonia | Religious | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 3,216 | Interval below zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ethiopia | Religious | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,914 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Finland | Religious | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,897 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | France | Religious | +0.18 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 3,845 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Georgia | Religious | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.08 | 4,283 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Germany | Religious | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.16 | 8,654 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ghana | Religious | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.07 | 2,330 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Greece | Religious | +0.29 | +0.25 | +0.33 | 2,118 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Guatemala | Religious | +0.06 | 0.00 | +0.11 | 1,211 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Haiti | Religious | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.05 | 1,929 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Hong Kong SAR | Religious | +0.06 | +0.02 | +0.09 | 3,801 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Hungary | Religious | +0.15 | +0.12 | +0.19 | 3,432 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Iceland | Religious | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.17 | 2,299 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | India | Religious | +0.12 | +0.10 | +0.15 | 5,785 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Indonesia | Religious | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 4,082 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Iraq | Religious | +0.07 | +0.01 | +0.13 | 978 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Ireland | Religious | +0.22 | +0.14 | +0.29 | 682 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Italy | Religious | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.23 | 3,515 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Japan | Religious | +0.13 | +0.10 | +0.16 | 3,386 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Kazakhstan | Religious | +0.11 | +0.06 | +0.16 | 1,500 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kenya | Religious | −0.04 | −0.10 | +0.02 | 1,160 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Kosovo | Religious | −0.06 | −0.13 | +0.02 | 650 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Kyrgyzstan | Religious | +0.18 | +0.13 | +0.23 | 1,458 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Latvia | Religious | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.10 | 2,033 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Lebanon | Religious | +0.11 | +0.04 | +0.17 | 834 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Libya | Religious | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.08 | 2,594 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Lithuania | Religious | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,812 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Luxembourg | Religious | +0.27 | +0.21 | +0.33 | 1,261 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Macau SAR | Religious | +0.06 | −0.01 | +0.12 | 996 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Malaysia | Religious | +0.15 | +0.11 | +0.18 | 2,613 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Maldives | Religious | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.15 | 1,023 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Mali | Religious | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.07 | 1,140 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Malta | Religious | +0.07 | −0.01 | +0.15 | 770 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Mexico | Religious | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.13 | 4,781 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Moldova | Religious | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.10 | 1,657 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Mongolia | Religious | +0.20 | +0.15 | +0.25 | 1,611 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Montenegro | Religious | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.21 | 1,218 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Morocco | Religious | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 1,914 | Interval includes zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Netherlands | Religious | +0.13 | +0.10 | +0.15 | 7,785 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | New Zealand | Religious | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.18 | 1,361 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Nicaragua | Religious | +0.02 | −0.05 | +0.08 | 871 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Nigeria | Religious | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.08 | 2,929 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | North Macedonia | Religious | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.14 | 1,729 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Northern Ireland | Religious | +0.16 | +0.08 | +0.24 | 763 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Norway | Religious | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 3,144 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Pakistan | Religious | +0.17 | +0.11 | +0.22 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | South Asia | | Palestine | Religious | +0.09 | +0.02 | +0.16 | 728 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Peru | Religious | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,339 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Philippines | Religious | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.12 | 2,388 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Poland | Religious | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 3,703 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Portugal | Religious | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.20 | 1,954 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Puerto Rico | Religious | +0.03 | −0.03 | +0.09 | 1,042 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Romania | Religious | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.04 | 4,728 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Russia | Religious | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.14 | 4,411 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Rwanda | Religious | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,554 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Serbia | Religious | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.12 | 3,715 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Singapore | Religious | +0.11 | +0.06 | +0.15 | 1,740 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Slovakia | Religious | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.03 | 3,257 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Slovenia | Religious | +0.33 | +0.30 | +0.36 | 3,098 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | South Africa | Religious | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 5,568 | Interval above zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | South Korea | Religious | +0.06 | +0.02 | +0.10 | 3,631 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Spain | Religious | +0.36 | +0.33 | +0.39 | 4,244 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Sweden | Religious | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.06 | 4,155 | Interval includes zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Switzerland | Religious | +0.09 | +0.07 | +0.12 | 5,138 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Taiwan ROC | Religious | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,561 | Interval includes zero | Not classified | | Tajikistan | Religious | +0.27 | +0.22 | +0.32 | 1,200 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Thailand | Religious | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,656 | Interval includes zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Trinidad and Tobago | Religious | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,210 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Tunisia | Religious | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,681 | Interval above zero | Middle East & North Africa | | Turkey | Religious | +0.21 | +0.19 | +0.24 | 6,438 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Ukraine | Religious | +0.10 | +0.06 | +0.15 | 4,601 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United Kingdom | Religious | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.15 | 6,155 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | United States | Religious | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 5,858 | Interval above zero | North America | | Uruguay | Religious | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.24 | 2,586 | Interval above zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Uzbekistan | Religious | +0.19 | +0.11 | +0.27 | 615 | Interval above zero | Europe & Central Asia | | Venezuela | Religious | −0.04 | −0.09 | +0.02 | 1,190 | Interval includes zero | Latin America & Caribbean | | Vietnam | Religious | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.14 | 1,373 | Interval above zero | East Asia & Pacific | | Zambia | Religious | −0.02 | −0.08 | +0.04 | 946 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | | Zimbabwe | Religious | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.00 | 2,627 | Interval includes zero | Sub-Saharan Africa | Note: Intervals treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering and stratification in the sample design, which can raise or lower the variance. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted (weight, S017 within each country); countries with an effective sample of 300 or more Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/country_loadings.json ### Table 5. The right-wing end of every item is fixed in advance from the wording of its answer scale Items used for the economic, moral and religious axes in the World Values Survey and EVS, with the answer that counts as right | Axis | Item | Survey code | Low end of the scale | High end of the scale | Right-wing pole | Answer that counts as right | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Economic | Income differences (E035) | E035 | Incomes should be made more equal | We need larger income differences as incentives | High end | We need larger income differences as incentives | | Economic | Government responsibility (E037) | E037 | People should take more responsibility | The government should take more responsibility | Low end | People should take more responsibility | | Economic | State ownership of business (E036) | E036 | Private ownership of business should be increased | Government ownership of business should be increased | Low end | Private ownership of business should be increased | | Economic | Competition (E039) | E039 | Competition is good | Competition is harmful | Low end | Competition is good | | Moral | Homosexuality (F118) | F118 | Never justifiable | Always justifiable | Low end | Never justifiable | | Moral | Abortion (F120) | F120 | Never justifiable | Always justifiable | Low end | Never justifiable | | Moral | Divorce (F121) | F121 | Never justifiable | Always justifiable | Low end | Never justifiable | | Religious | Importance of God (F063) | F063 | Not at all important | Very important | High end | Very important | Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study cleaned dictionary, fieldwork 2005-2023; item wording and coding, no estimates or weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/index_coding.json ### Table 6. The median economic loading runs from +0.02 to +0.12 depending on the items Median across countries of the loading of left-right on each definition of the economic axis, the moral index and the importance of God, with 95% intervals from resampling the countries | Definition | Axis | Median loading | Interval low | Interval high | Countries | Interval above zero | Interval includes zero | Interval below zero | Correlation with the chapter index | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Four-item index (used in this chapter) | Economic | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.10 | 104 | 61 | 36 | 7 | 1.00 | | Two items: income differences and government responsibility | Economic | +0.12 | +0.08 | +0.12 | 104 | 74 | 29 | 1 | 0.91 | | Three items: government responsibility, state ownership, competition | Economic | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.07 | 104 | 47 | 39 | 18 | 0.97 | | Income differences alone | Economic | +0.09 | +0.08 | +0.11 | 104 | 72 | 30 | 2 | 0.84 | | Government responsibility alone | Economic | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.09 | 104 | 62 | 36 | 6 | 0.86 | | State ownership of business alone | Economic | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.05 | 104 | 42 | 36 | 26 | 0.86 | | Competition alone | Economic | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.03 | 104 | 35 | 42 | 27 | 0.81 | | Three-item index (used in this chapter) | Moral | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.11 | 103 | 57 | 35 | 11 | 1.00 | | Importance of God (used in this chapter) | Religious | +0.09 | +0.07 | +0.11 | 104 | 75 | 28 | 1 | 1.00 | Note: Each country counts once, and the intervals come from resampling countries. Note: The variant that needs all four economic items answered and the three single moral items are in the estimates but not drawn. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted (weight, S017 within each country); countries with an effective sample of 300 or more Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/definition_sensitivity.json ### Table 7. Loadings on all three axes are higher in countries with higher human development Country loading of left-right self-placement (correlation) against the Human Development Index, countries with both, fieldwork 2005-2023 | axis | conf_high | conf_low | country | estimate | hdi | n | region | | --- | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | economic | 0.059 | −0.036 | Albania | 0.012 | 0.785 | 2,211 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.006 | −0.163 | Algeria | −0.079 | 0.754 | 532 | Middle East & North Africa | | economic | 0.261 | 0.169 | Andorra | 0.215 | 0.858 | 1,822 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.228 | 0.140 | Argentina | 0.185 | 0.825 | 2,293 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.091 | 0.017 | Armenia | 0.054 | 0.755 | 3,788 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.363 | 0.299 | Australia | 0.332 | 0.939 | 4,426 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | 0.251 | 0.173 | Austria | 0.212 | 0.908 | 2,705 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | −0.009 | −0.102 | Azerbaijan | −0.056 | 0.757 | 2,158 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.049 | −0.065 | Bangladesh | −0.008 | 0.608 | 1,200 | South Asia | | economic | 0.051 | −0.020 | Belarus | 0.015 | 0.808 | 3,213 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.300 | 0.198 | Belgium | 0.250 | 0.916 | 1,414 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.091 | −0.002 | Bolivia | 0.045 | 0.693 | 1,778 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.019 | −0.069 | Bosnia Herzegovina | −0.025 | 0.768 | 2,298 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.104 | 0.039 | Brazil | 0.071 | 0.759 | 3,642 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.287 | 0.210 | Bulgaria | 0.249 | 0.813 | 2,773 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.043 | −0.078 | Burkina Faso | −0.017 | 0.423 | 1,058 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | economic | 0.319 | 0.260 | Canada | 0.290 | 0.926 | 5,629 | North America | | economic | 0.308 | 0.206 | Chile | 0.258 | 0.843 | 2,103 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.068 | 0.012 | Colombia | 0.040 | 0.747 | 5,016 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.066 | −0.025 | Croatia | 0.021 | 0.831 | 2,352 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.036 | −0.040 | Cyprus | −0.002 | 0.869 | 3,266 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.402 | 0.345 | Czechia | 0.374 | 0.888 | 3,991 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.488 | 0.430 | Denmark | 0.460 | 0.929 | 4,679 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.043 | −0.040 | Ecuador | 0.002 | 0.752 | 2,238 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.220 | 0.147 | Egypt | 0.184 | 0.696 | 4,238 | Middle East & North Africa | | economic | 0.294 | 0.228 | Estonia | 0.261 | 0.871 | 3,302 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.276 | 0.192 | Ethiopia | 0.234 | 0.463 | 1,917 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | economic | 0.470 | 0.405 | Finland | 0.438 | 0.920 | 2,932 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.373 | 0.312 | France | 0.343 | 0.901 | 3,827 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.067 | 0.002 | Georgia | 0.034 | 0.780 | 4,227 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.217 | 0.168 | Germany | 0.192 | 0.936 | 8,683 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.297 | 0.211 | Ghana | 0.254 | 0.592 | 2,333 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | economic | 0.235 | 0.150 | Greece | 0.193 | 0.870 | 2,184 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.099 | −0.013 | Guatemala | 0.043 | 0.650 | 1,213 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.018 | −0.071 | Haiti | −0.027 | 0.498 | 1,944 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.018 | −0.047 | Hong Kong SAR | −0.014 | 0.933 | 3,946 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | 0.030 | −0.039 | Hungary | −0.004 | 0.838 | 3,447 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.532 | 0.463 | Iceland | 0.499 | 0.935 | 2,307 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.085 | 0.031 | India | 0.058 | 0.640 | 5,436 | South Asia | | economic | 0.073 | −0.002 | Indonesia | 0.035 | 0.694 | 4,061 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | 0.069 | −0.057 | Iraq | 0.006 | 0.685 | 975 | Middle East & North Africa | | economic | 0.147 | −0.010 | Ireland | 0.069 | 0.938 | 687 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.275 | 0.210 | Italy | 0.242 | 0.880 | 3,509 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.136 | 0.070 | Japan | 0.103 | 0.909 | 3,446 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | 0.149 | 0.047 | Kazakhstan | 0.098 | 0.800 | 1,500 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | −0.039 | −0.153 | Kenya | −0.096 | 0.590 | 1,161 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | economic | 0.160 | 0.059 | Kyrgyzstan | 0.110 | 0.672 | 1,461 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.114 | 0.025 | Latvia | 0.069 | 0.847 | 2,056 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.036 | −0.100 | Lebanon | −0.032 | 0.757 | 834 | Middle East & North Africa | | economic | 0.042 | −0.059 | Libya | −0.008 | 0.706 | 2,447 | Middle East & North Africa | | economic | 0.147 | 0.054 | Lithuania | 0.101 | 0.858 | 1,871 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.221 | 0.100 | Luxembourg | 0.161 | 0.904 | 1,257 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.007 | −0.070 | Malaysia | −0.032 | 0.802 | 2,613 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | 0.080 | −0.042 | Maldives | 0.019 | 0.717 | 1,023 | South Asia | | economic | 0.075 | −0.041 | Mali | 0.017 | 0.427 | 1,147 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | economic | 0.330 | 0.187 | Malta | 0.260 | 0.878 | 750 | Middle East & North Africa | | economic | 0.045 | −0.012 | Mexico | 0.016 | 0.774 | 4,752 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.150 | 0.053 | Moldova | 0.102 | 0.700 | 1,651 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | −0.104 | −0.205 | Mongolia | −0.155 | 0.741 | 1,613 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | 0.017 | −0.102 | Montenegro | −0.043 | 0.814 | 1,250 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.139 | 0.050 | Morocco | 0.095 | 0.667 | 1,909 | Middle East & North Africa | | economic | 0.413 | 0.373 | Netherlands | 0.393 | 0.931 | 7,741 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.504 | 0.421 | New Zealand | 0.464 | 0.917 | 1,372 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | −0.001 | −0.134 | Nicaragua | −0.068 | 0.658 | 871 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.045 | −0.037 | Nigeria | 0.004 | 0.532 | 2,927 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | economic | 0.070 | −0.030 | North Macedonia | 0.020 | 0.757 | 1,759 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.376 | 0.222 | Northern Ireland | 0.301 | 0.922 | 760 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.476 | 0.419 | Norway | 0.448 | 0.953 | 3,148 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.204 | 0.090 | Pakistan | 0.148 | 0.562 | 1,200 | South Asia | | economic | 0.045 | −0.100 | Palestine | −0.027 | 0.686 | 727 | Middle East & North Africa | | economic | 0.101 | 0.031 | Peru | 0.066 | 0.750 | 3,280 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.088 | 0.000 | Philippines | 0.044 | 0.699 | 2,389 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | 0.033 | −0.034 | Poland | 0.000 | 0.865 | 3,718 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.173 | 0.064 | Portugal | 0.119 | 0.847 | 1,895 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.138 | 0.078 | Romania | 0.108 | 0.811 | 4,705 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.097 | 0.031 | Russia | 0.064 | 0.816 | 4,564 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.146 | 0.069 | Rwanda | 0.108 | 0.524 | 2,552 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | economic | 0.044 | −0.031 | Serbia | 0.007 | 0.787 | 3,746 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.003 | −0.093 | Singapore | −0.045 | 0.932 | 1,743 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | 0.163 | 0.087 | Slovakia | 0.125 | 0.855 | 3,336 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.003 | −0.068 | Slovenia | −0.033 | 0.896 | 3,138 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.080 | 0.012 | South Africa | 0.046 | 0.699 | 5,541 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | economic | 0.065 | −0.016 | South Korea | 0.024 | 0.903 | 3,637 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | 0.225 | 0.166 | Spain | 0.196 | 0.891 | 4,200 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.612 | 0.569 | Sweden | 0.591 | 0.933 | 4,213 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.368 | 0.318 | Switzerland | 0.343 | 0.944 | 5,154 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.165 | 0.054 | Tajikistan | 0.110 | 0.650 | 1,200 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.070 | 0.005 | Thailand | 0.037 | 0.755 | 3,758 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | 0.104 | −0.014 | Trinidad and Tobago | 0.045 | 0.784 | 1,211 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.019 | −0.076 | Tunisia | −0.029 | 0.735 | 1,682 | Middle East & North Africa | | economic | 0.103 | 0.053 | Turkey | 0.078 | 0.791 | 6,325 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.119 | 0.033 | Ukraine | 0.076 | 0.751 | 4,667 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.390 | 0.338 | United Kingdom | 0.364 | 0.922 | 6,124 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.437 | 0.385 | United States | 0.411 | 0.924 | 5,866 | North America | | economic | 0.252 | 0.171 | Uruguay | 0.212 | 0.804 | 2,571 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | −0.049 | −0.207 | Uzbekistan | −0.129 | 0.710 | 591 | Europe & Central Asia | | economic | 0.297 | 0.191 | Venezuela | 0.245 | 0.761 | 1,190 | Latin America & Caribbean | | economic | 0.155 | 0.051 | Vietnam | 0.103 | 0.694 | 1,376 | East Asia & Pacific | | economic | 0.140 | 0.014 | Zambia | 0.077 | 0.588 | 948 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | economic | −0.036 | −0.126 | Zimbabwe | −0.081 | 0.535 | 2,627 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | moral | 0.065 | −0.030 | Albania | 0.018 | 0.785 | 2,220 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | −0.003 | −0.173 | Algeria | −0.089 | 0.754 | 521 | Middle East & North Africa | | moral | 0.254 | 0.161 | Andorra | 0.208 | 0.858 | 1,821 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.208 | 0.119 | Argentina | 0.164 | 0.825 | 2,240 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.063 | −0.012 | Armenia | 0.026 | 0.755 | 3,780 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.252 | 0.184 | Australia | 0.218 | 0.939 | 4,430 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | 0.226 | 0.146 | Austria | 0.186 | 0.908 | 2,681 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.016 | −0.078 | Azerbaijan | −0.031 | 0.757 | 2,138 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.223 | 0.113 | Bangladesh | 0.168 | 0.608 | 1,200 | South Asia | | moral | 0.022 | −0.048 | Belarus | −0.013 | 0.808 | 3,202 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.133 | 0.025 | Belgium | 0.079 | 0.916 | 1,419 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.047 | −0.046 | Bolivia | 0.000 | 0.693 | 1,780 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.168 | 0.082 | Bosnia Herzegovina | 0.125 | 0.768 | 2,285 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.123 | 0.057 | Brazil | 0.090 | 0.759 | 3,624 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | −0.036 | −0.119 | Bulgaria | −0.078 | 0.813 | 2,709 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | −0.029 | −0.147 | Burkina Faso | −0.088 | 0.423 | 1,084 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | moral | 0.318 | 0.259 | Canada | 0.289 | 0.926 | 5,604 | North America | | moral | 0.192 | 0.084 | Chile | 0.138 | 0.843 | 2,077 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.163 | 0.109 | Colombia | 0.136 | 0.747 | 5,015 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.374 | 0.293 | Croatia | 0.334 | 0.831 | 2,358 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.128 | 0.052 | Cyprus | 0.090 | 0.869 | 3,262 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | −0.073 | −0.139 | Czechia | −0.106 | 0.888 | 3,909 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.160 | 0.088 | Denmark | 0.124 | 0.929 | 4,701 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.000 | −0.082 | Ecuador | −0.041 | 0.752 | 2,235 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.006 | −0.065 | Estonia | −0.030 | 0.871 | 3,240 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | −0.065 | −0.153 | Ethiopia | −0.109 | 0.463 | 1,902 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | moral | 0.199 | 0.120 | Finland | 0.160 | 0.920 | 2,910 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.220 | 0.153 | France | 0.187 | 0.901 | 3,818 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.095 | 0.030 | Georgia | 0.063 | 0.780 | 4,271 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.184 | 0.135 | Germany | 0.159 | 0.936 | 8,668 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | −0.039 | −0.130 | Ghana | −0.085 | 0.592 | 2,324 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | moral | 0.327 | 0.246 | Greece | 0.287 | 0.870 | 2,188 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.118 | 0.006 | Guatemala | 0.062 | 0.650 | 1,213 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.060 | −0.029 | Haiti | 0.015 | 0.498 | 1,932 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | −0.023 | −0.088 | Hong Kong SAR | −0.056 | 0.933 | 3,955 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | 0.124 | 0.056 | Hungary | 0.090 | 0.838 | 3,448 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.200 | 0.110 | Iceland | 0.155 | 0.935 | 2,306 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.030 | −0.023 | India | 0.003 | 0.640 | 5,618 | South Asia | | moral | 0.017 | −0.058 | Indonesia | −0.020 | 0.694 | 4,086 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | 0.194 | 0.070 | Iraq | 0.132 | 0.685 | 968 | Middle East & North Africa | | moral | 0.295 | 0.143 | Ireland | 0.221 | 0.938 | 665 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.208 | 0.141 | Italy | 0.175 | 0.880 | 3,452 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.173 | 0.107 | Japan | 0.140 | 0.909 | 3,354 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | 0.092 | −0.011 | Kazakhstan | 0.041 | 0.800 | 1,500 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.161 | 0.045 | Kenya | 0.103 | 0.590 | 1,127 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | moral | 0.225 | 0.126 | Kyrgyzstan | 0.176 | 0.672 | 1,459 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.065 | −0.025 | Latvia | 0.020 | 0.847 | 2,028 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.069 | −0.066 | Lebanon | 0.002 | 0.757 | 837 | Middle East & North Africa | | moral | 0.044 | −0.053 | Libya | −0.005 | 0.706 | 2,514 | Middle East & North Africa | | moral | 0.085 | −0.010 | Lithuania | 0.038 | 0.858 | 1,829 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.291 | 0.174 | Luxembourg | 0.234 | 0.904 | 1,254 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.125 | 0.049 | Malaysia | 0.087 | 0.802 | 2,613 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | 0.226 | 0.107 | Maldives | 0.167 | 0.717 | 1,023 | South Asia | | moral | 0.078 | −0.041 | Mali | 0.018 | 0.427 | 1,081 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | moral | 0.236 | 0.087 | Malta | 0.162 | 0.878 | 751 | Middle East & North Africa | | moral | 0.084 | 0.027 | Mexico | 0.056 | 0.774 | 4,734 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.027 | −0.071 | Moldova | −0.022 | 0.700 | 1,638 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.061 | −0.041 | Mongolia | 0.010 | 0.741 | 1,613 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | 0.148 | 0.030 | Montenegro | 0.089 | 0.814 | 1,250 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.078 | −0.012 | Morocco | 0.033 | 0.667 | 1,904 | Middle East & North Africa | | moral | 0.180 | 0.135 | Netherlands | 0.158 | 0.931 | 7,801 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.240 | 0.138 | New Zealand | 0.190 | 0.917 | 1,352 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | 0.009 | −0.123 | Nicaragua | −0.057 | 0.658 | 871 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.045 | −0.037 | Nigeria | 0.004 | 0.532 | 2,928 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | moral | 0.124 | 0.025 | North Macedonia | 0.075 | 0.757 | 1,763 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.331 | 0.171 | Northern Ireland | 0.253 | 0.922 | 749 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.157 | 0.086 | Norway | 0.122 | 0.953 | 3,142 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.206 | 0.092 | Pakistan | 0.150 | 0.562 | 1,200 | South Asia | | moral | 0.160 | 0.015 | Palestine | 0.088 | 0.686 | 725 | Middle East & North Africa | | moral | 0.024 | −0.064 | Peru | −0.020 | 0.750 | 2,183 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.046 | −0.042 | Philippines | 0.002 | 0.699 | 2,389 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | 0.315 | 0.253 | Poland | 0.284 | 0.865 | 3,646 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.099 | −0.012 | Portugal | 0.043 | 0.847 | 1,915 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | −0.029 | −0.090 | Romania | −0.059 | 0.811 | 4,615 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.026 | −0.041 | Russia | −0.007 | 0.816 | 4,507 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.034 | −0.044 | Rwanda | −0.005 | 0.524 | 2,554 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | moral | 0.107 | 0.031 | Serbia | 0.069 | 0.787 | 3,654 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.224 | 0.131 | Singapore | 0.178 | 0.932 | 1,737 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | −0.001 | −0.079 | Slovakia | −0.041 | 0.855 | 3,260 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.330 | 0.265 | Slovenia | 0.298 | 0.896 | 3,127 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | −0.033 | −0.100 | South Africa | −0.067 | 0.699 | 5,512 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | moral | 0.241 | 0.163 | South Korea | 0.202 | 0.903 | 3,637 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | 0.351 | 0.296 | Spain | 0.323 | 0.891 | 4,220 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.082 | 0.016 | Sweden | 0.049 | 0.933 | 4,155 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.227 | 0.173 | Switzerland | 0.200 | 0.944 | 5,159 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.026 | −0.087 | Tajikistan | −0.030 | 0.650 | 1,200 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | −0.006 | −0.070 | Thailand | −0.038 | 0.755 | 3,751 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | 0.044 | −0.075 | Trinidad and Tobago | −0.015 | 0.784 | 1,206 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.132 | 0.038 | Tunisia | 0.085 | 0.735 | 1,696 | Middle East & North Africa | | moral | 0.212 | 0.164 | Turkey | 0.188 | 0.791 | 6,427 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.057 | −0.032 | Ukraine | 0.012 | 0.751 | 4,550 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.199 | 0.140 | United Kingdom | 0.170 | 0.922 | 6,116 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.397 | 0.342 | United States | 0.370 | 0.924 | 5,823 | North America | | moral | 0.235 | 0.153 | Uruguay | 0.194 | 0.804 | 2,600 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.073 | −0.085 | Uzbekistan | −0.006 | 0.710 | 615 | Europe & Central Asia | | moral | 0.079 | −0.034 | Venezuela | 0.022 | 0.761 | 1,190 | Latin America & Caribbean | | moral | 0.180 | 0.076 | Vietnam | 0.128 | 0.694 | 1,381 | East Asia & Pacific | | moral | 0.095 | −0.032 | Zambia | 0.032 | 0.588 | 945 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | moral | 0.022 | −0.069 | Zimbabwe | −0.024 | 0.535 | 2,626 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | religious | 0.180 | 0.087 | Albania | 0.134 | 0.785 | 2,209 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.062 | −0.107 | Algeria | −0.022 | 0.754 | 536 | Middle East & North Africa | | religious | 0.262 | 0.170 | Andorra | 0.217 | 0.858 | 1,813 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.262 | 0.176 | Argentina | 0.219 | 0.825 | 2,326 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.075 | 0.001 | Armenia | 0.038 | 0.755 | 3,758 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.230 | 0.161 | Australia | 0.196 | 0.939 | 4,456 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.168 | 0.088 | Austria | 0.128 | 0.908 | 2,710 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.090 | −0.004 | Azerbaijan | 0.043 | 0.757 | 2,152 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.062 | −0.051 | Bangladesh | 0.006 | 0.608 | 1,200 | South Asia | | religious | 0.107 | 0.036 | Belarus | 0.072 | 0.808 | 3,186 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.174 | 0.067 | Belgium | 0.121 | 0.916 | 1,421 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.098 | 0.006 | Bolivia | 0.052 | 0.693 | 1,803 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.235 | 0.150 | Bosnia Herzegovina | 0.193 | 0.768 | 2,269 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.124 | 0.059 | Brazil | 0.092 | 0.759 | 3,673 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.093 | 0.009 | Bulgaria | 0.051 | 0.813 | 2,670 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.024 | −0.094 | Burkina Faso | −0.035 | 0.423 | 1,109 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | religious | 0.284 | 0.224 | Canada | 0.254 | 0.926 | 5,628 | North America | | religious | 0.146 | 0.037 | Chile | 0.092 | 0.843 | 2,085 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.144 | 0.090 | Colombia | 0.117 | 0.747 | 5,005 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.399 | 0.320 | Croatia | 0.360 | 0.831 | 2,354 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.112 | 0.036 | Cyprus | 0.074 | 0.869 | 3,279 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.048 | −0.020 | Czechia | 0.014 | 0.888 | 3,856 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.100 | 0.027 | Denmark | 0.064 | 0.929 | 4,678 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.088 | 0.005 | Ecuador | 0.047 | 0.752 | 2,243 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.039 | −0.039 | Egypt | 0.000 | 0.696 | 2,721 | Middle East & North Africa | | religious | −0.025 | −0.096 | Estonia | −0.061 | 0.871 | 3,216 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.157 | 0.069 | Ethiopia | 0.113 | 0.463 | 1,914 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | religious | 0.227 | 0.148 | Finland | 0.188 | 0.920 | 2,897 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.217 | 0.151 | France | 0.184 | 0.901 | 3,845 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.083 | 0.018 | Georgia | 0.051 | 0.780 | 4,283 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.163 | 0.113 | Germany | 0.138 | 0.936 | 8,654 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.073 | −0.019 | Ghana | 0.027 | 0.592 | 2,330 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | religious | 0.329 | 0.247 | Greece | 0.289 | 0.870 | 2,118 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.114 | 0.002 | Guatemala | 0.059 | 0.650 | 1,211 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.054 | −0.035 | Haiti | 0.010 | 0.498 | 1,929 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.090 | 0.024 | Hong Kong SAR | 0.057 | 0.933 | 3,801 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.187 | 0.119 | Hungary | 0.153 | 0.838 | 3,432 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.174 | 0.083 | Iceland | 0.129 | 0.935 | 2,299 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.150 | 0.099 | India | 0.125 | 0.640 | 5,785 | South Asia | | religious | 0.103 | 0.029 | Indonesia | 0.066 | 0.694 | 4,082 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.135 | 0.010 | Iraq | 0.073 | 0.685 | 978 | Middle East & North Africa | | religious | 0.295 | 0.145 | Ireland | 0.221 | 0.938 | 682 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.226 | 0.160 | Italy | 0.193 | 0.880 | 3,515 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.163 | 0.097 | Japan | 0.130 | 0.909 | 3,386 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.159 | 0.057 | Kazakhstan | 0.108 | 0.800 | 1,500 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.020 | −0.095 | Kenya | −0.038 | 0.590 | 1,160 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | religious | 0.233 | 0.134 | Kyrgyzstan | 0.184 | 0.672 | 1,458 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.099 | 0.009 | Latvia | 0.054 | 0.847 | 2,033 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.174 | 0.040 | Lebanon | 0.108 | 0.757 | 834 | Middle East & North Africa | | religious | 0.079 | −0.016 | Libya | 0.032 | 0.706 | 2,594 | Middle East & North Africa | | religious | 0.162 | 0.068 | Lithuania | 0.115 | 0.858 | 1,812 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.327 | 0.213 | Luxembourg | 0.271 | 0.904 | 1,261 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.184 | 0.109 | Malaysia | 0.147 | 0.802 | 2,613 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.152 | 0.031 | Maldives | 0.092 | 0.717 | 1,023 | South Asia | | religious | 0.072 | −0.044 | Mali | 0.014 | 0.427 | 1,140 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | religious | 0.145 | −0.006 | Malta | 0.070 | 0.878 | 770 | Middle East & North Africa | | religious | 0.127 | 0.070 | Mexico | 0.099 | 0.774 | 4,781 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.096 | −0.001 | Moldova | 0.048 | 0.700 | 1,657 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.251 | 0.152 | Mongolia | 0.202 | 0.741 | 1,611 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.205 | 0.087 | Montenegro | 0.146 | 0.814 | 1,218 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.084 | −0.006 | Morocco | 0.039 | 0.667 | 1,914 | Middle East & North Africa | | religious | 0.148 | 0.102 | Netherlands | 0.125 | 0.931 | 7,785 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.181 | 0.077 | New Zealand | 0.130 | 0.917 | 1,361 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.084 | −0.048 | Nicaragua | 0.018 | 0.658 | 871 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.085 | 0.003 | Nigeria | 0.044 | 0.532 | 2,929 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | religious | 0.138 | 0.038 | North Macedonia | 0.088 | 0.757 | 1,729 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.243 | 0.079 | Northern Ireland | 0.162 | 0.922 | 763 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.129 | 0.058 | Norway | 0.093 | 0.953 | 3,144 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.223 | 0.110 | Pakistan | 0.167 | 0.562 | 1,200 | South Asia | | religious | 0.161 | 0.016 | Palestine | 0.089 | 0.686 | 728 | Middle East & North Africa | | religious | 0.110 | 0.041 | Peru | 0.076 | 0.750 | 3,339 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.117 | 0.029 | Philippines | 0.073 | 0.699 | 2,388 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.311 | 0.249 | Poland | 0.280 | 0.865 | 3,703 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.201 | 0.093 | Portugal | 0.147 | 0.847 | 1,954 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.037 | −0.023 | Romania | 0.007 | 0.811 | 4,728 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.142 | 0.074 | Russia | 0.108 | 0.816 | 4,411 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.036 | −0.042 | Rwanda | −0.003 | 0.524 | 2,554 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | religious | 0.117 | 0.041 | Serbia | 0.079 | 0.787 | 3,715 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.153 | 0.058 | Singapore | 0.106 | 0.932 | 1,740 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.026 | −0.053 | Slovakia | −0.014 | 0.855 | 3,257 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.359 | 0.296 | Slovenia | 0.328 | 0.896 | 3,098 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.108 | 0.041 | South Africa | 0.075 | 0.699 | 5,568 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | religious | 0.099 | 0.018 | South Korea | 0.059 | 0.903 | 3,631 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.386 | 0.333 | Spain | 0.360 | 0.891 | 4,244 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.059 | −0.007 | Sweden | 0.026 | 0.933 | 4,155 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.122 | 0.066 | Switzerland | 0.094 | 0.944 | 5,138 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.324 | 0.219 | Tajikistan | 0.272 | 0.650 | 1,200 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.049 | −0.017 | Thailand | 0.016 | 0.755 | 3,656 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.083 | −0.036 | Trinidad and Tobago | 0.023 | 0.784 | 1,210 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.159 | 0.065 | Tunisia | 0.113 | 0.735 | 1,681 | Middle East & North Africa | | religious | 0.238 | 0.190 | Turkey | 0.214 | 0.791 | 6,438 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.145 | 0.058 | Ukraine | 0.102 | 0.751 | 4,601 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.152 | 0.092 | United Kingdom | 0.122 | 0.922 | 6,155 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.313 | 0.254 | United States | 0.284 | 0.924 | 5,858 | North America | | religious | 0.241 | 0.160 | Uruguay | 0.201 | 0.804 | 2,586 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.265 | 0.113 | Uzbekistan | 0.190 | 0.710 | 615 | Europe & Central Asia | | religious | 0.019 | −0.094 | Venezuela | −0.037 | 0.761 | 1,190 | Latin America & Caribbean | | religious | 0.139 | 0.034 | Vietnam | 0.086 | 0.694 | 1,373 | East Asia & Pacific | | religious | 0.043 | −0.085 | Zambia | −0.021 | 0.588 | 946 | Sub-Saharan Africa | | religious | 0.003 | −0.088 | Zimbabwe | −0.042 | 0.535 | 2,627 | Sub-Saharan Africa | Views: Economic (axis = economic); Moral (axis = moral); Religious (axis = religious). Note: Kosovo, Macau, Puerto Rico and Taiwan have loadings but no HDI in the context file and are left out of this figure. Note: Each dot shows the country estimate only. The interval of every loading is in the data table. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted (weight, S017 within each country); countries with an effective sample of 300 or more; HDI from the country context file joined to the survey (a single value per country) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/loadings_by_hdi.json ### Table 8. Country loadings on religion in the ESS track those in the WVS and EVS, with a correlation of +0.88 Loading of left-right self-placement in the WVS/EVS (horizontal) and the ESS (vertical), countries in both surveys | Country | Axis | WVS and EVS loading | WVS and EVS interval low | WVS and EVS interval high | WVS and EVS respondents | ESS loading | ESS interval low | ESS interval high | ESS respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Albania | religious | +0.13 | +0.09 | +0.18 | 2,209 | +0.13 | +0.05 | +0.21 | 1,075 | | Austria | religious | +0.13 | +0.09 | +0.17 | 2,710 | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.16 | 11,712 | | Belgium | religious | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.17 | 1,421 | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.04 | 14,734 | | Bulgaria | religious | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.09 | 2,670 | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.03 | 11,631 | | Croatia | religious | +0.36 | +0.32 | +0.40 | 2,354 | +0.29 | +0.26 | +0.31 | 6,727 | | Cyprus | religious | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,279 | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.10 | 5,481 | | Czechia | religious | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 3,856 | −0.04 | −0.06 | −0.02 | 14,071 | | Denmark | religious | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 4,678 | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.08 | 9,023 | | Estonia | religious | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 3,216 | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.03 | 13,568 | | Finland | religious | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,897 | +0.18 | +0.16 | +0.19 | 16,370 | | France | religious | +0.18 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 3,845 | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.15 | 16,168 | | Germany | religious | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.16 | 8,654 | +0.15 | +0.13 | +0.16 | 29,078 | | Greece | religious | +0.29 | +0.25 | +0.33 | 2,118 | +0.24 | +0.22 | +0.27 | 8,492 | | Hungary | religious | +0.15 | +0.12 | +0.19 | 3,432 | +0.11 | +0.09 | +0.12 | 12,999 | | Iceland | religious | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.17 | 2,299 | +0.11 | +0.08 | +0.14 | 3,999 | | Ireland | religious | +0.22 | +0.14 | +0.29 | 682 | +0.21 | +0.20 | +0.23 | 17,000 | | Italy | religious | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.23 | 3,515 | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.14 | 8,571 | | Kosovo | religious | −0.06 | −0.13 | +0.02 | 650 | +0.10 | +0.01 | +0.19 | 811 | | Latvia | religious | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.10 | 2,033 | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 4,070 | | Lithuania | religious | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,812 | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.08 | 9,180 | | Montenegro | religious | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.21 | 1,218 | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.13 | 2,973 | | Netherlands | religious | +0.13 | +0.10 | +0.15 | 7,785 | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.14 | 14,937 | | North Macedonia | religious | +0.09 | +0.04 | +0.14 | 1,729 | +0.12 | +0.03 | +0.22 | 880 | | Norway | religious | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 3,144 | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.10 | 13,264 | | Poland | religious | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 3,703 | +0.29 | +0.28 | +0.31 | 12,994 | | Portugal | religious | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.20 | 1,954 | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.17 | 11,891 | | Romania | religious | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.04 | 4,728 | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.15 | 1,466 | | Russia | religious | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.14 | 4,411 | +0.04 | +0.01 | +0.07 | 7,854 | | Serbia | religious | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.12 | 3,715 | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.17 | 3,605 | | Slovakia | religious | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.03 | 3,257 | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 9,783 | | Slovenia | religious | +0.33 | +0.30 | +0.36 | 3,098 | +0.36 | +0.34 | +0.37 | 9,147 | | Spain | religious | +0.36 | +0.33 | +0.39 | 4,244 | +0.30 | +0.28 | +0.31 | 15,753 | | Sweden | religious | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.06 | 4,155 | +0.05 | +0.04 | +0.07 | 14,926 | | Switzerland | religious | +0.09 | +0.07 | +0.12 | 5,138 | +0.12 | +0.11 | +0.14 | 13,176 | | Turkey | religious | +0.21 | +0.19 | +0.24 | 6,438 | +0.24 | +0.19 | +0.29 | 1,928 | | Ukraine | religious | +0.10 | +0.06 | +0.15 | 4,601 | +0.11 | +0.08 | +0.14 | 5,947 | | United Kingdom | religious | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.15 | 6,155 | +0.09 | +0.07 | +0.10 | 16,448 | | Albania | moral | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 2,220 | +0.06 | −0.02 | +0.15 | 1,036 | | Austria | moral | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.23 | 2,681 | +0.22 | +0.20 | +0.24 | 11,495 | | Belgium | moral | +0.08 | +0.02 | +0.13 | 1,419 | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.05 | 14,693 | | Bulgaria | moral | −0.08 | −0.12 | −0.04 | 2,709 | −0.14 | −0.16 | −0.11 | 10,701 | | Croatia | moral | +0.33 | +0.29 | +0.37 | 2,358 | +0.26 | +0.23 | +0.28 | 6,546 | | Cyprus | moral | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.13 | 3,262 | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.04 | 5,316 | | Czechia | moral | −0.11 | −0.14 | −0.07 | 3,909 | −0.12 | −0.14 | −0.10 | 13,756 | | Denmark | moral | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 4,701 | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.14 | 8,992 | | Estonia | moral | −0.03 | −0.07 | +0.01 | 3,240 | −0.06 | −0.08 | −0.04 | 13,276 | | Finland | moral | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.20 | 2,910 | +0.17 | +0.16 | +0.19 | 16,287 | | France | moral | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 3,818 | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.15 | 16,107 | | Germany | moral | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.18 | 8,668 | +0.19 | +0.18 | +0.21 | 29,021 | | Greece | moral | +0.29 | +0.25 | +0.33 | 2,188 | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.21 | 8,325 | | Hungary | moral | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.12 | 3,448 | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.15 | 12,264 | | Iceland | moral | +0.16 | +0.11 | +0.20 | 2,306 | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.13 | 3,982 | | Ireland | moral | +0.22 | +0.14 | +0.30 | 665 | +0.11 | +0.09 | +0.13 | 16,742 | | Italy | moral | +0.17 | +0.14 | +0.21 | 3,452 | +0.20 | +0.18 | +0.22 | 8,485 | | Kosovo | moral | −0.02 | −0.10 | +0.06 | 655 | −0.14 | −0.24 | −0.04 | 715 | | Latvia | moral | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 2,028 | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 3,931 | | Lithuania | moral | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 1,829 | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.01 | 8,772 | | Montenegro | moral | +0.09 | +0.03 | +0.15 | 1,250 | +0.06 | +0.01 | +0.11 | 2,898 | | Netherlands | moral | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.18 | 7,801 | +0.17 | +0.15 | +0.18 | 14,891 | | North Macedonia | moral | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.12 | 1,763 | +0.01 | −0.09 | +0.11 | 840 | | Norway | moral | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 3,142 | +0.15 | +0.13 | +0.17 | 13,231 | | Poland | moral | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 3,646 | +0.23 | +0.21 | +0.25 | 12,621 | | Portugal | moral | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.10 | 1,915 | +0.11 | +0.08 | +0.13 | 11,519 | | Romania | moral | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.03 | 4,615 | 0.00 | −0.06 | +0.06 | 1,354 | | Russia | moral | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 4,507 | −0.08 | −0.11 | −0.05 | 7,160 | | Serbia | moral | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.11 | 3,654 | +0.14 | +0.10 | +0.19 | 3,549 | | Slovakia | moral | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 3,260 | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.05 | 9,445 | | Slovenia | moral | +0.30 | +0.26 | +0.33 | 3,127 | +0.22 | +0.20 | +0.24 | 8,891 | | Spain | moral | +0.32 | +0.30 | +0.35 | 4,220 | +0.23 | +0.21 | +0.25 | 15,588 | | Sweden | moral | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.08 | 4,155 | +0.11 | +0.09 | +0.12 | 14,860 | | Switzerland | moral | +0.20 | +0.17 | +0.23 | 5,159 | +0.21 | +0.20 | +0.23 | 13,090 | | Turkey | moral | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.21 | 6,427 | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.27 | 1,745 | | Ukraine | moral | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 4,550 | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.01 | 5,220 | | United Kingdom | moral | +0.17 | +0.14 | +0.20 | 6,116 | +0.16 | +0.14 | +0.18 | 16,347 | | Austria | economic | +0.21 | +0.17 | +0.25 | 2,705 | +0.19 | +0.14 | +0.24 | 1,817 | | Belgium | economic | +0.25 | +0.20 | +0.30 | 1,414 | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.22 | 3,372 | | Bulgaria | economic | +0.25 | +0.21 | +0.29 | 2,773 | +0.17 | +0.11 | +0.22 | 1,600 | | Croatia | economic | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.07 | 2,352 | −0.08 | −0.15 | −0.01 | 1,108 | | Cyprus | economic | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 3,266 | +0.09 | +0.02 | +0.15 | 1,008 | | Czechia | economic | +0.37 | +0.35 | +0.40 | 3,991 | +0.29 | +0.26 | +0.32 | 3,861 | | Denmark | economic | +0.46 | +0.43 | +0.49 | 4,679 | +0.32 | +0.26 | +0.37 | 1,535 | | Estonia | economic | +0.26 | +0.23 | +0.29 | 3,302 | +0.13 | +0.10 | +0.17 | 3,034 | | Finland | economic | +0.44 | +0.40 | +0.47 | 2,932 | +0.24 | +0.21 | +0.27 | 3,937 | | France | economic | +0.34 | +0.31 | +0.37 | 3,827 | +0.27 | +0.24 | +0.30 | 3,859 | | Germany | economic | +0.19 | +0.17 | +0.22 | 8,683 | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.19 | 5,288 | | Greece | economic | +0.19 | +0.15 | +0.24 | 2,184 | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.18 | 1,709 | | Hungary | economic | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 3,447 | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.01 | 2,534 | | Iceland | economic | +0.50 | +0.46 | +0.53 | 2,307 | +0.23 | +0.16 | +0.30 | 829 | | Ireland | economic | +0.07 | −0.01 | +0.15 | 687 | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 3,887 | | Italy | economic | +0.24 | +0.21 | +0.27 | 3,509 | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,687 | | Latvia | economic | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.11 | 2,056 | −0.11 | −0.16 | −0.06 | 1,656 | | Lithuania | economic | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 1,871 | +0.04 | −0.02 | +0.10 | 1,510 | | Netherlands | economic | +0.39 | +0.37 | +0.41 | 7,741 | +0.24 | +0.20 | +0.28 | 3,271 | | Norway | economic | +0.45 | +0.42 | +0.48 | 3,148 | +0.29 | +0.26 | +0.33 | 3,009 | | Poland | economic | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.03 | 3,718 | −0.05 | −0.09 | −0.02 | 2,746 | | Portugal | economic | +0.12 | +0.06 | +0.17 | 1,895 | +0.11 | +0.06 | +0.16 | 2,744 | | Romania | economic | +0.11 | +0.08 | +0.14 | 4,705 | +0.06 | 0.00 | +0.12 | 1,460 | | Russia | economic | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 4,564 | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.14 | 3,162 | | Slovakia | economic | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 3,336 | +0.19 | +0.13 | +0.25 | 1,545 | | Slovenia | economic | −0.03 | −0.07 | 0.00 | 3,138 | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.08 | 2,079 | | Spain | economic | +0.20 | +0.17 | +0.23 | 4,200 | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.22 | 3,752 | | Sweden | economic | +0.59 | +0.57 | +0.61 | 4,213 | +0.38 | +0.35 | +0.42 | 3,242 | | Switzerland | economic | +0.34 | +0.32 | +0.37 | 5,154 | +0.27 | +0.23 | +0.30 | 3,102 | | Turkey | economic | +0.08 | +0.05 | +0.10 | 6,325 | −0.04 | −0.09 | +0.02 | 1,883 | | Ukraine | economic | +0.08 | +0.03 | +0.12 | 4,667 | +0.11 | +0.02 | +0.18 | 1,037 | | United Kingdom | economic | +0.36 | +0.34 | +0.39 | 6,124 | +0.24 | +0.20 | +0.27 | 3,872 | Views: Religious (axis = religious); Moral (axis = moral); Economic (axis = economic). Note: Northern Ireland is left out because the ESS reports it within the United Kingdom. Note: The chart shows no interval on either loading. The data table lists the interval and the number of respondents of both loadings for every country. Note: The two surveys use different items and cover different years, so equal values are not expected on the economic and moral views. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023, and European Social Survey, rounds 3 to 11 (rounds 4 and 8 for the economic axis); weighted (weight within each survey); countries with an effective sample of 300 or more in both Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/wvs_ess_agreement.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (106), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | agree_drop_rel | 5 | countries | count of countries left out of the leave-out check because the WVS/EVS religious loading is at or above the cutoff | countries with usable religious loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 3 to 11 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | agree_k_econ | 32 | countries | count of countries in both surveys | countries with usable loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 4 and 8 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | agree_k_moral | 37 | countries | count of countries in both surveys | countries with usable loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 3 to 11 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | agree_k_rel | 37 | countries | count of countries in both surveys | countries with usable loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 3 to 11 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | agree_k_rel_trim | 32 | countries | count of countries left in the leave-out check | countries with usable religious loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 3 to 11 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | agree_lower_econ | 26 | countries | count of countries where the ESS economic loading is lower than the WVS/EVS economic loading | countries with usable economic loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 4 and 8 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | agree_mad_econ | 0.09 | absolute difference in correlation units | mean across countries of the absolute difference between the two surveys loadings | countries with usable economic loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 4 and 8 | | | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | agree_mad_moral | 0.05 | absolute difference in correlation units | mean across countries of the absolute difference between the two surveys loadings | countries with usable moral loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 3 to 11 | | | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | agree_mad_rel | 0.04 | absolute difference in correlation units | mean across countries of the absolute difference between the two surveys loadings | countries with usable religious loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 3 to 11 | | | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | agree_meddiff_econ | −0.07 | difference in correlation units | median across countries of the ESS economic loading minus the WVS/EVS economic loading | countries with usable economic loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 4 and 8 | | | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | agree_r_econ | +0.88 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries between the WVS/EVS and ESS economic loadings (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 4 and 8 | 95% CI 0.76 to 0.94 | 32 | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | agree_r_moral | +0.89 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries between the WVS/EVS and ESS moral loadings (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 3 to 11 | 95% CI 0.79 to 0.94 | 37 | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | agree_r_rel | +0.88 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries between the WVS/EVS and ESS religious loadings (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 3 to 11 | 95% CI 0.77 to 0.93 | 37 | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | agree_r_rel_trim | +0.73 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries between the WVS/EVS and ESS religious loadings, leaving out countries with a WVS/EVS loading at or above the cutoff (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable religious loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 3 to 11 | 95% CI 0.51 to 0.86 | 32 | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | agree_sign_rel | 34 | countries | count of countries where both surveys give a loading of the same sign | countries with usable religious loadings in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 3 to 11 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | agree_trim_cut | 0.25 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | WVS/EVS religious loading at or above which a country is left out of the check | threshold used to set countries aside | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005 or later; ESS rounds 3 to 11 | | | none (constant) | European Social Survey | | | cz_econ | +0.37 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the economic index (higher = economic right) | respondents in Czechia with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2008, 2017, 2022, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.40 | 3,991 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | cz_moral | −0.11 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the moral index (higher = morally conservative) | respondents in Czechia with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2008, 2017, 2022, waves pooled | 95% CI −0.14 to −0.07 | 3,909 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | deff_sens | 2 | ratio of variances | assumed multiplier of the variance of every country correlation to allow for clustering (a sensitivity check, not an estimate) | design effect assumed in the sensitivity check | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (constant) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | es_moral | +0.32 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the moral index (higher = morally conservative) | respondents in Spain with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2007, 2008, 2011, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.30 to 0.35 | 4,220 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | es_rel | +0.36 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with importance of God (higher = more religious) | respondents in Spain with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2007, 2008, 2011, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.39 | 4,244 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | estonia_rel | −0.06 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with importance of God (higher = more religious) | respondents in Estonia with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2008, 2011, 2018, waves pooled | 95% CI −0.10 to −0.03 | 3,216 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_cut_top | 0.86 | Human Development Index, 0 to 1 | HDI at or below which a country is in the lowest two thirds (upper tercile cut point, the same to two decimals on the three axes) | countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (constant) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_diff_econ | +0.22 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median of the economic loading in the highest third minus the median in the lowest third (bootstrap over countries within each third) | the highest and lowest thirds by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.32 | 66 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_diff_moral | +0.17 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median of the moral loading in the highest third minus the median in the lowest third (bootstrap over countries within each third) | the highest and lowest thirds by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.13 to 0.20 | 65 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_diff_rel | +0.07 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median of the religious loading in the highest third minus the median in the lowest third (bootstrap over countries within each third) | the highest and lowest thirds by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.13 | 66 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_hi_econ | +0.26 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the economic loading (bootstrap over countries) | the highest third by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.34 | 32 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_hi_moral | +0.18 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the moral loading (bootstrap over countries) | the highest third by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.20 | 32 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_hi_rel | +0.13 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the religious loading (bootstrap over countries) | the highest third by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.11 to 0.19 | 32 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_lo_econ | +0.04 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the economic loading (bootstrap over countries) | the lowest third by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.00 to 0.07 | 34 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_lo_moral | 0.00 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the moral loading (bootstrap over countries) | the lowest third by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.03 | 33 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_lo_rel | +0.06 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the religious loading (bootstrap over countries) | the lowest third by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.09 | 34 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_mid_econ | +0.05 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the economic loading (bootstrap over countries) | the middle third by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.08 | 34 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_mid_moral | +0.04 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the moral loading (bootstrap over countries) | the middle third by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.07 | 34 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_mid_rel | +0.10 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the religious loading (bootstrap over countries) | the middle third by human development index of the countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.12 | 34 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | in_moral | 0.00 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the moral index (higher = morally conservative) | respondents in India with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2006, 2012, 2023, waves pooled | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.03 | 5,618 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | in_rel | +0.12 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with importance of God (higher = more religious) | respondents in India with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2006, 2012, 2023, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.15 | 5,785 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | item_r_econ | +0.06 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the mean pairwise correlation among the four economic items after orientation | respondents within a country, median across countries | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | item_r_econ_ess | +0.13 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across the countries in both surveys of the mean pairwise correlation among the six ESS welfare items after orientation | countries with usable economic loadings in both surveys | ESS rounds 4 and 8 | | | weight (S017) within the country | European Social Survey | | | item_r_econ_shared | +0.15 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across the countries in both surveys of the mean pairwise correlation among the four WVS/EVS economic items after orientation | countries with usable economic loadings in both surveys | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | item_r_moral | +0.48 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the mean pairwise correlation among the three moral items after orientation | respondents within a country, median across countries | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | loading_cut | +0.30 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | cutoff for a larger loading | threshold used to count larger loadings | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (constant) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | loading_r_moral_rel | +0.72 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the moral and religious loadings (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable loadings on both axes | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.61 to 0.80 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_econ_2item | +0.12 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the loading on income differences and government responsibility (bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.12 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_econ_3item | +0.03 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the loading on government responsibility, state ownership and competition (bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.07 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_econ_compet | +0.02 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the loading on competition alone (bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.03 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_econ_govresp | +0.07 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the loading on government responsibility alone (bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.09 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_econ_income | +0.09 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the loading on income differences alone (bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.11 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_econ_owner | +0.02 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the loading on state ownership of business alone (bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.05 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_moral_abort | +0.06 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the loading on abortion alone (bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.08 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_moral_divorce | +0.05 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the loading on divorce alone (bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.08 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_moral_homo | +0.05 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the loading on homosexuality alone (bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.08 | 102 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | median_econ | +0.07 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the economic loading (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.10 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | median_moral | +0.07 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the moral loading (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.11 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | median_rel | +0.09 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the religious loading (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.11 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | mongolia_econ | −0.16 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the economic index (higher = economic right) | respondents in Mongolia with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2020, waves pooled | 95% CI −0.20 to −0.10 | 1,613 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_clear_econ | 29 | countries and territories | count of countries where the economic axis leads and the lead is clear (the lower bound of its interval exceeds the other axes point estimates) | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_clear_moral | 6 | countries and territories | count of countries where the moral axis leads and the lead is clear (the lower bound of its interval exceeds the other axes point estimates) | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_clear_rel | 16 | countries and territories | count of countries where the religious axis leads and the lead is clear (the lower bound of its interval exceeds the other axes point estimates) | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_countries_2005 | 112 | countries and territories | count | surveyed in 2005 or later | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_countries_file | 118 | countries and territories | count of countries and territories (ten EVS labels restored from the country code) | all countries in the cleaned WVS/EVS file | 1981-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_countries_lr | 107 | countries and territories | count | asked the left-right question, 30 or more answers | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_countries_used | 104 | countries and territories | count of countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on at least one axis | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_econ | 104 | countries and territories | count of countries with a usable loading on the economic axis | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_econ_30 | 14 | countries and territories | count of countries where the economic loading is +0.30 or higher | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_econ_above | 61 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval of the economic loading is above zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_econ_above_d2 | 56 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval of the economic loading is above zero when the effective sample is divided by the design effect | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_econ_below | 7 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval of the economic loading is below zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_hdi_missing | 4 | countries and territories | count of countries left out of the HDI comparisons | countries with a usable loading but no human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_lead_clear | 51 | countries and territories | count of countries where the lower bound of the leading loading exceeds the other axes point estimates | countries where an axis has an interval above zero | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_lead_unclear | 42 | countries and territories | count of countries where one axis has the largest loading but the lead is not clear | countries where an axis has an interval above zero | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_moral | 103 | countries and territories | count of countries with a usable loading on the moral axis | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_moral_30 | 3 | countries and territories | count of countries where the moral loading is +0.30 or higher | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_moral_above | 57 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval of the moral loading is above zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_moral_above_d2 | 55 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval of the moral loading is above zero when the effective sample is divided by the design effect | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_moral_below | 11 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval of the moral loading is below zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_near_tie | 28 | countries and territories | count of countries where the two largest loadings differ by less than the cutoff | countries with a usable loading on at least two axes | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_rel | 104 | countries and territories | count of countries with a usable loading on the religious axis | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_rel_30 | 3 | countries and territories | count of countries where the religious loading is +0.30 or higher | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_rel_above | 75 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval of the religious loading is above zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_rel_above_d2 | 66 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval of the religious loading is above zero when the effective sample is divided by the design effect | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_resp_used | 288,980 | respondents | count of respondents behind the estimates | respondents with a left-right answer and a positive weight in the countries with a usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_respondents | 289,897 | respondents | count of respondents | respondents with a left-right answer and a positive weight | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_strong_econ | 37 | countries and territories | count of countries where the largest loading with an interval above zero is on the economic axis | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_strong_moral | 15 | countries and territories | count of countries where the largest loading with an interval above zero is on the moral axis | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_strong_none | 11 | countries and territories | count of countries where no loading has an interval above zero | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_strong_none_d2 | 18 | countries and territories | count of countries where no loading has an interval above zero when the effective sample is divided by the design effect | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_strong_rel | 41 | countries and territories | count of countries where the largest loading with an interval above zero is on the religious axis | countries with at least one usable loading | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_with_leader | 93 | countries and territories | count of countries where at least one loading has an interval above zero, so that one axis leads | countries where an axis has an interval above zero | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | near_tie_cut | 0.02 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | cutoff for two loadings to count as close | threshold used to count close leaders | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (constant) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | neff_floor | 300 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | minimum effective sample for a country to appear | country-axis cells | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (constant) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | pl_econ | 0.00 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the economic index (higher = economic right) | respondents in Poland with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2005, 2008, 2012, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI −0.03 to 0.03 | 3,718 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | pl_moral | +0.28 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the moral index (higher = morally conservative) | respondents in Poland with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2005, 2008, 2012, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.31 | 3,646 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | pl_rel | +0.28 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with importance of God (higher = more religious) | respondents in Poland with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2005, 2008, 2012, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.31 | 3,703 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | r_2item_3item | +0.80 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries between the loadings on the two-item and three-item definitions (Fisher z interval) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.72 to 0.86 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | r_hdi_econ | +0.51 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries between HDI and the economic loading (Fisher z interval) | countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.64 | 100 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | r_hdi_moral | +0.52 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries between HDI and the moral loading (Fisher z interval) | countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.36 to 0.65 | 99 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | r_hdi_rel | +0.43 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries between HDI and the religious loading (Fisher z interval) | countries with a usable loading and a human development index | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.58 | 100 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | r_income_compet | +0.58 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries between the loadings on income differences and competition alone (Fisher z interval) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.43 to 0.69 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | r_income_owner | +0.53 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries between the loadings on income differences and state ownership of business alone (Fisher z interval) | countries and territories with an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.37 to 0.65 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | se_econ | +0.59 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the economic index (higher = economic right) | respondents in Sweden with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2006, 2009, 2011, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.57 to 0.61 | 4,213 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | se_rel | +0.03 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with importance of God (higher = more religious) | respondents in Sweden with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2006, 2009, 2011, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.06 | 4,155 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_econ | +0.41 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the economic index (higher = economic right) | respondents in United States with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2006, 2011, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.38 to 0.44 | 5,866 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_rel | +0.28 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with importance of God (higher = more religious) | respondents in United States with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2006, 2011, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.31 | 5,858 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | within_r_econ_moral | −0.01 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the within-country correlation between the economic and moral indices | respondents within a country, median across countries | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | within_r_moral_rel | +0.21 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the within-country correlation between the moral index and importance of God | respondents within a country, median across countries | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | ## Definitions - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Loading: The correlation, inside one country, between a survey scale such as left-right self-placement and an attitude. A loading of zero means the attitude says nothing about where people place themselves, and a positive loading means people who hold it place themselves further right. - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. ## Methods Sample: respondents in the World Values Survey and European Values Study with fieldwork in 2005 or later (waves 5 to 7 and EVS 2008 and 2017), who answered the left-right question (1 to 10, 10 = right) and carry a positive weight: 107 of the 112 countries and territories surveyed in that window and 289,897 respondents. 104 of these countries have an effective sample of 300 or more on at least one axis, and their 288,980 respondents enter the estimates. The cleaned file holds 118 countries and territories; ten EVS countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Kosovo and Northern Cyprus) have a blank country label there and are restored from the country code before any estimate. Estimand: for each country and axis, the survey-weighted Pearson correlation between left-right and the axis, waves pooled (the loading). Axes: the economic index averages the within-country weighted z-scores of income differences, government responsibility, state ownership and competition (E035, E037, E036, E039; at least three answered), the moral index averages those of the justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce (F118, F120, F121; at least two answered), and the religious axis is the importance of God (F063). Item orientation is fixed from the scale labels in the survey dictionary. Weights: the survey weight (S017) within each country; cross-country summaries count each country once. Intervals: 95% Fisher z intervals (Fisher z is a transformation that gives a correlation an approximately normal sampling distribution) on the Kish effective sample size of the complete cases (the sample size after unequal weights have reduced precision). They treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore clustering (respondents interviewed in the same place resemble one another) and stratification, which can raise or lower the variance of a correlation; the last section reports the counts of countries with an interval above zero when the effective sample is divided by a design effect of 2, which is a sensitivity check and not an estimate. Medians across countries have 95% percentile intervals from a bootstrap over countries (countries are resampled with replacement, 2,000 replicates, seed 12345), and the difference between the medians of two groups of countries resamples each group on its own. Correlations across countries use Fisher z on the number of countries. Suppression: a country-axis cell needs an effective sample of at least 300. Strongest axis: the axis with the largest loading among the axes whose interval is above zero; the lead is clear when the lower end of that interval is above the point estimate of every other axis. Human development: one value per country from the context file joined to the survey, missing for 4 countries in the comparisons. The line in the human development figure is a straight line fitted across countries by least squares (the line that minimizes the squared vertical distances), with a 95% band from robust (HC3) standard errors, which stay valid when the spread around the line differs across countries. The thirds of countries are cut at the tercile points of the HDI among the countries with both an HDI and a loading, separately for each axis; the dashed line in that figure joins the median loading of each third, drawn at the median HDI of the third, with a 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over the countries of that third. ESS comparison: loadings of the ESS 0 to 10 left-right scale on attendance and prayer (rounds 3 to 11), on gay and lesbian freedom (rounds 3 to 11) and on six welfare items (rounds 4 and 8), for 37, 37 and 32 countries in both surveys, with the ESS analysis weight. ## What these data cannot show - The loadings are associations between two answers given by the same person in one interview, so they do not show whether attitudes shape self-placement, self-placement shapes attitudes, or a third influence such as a party system shapes both. - Waves from 2005 to 2023 are pooled inside each country, so a loading blends years, and the economic index is a weak measure whose loadings depend on which items are averaged (Table 6). - The scale itself may mean different things to different respondents. - In a German survey with open-ended questions, the associations people attached to left and right varied with self-placement, education and region of residence [7], and a study in Mexico and Argentina found different conceptions of the labels across individuals and contexts [8]. - A loading therefore describes the association between the label and an attitude among people who answer the question. - Chapter 7.5, Non-placement on the left-right scale (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/non-placement-on-the-left-right-scale; planned) asks who declines to answer, and Chapter 7.6, Education and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-and-ideology; planned) asks how the association differs by education. - The intervals are model based and ignore clustering in the sample design (answers from the same place resemble one another) and stratification, which can raise or lower the variance of a correlation. - The analysis does not use strata or sampling units, so the chapter gives a sensitivity check in place of a design-based interval, and the design effect in that check is assumed, not estimated. - If clustering multiplied the variance of every correlation by 2 (a design effect of 2), the number of countries with an interval above zero would fall to 66 for religion, 56 for economic attitudes and 55 for moral attitudes, and 18 countries would have no axis above zero. - The countries are the ones the surveys reached, not a random sample of the world, and the correlations across countries treat each loading as if it were measured without error. - The agreement between the two surveys has a limit. - Both projects ask for self-placement on a left-right scale, with a ten-point form in the WVS and EVS, an eleven-point form in the ESS and different wording, so part of the agreement could come from how the label works in each country rather than from the attitudes. - The data hold no party manifestos, expert placements of parties or vote choices, so they cannot say why the label attaches to religion in one country and to economics in another. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Fisher, Ronald A. (1921). On the Probable Error of a Coefficient of Correlation Deduced from a Small Sample. Metron 1(4): 3-32. 3. Knutsen, Oddbjorn (1995). Value Orientations, Political Conflicts and Left-Right Identification: A Comparative Study. European Journal of Political Research 28(1): 63-93. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1995.tb00487.x 4. Malka, Ariel; Lelkes, Yphtach; Soto, Christopher J. (2019). Are Cultural and Economic Conservatism Positively Correlated? A Large-Scale Cross-National Test. British Journal of Political Science 49(3): 1045-1069. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-journal-of-political-science/article/are-cultural-and-economic-conservatism-positively-correlated-a-largescale-crossnational-test/83AFEDEA5E004CF23631C5388E7C9F67 5. Tavits, Margit; Letki, Natalia (2009). When Left Is Right: Party Ideology and Policy in Post-Communist Europe. American Political Science Review 103(4): 555-569. 6. Piurko, Yuval; Schwartz, Shalom H.; Davidov, Eldad (2011). Basic Personal Values and the Meaning of Left-Right Political Orientations in 20 Countries. Political Psychology 32(4): 537-561. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00828.x 7. Bauer, Paul C.; Barbera, Pablo; Ackermann, Kathrin; Venetz, Aaron (2017). Is the Left-Right Scale a Valid Measure of Ideology? Individual-Level Variation in Associations with Left and Right and Left-Right Self-Placement. Political Behavior 39(3): 553-583. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-016-9368-2 8. Zechmeister, Elizabeth J. (2006). What’s Left and Who’s Right? A Q-method Study of Individual and Contextual Influences on the Meaning of Ideological Labels. Political Behavior 28(2): 151-173. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-006-9006-5 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/left-and-right-across-countries/build.py (sha256 d7986322119fd8d5d32684fb66f66157c5ad78a9d3109b6149c924249e7b8a57) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/ess/ess_clean.parquet | 45,592,290 | 9487eead6817f028f5dd525709aa1b989ccd384384ef3700b9657cf68dd0b529 | 6def6b8c99fe6dbaf6abc744db6cabf584b900084600909b651870d99208e338 | | data/wvs/wvs_clean.parquet | 71,974,374 | cef4479481f8a48d6c765d39dc5438d31daa32fcecee3f181aaaf8e257f41f0b | 59a8e3c369176b7e1a2cb37fc10b87985ed79b02fab2eae1cca08e7a972db061 | | C:/github/politics-book/lib/geo/world.v1.json | 49,483 | 8e454ad862ef2ff389e1599a5e6eb1c20e0ae6ae77415ed1266424aa196d3b32 | 8e454ad862ef2ff389e1599a5e6eb1c20e0ae6ae77415ed1266424aa196d3b32 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | db579f30ea8343d0f8e4aae8b942c8b75f28b9f6086bfca12d67198dee99844c | | figures/axes_relation_to_zero.json | 03f949e783c9328f0139beacdb9e771d3302d230b71c99bfa7be028da8a773ca | | figures/country_loadings.json | 43f5315f3440b04483e0051f88daf612b5e9d2091197edafdb425e650878b523 | | figures/definition_sensitivity.json | c73b1c49c58e3c11640c2913279d7ae1d7980321c7eb395bd28f1da05181c52b | | figures/index_coding.json | a742b15045c4af561f027e4f1d7d2b9db0ecb7bfc5a76654587e3200d24ba9a8 | | figures/loadings_by_hdi.json | a0e78d864ba0462b730441d41ef6fabb417f6369c0060f705257c2745e36118e | | figures/six_country_panels.json | 537d92ab3ac5e7cc352961e5b7de8cc2b847cb8facafb208de3c996d9f9d86c7 | | figures/strongest_axis_map.json | 7138b1123da46bfe80d5d9f4366787aa7376f3f1b823608d9b8aae857c81a9be | | figures/wvs_ess_agreement.json | b63f13dd9bca5395d2c5e0a2bd4f4d6fe690ba0b01855c31c381b4aa45a19c2b | | meta.json | 80d5ff0c2f4ca2ce800811ad7055d24bf46584256e169809c9201e9a9d89f711 | | refs.json | cc96ba783eed7d6d212a6ac573b6e017d40d4fa25a0b31e3a7f45d05a04532a5 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/facts.json - Table 1, figure "strongest_axis_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/strongest_axis_map.json - Table 2, figure "six_country_panels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/six_country_panels.json - Table 3, figure "axes_relation_to_zero" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/axes_relation_to_zero.json - Table 4, figure "country_loadings" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/country_loadings.json - Table 5, figure "index_coding" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/index_coding.json - Table 6, figure "definition_sensitivity" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/definition_sensitivity.json - Table 7, figure "loadings_by_hdi" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/loadings_by_hdi.json - Table 8, figure "wvs_ess_agreement" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/left-and-right-across-countries/figures/wvs_ess_agreement.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Basic values and left-right: report Chapter 8.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/basic-values-and-left-right. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Basic values and left-right - Chapter: 8.1 (Part VIII, Values beneath politics; Ideology, values and religion) - Question: Which basic human values lean left or right, and does the pattern hold outside Western Europe? - Dek: People who rate universalism higher place themselves further left in all 18 Western European countries in the ESS from 2002 to 2024, with a mean correlation of −0.19. - Grain: countries - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - European Social Survey. European Social Survey rounds 1 to 11 (2002-2024): human values scale (Portrait Values Questionnaire) and left-right placement; round 11 value items rebuilt from the raw file; years: 2002-2023 (rounds 1 to 11; round 11 was fielded in 2023 and 2024); weights: analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries - World Values Survey and EVS. World Values Survey waves 5 and 6 (2005-2016): ten single-item value portraits and left-right placement; Human Development Index from the country context file; years: 1981-2023 (7 unified waves); weights: weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/basic-values-and-left-right - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/basic-values-and-left-right/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/basic-values-and-left-right/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026basicvaluesandleftright ```bibtex @misc{singh2026basicvaluesandleftright, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Basic values and left-right}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/basic-values-and-left-right}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | count of countries in the group, fixed by geography and history | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 18 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | n_west | | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with value Universalism (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | −0.19 | 95% CI −0.22 to −0.16 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | mean_west_universalism | | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with value Conformity (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | +0.11 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.13 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | mean_west_conformity | | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with value Tradition (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | +0.10 | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.12 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | mean_west_tradition | ## Findings In the European Social Survey (ESS), people who rate universalism as more important place themselves further left on the left-right scale in every one of the 18 countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe (Western Europe below), in rounds pooled from 2002 to 2024. The average correlation across these countries is −0.19 (95% CI −0.22 to −0.16), and in each country the 95% confidence interval of the correlation lies below zero. Conformity and tradition run the other way, at +0.11 and +0.10. The correlations are small, and outside Western Europe they are uneven. In post-communist Europe the values sit on their predicted sides of left-right in some countries and on the opposite sides in others. The chapter compares the ten values of Shalom Schwartz's theory with left-right placement, first across Western Europe, then country by country in post-communist Europe, and then in the World Values Survey (WVS), which reaches countries outside Europe. ### Theory, measures and country groups Schwartz's theory arranges ten basic values in a circle in which neighboring values are compatible and opposite values conflict [1]. Conformity, tradition and security (conservation) face self-direction and stimulation (openness to change), and universalism and benevolence (self-transcendence) face power and achievement (self-enhancement). Hedonism sits between openness and self-enhancement. Applied to politics, the circle predicts that conservation and self-enhancement values go with the right and that openness and self-transcendence values go with the left. A study of Italian voters found that supporters of the center-left coalition rated universalism, benevolence and self-direction higher, and security, power, achievement, conformity and tradition lower, than supporters of the center-right [2]. A comparison of countries in the first round of the ESS found universalism and benevolence going with a left orientation and conformity and tradition with a right orientation in liberal and traditional countries [3]. This chapter estimates every pattern with one estimator and counts the countries on the predicted side instead of relying on averages. The ESS measures the ten values with short portraits of a person, for example someone for whom thinking up new ideas and being creative is important, which respondents rate from very much like me to not like me at all. Each value score is centred on the respondent's own mean rating of all the portraits. Centring removes differences in how freely people use the top of the scale and leaves the priority of one value relative to the others, so every score is a relative priority [4]. The left-right question asks respondents to place themselves on a scale from left to right (left-right self-placement). In each country the chapter takes the correlation between a value score and the placement, called a loading, and a positive loading means that people who rate the value as more important place themselves further right. Rounds from 2002 to 2024 are pooled inside each country, which gives 432,669 respondents in 39 countries. (Note: A loading is a survey-weighted correlation computed inside one country. Its interval is model based, from the Fisher z transformation [5] of the Kish effective sample size [6], and it treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample; intervals for averages across countries come from resampling countries [7].) The countries are grouped by geography and history and not by anything in the data. The 18 Western European countries are those outside the former communist bloc and include Greece, Portugal and Spain. Germany is one country in this group and includes the former East Germany. The 18 post-communist countries had communist party rule in the twentieth century, and Cyprus, Israel and Turkey (3 countries) belong to neither group. ### Universalism leans left and conformity right in Western Europe Table 1 plots the mean loading of each value across the Western European countries. Universalism is at −0.19 (95% CI −0.22 to −0.16) and conformity at +0.11 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.13). Tradition, power and security lean right and benevolence, self-direction and stimulation lean left, each by less than universalism and with an interval that excludes zero. Achievement follows the theory least clearly, at +0.010 (95% CI 0.001 to 0.017), an interval that barely clears zero. Hedonism, to which the theory assigns no side, leans left at −0.02. Table 1. Across Western Europe universalism leans left and conformity, tradition and power lean right The loadings are small. Squared, the universalism loading averages 4% (95% CI 3% to 5%) across Western countries, which is the share of the variance in left-right placement that the two answers have in common. That share is the largest of the ten values. Conformity and tradition are the values closest to the obedience and respect for custom that Chapter 8.4, The obedience-autonomy disposition (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition) measures with a child-rearing question. Security is the conservation value with the least consistent sign, which Chapter 8.5, Order, security and threat (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/order-security-and-threat; planned) takes up with measures of threat. The averages hide little disagreement between countries. Table 2 counts the countries on the predicted side. Conformity, tradition, power, universalism and benevolence are on the predicted side in all 18 Western countries, and achievement, the lowest, in 12. Judged by the interval and not by the point estimate, universalism is on the predicted side in 18 countries and conformity in 18, and tradition, power and benevolence in 17 each. The figure also shows the post-communist countries, which the next section takes up. Table 2. Conformity, tradition, power, universalism and benevolence have the predicted sign in all 18 Western European countries, and only universalism does in as many as 15 of 18 post-communist countries Grouped into Schwartz's four higher-order types, the pattern is the same. Conservation loads right at +0.14 (95% CI 0.11 to 0.16) and self-transcendence loads left at −0.16 (95% CI −0.19 to −0.14), and both have an interval on the predicted side in all 18 Western countries. ### Post-communist countries split three ways The same estimator gives a different result in the 18 post-communist countries. Table 3 shows every value in every country. Its first view sets the Western mean beside each post-communist country, and the other views list the Western countries and all countries. The Western countries repeat one pattern, and the post-communist countries do not. Table 3. Western European countries show one pattern of correlations and post-communist countries show several Take the conservation values. In Croatia the conservation loading is +0.16 (95% CI 0.13 to 0.18), in Slovenia +0.14 and in Poland +0.12, so the values lean right, as in Western Europe, where the mean is +0.14. In Bulgaria the loading is −0.24, in Czechia −0.22 and in Slovakia −0.18, so the values lean left. People who give more weight to conformity, tradition and security place themselves further left than other people in the same country. In each of these countries the interval excludes zero. Table 4 shows all 18 countries. The interval is on the predicted side in 4, includes zero in 7 and is on the opposite side in 7. Table 4. By the 95% interval, conservation values go with the right in 4 post-communist countries and with the left in 7 The post-communist mean in the top rows of the figure is −0.02 (95% CI −0.07 to 0.03), which by itself reads as no link. That mean averages countries with opposite signs. The standard deviation of the country loadings is 0.11 in post-communist Europe against 0.06 in Western Europe, so a single figure for post-communist Europe hides the spread that the countries show. Universalism holds up better than conservation. It is on its predicted side in 15 of the 18 post-communist countries, has an interval on that side in 12 and has an interval on the opposite side in 0 (Table 4, universalism view). The alignment score gives one number per country. It averages the loadings of the eight values that have a predicted side and are measured in both surveys. Each loading is multiplied by a sign, positive for a value predicted to lean right and negative for a value predicted to lean left, so a positive score means the values sit on their predicted sides. Hedonism has no predicted side and is left out, and so is benevolence, which the WVS asked in too few places. The Western mean of the score is +0.08 (95% CI 0.07 to 0.09), and the interval is above zero in all 18 Western countries. In post-communist Europe the interval is above zero in 4 countries (Croatia, Slovenia, Poland and Hungary), includes zero in 10 and is below zero in 4 (Bulgaria, Czechia, Slovakia and Estonia). Hungary's score is +0.010 (95% CI 0.004 to 0.016), so the lower end of its interval is close to zero. Earlier work found the same division. In the first ESS round the values were only weakly associated with left-right placement in post-communist countries [3]. A study of Western and former communist countries in two later rounds found that conservatism, measured through values, could go with the left or the right depending on the cultural, political and economic situation of a society [8]. The country mean of the centred conservation score is higher in post-communist Europe (0.21 (95% CI 0.18 to 0.24)) than in Western Europe (0.02), so post-communist publics rate conservation values higher. Across all 39 ESS countries the country mean and the conservation loading correlate at −0.43 (95% CI −0.65 to −0.13). Inside Western Europe the correlation is −0.06 and inside post-communist Europe +0.03, both close to zero. Each interval includes the correlation across all countries, so with only 18 countries per group the data cannot rule out a link of that size inside a group. (Note: A comparison of country means assumes that respondents in different countries read the items in the same way. A test on the first ESS round found that the means of the value scale can be compared only across subsets of countries [9], and this chapter does not repeat the test. Chapter 8.2, Countries in value space (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/countries-in-value-space; planned) places countries by their values.) One account of why the left-right label attaches differently holds that leftist parties in post-communist governments had stronger incentives than rightist parties to hold spending down [10]. On that account, economic left and right did not mean what they meant in the West. The chapter does not test it. Chapter 7.4, Left and right across countries (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries) shows which attitudes the left-right scale tracks in each country. ### In the WVS the link is clearest at high human development The WVS asked one short portrait per value in the fifth and sixth waves, fielded from 2005 to 2016, such as "It is important to this person to be rich" for power. Each value rests on a single item, with universalism measured by an item on looking after the environment and benevolence by an item on helping people nearby. The items are centred on each respondent's mean rating of the items that every respondent in the sample answered, which are all except benevolence. The sample is 113,253 respondents with a left-right answer in 71 countries and territories. (Note: The WVS carries a ten-item battery inspired by Schwartz's questionnaire [11]. The cleaned file holds the items for the fifth and sixth waves and for no other wave, including the seventh. The two waves have 73 countries and territories in the sample, and Jordan and Yemen, with 555 respondents between them, fall below the effective-sample floor and are dropped. No respondent answered the benevolence item in 13 countries and territories, and a subsample answered it in 20, which is why the alignment score leaves benevolence out.) Countries are grouped into thirds by the Human Development Index (HDI), a country score that uses no answer from the survey, so the grouping does not depend on how values and left-right relate. The WVS country file has one HDI value per country and no year, and the fieldwork spans 2005 to 2016. The cut points between the thirds are 0.74 and 0.83. Table 5 gives the mean loading of each item, first by third of countries and then for all countries. Across all countries tradition is at +0.06 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.08) and the environment item at −0.03, both on their predicted sides and small, while security and achievement have intervals that include zero. Counted by country, tradition has the predicted sign in 56 of 71 countries, the environment item in 44 and security in 33. The counts for every item are in the data table of the figure. Table 5. The mean correlation has the predicted sign for all 9 items with a predicted side in the highest-HDI third of countries and for 4 of them in the lowest third The averages hide large differences between thirds. In the highest-HDI third every item with a predicted side has the predicted sign, with tradition at +0.12 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.15) and the environment item at −0.10, and security and achievement are closest to zero. In the lowest third most intervals include zero, while the environment item leans right at +0.04 and security leans left at −0.025, the opposite of their predicted sides. Without centring, tradition rises from +0.06 to +0.08 across all countries and the environment item from −0.03 to +0.01 (Table 5, uncentred view), because a respondent who rates every item as important adds to every loading. Only the centred version tests relative priorities. The alignment score condenses the items into one number per country. Its interval is above zero in 30 of 71 countries, includes zero in 32 and is below zero in 9 (Table 6). The score is +0.08 (95% CI 0.06 to 0.10) in the United States and +0.07 in Japan, so values sit on their predicted sides there. It is −0.05 in Malaysia and −0.04 in Egypt, so values sit on the opposite sides there. The interval of each of these scores excludes zero. Table 6. Values sit on their predicted sides in 30 of 71 countries and on the opposite sides in 9 By thirds of the HDI, the interval is above zero in 19 of the 23 countries in the highest third, in 7 of 23 in the middle third and in 3 of 24 in the lowest, where it is below zero in 5. Across the 70 countries with an index value, the alignment score and the index correlate at +0.60 (95% CI 0.43 to 0.73). The WVS covers countries outside Europe. The correlation is +0.64 (95% CI 0.42 to 0.79) across the 41 countries outside the World Bank region of Europe and Central Asia and +0.79 (95% CI 0.59 to 0.89) across the 29 countries inside it. That region counts Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Turkey and Cyprus with Europe. The correlation is a pattern across countries. It does not show that development changes how values relate to left-right. Countries with higher human development differ in other ways that could also move the score, such as the age of the party system, education and the meaning of the left-right label, and the chapter does not separate them. Table 7. Alignment is higher in countries with higher human development, with a correlation of +0.60 across 70 countries ### The pattern repeats in round 11 and the WVS Two checks compare estimates built from separate respondents. The alignment score estimated from round 11 alone, in 30 countries, correlates at +0.92 (95% CI 0.84 to 0.96) with the score from the earlier rounds. The loadings of single values correlate at +0.77 across country-value cells after each value's average across countries is removed, which takes out the differences between values that repeat in every country. The WVS and the ESS use different items, years and interviewers, yet the alignment scores of the 20 countries in both surveys correlate at +0.90 (95% CI 0.77 to 0.96) (Table 7, view against the ESS). Leaving the WVS items uncentred moves every item's mean loading toward the right and changes the order of countries by alignment little, with a correlation of +0.95 between the two versions across the same countries. ### What these data cannot show The loadings are associations between two answers given in one interview. They do not show whether values shape left-right placement, whether placement shapes the values a person reports, or whether a third influence such as a party system, a church or an education shapes both. A country's alignment says how tightly the scale and the values move together and nothing about which comes first. How self-direction and stimulation differ by birth cohort is in Chapter 8.3, The silent revolution (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-silent-revolution; planned). The scores are relative priorities. Because each value is centred on the respondent's own mean rating, the ten loadings cannot all lie on one side of zero, and a value that leans left partly reflects other values that lean right. The WVS measures each value with one item, which is noisier than the ESS scale, and the WVS universalism item is about the environment only. The alignment score leaves out hedonism and benevolence. The theory's prediction for achievement holds only weakly in Western Europe, where its mean interval sits barely above zero and it is on the predicted side in 12 of 18 countries. The intervals are model based. They treat each survey as a weighted simple random sample and ignore clustering in the sampling designs, and the bootstrap over countries treats the countries as a sample from a population of countries, which they are not. A count of countries by interval moves when a country's interval ends close to zero, as Hungary's does in the ESS and Estonia's, Georgia's and Uzbekistan's do in the WVS. A different bootstrap draw could place such a country in a neighboring group of the count. Countries appear in different rounds and waves, so a loading pools different years, and the chapter does not follow loadings over time. Round 10 of the ESS has no value items in 9 countries, so their loadings rest on the other rounds. The groups are historical and geographic labels. The post-communist group holds countries with different party systems and different histories after 1990, and Western Europe holds countries with long democratic histories and countries with recent ones. Left-right also means different things in different places, as Chapter 7.4, Left and right across countries (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries) shows, so a loading describes the tie between the label and a value among people who answer the question. The data hold no party manifestos, expert placements of parties or vote choices, so they cannot say why the tie is reversed in the 4 post-communist countries whose interval is below zero or unclear in the 10 whose interval includes zero. ## Tables ### Table 1. Across Western Europe universalism leans left and conformity, tradition and power lean right Mean across countries of the correlation between each value's importance and left-right self-placement (0 = left, 10 = right), Western Europe, with 95% intervals from resampling countries | Value | Mean correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Countries in the mean | Predicted side | Countries on the predicted side | Countries with the interval on the predicted side | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | | Conformity | +0.11 | +0.09 | +0.13 | 18 | Predicted to lean right | 18 | 18 | | Tradition | +0.10 | +0.08 | +0.12 | 18 | Predicted to lean right | 18 | 17 | | Security | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.10 | 18 | Predicted to lean right | 17 | 14 | | Power | +0.09 | +0.07 | +0.11 | 18 | Predicted to lean right | 18 | 17 | | Achievement | +0.01 | 0.00 | +0.02 | 18 | Predicted to lean right | 12 | 8 | | Hedonism | −0.02 | −0.04 | −0.01 | 18 | No predicted side | n/a | n/a | | Stimulation | −0.05 | −0.06 | −0.03 | 18 | Predicted to lean left | 16 | 13 | | Self-direction | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.03 | 18 | Predicted to lean left | 16 | 14 | | Universalism | −0.19 | −0.22 | −0.16 | 18 | Predicted to lean left | 18 | 18 | | Benevolence | −0.07 | −0.08 | −0.06 | 18 | Predicted to lean left | 18 | 17 | Note: Each score is centred on the respondent's own mean rating of all 21 items, so the ten correlations cannot all lie on one side of zero. Note: Hedonism has no predicted side and is left out of the counts of countries on the predicted side. Note: Country cells need an effective sample of 300 respondents or more. Source: European Social Survey, rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024; weighted (analysis weight within each country, every country counted once across countries); Western Europe only Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/value_circle_west.json ### Table 2. Conformity, tradition, power, universalism and benevolence have the predicted sign in all 18 Western European countries, and only universalism does in as many as 15 of 18 post-communist countries Number of countries where the correlation between a value and left-right self-placement has the predicted sign, by value and country group; ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024 | countries | group | measure | n_countries | value | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | --- | | 18 | Western Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 18 | Conformity | | 18 | Western Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 18 | Conformity | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 8 | Conformity | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 3 | Conformity | | 18 | Western Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 18 | Tradition | | 18 | Western Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 17 | Tradition | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 8 | Tradition | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 4 | Tradition | | 18 | Western Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 17 | Security | | 18 | Western Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 14 | Security | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 6 | Security | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 5 | Security | | 18 | Western Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 18 | Power | | 18 | Western Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 17 | Power | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 12 | Power | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 7 | Power | | 18 | Western Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 12 | Achievement | | 18 | Western Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 8 | Achievement | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 12 | Achievement | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 5 | Achievement | | 18 | Western Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 16 | Stimulation | | 18 | Western Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 13 | Stimulation | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 6 | Stimulation | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 2 | Stimulation | | 18 | Western Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 16 | Self-direction | | 18 | Western Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 14 | Self-direction | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 9 | Self-direction | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 3 | Self-direction | | 18 | Western Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 18 | Universalism | | 18 | Western Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 18 | Universalism | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 15 | Universalism | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 12 | Universalism | | 18 | Western Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 18 | Benevolence | | 18 | Western Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 17 | Benevolence | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | Correlation has the predicted sign | 10 | Benevolence | | 18 | Post-communist Europe | 95% interval on the predicted side | 7 | Benevolence | Views: Sign of the correlation (measure = Correlation has the predicted sign); Interval excludes zero (measure = 95% interval on the predicted side). Note: The two groups have the same number of countries. The first view counts countries by the sign of the correlation and the second view counts countries whose 95% interval excludes zero on the predicted side. Note: In a tooltip, n is the group total. Note: Country cells need an effective sample of 300 respondents or more. Source: European Social Survey, rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024; weighted (analysis weight within each country, every country counted once across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/countries_on_predicted_side.json ### Table 3. Western European countries show one pattern of correlations and post-communist countries show several Correlation between each value and left-right self-placement (0 = left, 10 = right), by country; columns run from the values predicted to lean right, through the values predicted to lean left, to hedonism; ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024 | Country | Value | Correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Countries in the mean | Group | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | Western mean | Achievement | +0.01 | 0.00 | +0.02 | n/a | 18 | Western mean | | Western mean | Power | +0.09 | +0.07 | +0.11 | n/a | 18 | Western mean | | Western mean | Security | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.10 | n/a | 18 | Western mean | | Western mean | Conformity | +0.11 | +0.09 | +0.13 | n/a | 18 | Western mean | | Western mean | Tradition | +0.10 | +0.08 | +0.12 | n/a | 18 | Western mean | | Western mean | Benevolence | −0.07 | −0.08 | −0.06 | n/a | 18 | Western mean | | Western mean | Universalism | −0.19 | −0.22 | −0.16 | n/a | 18 | Western mean | | Western mean | Self-direction | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.03 | n/a | 18 | Western mean | | Western mean | Stimulation | −0.05 | −0.06 | −0.03 | n/a | 18 | Western mean | | Western mean | Hedonism | −0.02 | −0.04 | −0.01 | n/a | 18 | Western mean | | Switzerland | Achievement | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.04 | 16,955 | n/a | Western Europe | | Switzerland | Power | +0.10 | +0.09 | +0.12 | 16,955 | n/a | Western Europe | | Switzerland | Security | +0.16 | +0.14 | +0.18 | 16,945 | n/a | Western Europe | | Switzerland | Conformity | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.15 | 16,927 | n/a | Western Europe | | Switzerland | Tradition | +0.16 | +0.14 | +0.18 | 16,960 | n/a | Western Europe | | Switzerland | Benevolence | −0.11 | −0.13 | −0.10 | 16,956 | n/a | Western Europe | | Switzerland | Universalism | −0.30 | −0.31 | −0.28 | 16,971 | n/a | Western Europe | | Switzerland | Self-direction | −0.09 | −0.10 | −0.07 | 16,963 | n/a | Western Europe | | Switzerland | Stimulation | −0.09 | −0.11 | −0.07 | 16,958 | n/a | Western Europe | | Switzerland | Hedonism | −0.01 | −0.03 | 0.00 | 16,958 | n/a | Western Europe | | Austria | Achievement | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.03 | 13,695 | n/a | Western Europe | | Austria | Power | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.10 | 13,699 | n/a | Western Europe | | Austria | Security | +0.12 | +0.10 | +0.14 | 13,689 | n/a | Western Europe | | Austria | Conformity | +0.16 | +0.14 | +0.18 | 13,678 | n/a | Western Europe | | Austria | Tradition | +0.16 | +0.14 | +0.18 | 13,699 | n/a | Western Europe | | Austria | Benevolence | −0.12 | −0.14 | −0.10 | 13,698 | n/a | Western Europe | | Austria | Universalism | −0.22 | −0.24 | −0.20 | 13,706 | n/a | Western Europe | | Austria | Self-direction | −0.11 | −0.13 | −0.09 | 13,700 | n/a | Western Europe | | Austria | Stimulation | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.05 | 13,695 | n/a | Western Europe | | Austria | Hedonism | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.02 | 13,698 | n/a | Western Europe | | Spain | Achievement | +0.03 | +0.02 | +0.05 | 16,347 | n/a | Western Europe | | Spain | Power | +0.07 | +0.05 | +0.08 | 16,365 | n/a | Western Europe | | Spain | Security | +0.12 | +0.11 | +0.14 | 16,369 | n/a | Western Europe | | Spain | Conformity | +0.16 | +0.14 | +0.17 | 16,380 | n/a | Western Europe | | Spain | Tradition | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.14 | 16,378 | n/a | Western Europe | | Spain | Benevolence | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.06 | 16,373 | n/a | Western Europe | | Spain | Universalism | −0.17 | −0.19 | −0.16 | 16,377 | n/a | Western Europe | | Spain | Self-direction | −0.11 | −0.12 | −0.09 | 16,363 | n/a | Western Europe | | Spain | Stimulation | −0.09 | −0.11 | −0.08 | 16,366 | n/a | Western Europe | | Spain | Hedonism | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.06 | 16,364 | n/a | Western Europe | | France | Achievement | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.04 | 19,026 | n/a | Western Europe | | France | Power | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.09 | 19,035 | n/a | Western Europe | | France | Security | +0.17 | +0.16 | +0.19 | 19,033 | n/a | Western Europe | | France | Conformity | +0.12 | +0.11 | +0.14 | 19,018 | n/a | Western Europe | | France | Tradition | +0.11 | +0.09 | +0.12 | 19,027 | n/a | Western Europe | | France | Benevolence | −0.07 | −0.08 | −0.05 | 19,026 | n/a | Western Europe | | France | Universalism | −0.22 | −0.24 | −0.21 | 19,040 | n/a | Western Europe | | France | Self-direction | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.04 | 19,038 | n/a | Western Europe | | France | Stimulation | −0.07 | −0.08 | −0.05 | 19,031 | n/a | Western Europe | | France | Hedonism | −0.08 | −0.10 | −0.06 | 19,024 | n/a | Western Europe | | Netherlands | Achievement | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.04 | 18,727 | n/a | Western Europe | | Netherlands | Power | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.15 | 18,732 | n/a | Western Europe | | Netherlands | Security | +0.10 | +0.08 | +0.11 | 18,729 | n/a | Western Europe | | Netherlands | Conformity | +0.12 | +0.10 | +0.13 | 18,731 | n/a | Western Europe | | Netherlands | Tradition | +0.09 | +0.08 | +0.11 | 18,731 | n/a | Western Europe | | Netherlands | Benevolence | −0.09 | −0.10 | −0.07 | 18,734 | n/a | Western Europe | | Netherlands | Universalism | −0.27 | −0.28 | −0.25 | 18,734 | n/a | Western Europe | | Netherlands | Self-direction | −0.08 | −0.10 | −0.07 | 18,723 | n/a | Western Europe | | Netherlands | Stimulation | −0.04 | −0.05 | −0.02 | 18,731 | n/a | Western Europe | | Netherlands | Hedonism | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.02 | 18,732 | n/a | Western Europe | | Germany | Achievement | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.01 | 26,141 | n/a | Western Europe | | Germany | Power | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.06 | 26,157 | n/a | Western Europe | | Germany | Security | +0.12 | +0.11 | +0.14 | 26,141 | n/a | Western Europe | | Germany | Conformity | +0.11 | +0.10 | +0.13 | 26,132 | n/a | Western Europe | | Germany | Tradition | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.14 | 26,152 | n/a | Western Europe | | Germany | Benevolence | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.06 | 26,141 | n/a | Western Europe | | Germany | Universalism | −0.20 | −0.22 | −0.19 | 26,160 | n/a | Western Europe | | Germany | Self-direction | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.04 | 26,149 | n/a | Western Europe | | Germany | Stimulation | −0.08 | −0.09 | −0.06 | 26,144 | n/a | Western Europe | | Germany | Hedonism | −0.03 | −0.05 | −0.02 | 26,145 | n/a | Western Europe | | Luxembourg | Achievement | +0.01 | −0.05 | +0.07 | 1,336 | n/a | Western Europe | | Luxembourg | Power | +0.03 | −0.04 | +0.09 | 1,338 | n/a | Western Europe | | Luxembourg | Security | +0.08 | +0.01 | +0.14 | 1,338 | n/a | Western Europe | | Luxembourg | Conformity | +0.15 | +0.09 | +0.22 | 1,337 | n/a | Western Europe | | Luxembourg | Tradition | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.19 | 1,338 | n/a | Western Europe | | Luxembourg | Benevolence | −0.04 | −0.10 | +0.03 | 1,338 | n/a | Western Europe | | Luxembourg | Universalism | −0.10 | −0.16 | −0.04 | 1,338 | n/a | Western Europe | | Luxembourg | Self-direction | −0.09 | −0.15 | −0.03 | 1,337 | n/a | Western Europe | | Luxembourg | Stimulation | −0.09 | −0.16 | −0.03 | 1,338 | n/a | Western Europe | | Luxembourg | Hedonism | −0.10 | −0.16 | −0.04 | 1,338 | n/a | Western Europe | | Denmark | Achievement | −0.01 | −0.03 | +0.01 | 11,701 | n/a | Western Europe | | Denmark | Power | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.15 | 11,713 | n/a | Western Europe | | Denmark | Security | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.05 | 11,704 | n/a | Western Europe | | Denmark | Conformity | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.15 | 11,699 | n/a | Western Europe | | Denmark | Tradition | +0.10 | +0.08 | +0.12 | 11,711 | n/a | Western Europe | | Denmark | Benevolence | −0.09 | −0.11 | −0.07 | 11,700 | n/a | Western Europe | | Denmark | Universalism | −0.27 | −0.28 | −0.25 | 11,714 | n/a | Western Europe | | Denmark | Self-direction | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.04 | 11,717 | n/a | Western Europe | | Denmark | Stimulation | −0.04 | −0.06 | −0.02 | 11,697 | n/a | Western Europe | | Denmark | Hedonism | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.02 | 11,703 | n/a | Western Europe | | United Kingdom | Achievement | −0.03 | −0.05 | −0.02 | 19,557 | n/a | Western Europe | | United Kingdom | Power | +0.07 | +0.06 | +0.09 | 19,572 | n/a | Western Europe | | United Kingdom | Security | +0.09 | +0.08 | +0.11 | 19,559 | n/a | Western Europe | | United Kingdom | Conformity | +0.13 | +0.12 | +0.15 | 19,562 | n/a | Western Europe | | United Kingdom | Tradition | +0.12 | +0.10 | +0.14 | 19,559 | n/a | Western Europe | | United Kingdom | Benevolence | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.06 | 19,565 | n/a | Western Europe | | United Kingdom | Universalism | −0.19 | −0.20 | −0.17 | 19,570 | n/a | Western Europe | | United Kingdom | Self-direction | −0.04 | −0.05 | −0.02 | 19,571 | n/a | Western Europe | | United Kingdom | Stimulation | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.04 | 19,560 | n/a | Western Europe | | United Kingdom | Hedonism | −0.03 | −0.05 | −0.01 | 19,555 | n/a | Western Europe | | Finland | Achievement | +0.03 | +0.02 | +0.05 | 18,948 | n/a | Western Europe | | Finland | Power | +0.11 | +0.10 | +0.13 | 18,962 | n/a | Western Europe | | Finland | Security | 0.00 | −0.01 | +0.02 | 18,955 | n/a | Western Europe | | Finland | Conformity | +0.11 | +0.10 | +0.13 | 18,933 | n/a | Western Europe | | Finland | Tradition | +0.12 | +0.10 | +0.13 | 18,941 | n/a | Western Europe | | Finland | Benevolence | −0.08 | −0.09 | −0.06 | 18,923 | n/a | Western Europe | | Finland | Universalism | −0.20 | −0.21 | −0.18 | 18,968 | n/a | Western Europe | | Finland | Self-direction | −0.04 | −0.05 | −0.02 | 18,965 | n/a | Western Europe | | Finland | Stimulation | −0.04 | −0.06 | −0.03 | 18,939 | n/a | Western Europe | | Finland | Hedonism | −0.05 | −0.06 | −0.03 | 18,928 | n/a | Western Europe | | Iceland | Achievement | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.02 | 4,430 | n/a | Western Europe | | Iceland | Power | +0.15 | +0.12 | +0.18 | 4,436 | n/a | Western Europe | | Iceland | Security | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 4,428 | n/a | Western Europe | | Iceland | Conformity | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.14 | 4,429 | n/a | Western Europe | | Iceland | Tradition | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.15 | 4,434 | n/a | Western Europe | | Iceland | Benevolence | −0.08 | −0.11 | −0.05 | 4,435 | n/a | Western Europe | | Iceland | Universalism | −0.25 | −0.28 | −0.22 | 4,437 | n/a | Western Europe | | Iceland | Self-direction | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.02 | 4,436 | n/a | Western Europe | | Iceland | Stimulation | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 4,433 | n/a | Western Europe | | Iceland | Hedonism | −0.03 | −0.06 | 0.00 | 4,431 | n/a | Western Europe | | Ireland | Achievement | −0.01 | −0.03 | +0.01 | 19,303 | n/a | Western Europe | | Ireland | Power | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.07 | 19,308 | n/a | Western Europe | | Ireland | Security | +0.07 | +0.05 | +0.09 | 19,306 | n/a | Western Europe | | Ireland | Conformity | +0.15 | +0.13 | +0.17 | 19,292 | n/a | Western Europe | | Ireland | Tradition | +0.11 | +0.09 | +0.12 | 19,306 | n/a | Western Europe | | Ireland | Benevolence | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.04 | 19,287 | n/a | Western Europe | | Ireland | Universalism | −0.10 | −0.11 | −0.08 | 19,311 | n/a | Western Europe | | Ireland | Self-direction | −0.08 | −0.09 | −0.06 | 19,307 | n/a | Western Europe | | Ireland | Stimulation | −0.09 | −0.10 | −0.07 | 19,301 | n/a | Western Europe | | Ireland | Hedonism | −0.07 | −0.08 | −0.05 | 19,287 | n/a | Western Europe | | Norway | Achievement | +0.02 | +0.01 | +0.04 | 16,216 | n/a | Western Europe | | Norway | Power | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.16 | 16,225 | n/a | Western Europe | | Norway | Security | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.03 | 16,219 | n/a | Western Europe | | Norway | Conformity | +0.06 | +0.04 | +0.07 | 16,223 | n/a | Western Europe | | Norway | Tradition | +0.06 | +0.05 | +0.08 | 16,216 | n/a | Western Europe | | Norway | Benevolence | −0.03 | −0.04 | −0.01 | 16,212 | n/a | Western Europe | | Norway | Universalism | −0.26 | −0.27 | −0.24 | 16,231 | n/a | Western Europe | | Norway | Self-direction | −0.01 | −0.03 | +0.01 | 16,220 | n/a | Western Europe | | Norway | Stimulation | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.02 | 16,221 | n/a | Western Europe | | Norway | Hedonism | +0.02 | +0.01 | +0.04 | 16,209 | n/a | Western Europe | | Greece | Achievement | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.04 | 12,385 | n/a | Western Europe | | Greece | Power | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.07 | 12,396 | n/a | Western Europe | | Greece | Security | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.04 | 12,395 | n/a | Western Europe | | Greece | Conformity | +0.11 | +0.09 | +0.13 | 12,391 | n/a | Western Europe | | Greece | Tradition | +0.07 | +0.05 | +0.09 | 12,396 | n/a | Western Europe | | Greece | Benevolence | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.03 | 12,396 | n/a | Western Europe | | Greece | Universalism | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.05 | 12,397 | n/a | Western Europe | | Greece | Self-direction | −0.09 | −0.11 | −0.07 | 12,395 | n/a | Western Europe | | Greece | Stimulation | −0.08 | −0.10 | −0.06 | 12,391 | n/a | Western Europe | | Greece | Hedonism | −0.01 | −0.03 | +0.01 | 12,393 | n/a | Western Europe | | Belgium | Achievement | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.02 | 17,920 | n/a | Western Europe | | Belgium | Power | +0.07 | +0.05 | +0.08 | 17,920 | n/a | Western Europe | | Belgium | Security | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.09 | 17,922 | n/a | Western Europe | | Belgium | Conformity | +0.06 | +0.04 | +0.08 | 17,919 | n/a | Western Europe | | Belgium | Tradition | +0.04 | +0.02 | +0.05 | 17,921 | n/a | Western Europe | | Belgium | Benevolence | −0.03 | −0.04 | −0.01 | 17,921 | n/a | Western Europe | | Belgium | Universalism | −0.17 | −0.18 | −0.15 | 17,923 | n/a | Western Europe | | Belgium | Self-direction | −0.03 | −0.04 | −0.01 | 17,919 | n/a | Western Europe | | Belgium | Stimulation | −0.03 | −0.05 | −0.02 | 17,921 | n/a | Western Europe | | Belgium | Hedonism | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.02 | 17,921 | n/a | Western Europe | | Italy | Achievement | +0.03 | 0.00 | +0.05 | 8,517 | n/a | Western Europe | | Italy | Power | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.11 | 8,528 | n/a | Western Europe | | Italy | Security | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.11 | 8,531 | n/a | Western Europe | | Italy | Conformity | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.06 | 8,514 | n/a | Western Europe | | Italy | Tradition | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.05 | 8,535 | n/a | Western Europe | | Italy | Benevolence | −0.09 | −0.12 | −0.07 | 8,535 | n/a | Western Europe | | Italy | Universalism | −0.19 | −0.21 | −0.16 | 8,539 | n/a | Western Europe | | Italy | Self-direction | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.02 | 8,521 | n/a | Western Europe | | Italy | Stimulation | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.04 | 8,525 | n/a | Western Europe | | Italy | Hedonism | +0.04 | +0.01 | +0.06 | 8,527 | n/a | Western Europe | | Sweden | Achievement | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.05 | 15,308 | n/a | Western Europe | | Sweden | Power | +0.17 | +0.15 | +0.19 | 15,309 | n/a | Western Europe | | Sweden | Security | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.05 | 15,305 | n/a | Western Europe | | Sweden | Conformity | +0.09 | +0.08 | +0.11 | 15,305 | n/a | Western Europe | | Sweden | Tradition | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.07 | 15,308 | n/a | Western Europe | | Sweden | Benevolence | −0.09 | −0.11 | −0.07 | 15,276 | n/a | Western Europe | | Sweden | Universalism | −0.23 | −0.25 | −0.22 | 15,326 | n/a | Western Europe | | Sweden | Self-direction | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.03 | 15,313 | n/a | Western Europe | | Sweden | Stimulation | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.04 | 15,312 | n/a | Western Europe | | Sweden | Hedonism | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.04 | 15,302 | n/a | Western Europe | | Portugal | Achievement | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 14,498 | n/a | Western Europe | | Portugal | Power | +0.04 | +0.02 | +0.06 | 14,519 | n/a | Western Europe | | Portugal | Security | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.05 | 14,508 | n/a | Western Europe | | Portugal | Conformity | +0.06 | +0.04 | +0.08 | 14,495 | n/a | Western Europe | | Portugal | Tradition | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.07 | 14,513 | n/a | Western Europe | | Portugal | Benevolence | −0.03 | −0.05 | 0.00 | 14,518 | n/a | Western Europe | | Portugal | Universalism | −0.09 | −0.11 | −0.07 | 14,518 | n/a | Western Europe | | Portugal | Self-direction | −0.06 | −0.08 | −0.03 | 14,513 | n/a | Western Europe | | Portugal | Stimulation | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.02 | 14,508 | n/a | Western Europe | | Portugal | Hedonism | −0.02 | −0.04 | 0.00 | 14,500 | n/a | Western Europe | | Croatia | Achievement | −0.03 | −0.06 | 0.00 | 6,686 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Croatia | Power | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.05 | 6,690 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Croatia | Security | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.08 | 6,687 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Croatia | Conformity | +0.08 | +0.05 | +0.10 | 6,681 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Croatia | Tradition | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.21 | 6,684 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Croatia | Benevolence | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.02 | 6,683 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Croatia | Universalism | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.04 | 6,694 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Croatia | Self-direction | −0.10 | −0.13 | −0.07 | 6,687 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Croatia | Stimulation | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.04 | 6,683 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Croatia | Hedonism | −0.04 | −0.06 | −0.01 | 6,680 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovenia | Achievement | −0.02 | −0.04 | 0.00 | 11,283 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovenia | Power | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.05 | 11,291 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovenia | Security | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.07 | 11,288 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovenia | Conformity | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.10 | 11,286 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovenia | Tradition | +0.15 | +0.13 | +0.17 | 11,288 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovenia | Benevolence | −0.05 | −0.06 | −0.03 | 11,286 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovenia | Universalism | −0.10 | −0.12 | −0.08 | 11,293 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovenia | Self-direction | −0.08 | −0.10 | −0.06 | 11,289 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovenia | Stimulation | −0.02 | −0.04 | 0.00 | 11,284 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovenia | Hedonism | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.06 | 11,283 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Poland | Achievement | −0.05 | −0.06 | −0.03 | 14,177 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Poland | Power | +0.02 | +0.01 | +0.04 | 14,199 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Poland | Security | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.07 | 14,198 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Poland | Conformity | +0.07 | +0.05 | +0.09 | 14,182 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Poland | Tradition | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.15 | 14,196 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Poland | Benevolence | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.03 | 14,187 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Poland | Universalism | −0.02 | −0.04 | 0.00 | 14,205 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Poland | Self-direction | −0.06 | −0.08 | −0.04 | 14,197 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Poland | Stimulation | −0.07 | −0.08 | −0.05 | 14,192 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Poland | Hedonism | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.06 | 14,180 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Montenegro | Achievement | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.08 | 2,972 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Montenegro | Power | −0.06 | −0.11 | −0.02 | 2,972 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Montenegro | Security | +0.10 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 2,972 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Montenegro | Conformity | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.01 | 2,967 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Montenegro | Tradition | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.06 | 2,972 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Montenegro | Benevolence | +0.08 | +0.03 | +0.12 | 2,971 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Montenegro | Universalism | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 2,976 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Montenegro | Self-direction | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.00 | 2,976 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Montenegro | Stimulation | −0.05 | −0.10 | 0.00 | 2,969 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Montenegro | Hedonism | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.02 | 2,967 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Hungary | Achievement | +0.01 | 0.00 | +0.03 | 15,163 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Hungary | Power | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.06 | 15,176 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Hungary | Security | −0.02 | −0.04 | 0.00 | 15,172 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Hungary | Conformity | −0.01 | −0.03 | 0.00 | 15,169 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Hungary | Tradition | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.03 | 15,177 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Hungary | Benevolence | −0.04 | −0.06 | −0.02 | 15,164 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Hungary | Universalism | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.05 | 15,179 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Hungary | Self-direction | −0.01 | −0.03 | 0.00 | 15,185 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Hungary | Stimulation | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.07 | 15,166 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Hungary | Hedonism | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.04 | 15,170 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Ukraine | Achievement | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.13 | 7,211 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Ukraine | Power | +0.03 | 0.00 | +0.06 | 7,233 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Ukraine | Security | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.03 | 7,232 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Ukraine | Conformity | −0.05 | −0.08 | −0.02 | 7,216 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Ukraine | Tradition | −0.02 | −0.05 | +0.01 | 7,235 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Ukraine | Benevolence | −0.02 | −0.05 | +0.01 | 7,229 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Ukraine | Universalism | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.04 | 7,251 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Ukraine | Self-direction | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.02 | 7,232 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Ukraine | Stimulation | +0.03 | 0.00 | +0.06 | 7,224 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Ukraine | Hedonism | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 7,196 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Serbia | Achievement | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.02 | 2,294 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Serbia | Power | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.05 | 2,298 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Serbia | Security | −0.04 | −0.08 | +0.01 | 2,295 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Serbia | Conformity | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.05 | 2,295 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Serbia | Tradition | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.10 | 2,298 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Serbia | Benevolence | −0.05 | −0.10 | 0.00 | 2,299 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Serbia | Universalism | −0.07 | −0.11 | −0.02 | 2,298 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Serbia | Self-direction | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.03 | 2,299 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Serbia | Stimulation | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.09 | 2,292 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Serbia | Hedonism | +0.06 | +0.01 | +0.11 | 2,295 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Lithuania | Achievement | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.04 | 9,097 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Lithuania | Power | −0.03 | −0.05 | 0.00 | 9,117 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Lithuania | Security | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.03 | 9,112 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Lithuania | Conformity | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.04 | 9,101 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Lithuania | Tradition | −0.01 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 9,121 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Lithuania | Benevolence | −0.01 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 9,104 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Lithuania | Universalism | −0.02 | −0.05 | 0.00 | 9,126 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Lithuania | Self-direction | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.04 | 9,120 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Lithuania | Stimulation | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.01 | 9,113 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Lithuania | Hedonism | +0.03 | 0.00 | +0.06 | 9,113 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | North Macedonia | Achievement | +0.06 | −0.04 | +0.15 | 879 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | North Macedonia | Power | −0.01 | −0.11 | +0.09 | 877 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | North Macedonia | Security | −0.05 | −0.14 | +0.05 | 878 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | North Macedonia | Conformity | +0.01 | −0.08 | +0.11 | 878 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | North Macedonia | Tradition | −0.01 | −0.10 | +0.09 | 878 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | North Macedonia | Benevolence | +0.01 | −0.08 | +0.11 | 877 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | North Macedonia | Universalism | −0.03 | −0.12 | +0.07 | 879 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | North Macedonia | Self-direction | +0.05 | −0.05 | +0.14 | 879 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | North Macedonia | Stimulation | −0.03 | −0.13 | +0.07 | 878 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | North Macedonia | Hedonism | +0.01 | −0.09 | +0.11 | 878 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Latvia | Achievement | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.07 | 3,133 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Latvia | Power | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 3,134 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Latvia | Security | −0.01 | −0.06 | +0.03 | 3,135 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Latvia | Conformity | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.02 | 3,130 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Latvia | Tradition | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.01 | 3,137 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Latvia | Benevolence | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.07 | 3,132 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Latvia | Universalism | −0.05 | −0.09 | −0.01 | 3,138 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Latvia | Self-direction | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.04 | 3,137 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Latvia | Stimulation | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.08 | 3,134 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Latvia | Hedonism | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.07 | 3,134 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Kosovo | Achievement | −0.06 | −0.16 | +0.03 | 806 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Kosovo | Power | −0.07 | −0.16 | +0.02 | 807 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Kosovo | Security | +0.10 | +0.01 | +0.19 | 804 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Kosovo | Conformity | +0.04 | −0.06 | +0.13 | 802 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Kosovo | Tradition | +0.06 | −0.04 | +0.15 | 808 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Kosovo | Benevolence | +0.02 | −0.07 | +0.11 | 807 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Kosovo | Universalism | +0.01 | −0.08 | +0.11 | 808 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Kosovo | Self-direction | +0.06 | −0.03 | +0.15 | 806 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Kosovo | Stimulation | +0.01 | −0.08 | +0.11 | 801 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Kosovo | Hedonism | −0.11 | −0.20 | −0.01 | 804 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Russia | Achievement | +0.03 | 0.00 | +0.06 | 7,967 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Russia | Power | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.04 | 7,982 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Russia | Security | −0.03 | −0.06 | 0.00 | 7,982 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Russia | Conformity | −0.04 | −0.07 | −0.01 | 7,969 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Russia | Tradition | −0.03 | −0.05 | 0.00 | 7,985 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Russia | Benevolence | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.03 | 7,975 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Russia | Universalism | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.04 | 7,992 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Russia | Self-direction | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.03 | 7,986 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Russia | Stimulation | +0.04 | +0.01 | +0.07 | 7,962 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Russia | Hedonism | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.08 | 7,962 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Romania | Achievement | +0.03 | −0.03 | +0.09 | 1,463 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Romania | Power | +0.05 | −0.01 | +0.11 | 1,462 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Romania | Security | −0.04 | −0.10 | +0.02 | 1,463 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Romania | Conformity | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.07 | 1,463 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Romania | Tradition | −0.09 | −0.15 | −0.04 | 1,464 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Romania | Benevolence | −0.06 | −0.12 | −0.01 | 1,462 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Romania | Universalism | −0.06 | −0.11 | 0.00 | 1,464 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Romania | Self-direction | +0.04 | −0.02 | +0.10 | 1,464 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Romania | Stimulation | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.11 | 1,463 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Romania | Hedonism | +0.04 | −0.02 | +0.10 | 1,463 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Albania | Achievement | +0.01 | −0.07 | +0.10 | 1,031 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Albania | Power | −0.05 | −0.13 | +0.04 | 1,040 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Albania | Security | −0.05 | −0.13 | +0.04 | 1,037 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Albania | Conformity | −0.02 | −0.11 | +0.06 | 1,035 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Albania | Tradition | +0.06 | −0.02 | +0.15 | 1,039 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Albania | Benevolence | +0.02 | −0.06 | +0.11 | 1,034 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Albania | Universalism | +0.06 | −0.03 | +0.14 | 1,041 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Albania | Self-direction | −0.05 | −0.13 | +0.03 | 1,035 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Albania | Stimulation | +0.04 | −0.04 | +0.13 | 1,022 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Albania | Hedonism | −0.01 | −0.09 | +0.08 | 1,032 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Estonia | Achievement | −0.01 | −0.02 | +0.01 | 15,020 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Estonia | Power | −0.01 | −0.02 | +0.01 | 15,027 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Estonia | Security | −0.06 | −0.08 | −0.05 | 15,026 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Estonia | Conformity | −0.02 | −0.04 | −0.01 | 15,020 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Estonia | Tradition | −0.05 | −0.06 | −0.03 | 15,028 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Estonia | Benevolence | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.03 | 15,024 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Estonia | Universalism | −0.05 | −0.07 | −0.03 | 15,033 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Estonia | Self-direction | +0.06 | +0.04 | +0.07 | 15,025 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Estonia | Stimulation | +0.06 | +0.04 | +0.08 | 15,015 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Estonia | Hedonism | +0.07 | +0.05 | +0.09 | 15,016 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovakia | Achievement | +0.10 | +0.08 | +0.12 | 10,981 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovakia | Power | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.11 | 10,980 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovakia | Security | −0.12 | −0.14 | −0.10 | 10,989 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovakia | Conformity | −0.13 | −0.15 | −0.10 | 10,973 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovakia | Tradition | −0.14 | −0.16 | −0.12 | 10,982 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovakia | Benevolence | −0.04 | −0.06 | −0.01 | 10,975 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovakia | Universalism | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.04 | 10,993 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovakia | Self-direction | +0.09 | +0.07 | +0.11 | 10,988 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovakia | Stimulation | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.14 | 10,979 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Slovakia | Hedonism | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.11 | 10,977 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Czechia | Achievement | +0.12 | +0.10 | +0.14 | 17,119 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Czechia | Power | +0.09 | +0.07 | +0.11 | 17,142 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Czechia | Security | −0.16 | −0.17 | −0.14 | 17,139 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Czechia | Conformity | −0.16 | −0.18 | −0.15 | 17,122 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Czechia | Tradition | −0.15 | −0.17 | −0.13 | 17,130 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Czechia | Benevolence | −0.06 | −0.08 | −0.04 | 17,135 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Czechia | Universalism | −0.11 | −0.13 | −0.10 | 17,162 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Czechia | Self-direction | +0.13 | +0.12 | +0.15 | 17,060 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Czechia | Stimulation | +0.16 | +0.14 | +0.18 | 17,117 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Czechia | Hedonism | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.14 | 17,116 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Bulgaria | Achievement | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.11 | 11,580 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Bulgaria | Power | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.16 | 11,602 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Bulgaria | Security | −0.17 | −0.19 | −0.15 | 11,607 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Bulgaria | Conformity | −0.17 | −0.20 | −0.15 | 11,578 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Bulgaria | Tradition | −0.21 | −0.23 | −0.18 | 11,615 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Bulgaria | Benevolence | −0.09 | −0.11 | −0.06 | 11,590 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Bulgaria | Universalism | −0.15 | −0.18 | −0.13 | 11,618 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Bulgaria | Self-direction | +0.15 | +0.13 | +0.17 | 11,581 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Bulgaria | Stimulation | +0.18 | +0.16 | +0.20 | 11,560 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Bulgaria | Hedonism | +0.17 | +0.15 | +0.19 | 11,563 | n/a | Post-communist Europe | | Turkey | Achievement | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.03 | 3,449 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Turkey | Power | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.09 | 3,462 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Turkey | Security | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.12 | 3,454 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Turkey | Conformity | +0.12 | +0.08 | +0.16 | 3,450 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Turkey | Tradition | +0.12 | +0.08 | +0.16 | 3,457 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Turkey | Benevolence | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 3,460 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Turkey | Universalism | −0.04 | −0.08 | 0.00 | 3,466 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Turkey | Self-direction | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.02 | 3,446 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Turkey | Stimulation | −0.11 | −0.15 | −0.07 | 3,449 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Turkey | Hedonism | −0.12 | −0.16 | −0.08 | 3,445 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Israel | Achievement | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.03 | 13,802 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Israel | Power | −0.03 | −0.05 | −0.01 | 13,829 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Israel | Security | +0.07 | +0.05 | +0.09 | 13,814 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Israel | Conformity | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.02 | 13,795 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Israel | Tradition | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.16 | 13,806 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Israel | Benevolence | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.03 | 13,768 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Israel | Universalism | −0.15 | −0.17 | −0.13 | 13,832 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Israel | Self-direction | −0.03 | −0.05 | −0.01 | 13,824 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Israel | Stimulation | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.02 | 13,792 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Israel | Hedonism | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.02 | 13,779 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Cyprus | Achievement | +0.04 | +0.01 | +0.08 | 4,629 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Cyprus | Power | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 4,636 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Cyprus | Security | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.04 | 4,636 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Cyprus | Conformity | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.04 | 4,624 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Cyprus | Tradition | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.01 | 4,634 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Cyprus | Benevolence | −0.07 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 4,635 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Cyprus | Universalism | −0.05 | −0.08 | −0.01 | 4,634 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Cyprus | Self-direction | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 4,632 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Cyprus | Stimulation | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 4,630 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | | Cyprus | Hedonism | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.08 | 4,632 | n/a | Cyprus, Israel, Turkey | Views: Post-communist Europe (in_post_view = true); Western Europe (group = Western Europe); All countries (is_country = true). Note: Every country cell rests on an effective sample of at least 300 respondents. Hover for the interval and the sample size. Note: The Western mean row is the mean of the 18 Western country correlations, with a 95% interval from resampling countries. Source: European Social Survey, rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024; weighted (analysis weight within each country, every country counted once across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/country_value_heatmap.json ### Table 4. By the 95% interval, conservation values go with the right in 4 post-communist countries and with the left in 7 Correlation between conservation values (conformity, tradition and security) and left-right self-placement, by post-communist country, with the Western and post-communist means; 95% intervals; ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024 | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | group | label | metric | n_units | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | | 0.161 | 0.111 | 0.135 | Western mean | Western mean | Conservation | 18 | | 0.027 | −0.073 | −0.020 | Post-communist mean | Post-communist mean | Conservation | 18 | | 0.184 | 0.131 | 0.158 | Interval above zero (leans right) | Croatia | Conservation | n/a | | 0.154 | 0.117 | 0.136 | Interval above zero (leans right) | Slovenia | Conservation | n/a | | 0.136 | 0.102 | 0.119 | Interval above zero (leans right) | Poland | Conservation | n/a | | 0.187 | 0.004 | 0.096 | Interval above zero (leans right) | Kosovo | Conservation | n/a | | 0.084 | −0.013 | 0.036 | Interval includes zero | Montenegro | Conservation | n/a | | 0.060 | −0.038 | 0.011 | Interval includes zero | Serbia | Conservation | n/a | | 0.034 | −0.019 | 0.008 | Interval includes zero | Lithuania | Conservation | n/a | | 0.086 | −0.082 | 0.002 | Interval includes zero | Albania | Conservation | n/a | | 0.007 | −0.030 | −0.011 | Interval includes zero | Hungary | Conservation | n/a | | 0.079 | −0.115 | −0.019 | Interval includes zero | North Macedonia | Conservation | n/a | | 0.005 | −0.079 | −0.037 | Interval includes zero | Latvia | Conservation | n/a | | −0.015 | −0.072 | −0.043 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Russia | Conservation | n/a | | −0.029 | −0.089 | −0.059 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Ukraine | Conservation | n/a | | −0.002 | −0.118 | −0.061 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Romania | Conservation | n/a | | −0.047 | −0.080 | −0.063 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Estonia | Conservation | n/a | | −0.153 | −0.198 | −0.176 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Slovakia | Conservation | n/a | | −0.201 | −0.235 | −0.218 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Czechia | Conservation | n/a | | −0.220 | −0.262 | −0.241 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Bulgaria | Conservation | n/a | | −0.162 | −0.224 | −0.193 | Western mean | Western mean | Universalism | 18 | | −0.024 | −0.071 | −0.049 | Post-communist mean | Post-communist mean | Universalism | 18 | | −0.133 | −0.176 | −0.155 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Bulgaria | Universalism | n/a | | −0.096 | −0.131 | −0.114 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Czechia | Universalism | n/a | | −0.079 | −0.117 | −0.098 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Slovenia | Universalism | n/a | | −0.055 | −0.091 | −0.073 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Hungary | Universalism | n/a | | −0.038 | −0.094 | −0.066 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Russia | Universalism | n/a | | −0.017 | −0.115 | −0.066 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Serbia | Universalism | n/a | | −0.035 | −0.095 | −0.065 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Ukraine | Universalism | n/a | | −0.037 | −0.091 | −0.064 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Croatia | Universalism | n/a | | −0.040 | −0.086 | −0.063 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Slovakia | Universalism | n/a | | 0.002 | −0.114 | −0.056 | Interval includes zero | Romania | Universalism | n/a | | −0.010 | −0.095 | −0.053 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Latvia | Universalism | n/a | | −0.035 | −0.068 | −0.051 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Estonia | Universalism | n/a | | 0.069 | −0.125 | −0.028 | Interval includes zero | North Macedonia | Universalism | n/a | | 0.003 | −0.051 | −0.024 | Interval includes zero | Lithuania | Universalism | n/a | | −0.001 | −0.035 | −0.018 | Interval below zero (leans left) | Poland | Universalism | n/a | | 0.105 | −0.080 | 0.013 | Interval includes zero | Kosovo | Universalism | n/a | | 0.092 | −0.005 | 0.044 | Interval includes zero | Montenegro | Universalism | n/a | | 0.142 | −0.026 | 0.059 | Interval includes zero | Albania | Universalism | n/a | | 0.094 | 0.074 | 0.084 | Western mean | Western mean | Alignment | 18 | | 0.015 | −0.016 | 0.000 | Post-communist mean | Post-communist mean | Alignment | 18 | | 0.077 | 0.057 | 0.067 | Interval above zero (predicted sides) | Croatia | Alignment | n/a | | 0.070 | 0.053 | 0.062 | Interval above zero (predicted sides) | Slovenia | Alignment | n/a | | 0.053 | 0.040 | 0.047 | Interval above zero (predicted sides) | Poland | Alignment | n/a | | 0.030 | −0.010 | 0.010 | Interval includes zero | Montenegro | Alignment | n/a | | 0.016 | 0.004 | 0.010 | Interval above zero (predicted sides) | Hungary | Alignment | n/a | | 0.018 | −0.004 | 0.007 | Interval includes zero | Ukraine | Alignment | n/a | | 0.027 | −0.016 | 0.006 | Interval includes zero | Serbia | Alignment | n/a | | 0.016 | −0.008 | 0.004 | Interval includes zero | Lithuania | Alignment | n/a | | 0.040 | −0.032 | 0.002 | Interval includes zero | North Macedonia | Alignment | n/a | | 0.016 | −0.018 | −0.002 | Interval includes zero | Latvia | Alignment | n/a | | 0.046 | −0.042 | −0.003 | Interval includes zero | Kosovo | Alignment | n/a | | 0.007 | −0.014 | −0.004 | Interval includes zero | Russia | Alignment | n/a | | 0.016 | −0.034 | −0.010 | Interval includes zero | Romania | Alignment | n/a | | 0.016 | −0.040 | −0.011 | Interval includes zero | Albania | Alignment | n/a | | −0.019 | −0.034 | −0.026 | Interval below zero (opposite sides) | Estonia | Alignment | n/a | | −0.035 | −0.052 | −0.044 | Interval below zero (opposite sides) | Slovakia | Alignment | n/a | | −0.048 | −0.062 | −0.055 | Interval below zero (opposite sides) | Czechia | Alignment | n/a | | −0.054 | −0.071 | −0.062 | Interval below zero (opposite sides) | Bulgaria | Alignment | n/a | Views: Conservation (metric = Conservation); Universalism (metric = Universalism); Alignment score (metric = Alignment). Note: The two mean rows are means of country correlations with a 95% interval from resampling countries; country rows use the Fisher z interval on the effective sample size. Note: Country cells need an effective sample of 300 respondents or more. Source: European Social Survey, rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024; weighted (analysis weight within each country, every country counted once across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/post_communist_countries.json ### Table 5. The mean correlation has the predicted sign for all 9 items with a predicted side in the highest-HDI third of countries and for 4 of them in the lowest third Mean across countries of the correlation between each value item and left-right self-placement (0 = left, 10 = right), by third of countries on the Human Development Index (HDI); items centred on each respondent's mean rating; WVS waves 5 and 6, 2005-2016; 95% intervals from resampling countries | Item | Item wording | Countries | Coding | Mean correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Countries in the mean | Countries on the predicted side | Countries with the interval on the predicted side | | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Conformity (behaving well) | It is important to this person to always behave properly | Highest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.06 | +0.04 | +0.08 | 23 | 19 | 15 | | Tradition | Tradition is important to this person | Highest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.15 | 23 | 23 | 18 | | Security (safety) | It is important to this person to live in secure surroundings | Highest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.03 | 0.00 | +0.05 | 23 | 15 | 7 | | Power (wealth) | It is important to this person to be rich | Highest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.07 | 23 | 16 | 9 | | Achievement (success) | It is important to this person to be very successful | Highest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.02 | 23 | 11 | 3 | | Hedonism (good time) | It is important to this person to have a good time | Highest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.05 | −0.06 | −0.04 | 23 | n/a | n/a | | Stimulation (adventure) | It is important to this person to seek adventure and take risks | Highest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.05 | −0.08 | −0.03 | 23 | 20 | 11 | | Self-direction (new ideas) | It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative | Highest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.08 | −0.10 | −0.05 | 23 | 22 | 14 | | Universalism (environment) | It is important to this person to look after the environment | Highest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.10 | −0.14 | −0.07 | 23 | 20 | 15 | | Benevolence (helping others) | It is important to this person to help the people nearby | Highest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.07 | −0.09 | −0.04 | 21 | 17 | 11 | | Conformity (behaving well) | It is important to this person to always behave properly | Middle third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.02 | 23 | 13 | 4 | | Tradition | Tradition is important to this person | Middle third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.05 | 23 | 15 | 8 | | Security (safety) | It is important to this person to live in secure surroundings | Middle third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.02 | −0.05 | +0.01 | 23 | 11 | 2 | | Power (wealth) | It is important to this person to be rich | Middle third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.03 | 23 | 14 | 4 | | Achievement (success) | It is important to this person to be very successful | Middle third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.03 | 23 | 17 | 3 | | Hedonism (good time) | It is important to this person to have a good time | Middle third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.04 | 23 | n/a | n/a | | Stimulation (adventure) | It is important to this person to seek adventure and take risks | Middle third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 23 | 12 | 8 | | Self-direction (new ideas) | It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative | Middle third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.01 | 23 | 12 | 7 | | Universalism (environment) | It is important to this person to look after the environment | Middle third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.02 | −0.05 | 0.00 | 23 | 17 | 5 | | Benevolence (helping others) | It is important to this person to help the people nearby | Middle third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.04 | −0.07 | −0.02 | 17 | 14 | 5 | | Conformity (behaving well) | It is important to this person to always behave properly | Lowest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.04 | 24 | 12 | 4 | | Tradition | Tradition is important to this person | Lowest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.04 | +0.01 | +0.07 | 24 | 17 | 8 | | Security (safety) | It is important to this person to live in secure surroundings | Lowest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.02 | −0.05 | 0.00 | 24 | 6 | 2 | | Power (wealth) | It is important to this person to be rich | Lowest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 24 | 10 | 4 | | Achievement (success) | It is important to this person to be very successful | Lowest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.02 | −0.05 | 0.00 | 24 | 11 | 2 | | Hedonism (good time) | It is important to this person to have a good time | Lowest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.02 | −0.04 | +0.01 | 24 | n/a | n/a | | Stimulation (adventure) | It is important to this person to seek adventure and take risks | Lowest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.02 | 24 | 14 | 6 | | Self-direction (new ideas) | It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative | Lowest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.03 | 24 | 10 | 4 | | Universalism (environment) | It is important to this person to look after the environment | Lowest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.04 | +0.01 | +0.06 | 24 | 7 | 1 | | Benevolence (helping others) | It is important to this person to help the people nearby | Lowest third by HDI | Centred on the respondent's mean | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.03 | 19 | 11 | 5 | | Conformity (behaving well) | It is important to this person to always behave properly | All countries | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.02 | 0.00 | +0.04 | 71 | 45 | 24 | | Tradition | Tradition is important to this person | All countries | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.06 | +0.04 | +0.08 | 71 | 56 | 35 | | Security (safety) | It is important to this person to live in secure surroundings | All countries | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.01 | −0.02 | +0.01 | 71 | 33 | 12 | | Power (wealth) | It is important to this person to be rich | All countries | Centred on the respondent's mean | +0.02 | +0.01 | +0.03 | 71 | 41 | 17 | | Achievement (success) | It is important to this person to be very successful | All countries | Centred on the respondent's mean | 0.00 | −0.01 | +0.01 | 71 | 39 | 8 | | Hedonism (good time) | It is important to this person to have a good time | All countries | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.02 | −0.04 | −0.01 | 71 | n/a | n/a | | Stimulation (adventure) | It is important to this person to seek adventure and take risks | All countries | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.02 | −0.04 | −0.01 | 71 | 47 | 26 | | Self-direction (new ideas) | It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative | All countries | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.03 | −0.04 | −0.01 | 71 | 45 | 26 | | Universalism (environment) | It is important to this person to look after the environment | All countries | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.03 | −0.05 | −0.01 | 71 | 44 | 21 | | Benevolence (helping others) | It is important to this person to help the people nearby | All countries | Centred on the respondent's mean | −0.04 | −0.05 | −0.02 | 58 | 42 | 21 | | Conformity (behaving well) | It is important to this person to always behave properly | All countries | Uncentred items | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.07 | 71 | 52 | 28 | | Tradition | Tradition is important to this person | All countries | Uncentred items | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.10 | 71 | 59 | 41 | | Security (safety) | It is important to this person to live in secure surroundings | All countries | Uncentred items | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.04 | 71 | 49 | 20 | | Power (wealth) | It is important to this person to be rich | All countries | Uncentred items | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.06 | 71 | 53 | 26 | | Achievement (success) | It is important to this person to be very successful | All countries | Uncentred items | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.04 | 71 | 44 | 20 | | Hedonism (good time) | It is important to this person to have a good time | All countries | Uncentred items | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.03 | 71 | n/a | n/a | | Stimulation (adventure) | It is important to this person to seek adventure and take risks | All countries | Uncentred items | 0.00 | −0.01 | +0.02 | 71 | 34 | 17 | | Self-direction (new ideas) | It is important to this person to think up new ideas and be creative | All countries | Uncentred items | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.02 | 71 | 36 | 17 | | Universalism (environment) | It is important to this person to look after the environment | All countries | Uncentred items | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.03 | 71 | 32 | 15 | | Benevolence (helping others) | It is important to this person to help the people nearby | All countries | Uncentred items | 0.00 | −0.02 | +0.01 | 58 | 32 | 10 | Views: By HDI third (view = thirds); All countries (view = all); Uncentred items (view = uncentred). Note: Each estimate is the mean of country correlations, every country counted once. Countries without a Human Development Index value (Taiwan) are in the all-countries and uncentred views only. Note: Benevolence is estimated in fewer countries: no respondent answered the item in 13 countries and territories, and a subsample answered it in 20. Note: Item labels are short forms; the wording of each item is in the data table. In a tooltip, n is the number of countries in the mean. Note: Country cells need an effective sample of 300 respondents or more. Source: World Values Survey, waves 5 and 6, 2005-2016; weighted (S017 within each country, every country counted once across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/wvs_items_by_hdi.json ### Table 6. Values sit on their predicted sides in 30 of 71 countries and on the opposite sides in 9 Average correlation between eight values and left-right self-placement, signed so that a positive score is the side the theory predicts; WVS waves 5 and 6, 2005-2016 | Country | ISO code | Interval of the score | Alignment score | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Algeria | DZA | Includes zero | +0.032 | −0.003 | +0.069 | 496 | | Andorra | AND | Above zero | +0.103 | +0.071 | +0.133 | 906 | | Argentina | ARG | Above zero | +0.092 | +0.070 | +0.115 | 1,438 | | Armenia | ARM | Includes zero | −0.010 | −0.041 | +0.022 | 629 | | Australia | AUS | Above zero | +0.082 | +0.063 | +0.100 | 2,683 | | Azerbaijan | AZE | Includes zero | +0.009 | −0.024 | +0.040 | 1,001 | | Belarus | BLR | Includes zero | −0.019 | −0.041 | +0.003 | 1,454 | | Brazil | BRA | Above zero | +0.031 | +0.016 | +0.046 | 2,517 | | Bulgaria | BGR | Includes zero | −0.019 | −0.051 | +0.014 | 634 | | Burkina Faso | BFA | Above zero | +0.024 | +0.002 | +0.047 | 958 | | Canada | CAN | Above zero | +0.095 | +0.066 | +0.120 | 1,585 | | Chile | CHL | Above zero | +0.032 | +0.011 | +0.055 | 1,319 | | Colombia | COL | Above zero | +0.037 | +0.017 | +0.056 | 1,238 | | Cyprus | CYP | Includes zero | +0.017 | −0.001 | +0.035 | 1,846 | | Ecuador | ECU | Includes zero | +0.014 | −0.006 | +0.035 | 1,140 | | Egypt | EGY | Below zero | −0.041 | −0.057 | −0.025 | 4,209 | | Estonia | EST | Below zero | −0.026 | −0.049 | −0.002 | 1,230 | | Ethiopia | ETH | Includes zero | −0.020 | −0.046 | +0.004 | 1,249 | | Finland | FIN | Above zero | +0.043 | +0.016 | +0.072 | 887 | | France | FRA | Above zero | +0.052 | +0.022 | +0.078 | 905 | | Georgia | GEO | Below zero | −0.020 | −0.040 | −0.002 | 1,594 | | Germany | DEU | Above zero | +0.065 | +0.044 | +0.085 | 3,523 | | Ghana | GHA | Includes zero | −0.001 | −0.018 | +0.018 | 2,299 | | Haiti | HTI | Includes zero | −0.009 | −0.026 | +0.009 | 1,932 | | Hong Kong SAR | HKG | Includes zero | −0.009 | −0.031 | +0.015 | 964 | | Hungary | HUN | Includes zero | −0.006 | −0.028 | +0.017 | 856 | | India | IND | Includes zero | +0.011 | −0.003 | +0.022 | 3,515 | | Indonesia | IDN | Includes zero | +0.015 | −0.007 | +0.036 | 1,339 | | Iraq | IRQ | Includes zero | +0.010 | −0.019 | +0.037 | 936 | | Japan | JPN | Above zero | +0.066 | +0.048 | +0.084 | 2,237 | | Kazakhstan | KAZ | Includes zero | +0.004 | −0.014 | +0.023 | 1,500 | | Kyrgyzstan | KGZ | Includes zero | −0.010 | −0.028 | +0.008 | 1,435 | | Lebanon | LBN | Includes zero | −0.008 | −0.037 | +0.018 | 750 | | Libya | LBY | Includes zero | −0.001 | −0.026 | +0.021 | 1,319 | | Malaysia | MYS | Below zero | −0.050 | −0.070 | −0.031 | 1,300 | | Mali | MLI | Below zero | −0.029 | −0.049 | −0.010 | 977 | | Mexico | MEX | Above zero | +0.022 | +0.010 | +0.034 | 3,127 | | Moldova | MDA | Below zero | −0.045 | −0.073 | −0.018 | 786 | | Morocco | MAR | Includes zero | −0.002 | −0.031 | +0.027 | 685 | | Netherlands | NLD | Above zero | +0.109 | +0.090 | +0.126 | 2,470 | | New Zealand | NZL | Above zero | +0.110 | +0.069 | +0.150 | 583 | | Nigeria | NGA | Below zero | −0.031 | −0.052 | −0.010 | 1,759 | | Norway | NOR | Above zero | +0.079 | +0.054 | +0.106 | 991 | | Pakistan | PAK | Includes zero | −0.021 | −0.053 | +0.008 | 1,129 | | Palestine | PSE | Includes zero | +0.009 | −0.017 | +0.036 | 705 | | Peru | PER | Includes zero | +0.001 | −0.014 | +0.016 | 2,022 | | Philippines | PHL | Includes zero | 0.000 | −0.024 | +0.022 | 1,186 | | Poland | POL | Above zero | +0.057 | +0.037 | +0.079 | 1,428 | | Romania | ROU | Below zero | −0.022 | −0.039 | −0.006 | 1,822 | | Russia | RUS | Includes zero | −0.009 | −0.032 | +0.014 | 903 | | Rwanda | RWA | Includes zero | +0.012 | −0.001 | +0.027 | 2,456 | | Serbia | SRB | Includes zero | −0.023 | −0.050 | +0.003 | 815 | | Slovenia | SVN | Above zero | +0.053 | +0.031 | +0.075 | 1,304 | | South Africa | ZAF | Includes zero | −0.013 | −0.027 | +0.001 | 5,449 | | South Korea | KOR | Above zero | +0.088 | +0.065 | +0.113 | 2,347 | | Spain | ESP | Above zero | +0.072 | +0.052 | +0.090 | 2,013 | | Sweden | SWE | Above zero | +0.083 | +0.062 | +0.104 | 2,053 | | Switzerland | CHE | Above zero | +0.109 | +0.084 | +0.136 | 1,083 | | Taiwan ROC | TWN | Above zero | +0.047 | +0.030 | +0.064 | 2,308 | | Thailand | THA | Includes zero | 0.000 | −0.014 | +0.012 | 2,664 | | Trinidad and Tobago | TTO | Above zero | +0.027 | +0.006 | +0.048 | 1,177 | | Tunisia | TUN | Above zero | +0.052 | +0.022 | +0.079 | 667 | | Turkey | TUR | Above zero | +0.053 | +0.037 | +0.070 | 2,491 | | Ukraine | UKR | Includes zero | −0.016 | −0.032 | +0.002 | 2,026 | | United Kingdom | GBR | Above zero | +0.067 | +0.038 | +0.091 | 857 | | United States | USA | Above zero | +0.083 | +0.065 | +0.101 | 3,250 | | Uruguay | URY | Above zero | +0.048 | +0.030 | +0.068 | 1,663 | | Uzbekistan | UZB | Below zero | −0.033 | −0.064 | −0.002 | 566 | | Vietnam | VNM | Above zero | +0.053 | +0.031 | +0.077 | 1,277 | | Zambia | ZMB | Includes zero | −0.009 | −0.033 | +0.014 | 891 | | Zimbabwe | ZWE | Includes zero | −0.012 | −0.037 | +0.013 | 1,500 | Note: Jordan and Yemen have an effective sample below 300 respondents and draw as no data. China, Iran, Kuwait, Qatar and Singapore have no left-right answers with the value items. Source: World Values Survey, waves 5 and 6, 2005-2016; weighted (S017 within each country, every country counted once across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/alignment_map.json ### Table 7. Alignment is higher in countries with higher human development, with a correlation of +0.60 across 70 countries Alignment of values with left-right self-placement against the Human Development Index, by country, World Values Survey, waves 5 and 6, 2005-2016 | alignment | country | ess_alignment | n | panel | region | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | −0.019 | Bulgaria | −0.062 | 634 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.017 | Cyprus | 0.011 | 1,846 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.026 | Estonia | −0.026 | 1,230 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.043 | Finland | 0.083 | 887 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.052 | France | 0.106 | 905 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.065 | Germany | 0.093 | 3,523 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.006 | Hungary | 0.010 | 856 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.109 | Netherlands | 0.105 | 2,470 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.079 | Norway | 0.070 | 991 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.057 | Poland | 0.047 | 1,428 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.022 | Romania | −0.010 | 1,822 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.009 | Russia | −0.004 | 903 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.023 | Serbia | 0.006 | 815 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.053 | Slovenia | 0.062 | 1,304 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.072 | Spain | 0.109 | 2,013 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.083 | Sweden | 0.059 | 2,053 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.109 | Switzerland | 0.132 | 1,083 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.053 | Turkey | 0.071 | 2,491 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.016 | Ukraine | 0.007 | 2,026 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.067 | United Kingdom | 0.083 | 857 | ess | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.032 | Algeria | n/a | 496 | hdi | Middle East & North Africa | | 0.103 | Andorra | n/a | 906 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.092 | Argentina | n/a | 1,438 | hdi | Latin America & Caribbean | | −0.010 | Armenia | n/a | 629 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.082 | Australia | n/a | 2,683 | hdi | East Asia & Pacific | | 0.009 | Azerbaijan | n/a | 1,001 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.019 | Belarus | n/a | 1,454 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.031 | Brazil | n/a | 2,517 | hdi | Latin America & Caribbean | | −0.019 | Bulgaria | n/a | 634 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.024 | Burkina Faso | n/a | 958 | hdi | Sub-Saharan Africa | | 0.095 | Canada | n/a | 1,585 | hdi | North America | | 0.032 | Chile | n/a | 1,319 | hdi | Latin America & Caribbean | | 0.037 | Colombia | n/a | 1,238 | hdi | Latin America & Caribbean | | 0.017 | Cyprus | n/a | 1,846 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.014 | Ecuador | n/a | 1,140 | hdi | Latin America & Caribbean | | −0.041 | Egypt | n/a | 4,209 | hdi | Middle East & North Africa | | −0.026 | Estonia | n/a | 1,230 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.020 | Ethiopia | n/a | 1,249 | hdi | Sub-Saharan Africa | | 0.043 | Finland | n/a | 887 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.052 | France | n/a | 905 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.020 | Georgia | n/a | 1,594 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.065 | Germany | n/a | 3,523 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.001 | Ghana | n/a | 2,299 | hdi | Sub-Saharan Africa | | −0.009 | Haiti | n/a | 1,932 | hdi | Latin America & Caribbean | | −0.009 | Hong Kong SAR | n/a | 964 | hdi | East Asia & Pacific | | −0.006 | Hungary | n/a | 856 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.011 | India | n/a | 3,515 | hdi | South Asia | | 0.015 | Indonesia | n/a | 1,339 | hdi | East Asia & Pacific | | 0.010 | Iraq | n/a | 936 | hdi | Middle East & North Africa | | 0.066 | Japan | n/a | 2,237 | hdi | East Asia & Pacific | | 0.004 | Kazakhstan | n/a | 1,500 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.010 | Kyrgyzstan | n/a | 1,435 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.008 | Lebanon | n/a | 750 | hdi | Middle East & North Africa | | −0.001 | Libya | n/a | 1,319 | hdi | Middle East & North Africa | | −0.050 | Malaysia | n/a | 1,300 | hdi | East Asia & Pacific | | −0.029 | Mali | n/a | 977 | hdi | Sub-Saharan Africa | | 0.022 | Mexico | n/a | 3,127 | hdi | Latin America & Caribbean | | −0.045 | Moldova | n/a | 786 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.002 | Morocco | n/a | 685 | hdi | Middle East & North Africa | | 0.109 | Netherlands | n/a | 2,470 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.110 | New Zealand | n/a | 583 | hdi | East Asia & Pacific | | −0.031 | Nigeria | n/a | 1,759 | hdi | Sub-Saharan Africa | | 0.079 | Norway | n/a | 991 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.021 | Pakistan | n/a | 1,129 | hdi | South Asia | | 0.009 | Palestine | n/a | 705 | hdi | Middle East & North Africa | | 0.001 | Peru | n/a | 2,022 | hdi | Latin America & Caribbean | | 0.000 | Philippines | n/a | 1,186 | hdi | East Asia & Pacific | | 0.057 | Poland | n/a | 1,428 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.022 | Romania | n/a | 1,822 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.009 | Russia | n/a | 903 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.012 | Rwanda | n/a | 2,456 | hdi | Sub-Saharan Africa | | −0.023 | Serbia | n/a | 815 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.053 | Slovenia | n/a | 1,304 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.013 | South Africa | n/a | 5,449 | hdi | Sub-Saharan Africa | | 0.088 | South Korea | n/a | 2,347 | hdi | East Asia & Pacific | | 0.072 | Spain | n/a | 2,013 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.083 | Sweden | n/a | 2,053 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.109 | Switzerland | n/a | 1,083 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.000 | Thailand | n/a | 2,664 | hdi | East Asia & Pacific | | 0.027 | Trinidad and Tobago | n/a | 1,177 | hdi | Latin America & Caribbean | | 0.052 | Tunisia | n/a | 667 | hdi | Middle East & North Africa | | 0.053 | Turkey | n/a | 2,491 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | −0.016 | Ukraine | n/a | 2,026 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.067 | United Kingdom | n/a | 857 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.083 | United States | n/a | 3,250 | hdi | North America | | 0.048 | Uruguay | n/a | 1,663 | hdi | Latin America & Caribbean | | −0.033 | Uzbekistan | n/a | 566 | hdi | Europe & Central Asia | | 0.053 | Vietnam | n/a | 1,277 | hdi | East Asia & Pacific | | −0.009 | Zambia | n/a | 891 | hdi | Sub-Saharan Africa | | −0.012 | Zimbabwe | n/a | 1,500 | hdi | Sub-Saharan Africa | Views: Against human development (panel = hdi); Against the ESS (panel = ess). Note: Taiwan has no Human Development Index value and is left out of the first view. Note: The alignment score averages eight values in both surveys. The ESS scale has 21 items and the WVS scale has one item per value. Note: The fit uses robust standard errors, which allow the spread around the line to differ across countries, and treats the countries as the sample. Note: Country cells need an effective sample of 300 respondents or more. Source: World Values Survey, waves 5 and 6, 2005-2016; weighted (S017 within each country, every country counted once across countries); Human Development Index from the country context file (one value per country); second view also uses the European Social Survey, rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024; weighted (analysis weight within each country, every country counted once across countries) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/alignment_hdi_agreement.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (101), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | al_post | 0.00 | average signed loading (alignment), in correlation units | mean across countries of the alignment score (bootstrap over countries) | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.01 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | al_west | +0.08 | average signed loading (alignment), in correlation units | mean across countries of the alignment score (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.09 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | alcount_post_above | 4 | countries | count of countries whose alignment interval is above zero | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | alcount_post_below | 4 | countries | count of countries whose alignment interval is below zero | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | alcount_post_includes | 10 | countries | count of countries whose alignment interval is including zero | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | alcount_west_above | 18 | countries | count of countries whose alignment interval is above zero | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | chance_count | 9 | countries | number of countries on the predicted side of a value if its correlation with left-right were zero in every country (half of the group) | countries in a European group of 18 (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (expected count) | European Social Survey | | | ciincl_post_ax_conservation | 7 | countries | count of countries with the 95% interval including zero for Conservation | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | ciopp_post_ax_conservation | 7 | countries | count of countries with the 95% interval on the opposite side of the predicted one for Conservation | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | ciopp_post_universalism | 0 | countries | count of countries with the 95% interval on the opposite side of the predicted one for Universalism | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | cipred_post_ax_conservation | 4 | countries | count of countries with the 95% interval on the predicted side for Conservation | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | cipred_post_conformity | 3 | countries | count of countries with the 95% interval on the predicted side for Conformity | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | cipred_post_tradition | 4 | countries | count of countries with the 95% interval on the predicted side for Tradition | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | cipred_post_universalism | 12 | countries | count of countries with the 95% interval on the predicted side for Universalism | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | cipred_west_conformity | 18 | countries | count of countries with the 95% interval on the predicted side for Conformity | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | cipred_west_tradition | 17 | countries | count of countries with the 95% interval on the predicted side for Tradition | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | cipred_west_universalism | 18 | countries | count of countries with the 95% interval on the predicted side for Universalism | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | ess_al_hu | +0.010 | average signed loading (alignment), in correlation units | alignment score: mean of predicted sign x weighted correlation of left-right with eight values (respondent bootstrap) | respondents in Hungary with a left-right answer | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024 | 95% CI 0.004 to 0.016 | 15,197 | ESS analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | ess_conservation_bg | −0.24 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Conservation | respondents in Bulgaria with a left-right answer | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024 | 95% CI −0.26 to −0.22 | 11,629 | ESS analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | ess_conservation_cz | −0.22 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Conservation | respondents in Czechia with a left-right answer | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024 | 95% CI −0.23 to −0.20 | 17,177 | ESS analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | ess_conservation_hr | +0.16 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Conservation | respondents in Croatia with a left-right answer | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024 | 95% CI 0.13 to 0.18 | 6,692 | ESS analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | ess_conservation_pl | +0.12 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Conservation | respondents in Poland with a left-right answer | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024 | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.14 | 14,207 | ESS analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | ess_conservation_si | +0.14 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Conservation | respondents in Slovenia with a left-right answer | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024 | 95% CI 0.12 to 0.15 | 11,293 | ESS analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | ess_conservation_sk | −0.18 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Conservation | respondents in Slovakia with a left-right answer | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024 | 95% CI −0.20 to −0.15 | 10,996 | ESS analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | hdi_cut_high | 0.83 | Human Development Index, from 0 to 1 | upper bound of the middle third of countries by the index (countries above it are in the highest third) | WVS countries with an alignment score and a Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (cut point) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | hdi_cut_low | 0.74 | Human Development Index, from 0 to 1 | upper bound of the lowest third of countries by the index | WVS countries with an alignment score and a Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (cut point) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | mean_post_ax_conservation | −0.02 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with higher-order axis Conservation (bootstrap over countries) | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI −0.07 to 0.03 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | mean_post_universalism | −0.05 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with value Universalism (bootstrap over countries) | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI −0.07 to −0.02 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | mean_west_achievement | +0.010 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with value Achievement (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI 0.001 to 0.017 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | mean_west_ax_conservation | +0.14 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with higher-order axis Conservation (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI 0.11 to 0.16 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | mean_west_ax_selftranscendence | −0.16 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with higher-order axis Self-transcendence (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI −0.19 to −0.14 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | mean_west_conformity | +0.11 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with value Conformity (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.13 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | mean_west_hedonism | −0.02 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with value Hedonism (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI −0.04 to −0.01 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | mean_west_tradition | +0.10 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with value Tradition (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.12 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | mean_west_universalism | −0.19 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with value Universalism (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI −0.22 to −0.16 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | n_ess_countries | 39 | countries | count of countries | countries in the ESS human-values sample | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | n_ess_resp | 432,669 | respondents | count of respondents | ESS respondents with a human-values score and a left-right answer | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | n_other | 3 | countries | count of countries in the group | Cyprus, Israel and Turkey (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | n_post | 18 | countries | count of countries in the group, fixed by history | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | n_pvq_items | 21 | items | count of items in the scale | ESS human-values scale (Portrait Values Questionnaire) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (constant) | European Social Survey | | | n_r10_no_items | 9 | countries | count of countries with no answered value item in round 10 | ESS countries with round 10 rows and no value items | ESS round 10, 2020-2022 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | n_west | 18 | countries | count of countries in the group, fixed by geography and history | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | n_wvs_benev_none | 13 | countries and territories | count of countries and territories in which no respondent answered the benevolence item | WVS countries with the value items and a left-right answer | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_wvs_benev_part | 20 | countries and territories | count of countries and territories in which under 90% of respondents answered the benevolence item | WVS countries with the value items and a left-right answer | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_wvs_countries | 71 | countries and territories | count of countries and territories | WVS countries with an alignment score | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_wvs_dropped_resp | 555 | respondents | count of respondents with a left-right answer and all nine core value items in the countries that are dropped | WVS respondents in countries whose effective sample is below the floor | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_wvs_firm | 9 | items | count of items with a predicted side | WVS value items that have a predicted side | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_wvs_resp | 113,253 | respondents | count of respondents in the countries that are estimated (an effective sample of 300 or more) | WVS respondents with a left-right answer and all nine core value items in the countries with an alignment score | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_wvs_sample | 73 | countries and territories | count of countries and territories | WVS countries with the value items and a left-right answer | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | neff_floor | 300 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | minimum effective sample for a country to be estimated | country-value cells | all fieldwork years | | | none (constant) | European Social Survey | | | pred_post_security | 6 | countries | count of countries with the point estimate on the predicted side for Security | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | pred_post_universalism | 15 | countries | count of countries with the point estimate on the predicted side for Universalism | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | pred_west_achievement | 12 | countries | count of countries with the point estimate on the predicted side for Achievement | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | pri_post_conservation | 0.21 | points on the value scale (1 to 6 scale, centred on each respondent's mean rating) | mean across countries of the country mean of the centred conservation score (bootstrap over countries) | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI 0.18 to 0.24 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | pri_west_conservation | 0.02 | points on the value scale (1 to 6 scale, centred on each respondent's mean rating) | mean across countries of the country mean of the centred conservation score (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.08 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | priority_loading_r | −0.43 | correlation across countries, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the country mean of the centred conservation score and the conservation loading (Fisher z interval on the number of countries) | countries in the ESS human-values sample | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI −0.65 to −0.13 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | priority_loading_r_post | +0.03 | correlation across countries, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across the countries of the group of the country mean of the centred conservation score and the conservation loading (Fisher z interval on the number of countries) | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI −0.44 to 0.49 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | priority_loading_r_west | −0.06 | correlation across countries, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across the countries of the group of the country mean of the centred conservation score and the conservation loading (Fisher z interval on the number of countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI −0.51 to 0.42 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | r11_agree_r | +0.92 | correlation across countries, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the alignment estimated from round 11 alone and from rounds 1 to 10 (Fisher z interval on the number of countries) | countries in ESS round 11 | ESS round 11 (2023-2024) against rounds 1 to 10 | 95% CI 0.84 to 0.96 | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | r11_cells_r | +0.77 | correlation across country-value cells, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across country-value cells of the loading estimated from round 11 alone and from rounds 1 to 10, after subtracting each value's mean across countries from each set of loadings (no interval: the ten cells of a country are not independent) | country-value cells in ESS round 11 | ESS round 11 (2023-2024) against rounds 1 to 10 | | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | r11_n_countries | 30 | countries | count of countries | countries in ESS round 11 | ESS round 11, 2023-2024 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | r2_west_universalism | 4% | percent of the variance of left-right placement | mean across countries of the squared within-country weighted correlation of left-right with universalism (bootstrap over countries) | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | 95% CI 3% to 5% | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | sd_post_ax_conservation | 0.11 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | standard deviation across countries of the loading of left-right on higher-order axis Conservation | post-communist European countries (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | sd_west_ax_conservation | 0.06 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | standard deviation across countries of the loading of left-right on higher-order axis Conservation | countries of Western, Northern and Southern Europe outside the former communist bloc (ESS) | ESS rounds 1 to 11, 2002-2024, rounds pooled within country | | | ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) within each country; every country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | wvs_al_egy | −0.04 | average signed loading (alignment), in correlation units | alignment score: mean of predicted sign x weighted correlation of left-right with eight items, centred on the respondent's mean (respondent bootstrap) | respondents in Egypt with a left-right answer | WVS fieldwork 2008, 2013 | 95% CI −0.06 to −0.03 | 4,209 | WVS weight within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_al_jpn | +0.07 | average signed loading (alignment), in correlation units | alignment score: mean of predicted sign x weighted correlation of left-right with eight items, centred on the respondent's mean (respondent bootstrap) | respondents in Japan with a left-right answer | WVS fieldwork 2005, 2010 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.08 | 2,237 | WVS weight within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_al_mys | −0.05 | average signed loading (alignment), in correlation units | alignment score: mean of predicted sign x weighted correlation of left-right with eight items, centred on the respondent's mean (respondent bootstrap) | respondents in Malaysia with a left-right answer | WVS fieldwork 2012 | 95% CI −0.07 to −0.03 | 1,300 | WVS weight within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_al_usa | +0.08 | average signed loading (alignment), in correlation units | alignment score: mean of predicted sign x weighted correlation of left-right with eight items, centred on the respondent's mean (respondent bootstrap) | respondents in United States with a left-right answer | WVS fieldwork 2006, 2011 | 95% CI 0.06 to 0.10 | 3,250 | WVS weight within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_alcount_all_above | 30 | countries | count of countries whose alignment interval is above zero | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_alcount_all_below | 9 | countries | count of countries whose alignment interval is below zero | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_alcount_all_includes | 32 | countries | count of countries whose alignment interval is including zero | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_alcount_high_above | 19 | countries | count of countries whose alignment interval is above zero | countries in the highest third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_alcount_low_above | 3 | countries | count of countries whose alignment interval is above zero | countries in the lowest third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_alcount_low_below | 5 | countries | count of countries whose alignment interval is below zero | countries in the lowest third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_alcount_mid_above | 7 | countries | count of countries whose alignment interval is above zero | countries in the middle third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_ess_k | 20 | countries | count of countries | countries in both the ESS and the WVS value samples | ESS rounds 1 to 11 and WVS waves 5 and 6 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | wvs_ess_r | +0.90 | correlation across countries, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the alignment score from the ESS 21-item scale and from the WVS ten-item scale (Fisher z interval on the number of countries) | countries in both the ESS and the WVS value samples | ESS rounds 1 to 11 and WVS waves 5 and 6 | 95% CI 0.77 to 0.96 | | survey weight within each country | European Social Survey | | | wvs_hdi_k | 70 | countries and territories | count of countries and territories | WVS countries with an alignment score and a Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_hdi_k_in | 29 | countries and territories | count of countries and territories | WVS countries inside the World Bank region Europe and Central Asia with an alignment score and a Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_hdi_k_out | 41 | countries and territories | count of countries and territories | WVS countries outside the World Bank region Europe and Central Asia with an alignment score and a Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_hdi_r | +0.60 | correlation across countries, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the alignment score and the Human Development Index (Fisher z interval on the number of countries) | WVS countries with an alignment score and a Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI 0.43 to 0.73 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_hdi_r_in | +0.79 | correlation across countries, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the alignment score and the Human Development Index (Fisher z interval on the number of countries) | WVS countries inside the World Bank region Europe and Central Asia with an alignment score and a Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI 0.59 to 0.89 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_hdi_r_out | +0.64 | correlation across countries, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the alignment score and the Human Development Index (Fisher z interval on the number of countries) | WVS countries outside the World Bank region Europe and Central Asia with an alignment score and a Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI 0.42 to 0.79 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_k_high | 23 | countries | count of countries with an alignment score | countries in the highest third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_k_low | 24 | countries | count of countries with an alignment score | countries in the lowest third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_k_mid | 23 | countries | count of countries with an alignment score | countries in the middle third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_mean_all_benevolence | −0.04 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with the benevolence item (bootstrap over countries) | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI −0.05 to −0.02 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_mean_all_tradition | +0.06 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with the tradition item (bootstrap over countries) | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.08 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_mean_all_universalism | −0.03 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with the universalism item (bootstrap over countries) | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI −0.05 to −0.01 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_mean_high_tradition | +0.12 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with the tradition item (bootstrap over countries) | countries in the highest third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.15 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_mean_high_universalism | −0.10 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with the universalism item (bootstrap over countries) | countries in the highest third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI −0.14 to −0.07 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_mean_low_security | −0.025 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with the security item (bootstrap over countries) | countries in the lowest third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI −0.046 to −0.004 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_mean_low_universalism | +0.04 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with the universalism item (bootstrap over countries) | countries in the lowest third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.06 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_n_all_tradition | 71 | countries and territories | count of countries and territories in which the tradition item is estimated | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_pred_all_security | 33 | countries | count of countries with the point estimate on the predicted side for the security item | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_pred_all_tradition | 56 | countries | count of countries with the point estimate on the predicted side for the tradition item | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_pred_all_universalism | 44 | countries | count of countries with the point estimate on the predicted side for the universalism item | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_raw_all_tradition | +0.08 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with the tradition item, not centred (bootstrap over countries) | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI 0.06 to 0.10 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_raw_all_universalism | +0.01 | correlation coefficient (loading), from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country weighted correlation of left-right with the universalism item, not centred (bootstrap over countries) | countries in the WVS value sample | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.03 | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_raw_r | +0.95 | correlation across countries, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the alignment score from items centred on the respondent's mean and from the raw items (no interval: the two versions use the same respondents) | WVS countries with an alignment score | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | WVS weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_sign_low | 4 | items | count of the items with a predicted side whose mean correlation with left-right across countries has the predicted sign | countries in the lowest third of the Human Development Index | WVS waves 5 and 6, fieldwork 2005-2016, waves pooled within country | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | ## Definitions - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Schwartz basic values: Ten broad motivations, such as security, tradition, achievement and universalism, that Shalom Schwartz's theory arranges in a circle. Neighboring values are compatible and opposite values conflict. - Left-right self-placement: A survey question that asks people to place themselves on a scale from left to right. The scale is the same for everyone, but the meaning attached to left and right differs across people, countries and years. - Loading: The correlation, inside one country, between a survey scale such as left-right self-placement and an attitude. A loading of zero means the attitude says nothing about where people place themselves, and a positive loading means people who hold it place themselves further right. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Human Development Index: A country score from 0 to 1 that combines life expectancy, years of schooling and income per person, published by the United Nations Development Programme. Higher scores mean higher human development. ## Methods Sample: ESS respondents in rounds 1 to 11 (2002-2024) with a human-values score and a left-right answer (0 = left, 10 = right) and a positive analysis weight, 432,669 respondents in 39 countries; WVS respondents in waves 5 and 6 (fieldwork 2005-2016) with a left-right answer (1 to 10) and all nine core value items, 113,253 respondents in 71 countries and territories (113,808 respondents in 73 countries before Jordan and Yemen are dropped for an effective sample below 300). Round 10 of the ESS has no value items in 9 countries (Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Spain, Israel, Latvia, Poland, Serbia, Sweden), which is a gap in the raw file and not a cleaning loss, so their loadings rest on the other rounds. Germany is one country and includes the former East Germany. Values: the ten Schwartz basic values from the 21-item Portrait Values Questionnaire, each the mean of its answered items minus the respondent's mean over all answered items (reverse coded so higher means more important); the four higher-order axes are means of their member values. Rounds 1 to 10 come from the cleaned ESS file and the build reproduces its own value columns exactly; round 11 has no value items in the cleaned file, so they are rebuilt from the raw file (the items with the suffix a) and joined to the cleaned file's left-right answers and weights on country and respondent number, one to one. The WVS has one item per value (waves 5 and 6 only in the cleaned file), centred on the respondent's mean over the nine core items (all but benevolence, which no respondent answered in 13 countries and territories and a subsample answered in 20); the cleaned WVS file restores ten EVS countries with a blank label, and none carries the value items. Estimand: the loading of a value is the survey-weighted Pearson correlation between its score and left-right inside one country, with all fielded rounds or waves pooled. The predicted side of each value is fixed before estimation from the value circle (conservation and self-enhancement lean right, openness to change and self-transcendence lean left, hedonism has no predicted side). Weights: ESS analysis weight (pspwght x pweight) and WVS weight (S017) within each country; averages across countries count each country once. Intervals: country loadings have 95% Fisher z intervals on the Kish effective sample size of the complete cases, which are model based and ignore clustering; a mean across countries has a 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over countries (2,000 replicates, seed 12345); the alignment of a country is the mean over eight values of the predicted sign times the loading, with a 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over respondents (1,000 replicates, seed 12345); correlations across countries use Fisher z on the number of countries, the correlations across country-value cells (after subtracting each value's mean across countries) and between the centred and raw WVS scores are reported without an interval, and the line in the last figure is least squares with HC3 errors. Counts: a country is on the predicted side when its point estimate has the predicted sign, and its interval is on the predicted side when the interval excludes zero on that side. Suppression: a country-value cell needs a Kish effective sample of at least 300; no ESS cell fell below it, and Jordan and Yemen fall below it in the WVS. Country groups: Western Europe (18 countries outside the former communist bloc), post-communist Europe (18 countries) and Cyprus, Israel and Turkey, fixed by geography and history. Human Development Index: one value per country from the WVS country context file (year not recorded), thirds among the countries with an alignment score and a value (Taiwan has none); the region is the World Bank region in the same file, in which Europe and Central Asia includes Central Asia, the South Caucasus, Turkey and Cyprus. ## What these data cannot show - The loadings are associations between two answers given in one interview. - They do not show whether values shape left-right placement, whether placement shapes the values a person reports, or whether a third influence such as a party system, a church or an education shapes both. - A country's alignment says how tightly the scale and the values move together and nothing about which comes first. - How self-direction and stimulation differ by birth cohort is in Chapter 8.3, The silent revolution (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-silent-revolution; planned). - The scores are relative priorities. - Because each value is centred on the respondent's own mean rating, the ten loadings cannot all lie on one side of zero, and a value that leans left partly reflects other values that lean right. - The WVS measures each value with one item, which is noisier than the ESS scale, and the WVS universalism item is about the environment only. - The alignment score leaves out hedonism and benevolence. - The theory's prediction for achievement holds only weakly in Western Europe, where its mean interval sits barely above zero and it is on the predicted side in 12 of 18 countries. - The intervals are model based. - They treat each survey as a weighted simple random sample and ignore clustering in the sampling designs, and the bootstrap over countries treats the countries as a sample from a population of countries, which they are not. - A count of countries by interval moves when a country's interval ends close to zero, as Hungary's does in the ESS and Estonia's, Georgia's and Uzbekistan's do in the WVS. - A different bootstrap draw could place such a country in a neighboring group of the count. - Countries appear in different rounds and waves, so a loading pools different years, and the chapter does not follow loadings over time. - Round 10 of the ESS has no value items in 9 countries, so their loadings rest on the other rounds. - The groups are historical and geographic labels. - The post-communist group holds countries with different party systems and different histories after 1990, and Western Europe holds countries with long democratic histories and countries with recent ones. - Left-right also means different things in different places, as Chapter 7.4, Left and right across countries (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries) shows, so a loading describes the tie between the label and a value among people who answer the question. - The data hold no party manifestos, expert placements of parties or vote choices, so they cannot say why the tie is reversed in the 4 post-communist countries whose interval is below zero or unclear in the 10 whose interval includes zero. ## References 1. Schwartz, Shalom H. (1992). Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 25: 1-65. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60281-6 2. Caprara, Gian Vittorio; Schwartz, Shalom; Capanna, Cristina; Vecchione, Michele; Barbaranelli, Claudio (2006). Personality and Politics: Values, Traits, and Political Choice. Political Psychology 27(1): 1-28. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2006.00447.x 3. Piurko, Yuval; Schwartz, Shalom H.; Davidov, Eldad (2011). Basic Personal Values and the Meaning of Left-Right Political Orientations in 20 Countries. Political Psychology 32(4): 537-561. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2011.00828.x 4. Schwartz, Shalom H. (2003). A Proposal for Measuring Value Orientations across Nations. Chapter 7 in the Questionnaire Development Report of the European Social Survey. https://www.europeansocialsurvey.org/sites/default/files/2023-06/ESS_core_questionnaire_human_values.pdf 5. Fisher, Ronald A. (1921). On the Probable Error of a Coefficient of Correlation Deduced from a Small Sample. Metron 1(4): 3-32. 6. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 7. Efron, Bradley (1979). Bootstrap Methods: Another Look at the Jackknife. Annals of Statistics 7(1): 1-26. https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1176344552 8. Aspelund, Anna; Lindeman, Marjaana; Verkasalo, Markku (2013). Political Conservatism and Left-Right Orientation in 28 Eastern and Western European Countries. Political Psychology 34(3): 409-417. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12000 9. Davidov, Eldad; Schmidt, Peter; Schwartz, Shalom H. (2008). Bringing Values Back In: The Adequacy of the European Social Survey to Measure Values in 20 Countries. Public Opinion Quarterly 72(3): 420-445. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfn035 10. Tavits, Margit; Letki, Natalia (2009). When Left Is Right: Party Ideology and Policy in Post-Communist Europe. American Political Science Review 103(4): 555-569. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055409990220 11. Kaasa, Anneli; Welzel, Christian (2023). Elements of Schwartz's Model in the WVS: How Do They Relate to Other Cultural Models?. Cross-Cultural Research 57(5): 431-471. https://doi.org/10.1177/10693971231179792 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/basic-values-and-left-right/build.py (sha256 4783ace187627f86e2a29b2af10963ec3ea566d31c9f2c197d7e5e52df09ffac) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/ess/Datafile.sav | 1,771,059,844 | 277e9393b493b0a4e8d0cc8db99db78ddd0b48333fbf4487e54638427ba55abd | eaeb795cfa656529b28f6d0f579e1e6146c0dc45a9555a3249f983ab6433851b | | data/ess/ess_clean.parquet | 45,592,290 | 9487eead6817f028f5dd525709aa1b989ccd384384ef3700b9657cf68dd0b529 | 6def6b8c99fe6dbaf6abc744db6cabf584b900084600909b651870d99208e338 | | data/wvs/wvs_clean.parquet | 71,974,374 | cef4479481f8a48d6c765d39dc5438d31daa32fcecee3f181aaaf8e257f41f0b | 59a8e3c369176b7e1a2cb37fc10b87985ed79b02fab2eae1cca08e7a972db061 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | b3f8fa4caf9f19bd4db0bdee3b550b87ec15ad816fb6ea0c94474aa0d3ac6401 | | figures/alignment_hdi_agreement.json | 70cd369aa6bf86f10cd8866e5ab8b058d271bfed8616ce7d544ecf557dd18bd8 | | figures/alignment_map.json | 543e28e65b865843768e4d1fa02d13454f99836b5893b04b321784a684e24939 | | figures/countries_on_predicted_side.json | 711d1f14f03069d77a6218691975b80d6a61ca98643c0721aa6227d1ed058fb4 | | figures/country_value_heatmap.json | 19bf23880f3afd7737b812672dee9f4c5044d2572be5a1f9968ae8d22eadeae4 | | figures/post_communist_countries.json | a56b771ecf07066f9f1280e2524bc4861ca6ff8e12369d521915332cfc5c3064 | | figures/value_circle_west.json | 1755711fb0460184358392bc6e9962901fe833a08a2c2cd99dc1f338f80cebbf | | figures/wvs_items_by_hdi.json | 9a68d4f9e613781b63d9f60585959b7d6cc99dbd6486c2ac1a3f5e3390cd7d71 | | meta.json | 8b7fc9e16f33eb1364baadf339e81821adfd31d3945959e6aaac77427579ebac | | refs.json | c445f16b078e8aea1544bd209165e9ca9cd9fe99cd90c98b2e81daa48c7d5f6c | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/basic-values-and-left-right/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/basic-values-and-left-right/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/facts.json - Table 1, figure "value_circle_west" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/value_circle_west.json - Table 2, figure "countries_on_predicted_side" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/countries_on_predicted_side.json - Table 3, figure "country_value_heatmap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/country_value_heatmap.json - Table 4, figure "post_communist_countries" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/post_communist_countries.json - Table 5, figure "wvs_items_by_hdi" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/wvs_items_by_hdi.json - Table 6, figure "alignment_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/alignment_map.json - Table 7, figure "alignment_hdi_agreement" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/basic-values-and-left-right/figures/alignment_hdi_agreement.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # The obedience-autonomy disposition: report Chapter 8.4 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: The obedience-autonomy disposition - Chapter: 8.4 (Part VIII, Values beneath politics; Ideology, values and religion) - Question: How does valuing obedience over autonomy in children relate to the political right across three surveys? - Dek: Valuing obedience over autonomy in children goes with placing oneself further right, with a median correlation of +0.04 across 103 countries in the WVS and EVS from 2005 to 2023. - Grain: countries - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - World Values Survey and EVS. World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023: child-quality checklist, left-right, moral, neighbor and political-system items; years: 1981-2023 (7 unified waves); weights: weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries - European Social Survey. European Social Survey rounds 3 to 10: Schwartz conservation values and left-right; years: 2002-2023 (rounds 1 to 11; round 11 was fielded in 2023 and 2024); weights: analysis weight within each country - ANES Cumulative Data File. ANES Cumulative Data File 1992-2024, presidential-year studies: forced-choice child-rearing pairs, party identification, ideology; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z); weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode views - General Social Survey. General Social Survey 1986-2024: obey and think-for-oneself rankings, party identification; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026theobedienceautonomydisposition ```bibtex @misc{singh2026theobedienceautonomydisposition, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {The obedience-autonomy disposition}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the full index (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | +0.04 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.06 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | median_wvs | | count of countries with a usable correlation between left-right and the full index | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 103 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | n_countries_wvs | | count of countries where the point estimate is above zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 84 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | n_positive | ## Findings People who name obedience and religious faith over independence and tolerance as important qualities for a child place themselves further right in most of the 103 countries in the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Study (EVS), fielded from 2005 to 2023. The median correlation between that measure and left-right placement is +0.04 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.06), and the correlation is above zero in 84 countries. A correlation of zero means that two answers are unrelated, so a median this close to zero means that the child-rearing answer tracks left-right placement only weakly. In the United States the correlation with party identification rose between 1992 and 2024, except among Black respondents. The chapter follows the child-rearing measure through the WVS and EVS, the American National Election Studies (ANES) and the General Social Survey (GSS), and adds the European Social Survey (ESS) as a related comparison. The ESS has no question about children. Its measure is a different instrument, the importance a respondent gives to conformity, tradition and security among Schwartz's basic values, which Chapter 8.1, Basic values and left-right (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/basic-values-and-left-right) compares with left-right value by value. All four surveys correlate their measure with the same kind of outcome, a left-right or party question, and the chapter returns to that overlap below. Chapter 7.4, Left and right across countries (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/left-and-right-across-countries) shows how differently the left-right question attaches to religion, economics and moral attitudes from one country to the next. ### The surveys measure the disposition with different questions Stenner argued that a lasting preference for sameness and authority over difference and choice can be read from child-rearing preferences, because those questions do not mention politics [1]. Feldman described the same disposition as a conflict between conformity and personal autonomy [2], and Hetherington and Weiler used four American forced choices to study polarization [3]. Engelhardt, Feldman and Hetherington assess the child-rearing items as a measure of authoritarianism [4]. The WVS checklist also feeds the traditional versus secular-rational dimension of the WVS cultural map [5]. Table 1. Three surveys ask about children and one asks about values, and each fixes the obedience pole in advance Each survey fixes the obedience pole from the wording of its answers before any correlation with left-right is computed. In the WVS and EVS, respondents pick up to five qualities from a list, of which the cleaned file carries ten. The full index counts obedience and religious faith on one side and independence and tolerance and respect for other people on the other. The ANES sets an autonomy quality against an obedience quality in each of its four pairs, and its index is the mean of the obedience answers. (Note: Each correlation is survey-weighted, and its 95% interval (built on the Kish effective sample size [6] and Fisher z [7]) treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample, so it is narrower than an interval that follows the sampling design. Intervals on medians and means across countries come from a bootstrap over countries.) ### The obedience side is larger in lower-income countries Table 2 counts respondents on the obedience side, those who name more obedience-side than autonomy-side qualities, by country income group (the World Bank groups in the WVS context file) and birth decade. In high-income countries the share is 11.5% among people born in the 1940s and 7.4% among those born in the 1990s, a change of −4.1 (95% CI −5.6 to −2.6) points. In upper-middle-income countries the figures are 25.6% and 20.9% (a change of −4.7 (95% CI −7.3 to −2.4)). In lower-income countries they are 31.5% and 27.9% (a change of −3.6 (95% CI −10.0 to 2.5), an interval that includes zero). The gap between lower-income and high-income countries is larger than the change across birth decades in either group. Table 2. The obedience side is largest in lower-income countries and shrinks across birth decades in richer ones A cohort profile from surveys spread over 2005 to 2023 mixes age with birth decade, because a later survey measures the same birth decade at an older age. Comparing the same birth decade measured in 2014 to 2023 with 2005 to 2013 gives a mean difference of −0.3 (95% CI −0.9 to 0.2) points across country-by-decade cells, which rules out a uniform shift between the two periods. Still, 28% of the cells differ by more than 5 points, about the size of the cohort changes in the two richer groups, so period effects in single countries are not ruled out. ### The correlation is positive but small in most countries Table 3 shows the correlation for each of the 103 countries with a usable estimate, computed on 281,678 respondents. The median is +0.04 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.06) and the mean is +0.06 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.07). The 5 countries with an interval below zero are Bulgaria, Czechia, Egypt, Moldova and Zambia. Table 3. The correlation is positive in 84 of 103 countries and +0.04 in the median country The United States (+0.28 (95% CI 0.25 to 0.31)) and Canada (+0.25 (95% CI 0.22 to 0.28)) have the largest correlations, followed by Luxembourg (+0.22), the Netherlands (+0.20), Spain (+0.20) and Andorra (+0.20). Poland is at +0.19, Germany at +0.12, Sweden at +0.04 and India at +0.01 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.04), an interval that includes zero. The correlation is negative in Czechia (−0.06), Bulgaria (−0.06) and Egypt (−0.14). The median also differs by the income groups of Table 2. It is +0.10 (95% CI 0.07 to 0.15) in high-income countries, +0.04 (95% CI 0.02 to 0.05) in upper-middle-income countries and +0.02 (95% CI 0.00 to 0.03) in lower-income countries. High-income countries are separated from upper-middle-income countries (a difference in medians of +0.061 (95% CI 0.020 to 0.116)), and upper-middle-income and lower-income countries are not separated from each other (+0.024 (95% CI −0.001 to 0.043), an interval that includes zero). The three groups hold 102 of the 103 countries, because Taiwan ROC has no income group in the context file. Income group also tracks region, religion and party system, so the comparison describes where the correlation is larger and does not say why. The ESS views of Table 3 use the neighboring measure, the importance of conformity, tradition and security, which comes from the circle of Schwartz's basic values [8]. It asks nothing about children, so its correlations are a related comparison rather than a second estimate of the child-rearing tie. Its median correlation with left-right is +0.08 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.11) across 38 countries, positive in 27 and with an interval below zero in 7. The country pattern resembles the WVS one. The correlation is +0.20 in Spain and +0.22 in Austria, +0.04 in Sweden, and negative in Czechia (−0.23), Bulgaria (−0.23) and Slovakia (−0.19). All 7 ESS countries with an interval below zero are post-communist, and 10 of the 18 post-communist countries have a negative point estimate, against 1 of the 20 other countries. Poland, Slovenia and Croatia are post-communist and have positive correlations in both surveys, so the region is not uniform. Work on post-communist publics finds that having lived under communism is associated with more support for state welfare and less support for markets [9]. This chapter does not test whether that legacy lies behind the negative signs. ### Faith alone gives the same median as the full index The WVS index contains religious faith, and faith alone has an interval above zero in 52 countries. Table 4 recomputes the median country correlation for ten definitions of the measure and for the full index with age, sex and education held fixed. Without faith, the median is +0.03 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.05) against +0.04 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.06) with it, a difference of +0.010 (95% CI 0.005 to 0.027). Without faith the correlation is positive in 80 countries, and the interval is above zero in 41 countries against 49 with it. The country-by-country correlations with and without faith are close (+0.93 (95% CI 0.90 to 0.95) across countries), so the ordering of countries does not depend on the faith item. Table 4. Religious faith alone gives a median correlation of +0.04, the same as the full index (+0.04), and independence or tolerance alone give +0.02 and +0.02 Religious faith alone gives a median of +0.04 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.06), and the difference between the full index and faith alone (+0.006 (95% CI −0.008 to 0.020)) includes zero. Obedience alone gives +0.03 (95% CI 0.02 to 0.04), above the three autonomy items alone. Independence (+0.02 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.03)), tolerance (+0.02 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.03)) and imagination (+0.02 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.04)) alone give lower medians, each scored so that a higher value marks the obedience pole. The median for the full index is higher than each of them by +0.027 (95% CI 0.016 to 0.041), +0.026 (95% CI 0.013 to 0.044) and +0.024 (95% CI 0.004 to 0.039). The version that uses imagination in place of tolerance gives +0.04 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.07), close to the full index. ### Age, sex and education change little in the WVS Age, sex and education could stand behind the correlation if they relate to both the measure and left-right placement. In the WVS and EVS, holding them fixed leaves the median at +0.05 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.06), and the adjusted and unadjusted country correlations are nearly the same (+0.99 (95% CI 0.98 to 0.99)). In the ESS the adjustment changes individual countries more. The correlation in Czechia moves from −0.23 to −0.14 (95% CI −0.16 to −0.12), and Czechia, Bulgaria and Slovakia stay below zero. The median is +0.07 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.10) against +0.08 (the last view of Table 3). ### The surveys agree as closely on age and religiosity Table 5 sets the WVS and EVS correlation for each country against the ESS one. Across 36 countries in both surveys the correlation between the two sets is +0.81 (95% CI 0.66 to 0.90). The two surveys give a correlation of the same sign in 30 countries, and the mean absolute difference is 0.06. Czechia and Bulgaria are negative in both. Slovakia and Hungary are close to zero or slightly positive in the WVS and lower in the ESS. The interval on the cross-country correlation is wide, because it rests on only 36 countries. Table 5. The two surveys rank countries alike, with a correlation of +0.81 across 36 countries Both surveys correlate their measure with the same outcome, and left-right placement means different things in different countries. Agreement between the two surveys could therefore come from how the label attaches to any characteristic, and not from the measure. Table 6 repeats the comparison for four other predictors of left-right placement, on the same countries. The correlation between the two surveys is +0.87 (95% CI 0.76 to 0.93) for religiosity, +0.90 (95% CI 0.82 to 0.95) for age, +0.70 (95% CI 0.47 to 0.84) for education and +0.72 (95% CI 0.52 to 0.85) for sex, against +0.81 (95% CI 0.66 to 0.90) for the obedience measure. Age and religiosity give higher point estimates than the obedience measure, and no predictor's interval separates from the one for the obedience measure. Table 6. The two surveys agree as closely on age and religiosity as on obedience, so agreement is not specific to the measure The agreement between the surveys shows that both rank countries alike on how left-right attaches to individual traits, and it does not show that both are measuring one disposition. Older people place themselves further left in Czechia and Bulgaria, where the obedience correlation is negative in both surveys, and further right in Spain and Germany, in both surveys. (Note: Correlation of left-right with age in years, WVS and EVS first and ESS second: Czechia −0.17 and −0.23, Bulgaria −0.22 and −0.24, Spain +0.14 and +0.08, Germany +0.09 and +0.11. Every interval excludes zero.) ### The US tie to party rose, except among Black respondents Table 7 follows the ANES correlations from 1992 to 2024, by race in its first view and for all respondents in its second. Among all respondents the correlation with party identification is −0.04 (95% CI −0.09 to 0.00) in 1992, +0.14 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.18) in 2016 and +0.28 (95% CI 0.24 to 0.32) in 2024. Each study after 2008 has a higher point estimate than the one before it, so the rise is a climb through successive studies rather than a single step. The correlation with liberal-conservative self-placement starts higher, +0.22 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.26) in 1992, and reaches +0.43 (95% CI 0.39 to 0.46) in 2024. Table 7. The correlation with party rose among white and Hispanic and other respondents and stayed near zero among Black respondents The all-respondent series combines three race groups. Among white non-Hispanic respondents the correlation with party identification rose from +0.04 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.09) in 1992 to +0.43 (95% CI 0.38 to 0.47) in 2024. Among Hispanic and other respondents, a residual group that grew from 10% to 24% of the weighted sample, it went from −0.12 (95% CI −0.25 to 0.02) to +0.26 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.35). Among Black non-Hispanic respondents the interval includes zero in 7 of 8 studies and is below zero in the other one, 2012 (−0.11 (95% CI −0.21 to −0.01)). In 2024 they score higher on the obedience side than white non-Hispanic respondents, 0.63 (95% CI 0.58 to 0.67) against 0.46 (95% CI 0.44 to 0.47) on the ANES index (which runs from autonomy on every pair to obedience on every pair). 78.8% of them identify as Democrats, leaners included. The rise in the all-respondent series therefore comes from the white group and the Hispanic and other group, and it is absent among Black respondents. Holding a college degree, age and whether the respondent is white non-Hispanic fixed (a partial correlation, which removes what those three variables explain of each measure), the correlation with party identification is +0.06 (95% CI 0.02 to 0.11) in 1992 and +0.31 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.35) in 2024. Studies disagree on whether the child-rearing scale works the same way for Black and white respondents. Pérez and Hetherington report that it does not [10]. A later study reports partial measurement invariance in the 1992 to 2008 studies, with one item, respect for elders, working differently, and full invariance in 2012 and 2016 [11]. This chapter reports the groups separately and does not test invariance itself. The ANES 2012 and 2016 studies have separate face-to-face and web samples, and the 2020 and 2024 studies mix interview modes. The 2020 study has no mode weight. In 2024, 43% of the respondents in the party analysis (2,027 of 4,668) have neither a face-to-face nor a web weight, because they come from a panel or a paper questionnaire, so they are in neither mode estimate. Among respondents with a mode weight, the 2024 correlation with party identification is +0.29 (95% CI 0.21 to 0.38) in the face-to-face sample and +0.26 (95% CI 0.20 to 0.32) in the web sample, so the high 2024 value does not come from one mode. The GSS gives a second series that does not use the four forced choices. Its measure is the rank of obeying against the rank of thinking for oneself, and its correlation with party identification is 0.00 (95% CI −0.03 to 0.02) in 1986 to 1994 and +0.11 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.14) in 2016 to 2024. (Note: The share ranking obedience above thinking for oneself is +6.9 (95% CI 4.3 to 9.4) points higher among Republican than among Democratic identifiers, leaners included, in 2016 to 2024, against −1.0 (95% CI −3.3 to 1.4) in 1986 to 1994.) The correlation with party rose while the average score on the measure fell. The mean score on the ANES index is 0.60 (95% CI 0.59 to 0.62) in 1992, 0.56 (95% CI 0.55 to 0.57) in 2016 and 0.49 (95% CI 0.48 to 0.50) in 2024, so respondents chose the obedience answer less often over the period. The fall also appears within the face-to-face sample, where the mean is 0.61 in 2012, 0.58 in 2016 and 0.48 in 2024. Hetherington and Weiler argue that the parties came to differ on worldview [3]. The data here show the correlation and its timing, and they are consistent with that argument and with others. ### The obedience side is more morally conservative and less tolerant Table 8 compares respondents on the autonomy side of the index with those on the obedience side, country by country and then averaged across a fixed panel of countries. Averaged across countries, 70.9% of respondents on the obedience side are socially conservative, against 57.1% on the autonomy side, a gap of 13.8 (95% CI 11.4 to 16.5) points. Socially conservative here means an average of 4 or lower on the three justifiability items of the ten-point scale. Naming homosexuals as unwanted neighbors is 7.7 (95% CI 6.1 to 9.4) points more common on the obedience side, naming immigrants or foreign workers 2.8 (95% CI 1.8 to 4.0) points and naming people of a different race 2.9 (95% CI 1.8 to 3.9) points. Calling a strong leader who bypasses parliament a good way to run the country is 4.2 (95% CI 2.5 to 6.1) points more common and calling army rule good is 4.3 (95% CI 3.1 to 5.4) points more common. Table 8. Every attitude is more common on the obedience side of the index, and the gap is largest for moral conservatism The moral gap is smaller without the faith item (Table 9), and the comparison needs the same countries under both indices. The index without faith leaves fewer respondents on its obedience side, so fewer countries qualify (74 against 97 for moral conservatism). On those 74 countries the gap for moral conservatism is 12.0 (95% CI 9.1 to 15.1) points with the faith item and 7.2 (95% CI 4.8 to 9.9) points without it, a difference of 4.7 (95% CI 3.7 to 5.8) points. The gap for naming homosexuals as neighbors falls from 6.9 (95% CI 5.1 to 8.7) to 5.0 (95% CI 3.3 to 6.6) points (a difference of 1.9 (95% CI 1.1 to 2.6) points). For immigrants, people of a different race and army rule, the difference between the two indices has an interval that includes zero. The gap for a strong leader is larger without the faith item (a difference of −1.2 (95% CI −2.1 to −0.2) points, taken as with the faith item minus without it). Table 9. Dropping the faith item shrinks the gaps for moral conservatism and for homosexuals as neighbors, and leaves the gaps for immigrants, race, army rule and a strong leader no smaller Across countries, the median correlation of the full index with a moral-conservatism index (the reversed justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce) is +0.13 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.16), and it is +0.09 (95% CI 0.07 to 0.12) without the faith item. The median correlation of left-right placement with the same moral index is +0.07 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.10). The measure is more closely tied to moral attitudes than to left-right placement, where the median is +0.04. Every gap stays above zero under both indices. The moral outcome is more common on the obedience side in 87 of 97 countries. These are differences between groups of respondents, averaged across countries, and show what occurs together. Chapter 6.7, Support for democracy (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/support-for-democracy) takes up support for strong rule directly, and Chapter 8.5, Order, security and threat (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/order-security-and-threat; planned) asks whether security values and threat perceptions lean right. ### What these data cannot show The correlations come from one interview per person, so they do not show whether valuing obedience shapes where people place themselves, whether placement or party shapes the child-rearing answers, or whether a third influence shapes both. The rise in the American correlation with party is a change in how the measure lines up with party. The ANES and GSS are repeated cross-sections, so they cannot say whether people changed parties, the parties changed or the composition of each party changed. The measures are related but different. The WVS checklist, the ANES forced choices, the GSS ranking and the ESS values battery use different formats, and the ESS has no question about children. The agreement between the WVS and ESS country patterns shows that both rank countries alike, and the comparison with age, education, sex and religiosity shows that this agreement is not specific to the obedience measure. This chapter does not use party manifestos, expert placements of parties or vote choices, so it cannot say why the label attaches to conservation values in one country and not in another. Whether the ANES child-rearing items mean the same thing to Black and white respondents is disputed [10] [11], and this chapter reports the groups separately without testing it. The Hispanic and other group is a residual category whose makeup changes across studies. The intervals are model based and ignore the sampling design, and the countries are those the surveys reached, not a sample of the world. The cohort profile cannot separate age from birth decade, the country groups by income are a single classification from the WVS context file, and waves are pooled inside each country, so a correlation blends years. The link between the disposition and politics is thought to depend on perceived threat [1]. This chapter does not test whether threat conditions the link; Chapter 8.5, Order, security and threat (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/order-security-and-threat; planned) takes up the threat measures in the WVS and ESS. ## Tables ### Table 1. Three surveys ask about children and one asks about values, and each fixes the obedience pole in advance Questions, the answers that count as each pole and the measure built from them, by survey | Survey and years | Question | Obedience versus autonomy pole | Measure | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023 | Check-all list: which qualities are especially important for a child to learn at home (up to five; ten qualities in the cleaned file) | Obedience and religious faith, against independence and tolerance and respect for other people | Obedience and faith minus independence and tolerance, from a low of −2 to a high of +2 | | American National Election Studies, presidential-year studies 1992-2024 | Four forced choices: independence or respect for elders, curiosity or good manners, self-reliance or obedience, considerate or well-behaved | Respect for elders, good manners, obedience and being well-behaved, against independence, curiosity, self-reliance and being considerate | One minus the mean of the four answers, from 0 (autonomy on every pair) to 1 (obedience on every pair) | | General Social Survey, 1986-2024 | Rank five qualities by importance for a child to learn, including obeying and thinking for oneself | Obeying, against thinking for oneself | Rank of thinking for oneself minus rank of obeying, from −4 to +4 | | European Social Survey, rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | Twenty-one portraits of a person; how much the respondent resembles each. No child-rearing item | Conformity, tradition and security values (conservation); openness to change is the opposite pole and is not measured directly | Conservation score, centered on the respondent's mean rating | Source: WVS/EVS 2005-2023, ANES 1992-2024, GSS 1986-2024 and ESS 2006-2022 questionnaires and cleaned data dictionaries; item wording only, no estimates or weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/instruments.json ### Table 2. The obedience side is largest in lower-income countries and shrinks across birth decades in richer ones Percent of respondents on the obedience side (more obedience-side than autonomy-side qualities), by birth decade and country income group; fixed country panels; WVS and EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 | Country group | Birth decade | Percent on the obedience side | Interval low | Interval high | Countries | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | High income | 1940 | 11.5 | 9.0 | 14.1 | 36 | | High income | 1950 | 9.7 | 7.4 | 12.2 | 36 | | High income | 1960 | 8.9 | 6.7 | 11.4 | 36 | | High income | 1970 | 8.4 | 6.5 | 10.5 | 36 | | High income | 1980 | 8.3 | 6.4 | 10.2 | 36 | | High income | 1990 | 7.4 | 5.8 | 9.2 | 36 | | Lower income | 1940 | 31.5 | 23.3 | 40.9 | 10 | | Lower income | 1950 | 30.0 | 22.8 | 38.6 | 10 | | Lower income | 1960 | 28.9 | 21.3 | 38.2 | 10 | | Lower income | 1970 | 29.7 | 22.4 | 38.6 | 10 | | Lower income | 1980 | 27.8 | 21.0 | 36.1 | 10 | | Lower income | 1990 | 27.9 | 20.8 | 36.9 | 10 | | Upper-middle income | 1940 | 25.6 | 20.7 | 30.8 | 22 | | Upper-middle income | 1950 | 24.8 | 19.9 | 29.5 | 22 | | Upper-middle income | 1960 | 23.9 | 19.0 | 29.1 | 22 | | Upper-middle income | 1970 | 23.3 | 18.6 | 28.2 | 22 | | Upper-middle income | 1980 | 21.7 | 17.1 | 26.8 | 22 | | Upper-middle income | 1990 | 20.9 | 17.0 | 24.9 | 22 | Note: Birth decade is the survey year minus age, and the survey years span 2005 to 2023, so birth decade and age at interview move together within a survey window. Note: Panels: countries with an effective sample of 100 or more in every birth decade; the number of countries in each group is in the table. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted (weight, S017, within each country); countries with an effective sample of 100 or more in every birth decade shown Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/cohort_prevalence.json ### Table 3. The correlation is positive in 84 of 103 countries and +0.04 in the median country Weighted correlation between left-right self-placement (10 = right) and the obedience measure, one dot per country; WVS and EVS fieldwork 2005-2023, ESS rounds 3 to 10 | Country | Region | Correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents | Measure | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | Albania | Europe & Central Asia | +0.06 | +0.02 | +0.11 | 2,253 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Algeria | Middle East & North Africa | +0.06 | −0.02 | +0.14 | 545 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Andorra | Europe & Central Asia | +0.20 | +0.15 | +0.24 | 1,824 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Argentina | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.15 | +0.11 | +0.20 | 2,346 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Armenia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.08 | 3,776 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Australia | East Asia & Pacific | +0.17 | +0.13 | +0.20 | 4,488 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Austria | Europe & Central Asia | +0.17 | +0.13 | +0.21 | 2,685 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Azerbaijan | Europe & Central Asia | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 2,174 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Bangladesh | South Asia | 0.00 | −0.06 | +0.06 | 1,200 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Belarus | Europe & Central Asia | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.04 | 3,222 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Belgium | Europe & Central Asia | +0.07 | +0.01 | +0.12 | 1,422 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Bolivia | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.10 | 1,800 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Europe & Central Asia | +0.10 | +0.06 | +0.15 | 2,315 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Brazil | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 3,680 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Bulgaria | Europe & Central Asia | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.02 | 2,665 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Burkina Faso | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,126 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Canada | North America | +0.25 | +0.22 | +0.28 | 5,642 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Chile | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.06 | +0.01 | +0.12 | 2,127 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Colombia | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.11 | 5,023 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Croatia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.21 | 2,196 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Cyprus | Europe & Central Asia | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.03 | 2,894 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Czechia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.02 | 3,615 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Denmark | Europe & Central Asia | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 4,688 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Ecuador | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.12 | 2,244 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Egypt | Middle East & North Africa | −0.14 | −0.17 | −0.10 | 4,245 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Estonia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 3,319 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Ethiopia | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.07 | 1,931 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Finland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.15 | 2,955 | WVS and EVS, full index | | France | Europe & Central Asia | +0.13 | +0.10 | +0.17 | 3,862 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Georgia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 4,248 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Germany | Europe & Central Asia | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.14 | 8,805 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Ghana | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 2,334 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Greece | Europe & Central Asia | +0.18 | +0.14 | +0.22 | 2,201 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Guatemala | Latin America & Caribbean | −0.03 | −0.10 | +0.05 | 728 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Haiti | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 1,945 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Hong Kong SAR | East Asia & Pacific | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,960 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Hungary | Europe & Central Asia | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 3,444 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Iceland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.06 | +0.01 | +0.11 | 2,322 | WVS and EVS, full index | | India | South Asia | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.04 | 5,826 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Indonesia | East Asia & Pacific | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.04 | 4,093 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Iraq | Middle East & North Africa | +0.12 | +0.05 | +0.18 | 978 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Italy | Europe & Central Asia | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.19 | 3,552 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Japan | East Asia & Pacific | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 3,609 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Kazakhstan | Europe & Central Asia | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.07 | 1,500 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Kenya | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.07 | 1,164 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Kosovo | Europe & Central Asia | −0.02 | −0.10 | +0.06 | 662 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Kyrgyzstan | Europe & Central Asia | +0.08 | +0.03 | +0.13 | 1,461 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Latvia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.04 | 1,985 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Lebanon | Middle East & North Africa | +0.04 | −0.02 | +0.11 | 837 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Libya | Middle East & North Africa | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.06 | 2,606 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Lithuania | Europe & Central Asia | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.11 | 1,831 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Luxembourg | Europe & Central Asia | +0.22 | +0.16 | +0.28 | 1,256 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Macau SAR | East Asia & Pacific | −0.01 | −0.08 | +0.05 | 997 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Malaysia | East Asia & Pacific | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.06 | 2,613 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Maldives | South Asia | +0.04 | −0.02 | +0.10 | 1,022 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Mali | Sub-Saharan Africa | 0.00 | −0.06 | +0.05 | 1,193 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Malta | Middle East & North Africa | +0.05 | −0.03 | +0.12 | 764 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Mexico | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.04 | +0.01 | +0.07 | 4,785 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Moldova | Europe & Central Asia | −0.07 | −0.12 | −0.02 | 1,610 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Mongolia | East Asia & Pacific | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.09 | 1,613 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Montenegro | Europe & Central Asia | +0.03 | −0.03 | +0.10 | 1,211 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Morocco | Middle East & North Africa | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.20 | 1,916 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Netherlands | Europe & Central Asia | +0.20 | +0.18 | +0.22 | 7,886 | WVS and EVS, full index | | New Zealand | East Asia & Pacific | +0.15 | +0.10 | +0.20 | 1,423 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Nicaragua | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.03 | −0.04 | +0.09 | 871 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Nigeria | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.02 | −0.02 | +0.06 | 2,929 | WVS and EVS, full index | | North Macedonia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | −0.03 | +0.13 | 766 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Northern Ireland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.16 | +0.06 | +0.25 | 642 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Norway | Europe & Central Asia | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 3,154 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Pakistan | South Asia | −0.04 | −0.09 | +0.02 | 1,200 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Palestine | Middle East & North Africa | −0.01 | −0.09 | +0.06 | 730 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Peru | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.06 | 3,345 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Philippines | East Asia & Pacific | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.07 | 2,389 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Poland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.22 | 3,599 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Portugal | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.11 | 1,942 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Puerto Rico | Latin America & Caribbean | 0.00 | −0.06 | +0.06 | 1,049 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Romania | Europe & Central Asia | −0.02 | −0.05 | +0.01 | 4,539 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Russia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.05 | 4,611 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Rwanda | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.10 | 2,555 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Serbia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.07 | 3,739 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Singapore | East Asia & Pacific | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.11 | 1,745 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Slovakia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.07 | 3,260 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Slovenia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.17 | +0.13 | +0.20 | 3,091 | WVS and EVS, full index | | South Africa | Sub-Saharan Africa | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.01 | 5,594 | WVS and EVS, full index | | South Korea | East Asia & Pacific | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.08 | 3,640 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Spain | Europe & Central Asia | +0.20 | +0.17 | +0.23 | 4,298 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Sweden | Europe & Central Asia | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 4,254 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Switzerland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.15 | +0.12 | +0.17 | 5,134 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Taiwan ROC | Not classified | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 3,563 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Tajikistan | Europe & Central Asia | −0.03 | −0.09 | +0.02 | 1,200 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Thailand | East Asia & Pacific | +0.06 | +0.02 | +0.09 | 3,763 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Trinidad and Tobago | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.01 | −0.05 | +0.07 | 1,213 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Tunisia | Middle East & North Africa | −0.01 | −0.06 | +0.04 | 1,678 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Turkey | Europe & Central Asia | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.19 | 4,467 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Ukraine | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.10 | 4,565 | WVS and EVS, full index | | United Kingdom | Europe & Central Asia | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.16 | 6,150 | WVS and EVS, full index | | United States | North America | +0.28 | +0.25 | +0.31 | 5,900 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Uruguay | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.14 | +0.10 | +0.18 | 2,662 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Uzbekistan | Europe & Central Asia | +0.01 | −0.07 | +0.09 | 615 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Venezuela | Latin America & Caribbean | −0.06 | −0.11 | 0.00 | 1,190 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Vietnam | East Asia & Pacific | +0.11 | +0.06 | +0.16 | 1,408 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Zambia | Sub-Saharan Africa | −0.07 | −0.14 | −0.01 | 959 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Zimbabwe | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 2,627 | WVS and EVS, full index | | Albania | Europe & Central Asia | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.05 | 2,253 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Algeria | Middle East & North Africa | +0.06 | −0.02 | +0.14 | 545 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Andorra | Europe & Central Asia | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.21 | 1,824 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Argentina | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.15 | +0.11 | +0.20 | 2,346 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Armenia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.08 | 3,783 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Australia | East Asia & Pacific | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.18 | 4,488 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Austria | Europe & Central Asia | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.20 | 2,693 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Azerbaijan | Europe & Central Asia | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 2,174 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Bangladesh | South Asia | +0.01 | −0.05 | +0.07 | 1,200 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Belarus | Europe & Central Asia | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.04 | 3,223 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Belgium | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.11 | 1,422 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Bolivia | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.10 | 1,800 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Bosnia Herzegovina | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 2,315 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Brazil | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 3,680 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Bulgaria | Europe & Central Asia | −0.07 | −0.12 | −0.03 | 2,689 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Burkina Faso | Sub-Saharan Africa | −0.02 | −0.08 | +0.04 | 1,126 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Canada | North America | +0.21 | +0.18 | +0.24 | 5,642 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Chile | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.04 | −0.02 | +0.09 | 2,127 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Colombia | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.09 | 5,023 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Croatia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.08 | +0.03 | +0.13 | 2,208 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Cyprus | Europe & Central Asia | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.03 | 2,898 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Czechia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 3,663 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Denmark | Europe & Central Asia | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.11 | 4,688 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Ecuador | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.11 | 2,244 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Egypt | Middle East & North Africa | −0.13 | −0.16 | −0.09 | 4,245 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Estonia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 3,322 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Ethiopia | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.08 | 1,931 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Finland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.12 | 2,955 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | France | Europe & Central Asia | +0.13 | +0.09 | +0.16 | 3,862 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Georgia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.05 | 4,250 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Germany | Europe & Central Asia | +0.11 | +0.09 | +0.14 | 8,805 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Ghana | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.06 | 2,334 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Greece | Europe & Central Asia | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.13 | 2,201 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Guatemala | Latin America & Caribbean | −0.03 | −0.10 | +0.04 | 759 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Haiti | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 1,945 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Hong Kong SAR | East Asia & Pacific | +0.09 | +0.05 | +0.12 | 3,960 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Hungary | Europe & Central Asia | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.06 | 3,446 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Iceland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.09 | 2,323 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | India | South Asia | −0.01 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 5,826 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Indonesia | East Asia & Pacific | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.04 | 4,093 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Iraq | Middle East & North Africa | +0.02 | −0.05 | +0.08 | 978 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Italy | Europe & Central Asia | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.17 | 3,554 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Japan | East Asia & Pacific | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.09 | 3,609 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Kazakhstan | Europe & Central Asia | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.06 | 1,500 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Kenya | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,164 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Kosovo | Europe & Central Asia | +0.04 | −0.04 | +0.11 | 662 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Kyrgyzstan | Europe & Central Asia | +0.08 | +0.02 | +0.13 | 1,461 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Latvia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.04 | 2,014 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Lebanon | Middle East & North Africa | 0.00 | −0.07 | +0.07 | 837 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Libya | Middle East & North Africa | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.06 | 2,606 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Lithuania | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.10 | 1,834 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Luxembourg | Europe & Central Asia | +0.18 | +0.12 | +0.23 | 1,259 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Macau SAR | East Asia & Pacific | 0.00 | −0.07 | +0.06 | 997 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Malaysia | East Asia & Pacific | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 2,613 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Maldives | South Asia | +0.06 | −0.01 | +0.12 | 1,022 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Mali | Sub-Saharan Africa | 0.00 | −0.06 | +0.06 | 1,193 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Malta | Middle East & North Africa | +0.04 | −0.04 | +0.11 | 766 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Mexico | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.06 | 4,786 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Moldova | Europe & Central Asia | −0.07 | −0.11 | −0.02 | 1,616 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Mongolia | East Asia & Pacific | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.05 | 1,613 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Montenegro | Europe & Central Asia | −0.03 | −0.09 | +0.03 | 1,212 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Morocco | Middle East & North Africa | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 1,916 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Netherlands | Europe & Central Asia | +0.18 | +0.16 | +0.20 | 7,889 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | New Zealand | East Asia & Pacific | +0.14 | +0.09 | +0.19 | 1,423 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Nicaragua | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.01 | −0.06 | +0.07 | 871 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Nigeria | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.05 | 2,929 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | North Macedonia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | −0.03 | +0.13 | 804 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Northern Ireland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.12 | +0.02 | +0.21 | 650 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Norway | Europe & Central Asia | +0.06 | +0.02 | +0.09 | 3,154 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Pakistan | South Asia | −0.05 | −0.11 | +0.01 | 1,200 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Palestine | Middle East & North Africa | −0.03 | −0.10 | +0.05 | 730 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Peru | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.02 | −0.01 | +0.06 | 3,345 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Philippines | East Asia & Pacific | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.06 | 2,389 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Poland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.10 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 3,604 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Portugal | Europe & Central Asia | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.07 | 1,944 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Puerto Rico | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 1,049 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Romania | Europe & Central Asia | −0.02 | −0.05 | +0.01 | 4,544 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Russia | Europe & Central Asia | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 4,620 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Rwanda | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.08 | 2,555 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Serbia | Europe & Central Asia | 0.00 | −0.03 | +0.04 | 3,743 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Singapore | East Asia & Pacific | +0.03 | −0.02 | +0.08 | 1,745 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Slovakia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.07 | 3,270 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Slovenia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 3,093 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | South Africa | Sub-Saharan Africa | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 5,594 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | South Korea | East Asia & Pacific | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.07 | 3,640 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Spain | Europe & Central Asia | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.17 | 4,304 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Sweden | Europe & Central Asia | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 4,254 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Switzerland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.15 | +0.13 | +0.18 | 5,134 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Taiwan ROC | Not classified | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 3,563 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Tajikistan | Europe & Central Asia | −0.04 | −0.10 | +0.01 | 1,200 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Thailand | East Asia & Pacific | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.08 | 3,763 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Trinidad and Tobago | Latin America & Caribbean | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.06 | 1,213 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Tunisia | Middle East & North Africa | −0.07 | −0.12 | −0.02 | 1,680 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Turkey | Europe & Central Asia | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.10 | 4,505 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Ukraine | Europe & Central Asia | +0.01 | −0.03 | +0.05 | 4,577 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | United Kingdom | Europe & Central Asia | +0.13 | +0.10 | +0.16 | 6,155 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | United States | North America | +0.22 | +0.19 | +0.25 | 5,900 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Uruguay | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.12 | +0.08 | +0.16 | 2,662 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Uzbekistan | Europe & Central Asia | +0.01 | −0.07 | +0.09 | 615 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Venezuela | Latin America & Caribbean | +0.01 | −0.04 | +0.07 | 1,190 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Vietnam | East Asia & Pacific | +0.12 | +0.06 | +0.17 | 1,408 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Zambia | Sub-Saharan Africa | −0.04 | −0.11 | +0.02 | 959 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Zimbabwe | Sub-Saharan Africa | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.08 | 2,627 | WVS and EVS, without the religious-faith item | | Albania | Europe & Central Asia | 0.00 | −0.08 | +0.09 | 1,041 | ESS, conservation values | | Austria | Europe & Central Asia | +0.22 | +0.19 | +0.24 | 7,715 | ESS, conservation values | | Belgium | Europe & Central Asia | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.09 | 13,202 | ESS, conservation values | | Bulgaria | Europe & Central Asia | −0.23 | −0.25 | −0.21 | 9,818 | ESS, conservation values | | Croatia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.15 | +0.12 | +0.18 | 5,353 | ESS, conservation values | | Cyprus | Europe & Central Asia | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.02 | 4,044 | ESS, conservation values | | Czechia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.23 | −0.25 | −0.21 | 13,804 | ESS, conservation values | | Denmark | Europe & Central Asia | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.14 | 8,952 | ESS, conservation values | | Estonia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.06 | −0.08 | −0.05 | 12,434 | ESS, conservation values | | Finland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.10 | +0.08 | +0.12 | 14,133 | ESS, conservation values | | France | Europe & Central Asia | +0.20 | +0.19 | +0.22 | 14,593 | ESS, conservation values | | Germany | Europe & Central Asia | +0.16 | +0.15 | +0.18 | 18,649 | ESS, conservation values | | Greece | Europe & Central Asia | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.13 | 6,131 | ESS, conservation values | | Hungary | Europe & Central Asia | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.01 | 10,753 | ESS, conservation values | | Iceland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.14 | 3,146 | ESS, conservation values | | Ireland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.15 | +0.13 | +0.17 | 15,004 | ESS, conservation values | | Israel | Middle East & North Africa | +0.09 | +0.07 | +0.11 | 10,886 | ESS, conservation values | | Italy | Europe & Central Asia | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 6,404 | ESS, conservation values | | Kosovo | Europe & Central Asia | +0.10 | 0.00 | +0.19 | 809 | ESS, conservation values | | Latvia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.03 | 2,290 | ESS, conservation values | | Lithuania | Europe & Central Asia | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.04 | 8,096 | ESS, conservation values | | Montenegro | Europe & Central Asia | +0.03 | −0.04 | +0.10 | 1,613 | ESS, conservation values | | Netherlands | Europe & Central Asia | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.16 | 13,145 | ESS, conservation values | | North Macedonia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.02 | −0.12 | +0.08 | 879 | ESS, conservation values | | Norway | Europe & Central Asia | +0.08 | +0.05 | +0.10 | 11,607 | ESS, conservation values | | Poland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.15 | 9,787 | ESS, conservation values | | Portugal | Europe & Central Asia | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.09 | 10,831 | ESS, conservation values | | Romania | Europe & Central Asia | −0.06 | −0.12 | 0.00 | 1,464 | ESS, conservation values | | Russia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.04 | −0.07 | −0.02 | 7,993 | ESS, conservation values | | Serbia | Europe & Central Asia | 0.00 | −0.06 | +0.07 | 1,274 | ESS, conservation values | | Slovakia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.19 | −0.21 | −0.16 | 8,503 | ESS, conservation values | | Slovenia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.16 | 8,061 | ESS, conservation values | | Spain | Europe & Central Asia | +0.20 | +0.19 | +0.22 | 11,913 | ESS, conservation values | | Sweden | Europe & Central Asia | +0.04 | +0.02 | +0.06 | 10,896 | ESS, conservation values | | Switzerland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.22 | +0.20 | +0.24 | 11,856 | ESS, conservation values | | Turkey | Europe & Central Asia | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.18 | 1,885 | ESS, conservation values | | Ukraine | Europe & Central Asia | −0.05 | −0.09 | −0.01 | 4,541 | ESS, conservation values | | United Kingdom | Europe & Central Asia | +0.17 | +0.15 | +0.19 | 14,926 | ESS, conservation values | | Albania | Europe & Central Asia | +0.04 | −0.04 | +0.13 | 1,035 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Austria | Europe & Central Asia | +0.18 | +0.15 | +0.21 | 5,705 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Belgium | Europe & Central Asia | +0.08 | +0.05 | +0.10 | 9,741 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Bulgaria | Europe & Central Asia | −0.09 | −0.12 | −0.06 | 7,237 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Switzerland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.18 | +0.16 | +0.20 | 8,462 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Cyprus | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.10 | 2,137 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Czechia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.14 | −0.16 | −0.12 | 11,912 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Germany | Europe & Central Asia | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.16 | 13,439 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Denmark | Europe & Central Asia | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 5,987 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Estonia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.04 | −0.06 | −0.02 | 10,008 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Spain | Europe & Central Asia | +0.18 | +0.16 | +0.21 | 8,217 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Finland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.10 | 10,694 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | France | Europe & Central Asia | +0.17 | +0.15 | +0.19 | 10,749 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | United Kingdom | Europe & Central Asia | +0.15 | +0.12 | +0.17 | 10,388 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Greece | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.08 | 4,368 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Croatia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.18 | 4,179 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Hungary | Europe & Central Asia | +0.04 | +0.01 | +0.06 | 8,354 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Ireland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.10 | +0.08 | +0.12 | 11,842 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Israel | Middle East & North Africa | +0.10 | +0.08 | +0.13 | 8,536 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Iceland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 3,130 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Italy | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | +0.02 | +0.08 | 6,305 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Lithuania | Europe & Central Asia | +0.03 | 0.00 | +0.05 | 8,031 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Latvia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.12 | −0.21 | −0.02 | 638 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Montenegro | Europe & Central Asia | +0.05 | −0.02 | +0.12 | 1,580 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | North Macedonia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.03 | −0.13 | +0.06 | 867 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Netherlands | Europe & Central Asia | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.15 | 9,653 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Norway | Europe & Central Asia | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.09 | 8,655 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Poland | Europe & Central Asia | +0.14 | +0.11 | +0.16 | 7,022 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Portugal | Europe & Central Asia | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.10 | 7,603 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Serbia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.07 | 0.00 | +0.14 | 1,265 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Russia | Europe & Central Asia | 0.00 | −0.04 | +0.04 | 5,059 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Sweden | Europe & Central Asia | +0.03 | 0.00 | +0.05 | 7,774 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Slovenia | Europe & Central Asia | +0.15 | +0.12 | +0.17 | 5,947 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Slovakia | Europe & Central Asia | −0.12 | −0.15 | −0.08 | 5,338 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Ukraine | Europe & Central Asia | −0.03 | −0.08 | +0.02 | 2,309 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | | Kosovo | Europe & Central Asia | +0.11 | +0.01 | +0.20 | 809 | ESS, conservation values net of age, sex and education | Views: WVS and EVS, full index (index = chapter); WVS and EVS, without faith (index = no_faith); ESS, conservation values (index = ess); ESS, net of age, sex and education (index = ess_adj). Note: The chart does not draw each country's interval; it colors the dot by where the 95% interval falls against zero, and the intervals and respondent counts are in the data table. Note: Intervals are model based (Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Note: Ten EVS countries have a blank country label in the cleaned file and are restored from the country code; Ireland and Northern Cyprus fall below the effective-sample floor in the WVS and EVS. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted (weight, S017, within each country); countries with an effective sample of 300 or more; ESS views: European Social Survey, rounds 3 to 10 (2006-2022); weighted (analysis weight) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/country_loadings.json ### Table 4. Religious faith alone gives a median correlation of +0.04, the same as the full index (+0.04), and independence or tolerance alone give +0.02 and +0.02 Median across countries of the correlation of left-right with each definition of the measure, with 95% bootstrap intervals over countries; WVS and EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 | Measure | Definition | Median correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Countries | Interval above zero | Interval includes zero | Interval below zero | Correlation across countries with the full index | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Full index (obedience and faith vs independence and tolerance) | Full index: obedience and faith minus independence and tolerance | +0.04 | +0.03 | +0.06 | 103 | 49 | 49 | 5 | 1.00 | | Full index, imagination for tolerance | Imagination version: obedience and faith minus independence and imagination | +0.04 | +0.03 | +0.07 | 103 | 52 | 44 | 7 | 0.95 | | No faith item | Without faith: obedience minus independence and tolerance | +0.03 | +0.01 | +0.05 | 103 | 41 | 57 | 5 | 0.93 | | No faith, imagination added | Without faith: obedience minus independence, tolerance and imagination | +0.03 | +0.02 | +0.06 | 103 | 43 | 53 | 7 | 0.91 | | Obedience minus independence | Without faith: obedience minus independence | +0.03 | +0.02 | +0.04 | 103 | 37 | 59 | 7 | 0.87 | | Obedience only | Obedience alone | +0.03 | +0.02 | +0.04 | 104 | 37 | 64 | 3 | 0.65 | | Faith only | Religious faith alone | +0.04 | +0.03 | +0.06 | 104 | 52 | 48 | 4 | 0.80 | | Independence only (reversed) | Independence alone, reversed | +0.02 | +0.01 | +0.03 | 104 | 31 | 63 | 10 | 0.76 | | Tolerance only (reversed) | Tolerance and respect alone, reversed | +0.02 | +0.01 | +0.03 | 104 | 32 | 66 | 6 | 0.59 | | Imagination only (reversed) | Imagination alone, reversed | +0.02 | +0.01 | +0.04 | 104 | 41 | 52 | 11 | 0.66 | | Full index, net of age, sex, education | Full index net of age, sex and education | +0.05 | +0.03 | +0.06 | 103 | 49 | 51 | 3 | 0.99 | Note: Each country counts once, and the intervals come from resampling countries. The item reversed in a row name is scored so that higher means the obedience pole. Note: Imagination is one of the ten child qualities in the cleaned file and is not in the main index; two rows use it, one in place of tolerance and one added to the autonomy items. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted (weight, S017, within each country); countries with an effective sample of 300 or more Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/index_variants.json ### Table 5. The two surveys rank countries alike, with a correlation of +0.81 across 36 countries Correlation of left-right with the WVS and EVS obedience index (horizontal) and with the ESS conservation values (vertical), countries in both surveys | Country | WVS and EVS correlation | WVS interval low | WVS interval high | ESS correlation | ESS interval low | ESS interval high | WVS respondents | ESS respondents | Smaller of the two counts | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Albania | +0.06 | +0.02 | +0.11 | 0.00 | −0.08 | +0.09 | 2,253 | 1,041 | 1,041 | | Austria | +0.17 | +0.13 | +0.21 | +0.22 | +0.19 | +0.24 | 2,685 | 7,715 | 2,685 | | Belgium | +0.07 | +0.01 | +0.12 | +0.08 | +0.06 | +0.09 | 1,422 | 13,202 | 1,422 | | Bulgaria | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.02 | −0.23 | −0.25 | −0.21 | 2,665 | 9,818 | 2,665 | | Croatia | +0.16 | +0.12 | +0.21 | +0.15 | +0.12 | +0.18 | 2,196 | 5,353 | 2,196 | | Cyprus | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.03 | −0.02 | −0.06 | +0.02 | 2,894 | 4,044 | 2,894 | | Czechia | −0.06 | −0.09 | −0.02 | −0.23 | −0.25 | −0.21 | 3,615 | 13,804 | 3,615 | | Denmark | +0.09 | +0.06 | +0.13 | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.14 | 4,688 | 8,952 | 4,688 | | Estonia | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.02 | −0.06 | −0.08 | −0.05 | 3,319 | 12,434 | 3,319 | | Finland | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.15 | +0.10 | +0.08 | +0.12 | 2,955 | 14,133 | 2,955 | | France | +0.13 | +0.10 | +0.17 | +0.20 | +0.19 | +0.22 | 3,862 | 14,593 | 3,862 | | Germany | +0.12 | +0.09 | +0.14 | +0.16 | +0.15 | +0.18 | 8,805 | 18,649 | 8,805 | | Greece | +0.18 | +0.14 | +0.22 | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.13 | 2,201 | 6,131 | 2,201 | | Hungary | +0.07 | +0.03 | +0.10 | −0.01 | −0.04 | +0.01 | 3,444 | 10,753 | 3,444 | | Iceland | +0.06 | +0.01 | +0.11 | +0.10 | +0.07 | +0.14 | 2,322 | 3,146 | 2,322 | | Italy | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.19 | +0.06 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 3,552 | 6,404 | 3,552 | | Kosovo | −0.02 | −0.10 | +0.06 | +0.10 | 0.00 | +0.19 | 662 | 809 | 662 | | Latvia | −0.01 | −0.05 | +0.04 | −0.02 | −0.07 | +0.03 | 1,985 | 2,290 | 1,985 | | Lithuania | +0.07 | +0.02 | +0.11 | +0.01 | −0.01 | +0.04 | 1,831 | 8,096 | 1,831 | | Montenegro | +0.03 | −0.03 | +0.10 | +0.03 | −0.04 | +0.10 | 1,211 | 1,613 | 1,211 | | Netherlands | +0.20 | +0.18 | +0.22 | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.16 | 7,886 | 13,145 | 7,886 | | North Macedonia | +0.05 | −0.03 | +0.13 | −0.02 | −0.12 | +0.08 | 766 | 879 | 766 | | Norway | +0.08 | +0.04 | +0.11 | +0.08 | +0.05 | +0.10 | 3,154 | 11,607 | 3,154 | | Poland | +0.19 | +0.16 | +0.22 | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.15 | 3,599 | 9,787 | 3,599 | | Portugal | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.09 | 1,942 | 10,831 | 1,942 | | Romania | −0.02 | −0.05 | +0.01 | −0.06 | −0.12 | 0.00 | 4,539 | 1,464 | 1,464 | | Russia | +0.01 | −0.02 | +0.05 | −0.04 | −0.07 | −0.02 | 4,611 | 7,993 | 4,611 | | Serbia | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.07 | 0.00 | −0.06 | +0.07 | 3,739 | 1,274 | 1,274 | | Slovakia | +0.03 | −0.01 | +0.07 | −0.19 | −0.21 | −0.16 | 3,260 | 8,503 | 3,260 | | Slovenia | +0.17 | +0.13 | +0.20 | +0.14 | +0.12 | +0.16 | 3,091 | 8,061 | 3,091 | | Spain | +0.20 | +0.17 | +0.23 | +0.20 | +0.19 | +0.22 | 4,298 | 11,913 | 4,298 | | Sweden | +0.04 | 0.00 | +0.07 | +0.04 | +0.02 | +0.06 | 4,254 | 10,896 | 4,254 | | Switzerland | +0.15 | +0.12 | +0.17 | +0.22 | +0.20 | +0.24 | 5,134 | 11,856 | 5,134 | | Turkey | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.19 | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.18 | 4,467 | 1,885 | 1,885 | | Ukraine | +0.05 | +0.01 | +0.10 | −0.05 | −0.09 | −0.01 | 4,565 | 4,541 | 4,541 | | United Kingdom | +0.13 | +0.11 | +0.16 | +0.17 | +0.15 | +0.19 | 6,150 | 14,926 | 6,150 | Note: Northern Ireland is left out because the ESS reports it within the United Kingdom. The tooltip gives the smaller of the two respondent counts for a country. Note: The chart does not draw the interval on each country's correlation; both intervals are in the data table under the chart. Note: Intervals are model based (Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023, and European Social Survey, rounds 3 to 10 (2006-2022); weighted (weight within each survey); countries with an effective sample of 300 or more in both Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/wvs_ess_agreement.json ### Table 6. The two surveys agree as closely on age and religiosity as on obedience, so agreement is not specific to the measure Correlation across countries between the WVS and EVS and the ESS correlations of left-right with each predictor; 95% Fisher z intervals | Predictor | Definition | Correlation between surveys | Interval low | Interval high | Countries | Spread of WVS correlations (standard deviation) | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Obedience measure | WVS and EVS full index against ESS conservation values | 0.81 | 0.66 | 0.90 | 36 | 0.08 | | Religiosity | Importance of God in the WVS and EVS against attendance and prayer in the ESS | 0.87 | 0.76 | 0.93 | 36 | 0.10 | | Education | Three levels | 0.70 | 0.47 | 0.84 | 34 | 0.08 | | Age | Years | 0.90 | 0.82 | 0.95 | 36 | 0.10 | | Sex (female) | Female against male | 0.72 | 0.52 | 0.85 | 36 | 0.05 | Note: Every row uses the countries paired in the obedience comparison, and a country enters a row only if its effective sample is 300 or more for that predictor in both surveys, so the number of countries differs by row. Note: Intervals are model based (Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023, and European Social Survey, rounds 3 to 10 (2006-2022); weighted (weight within each survey); countries with an effective sample of 300 or more in both Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/agreement_reference.json ### Table 7. The correlation with party rose among white and Hispanic and other respondents and stayed near zero among Black respondents Correlation of the child-rearing measure with party identification among ANES respondents, by race and study year, with 95% bands; the other views add liberal-conservative self-placement and the GSS | Study year | Series | Respondents | Mode | Correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents in cell | | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1992 | ANES party | All respondents | All modes | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.00 | 2,023 | | 1992 | ANES party | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.09 | 1,551 | | 1992 | ANES party | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.02 | −0.11 | +0.14 | 261 | | 1992 | ANES party | Hispanic and other | All modes | −0.12 | −0.25 | +0.02 | 206 | | 1992 | ANES party | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.06 | +0.02 | +0.11 | 1,971 | | 1992 | ANES ideology | All respondents | All modes | +0.22 | +0.17 | +0.26 | 1,498 | | 1992 | ANES ideology | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.28 | +0.23 | +0.33 | 1,217 | | 1992 | ANES ideology | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.07 | −0.09 | +0.23 | 147 | | 1992 | ANES ideology | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.14 | −0.03 | +0.30 | 131 | | 1992 | ANES ideology | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.24 | +0.19 | +0.29 | 1,457 | | 2000 | ANES party | All respondents | All modes | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.06 | 1,527 | | 2000 | ANES party | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.08 | +0.02 | +0.14 | 1,184 | | 2000 | ANES party | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | −0.03 | −0.21 | +0.15 | 151 | | 2000 | ANES party | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.02 | −0.15 | +0.18 | 183 | | 2000 | ANES party | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.08 | +0.02 | +0.14 | 1,510 | | 2000 | ANES ideology | All respondents | All modes | +0.24 | +0.15 | +0.32 | 575 | | 2000 | ANES ideology | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.24 | +0.15 | +0.34 | 470 | | 2000 | ANES ideology | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.23 | +0.15 | +0.32 | 568 | | 2004 | ANES party | All respondents | All modes | +0.05 | −0.01 | +0.12 | 1,041 | | 2004 | ANES party | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.17 | +0.09 | +0.25 | 741 | | 2004 | ANES party | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | 0.00 | −0.18 | +0.18 | 152 | | 2004 | ANES party | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.09 | −0.10 | +0.28 | 132 | | 2004 | ANES party | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.14 | +0.07 | +0.21 | 1,025 | | 2004 | ANES ideology | All respondents | All modes | +0.26 | +0.19 | +0.33 | 817 | | 2004 | ANES ideology | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.32 | +0.24 | +0.39 | 614 | | 2004 | ANES ideology | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.25 | +0.18 | +0.32 | 810 | | 2008 | ANES party | All respondents | All modes | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.11 | 2,050 | | 2008 | ANES party | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.23 | 1,022 | | 2008 | ANES party | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | 0.00 | −0.10 | +0.10 | 484 | | 2008 | ANES party | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.08 | −0.03 | +0.19 | 524 | | 2008 | ANES party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.05 | 0.00 | +0.11 | 2,050 | | 2008 | ANES party | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.14 | +0.09 | +0.20 | 1,994 | | 2008 | ANES ideology | All respondents | All modes | +0.27 | +0.21 | +0.33 | 1,473 | | 2008 | ANES ideology | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.32 | +0.25 | +0.38 | 815 | | 2008 | ANES ideology | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.21 | +0.08 | +0.33 | 266 | | 2008 | ANES ideology | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.27 | +0.14 | +0.40 | 378 | | 2008 | ANES ideology | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.27 | +0.21 | +0.33 | 1,473 | | 2008 | ANES ideology | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.28 | +0.22 | +0.34 | 1,433 | | 2012 | ANES party | All respondents | All modes | +0.08 | +0.05 | +0.12 | 5,453 | | 2012 | ANES party | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.21 | +0.17 | +0.25 | 3,255 | | 2012 | ANES party | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | −0.11 | −0.21 | −0.01 | 949 | | 2012 | ANES party | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.06 | −0.02 | +0.15 | 1,233 | | 2012 | ANES party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.05 | −0.02 | +0.11 | 1,888 | | 2012 | ANES party | All respondents | Web | +0.10 | +0.06 | +0.14 | 3,565 | | 2012 | ANES party | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.16 | +0.13 | +0.20 | 5,329 | | 2012 | ANES ideology | All respondents | All modes | +0.23 | +0.20 | +0.27 | 4,912 | | 2012 | ANES ideology | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.31 | +0.27 | +0.35 | 3,100 | | 2012 | ANES ideology | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.12 | +0.01 | +0.23 | 752 | | 2012 | ANES ideology | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.17 | +0.08 | +0.26 | 1,047 | | 2012 | ANES ideology | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.20 | +0.13 | +0.27 | 1,365 | | 2012 | ANES ideology | All respondents | Web | +0.24 | +0.20 | +0.29 | 3,547 | | 2012 | ANES ideology | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.25 | +0.21 | +0.28 | 4,805 | | 2016 | ANES party | All respondents | All modes | +0.14 | +0.10 | +0.18 | 3,600 | | 2016 | ANES party | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.29 | +0.25 | +0.33 | 2,601 | | 2016 | ANES party | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.02 | −0.11 | +0.15 | 338 | | 2016 | ANES party | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.03 | −0.07 | +0.12 | 643 | | 2016 | ANES party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.11 | +0.04 | +0.18 | 1,038 | | 2016 | ANES party | All respondents | Web | +0.15 | +0.11 | +0.20 | 2,562 | | 2016 | ANES party | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.20 | +0.16 | +0.24 | 3,482 | | 2016 | ANES ideology | All respondents | All modes | +0.35 | +0.32 | +0.39 | 2,856 | | 2016 | ANES ideology | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.42 | +0.38 | +0.46 | 2,175 | | 2016 | ANES ideology | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.22 | +0.05 | +0.38 | 200 | | 2016 | ANES ideology | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.26 | +0.16 | +0.36 | 467 | | 2016 | ANES ideology | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.32 | +0.24 | +0.39 | 821 | | 2016 | ANES ideology | All respondents | Web | +0.37 | +0.32 | +0.41 | 2,035 | | 2016 | ANES ideology | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.34 | +0.30 | +0.38 | 2,760 | | 2020 | ANES party | All respondents | All modes | +0.21 | +0.18 | +0.24 | 7,314 | | 2020 | ANES party | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.40 | +0.37 | +0.43 | 5,332 | | 2020 | ANES party | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | −0.03 | −0.14 | +0.08 | 638 | | 2020 | ANES party | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.12 | +0.05 | +0.20 | 1,280 | | 2020 | ANES party | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.25 | +0.22 | +0.28 | 6,929 | | 2020 | ANES ideology | All respondents | All modes | +0.39 | +0.36 | +0.41 | 6,288 | | 2020 | ANES ideology | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.47 | +0.44 | +0.50 | 4,764 | | 2020 | ANES ideology | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.16 | +0.03 | +0.28 | 425 | | 2020 | ANES ideology | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.34 | +0.26 | +0.41 | 1,049 | | 2020 | ANES ideology | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.37 | +0.34 | +0.40 | 5,966 | | 2024 | ANES party | All respondents | All modes | +0.28 | +0.24 | +0.32 | 4,668 | | 2024 | ANES party | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.43 | +0.38 | +0.47 | 3,379 | | 2024 | ANES party | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.05 | −0.08 | +0.18 | 418 | | 2024 | ANES party | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.26 | +0.17 | +0.35 | 833 | | 2024 | ANES party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.29 | +0.21 | +0.38 | 905 | | 2024 | ANES party | All respondents | Web | +0.26 | +0.20 | +0.32 | 1,736 | | 2024 | ANES party | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.31 | +0.27 | +0.35 | 4,429 | | 2024 | ANES ideology | All respondents | All modes | +0.43 | +0.39 | +0.46 | 4,085 | | 2024 | ANES ideology | White non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.51 | +0.47 | +0.54 | 3,067 | | 2024 | ANES ideology | Black non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.25 | +0.09 | +0.39 | 290 | | 2024 | ANES ideology | Hispanic and other | All modes | +0.41 | +0.32 | +0.49 | 694 | | 2024 | ANES ideology | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.45 | +0.37 | +0.53 | 784 | | 2024 | ANES ideology | All respondents | Web | +0.44 | +0.38 | +0.49 | 1,473 | | 2024 | ANES ideology | Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic | All modes | +0.41 | +0.37 | +0.45 | 3,866 | | 1986 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | −0.03 | −0.11 | +0.06 | 728 | | 1987 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | −0.05 | −0.11 | +0.01 | 1,776 | | 1988 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.03 | −0.04 | +0.10 | 975 | | 1989 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | −0.04 | −0.11 | +0.03 | 985 | | 1990 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | −0.02 | −0.10 | +0.06 | 861 | | 1991 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.03 | −0.04 | +0.10 | 970 | | 1993 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.04 | −0.03 | +0.11 | 1,016 | | 1994 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.02 | −0.04 | +0.07 | 1,914 | | 1996 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.04 | −0.01 | +0.09 | 1,856 | | 1998 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | 0.00 | −0.05 | +0.05 | 1,830 | | 2000 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.02 | −0.03 | +0.07 | 1,817 | | 2002 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.02 | −0.06 | +0.09 | 876 | | 2004 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | −0.03 | −0.11 | +0.05 | 856 | | 2004 | GSS party | All respondents | Face-to-face | 0.00 | −0.09 | +0.09 | 692 | | 2006 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.06 | −0.02 | +0.14 | 980 | | 2006 | GSS party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.07 | −0.01 | +0.15 | 918 | | 2008 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.08 | +0.01 | +0.14 | 1,319 | | 2008 | GSS party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.08 | +0.01 | +0.15 | 1,169 | | 2010 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | −0.03 | −0.10 | +0.04 | 1,312 | | 2010 | GSS party | All respondents | Face-to-face | −0.04 | −0.11 | +0.03 | 1,170 | | 2012 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.07 | 0.00 | +0.13 | 1,274 | | 2012 | GSS party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.06 | −0.01 | +0.14 | 1,109 | | 2014 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.04 | −0.02 | +0.09 | 1,620 | | 2014 | GSS party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.03 | −0.03 | +0.10 | 1,391 | | 2016 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.11 | +0.05 | +0.16 | 1,860 | | 2016 | GSS party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.12 | +0.06 | +0.18 | 1,735 | | 2018 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.10 | +0.03 | +0.16 | 1,470 | | 2018 | GSS party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.08 | +0.02 | +0.15 | 1,320 | | 2021 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 2,479 | | 2021 | GSS party | All respondents | Web | +0.12 | +0.07 | +0.17 | 2,171 | | 2022 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.12 | +0.05 | +0.18 | 2,209 | | 2022 | GSS party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.11 | +0.01 | +0.20 | 962 | | 2022 | GSS party | All respondents | Web | +0.13 | +0.03 | +0.22 | 1,042 | | 2024 | GSS party | All respondents | All modes | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.19 | 2,045 | | 2024 | GSS party | All respondents | Face-to-face | +0.12 | +0.01 | +0.22 | 691 | | 2024 | GSS party | All respondents | Web | +0.18 | +0.10 | +0.26 | 1,135 | Views: By race (view_group = race); Party, ideology and GSS (mode = All modes, sample = All respondents); Net of college, age and race (mode = All modes, sample = Net of college, age and white non-Hispanic); Face-to-face only (mode = Face-to-face); Web only (mode = Web). Note: Party identification runs from strong Democrat to strong Republican with leaners included, and higher values are more Republican. The GSS drops respondents who name another party. Note: The ANES Cumulative File has none of the four child-rearing items in 1996, so the ANES lines run from 1992 to 2000. ANES 2020 and part of 2024 are mixed-mode and have no face-to-face or web weight for some respondents; the mode views show what mode weights allow. Note: Intervals are model based (Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size) and ignore clustering in the sample design. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, presidential-year studies 1992-2024; weighted (weight, VCF0009z; mode-specific weights in the mode views); General Social Survey, 1986-2024; weighted (weight_use) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/us_party_trend.json ### Table 8. Every attitude is more common on the obedience side of the index, and the gap is largest for moral conservatism Share holding each attitude among respondents on the autonomy side and the obedience side of the index, average of country shares (each country counted once); 95% bootstrap intervals; WVS and EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 | Attitude | Definition | Autonomy side, percent | Autonomy interval low | Autonomy interval high | Obedience side, percent | Obedience interval low | Obedience interval high | Gap, points | Countries | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Socially conservative (homosexuality, abortion, divorce) | Mean of 4 or lower on the 1 to 10 justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce | 57.1 | 51.9 | 62.0 | 70.9 | 67.6 | 74.2 | 13.8 | 97 | | Does not want homosexuals as neighbors | Names homosexuals as people they would not want as neighbors | 46.4 | 41.1 | 51.5 | 54.1 | 49.5 | 58.7 | 7.7 | 100 | | Does not want immigrants as neighbors | Names immigrants or foreign workers as people they would not want as neighbors | 22.7 | 20.1 | 25.3 | 25.5 | 22.9 | 28.4 | 2.8 | 102 | | Does not want people of another race as neighbors | Names people of a different race as people they would not want as neighbors | 17.9 | 15.5 | 20.4 | 20.8 | 18.5 | 23.3 | 2.9 | 102 | | Strong leader bypassing parliament is good | Says a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections is a good or very good way to run the country | 45.0 | 41.0 | 48.8 | 49.2 | 45.6 | 52.7 | 4.2 | 99 | | Army rule is good | Says army rule is a good or very good way to run the country | 25.3 | 22.0 | 28.8 | 29.5 | 26.4 | 32.9 | 4.3 | 99 | Note: Respondents with an index score of exactly zero are left out. Each row uses its own panel of countries (97 to 102 countries by row); each country's share is computed first and the countries are then averaged with equal weight. Note: Percent of respondents; the gap is the share on the obedience side minus the share on the autonomy side. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted (weight, S017, within each country); countries with an effective sample of 100 or more on both sides of the index in each row Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/outcome_gaps.json ### Table 9. Dropping the faith item shrinks the gaps for moral conservatism and for homosexuals as neighbors, and leaves the gaps for immigrants, race, army rule and a strong leader no smaller Gap between the obedience side and the autonomy side of the index in the share holding each attitude, with and without the religious-faith item, on the countries that qualify under both; 95% bootstrap intervals; WVS and EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 | Attitude | Definition | Gap without the faith item, points | Interval low | Interval high | Gap with the faith item, points | Interval low | Interval high | Difference, with minus without, points | Difference interval low | Difference interval high | Countries | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Socially conservative (homosexuality, abortion, divorce) | Mean of 4 or lower on the 1 to 10 justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce | 7.2 | 4.8 | 9.9 | 12.0 | 9.1 | 15.1 | +4.7 | +3.7 | +5.8 | 74 | | Does not want homosexuals as neighbors | Names homosexuals as people they would not want as neighbors | 5.0 | 3.3 | 6.6 | 6.9 | 5.1 | 8.7 | +1.9 | +1.1 | +2.6 | 77 | | Army rule is good | Says army rule is a good or very good way to run the country | 3.7 | 2.1 | 5.3 | 3.9 | 2.5 | 5.3 | +0.2 | −0.7 | +1.0 | 73 | | Does not want people of another race as neighbors | Names people of a different race as people they would not want as neighbors | 2.3 | 1.1 | 3.5 | 2.5 | 1.3 | 3.6 | +0.1 | −0.5 | +0.8 | 80 | | Does not want immigrants as neighbors | Names immigrants or foreign workers as people they would not want as neighbors | 2.3 | 1.1 | 3.7 | 2.2 | 1.1 | 3.3 | −0.2 | −1.0 | +0.6 | 80 | | Strong leader bypassing parliament is good | Says a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections is a good or very good way to run the country | 4.2 | 1.8 | 6.7 | 3.1 | 0.8 | 5.4 | −1.2 | −2.1 | −0.2 | 73 | Note: Every row uses the countries that qualify under both indices (73 to 80 countries by row), because the index without the faith item leaves fewer respondents on its obedience side, so fewer countries reach an effective sample of 100 there. Note: Respondents with an index score of exactly zero are left out. The interval on the difference redraws the same countries for both gaps and is in the data table. Source: World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted (weight, S017, within each country); countries with an effective sample of 100 or more on both sides of both indices in each row Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/outcome_gaps_faith.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (154), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | above_faith | 52 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval of the correlation with the religious faith alone is above zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | above_no_faith | 41 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval of the correlation with the without faith: obedience minus independence and tolerance is above zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | ad_wvs | +0.20 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in Andorra with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2005, 2018, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.24 | 1,824 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | age_bg_ess | −0.24 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with age in years (ESS) | respondents in Bulgaria with a left-right answer | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI −0.27 to −0.22 | 9,869 | analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | age_bg_wvs | −0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with age in years (WVS/EVS) | respondents in Bulgaria with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI −0.26 to −0.18 | 2,809 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | age_cz_ess | −0.23 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with age in years (ESS) | respondents in Czechia with a left-right answer | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.22 | 14,107 | analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | age_cz_wvs | −0.17 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with age in years (WVS/EVS) | respondents in Czechia with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI −0.20 to −0.14 | 3,990 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | age_de_ess | +0.11 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with age in years (ESS) | respondents in Germany with a left-right answer | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.12 | 26,424 | analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | age_de_wvs | +0.09 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with age in years (WVS/EVS) | respondents in Germany with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.12 | 8,805 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | age_es_ess | +0.08 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with age in years (ESS) | respondents in Spain with a left-right answer | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI 0.06 to 0.09 | 14,089 | analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | age_es_wvs | +0.14 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with age in years (WVS/EVS) | respondents in Spain with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.12 to 0.17 | 4,322 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | agree_k | 36 | countries | count of countries in both surveys | countries with usable correlations in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 and ESS rounds 3 to 10 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | agree_mad | 0.06 | absolute difference in correlation units | mean across countries of the absolute difference between the two surveys' correlations | countries with usable correlations in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 and ESS rounds 3 to 10 | | | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | agree_r | +0.81 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the WVS/EVS and ESS correlations with left-right (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable correlations in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 and ESS rounds 3 to 10 | 95% CI 0.66 to 0.90 | 36 | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | agree_sign | 30 | countries | count of countries where the two surveys give a correlation of the same sign | countries with usable correlations in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 and ESS rounds 3 to 10 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | anes_black_dem | 78.8 | percent of respondents | weighted share identifying with the Democratic party | Black non-Hispanic adults, party identification 1 to 3 counted as Democratic (leaners included) | 2024 | 95% CI 73.8 to 83.8 | 503 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_black_party_2012 | −0.11 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) among Black non-Hispanic respondents | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2012 | 95% CI −0.21 to −0.01 | 949 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ftf_level_2012 | 0.61 | position on the 0 to 1 index (1 = obedience on every pair) | weighted mean of the ANES child-rearing index | adults in the face-to-face sample who answered the four child-rearing pairs | 2012 | 95% CI 0.59 to 0.63 | 1,907 | weight_ftf (face-to-face) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ftf_level_2016 | 0.58 | position on the 0 to 1 index (1 = obedience on every pair) | weighted mean of the ANES child-rearing index | adults in the face-to-face sample who answered the four child-rearing pairs | 2016 | 95% CI 0.55 to 0.60 | 1,050 | weight_ftf (face-to-face) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ftf_level_2024 | 0.48 | position on the 0 to 1 index (1 = obedience on every pair) | weighted mean of the ANES child-rearing index | adults in the face-to-face sample who answered the four child-rearing pairs | 2024 | 95% CI 0.45 to 0.51 | 916 | weight_ftf (face-to-face) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ftf_party_2024 | +0.29 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) in the face-to-face sample | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2024 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.38 | 905 | weight_ftf (face-to-face) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ideo_1992 | +0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point liberal-conservative self-placement | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 1992 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.26 | 1,498 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ideo_2024 | +0.43 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point liberal-conservative self-placement | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2024 | 95% CI 0.39 to 0.46 | 4,085 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_level_1992 | 0.60 | position on the 0 to 1 index (1 = obedience on every pair) | weighted mean of the ANES child-rearing index | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs | 1992 | 95% CI 0.59 to 0.62 | 2,036 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_level_2016 | 0.56 | position on the 0 to 1 index (1 = obedience on every pair) | weighted mean of the ANES child-rearing index | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs | 2016 | 95% CI 0.55 to 0.57 | 3,616 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_level_2024 | 0.49 | position on the 0 to 1 index (1 = obedience on every pair) | weighted mean of the ANES child-rearing index | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs | 2024 | 95% CI 0.48 to 0.50 | 4,690 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_level_black_2024 | 0.63 | position on the 0 to 1 index (1 = obedience on every pair) | weighted mean of the ANES child-rearing index | Black non-Hispanic adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs | 2024 | 95% CI 0.58 to 0.67 | 421 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_level_white_2024 | 0.46 | position on the 0 to 1 index (1 = obedience on every pair) | weighted mean of the ANES child-rearing index | White non-Hispanic adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs | 2024 | 95% CI 0.44 to 0.47 | 3,390 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_net_party_1992 | +0.06 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) net of college degree, age and race | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 1992 | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.11 | 1,971 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_net_party_2024 | +0.31 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) net of college degree, age and race | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2024 | 95% CI 0.27 to 0.35 | 4,429 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_no_mode_k | 2,027 | respondents | count of analytic respondents with neither a face-to-face nor a web weight | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_no_mode_n | 4,668 | respondents | count of analytic respondents in the party identification correlation | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_no_mode_share | 43 | percent of respondents (unweighted count) | share of analytic respondents with neither a face-to-face nor a web weight (panel and paper cases) | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2024 | | 4,668 | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_other_party_1992 | −0.12 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) among Hispanic and other respondents (neither white nor Black non-Hispanic) | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 1992 | 95% CI −0.25 to 0.02 | 206 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_other_party_2024 | +0.26 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) among Hispanic and other respondents (neither white nor Black non-Hispanic) | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2024 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.35 | 833 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_other_share_1992 | 10 | percent of respondents | weighted share of the party identification analysis sample who are neither white nor Black non-Hispanic | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 1992 | 95% CI 9 to 11 | 2,018 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_other_share_2024 | 24 | percent of respondents | weighted share of the party identification analysis sample who are neither white nor Black non-Hispanic | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2024 | 95% CI 22 to 26 | 4,630 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_party_1992 | −0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 1992 | 95% CI −0.09 to 0.00 | 2,023 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_party_2016 | +0.14 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2016 | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.18 | 3,600 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_party_2024 | +0.28 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2024 | 95% CI 0.24 to 0.32 | 4,668 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_web_party_2024 | +0.26 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) in the web sample | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2024 | 95% CI 0.20 to 0.32 | 1,736 | weight_web | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_white_party_1992 | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) among white non-Hispanic respondents | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 1992 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.09 | 1,551 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_white_party_2024 | +0.43 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of the ANES child-rearing index with 7-point party identification (leaners included) among white non-Hispanic respondents | adults who answered the four child-rearing pairs and the outcome | 2024 | 95% CI 0.38 to 0.47 | 3,379 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | at_ess | +0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Schwartz conservation values | respondents in Austria with a left-right answer and conservation score | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.24 | 7,715 | analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | bg_ess | −0.23 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Schwartz conservation values | respondents in Bulgaria with a left-right answer and conservation score | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.21 | 9,818 | analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | bg_wvs | −0.06 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in Bulgaria with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2006, 2008, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI −0.10 to −0.02 | 2,665 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | ca_wvs | +0.25 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in Canada with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2006, 2020, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.22 to 0.28 | 5,642 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | coh_diff_high | −4.1 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share above zero among those born in the 1990s minus those born in the 1940s (bootstrap over countries) | high-income countries, fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI −5.6 to −2.6 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 36 countries. | | coh_diff_lower | −3.6 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share above zero among those born in the 1990s minus those born in the 1940s (bootstrap over countries) | lower-income countries, fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI −10.0 to 2.5 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 10 countries. | | coh_diff_upper | −4.7 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share above zero among those born in the 1990s minus those born in the 1940s (bootstrap over countries) | upper-middle-income countries, fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI −7.3 to −2.4 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 22 countries. | | coh_high_1940 | 11.5 | percent of respondents above zero on the index | mean across countries of the weighted share above zero on the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in high-income countries born in the 1940s, fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 9.0 to 14.1 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 36 countries. | | coh_high_1990 | 7.4 | percent of respondents above zero on the index | mean across countries of the weighted share above zero on the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in high-income countries born in the 1990s, fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 5.8 to 9.2 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 36 countries. | | coh_k_high | 36 | countries | count of countries in the fixed panel | high-income countries | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | coh_k_lower | 10 | countries | count of countries in the fixed panel | lower-income countries | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | coh_k_upper | 22 | countries | count of countries in the fixed panel | upper-middle-income countries | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | coh_lower_1940 | 31.5 | percent of respondents above zero on the index | mean across countries of the weighted share above zero on the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in lower-income countries born in the 1940s, fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 23.3 to 40.9 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 10 countries. | | coh_lower_1990 | 27.9 | percent of respondents above zero on the index | mean across countries of the weighted share above zero on the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in lower-income countries born in the 1990s, fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 20.8 to 36.9 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 10 countries. | | coh_upper_1940 | 25.6 | percent of respondents above zero on the index | mean across countries of the weighted share above zero on the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in upper-middle-income countries born in the 1940s, fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 20.7 to 30.8 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 22 countries. | | coh_upper_1990 | 20.9 | percent of respondents above zero on the index | mean across countries of the weighted share above zero on the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in upper-middle-income countries born in the 1990s, fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 17.0 to 24.9 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 22 countries. | | coh_window_cut | 5 | percentage points | cutoff on the absolute difference in the share above zero | definition of a large difference between the two survey windows | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (constant) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | coh_window_diff | −0.3 | percentage points | mean difference in the share above zero for the same birth decade between fieldwork in 2014-2023 and 2005-2013 (bootstrap over cells) | country-by-birth-decade cells in the fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI −0.9 to 0.2 | 312 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | coh_window_gt5 | 28 | percent of cells | share of cells where the two windows differ by more than 5 percentage points in either direction | country-by-birth-decade cells in the fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | 312 | each country-by-birth-decade cell counted once; shares inside a cell use weight (S017) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | coh_window_mad | 3.8 | percentage points | mean absolute difference in the share above zero for the same birth decade between fieldwork in 2014-2023 and 2005-2013 | country-by-birth-decade cells in the fixed panel | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | 312 | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | cz_ess | −0.23 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Schwartz conservation values | respondents in Czechia with a left-right answer and conservation score | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI −0.25 to −0.21 | 13,804 | analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | cz_ess_adj | −0.14 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted partial correlation of left-right with Schwartz conservation values, holding age, sex and education fixed | respondents in Czechia with a left-right answer and conservation score | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI −0.16 to −0.12 | 11,912 | analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | cz_wvs | −0.06 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in Czechia with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2008, 2017, 2022, waves pooled | 95% CI −0.09 to −0.02 | 3,615 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | de_wvs | +0.12 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in Germany with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2006, 2008, 2013, 2017, 2018, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.14 | 8,805 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | diff_faith | +0.006 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation with the full index minus the median for the religious faith alone, on the countries usable under both (bootstrap over countries, one draw applied to both) | countries with a usable correlation under both definitions | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI −0.008 to 0.020 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | diff_imagination | +0.024 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation with the full index minus the median for the imagination alone, reversed, on the countries usable under both (bootstrap over countries, one draw applied to both) | countries with a usable correlation under both definitions | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.004 to 0.039 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | diff_income_high_upper | +0.061 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | difference between the median correlations of the two income groups, high-income minus upper-middle-income (bootstrap that redraws the countries of each group) | countries with a usable correlation and an income group | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.020 to 0.116 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 72 countries. | | diff_income_upper_lower | +0.024 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | difference between the median correlations of the two income groups, upper-middle-income minus lower-income (bootstrap that redraws the countries of each group) | countries with a usable correlation and an income group | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI −0.001 to 0.043 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 58 countries. | | diff_independence | +0.027 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation with the full index minus the median for the independence alone, reversed, on the countries usable under both (bootstrap over countries, one draw applied to both) | countries with a usable correlation under both definitions | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.016 to 0.041 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | diff_no_faith | +0.010 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation with the full index minus the median for the without faith: obedience minus independence and tolerance, on the countries usable under both (bootstrap over countries, one draw applied to both) | countries with a usable correlation under both definitions | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.005 to 0.027 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | diff_tolerance | +0.026 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation with the full index minus the median for the tolerance and respect alone, reversed, on the countries usable under both (bootstrap over countries, one draw applied to both) | countries with a usable correlation under both definitions | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.013 to 0.044 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | drop_homosexuals | 1.9 | percentage points | mean across countries of the gap under the full index minus the gap under the index without the religious-faith item, for naming homosexuals as unwanted neighbors (bootstrap over countries, one draw applied to both) | countries that qualify under both indices for this outcome | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 1.1 to 2.6 | 77 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | drop_leader | −1.2 | percentage points | mean across countries of the gap under the full index minus the gap under the index without the religious-faith item, for saying that a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections is a good or very good way to run the country (bootstrap over countries, one draw applied to both) | countries that qualify under both indices for this outcome | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI −2.1 to −0.2 | 73 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | drop_moral | 4.7 | percentage points | mean across countries of the gap under the full index minus the gap under the index without the religious-faith item, for a mean of 4 or lower on the justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce (bootstrap over countries, one draw applied to both) | countries that qualify under both indices for this outcome | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 3.7 to 5.8 | 74 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | eg_wvs | −0.14 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in Egypt with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2008, 2013, 2018, waves pooled | 95% CI −0.17 to −0.10 | 4,245 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | es_ess | +0.20 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Schwartz conservation values | respondents in Spain with a left-right answer and conservation score | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.22 | 11,913 | analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | es_wvs | +0.20 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in Spain with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2007, 2008, 2011, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.23 | 4,298 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | ess_below | 7 | countries | count of countries where the 95% interval is below zero | ESS countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | ess_other_k | 20 | countries | count of other countries with a usable correlation (post-communist: governed by a communist party before 1990 in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia) | ESS countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | ess_other_neg | 1 | countries | count of other countries where the point estimate is below zero (post-communist: governed by a communist party before 1990 in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia) | ESS countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | ess_pc_k | 18 | countries | count of post-communist countries with a usable correlation (post-communist: governed by a communist party before 1990 in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia) | ESS countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | ess_pc_neg | 10 | countries | count of post-communist countries where the point estimate is below zero (post-communist: governed by a communist party before 1990 in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union or the former Yugoslavia) | ESS countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | ess_positive | 27 | countries | count of countries where the point estimate is above zero | ESS countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | gap_army_chapter | 4.3 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share saying that army rule is a good or very good way to run the country, obedience side minus autonomy side of the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 3.1 to 5.4 | 99 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_homosexuals_chapter | 7.7 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share naming homosexuals as unwanted neighbors, obedience side minus autonomy side of the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 6.1 to 9.4 | 100 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_homosexuals_chapter_same | 6.9 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share naming homosexuals as unwanted neighbors, obedience side minus autonomy side of the full index, on the countries that also qualify without the religious-faith item (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 5.1 to 8.7 | 77 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_homosexuals_no_faith | 5.0 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share naming homosexuals as unwanted neighbors, obedience side minus autonomy side of the index without the religious-faith item, on the countries that qualify under both indices (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 3.3 to 6.6 | 77 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_immigrants_chapter | 2.8 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share naming immigrants or foreign workers as unwanted neighbors, obedience side minus autonomy side of the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 1.8 to 4.0 | 102 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_leader_chapter | 4.2 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share saying that a strong leader who does not bother with parliament and elections is a good or very good way to run the country, obedience side minus autonomy side of the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 2.5 to 6.1 | 99 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_moral_chapter | 13.8 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share a mean of 4 or lower on the justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce, obedience side minus autonomy side of the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 11.4 to 16.5 | 97 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_moral_chapter_same | 12.0 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share a mean of 4 or lower on the justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce, obedience side minus autonomy side of the full index, on the countries that also qualify without the religious-faith item (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 9.1 to 15.1 | 74 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_moral_no_faith | 7.2 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share a mean of 4 or lower on the justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce, obedience side minus autonomy side of the index without the religious-faith item, on the countries that qualify under both indices (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 4.8 to 9.9 | 74 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gap_race_chapter | 2.9 | percentage points | mean across countries of the share naming people of a different race as unwanted neighbors, obedience side minus autonomy side of the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 1.8 to 3.9 | 102 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | gss_gap_early | −1.0 | percentage points | difference in the share ranking obedience above thinking for oneself | adults ranking the GSS child qualities, Republican minus Democratic identifiers (leaners included) | 1986-1994 | 95% CI −3.3 to 1.4 | 8,103 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_gap_late | +6.9 | percentage points | difference in the share ranking obedience above thinking for oneself | adults ranking the GSS child qualities, Republican minus Democratic identifiers (leaners included) | 2016-2024 | 95% CI 4.3 to 9.4 | 7,914 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_pid_early | 0.00 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of obedience ranked above thinking for oneself (rank difference) with 7-point party identification | adults ranking the GSS child qualities, party identification 0 to 6 | 1986-1994 | 95% CI −0.03 to 0.02 | 9,225 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_pid_late | +0.11 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of obedience ranked above thinking for oneself (rank difference) with 7-point party identification | adults ranking the GSS child qualities, party identification 0 to 6 | 2016-2024 | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.14 | 10,063 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | in_wvs | +0.01 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in India with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2006, 2012, 2023, waves pooled | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.04 | 5,826 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_moral_chapter | 97 | countries and territories | count of countries with an effective sample of 100 or more on both sides of the index | fixed panel for this outcome and index | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | k_moral_no_faith | 74 | countries and territories | count of countries with an effective sample of 100 or more on both sides of the index | fixed panel for this outcome and index | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | lu_wvs | +0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in Luxembourg with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2008, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.28 | 1,256 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | mean_wvs | +0.06 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the correlation between left-right and the full index (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.07 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_adjusted | +0.05 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the full index net of age, sex and education (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.06 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_article | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the imagination version: obedience and faith minus independence and imagination (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.07 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_chapter | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the full index: obedience and faith minus independence and tolerance (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.06 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_faith | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the religious faith alone (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.06 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_high | +0.10 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the full index (bootstrap over countries) | high-income countries with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.15 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 44 countries. | | med_imagination | +0.02 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the imagination alone, reversed (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.04 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_independence | +0.02 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the independence alone, reversed (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.03 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_lower | +0.02 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the full index (bootstrap over countries) | lower-income countries with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.00 to 0.03 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 30 countries. | | med_no_faith | +0.03 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the without faith: obedience minus independence and tolerance (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.05 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_obedience | +0.03 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the obedience alone (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.04 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_tolerance | +0.02 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the tolerance and respect alone, reversed (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.03 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | med_upper | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the full index (bootstrap over countries) | upper-income countries with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.05 | | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | Based on 28 countries. | | median_ess | +0.08 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and Schwartz conservation values (bootstrap over countries) | ESS countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.11 | 38 | analysis weight within each country; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | median_ess_adj | +0.07 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the partial correlation of left-right with Schwartz conservation values, holding age, sex and education fixed (bootstrap over countries) | ESS countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.10 | 36 | analysis weight within each country; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | median_wvs | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation between left-right and the full index (bootstrap over countries) | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.06 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | moral_r_chapter | +0.13 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation of the full index with a moral-conservatism index (justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce, reversed) | countries with usable correlations for all three measures with moral attitudes | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.16 | 102 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | moral_r_left_right | +0.07 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation of left-right self-placement with a moral-conservatism index (justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce, reversed) | countries with usable correlations for all three measures with moral attitudes | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.10 | 102 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | moral_r_no_faith | +0.09 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | median across countries of the correlation of the index without the religious-faith item with a moral-conservatism index (justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce, reversed) | countries with usable correlations for all three measures with moral attitudes | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.12 | 102 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_above | 49 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval is above zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_below | 5 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval is below zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_black_incl | 7 | study years | count of years where the 95% interval of the correlation with party identification includes zero | ANES presidential-year studies with 100 or more Black non-Hispanic respondents | 1992-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_black_years | 8 | study years | count | ANES presidential-year studies with 100 or more Black non-Hispanic respondents | 1992-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_countries_wvs | 103 | countries and territories | count of countries with a usable correlation between left-right and the full index | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_ess | 38 | countries | count of countries with a usable correlation | ESS countries with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | n_evs_restored | 10 | countries and territories | count of labels restored from the country code | EVS countries with a blank label in the cleaned file | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_evs_usable | 8 | countries and territories | count | restored EVS countries with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_includes | 49 | countries and territories | count of countries where the 95% interval includes zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_income_grouped | 102 | countries and territories | count of countries with a usable correlation and an income group in the WVS context file | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_positive | 84 | countries and territories | count of countries where the point estimate is above zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_resp_wvs | 281,678 | respondents | count of respondents | respondents with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers, in the countries with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | neff_floor | 300 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | minimum effective sample for a country to appear | country cells | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (constant) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | neff_floor_side | 100 | respondents (Kish effective sample size) | minimum effective sample for a country to enter a share | country cells for shares by index side and birth decade | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (constant) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | nl_wvs | +0.20 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in Netherlands with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2006, 2008, 2012, 2017, 2022, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.18 to 0.22 | 7,886 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | pl_wvs | +0.19 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in Poland with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2005, 2008, 2012, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.22 | 3,599 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | pos_moral_chapter | 87 | countries and territories | count of countries where the outcome is more common on the obedience side | fixed panel for this outcome and index | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | positive_no_faith | 80 | countries and territories | count of countries where the point estimate for the without faith: obedience minus independence and tolerance is above zero | countries with an effective sample of 300 or more on the measure and left-right | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | r_chapter_adjusted | +0.99 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the two sets of country correlations (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable correlations on both measures | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.98 to 0.99 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | r_chapter_no_faith | +0.93 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the two sets of country correlations (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable correlations on both measures | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 0.90 to 0.95 | 103 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | ref_r_age | +0.90 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the WVS/EVS and ESS correlations of left-right with age (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable correlations in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 and ESS rounds 3 to 10 | 95% CI 0.82 to 0.95 | 36 | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | ref_r_education | +0.70 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the WVS/EVS and ESS correlations of left-right with education (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable correlations in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 and ESS rounds 3 to 10 | 95% CI 0.47 to 0.84 | 34 | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | ref_r_female | +0.72 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the WVS/EVS and ESS correlations of left-right with female (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable correlations in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 and ESS rounds 3 to 10 | 95% CI 0.52 to 0.85 | 36 | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | ref_r_religiosity | +0.87 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the WVS/EVS and ESS correlations of left-right with religiosity (Fisher z interval) | countries with usable correlations in both surveys | WVS/EVS fieldwork 2005-2023 and ESS rounds 3 to 10 | 95% CI 0.76 to 0.93 | 36 | weight within country in each survey; every country counted once | European Social Survey | | | se_ess | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Schwartz conservation values | respondents in Sweden with a left-right answer and conservation score | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.06 | 10,896 | analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | se_wvs | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in Sweden with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2006, 2009, 2011, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.00 to 0.07 | 4,254 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | share_moral_chapter_aut | 57.1 | percent of respondents | mean across countries of the weighted share a mean of 4 or lower on the justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce, respondents on the autonomy side of the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 51.9 to 62.0 | 97 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | share_moral_chapter_obe | 70.9 | percent of respondents | mean across countries of the weighted share a mean of 4 or lower on the justifiability of homosexuality, abortion and divorce, respondents on the obedience side of the full index (bootstrap over countries) | respondents in the fixed panel of countries, with an index score other than zero | fieldwork 2005-2023 | 95% CI 67.6 to 74.2 | 97 | weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | sk_ess | −0.19 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with Schwartz conservation values | respondents in Slovakia with a left-right answer and conservation score | ESS rounds 3 to 10, 2006-2022 | 95% CI −0.21 to −0.16 | 8,503 | analysis weight within the country | European Social Survey | | | soc_cut | 4 | points on the 1 to 10 justifiability scale | cutoff on the mean of the three justifiability items | definition of socially conservative | fieldwork 2005-2023 | | | none (constant) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | us_wvs | +0.28 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with the full index | respondents in United States with a left-right answer and all four child-quality answers | fieldwork 2006, 2011, 2017, waves pooled | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.31 | 5,900 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | ## Definitions - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Left-right self-placement: A survey question that asks people to place themselves on a scale from left to right. The scale is the same for everyone, but the meaning attached to left and right differs across people, countries and years. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Cohort: People born in the same period, such as the same decade. Comparing cohorts shows whether a difference comes from when people were born, as distinct from their age or the year they were surveyed. - Schwartz basic values: Ten broad motivations, such as security, tradition, achievement and universalism, that Shalom Schwartz's theory arranges in a circle. Neighboring values are compatible and opposite values conflict. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. ## Methods Sample. World Values Survey and European Values Study (WVS/EVS), fieldwork in 2005 or later (waves 5 to 7 and the EVS 2008 and 2017 rounds): 112 countries and territories with fieldwork in 2005 or later (118 in the full 1981 to 2023 file, after restoring the ten unlabelled EVS countries from the country code); 107 had enough respondents to test and 103 have a usable correlation, on 281,678 respondents in those 103 countries with a left-right answer (1 to 10, 10 = right), a positive weight and all four child-quality answers. The cleaned file carries ten of the child qualities. The cleaned WVS and EVS file leaves the country name blank for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Kosovo and Northern Cyprus; the country code restores those 10 labels, and 8 of them have a usable correlation. European Social Survey (ESS), rounds 3 to 10 (2006-2022; round 11 carries no values battery in the cleaned file): 38 countries with a usable correlation. American National Election Studies (ANES) Cumulative File, the eight presidential-year studies 1992-2024 that field the four forced-choice child-rearing pairs (the file carries none of them for 1996), adults with all four answers. General Social Survey (GSS), 1986-2024, adults who ranked both obeying and thinking for oneself. ANES race groups are the file's three categories: white non-Hispanic, Black non-Hispanic and other (Hispanic, Asian and every other group). Measures. WVS/EVS: obedience and religious faith minus independence and tolerance and respect for other people (each 1 if mentioned as an important child quality, 0 if not; A042, A040, A029, A035), range −2 to +2, complete cases; robustness versions drop the faith item, swap tolerance for imagination (A034), use pairs of items or single items. ANES: one minus the mean of four forced choices coded 0, 0.5 and 1 (VCF9246 to VCF9249), 0 to 1. GSS: the rank of thinking for oneself minus the rank of obeying. ESS: the mean-rating-centred Schwartz conservation composite (conformity, tradition, security). The sign of every item is fixed from the wording, not from a correlation with the outcome. Estimand. A correlation is the survey-weighted Pearson correlation between the measure and left-right placement (WVS/EVS 1 to 10, ESS 0 to 10), party identification (ANES 1 to 7, GSS 0 to 6, leaners included, other-party respondents dropped) or liberal-conservative self-placement (ANES 1 to 7), computed inside a country or a study year with waves pooled. Net-of-covariate versions correlate the residuals from weighted least squares on age, sex and three education levels (WVS/EVS and ESS), or on a college degree, age and whether the respondent is white non-Hispanic (ANES). Weights. WVS/EVS weight (S017) within a country and every country counted once across countries; ESS analysis weight; ANES weight (VCF0009z), with weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode views; GSS weight_use. Intervals. 95% Fisher z intervals on the Kish effective sample size of the complete cases, which are model based and ignore strata and clusters; partial correlations use the effective sample minus the number of covariates; medians and means across countries and the country gaps have percentile intervals from a bootstrap over countries (2,000 replicates, seed 12345), that is, the list of countries is redrawn with replacement and the statistic recomputed; a difference between two medians for the same countries (index definitions) uses one draw of countries for both, and a difference between two income groups redraws the countries of each group on its own; correlations across countries use Fisher z (a transformation that makes the sampling error of a correlation nearly constant) on the number of countries; gaps between two GSS groups combine standard errors in quadrature. Suppression. A WVS/EVS or ESS country cell needs an effective sample of at least 300; an ANES or GSS year cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; shares by index side need an effective sample of 100 on each side; the cohort panels need 100 in every birth decade. Country groups and cohort panels. Income groups are the World Bank groups in the WVS context file, with lower middle income and low income combined as lower income. Birth decade is the survey year minus age. The cohort panels are fixed sets of countries with enough respondents in every birth decade: 36 high-income, 22 upper-middle-income and 10 lower-income countries. Across the country-by-decade cells of the panels, the same birth decade measured in 2014 to 2023 rather than 2005 to 2013 differs by 3.8 points on average in absolute value. Outcome gaps. Respondents on the obedience side score above zero on the index and those on the autonomy side below zero; each country's share is computed first and countries are averaged with equal weight over a fixed panel of countries with enough respondents on both sides. The full index is shown on every country that qualifies under it and, beside the index without the faith item, on the countries that qualify under both indices, because the index without faith leaves fewer respondents on its obedience side. The difference between the two gaps has a bootstrap interval that redraws the same countries for both. Socially conservative means a mean of 4 or lower on the three 1-to-10 justifiability items (homosexuality, abortion, divorce) with all three answered. Mode. ANES 2008 is a single-mode face-to-face study, 2012, 2016 and 2024 have face-to-face and web weights, and 2020 has none; in 2024 the panel and paper cases have neither weight. The GSS 2021 wave is mostly web and 2022 and 2024 mix in-person and web interviews. The mode views report both modes where a cell has 100 respondents. Post-communist countries. Post-communist ESS countries are those governed by a communist party before 1990 in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and the former Yugoslavia (ESS codes AL, BG, BY, CZ, EE, GE, HR, HU, LT, LV, ME, MK, PL, RO, RS, RU, SI, SK, UA, XK); Germany is not classed as post-communist because the ESS reports it as one country. ## What these data cannot show - The correlations come from one interview per person, so they do not show whether valuing obedience shapes where people place themselves, whether placement or party shapes the child-rearing answers, or whether a third influence shapes both. - The rise in the American correlation with party is a change in how the measure lines up with party. - The ANES and GSS are repeated cross-sections, so they cannot say whether people changed parties, the parties changed or the composition of each party changed. - The measures are related but different. - The WVS checklist, the ANES forced choices, the GSS ranking and the ESS values battery use different formats, and the ESS has no question about children. - The agreement between the WVS and ESS country patterns shows that both rank countries alike, and the comparison with age, education, sex and religiosity shows that this agreement is not specific to the obedience measure. - This chapter does not use party manifestos, expert placements of parties or vote choices, so it cannot say why the label attaches to conservation values in one country and not in another. - Whether the ANES child-rearing items mean the same thing to Black and white respondents is disputed [10] [11], and this chapter reports the groups separately without testing it. - The Hispanic and other group is a residual category whose makeup changes across studies. - The intervals are model based and ignore the sampling design, and the countries are those the surveys reached, not a sample of the world. - The cohort profile cannot separate age from birth decade, the country groups by income are a single classification from the WVS context file, and waves are pooled inside each country, so a correlation blends years. - The link between the disposition and politics is thought to depend on perceived threat [1]. - This chapter does not test whether threat conditions the link; Chapter 8.5, Order, security and threat (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/order-security-and-threat; planned) takes up the threat measures in the WVS and ESS. ## References 1. Stenner, Karen (2005). The Authoritarian Dynamic. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614712 2. Feldman, Stanley (2003). Enforcing Social Conformity: A Theory of Authoritarianism. Political Psychology 24(1): 41-74. https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00316 3. Hetherington, Marc J.; Weiler, Jonathan D. (2009). Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics. Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/authoritarianism-and-polarization-in-american-politics/C0831CCE83C7C2D506A0954A8956BAE8 4. Engelhardt, Andrew M.; Feldman, Stanley; Hetherington, Marc J. (2023). Advancing the Measurement of Authoritarianism. Political Behavior 45: 537-560. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-021-09718-6 5. Inglehart, Ronald; Baker, Wayne E. (2000). Modernization, Cultural Change, and the Persistence of Traditional Values. American Sociological Review 65(1): 19-51. https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240006500103 6. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 7. Fisher, Ronald A. (1921). On the Probable Error of a Coefficient of Correlation Deduced from a Small Sample. Metron 1(4): 3-32. 8. Schwartz, Shalom H. (1992). Universals in the Content and Structure of Values: Theoretical Advances and Empirical Tests in 20 Countries. Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 25: 1-65. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60281-6 9. Pop-Eleches, Grigore; Tucker, Joshua A. (2017). Communism's Shadow: Historical Legacies and Contemporary Political Attitudes. Princeton University Press. https://doi.org/10.23943/princeton/9780691175591.001.0001 10. Pérez, Efrén O.; Hetherington, Marc J. (2014). Authoritarianism in Black and White: Testing the Cross-Racial Validity of the Child Rearing Scale. Political Analysis 22(3): 398-412. https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/mpu002 11. Fialho, Fabrício M. (2026). Reassessing Racial Differences in Authoritarianism in the United States: Measurement Invariance and Group Comparisons Using the ANES Child-Rearing Values Scale. Public Opinion Quarterly. https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfag020 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/build.py (sha256 5f3b54214c5e1c001ccd0a6e41a816da8747cecfbe5c7eee1bf82756e4b0cb80) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/ess/ess_clean.parquet | 45,592,290 | 9487eead6817f028f5dd525709aa1b989ccd384384ef3700b9657cf68dd0b529 | 6def6b8c99fe6dbaf6abc744db6cabf584b900084600909b651870d99208e338 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 | | data/wvs/wvs_clean.parquet | 71,974,374 | cef4479481f8a48d6c765d39dc5438d31daa32fcecee3f181aaaf8e257f41f0b | 59a8e3c369176b7e1a2cb37fc10b87985ed79b02fab2eae1cca08e7a972db061 | | C:/github/politics-book/lib/geo/world.v1.json | 49,483 | 8e454ad862ef2ff389e1599a5e6eb1c20e0ae6ae77415ed1266424aa196d3b32 | 8e454ad862ef2ff389e1599a5e6eb1c20e0ae6ae77415ed1266424aa196d3b32 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 6e537ca07b09798099221ebb7746d3ad6bda11d8729d53e90ff734161438b24a | | figures/agreement_reference.json | 8e281f57e4dddb2ed69ce0eba074a3887996cc34457a08486f2998940e8e9a42 | | figures/cohort_prevalence.json | fc0bac178a1c444506cc7c68ec5b7d0daf511d469c88ede5b2e6439f9c2dbe6e | | figures/country_loadings.json | 2920e7a65d3c31a5d1148d3df0007ff41578d0815d7f0eb6d72f0956b96c7ecf | | figures/index_variants.json | a2e8b3010f7694405feccf8123394a3f612a2416ba9ce61c0dd0acd72d2249f2 | | figures/instruments.json | e317f8681168d99d67115e8c52a6d71f5596a212c00231eeb695900fbb413bc1 | | figures/outcome_gaps.json | 11873710e7b96828163732d1f44a062b1016ddbba9976d7def354df3296c400d | | figures/outcome_gaps_faith.json | a4421f108bbdafb23c7a494af128a7c914b1a32886ef090c7a1d298ec7b382f4 | | figures/us_party_trend.json | 774f9ce796ca61681dc9ce0ea89bacdb9a5d8ecf6f7962421d7730593747037f | | figures/wvs_ess_agreement.json | ab637adee335b6895021850198b18afc1fcb186b48a6b10197be64a00859c9dc | | meta.json | 22aa29a29128255921657ca829581fc7c2b919df3b6b6611ac9ea17c0e9a7ea7 | | refs.json | 8dd553063beef40395719abeda4baa25baf15ee9720cbcbf1ea00067a92e0aa8 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/facts.json - Table 1, figure "instruments" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/instruments.json - Table 2, figure "cohort_prevalence" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/cohort_prevalence.json - Table 3, figure "country_loadings" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/country_loadings.json - Table 4, figure "index_variants" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/index_variants.json - Table 5, figure "wvs_ess_agreement" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/wvs_ess_agreement.json - Table 6, figure "agreement_reference" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/agreement_reference.json - Table 7, figure "us_party_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/us_party_trend.json - Table 8, figure "outcome_gaps" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/outcome_gaps.json - Table 9, figure "outcome_gaps_faith" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-obedience-autonomy-disposition/figures/outcome_gaps_faith.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # The god gap in America: report Chapter 9.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: The god gap in America - Chapter: 9.1 (Part IX, Religion and morality; Ideology, values and religion) - Question: How large is the political gap between frequent and infrequent worshippers, and how much of it runs through party? - Dek: The Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders rose from 5.5 points in the ANES studies of 1972 to 1988 to 21.8 points in those of 2008 to 2020 and was 27.7 points in the 2024 CES. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Time Series Cumulative Data File, studies 1952 to 2020 (2024 religion and attendance codes excluded); years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z) - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content, 2008 to 2024; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative - General Social Survey. Cumulative file, 1972 to 2024, with interview mode from the raw file; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use - World Values Survey and EVS. World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005 to 2023; ten EVS country labels restored; years: 1981-2023 (7 unified waves); weights: weight (S017) within each country; every country counted once across countries - European Social Survey. European Social Survey rounds 1 to 11; attendance and left-right self-placement; years: 2002-2023 (rounds 1 to 11; round 11 was fielded in 2023 and 2024); weights: weight (analysis weight) within each country - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026thegodgapinamerica ```bibtex @misc{singh2026thegodgapinamerica, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {The god gap in America}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | ANES studies of 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988, pooled | 5.5 | 95% CI 2.9 to 8.1 | 5,572 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_dev_early | | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | ANES studies of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled | 21.8 | 95% CI 19.5 to 24.1 | 12,996 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File | anes_dev_late | | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2024 | 27.7 | 95% CI 26.0 to 29.3 | 39,057 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | ces_gap_2024 | ## Findings Among voters who reported a choice between the two major-party candidates in the 2024 Cooperative Election Study (CES), those who attend religious services a few times a year or never voted Democratic at a rate 27.7 (95% CI 26.0 to 29.3) points above those who attend weekly or more. This chapter calls that difference between seldom and frequent attenders the god gap. In the American National Election Studies (ANES) of 1972 to 1988 the same gap was 5.5 points, and in those of 2008 to 2020 it was 21.8 points. The pooled gap is not uniform across groups. It is larger among white voters and smaller among Protestants and Catholics, and part of it is the contrast between the unaffiliated and everyone else. The chapter keeps three comparisons apart. The first is by attendance, the gap above. The second is by affiliation, the Democratic vote among Catholics against Protestants, which the attendance gap has exceeded since 1992. The third holds party identification fixed and asks how much of the rise in the tie between attendance and ideology, measured as a slope of ideology on attendance, remains in the General Social Survey (GSS). The chapter then compares the United States with Europe and the rest of the world. Frequent attenders go to services weekly or nearly weekly, and seldom attenders go a few times a year or never. The ANES records attendance in three categories only, so the other surveys are cut to match as closely as their items allow. The CES has no nearly-weekly answer, so its frequent group is weekly or more. (Note: Attendance is self-reported, so each group is defined by how respondents answer and not by a count of visits. The cut is the same in the ANES and the GSS and one answer narrower in the CES, and the levels of the groups are compared across surveys only where the text says so.) A gap is the Democratic share of the two-party vote among seldom attenders minus the share among frequent attenders, in points, so a positive gap means that seldom attenders voted more Democratic. It describes who votes for whom and does not say why. A pooled estimate combines the respondents of several studies into one estimate. (Note: Every interval is a 95% confidence interval. Shares use the Kish effective sample size [1] and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample, which leaves out strata and clusters and can move an interval either way, and they describe sampling error within one survey and not differences between surveys. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its respondents chose to join; the same formula is used for it, and its interval does not cover the error that comes from how respondents were recruited.) Studies of American party politics through the 1990s described a widening division between religious traditionalists and seculars in party attachments [2]. A later account of American religion documented polarization between religious conservatives and secular liberals [3]. The sections below measure that division in several surveys. ### The ANES vote gap has been above zero since 1992 Table 1 plots the gap in every presidential year. In the ANES it was 10.3 (95% CI 5.3 to 15.3) points in 1972, 0.1 (95% CI −6.5 to 6.6) in 1980, an interval that includes zero, 11.3 (95% CI 6.2 to 16.5) in 1992 and 21.9 (95% CI 18.2 to 25.7) in 2020. The interval lies above zero in 8 of the 8 studies from 1992 on, and it includes zero in 3 studies, those of 1980, 1984 and 1988. Pooled over 1972 to 1988 the ANES gap is 5.5 (95% CI 2.9 to 8.1) points, and pooled over 1992 to 2004 it is 13.0 (95% CI 9.7 to 16.2) points. Table 1. In the ANES the Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders included zero in 1980, 1984 and 1988, and in the 2024 CES it was 27.7 points The ANES and the CES agree in the gap pooled over 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, which is 21.8 (95% CI 19.5 to 24.1) points in the ANES and 23.4 (95% CI 22.7 to 24.2) points in the CES. (Note: In single years the two surveys differ in both directions. The CES gap was 27.3 (95% CI 25.7 to 28.9) points in 2012 against 20.5 (95% CI 16.2 to 24.8) in the ANES, with intervals that do not overlap, and the ANES gap was 23.8 (95% CI 18.9 to 28.7) points in 2016 against 18.9 (95% CI 17.4 to 20.4) in the CES.) The CES gap did not move in one direction after 2008. It was 25.5 (95% CI 23.9 to 27.1) points in 2008 and 27.3 (95% CI 25.7 to 28.9) in 2012, fell to 18.9 (95% CI 17.4 to 20.4) in 2016, was 23.5 (95% CI 22.1 to 24.9) in 2020 and stood at 27.7 (95% CI 26.0 to 29.3) in 2024. The change from 2020 to 2024 came from the frequent end. The Democratic share among frequent attenders went from 36.5% (95% CI 35.3% to 37.7%) to 29.9% (95% CI 28.5% to 31.3%), while the share among seldom attenders went from 60.0% (95% CI 59.3% to 60.7%) to 57.6% (95% CI 56.7% to 58.5%). #### The gap is larger among white voters and smaller among Protestants and Catholics The gap for all voters mixes several groups, and the other two views of Table 1 separate some of them. Among white non-Hispanic voters the 2024 CES gap was 33.8 (95% CI 32.1 to 35.5) points, so leaving out Black, Hispanic and other voters raises it. Among Protestant and Catholic voters it was 13.2 (95% CI 11.2 to 15.2) points in 2024, down from 18.7 (95% CI 16.6 to 20.7) in 2008. The voters left out of the Protestant and Catholic view include the unaffiliated. In the 2024 CES the unaffiliated attended seldom in 96% (95% CI 95% to 96%) of cases and voted 70.9% (95% CI 69.7% to 72.2%) Democratic. They made up 34.2% (95% CI 33.2% to 35.2%) of seldom-attending voters in 2008 and 44.8% (95% CI 43.9% to 45.7%) in 2024, so a growing part of the seldom group is made up of voters who voted Democratic at that rate. See Chapter 9.2, The rise of the nones (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-rise-of-the-nones; planned) for the unaffiliated and Chapter 9.3, Religious tradition and race (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/religious-tradition-and-race) for white evangelicals, Black Protestants, Latino Catholics and other traditions. ### The attendance gap has exceeded the denominational gap since 1992 The ANES records denomination from 1952 and attendance from 1970, so the earliest religious line in the vote that can be measured runs between Catholics and Protestants. (Note: In the ANES the Catholic minus Protestant gap in the Democratic vote was 46.2 (95% CI 38.7 to 53.7) points in 1960, the year John F. Kennedy, a Catholic, was elected, and 20.6 (95% CI 17.4 to 23.7) points over the studies of 1952 to 1968 pooled. It was 8.5 (95% CI 5.6 to 11.3) points in 1972 to 1988.) The Catholic minus Protestant gap was 5.0 (95% CI 1.3 to 8.6) points in 1992 to 2004 and 8.3 (95% CI 5.6 to 11.1) in 2008 to 2020, and it was 10.4 (95% CI 8.3 to 12.4) in the 2024 CES (Table 2). The pooled attendance gap was 13.0 (95% CI 9.7 to 16.2) points in 1992 to 2004 and 21.8 (95% CI 19.5 to 24.1) in 2008 to 2020, and its interval lies above the denominational interval in both windows. By study, the attendance gap was larger than the denominational gap in 8 of the 8 ANES studies from 1992 on, against 1 of 5 in 1972 to 1988. The two intervals are separate in 3 of the 8 studies from 1992 on (those of 2012, 2016 and 2020). In the CES the attendance interval lies wholly above the denominational interval in 5 of 5 presidential years. (Note: The ANES cumulative file cannot supply 2024 religion or attendance. It codes 835 respondents as Protestant in 2024 against 3,180 in 2020, and 49% of 2024 respondents have an attendance answer against 99% in 2020. Every ANES series here stops in 2020, and the CES supplies 2024.) Table 2. Since 1992 the attendance gap has been larger than the Catholic-Protestant gap, and the unaffiliated-Protestant gap is larger still The two gaps differ in who is compared. The attendance gap counts the unaffiliated in its seldom group, and the Catholic minus Protestant gap leaves them out. In the CES the unaffiliated voted 36.7 (95% CI 34.7 to 38.6) points more Democratic than Protestants in 2008 and 38.0 (95% CI 36.3 to 39.7) points more in 2024, against attendance gaps of 25.5 and 27.7 points. The unaffiliated-Protestant interval lies above both the attendance interval and the Catholic-Protestant interval in every presidential year. Among Protestant and Catholic voters alone, the two groups that the denominational gap compares, the attendance gap was 13.2 (95% CI 11.2 to 15.2) points in 2024 (the third view of Table 1) against 10.4 (95% CI 8.3 to 12.4) points for denomination, and the two intervals overlap. Across the 5 CES presidential years the attendance interval among these voters lies wholly above the denominational interval in 2 of them (2008 and 2012), and across the 8 ANES studies from 1992 on in 0. The comparison of the two gaps therefore depends on which voters are included. The vote differs by attendance inside each tradition, by less than in the pooled comparison. In the 2024 CES seldom Protestants voted 12.5 (95% CI 10.1 to 14.8) points more Democratic than frequent Protestants, and seldom Catholics 10.4 (95% CI 6.6 to 14.2) points more than frequent Catholics, against 27.7 points among all voters. In 2008 the two gaps were 17.2 and 18.1 points. Denomination also separates voters at each level of attendance. In 2024 Catholics who attend often voted 10.2 (95% CI 6.6 to 13.8) points more Democratic than Protestants who attend often, and Catholics who attend seldom voted 8.1 (95% CI 5.4 to 10.9) points more than Protestants who attend seldom. Among the unaffiliated, those who attended weekly or more in 2020 voted 14.3 (95% CI 7.5 to 21.0) points less Democratic than the seldom attenders. The pooled attendance gap therefore combines a gap inside each tradition with the contrast between the unaffiliated and everyone else, and it is not a single gap that holds in every group. ### The Republican share among frequent attenders rose in the GSS Table 3 plots the Republican share of Democratic and Republican identifiers by attendance. In the GSS the share among frequent attenders was 37.4% (95% CI 35.5% to 39.2%) in 1972 to 1978 and 53.2% (95% CI 50.9% to 55.5%) in 2010 to 2018, the last in-person surveys, a change of 15.9 (95% CI 12.9 to 18.8) points. Among seldom attenders it went from 32.1% (95% CI 30.5% to 33.7%) to 37.8% (95% CI 36.2% to 39.5%), a change of 5.7 (95% CI 3.4 to 8.0) points. The gap between the two groups went from 5.3 (95% CI 2.9 to 7.7) to 15.4 (95% CI 12.6 to 18.2) points, so the Republican share rose in both groups and rose more among frequent attenders. The GSS has included web interviews since 2021, and the surveys from 2021 on are called the web era below. The surveys of 2018 to 2024, which include web interviews, give a larger gap of 19.5 (95% CI 16.3 to 22.8) points. In 2022 and 2024 the gap was 18.0 (95% CI 10.3 to 25.8) points among in-person respondents and 23.7 (95% CI 16.8 to 30.5) among web respondents, so part of the larger gap in that window is not separable from the interview mode. (Note: In the surveys of 2018 to 2024 the Republican share was 59.7% (95% CI 57.0% to 62.5%) among frequent attenders and 40.2% (95% CI 38.5% to 41.9%) among seldom attenders, changes from 1972 to 1978 of 22.4 (95% CI 19.1 to 25.7) and 8.1 (95% CI 5.8 to 10.4) points.) Table 3. The Republican share of party identifiers rose more among frequent attenders than among seldom attenders in the GSS The CES begins in 2008 and shows a different pattern. Its gap was 26.5 (95% CI 25.0 to 28.0) points in 2008 and 27.4 (95% CI 25.7 to 29.1) points in 2024. Frequent attenders were 61.5% (95% CI 60.3% to 62.7%) Republican in 2008 and 68.1% (95% CI 66.7% to 69.5%) in 2024, and seldom attenders 35.0% (95% CI 34.1% to 35.9%) and 40.7% (95% CI 39.8% to 41.6%), so the Republican share rose by similar amounts in the two groups. The CES gap of 2008 already exceeds the GSS gap of 15.4 points in 2010 to 2018 and of 19.5 points in 2018 to 2024. The two surveys differ in sample, mode and party items, so their levels are not comparable. The CES cannot say what happened before 2008. ### Party identification accounts for part of the rise in the slope In the GSS, party identification accounts for 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) of the rise in the slope of ideology on attendance between the in-person surveys of 1974 to 1978 and those of 2010 to 2018. The raw slope was 0.15 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.20) in 1974, 0.26 (95% CI 0.21 to 0.31) in 2008, 0.25 (95% CI 0.20 to 0.31) in 2018 and 0.32 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.37) in 2024 (Table 4). Each slope is the standardized slope of self-placed ideology on attendance in one survey year, with both variables standardized once on all respondents in the sample. It counts the standard deviations of ideology that go with one standard deviation more attendance. Net of party identification, with leaners counted with their party and the fit made on the same respondents, the slope was 0.14 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.19) in 1974, 0.19 (95% CI 0.14 to 0.24) in 2018 and 0.20 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.25) in 2024. The 2024 point falls in the web era of the GSS. In 2022 and 2024 pooled, in-person respondents give a slope of 0.23 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.30) and web respondents give 0.37 (95% CI 0.31 to 0.42), a difference of 0.13 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.22), so the 2024 slope differs by mode of interview. The CES, which is online throughout, does not show a steady rise. Its slope was 0.35 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.36) in 2008 and fell to 0.25 (95% CI 0.24 to 0.26) in 2010, and it was 0.35 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.37) in 2024. Pooled, it was 0.26 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.27) over 2010 to 2017 and 0.35 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.35) over 2018 to 2024. The step between 2017 and 2018 coincides with a rise in the spread of the five-point ideology item, whose standard deviation was 1.00 in 2010 to 2017 and 1.21 in 2018 to 2024. The slope is standardized on all years together, so part of the step is a change in that spread and not in the tie with attendance. The correlation of attendance with ideology, which does not depend on the spread, was +0.29 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.29) over 2010 to 2017 and +0.32 (95% CI 0.31 to 0.32) over 2018 to 2024. Table 4. The slope of ideology on attendance rose in the GSS from the 1970s to the 2000s, and party accounts for part of the rise To ask how much of the rise is accounted for by party, the chapter fits each slope on one set of respondents, once raw and once with party identification added, and compares an early and a late window. The main comparison pools the in-person GSS surveys of 1974 to 1978 and of 2010 to 2018. The raw slope rose by 0.11 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.15) between the two windows and the slope net of party by 0.06 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.10), so party identification accounts for 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) of the rise. (Note: The share is one minus the ratio of the two rises. Its interval comes from a bootstrap over respondents, which recomputes both rises on 2,000 resamples of the respondents drawn with replacement and reads the interval from the spread of the results.) Four other specifications give shares from 50% to 64% (Table 5). Every specification puts the rise net of party below the raw rise, and the single-year comparisons have intervals wide enough to include the whole rise. Table 5. Party identification accounts for 46% of the rise in the ideology slope (95% interval 33% to 67%) and for 50% to 64% in four other specifications The share is an accounting of the slope. Party identification and ideology are answered by the same respondents in the same interview, and the tie between them tightened over these years (Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology)), so a party control can be expected to remove more of the slope in later years. In the GSS it removes 8% (95% CI 0% to 18%) of the raw slope in 1974 and 38% (95% CI 29% to 48%) in 2024, and in the CES 47% (95% CI 45% to 50%) in 2008 and 53% (95% CI 50% to 55%) in 2024. Panel studies find that religious behavior and identity respond to politics. Partisan identity that forms early can shape how often people attend and whether they identify with a religion [4], and religious and secular orientations respond to political orientations [5]. Cross-sections cannot separate the two directions, so the share is not an estimate of how much of the slope party causes or how much religion does. ### Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic attitudes The GSS asks questions on sexual morality and abortion (homosexuality, premarital sex, extramarital sex, a pornography law and abortion for any reason) and on economic policy (help for the poor, help for the sick and government action on income differences). Averaging each set gives a cultural index and an economic index. The economic items are asked from 1975, so the comparison starts there. Over 1975 to 2024 the correlation of attendance with the cultural index is +0.44 (95% CI 0.43 to 0.45), with the economic index +0.11 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.12) and with self-placed ideology +0.22 (95% CI 0.21 to 0.23). All three use the same survey years. The cultural and economic correlations use the same respondents, and the ideology correlation uses every respondent who answered the ideology item in those years. The cultural correlation was +0.37 (95% CI 0.34 to 0.40) in 1975 to 1984 and +0.46 (95% CI 0.44 to 0.49) in 2021 to 2024, and the economic correlation went from +0.07 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.11) to +0.18 (95% CI 0.15 to 0.22) (Table 6). The first period rests on the surveys of 1975, 1983 and 1984, the only ones in it that asked the economic items. Table 6. Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic conservatism, and the economic correlation has grown The two indices have similar internal consistency, meaning that their items agree with one another to a similar degree (standardized alpha of 0.70 for the cultural items and 0.69 for the economic ones). That similarity limits how far unequal measurement error can account for the difference in correlations. The cultural items ask about sexual morality and abortion, topics on which many religious traditions take positions, so part of the tie sits close to the content of religious teaching. For the abortion item by party see Chapter 4.1, The abortion sort (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-abortion-sort), for whether the cultural items form one dimension see Chapter 9.5, Two moralities (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/two-moralities; planned), and for the economic and cultural dimensions across the whole ideology scale see Chapter 7.2, Economic and cultural dimensions (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/economic-and-cultural-dimensions). ### The United States sits above the European and world averages The World Values Survey and the European Values Study (WVS/EVS) ask how important God is in a respondent's life and ask for a left-right self-placement. Inside each country the two answers have a correlation, and in the United States it is +0.28 (95% CI 0.25 to 0.31). The mean across the 104 countries and territories with a usable estimate, counting each once, is +0.10 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.12). It is +0.13 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.16) across 42 European countries and +0.08 (95% CI 0.06 to 0.10) across 61 countries outside Europe and the United States. 4 countries have a higher point estimate than the United States (Croatia, Greece, Slovenia and Spain), and in 2 of them (Croatia and Spain) the interval lies wholly above the United States interval (Table 7). (Note: The cleaned WVS/EVS file holds 118 countries and territories, and 112 were surveyed in 2005 or later. It leaves the country name blank for ten EVS countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Kosovo and Northern Cyprus. This chapter restores them from the country code, and 9 have a usable estimate. Without them the mean across 95 countries and territories is +0.10 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.12).) Table 7. On both measures the United States correlation between religiosity and the right lies above the European and world averages The rank comparison uses only the WVS/EVS, where every country answered the same question. Attendance gives the same contrast on other surveys. The correlation of attendance with self-placed ideology in the GSS from 2006 to 2024 is +0.25 (95% CI 0.23 to 0.26) in the United States, and the mean across 36 European countries in the European Social Survey (ESS) is +0.11 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.14). The two projects also order countries alike. Across the 36 countries that both surveyed, the attendance correlations in the WVS/EVS and the ESS correlate at +0.81 (95% CI 0.66 to 0.90), with a mean absolute difference of 0.04. #### In the GSS the correlation is higher in 2024 than in 2002 A rising correlation would make the United States a place where the tie between religiosity and the right is still growing, and the data do not settle it. In the GSS the correlation of attendance with ideology was +0.18 (95% CI 0.11 to 0.24) in 2002 and +0.30 (95% CI 0.25 to 0.34) in 2024. The 2024 value falls in the web era. In 2022 and 2024 pooled the correlation was +0.22 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.27) among in-person respondents and +0.33 (95% CI 0.28 to 0.37) among web respondents. The in-person 2018 interval overlaps the 2002 interval, so the separation between 2002 and 2024 rests on the web-era point. In the CES the correlation was +0.34 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.35) in 2008, +0.27 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.28) in 2010 and +0.33 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.34) in 2024. In a fixed panel of 15 European countries present in every ESS round, the mean correlation was +0.17 (95% CI 0.14 to 0.20) in 2002 and +0.15 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.21) in 2023, a paired change of −0.02 (95% CI −0.06 to 0.03) (Table 8). (Note: The panel mean hides movements in both directions. The correlation rose in 6 of the countries and fell in 9, with the largest rise in Poland, from +0.20 (95% CI 0.16 to 0.25) to +0.38 (95% CI 0.33 to 0.43), and the largest fall in Belgium, from +0.14 (95% CI 0.08 to 0.19) to −0.04 (95% CI −0.10 to 0.02).) The direction of the United States series therefore depends on the survey and on the years compared. For attendance in Europe see Chapter 9.4, Secularization in Europe (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/secularization-in-europe; planned). Table 8. The United States attendance-ideology correlation depends on the survey and the years compared, and a European panel shows no change ### What these data cannot show Every estimate here is an association between answers given by the same people in one interview, or between groups defined by such answers. The vote gap does not say that attendance moves the vote, the ideology slope does not say that attendance moves ideology, and the share accounted for by party does not say that party moves either one. The panel studies cited above find religious change that follows political orientation. The surveys here have no panel, so they cannot say how much of each gap comes from people changing their attendance, their affiliation or their party, and how much from who joins and leaves the electorate. The GSS moved from in-person interviews to a mix that includes the web in 2021, and the chapter reports the split for 2022 and 2024 for the slope, the Republican-share gap and the attendance-ideology correlation. The ANES has included web interviews since 2012 and has no mode weights for 2020, and the chapter does not split its gap by mode. The CES is an opt-in online panel. The ideology and attendance items differ between the GSS and the CES, so levels are compared within a survey and trends are compared across surveys. The intervals treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the strata and clusters of the sampling designs. The GSS design variables allow two checks. Cluster-robust standard errors for the yearly slopes are 0.92 to 1.15 times the HC3 standard errors, on both sides of one. A bootstrap over primary sampling units gives the share of the rise that party accounts for as 46% (95% CI 33% to 66%), against 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) from a bootstrap over respondents. The ANES, CES, WVS, EVS and ESS estimates are not checked this way. Race and tradition enter only as views of one figure, with Black Protestants, Latino Catholics and non-Christian faiths left to the chapter on tradition and race. The cross-national comparison sets the correlation inside each country against an average of other countries, using different survey items, so it does not show why the tie is stronger where it is. The data hold nothing on belief or on congregations, and they cannot separate the effect of religion from that of the party system in each country. ## Tables ### Table 1. In the ANES the Democratic vote gap between seldom and frequent attenders included zero in 1980, 1984 and 1988, and in the 2024 CES it was 27.7 points Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or nearly weekly, and weekly or more in the CES), reported voters, percentage points, 95% intervals; ANES 1972 to 2020 and CES 2008 to 2024 | Sample | Survey | Year | Gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Seldom, Democratic share (%) | Frequent, Democratic share (%) | Seldom voters | Frequent voters | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All voters | ANES | 1972 | 10.3 | 5.3 | 15.3 | 40.6 | 30.3 | 705 | 684 | | All voters | ANES | 1976 | 7.5 | 1.5 | 13.5 | 53.5 | 46.0 | 536 | 578 | | All voters | ANES | 1980 | 0.1 | −6.5 | 6.6 | 38.8 | 38.7 | 441 | 408 | | All voters | ANES | 1984 | 5.2 | −0.3 | 10.8 | 43.0 | 37.8 | 621 | 580 | | All voters | ANES | 1988 | 2.1 | −4.1 | 8.2 | 47.1 | 45.1 | 522 | 497 | | All voters | ANES | 1992 | 11.3 | 6.2 | 16.5 | 53.4 | 42.0 | 745 | 684 | | All voters | ANES | 1996 | 14.6 | 7.7 | 21.5 | 61.3 | 46.7 | 459 | 496 | | All voters | ANES | 2000 | 14.9 | 7.9 | 21.9 | 58.4 | 43.5 | 453 | 481 | | All voters | ANES | 2004 | 12.6 | 4.5 | 20.7 | 55.9 | 43.3 | 371 | 316 | | All voters | ANES | 2008 | 21.1 | 14.4 | 27.8 | 62.2 | 41.2 | 666 | 600 | | All voters | ANES | 2012 | 20.5 | 16.2 | 24.8 | 61.2 | 40.8 | 2,198 | 1,543 | | All voters | ANES | 2016 | 23.8 | 18.9 | 28.7 | 62.0 | 38.2 | 1,432 | 884 | | All voters | ANES | 2020 | 21.9 | 18.2 | 25.7 | 62.3 | 40.4 | 3,950 | 1,723 | | All voters | CES | 2008 | 25.5 | 23.9 | 27.1 | 63.4 | 37.9 | 13,147 | 8,021 | | All voters | CES | 2012 | 27.3 | 25.7 | 28.9 | 62.3 | 35.0 | 22,397 | 11,984 | | All voters | CES | 2016 | 18.9 | 17.4 | 20.4 | 56.9 | 37.9 | 26,471 | 10,902 | | All voters | CES | 2020 | 23.5 | 22.1 | 24.9 | 60.0 | 36.5 | 30,080 | 10,434 | | All voters | CES | 2024 | 27.7 | 26.0 | 29.3 | 57.6 | 29.9 | 29,642 | 9,415 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1972 | 6.3 | 1.1 | 11.5 | 36.4 | 30.1 | 604 | 677 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1976 | 4.5 | −1.8 | 10.8 | 50.6 | 46.1 | 450 | 570 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1980 | 0.6 | −6.5 | 7.7 | 39.4 | 38.8 | 340 | 402 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1984 | 2.1 | −3.8 | 8.0 | 39.5 | 37.3 | 484 | 568 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1988 | −1.7 | −8.2 | 4.8 | 43.0 | 44.7 | 407 | 492 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1992 | 8.3 | 2.5 | 14.2 | 49.8 | 41.5 | 488 | 643 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 1996 | 15.7 | 7.9 | 23.5 | 61.2 | 45.5 | 301 | 469 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2000 | 9.4 | 1.3 | 17.6 | 53.5 | 44.0 | 289 | 458 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2004 | 11.0 | 1.4 | 20.6 | 55.1 | 44.1 | 211 | 292 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2008 | 16.4 | 8.5 | 24.3 | 57.3 | 40.9 | 394 | 568 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2012 | 14.7 | 9.5 | 19.9 | 55.4 | 40.7 | 1,207 | 1,348 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2016 | 15.3 | 9.5 | 21.2 | 52.9 | 37.5 | 759 | 797 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES | 2020 | 11.8 | 7.2 | 16.3 | 52.6 | 40.9 | 1,938 | 1,403 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES | 2008 | 18.7 | 16.6 | 20.7 | 51.9 | 33.3 | 6,415 | 5,786 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES | 2012 | 15.3 | 13.5 | 17.2 | 50.6 | 35.3 | 11,833 | 10,669 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES | 2016 | 9.0 | 7.3 | 10.8 | 45.3 | 36.3 | 12,636 | 9,457 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES | 2020 | 11.0 | 9.3 | 12.7 | 45.7 | 34.8 | 12,431 | 8,674 | | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES | 2024 | 13.2 | 11.2 | 15.2 | 42.2 | 29.0 | 12,221 | 7,759 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1972 | 9.9 | 4.8 | 15.0 | 35.8 | 25.9 | 640 | 622 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1976 | 8.3 | 2.1 | 14.6 | 49.6 | 41.2 | 486 | 523 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1980 | 3.5 | −3.2 | 10.3 | 33.6 | 30.1 | 384 | 346 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1984 | 9.0 | 3.2 | 14.8 | 39.4 | 30.4 | 545 | 483 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1988 | 6.5 | −0.1 | 13.1 | 42.5 | 36.0 | 447 | 400 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1992 | 17.9 | 12.3 | 23.4 | 50.1 | 32.2 | 640 | 542 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 1996 | 22.5 | 15.0 | 29.9 | 57.3 | 34.8 | 397 | 386 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2000 | 18.8 | 11.1 | 26.4 | 54.9 | 36.1 | 377 | 383 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2004 | 18.9 | 9.7 | 28.0 | 51.5 | 32.7 | 283 | 230 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2008 | 28.8 | 20.9 | 36.7 | 55.4 | 26.6 | 410 | 284 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2012 | 29.3 | 24.4 | 34.1 | 53.9 | 24.7 | 1,460 | 874 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2016 | 27.8 | 22.6 | 33.1 | 53.5 | 25.7 | 1,107 | 652 | | White non-Hispanic voters | ANES | 2020 | 29.9 | 26.0 | 33.9 | 55.4 | 25.4 | 3,035 | 1,292 | | White non-Hispanic voters | CES | 2008 | 32.1 | 30.5 | 33.7 | 58.2 | 26.2 | 11,293 | 6,653 | | White non-Hispanic voters | CES | 2012 | 33.0 | 31.3 | 34.7 | 57.9 | 24.9 | 18,416 | 9,387 | | White non-Hispanic voters | CES | 2016 | 25.4 | 23.9 | 26.9 | 51.1 | 25.7 | 20,561 | 7,745 | | White non-Hispanic voters | CES | 2020 | 31.0 | 29.6 | 32.3 | 54.2 | 23.2 | 23,149 | 7,406 | | White non-Hispanic voters | CES | 2024 | 33.8 | 32.1 | 35.5 | 53.7 | 19.9 | 22,958 | 6,803 | Views: All voters (sample = All voters); White non-Hispanic voters (sample = White non-Hispanic voters); Protestant and Catholic voters (sample = Protestant and Catholic voters). Note: The ANES cumulative file's 2024 religion and attendance codes cannot be used, so the ANES line ends in 2020. Note: Attendance groups follow the ANES three-category item: frequent is weekly or almost weekly, seldom is a few times a year or never. The CES has no almost-weekly answer, so its frequent group is the top two answers, once a week and more than once a week. Note: A study enters only when each attendance group has at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2020, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/vote_gap.json ### Table 2. Since 1992 the attendance gap has been larger than the Catholic-Protestant gap, and the unaffiliated-Protestant gap is larger still Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among reported voters; gaps in percentage points and shares in percent; ANES 1952 to 2020 and CES 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals | View | Tradition or sample | Series | Year | Estimate | Lower | Upper | Voters | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1972 | 10.3 | 5.3 | 15.3 | 1,389 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1976 | 7.5 | 1.5 | 13.5 | 1,114 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1980 | 0.1 | −6.5 | 6.6 | 849 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1984 | 5.2 | −0.3 | 10.8 | 1,201 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1988 | 2.1 | −4.1 | 8.2 | 1,019 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1992 | 11.3 | 6.2 | 16.5 | 1,429 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 1996 | 14.6 | 7.7 | 21.5 | 955 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2000 | 14.9 | 7.9 | 21.9 | 934 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2004 | 12.6 | 4.5 | 20.7 | 687 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2008 | 21.1 | 14.4 | 27.8 | 1,266 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2012 | 20.5 | 16.2 | 24.8 | 3,741 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2016 | 23.8 | 18.9 | 28.7 | 2,316 | | gaps | All voters | ANES attendance | 2020 | 21.9 | 18.2 | 25.7 | 5,673 | | gaps | All voters | CES attendance | 2008 | 25.5 | 23.9 | 27.1 | 21,168 | | gaps | All voters | CES attendance | 2012 | 27.3 | 25.7 | 28.9 | 34,381 | | gaps | All voters | CES attendance | 2016 | 18.9 | 17.4 | 20.4 | 37,373 | | gaps | All voters | CES attendance | 2020 | 23.5 | 22.1 | 24.9 | 40,514 | | gaps | All voters | CES attendance | 2024 | 27.7 | 26.0 | 29.3 | 39,057 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1952 | 15.3 | 8.7 | 22.0 | 1,104 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1956 | 9.9 | 3.4 | 16.4 | 1,181 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1960 | 46.2 | 38.7 | 53.7 | 847 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1964 | 16.2 | 10.2 | 22.1 | 1,035 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1968 | 21.8 | 14.6 | 29.0 | 963 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1972 | 8.2 | 2.7 | 13.7 | 1,469 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1976 | 11.5 | 5.1 | 17.8 | 1,219 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1980 | 1.3 | −6.3 | 8.9 | 839 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1984 | 8.7 | 2.7 | 14.7 | 1,212 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1988 | 10.5 | 3.9 | 17.1 | 1,070 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1992 | 5.9 | 0.1 | 11.7 | 1,342 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 1996 | 6.6 | −1.0 | 14.1 | 912 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2000 | 1.4 | −6.1 | 9.0 | 911 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2004 | 5.0 | −4.2 | 14.3 | 610 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2008 | 9.2 | 1.2 | 17.1 | 1,195 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2012 | 9.5 | 4.4 | 14.7 | 2,927 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2016 | 8.6 | 2.8 | 14.4 | 1,799 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | ANES denomination | 2020 | 7.3 | 2.8 | 11.8 | 3,745 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES denomination | 2008 | 10.1 | 8.1 | 12.2 | 13,915 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES denomination | 2012 | 7.9 | 6.1 | 9.8 | 25,252 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES denomination | 2016 | 10.8 | 9.0 | 12.5 | 24,840 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES denomination | 2020 | 10.7 | 9.0 | 12.5 | 23,634 | | gaps | Protestant and Catholic voters | CES denomination | 2024 | 10.4 | 8.3 | 12.4 | 22,174 | | gaps | Unaffiliated and Protestant voters | CES unaffiliated | 2008 | 36.7 | 34.7 | 38.6 | 13,283 | | gaps | Unaffiliated and Protestant voters | CES unaffiliated | 2012 | 32.3 | 30.5 | 34.1 | 25,423 | | gaps | Unaffiliated and Protestant voters | CES unaffiliated | 2016 | 30.1 | 28.5 | 31.6 | 27,239 | | gaps | Unaffiliated and Protestant voters | CES unaffiliated | 2020 | 35.4 | 34.0 | 36.8 | 29,897 | | gaps | Unaffiliated and Protestant voters | CES unaffiliated | 2024 | 38.0 | 36.3 | 39.7 | 28,512 | | within | Catholic | Frequent | 2008 | 38.7 | 36.0 | 41.3 | 1,809 | | within | Catholic | Frequent | 2012 | 37.5 | 35.0 | 39.9 | 3,002 | | within | Catholic | Frequent | 2016 | 42.9 | 40.4 | 45.4 | 2,901 | | within | Catholic | Frequent | 2020 | 42.3 | 39.7 | 44.9 | 2,434 | | within | Catholic | Frequent | 2024 | 36.7 | 33.5 | 39.8 | 2,146 | | within | Catholic | Seldom | 2008 | 56.8 | 54.5 | 59.1 | 2,705 | | within | Catholic | Seldom | 2012 | 56.0 | 53.9 | 58.1 | 4,421 | | within | Catholic | Seldom | 2016 | 51.4 | 49.5 | 53.2 | 5,220 | | within | Catholic | Seldom | 2020 | 51.6 | 49.7 | 53.5 | 5,232 | | within | Catholic | Seldom | 2024 | 47.1 | 44.9 | 49.2 | 5,074 | | within | Protestant | Frequent | 2008 | 30.8 | 29.1 | 32.4 | 3,977 | | within | Protestant | Frequent | 2012 | 34.5 | 32.9 | 36.1 | 7,667 | | within | Protestant | Frequent | 2016 | 33.6 | 32.0 | 35.1 | 6,556 | | within | Protestant | Frequent | 2020 | 32.3 | 30.8 | 33.7 | 6,240 | | within | Protestant | Frequent | 2024 | 26.5 | 24.8 | 28.1 | 5,613 | | within | Protestant | Seldom | 2008 | 48.0 | 46.1 | 49.9 | 3,710 | | within | Protestant | Seldom | 2012 | 47.2 | 45.6 | 48.8 | 7,412 | | within | Protestant | Seldom | 2016 | 41.4 | 39.9 | 43.0 | 7,416 | | within | Protestant | Seldom | 2020 | 41.8 | 40.4 | 43.3 | 7,199 | | within | Protestant | Seldom | 2024 | 38.9 | 37.2 | 40.6 | 7,147 | | within | Unaffiliated | Frequent | 2012 | 54.5 | 46.0 | 62.9 | 266 | | within | Unaffiliated | Frequent | 2016 | 53.5 | 46.8 | 60.3 | 386 | | within | Unaffiliated | Frequent | 2020 | 59.5 | 52.9 | 66.2 | 369 | | within | Unaffiliated | Seldom | 2008 | 76.6 | 75.0 | 78.1 | 4,351 | | within | Unaffiliated | Seldom | 2012 | 74.7 | 73.2 | 76.2 | 7,904 | | within | Unaffiliated | Seldom | 2016 | 69.3 | 68.1 | 70.4 | 10,803 | | within | Unaffiliated | Seldom | 2020 | 73.8 | 72.9 | 74.8 | 14,096 | | within | Unaffiliated | Seldom | 2024 | 72.1 | 70.9 | 73.4 | 13,762 | Views: Three gaps compared (view = gaps); Attendance within each tradition (view = within). Note: The ANES cumulative file's 2024 religion codes cannot be used: Protestants number 3,180 in 2020 and 835 in 2024 while Catholics are stable, so the ANES lines end in 2020. The CES gives a Catholic-Protestant gap of 10.4 points in 2024. The ANES religion item cannot separate the unaffiliated from other faiths, so the unaffiliated line is CES only. Note: A group needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size in a study. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2020, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/denomination_attendance.json ### Table 3. The Republican share of party identifiers rose more among frequent attenders than among seldom attenders in the GSS Republican share of Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) among frequent attenders (weekly or nearly weekly, and weekly or more in the CES) and seldom attenders (a few times a year or never), by year, percent, 95% intervals | Survey | Attendance | Year | Republican share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | CES | Frequent | 2008 | 61.5 | 60.3 | 62.7 | 9,264 | | CES | Frequent | 2009 | 62.6 | 60.7 | 64.5 | 3,447 | | CES | Frequent | 2010 | 61.7 | 60.5 | 63.0 | 15,341 | | CES | Frequent | 2011 | 58.2 | 56.2 | 60.2 | 4,711 | | CES | Frequent | 2012 | 59.6 | 58.3 | 60.8 | 13,849 | | CES | Frequent | 2013 | 57.2 | 54.8 | 59.6 | 3,336 | | CES | Frequent | 2014 | 61.4 | 60.1 | 62.7 | 12,466 | | CES | Frequent | 2015 | 57.0 | 54.6 | 59.4 | 3,019 | | CES | Frequent | 2016 | 56.5 | 55.4 | 57.7 | 13,736 | | CES | Frequent | 2017 | 59.3 | 57.0 | 61.6 | 3,608 | | CES | Frequent | 2018 | 65.1 | 63.9 | 66.3 | 12,055 | | CES | Frequent | 2019 | 63.9 | 61.9 | 65.9 | 3,690 | | CES | Frequent | 2020 | 63.8 | 62.6 | 65.0 | 11,385 | | CES | Frequent | 2021 | 63.5 | 61.7 | 65.3 | 4,609 | | CES | Frequent | 2022 | 64.5 | 63.2 | 65.8 | 11,125 | | CES | Frequent | 2023 | 58.2 | 56.4 | 60.0 | 5,168 | | CES | Frequent | 2024 | 68.1 | 66.7 | 69.5 | 10,949 | | CES | Seldom | 2008 | 35.0 | 34.1 | 35.9 | 15,164 | | CES | Seldom | 2009 | 37.6 | 36.3 | 39.0 | 6,317 | | CES | Seldom | 2010 | 40.8 | 39.8 | 41.7 | 26,251 | | CES | Seldom | 2011 | 38.8 | 37.4 | 40.2 | 9,845 | | CES | Seldom | 2012 | 33.8 | 32.9 | 34.7 | 25,858 | | CES | Seldom | 2013 | 37.2 | 35.7 | 38.8 | 7,801 | | CES | Seldom | 2014 | 40.1 | 39.2 | 40.9 | 26,501 | | CES | Seldom | 2015 | 39.9 | 38.3 | 41.4 | 7,057 | | CES | Seldom | 2016 | 39.1 | 38.4 | 39.9 | 31,636 | | CES | Seldom | 2017 | 39.2 | 37.7 | 40.7 | 8,894 | | CES | Seldom | 2018 | 38.7 | 38.0 | 39.5 | 31,182 | | CES | Seldom | 2019 | 37.6 | 36.3 | 38.9 | 9,363 | | CES | Seldom | 2020 | 40.3 | 39.6 | 41.1 | 32,768 | | CES | Seldom | 2021 | 38.4 | 37.3 | 39.5 | 13,718 | | CES | Seldom | 2022 | 40.0 | 39.2 | 40.7 | 32,774 | | CES | Seldom | 2023 | 40.1 | 39.0 | 41.2 | 12,096 | | CES | Seldom | 2024 | 40.7 | 39.8 | 41.6 | 34,618 | | GSS | Frequent | 1972 | 33.7 | 29.5 | 37.9 | 575 | | GSS | Frequent | 1973 | 43.0 | 38.1 | 47.8 | 468 | | GSS | Frequent | 1974 | 36.9 | 32.1 | 41.8 | 473 | | GSS | Frequent | 1975 | 38.9 | 34.0 | 43.9 | 467 | | GSS | Frequent | 1976 | 33.3 | 28.5 | 38.0 | 452 | | GSS | Frequent | 1977 | 35.3 | 30.5 | 40.0 | 482 | | GSS | Frequent | 1978 | 41.4 | 35.7 | 47.1 | 458 | | GSS | Frequent | 1980 | 38.6 | 33.1 | 44.2 | 438 | | GSS | Frequent | 1982 | 39.7 | 34.3 | 45.0 | 579 | | GSS | Frequent | 1983 | 39.9 | 34.3 | 45.4 | 513 | | GSS | Frequent | 1984 | 47.8 | 42.2 | 53.5 | 489 | | GSS | Frequent | 1985 | 45.4 | 39.8 | 50.9 | 507 | | GSS | Frequent | 1986 | 47.1 | 42.1 | 52.1 | 466 | | GSS | Frequent | 1987 | 46.3 | 41.1 | 51.5 | 549 | | GSS | Frequent | 1988 | 51.6 | 46.5 | 56.7 | 444 | | GSS | Frequent | 1989 | 50.1 | 45.0 | 55.2 | 476 | | GSS | Frequent | 1990 | 52.8 | 47.5 | 58.1 | 429 | | GSS | Frequent | 1991 | 50.9 | 45.7 | 56.0 | 458 | | GSS | Frequent | 1993 | 53.5 | 48.5 | 58.6 | 487 | | GSS | Frequent | 1994 | 51.1 | 47.2 | 55.0 | 810 | | GSS | Frequent | 1996 | 50.0 | 46.0 | 53.9 | 748 | | GSS | Frequent | 1998 | 51.2 | 47.3 | 55.2 | 763 | | GSS | Frequent | 2000 | 53.9 | 49.8 | 58.1 | 688 | | GSS | Frequent | 2002 | 54.1 | 49.9 | 58.4 | 705 | | GSS | Frequent | 2004 | 53.7 | 49.5 | 57.8 | 786 | | GSS | Frequent | 2006 | 55.3 | 51.9 | 58.6 | 1,165 | | GSS | Frequent | 2008 | 53.0 | 47.9 | 58.1 | 527 | | GSS | Frequent | 2010 | 50.7 | 45.2 | 56.2 | 507 | | GSS | Frequent | 2012 | 50.8 | 45.2 | 56.3 | 496 | | GSS | Frequent | 2014 | 54.6 | 50.0 | 59.3 | 587 | | GSS | Frequent | 2016 | 52.2 | 47.7 | 56.7 | 681 | | GSS | Frequent | 2018 | 57.9 | 52.1 | 63.6 | 489 | | GSS | Frequent | 2021 | 54.6 | 50.3 | 59.0 | 813 | | GSS | Frequent | 2022 | 60.7 | 54.2 | 67.3 | 606 | | GSS | Frequent | 2024 | 66.2 | 60.9 | 71.5 | 623 | | GSS | Seldom | 1972 | 31.4 | 27.2 | 35.6 | 579 | | GSS | Seldom | 1973 | 34.3 | 30.3 | 38.4 | 625 | | GSS | Seldom | 1974 | 29.4 | 25.3 | 33.4 | 571 | | GSS | Seldom | 1975 | 30.7 | 26.6 | 34.7 | 587 | | GSS | Seldom | 1976 | 30.8 | 26.8 | 34.9 | 620 | | GSS | Seldom | 1977 | 32.8 | 28.7 | 36.9 | 631 | | GSS | Seldom | 1978 | 34.7 | 30.0 | 39.4 | 625 | | GSS | Seldom | 1980 | 33.2 | 28.5 | 37.9 | 587 | | GSS | Seldom | 1982 | 38.1 | 33.7 | 42.5 | 753 | | GSS | Seldom | 1983 | 37.9 | 33.2 | 42.7 | 639 | | GSS | Seldom | 1984 | 40.5 | 35.4 | 45.6 | 576 | | GSS | Seldom | 1985 | 44.4 | 39.7 | 49.1 | 650 | | GSS | Seldom | 1986 | 43.1 | 38.5 | 47.6 | 560 | | GSS | Seldom | 1987 | 43.5 | 39.1 | 47.9 | 706 | | GSS | Seldom | 1988 | 40.2 | 35.8 | 44.6 | 612 | | GSS | Seldom | 1989 | 46.3 | 42.0 | 50.7 | 643 | | GSS | Seldom | 1990 | 44.7 | 39.9 | 49.5 | 528 | | GSS | Seldom | 1991 | 49.5 | 45.1 | 54.0 | 596 | | GSS | Seldom | 1993 | 43.4 | 39.1 | 47.8 | 630 | | GSS | Seldom | 1994 | 41.8 | 38.8 | 44.9 | 1,250 | | GSS | Seldom | 1996 | 44.9 | 41.8 | 48.1 | 1,187 | | GSS | Seldom | 1998 | 41.0 | 37.8 | 44.3 | 1,108 | | GSS | Seldom | 2000 | 40.4 | 37.2 | 43.7 | 1,110 | | GSS | Seldom | 2002 | 40.9 | 37.5 | 44.4 | 1,083 | | GSS | Seldom | 2004 | 42.7 | 39.3 | 46.0 | 1,140 | | GSS | Seldom | 2006 | 39.3 | 36.6 | 42.0 | 1,733 | | GSS | Seldom | 2008 | 35.3 | 31.5 | 39.1 | 857 | | GSS | Seldom | 2010 | 37.1 | 33.0 | 41.1 | 842 | | GSS | Seldom | 2012 | 36.3 | 32.2 | 40.5 | 788 | | GSS | Seldom | 2014 | 37.1 | 33.7 | 40.5 | 1,069 | | GSS | Seldom | 2016 | 36.2 | 32.9 | 39.5 | 1,240 | | GSS | Seldom | 2018 | 42.3 | 38.4 | 46.1 | 1,055 | | GSS | Seldom | 2021 | 35.0 | 32.4 | 37.6 | 1,977 | | GSS | Seldom | 2022 | 43.6 | 39.9 | 47.3 | 1,690 | | GSS | Seldom | 2024 | 42.0 | 38.5 | 45.5 | 1,452 | Views: GSS, 1972 to 2024 (source = GSS); CES, 2008 to 2024 (source = CES). Note: Pure independents are left out. GSS 2021 to 2024 include web interviews, so the 2018 to 2024 window is not comparable with the in-person window of 2010 to 2018. In 2022 and 2024 pooled the frequent-minus-seldom gap was 18.0 points among in-person respondents and 23.7 points among web respondents. Note: A cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/party_by_attendance.json ### Table 4. The slope of ideology on attendance rose in the GSS from the 1970s to the 2000s, and party accounts for part of the rise Standardized slope of ideology on church attendance, by year, raw and net of party identification; 95% intervals | Survey | Series | Year | Slope | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | CES | Net of party | 2008 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 29,793 | | CES | Net of party | 2009 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.19 | 12,123 | | CES | Net of party | 2010 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.15 | 51,265 | | CES | Net of party | 2011 | 0.15 | 0.13 | 0.16 | 18,198 | | CES | Net of party | 2012 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 48,517 | | CES | Net of party | 2013 | 0.16 | 0.14 | 0.17 | 14,509 | | CES | Net of party | 2014 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.17 | 49,407 | | CES | Net of party | 2015 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 12,719 | | CES | Net of party | 2016 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 58,315 | | CES | Net of party | 2017 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 16,175 | | CES | Net of party | 2018 | 0.19 | 0.18 | 0.20 | 53,579 | | CES | Net of party | 2019 | 0.16 | 0.15 | 0.18 | 16,287 | | CES | Net of party | 2020 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.19 | 54,697 | | CES | Net of party | 2021 | 0.19 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 23,134 | | CES | Net of party | 2022 | 0.20 | 0.18 | 0.21 | 54,246 | | CES | Net of party | 2023 | 0.18 | 0.17 | 0.20 | 21,693 | | CES | Net of party | 2024 | 0.17 | 0.16 | 0.18 | 55,195 | | CES | Raw slope | 2008 | 0.35 | 0.34 | 0.36 | 29,793 | | CES | Raw slope | 2009 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 12,123 | | CES | Raw slope | 2010 | 0.25 | 0.24 | 0.26 | 51,265 | | CES | Raw slope | 2011 | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0.26 | 18,198 | | CES | Raw slope | 2012 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.29 | 48,517 | | CES | Raw slope | 2013 | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.27 | 14,509 | | CES | Raw slope | 2014 | 0.27 | 0.26 | 0.28 | 49,407 | | CES | Raw slope | 2015 | 0.26 | 0.24 | 0.28 | 12,719 | | CES | Raw slope | 2016 | 0.26 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 58,315 | | CES | Raw slope | 2017 | 0.27 | 0.25 | 0.29 | 16,175 | | CES | Raw slope | 2018 | 0.36 | 0.35 | 0.38 | 53,579 | | CES | Raw slope | 2019 | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 16,287 | | CES | Raw slope | 2020 | 0.34 | 0.33 | 0.35 | 54,697 | | CES | Raw slope | 2021 | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 23,134 | | CES | Raw slope | 2022 | 0.36 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 54,246 | | CES | Raw slope | 2023 | 0.30 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 21,693 | | CES | Raw slope | 2024 | 0.35 | 0.34 | 0.37 | 55,195 | | GSS | Net of party | 1974 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 1,344 | | GSS | Net of party | 1975 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 1,382 | | GSS | Net of party | 1976 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 1,387 | | GSS | Net of party | 1977 | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.16 | 1,435 | | GSS | Net of party | 1978 | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 1,420 | | GSS | Net of party | 1980 | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.18 | 1,414 | | GSS | Net of party | 1982 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 1,718 | | GSS | Net of party | 1983 | −0.02 | −0.10 | 0.06 | 761 | | GSS | Net of party | 1984 | 0.18 | 0.12 | 0.23 | 1,380 | | GSS | Net of party | 1985 | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.17 | 1,443 | | GSS | Net of party | 1986 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 1,387 | | GSS | Net of party | 1987 | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.18 | 1,658 | | GSS | Net of party | 1988 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 0.18 | 1,408 | | GSS | Net of party | 1989 | 0.12 | 0.06 | 0.17 | 1,428 | | GSS | Net of party | 1990 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 1,267 | | GSS | Net of party | 1991 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 1,421 | | GSS | Net of party | 1993 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.26 | 1,496 | | GSS | Net of party | 1994 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.22 | 2,765 | | GSS | Net of party | 1996 | 0.17 | 0.13 | 0.21 | 2,630 | | GSS | Net of party | 1998 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 2,585 | | GSS | Net of party | 2000 | 0.18 | 0.13 | 0.22 | 2,527 | | GSS | Net of party | 2002 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 1,294 | | GSS | Net of party | 2004 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.20 | 1,287 | | GSS | Net of party | 2006 | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.19 | 4,244 | | GSS | Net of party | 2008 | 0.19 | 0.14 | 0.24 | 1,884 | | GSS | Net of party | 2010 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 1,911 | | GSS | Net of party | 2012 | 0.19 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 1,809 | | GSS | Net of party | 2014 | 0.21 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 2,360 | | GSS | Net of party | 2016 | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 2,662 | | GSS | Net of party | 2018 | 0.19 | 0.14 | 0.24 | 2,139 | | GSS | Net of party | 2021 | 0.16 | 0.12 | 0.19 | 3,793 | | GSS | Net of party | 2022 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.23 | 3,276 | | GSS | Net of party | 2024 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.25 | 3,039 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1974 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 1,344 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1975 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 1,382 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1976 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 1,387 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1977 | 0.10 | 0.04 | 0.16 | 1,435 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1978 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 1,420 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1980 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.19 | 1,414 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1982 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.23 | 1,718 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1983 | −0.02 | −0.11 | 0.06 | 761 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1984 | 0.19 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 1,380 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1985 | 0.12 | 0.05 | 0.18 | 1,443 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1986 | 0.14 | 0.08 | 0.19 | 1,387 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1987 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 1,658 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1988 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 1,408 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1989 | 0.13 | 0.07 | 0.19 | 1,428 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1990 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.23 | 1,267 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1991 | 0.16 | 0.10 | 0.22 | 1,421 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1993 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.29 | 1,496 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1994 | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.25 | 2,765 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1996 | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.24 | 2,630 | | GSS | Raw slope | 1998 | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.27 | 2,585 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2000 | 0.22 | 0.17 | 0.26 | 2,527 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2002 | 0.18 | 0.11 | 0.24 | 1,294 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2004 | 0.17 | 0.10 | 0.24 | 1,287 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2006 | 0.22 | 0.19 | 0.26 | 4,244 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2008 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.31 | 1,884 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2010 | 0.21 | 0.15 | 0.27 | 1,911 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2012 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.30 | 1,809 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2014 | 0.27 | 0.23 | 0.32 | 2,360 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2016 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.30 | 2,662 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2018 | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.31 | 2,139 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2021 | 0.26 | 0.22 | 0.30 | 3,793 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2022 | 0.29 | 0.23 | 0.35 | 3,276 | | GSS | Raw slope | 2024 | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.37 | 3,039 | Views: GSS, 1974 to 2024 (source = GSS); CES, 2008 to 2024 (source = CES). Note: Ideology is the seven-point liberal-conservative scale in the GSS and a five-point scale in the CES. Note: GSS interviews were in person, with some telephone interviews, through 2018; 2021 was mostly web, and 2022 and 2024 mixed in-person and web interviews. In 2022 and 2024 pooled, in-person respondents give a slope of 0.23 and web respondents 0.37. Note: The GSS 1983 survey asked the ideology item of a subsample only, and that year's slope, marked on the chart, rests on fewer respondents. Years with fewer than 200 respondents are left out. Intervals are 95% intervals on the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Regression intervals use HC3 robust errors. Source: General Social Survey, 1974-2024, and Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/attendance_ideology_slope.json ### Table 5. Party identification accounts for 46% of the rise in the ideology slope (95% interval 33% to 67%) and for 50% to 64% in four other specifications Early and late GSS periods compared on one common sample of respondents, by specification; 95% bootstrap intervals #### Table 5.1. Share accounted for The share of the rise that party identification accounts for runs from 46% in the main specification to 64% when 1974 is compared with 2024 Share of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, in percent | Specification | Periods compared | Share accounted for by party (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Pooled in-person windows | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 46 | 33 | 67 | 17,849 | | Seven party categories | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, seven party categories | 52 | 37 | 74 | 17,849 | | 1974 and 2018 alone | 1974 and 2018 alone (2018 is the last survey before the web mode) | 50 | 20 | 163 | 3,483 | | 1974 and 2024 alone | 1974 and 2024 alone (2024 includes web interviews) | 64 | 41 | 112 | 4,383 | | Late window with web | 1974 to 1978 and 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 63 | 49 | 82 | 19,215 | #### Table 5.2. Rises in the slope The rise in the slope net of party is smaller than the rise in the raw slope in every specification Rise in the standardized slope of ideology on attendance, raw and net of party identification | Specification | Periods compared | Raw rise | Lower | Upper | Rise net of party | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Pooled in-person windows | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.15 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 17,849 | | Seven party categories | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, seven party categories | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.15 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 17,849 | | 1974 and 2018 alone | 1974 and 2018 alone (2018 is the last survey before the web mode) | 0.11 | 0.02 | 0.19 | 0.05 | −0.02 | 0.13 | 3,483 | | 1974 and 2024 alone | 1974 and 2024 alone (2024 includes web interviews) | 0.17 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.06 | −0.01 | 0.14 | 4,383 | | Late window with web | 1974 to 1978 and 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 19,215 | Note: The main specification pools the in-person GSS surveys of 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, and the seven-category row repeats that comparison with a finer party control. The single-year rows compare 1974 with 2018, the last survey before the web mode, and with 2024. The late window with web pools 2018 to 2024 against 1974 to 1978. Note: The percentile bootstrap resamples respondents within each period 2,000 times and refits both slopes each time. The party control is two indicators (Republican, independent) unless the row says seven categories. Note: The web mode began in 2021. Rows that end in 2018 or use the survey years 2010 to 2018 contain no web interviews. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/absorbed_share.json ### Table 6. Attendance correlates more closely with cultural than with economic conservatism, and the economic correlation has grown Weighted correlation of church attendance (never to more than weekly) with cultural conservatism, economic conservatism and self-placed ideology, by period, GSS respondents, 95% intervals | Outcome | Period | Correlation | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Cultural conservatism | 1975 to 1984 | 0.37 | 0.34 | 0.40 | 4,196 | | Cultural conservatism | 1985 to 1994 | 0.39 | 0.37 | 0.41 | 9,643 | | Cultural conservatism | 1995 to 2004 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 6,963 | | Cultural conservatism | 2005 to 2014 | 0.44 | 0.42 | 0.47 | 7,362 | | Cultural conservatism | 2015 to 2018 | 0.47 | 0.44 | 0.51 | 3,317 | | Cultural conservatism | 2021 to 2024 | 0.46 | 0.44 | 0.49 | 6,846 | | Economic conservatism | 1975 to 1984 | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 4,196 | | Economic conservatism | 1985 to 1994 | 0.06 | 0.04 | 0.08 | 9,643 | | Economic conservatism | 1995 to 2004 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.10 | 6,963 | | Economic conservatism | 2005 to 2014 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.11 | 7,362 | | Economic conservatism | 2015 to 2018 | 0.12 | 0.08 | 0.17 | 3,317 | | Economic conservatism | 2021 to 2024 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.22 | 6,846 | | Self-placed ideology | 1975 to 1984 | 0.14 | 0.10 | 0.17 | 3,565 | | Self-placed ideology | 1985 to 1994 | 0.17 | 0.15 | 0.19 | 12,990 | | Self-placed ideology | 1995 to 2004 | 0.21 | 0.19 | 0.23 | 10,527 | | Self-placed ideology | 2005 to 2014 | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.26 | 12,522 | | Self-placed ideology | 2015 to 2018 | 0.24 | 0.21 | 0.27 | 4,983 | | Self-placed ideology | 2021 to 2024 | 0.27 | 0.24 | 0.29 | 10,448 | Note: The first period rests on the surveys of 1975, 1983 and 1984, the only ones in it that asked the economic items. All three outcomes use the survey years in which both indices were measured; the ideology points include every respondent who answered the ideology item in those years. The periods are 1975 to 1984, 1985 to 1994, 1995 to 2004, 2005 to 2014, 2015 to 2018 and 2021 to 2024. Note: Cultural conservatism averages five standardized items (homosexuality, premarital sex, extramarital sex, pornography law, abortion for any reason); economic conservatism averages three (help for the poor, help for the sick, government action on income differences). Each index needs at least two answers. The mean correlation among the cultural items is +0.32 and among the economic items +0.42. Note: GSS 2021 to 2024 include web interviews, and 2015 to 2018 is the last period before them. Correlations use the Kish effective sample size for the interval. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2024; weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/culture_economics.json ### Table 7. On both measures the United States correlation between religiosity and the right lies above the European and world averages Weighted correlation between left-right self-placement and the importance of God or attendance, inside each country; the United States on two measures and equal-country means for Europe and the rest of the world; 95% intervals | View | Row | Drawn in the chart | Correlation | Lower | Upper | Respondents | Countries | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | summary | US, GSS attendance | yes | 0.25 | 0.23 | 0.26 | 27,953 | n/a | | summary | Europe, ESS attendance (36 countries) | yes | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.14 | n/a | 36 | | summary | US, WVS/EVS importance of God | yes | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 5,858 | n/a | | summary | Europe, WVS/EVS importance of God (42 countries) | yes | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.16 | n/a | 42 | | summary | Rest of the world, WVS/EVS importance of God (61 countries) | yes | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.10 | n/a | 61 | | summary | All WVS/EVS countries, importance of God (104 countries) | yes | 0.10 | 0.09 | 0.12 | n/a | 104 | | countries | Albania | no | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.18 | 2,209 | n/a | | countries | Algeria | no | −0.02 | −0.11 | 0.06 | 536 | n/a | | countries | Andorra | yes | 0.22 | 0.17 | 0.26 | 1,813 | n/a | | countries | Argentina | yes | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.26 | 2,326 | n/a | | countries | Armenia | no | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 3,758 | n/a | | countries | Australia | no | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.23 | 4,456 | n/a | | countries | Austria | no | 0.13 | 0.09 | 0.17 | 2,710 | n/a | | countries | Azerbaijan | no | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.09 | 2,152 | n/a | | countries | Bangladesh | no | 0.01 | −0.05 | 0.06 | 1,200 | n/a | | countries | Belarus | no | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 3,186 | n/a | | countries | Belgium | no | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.17 | 1,421 | n/a | | countries | Bolivia | no | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 1,803 | n/a | | countries | Bosnia Herzegovina | no | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 2,269 | n/a | | countries | Brazil | no | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.12 | 3,673 | n/a | | countries | Bulgaria | no | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 2,670 | n/a | | countries | Burkina Faso | no | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.02 | 1,109 | n/a | | countries | Canada | yes | 0.25 | 0.22 | 0.28 | 5,628 | n/a | | countries | Chile | no | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.15 | 2,085 | n/a | | countries | Colombia | no | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 5,005 | n/a | | countries | Croatia | yes | 0.36 | 0.32 | 0.40 | 2,354 | n/a | | countries | Cyprus | no | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 3,279 | n/a | | countries | Czechia | no | 0.01 | −0.02 | 0.05 | 3,856 | n/a | | countries | Denmark | no | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 4,678 | n/a | | countries | Ecuador | no | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.09 | 2,243 | n/a | | countries | Egypt | no | 0.00 | −0.04 | 0.04 | 2,721 | n/a | | countries | Estonia | yes | −0.06 | −0.10 | −0.03 | 3,216 | n/a | | countries | Ethiopia | no | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.16 | 1,914 | n/a | | countries | Finland | no | 0.19 | 0.15 | 0.23 | 2,897 | n/a | | countries | France | no | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.22 | 3,845 | n/a | | countries | Georgia | no | 0.05 | 0.02 | 0.08 | 4,283 | n/a | | countries | Germany | no | 0.14 | 0.11 | 0.16 | 8,654 | n/a | | countries | Ghana | no | 0.03 | −0.02 | 0.07 | 2,330 | n/a | | countries | Greece | yes | 0.29 | 0.25 | 0.33 | 2,118 | n/a | | countries | Guatemala | no | 0.06 | 0.00 | 0.11 | 1,211 | n/a | | countries | Haiti | no | 0.01 | −0.03 | 0.05 | 1,929 | n/a | | countries | Hong Kong SAR | no | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.09 | 3,801 | n/a | | countries | Hungary | no | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.19 | 3,432 | n/a | | countries | Iceland | no | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.17 | 2,299 | n/a | | countries | India | no | 0.12 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 5,785 | n/a | | countries | Indonesia | no | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.10 | 4,082 | n/a | | countries | Iraq | no | 0.07 | 0.01 | 0.13 | 978 | n/a | | countries | Ireland | yes | 0.22 | 0.14 | 0.29 | 682 | n/a | | countries | Italy | no | 0.19 | 0.16 | 0.23 | 3,515 | n/a | | countries | Japan | no | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.16 | 3,386 | n/a | | countries | Kazakhstan | no | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.16 | 1,500 | n/a | | countries | Kenya | no | −0.04 | −0.10 | 0.02 | 1,160 | n/a | | countries | Kosovo | yes | −0.06 | −0.13 | 0.02 | 650 | n/a | | countries | Kyrgyzstan | no | 0.18 | 0.13 | 0.23 | 1,458 | n/a | | countries | Latvia | no | 0.05 | 0.01 | 0.10 | 2,033 | n/a | | countries | Lebanon | no | 0.11 | 0.04 | 0.17 | 834 | n/a | | countries | Libya | no | 0.03 | −0.02 | 0.08 | 2,594 | n/a | | countries | Lithuania | no | 0.12 | 0.07 | 0.16 | 1,812 | n/a | | countries | Luxembourg | yes | 0.27 | 0.21 | 0.33 | 1,261 | n/a | | countries | Macau SAR | no | 0.06 | −0.01 | 0.12 | 996 | n/a | | countries | Malaysia | no | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.18 | 2,613 | n/a | | countries | Maldives | no | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.15 | 1,023 | n/a | | countries | Mali | no | 0.01 | −0.04 | 0.07 | 1,140 | n/a | | countries | Malta | no | 0.07 | −0.01 | 0.15 | 770 | n/a | | countries | Mexico | no | 0.10 | 0.07 | 0.13 | 4,781 | n/a | | countries | Moldova | no | 0.05 | 0.00 | 0.10 | 1,657 | n/a | | countries | Mongolia | no | 0.20 | 0.15 | 0.25 | 1,611 | n/a | | countries | Montenegro | no | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 1,218 | n/a | | countries | Morocco | no | 0.04 | −0.01 | 0.08 | 1,914 | n/a | | countries | Netherlands | no | 0.13 | 0.10 | 0.15 | 7,785 | n/a | | countries | New Zealand | no | 0.13 | 0.08 | 0.18 | 1,361 | n/a | | countries | Nicaragua | no | 0.02 | −0.05 | 0.08 | 871 | n/a | | countries | Nigeria | no | 0.04 | 0.00 | 0.08 | 2,929 | n/a | | countries | North Macedonia | no | 0.09 | 0.04 | 0.14 | 1,729 | n/a | | countries | Northern Ireland | no | 0.16 | 0.08 | 0.24 | 763 | n/a | | countries | Norway | no | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.13 | 3,144 | n/a | | countries | Pakistan | no | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.22 | 1,200 | n/a | | countries | Palestine | no | 0.09 | 0.02 | 0.16 | 728 | n/a | | countries | Peru | no | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 3,339 | n/a | | countries | Philippines | no | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.12 | 2,388 | n/a | | countries | Poland | yes | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 3,703 | n/a | | countries | Portugal | no | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 1,954 | n/a | | countries | Puerto Rico | no | 0.03 | −0.03 | 0.09 | 1,042 | n/a | | countries | Romania | no | 0.01 | −0.02 | 0.04 | 4,728 | n/a | | countries | Russia | no | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.14 | 4,411 | n/a | | countries | Rwanda | no | 0.00 | −0.04 | 0.04 | 2,554 | n/a | | countries | Serbia | no | 0.08 | 0.04 | 0.12 | 3,715 | n/a | | countries | Singapore | no | 0.11 | 0.06 | 0.15 | 1,740 | n/a | | countries | Slovakia | no | −0.01 | −0.05 | 0.03 | 3,257 | n/a | | countries | Slovenia | yes | 0.33 | 0.30 | 0.36 | 3,098 | n/a | | countries | South Africa | no | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.11 | 5,568 | n/a | | countries | South Korea | no | 0.06 | 0.02 | 0.10 | 3,631 | n/a | | countries | Spain | yes | 0.36 | 0.33 | 0.39 | 4,244 | n/a | | countries | Sweden | no | 0.03 | −0.01 | 0.06 | 4,155 | n/a | | countries | Switzerland | no | 0.09 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 5,138 | n/a | | countries | Taiwan ROC | no | 0.02 | −0.02 | 0.05 | 3,561 | n/a | | countries | Tajikistan | yes | 0.27 | 0.22 | 0.32 | 1,200 | n/a | | countries | Thailand | no | 0.02 | −0.02 | 0.05 | 3,656 | n/a | | countries | Trinidad and Tobago | no | 0.02 | −0.04 | 0.08 | 1,210 | n/a | | countries | Tunisia | no | 0.11 | 0.07 | 0.16 | 1,681 | n/a | | countries | Turkey | no | 0.21 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 6,438 | n/a | | countries | Ukraine | no | 0.10 | 0.06 | 0.15 | 4,601 | n/a | | countries | United Kingdom | no | 0.12 | 0.09 | 0.15 | 6,155 | n/a | | countries | United States | yes | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.31 | 5,858 | n/a | | countries | Uruguay | no | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.24 | 2,586 | n/a | | countries | Uzbekistan | no | 0.19 | 0.11 | 0.27 | 615 | n/a | | countries | Venezuela | no | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.02 | 1,190 | n/a | | countries | Vietnam | no | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.14 | 1,373 | n/a | | countries | Zambia | no | −0.02 | −0.08 | 0.04 | 946 | n/a | | countries | Zimbabwe | yes | −0.04 | −0.09 | 0.00 | 2,627 | n/a | Views: Averages (view = summary); Country ranking (plotted = yes, view = countries). Note: The WVS/EVS file holds ten EVS countries with no country label; they are restored from the country code, and 9 of them enter here. Without them the world mean is +0.10. Note: Europe in the WVS/EVS excludes Turkey and the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. A country needs an effective sample of 300 or more. Northern Ireland is a separate WVS/EVS entry. Note: The rank comparison uses only the WVS/EVS rows, where every country answered the same question. Source: General Social Survey, 2006-2024; European Social Survey, rounds 3-11 (2006-2023); World Values Survey and European Values Study, fieldwork 2005-2023; weighted, with equal weight for each country in averages Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/world_correlations.json ### Table 8. The United States attendance-ideology correlation depends on the survey and the years compared, and a European panel shows no change Weighted correlation between church attendance and left-right or ideological self-placement, by survey year; the United States in the GSS and CES and a fixed panel of European countries in the ESS; 95% intervals | Series | Year | Correlation | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Europe, ESS | 2002 | 0.17 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 26,103 | | Europe, ESS | 2004 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.20 | 25,153 | | Europe, ESS | 2006 | 0.18 | 0.14 | 0.22 | 25,528 | | Europe, ESS | 2008 | 0.15 | 0.12 | 0.20 | 25,843 | | Europe, ESS | 2010 | 0.17 | 0.13 | 0.21 | 25,234 | | Europe, ESS | 2012 | 0.15 | 0.11 | 0.20 | 26,600 | | Europe, ESS | 2014 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.20 | 25,084 | | Europe, ESS | 2016 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.19 | 24,898 | | Europe, ESS | 2018 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 23,263 | | Europe, ESS | 2020 | 0.15 | 0.09 | 0.21 | 29,750 | | Europe, ESS | 2023 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.21 | 22,401 | | US, CES | 2008 | 0.34 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 29,793 | | US, CES | 2009 | 0.32 | 0.30 | 0.34 | 12,123 | | US, CES | 2010 | 0.27 | 0.26 | 0.28 | 51,265 | | US, CES | 2011 | 0.28 | 0.26 | 0.30 | 18,198 | | US, CES | 2012 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.33 | 48,517 | | US, CES | 2013 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 14,509 | | US, CES | 2014 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.31 | 49,407 | | US, CES | 2015 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.30 | 12,719 | | US, CES | 2016 | 0.29 | 0.28 | 0.30 | 58,315 | | US, CES | 2017 | 0.29 | 0.27 | 0.31 | 16,175 | | US, CES | 2018 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 53,579 | | US, CES | 2019 | 0.31 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 16,287 | | US, CES | 2020 | 0.31 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 54,697 | | US, CES | 2021 | 0.32 | 0.30 | 0.33 | 23,134 | | US, CES | 2022 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 54,246 | | US, CES | 2023 | 0.28 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 21,693 | | US, CES | 2024 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.34 | 55,195 | | US, GSS | 2002 | 0.18 | 0.11 | 0.24 | 1,325 | | US, GSS | 2004 | 0.17 | 0.11 | 0.23 | 1,305 | | US, GSS | 2006 | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.26 | 4,322 | | US, GSS | 2008 | 0.26 | 0.21 | 0.31 | 1,926 | | US, GSS | 2010 | 0.21 | 0.16 | 0.26 | 1,968 | | US, GSS | 2012 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.29 | 1,868 | | US, GSS | 2014 | 0.28 | 0.24 | 0.32 | 2,438 | | US, GSS | 2016 | 0.23 | 0.19 | 0.28 | 2,748 | | US, GSS | 2018 | 0.24 | 0.19 | 0.29 | 2,235 | | US, GSS | 2021 | 0.25 | 0.21 | 0.28 | 3,916 | | US, GSS | 2022 | 0.25 | 0.20 | 0.30 | 3,395 | | US, GSS | 2024 | 0.30 | 0.25 | 0.34 | 3,137 | Note: GSS 2021 to 2024 include web interviews: 2021 was mostly web, and 2022 and 2024 mixed in-person and web interviews. The 2024 point falls in that period, and the in-person 2018 interval overlaps the 2002 interval. The three surveys use different attendance and ideology items, so levels are compared less safely than trends. Note: ESS rounds are placed at the year fieldwork began; round 10 ran from 2020 to 2022 and round 11 began in 2023. The panel is the 15 countries present in every round: Belgium, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia. Note: The panel mean hides opposite movements: the correlation rose in 6 of the countries and fell in 9. The largest rise is in Poland, from +0.20 in 2002 to +0.38 in 2023, and the largest fall in Belgium, from +0.14 to −0.04. Source: General Social Survey, 2002-2024; Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; European Social Survey, rounds 1-11 (2002-2023); weighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/europe_time.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (175), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | alpha_cult | 0.70 | coefficient from 0 to 1 (standardized alpha) | standardized alpha of the five cultural items, k r / (1 + (k - 1) r) with r the mean pairwise weighted correlation | GSS respondents | 1972-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | alpha_econ | 0.69 | coefficient from 0 to 1 (standardized alpha) | standardized alpha of the three economic items, k r / (1 + (k - 1) r) with r the mean pairwise weighted correlation | GSS respondents | 1972-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | anes_att_valid_2020 | 99% | percent of respondents with a valid attendance answer | share of respondents with a non-missing attendance code (unweighted) | respondents in the ANES cumulative file | 2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_att_valid_2024 | 49% | percent of respondents with a valid attendance answer | share of respondents with a non-missing attendance code (unweighted) | respondents in the ANES cumulative file | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_dev_early | 5.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | ANES studies of 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988, pooled | 95% CI 2.9 to 8.1 | 5,572 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_dev_late | 21.8 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | ANES studies of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled | 95% CI 19.5 to 24.1 | 12,996 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_dev_mid | 13.0 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | ANES studies of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004, pooled | 95% CI 9.7 to 16.2 | 4,005 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1972 | 10.3 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 1972 | 95% CI 5.3 to 15.3 | 1,389 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1980 | 0.1 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 1980 | 95% CI −6.5 to 6.6 | 849 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_1992 | 11.3 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 1992 | 95% CI 6.2 to 16.5 | 1,429 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2012 | 20.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2012 | 95% CI 16.2 to 24.8 | 3,741 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2016 | 23.8 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2016 | 95% CI 18.9 to 28.7 | 2,316 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_gap_2020 | 21.9 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2020 | 95% CI 18.2 to 25.7 | 5,673 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_prot_2020 | 3,180 | count | count of respondents (unweighted) | respondents in the ANES cumulative file coded Protestant | 2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_prot_2024 | 835 | count | count of respondents (unweighted) | respondents in the ANES cumulative file coded Protestant | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | be_2002 | +0.14 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with attendance | respondents in Belgium with a left-right answer and an attendance answer | ESS round 1 (2002) | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.19 | 1,627 | weight (analysis weight) within the country | European Social Survey | | | be_2023 | −0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with attendance | respondents in Belgium with a left-right answer and an attendance answer | ESS round 11 (2023) | 95% CI −0.10 to 0.02 | 1,513 | weight (analysis weight) within the country | European Social Survey | | | boot_reps | 2,000 | count | suppression floor or setting used in the build | bootstrap replicates | all years | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bridge_mad | 0.04 | absolute difference between two correlation coefficients (no sign) | mean absolute difference between the WVS/EVS and ESS attendance correlations | countries with a usable attendance correlation in both surveys | 2005 or later | | | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | bridge_r | +0.81 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | Pearson correlation across countries of the WVS/EVS and ESS attendance correlations (Fisher z interval on the number of countries) | countries with a usable attendance correlation in both surveys | 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.66 to 0.90 | 36 | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | ces_c_2008 | +0.34 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology | 2008 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.35 | 29,793 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_c_2010 | +0.27 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology | 2010 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.28 | 51,265 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_c_2018 | +0.33 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology | 2018 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.34 | 53,579 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_c_2024 | +0.33 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance and five-point ideology | 2024 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.34 | 55,195 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_cwin_early | +0.29 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2010 to 2017, pooled | 95% CI 0.28 to 0.29 | 269,105 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_cwin_late | +0.32 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2018 to 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.31 to 0.32 | 278,831 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_dev_pool | 23.4 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | CES 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled | 95% CI 22.7 to 24.2 | 133,436 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_freq_2020 | 36.5% | percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic | weighted share voting Democratic | reported two-party presidential voters who attend weekly or more | 2020 | 95% CI 35.3% to 37.7% | 10,434 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_freq_2024 | 29.9% | percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic | weighted share voting Democratic | reported two-party presidential voters who attend weekly or more | 2024 | 95% CI 28.5% to 31.3% | 9,415 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2008 | 25.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2008 | 95% CI 23.9 to 27.1 | 21,168 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2012 | 27.3 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2012 | 95% CI 25.7 to 28.9 | 34,381 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2016 | 18.9 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2016 | 95% CI 17.4 to 20.4 | 37,373 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2020 | 23.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2020 | 95% CI 22.1 to 24.9 | 40,514 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_2024 | 27.7 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2024 | 95% CI 26.0 to 29.3 | 39,057 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_christian_2008 | 18.7 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2008 | 95% CI 16.6 to 20.7 | 12,201 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_christian_2024 | 13.2 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 11.2 to 15.2 | 19,980 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_gap_white_2024 | 33.8 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders | white non-Hispanic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 32.1 to 35.5 | 29,761 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_net_2008 | 0.18 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2008 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.20 | 29,793 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_net_2024 | 0.17 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.18 | 55,195 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_raw_2008 | 0.35 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2008 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.36 | 29,793 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_raw_2010 | 0.25 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2010 | 95% CI 0.24 to 0.26 | 51,265 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_raw_2016 | 0.26 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2016 | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.27 | 58,315 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_raw_2018 | 0.36 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2018 | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.38 | 53,579 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_raw_2024 | 0.35 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.37 | 55,195 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_sd_early | 1.00 | standard deviation, in points of the five-point ideology scale (1 very liberal to 5 very conservative) | weighted standard deviation of five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2010 to 2017, pooled | | 269,105 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_sd_late | 1.21 | standard deviation, in points of the five-point ideology scale (1 very liberal to 5 very conservative) | weighted standard deviation of five-point ideology | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2018 to 2024, pooled | | 278,831 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_sel_2020 | 60.0% | percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic | weighted share voting Democratic | reported two-party presidential voters who attend a few times a year or never | 2020 | 95% CI 59.3% to 60.7% | 30,080 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_sel_2024 | 57.6% | percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic | weighted share voting Democratic | reported two-party presidential voters who attend a few times a year or never | 2024 | 95% CI 56.7% to 58.5% | 29,642 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_slope_early | 0.26 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2010 to 2017, pooled | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.27 | 269,105 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_slope_late | 0.35 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | CES 2018 to 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.35 | 278,831 | weight_cumulative, rescaled to average one within each year | Cooperative Election Study | | | den_1960 | 46.2 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | 1960 | 95% CI 38.7 to 53.7 | 847 | weight (VCF0009z) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | den_ces_2024 | 10.4 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | 2024 | 95% CI 8.3 to 12.4 | 22,174 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | den_early | 8.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | ANES studies of 1972, 1976, 1980, 1984 and 1988, pooled | 95% CI 5.6 to 11.3 | 5,809 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | den_fix_frequent_2024 | 10.2 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants, within one attendance group | Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend weekly or more | 2024 | 95% CI 6.6 to 13.8 | 7,759 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | den_fix_seldom_2024 | 8.1 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants, within one attendance group | Protestant and Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend a few times a year or never | 2024 | 95% CI 5.4 to 10.9 | 12,221 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | den_late | 8.3 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | ANES studies of 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2020, pooled | 95% CI 5.6 to 11.1 | 9,666 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | den_mid | 5.0 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | ANES studies of 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004, pooled | 95% CI 1.3 to 8.6 | 3,775 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | den_old | 20.6 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among Catholics minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, Catholics minus Protestants | ANES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are Protestant or Catholic | ANES studies of 1952, 1956, 1960, 1964 and 1968, pooled | 95% CI 17.4 to 23.7 | 5,130 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study year | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | design_ratio_max | 1.15 | ratio of the cluster-robust standard error to the HC3 standard error of the raw standardized slope | largest across survey years of the standard error with the primary sampling unit as the cluster over the standard error without clustering | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification (design variables available) | GSS 1975 to 2024, 32 survey years | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | design_ratio_med | 1.01 | ratio of the cluster-robust standard error to the HC3 standard error of the raw standardized slope | median across survey years of the standard error with the primary sampling unit as the cluster over the standard error without clustering | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification (design variables available) | GSS 1975 to 2024, 32 survey years | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | design_ratio_min | 0.92 | ratio of the cluster-robust standard error to the HC3 standard error of the raw standardized slope | smallest across survey years of the standard error with the primary sampling unit as the cluster over the standard error without clustering | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification (design variables available) | GSS 1975 to 2024, 32 survey years | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | ess_2002 | +0.17 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across the 15 countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with attendance (percentile bootstrap over countries) | 15 European countries in every ESS round | ESS round 1 (2002) | 95% CI 0.14 to 0.20 | 26,103 | weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | ess_2023 | +0.15 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across the 15 countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with attendance (percentile bootstrap over countries) | 15 European countries in every ESS round | ESS round 11 (2023) | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.21 | 22,401 | weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | ess_europe_mean | +0.11 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with attendance (percentile bootstrap over countries) | European countries in the ESS with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 11 (2006-2023) | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.14 | 36 | weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | | | ess_panel_change | −0.02 | change in the correlation coefficient between ESS round 1 and round 11 | mean across the countries of the round 11 correlation minus the round 1 correlation (percentile bootstrap over countries) | 15 European countries in every ESS round | ESS rounds 1 (2002) and 11 (2023) | 95% CI −0.06 to 0.03 | 48,504 | weight (analysis weight) within each country; each country counted once across countries | European Social Survey | n is the number of respondents in rounds 1 and 11 together; the interval comes from a bootstrap over the 15 countries. | | floor_cell | 100 | count | suppression floor or setting used in the build | respondents (and effective respondents) needed in each attendance group of a survey year | all years | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | floor_country | 300 | count | suppression floor or setting used in the build | effective respondents needed for a country correlation | all years | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | floor_reg | 200 | count | suppression floor or setting used in the build | respondents needed for a year-by-year regression | all years | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | gss_c_2002 | +0.18 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2002 | 95% CI 0.11 to 0.24 | 1,325 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_c_2008 | +0.26 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2008 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.31 | 1,926 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_c_2018 | +0.24 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2018 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.29 | 2,235 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_c_2021 | +0.25 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2021 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.28 | 3,916 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_c_2024 | +0.30 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2024 | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.34 | 3,137 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_c_ftf | +0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | in-person GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.27 | 2,512 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gss_c_web | +0.33 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | web GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.28 to 0.37 | 3,331 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gss_net_1974 | 0.14 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.19 | 1,344 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_net_2018 | 0.19 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2018 | 95% CI 0.14 to 0.24 | 2,139 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_net_2024 | 0.20 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance net of party identification | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.25 | 3,039 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_raw_1974 | 0.15 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.20 | 1,344 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_raw_2008 | 0.26 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2008 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.31 | 1,884 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_raw_2018 | 0.25 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2018 | 95% CI 0.20 to 0.31 | 2,139 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | gss_raw_2024 | 0.32 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.37 | 3,039 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | item_r_cult | +0.32 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean pairwise weighted correlation among the five cultural items | GSS respondents | 1972-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | item_r_econ | +0.42 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean pairwise weighted correlation among the three economic items | GSS respondents | 1972-2024 | | | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | level_ces_2008 | 47% | percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2008 | 95% CI 45% to 50% | 29,793 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | level_ces_2024 | 53% | percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents | CES respondents with attendance, five-point ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 50% to 55% | 55,195 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | level_gss_1974 | 8% | percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 | 95% CI 0% to 18% | 1,344 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | level_gss_2024 | 38% | percent of the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the slope net of party to the raw slope in one year; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2024 | 95% CI 29% to 48% | 3,039 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | mode_diff_raw | 0.13 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | web slope minus in-person slope (independent samples, standard errors combined) | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.22 | 5,650 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | mode_ftf_raw | 0.23 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | in-person GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.30 | 2,423 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | mode_web_raw | 0.37 | standard deviations of ideology per standard deviation of attendance (standardized slope) | weighted standardized slope of ideology on attendance | web GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 0.31 to 0.42 | 3,227 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | n_anes_above_zero | 8 | count | count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap lies above zero | ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020 | 1992-2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_since_1992 | 8 | count | count of studies | ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020 | 1992-2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_anes_zero | 3 | count | count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap includes zero | ANES presidential-year studies from 1980 to 1988 | 1980-1988 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_before_1992 | 5 | count | count of studies | ANES presidential-year studies from 1972 to 1988 | 1972-1988 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_bridge | 36 | count | count of countries | countries with a usable correlation in both the WVS/EVS and the ESS | 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_ces_chr_dev_gt_den | 2 | count | count of years in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap among Protestant and Catholic voters lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap | CES presidential years from 2008 to 2024, Protestant and Catholic voters only | 2008-2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_ces_dev_gt_den | 5 | count | count of years in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap | CES presidential years from 2008 to 2024 | 2008-2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_ces_years | 5 | count | count of years | CES presidential years from 2008 to 2024 | 2008-2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_chr_apart_den_anes | 0 | count | count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap among Protestant and Catholic voters lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap | ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020, Protestant and Catholic voters only | 1992-2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_clearly_steeper | 2 | count | count of countries whose 95% interval lies entirely above the United States interval | countries and territories with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_dev_apart_den | 3 | count | count of studies in which the 95% interval of the attendance gap lies wholly above that of the Catholic minus Protestant gap | ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020 | 1992-2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_dev_gt_den | 8 | count | count of studies in which the attendance gap is larger than the Catholic minus Protestant gap | ANES presidential-year studies from 1992 to 2020 | 1992-2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_dev_gt_den_early | 1 | count | count of studies in which the attendance gap is larger than the Catholic minus Protestant gap | ANES presidential-year studies from 1972 to 1988 | 1972-1988 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_ess | 36 | count | count of countries | European countries in the ESS with an effective sample of 300 or more | ESS rounds 3 to 11 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | n_europe_wvs | 42 | count | count of countries | European countries and territories with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_panel | 15 | count | count of countries | European countries in every ESS round from 1 to 11 | ESS rounds 1 to 11 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | n_panel_down | 9 | count | count of countries whose correlation is lower in round 11 than in round 1 | European countries in every ESS round from 1 to 11 | ESS rounds 1 to 11 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | n_panel_up | 6 | count | count of countries whose correlation is higher in round 11 than in round 1 | European countries in every ESS round from 1 to 11 | ESS rounds 1 to 11 | | | none (count) | European Social Survey | | | n_publics | 104 | count | count of countries and territories | countries and territories with a left-right answer and an effective sample of 300 or more | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_publics_2005 | 112 | count | count of countries and territories | countries and territories surveyed in 2005 or later | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_publics_file | 118 | count | count of countries and territories (ten EVS labels restored from the country code) | countries and territories in the cleaned WVS/EVS file | 1981-2023 | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_publics_old | 95 | count | count of countries and territories | countries and territories with a usable correlation, without the restored EVS countries | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_rest_wvs | 61 | count | count of countries | countries outside Europe and the United States with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_restored | 9 | count | count of countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Iceland, Ireland, Kosovo, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal) | restored EVS countries with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | n_steeper | 4 | count | count of countries whose correlation is larger than the United States value | countries and territories with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later | | | none (count) | World Values Survey and EVS | | | pl_2002 | +0.20 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with attendance | respondents in Poland with a left-right answer and an attendance answer | ESS round 1 (2002) | 95% CI 0.16 to 0.25 | 1,750 | weight (analysis weight) within the country | European Social Survey | | | pl_2023 | +0.38 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right with attendance | respondents in Poland with a left-right answer and an attendance answer | ESS round 11 (2023) | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.43 | 1,282 | weight (analysis weight) within the country | European Social Survey | | | r_cult_1975 | +0.37 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the cultural conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 1975-1984 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.40 | 4,196 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | r_cult_2021 | +0.46 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the cultural conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 2021-2024 | 95% CI 0.44 to 0.49 | 6,846 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | r_cult_all | +0.44 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the cultural conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 1975-2024 | 95% CI 0.43 to 0.45 | 38,327 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | r_econ_1975 | +0.07 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the economic conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 1975-1984 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.11 | 4,196 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | r_econ_2021 | +0.18 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the economic conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 2021-2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.22 | 6,846 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | r_econ_all | +0.11 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the economic conservatism | GSS respondents with attendance and both indices | 1975-2024 | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.12 | 38,327 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | r_ideo_all | +0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with the self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology, in the survey years in which both indices were measured | 1975-2024 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.23 | 55,035 | weight_use | General Social Survey | | | rep_ces_freq_2008 | 61.5% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or more | 2008 | 95% CI 60.3% to 62.7% | 9,264 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rep_ces_freq_2024 | 68.1% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or more | 2024 | 95% CI 66.7% to 69.5% | 10,949 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rep_ces_gap_2008 | 26.5 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | 2008 | 95% CI 25.0 to 28.0 | 24,428 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rep_ces_gap_2024 | 27.4 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | 2024 | 95% CI 25.7 to 29.1 | 45,567 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rep_ces_sel_2008 | 35.0% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | 2008 | 95% CI 34.1% to 35.9% | 15,164 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rep_ces_sel_2024 | 40.7% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | CES Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | 2024 | 95% CI 39.8% to 41.6% | 34,618 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | rep_freq_change | 15.9 | percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers | late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined) | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly | 1972-1978 to 2010-2018 | 95% CI 12.9 to 18.8 | 15,367 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_freq_change24 | 22.4 | percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers | late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined) | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly | 1972-1978 to 2018-2024 | 95% CI 19.1 to 25.7 | 16,318 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_freq_early | 37.4% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly | GSS 1972 to 1978, pooled | 95% CI 35.5% to 39.2% | 3,375 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_freq_late | 53.2% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly | GSS 2010 to 2018, pooled (in-person surveys) | 95% CI 50.9% to 55.5% | 2,760 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_freq_late24 | 59.7% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend weekly or nearly weekly | GSS 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 95% CI 57.0% to 62.5% | 2,531 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_gap_early | 5.3 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | GSS 1972 to 1978, pooled | 95% CI 2.9 to 7.7 | 7,613 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_gap_ftf | 18.0 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | in-person GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 10.3 to 25.8 | 1,723 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_gap_late | 15.4 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | GSS 2010 to 2018, pooled (in-person surveys) | 95% CI 12.6 to 18.2 | 7,754 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_gap_late24 | 19.5 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | GSS 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 95% CI 16.3 to 22.8 | 8,705 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_gap_web | 23.7 | percentage points, Republican share of party identifiers among frequent attenders minus seldom attenders | weighted difference in the Republican share of party identifiers, frequent minus seldom attenders | web GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend seldom or frequently | 2022 and 2024, pooled | 95% CI 16.8 to 30.5 | 2,175 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_sel_change | 5.7 | percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers | late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined) | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | 1972-1978 to 2010-2018 | 95% CI 3.4 to 8.0 | 15,367 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_sel_change24 | 8.1 | percentage points, change in the Republican share of party identifiers | late pooled share minus early pooled share (independent samples, standard errors combined) | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | 1972-1978 to 2018-2024 | 95% CI 5.8 to 10.4 | 16,318 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_sel_early | 32.1% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | GSS 1972 to 1978, pooled | 95% CI 30.5% to 33.7% | 4,238 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_sel_late | 37.8% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | GSS 2010 to 2018, pooled (in-person surveys) | 95% CI 36.2% to 39.5% | 4,994 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rep_sel_late24 | 40.2% | percent of party identifiers (leaners included) who identify as Republican | weighted share Republican | GSS Democratic or Republican identifiers who attend a few times a year or never | GSS 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 95% CI 38.5% to 41.9% | 6,174 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rise_net_in | 0.06 | change in the standardized slope | rise in the standardized slope net of party; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.10 | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | rise_raw_in | 0.11 | change in the standardized slope | rise in the raw standardized slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.15 | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | share_1974_2018 | 50% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 and 2018 alone (2018 is the last survey before the web mode) | 95% CI 20% to 163% | 3,483 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | share_1974_2024 | 64% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 and 2024 alone (2024 includes web interviews) | 95% CI 41% to 112% | 4,383 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | share_in | 46% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 95% CI 33% to 67% | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | share_in7 | 52% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, seven party categories | 95% CI 37% to 74% | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | share_in_hi | 67% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, upper end of the 95% interval | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | share_in_lo | 33% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, lower end of the 95% interval | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | share_in_psu | 46% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | same share as the main specification; percentile bootstrap over primary sampling units (respondents in 1974 stand alone, since the design variables start in 1975) | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | 95% CI 33% to 66% | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | share_in_psu_hi | 66% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, upper end of the 95% interval from the bootstrap over primary sampling units | same share as the main specification; percentile bootstrap over primary sampling units | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | share_in_psu_lo | 33% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for, lower end of the 95% interval from the bootstrap over primary sampling units | same share as the main specification; percentile bootstrap over primary sampling units | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2010 to 2018, pooled | | 17,849 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | share_web | 63% | percent of the rise in the raw slope that the party control accounts for | one minus the ratio of the rise in the slope net of party to the rise in the raw slope; percentile bootstrap over respondents | GSS respondents with attendance, self-placed ideology and party identification | 1974 to 1978 and 2018 to 2024, pooled (includes web interviews) | 95% CI 49% to 82% | 19,215 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | unaff_dem_2024 | 70.9% | percent of two-party presidential voters who voted Democratic | weighted share voting Democratic | unaffiliated CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2024 | 95% CI 69.7% to 72.2% | 14,311 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | unaff_in_seldom_2008 | 34.2% | percent of seldom-attending voters who are unaffiliated | weighted share unaffiliated | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend a few times a year or never | 2008 | 95% CI 33.2% to 35.2% | 13,123 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | unaff_in_seldom_2024 | 44.8% | percent of seldom-attending voters who are unaffiliated | weighted share unaffiliated | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend a few times a year or never | 2024 | 95% CI 43.9% to 45.7% | 29,631 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | unaff_prot_2008 | 36.7 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among the unaffiliated minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, unaffiliated minus Protestants | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are unaffiliated or Protestant | 2008 | 95% CI 34.7 to 38.6 | 13,283 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | unaff_prot_2024 | 38.0 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among the unaffiliated minus Protestants | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, unaffiliated minus Protestants | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and are unaffiliated or Protestant | 2024 | 95% CI 36.3 to 39.7 | 28,512 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | unaff_seldom_share | 96% | percent of unaffiliated voters who attend a few times a year or never | weighted share attending seldom | unaffiliated CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and answered the attendance question | 2024 | 95% CI 95% to 96% | 14,224 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | us_gss | +0.25 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of church attendance with self-placed ideology | GSS respondents with attendance and self-placed ideology | 2006-2024 | 95% CI 0.23 to 0.26 | 27,953 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | us_wvs | +0.28 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | weighted correlation of left-right self-placement with the importance of God | WVS/EVS respondents in the United States with a left-right answer | fieldwork 2006, 2011 and 2017 | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.31 | 5,858 | weight (S017) within the country | World Values Survey and EVS | | | within_cath_2008 | 18.1 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition | Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2008 | 95% CI 14.7 to 21.6 | 4,514 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | within_cath_2024 | 10.4 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition | Catholic CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2024 | 95% CI 6.6 to 14.2 | 7,220 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | within_none_2020 | 14.3 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, among the unaffiliated | unaffiliated CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2020 | 95% CI 7.5 to 21.0 | 14,465 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | n counts the seldom and the frequent group together. The frequent group is the limiting cell, with 369 respondents and an effective sample of 208. | | within_prot_2008 | 17.2 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition | Protestant CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2008 | 95% CI 14.7 to 19.7 | 7,687 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | within_prot_2024 | 12.5 | percentage points, Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among seldom attenders minus frequent attenders | weighted difference in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, seldom minus frequent attenders, inside one tradition | Protestant CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate and attend seldom or frequently | 2024 | 95% CI 10.1 to 14.8 | 12,760 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | wvs_all_mean | +0.10 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.12 | 104 | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_all_mean_old | +0.10 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries) | countries and territories in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation, without the restored EVS countries | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.08 to 0.12 | 95 | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_europe_mean | +0.13 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries) | European countries in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.16 | 42 | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | | wvs_rest_mean | +0.08 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | mean across countries of the within-country correlation of left-right with the importance of God (percentile bootstrap over countries) | countries outside Europe and the United States in the WVS/EVS with a usable correlation | fieldwork 2005 or later | 95% CI 0.06 to 0.10 | 61 | weight (S017) within each country; each country counted once across countries | World Values Survey and EVS | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Standardized coefficient: A regression coefficient measured in standard deviations of the variables involved. It lets effects on differently scaled variables be compared. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Left-right self-placement: A survey question that asks people to place themselves on a scale from left to right. The scale is the same for everyone, but the meaning attached to left and right differs across people, countries and years. ## Methods Sample. Reported two-party presidential voters in the ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File (studies from 1952 to 2020; attendance is asked from 1970) and in the Cooperative Election Study (presidential years 2008 to 2024, weight_cumulative); General Social Survey respondents 1972 to 2024 (weight_use, with the interview mode joined from the raw file); World Values Survey and European Values Study respondents with fieldwork in 2005 or later; European Social Survey rounds 1 to 11. The cumulative ANES file's 2024 religion and attendance codes are unusable (the count of Protestants falls from 3,180 in 2020 to 835 in 2024 while Catholics are stable, and 49% of 2024 respondents have a valid attendance answer against 99% in 2020), so every ANES series ends in 2020 and 2024 comes from the CES. Groups. Attendance groups follow the ANES three-category item and are cut as closely as each source allows: frequent is weekly or nearly weekly (ANES Often, GSS attend 6 to 8), which in the CES is weekly or more (5 and 6 on the six-point item) because the CES has no nearly-weekly answer; occasional is monthly; seldom is a few times a year or never. Party identification includes leaners (GSS partyid 0 to 2 Democratic, 3 independent, 4 to 6 Republican; CES pid7 1 to 3, 4 and 5 to 7); pure independents are left out of the Republican share and are a category in the party control. The CES party and ideology series use every CES year from 2008 to 2024, and the vote series the presidential years. Estimands. The attendance gap is the weighted Democratic share of the two-party vote among seldom attenders minus that among frequent attenders; the denominational gap is Catholics minus Protestants, and the CES contrast for the unaffiliated is the unaffiliated minus Protestants. The slope is the weighted least squares coefficient of ideology (GSS polviews 1 to 7; CES five-point ideology with not sure missing) on attendance (GSS 0 to 8; CES 1 to 6), both standardized once on the whole common sample of respondents with attendance, ideology and party (GSS 1974 to 2024; CES 2008 to 2024), fitted year by year raw and with the party control on the same respondents (two indicators for Republican and independent, or six indicators for seven categories). A rise is the late slope minus the early slope; the share accounted for by party is one minus the ratio of the rise net of party to the raw rise. Windows of several survey years rescale each year's weights to average one. The cultural index averages the weighted z-scores of five GSS items (homosexuality, premarital sex, extramarital sex, pornography law, abortion for any reason) and the economic index those of three (help for the poor, help for the sick, government action on income differences), each with at least two answers; the economic items are asked from 1975, so both indices and their correlations start there, the first period holds the surveys of 1975, 1983 and 1984 only, and the correlation with self-placed ideology uses the same survey years. Cross-national correlations are weighted Pearson correlations of left-right self-placement with the importance of God (WVS/EVS), or with attendance (ESS rounds 3 to 11 pooled; the GSS for the United States, 2006 to 2024). Intervals. Weighted shares and means use the Kish effective sample size and a normal interval, which treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignores stratification and clustering, which can raise or lower the variance; the same formula is used for the CES, an opt-in panel, and its interval does not cover the error that comes from how respondents were recruited; gaps combine the two standard errors; correlations use Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size; year-by-year slopes use HC3 robust errors; rises and the shares of a rise or of a slope that party accounts for use a percentile bootstrap over respondents (the estimate is recomputed on 2,000 resamples of the respondents drawn with replacement, each window resampled separately, seed 12345, and the interval is read from the percentiles of the results); means across countries count each country once and use the same bootstrap over countries; the correlation between the WVS/EVS and ESS country values uses Fisher z on the number of countries. The GSS design variables are used for two checks: cluster-robust errors on the primary sampling unit change the standard errors of the yearly slopes by a median ratio of 1.01 against the HC3 errors (range 0.92 to 1.15), and a bootstrap over primary sampling units gives the main share as 46% (95% interval 33% to 66%) against 46% (33% to 67%) from the bootstrap over respondents. The shares and correlations of the ANES, CES, WVS/EVS and ESS are not checked this way. Suppression. A subgroup-year cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of the same size; a yearly regression needs 200 respondents; a country correlation needs an effective sample of 300; no published cell rests on fewer than 30 respondents. Countries. The cleaned WVS/EVS file has a blank country label for ten EVS countries; they are restored from the country code and 9 of them have a usable correlation. Europe in the WVS/EVS is the region Europe and Central Asia without Turkey and the Caucasus and Central Asian countries. The European time series uses the 15 countries in every ESS round and places each round at the year fieldwork began. Mode. GSS interviews were in person, with some by telephone, through 2018, mostly on the web in 2021, and a mix of in-person and web interviews in 2022 and 2024; the CES is online throughout. Estimates from 2021 on are reported with a mode split or a mode note: the split covers the slope, the Republican-share gap and the attendance-ideology correlation in 2022 and 2024, and the party comparison of the text uses the in-person surveys of 2010 to 2018 with the 2018 to 2024 window as a second comparison. The ANES mixes in-person and web interviews from 2012 and has no mode weights in 2020, and its vote gap is not split by mode. ## What these data cannot show - Every estimate here is an association between answers given by the same people in one interview, or between groups defined by such answers. - The vote gap does not say that attendance moves the vote, the ideology slope does not say that attendance moves ideology, and the share accounted for by party does not say that party moves either one. - The panel studies cited above find religious change that follows political orientation. - The surveys here have no panel, so they cannot say how much of each gap comes from people changing their attendance, their affiliation or their party, and how much from who joins and leaves the electorate. - The GSS moved from in-person interviews to a mix that includes the web in 2021, and the chapter reports the split for 2022 and 2024 for the slope, the Republican-share gap and the attendance-ideology correlation. - The ANES has included web interviews since 2012 and has no mode weights for 2020, and the chapter does not split its gap by mode. - The CES is an opt-in online panel. - The ideology and attendance items differ between the GSS and the CES, so levels are compared within a survey and trends are compared across surveys. - The intervals treat each weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignore the strata and clusters of the sampling designs. - The GSS design variables allow two checks. - Cluster-robust standard errors for the yearly slopes are 0.92 to 1.15 times the HC3 standard errors, on both sides of one. - A bootstrap over primary sampling units gives the share of the rise that party accounts for as 46% (95% CI 33% to 66%), against 46% (95% CI 33% to 67%) from a bootstrap over respondents. - The ANES, CES, WVS, EVS and ESS estimates are not checked this way. - Race and tradition enter only as views of one figure, with Black Protestants, Latino Catholics and non-Christian faiths left to the chapter on tradition and race. - The cross-national comparison sets the correlation inside each country against an average of other countries, using different survey items, so it does not show why the tie is stronger where it is. - The data hold nothing on belief or on congregations, and they cannot separate the effect of religion from that of the party system in each country. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Layman, Geoffrey C. (2001). The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Politics. Columbia University Press. 3. Putnam, Robert D.; Campbell, David E. (2010). American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Us. Simon and Schuster. 4. Margolis, Michele F. (2018). From Politics to the Pews: How Partisanship and the Political Environment Shape Religious Identity. University of Chicago Press. 5. Campbell, David E.; Layman, Geoffrey C.; Green, John C.; Sumaktoyo, Nathanael G. (2018). Putting Politics First: The Impact of Politics on American Religious and Secular Orientations. American Journal of Political Science 62(3): 551-565. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12365 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/the-god-gap-in-america/build.py (sha256 1efbd4d08327c8f4db0440ba4e914725365d37fecbd1562fa4c64e45f1770290) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/ess/ess_clean.parquet | 45,592,290 | 9487eead6817f028f5dd525709aa1b989ccd384384ef3700b9657cf68dd0b529 | 6def6b8c99fe6dbaf6abc744db6cabf584b900084600909b651870d99208e338 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/gss/gss_sub2024.parquet | 4,925,270 | 09c4894730735ec7ae5a057c99d97705866b0b4d485a8b14030435944f909fba | fbbacc5d2586b9f6a774f02031f3686c14fa23a0effee92366bb90a6de8e0ad3 | | data/wvs/wvs_clean.parquet | 71,974,374 | cef4479481f8a48d6c765d39dc5438d31daa32fcecee3f181aaaf8e257f41f0b | 59a8e3c369176b7e1a2cb37fc10b87985ed79b02fab2eae1cca08e7a972db061 | | C:/github/politics-book/lib/geo/world.v1.json | 49,483 | 8e454ad862ef2ff389e1599a5e6eb1c20e0ae6ae77415ed1266424aa196d3b32 | 8e454ad862ef2ff389e1599a5e6eb1c20e0ae6ae77415ed1266424aa196d3b32 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | cd368dc38fad0e09bcd47e966d70d4e1ef4242d8fa2892da9f7f2f8cbe496034 | | figures/absorbed_share.json | 6aec4900cf7cfa3a0adb86e75d1ed5e44673530364a2db63d1f1812ea2f74273 | | figures/attendance_ideology_slope.json | 4bef0e4879a66a4df65d44cea6e06efa4d357a9a1f9cb39e3f14bc3380a956fc | | figures/culture_economics.json | 7e554a4e4c1057034e32db8fbd320bfc3948f5939dc6860e632eb128d963b0fb | | figures/denomination_attendance.json | 09fceedb34ff1c11f9815acd3c490a4a0a578c492d275a804e17f6801d2ad49d | | figures/europe_time.json | b12002b0a858197205a6e95959546f63b6fc97291a23a7d33e00f904cc660159 | | figures/party_by_attendance.json | 3ecaf73993edb276e71f13e8e6466790752370c4359515c17ad5571c7da6275f | | figures/vote_gap.json | 7383489921647668c3e8ba5b8bbc62a464ff7a969a5aab02d55a8c5b85b7aa7a | | figures/world_correlations.json | 1d9e907148092b6f0f46f4b913df2dc4d4f9810a0876ec3ad2addf0bedf90515 | | meta.json | 7c8b722ca7a0de3dee8e67ef0a09eac7e3351b8e93051ee71e1b2b4a4209e310 | | refs.json | 718f8ea732d967f435517adf7b53597b252e6925bf32ef8a8d0e0fca857c8f69 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/facts.json - Table 1, figure "vote_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/vote_gap.json - Table 2, figure "denomination_attendance" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/denomination_attendance.json - Table 3, figure "party_by_attendance" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/party_by_attendance.json - Table 4, figure "attendance_ideology_slope" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/attendance_ideology_slope.json - Table 5, figure "absorbed_share" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/absorbed_share.json - Table 6, figure "culture_economics" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/culture_economics.json - Table 7, figure "world_correlations" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/world_correlations.json - Table 8, figure "europe_time" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-god-gap-in-america/figures/europe_time.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Religious tradition and race: report Chapter 9.3 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/religious-tradition-and-race. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Religious tradition and race - Chapter: 9.3 (Part IX, Religion and morality; Ideology, values and religion) - Question: How does the religious gap differ among white evangelicals, Black Protestants, Latino Catholics and other traditions? - Dek: In the 2024 CES, seldom attenders voted more Democratic than frequent attenders by +9.5 points among white born-again Protestants and by +0.8 points among Black Protestants, an interval that includes zero. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - Cooperative Election Study. Cumulative Common Content, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; religion, race, born-again, attendance, vote and party; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative; vvweight for the 2024 sensitivity check - General Social Survey. Cumulative data 1972 to 2022 from the raw file: relig, denom (detailed), other, race, hispanic, attend, partyid, reborn; mode joined from the raw file; years: 1972-2024 (35 study years); weights: weight_use, rescaled within year - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File, presidential-year studies 1980 to 2020: religion, born-again, race, party identification and presidential vote; the 2024 religion codes are unusable; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z) - ANES 2024 Time Series. 2024 Time Series: major-group religion summary, race, attendance, born-again, 2024 vote and turnout; years: 2024 (pre-election and post-election interviews); weights: V240107b - State presidential returns. State presidential returns 1976 to 2024, used only for the certified national two-party share in 2024; years: 1976-2024 (13 elections); weights: none (full counts) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/religious-tradition-and-race - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/religious-tradition-and-race/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/religious-tradition-and-race/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026religioustraditionandrace ```bibtex @misc{singh2026religioustraditionandrace, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Religious tradition and race}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/religious-tradition-and-race}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | +9.5 | 95% CI 6.6 to 12.4 | 5,380 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | gpv_2024_wev | | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | +0.8 | 95% CI −5.1 to 6.7 | 1,684 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | gpv_2024_bp | | pooled gap of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 27.7 | 95% CI 26.0 to 29.4 | 39,039 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | dc_2024_tot | | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 14.5% | 95% CI 13.2% to 15.7% | 5,987 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | lvv_2024_wev | | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 83.1% | 95% CI 80.3% to 86.0% | 1,889 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | lvv_2024_bp | | weighted share who attend religious services weekly or more | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 57.8% | 95% CI 56.0% to 59.5% | 5,904 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | fq_2024_wev | | weighted share who attend religious services weekly or more | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 47.3% | 95% CI 43.6% to 51.1% | 1,870 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | fq_2024_bp | | weighted share who attend religious services weekly or more | all respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 26.7% | 95% CI 26.0% to 27.4% | 41,630 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | fq_2024_all | | minimum respondents (and minimum Kish effective sample size) in a published cell | a cell published in a figure or the text | 2008 to 2024 | 30 | | | none (rule) | Cooperative Election Study | floor_n | | count of respondents | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 188,145 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_voters | | count of respondents | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 42,008 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_voters_2024 | ## Findings Among voters in the 2024 Cooperative Election Study (CES), seldom attenders voted more Democratic than frequent attenders by +9.5 (95% CI 6.6 to 12.4) points among white born-again Protestants and by +0.8 (95% CI −5.1 to 6.7) points among Black Protestants, an interval that includes zero. Seldom attenders go to religious services a few times a year or never, and frequent attenders go weekly or more. Among all voters the same gap, which Chapter 9.1, The god gap in America (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america) measures, was 27.7 (95% CI 26.0 to 29.4) points. The two groups sit at opposite ends of the vote. White born-again Protestants voted 14.5% Democratic in the two-party presidential vote and Black Protestants voted 83.1%. Both groups attend often. 57.8% of white born-again Protestant voters and 47.3% of Black Protestant voters attend weekly or more, against 26.7% of all voters. This chapter asks what the single all-voter gap combines. Tradition and race are coded together. The CES has no denomination item, so white Protestants are split by whether they call themselves born-again or evangelical Christians. Those who do are white born-again Protestants and those who do not are white Protestants who are not born-again. Black, Hispanic and Asian or other-race Protestants are kept whole, and Catholics are split by race. The remaining groups are Jewish, Mormon, Muslim, Orthodox Christian, and Buddhist or Hindu voters, voters who gave another religion, and the unaffiliated, who are atheists, agnostics and people with no religion in particular. White means non-Hispanic white. The born-again rule stands in for denomination. A denominational scheme, RELTRAD [1], sorts Protestants into evangelical, mainline and Black Protestant traditions from the denomination they name, which the CES does not record. The rule ties the white born-again group to an answer that marks religious commitment, and the group of white Protestants who are not born-again is whoever is left. A gap in this chapter is the Democratic share among seldom attenders minus the share among frequent attenders, so a positive gap means that seldom attenders voted more Democratic. (Note: RELTRAD can be coded in the General Social Survey (GSS), and the 2024 American National Election Studies (ANES) have their own major-group summary, so results from those surveys use the terms evangelical and mainline, and the last section checks the CES rule against both. Shares use the survey weights, and the CES weight is the one defined for all five elections. Every interval is a 95% confidence interval from the Kish effective sample size [2], and a cell needs at least 30 respondents. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals cover sampling error and not how respondents were recruited.) The sample is 188,145 CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican candidate in the five presidential elections from 2008 to 2024, 42,008 of them in 2024. Chapter 9.1, The god gap in America (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america) measures the overall gap and compares the United States with other countries, Chapter 9.2, The rise of the nones (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-rise-of-the-nones; planned) follows the unaffiliated, and Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) follows the vote of Black, Hispanic and Asian voters across traditions. This chapter takes the traditions one at a time and asks whether attendance relates to the vote in the same way inside each. ### Two groups that attend often sit at opposite ends of the vote Table 1 orders the groups by their Democratic share in 2024. White born-again Protestants were at 14.5% (95% CI 13.2% to 15.7%), white Catholics at 37.1% (95% CI 35.4% to 38.9%), white Protestants who are not born-again at 43.0% (95% CI 41.0% to 45.0%), Hispanic Catholics at 57.0% (95% CI 52.5% to 61.5%), the unaffiliated at 70.9% (95% CI 69.7% to 72.2%) and Black Protestants at 83.1% (95% CI 80.3% to 86.0%). Party identification gives the same order, from 13.7% Democratic among white born-again Protestants to 86.3% among Black Protestants (the third view). Pooled over the five elections the vote shares run from 18.1% (95% CI 17.6% to 18.7%) among white born-again Protestants to 91.4% (95% CI 90.4% to 92.3%) among Black Protestants (the second view). Table 1. In 2024 the Democratic share of the two-party vote ran from 14.5% among white born-again Protestants to 83.1% among Black Protestants Race separates voters inside each large Christian family. Among Catholics, Hispanic Catholics voted 19.9 (95% CI 15.0 to 24.7) points more Democratic than white Catholics, and the 2024 estimate for Black Catholics, 76.0% (95% CI 67.2% to 84.8%), rests on a small sample. Among Protestants, Hispanic Protestants voted 33.1% (95% CI 27.3% to 38.9%) Democratic, above white born-again Protestants and below Black Protestants. Hispanic voters divide by tradition. Hispanic Catholics voted 23.9 (95% CI 16.5 to 31.3) points more Democratic than Hispanic Protestants. Among white Protestants, those who are not born-again voted 28.5 (95% CI 26.1 to 30.8) points more Democratic than those who are. Among the smaller traditions, Jewish voters were 68.0% (95% CI 64.0% to 72.1%) Democratic and Mormon voters 31.1% (95% CI 24.8% to 37.4%), both inside the range that white born-again Protestants and Black Protestants set. Muslim voters were 65.9% (95% CI 52.7% to 79.0%), and that interval is the widest in the figure. Attendance does not order the groups. Table 2 plots the share of voters in each group who attend weekly or more against the Democratic share. Black Protestant voters attend weekly or more at 47.3% (95% CI 43.6% to 51.1%) and say religion is very important in their life at 72.3%, and 70.6% call themselves born-again or evangelical, the answer that defines white born-again Protestants here. For white born-again Protestants the first two shares are 57.8% (95% CI 56.0% to 59.5%) and 79.8%. Among all voters they are 26.7% and 39.0%. Hispanic Protestant voters (55.6% weekly) and Mormon voters (67.7%) also attend often and voted 33.1% and 31.1% Democratic, while the unaffiliated, of whom 2.5% attend weekly, voted 70.9%. The groups with the highest Democratic shares include one with a high attendance rate and one with a low one. Table 2. White born-again and Black Protestant voters attend weekly or more at 57.8% and 47.3%, against 26.7% of all voters, and voted 14.5% and 83.1% Democratic Two groups with weekly attendance of 57.8% and 47.3%, against 26.7% among all voters, voted 68.6 (95% CI 65.6 to 71.7) points apart. The data cannot say why. Accounts of the Black church describe an institution of community and political life as well as of worship [3], but the survey items here measure attendance, importance and identification and not what congregations do. ### The five largest Christian groups moved Republican by different amounts Table 3 compares each later election with 2008. Over the full period the Democratic share changed by −13.2 (95% CI −19.5 to −6.9) points among Hispanic Catholics, −10.3 (95% CI −14.1 to −6.5) among Black Protestants, −7.9 (95% CI −10.7 to −5.1) among white Protestants who are not born-again, −6.5 (95% CI −8.9 to −4.0) among white Catholics and −6.2 (95% CI −8.1 to −4.4) among white born-again Protestants. Each of those intervals lies below zero. The five groups and the unaffiliated, who changed by −5.6 (95% CI −7.6 to −3.7) points, kept the same order in 2008 and 2024, from Black Protestants at 93.4% and 83.1% to white born-again Protestants at 20.7% and 14.5%. Table 3. From 2008 to 2024 the Democratic share changed by −13.2 points among Hispanic Catholics and −10.3 among Black Protestants, against −6.2 among white born-again Protestants and −6.5 among white Catholics The two largest falls are those of Hispanic Catholics and Black Protestants, and the differences between the changes can be tested. The change among Hispanic Catholics differs from the change among white born-again Protestants by −7.0 (95% CI −13.5 to −0.4) points and from the change among the unaffiliated by −7.6 (95% CI −14.2 to −1.0). The change among Black Protestants differs from the change among the unaffiliated by −4.7 (95% CI −8.9 to −0.4). Hispanic Catholics differ from white Catholics by −6.7 (95% CI −13.5 to 0.0), an interval that reaches zero, and every other difference among the six changes has an interval that includes zero. The groups that moved most are therefore separable from some of the others and not from all of them. The order does not hold for every group. Muslim voters, Black Catholic voters and Buddhist or Hindu voters were among the most Democratic in 2008 and changed by −30.1 (95% CI −44.8 to −15.4), −18.5 (95% CI −28.7 to −8.2) and −19.5 (95% CI −28.1 to −10.9) points, so the order of all the groups differs between 2008 and 2024. Hispanic Protestants, Jewish voters and Mormon voters show no change that the sample can separate from zero, at −3.3 (95% CI −13.0 to 6.4), −3.3 (95% CI −9.2 to 2.5) and +6.5 (95% CI −1.2 to 14.2) points. The last is the only point estimate that rose by more than a few points. Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) follows Black and Hispanic voters as a whole, and the figure here describes the same voters split by tradition. ### Attendance relates to the vote in different directions inside each group Table 4 splits each group by attendance. One sign comes from the CES coding and is not reproduced in the other surveys: the gap among white Protestants who are not born-again, taken up below and in the last section. Pooled over the five elections, seldom attenders voted more Democratic than frequent attenders by +10.1 (95% CI 8.7 to 11.4) points among white born-again Protestants, +13.7 (95% CI 12.2 to 15.3) among white Catholics, +11.9 (95% CI 7.5 to 16.3) among Hispanic Catholics and +13.8 (95% CI 7.5 to 20.0) among Hispanic Protestants. The white Catholic gap exceeds the white born-again gap by 3.6 (95% CI 1.6 to 5.7) points, and the two Hispanic intervals are wide enough to include both. In 2024 alone the four gaps were +9.5 (95% CI 6.6 to 12.4), +12.0 (95% CI 8.1 to 15.9), +15.3 (95% CI 4.9 to 25.7) and +10.6 (95% CI −2.0 to 23.2). Table 4. Inside tradition-by-race groups the vote differs by attendance in different directions: seldom minus frequent attenders in the Democratic share was +13.7 points among white Catholics, +10.1 among white born-again Protestants, +1.9 among Black Protestants and −5.4 among white Protestants who are not born-again, a sign that the GSS and ANES do not reproduce Among Black Protestants the pooled gap is small, +1.9 (95% CI 0.0 to 3.8) points, with frequent attenders at 90.7% and seldom attenders at 92.6% Democratic, and for party identification it is +2.6 (95% CI 1.0 to 4.2) points. The vote interval lies below the intervals of the four groups above, so Black Protestants who attend often and seldom voted within a few points of one another. The same two attendance groups among white born-again Protestants voted +10.1 points apart. In 2024 alone the Black Protestant gap was +0.8 (95% CI −5.1 to 6.7) points. In 2008 the gaps were +4.9 (95% CI −0.1 to 9.9) for Black Protestants, +15.1 (95% CI 11.5 to 18.6) for white born-again Protestants and −4.4 (95% CI −9.4 to 0.6) for white Protestants who are not born-again, the same order as in the pooled estimates. Among white Protestants who are not born-again the direction reverses in the CES, and this is the sign that the GSS and the ANES do not reproduce. The GSS gives +2.8 (95% CI −3.8 to 9.4) points for the RELTRAD mainline group and +5.7 (95% CI −0.5 to 12.0) under the born-again rule, and the ANES gives +11.6 (95% CI −3.4 to 26.6) (the last section). In the CES, frequent attenders voted 50.5% Democratic and seldom attenders 45.1%, a gap of −5.4 (95% CI −7.5 to −3.4) points, and the point estimate is below zero in each of the five elections. The gap was −8.1 (95% CI −12.2 to −4.0) points in 2020 and −4.1 (95% CI −9.0 to 0.8) in 2024. Party identification gives the same signs in the CES, +11.2 (95% CI 9.9 to 12.5) among white born-again Protestants, +2.6 (95% CI 1.0 to 4.2) among Black Protestants and −3.7 (95% CI −5.8 to −1.7) among white Protestants who are not born-again (the last view). Jewish voters, Mormon voters and the unaffiliated have positive gaps, +23.8 (95% CI 17.9 to 29.8), +17.5 (95% CI 11.1 to 23.9) and +18.1 (95% CI 14.1 to 22.1) points, with intervals wider than those of the larger groups because one of their two attendance cells is small. The Jewish gap exceeds the white born-again gap by 13.7 (95% CI 7.6 to 19.8) points. A positive gap means that seldom attenders voted more Democratic, and the sign does not say that attendance moves the vote. ### The pooled gap is a sum of different gaps and different mixes The pooled gap can be written as two parts. The within-group part is each group's own seldom-minus-frequent gap, weighted by the group's average share of the two attendance groups. The mix part is the difference between a group's share of seldom attenders and its share of frequent attenders, valued at the group's average Democratic share relative to all voters. The two parts add to the pooled gap exactly, and the split is an accounting of the gap and not a causal one. In 2024 the pooled gap of 27.7 (95% CI 26.0 to 29.4) points, the gap of Chapter 9.1, The god gap in America (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-god-gap-in-america) restricted to voters with a group and an attendance answer, divides into 14.6 (95% CI 11.8 to 17.4) points within groups and 13.1 (95% CI 10.6 to 15.5) points from the mix (Table 5). Pooled over the five elections the gap is 24.4 (95% CI 23.7 to 25.1) points, of which 11.4 (95% CI 10.3 to 12.4) is within groups and 13.1 (95% CI 12.2 to 13.9) is the mix. Each part is at least 8.0 points in every election, and the mix part is the larger in 3 elections and the within-group part in the others. Table 5. Of the 27.7 point gap between seldom and frequent attenders in the 2024 vote, 14.6 points is a gap inside tradition-by-race groups and 13.1 points reflects which groups the two attendance levels contain Table 6 assigns the parts to groups. White born-again Protestants are 39.0% (95% CI 37.5% to 40.6%) of the voters who attend weekly or more and 9.1% (95% CI 8.6% to 9.7%) of those who attend seldom. They are less Democratic than other voters, so their concentration among weekly attenders adds 10.2 (95% CI 9.5 to 10.9) points to the mix part. Black Protestants are 8.4% (95% CI 7.5% to 9.3%) of weekly attenders and 3.0% (95% CI 2.7% to 3.3%) of seldom attenders and are more Democratic than the average voter, so their contribution to the mix part is −1.8 (95% CI −2.2 to −1.5) points, below zero. White Catholics add 1.5 (95% CI 1.0 to 2.0) points through their own gap and white born-again Protestants 2.3 (95% CI 1.6 to 3.0). Pooled over the five elections, white born-again Protestants contribute 9.2 (95% CI 9.0 to 9.5) points through the mix and the unaffiliated 3.9 (95% CI 3.1 to 4.8) points through their own gap, the largest part of each kind. Table 6. White born-again Protestants contribute 10.2 points to the mix part of the 2024 gap and Black Protestants −1.8 points, while the unaffiliated contribute 7.2 points to the within-group part The unaffiliated need a caution. They are 44.8% (95% CI 43.9% to 45.7%) of seldom attenders and 3.0% (95% CI 2.3% to 3.6%) of weekly attenders, and they contribute 3.1 (95% CI 1.0 to 5.3) points through the mix and 7.2 (95% CI 4.7 to 9.7) points through their own gap. The second is 49.4% (95% CI 38.9% to 59.8%) of the 2024 within-group part, and without the unaffiliated that part is 7.4 (95% CI 6.0 to 8.8) points. It rests on a small weekly cell, with an effective sample of 77 respondents in 2024 against 134, 212 and 208 in 2012, 2016 and 2020. The unaffiliated gap was +0.4 (95% CI −11.5 to 12.3) points in 2008 on an effective weekly sample of 51, then +20.2 (95% CI 11.7 to 28.8), +15.7 (95% CI 8.9 to 22.6) and +14.3 (95% CI 7.5 to 21.0) points, and +30.1 (95% CI 19.0 to 41.3) in 2024. The 2024 estimate is the largest of the five, and its interval overlaps those of 2012, 2016 and 2020. The pooled gap therefore contains two kinds of difference. One is the difference in vote between seldom and frequent attenders inside a tradition and race, which is small among Black Protestants and below zero in the CES among white Protestants who are not born-again, a sign that other surveys do not reproduce. The other is a difference in who the two attendance groups are. Because Black Protestants are a larger share of frequent attenders than of seldom attenders, they hold the pooled gap below what the other groups alone would give. The born-again rule also builds part of the white born-again contribution into the coding, because the group is defined by an answer that marks religious commitment. ### In the GSS white RELTRAD evangelical Protestants leaned Democratic in the 1970s The CES begins in 2008. The GSS asks Protestants which denomination they belong to, which allows RELTRAD from 1972 to 2022 (68,896 respondents placed; the 2024 GSS has no detailed denomination). This chapter codes it from the denomination and open-ended answers with the published syntax of the scheme, as the methods note describes. Table 7 follows the Democratic share of party identifiers in five windows of survey years. Among white RELTRAD evangelical Protestants it fell from 61.0% (95% CI 59.0% to 63.0%) in 1972 to 1984 to 43.8% in 1985 to 1996, 35.3% in 1998 to 2008 and 30.6% (95% CI 28.1% to 33.1%) in 2010 to 2018. Black Protestants stayed between 88.5% and 91.1% in every window, and white RELTRAD mainline Protestants between 40.9% and 45.4%. Catholics, of any race, fell from 72.4% (95% CI 70.7% to 74.1%) to 56.9% (95% CI 55.1% to 58.8%) and were at 58.3% (95% CI 55.7% to 60.9%) in 2010 to 2018. The GSS race item counts respondents of Hispanic origin who say white as white. 7.7% of white RELTRAD evangelical respondents in 2010 to 2018 are of Hispanic origin, and the non-Hispanic Democratic share is 28.8% (95% CI 26.3% to 31.4%) against 30.6%. Table 7. In the GSS the Democratic share of party identifiers among white RELTRAD evangelical Protestants fell from 61.0% in 1972 to 1984 to 30.6% in 2010 to 2018, while Black Protestants stayed near 91.1% Attendance separated white RELTRAD evangelical Protestants before the group moved. In 1972 to 1984 frequent attenders were 55.0% (95% CI 52.0% to 58.1%) Democratic and seldom attenders 67.4% (95% CI 64.3% to 70.5%), a gap of +12.4 (95% CI 8.0 to 16.8) points, and the gap was +17.1 (95% CI 11.4 to 22.7) in 2010 to 2018. Its interval lies above zero in every window except the last, where it includes zero (+4.7 (95% CI −3.5 to 12.9)). The Black Protestant gap has an interval that includes zero in all five windows. The white RELTRAD mainline gap was +12.3 (95% CI 8.3 to 16.4) points in 1972 to 1984 and −3.5 (95% CI −11.8 to 4.8) in 2010 to 2018. Frequent mainline attenders were less Democratic than seldom attenders early, and by the 2010s the gap is within sampling error of zero. The 2021 to 2022 window, at +10.1 (95% CI −0.9 to 21.2), does not continue that path. The last window includes web interviews and its estimates differ with the mode. White RELTRAD evangelical Protestants were 16.0% (95% CI 12.4% to 19.6%) Democratic across 2021 to 2022. In 2022, in-person respondents gave 9.2% (95% CI 2.2% to 16.3%) and web respondents 12.4% (95% CI 4.3% to 20.5%), and the 2021 survey, 87.8% of it on the web, gave 21.3% (95% CI 16.5% to 26.1%). RELTRAD also leaves 7.6% of respondents in that window unplaced. 5.4% of respondents are Protestants with no denomination who attend less than monthly and 1.6% are respondents who say only Christian or interdenominational, a gap in the syntax that [4] describe. Counting every white respondent that RELTRAD cannot place as evangelical gives 23.5% (95% CI 20.0% to 27.0%) Democratic, and counting only those who say Christian or interdenominational gives 18.0% (95% CI 14.4% to 21.6%). Even the larger estimate lies below the estimate for 2010 to 2018. The ANES cumulative file measures the presidential vote and not party identification, and its born-again item, asked in every presidential-year study from 1980 to 2020 except 2004, allows the CES rule (the second view of Table 7). White born-again Protestants voted 30.1% (95% CI 26.8% to 33.5%) Democratic in 1980 to 1988 and 19.1% (95% CI 16.5% to 21.8%) in 2016 to 2020. By party identification the GSS puts white RELTRAD evangelical Protestants at 61.0% in the first window and the ANES puts white born-again Protestants at 44.0% (95% CI 40.8% to 47.1%). The gap between the GSS party share and the ANES vote share therefore has two sources, the coding of the group and the difference between identification and vote. White Protestants who are not born-again voted 30.9% (95% CI 27.8% to 33.9%) Democratic in 1980 to 1988 and 47.0% (95% CI 43.6% to 50.4%) in 2016 to 2020, a rise whose intervals do not overlap, while their party identification is flat at 42.5% and 42.0%, as the GSS series is. Black Protestants were at 91.7% and 93.1% and white Catholics at 42.9% and 42.5%. The 2012 and 2016 ANES studies add web samples and the 2020 study was collected online, by telephone and by video, so the last windows mix interview modes. ### The sign for white Protestants who are not born-again depends on survey and coding The CES rule puts a white Protestant in the born-again group when the respondent calls themselves born-again or evangelical. In the GSS from 2006 to 2018, the two codings agree for 61.3% of white Protestants with a born-again answer and a party identification, counting respondents RELTRAD cannot place as disagreeing and leaving out pure independents. They agree for 70.7% of those RELTRAD places in the evangelical or mainline tradition. Among white Protestants RELTRAD places, with no condition on party identification, 39.0% of those who are not born-again are RELTRAD evangelical and 22.3% of those who are born-again are RELTRAD mainline, so the CES groups are not the denominational ones. Table 8 shows what that does. The first tab compares 2024 levels in the CES and the ANES with the born-again rule applied in both. The ANES puts white Protestants who are not born-again at 56.1% (95% CI 49.9% to 62.3%) Democratic and the CES at 43.0% (95% CI 41.0% to 45.0%), a difference of +13.2 (95% CI 6.7 to 19.7) points, and the major-group summary of the ANES gives 57.6% (95% CI 51.0% to 64.1%) for its mainline category. The ANES national Democratic share, 54.4% (95% CI 52.2% to 56.7%), is above the CES share, 49.0% (95% CI 48.2% to 49.7%), and the certified count, 49.2%, so part of the difference belongs to the survey. The ANES also places each of six groups above the CES and orders them the same way. Table 8. The ANES and the CES differ by +13.2 points for white Protestants who are not born-again in 2024, and only the CES puts their attendance gap below zero The second tab gives the attendance gap for the evangelical and the mainline group of white Protestants under six combinations of survey and coding. The gap in the evangelical group has a positive point estimate in every row, +10.1 (95% CI 8.7 to 11.4) points in the CES vote, +19.3 (95% CI 14.6 to 24.1) in the GSS under RELTRAD and +11.9 (95% CI 0.1 to 23.8) in the ANES under its own summary. Its interval lies above zero in every row except the ANES born-again row. The sizes differ across surveys. The gap in the mainline group is below zero in the CES, −5.4 (95% CI −7.5 to −3.4) points for the vote and −3.7 (95% CI −5.8 to −1.7) for party identification, and its interval includes zero under the denominational codings of the GSS, +2.8 (95% CI −3.8 to 9.4), and the ANES, +11.6 (95% CI −3.4 to 26.6). Applying the CES born-again rule to the GSS gives +5.7 (95% CI −0.5 to 12.0) and to the ANES +6.2 (95% CI −7.9 to 20.3), so the rule alone does not reproduce the CES sign. The data do not say whether the CES result comes from its sample, from the mode of interview or from the rule, and the gap among white Protestants who are not born-again is the least settled estimate in this chapter. ### What these data cannot show Each survey interviews a different sample, so the gaps compare groups and say nothing about any voter changing. Religious behavior and identity respond to politics as well as the reverse. Panel studies find that partisan identity shapes whether people identify with a religion and how often they attend [5] [6]. A gap between seldom and frequent attenders, or a difference between traditions, can therefore reflect people moving between groups, and the decomposition splits an observed gap into parts without saying what would happen if the mix of attenders changed. Tradition in the CES is a proxy for denomination. The CES cannot separate Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran and non-denominational respondents, cannot place Black Protestants by denomination, and cannot tell Pentecostal from other Hispanic Protestants. The GSS codes tradition by denomination but stops in 2022, records Hispanic origin only from 2000, and leaves 5.3% of respondents in 2010 to 2018 unplaced. The ANES 2024 rows of the coding check have wider intervals than the CES rows, and the ANES sample is too small to give a Hispanic Protestant estimate at all. The levels depend on the survey and the weight. The CES estimates use the cumulative-file weight because it is the one CES weight defined for all five elections; the validated-vote weight exists only for 2018 to 2024. In 2024 it gives 34.1% (95% CI 32.4% to 35.8%) for white Catholics against 37.1%, 13.2% (95% CI 11.9% to 14.4%) for white born-again Protestants against 14.5% and 59.6% (95% CI 53.9% to 65.2%) for Hispanic Catholics against 57.0%. The CES national Democratic share is 49.0% with the cumulative-file weight and 49.1% with the validated-vote weight, against a certified 49.2%. Agreement at the national level does not show that a survey is accurate inside a tradition and race. The ANES group levels exceed the CES levels by the most for white Protestants who are not born-again and Hispanic Catholics, and by more than the two national shares differ. Small groups carry intervals as wide as the Muslim estimate, and the figures draw those intervals; the only cells removed are those under the floor. The sample is voters who reported a Democratic or Republican vote, so nonvoters, third-party voters and respondents who did not answer are outside it. The chapter has no measure of belief, congregation, region or age, and nothing in it identifies why Black Protestants and white born-again Protestants vote as they do. The growth of the unaffiliated and their subtypes belong to Chapter 9.2, The rise of the nones (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-rise-of-the-nones; planned), and the link between attendance and moral attitudes to Chapter 9.5, Two moralities (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/two-moralities; planned). ## Tables ### Table 1. In 2024 the Democratic share of the two-party vote ran from 14.5% among white born-again Protestants to 83.1% among Black Protestants Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by religious tradition and race, reported voters, percent, 2024 (buttons: five elections pooled, and party identification); 95% intervals | View | Group | Democratic share (%) | Lower | Upper | Interval width (points) | Respondents | Group share of the sample (%) | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | vote2024 | Black Protestants | 83.1 | 80.3 | 86.0 | 5.7 | 1,889 | 4.7 | | vote2024 | Black Catholics | 76.0 | 67.2 | 84.8 | 17.7 | 260 | 0.6 | | vote2024 | Buddhist or Hindu | 71.6 | 64.8 | 78.5 | 13.7 | 431 | 1.1 | | vote2024 | Unaffiliated | 70.9 | 69.7 | 72.2 | 2.4 | 14,311 | 31.0 | | vote2024 | Jewish | 68.0 | 64.0 | 72.1 | 8.1 | 1,219 | 2.7 | | vote2024 | Muslim | 65.9 | 52.7 | 79.0 | 26.3 | 139 | 0.5 | | vote2024 | Hispanic Catholics | 57.0 | 52.5 | 61.5 | 9.1 | 1,351 | 4.0 | | vote2024 | Asian or other-race Catholics | 45.4 | 37.0 | 53.7 | 16.7 | 388 | 1.2 | | vote2024 | Another religion or something else | 43.9 | 40.8 | 46.9 | 6.2 | 3,082 | 7.7 | | vote2024 | White Protestants who are not born-again | 43.0 | 41.0 | 45.0 | 4.0 | 4,979 | 9.9 | | vote2024 | White Catholics | 37.1 | 35.4 | 38.9 | 3.5 | 5,974 | 12.7 | | vote2024 | Hispanic Protestants | 33.1 | 27.3 | 38.9 | 11.7 | 646 | 2.1 | | vote2024 | Mormon | 31.1 | 24.8 | 37.4 | 12.5 | 438 | 1.1 | | vote2024 | Orthodox Christian | 30.9 | 19.7 | 42.0 | 22.3 | 197 | 0.5 | | vote2024 | Asian or other-race Protestants | 30.4 | 25.0 | 35.9 | 10.9 | 699 | 2.1 | | vote2024 | White born-again Protestants | 14.5 | 13.2 | 15.7 | 2.5 | 5,987 | 18.1 | | votepool | Black Protestants | 91.4 | 90.4 | 92.3 | 1.8 | 8,852 | 5.0 | | votepool | Black Catholics | 88.4 | 85.5 | 91.3 | 5.8 | 1,105 | 0.6 | | votepool | Muslim | 81.4 | 76.7 | 86.2 | 9.5 | 600 | 0.4 | | votepool | Buddhist or Hindu | 78.9 | 76.2 | 81.6 | 5.4 | 1,827 | 0.9 | | votepool | Unaffiliated | 72.2 | 71.6 | 72.8 | 1.1 | 53,647 | 26.8 | | votepool | Jewish | 69.8 | 68.1 | 71.4 | 3.3 | 5,325 | 2.4 | | votepool | Hispanic Catholics | 67.0 | 65.1 | 68.8 | 3.8 | 6,487 | 3.8 | | votepool | Another religion or something else | 55.4 | 54.2 | 56.7 | 2.5 | 13,375 | 8.5 | | votepool | Asian or other-race Catholics | 49.6 | 46.0 | 53.1 | 7.1 | 1,706 | 0.9 | | votepool | White Protestants who are not born-again | 46.4 | 45.6 | 47.2 | 1.6 | 25,359 | 12.0 | | votepool | Hispanic Protestants | 42.9 | 40.0 | 45.9 | 5.9 | 2,923 | 1.6 | | votepool | Orthodox Christian | 42.1 | 37.4 | 46.9 | 9.5 | 879 | 0.5 | | votepool | White Catholics | 41.4 | 40.6 | 42.1 | 1.5 | 29,810 | 14.8 | | votepool | Asian or other-race Protestants | 34.8 | 32.4 | 37.3 | 4.9 | 3,172 | 1.7 | | votepool | Mormon | 24.5 | 22.2 | 26.7 | 4.5 | 2,527 | 1.5 | | votepool | White born-again Protestants | 18.1 | 17.6 | 18.7 | 1.1 | 30,356 | 18.4 | | party2024 | Black Protestants | 86.3 | 83.9 | 88.6 | 4.7 | 3,072 | 5.3 | | party2024 | Black Catholics | 80.7 | 73.3 | 88.1 | 14.9 | 427 | 0.8 | | party2024 | Buddhist or Hindu | 72.8 | 66.8 | 78.8 | 12.0 | 604 | 1.3 | | party2024 | Unaffiliated | 71.6 | 70.4 | 72.7 | 2.4 | 17,677 | 32.0 | | party2024 | Jewish | 68.9 | 64.8 | 73.0 | 8.2 | 1,353 | 2.5 | | party2024 | Muslim | 64.7 | 54.8 | 74.6 | 19.8 | 300 | 0.6 | | party2024 | Hispanic Catholics | 63.4 | 59.6 | 67.3 | 7.8 | 2,325 | 4.8 | | party2024 | Asian or other-race Catholics | 48.8 | 40.7 | 56.9 | 16.2 | 482 | 1.2 | | party2024 | Another religion or something else | 46.1 | 43.1 | 49.1 | 6.0 | 3,770 | 7.6 | | party2024 | White Protestants who are not born-again | 42.8 | 40.8 | 44.9 | 4.1 | 5,297 | 9.2 | | party2024 | White Catholics | 37.6 | 35.7 | 39.4 | 3.7 | 6,296 | 11.6 | | party2024 | Hispanic Protestants | 37.5 | 32.0 | 43.0 | 11.0 | 1,109 | 2.5 | | party2024 | Orthodox Christian | 37.3 | 25.4 | 49.1 | 23.7 | 257 | 0.6 | | party2024 | Asian or other-race Protestants | 34.0 | 28.2 | 39.7 | 11.5 | 825 | 1.9 | | party2024 | Mormon | 30.3 | 24.3 | 36.3 | 12.1 | 523 | 1.1 | | party2024 | White born-again Protestants | 13.7 | 12.5 | 15.0 | 2.5 | 6,484 | 16.8 | Views: Presidential vote, 2024 (view = vote2024); Presidential vote, 2008 to 2024 (view = votepool); Party identification, 2024 (view = party2024). Note: White born-again Protestants and white Protestants who are not born-again are the white Protestants who do and do not call themselves born-again or evangelical, because the CES file has no denomination; the last figure compares this coding with denominational codings. Black, Hispanic and Asian or other-race Protestants and the Catholic groups are not split further. Note: The interval width is in the data table. A cell is drawn only when it has at least 30 respondents and an effective sample of at least 30. Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so they cover sampling error and not how respondents were recruited. Source: Cooperative Election Study, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/vote_by_group.json ### Table 2. White born-again and Black Protestant voters attend weekly or more at 57.8% and 47.3%, against 26.7% of all voters, and voted 14.5% and 83.1% Democratic Share of reported voters who attend services weekly or more (horizontal) against the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote (vertical), by tradition and race, 2024; dot area is the group's share of voters | Group | Weekly or more (%) | Lower | Upper | Democratic share (%) | Lower | Upper | Share of voters (%) | Respondents | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | White born-again Protestants | 57.8 | 56.0 | 59.5 | 14.5 | 13.2 | 15.7 | 18.1 | 5,987 | | White Protestants who are not born-again | 18.4 | 16.9 | 20.0 | 43.0 | 41.0 | 45.0 | 9.9 | 4,979 | | Black Protestants | 47.3 | 43.6 | 51.1 | 83.1 | 80.3 | 86.0 | 4.7 | 1,889 | | Hispanic Protestants | 55.6 | 49.4 | 61.8 | 33.1 | 27.3 | 38.9 | 2.1 | 646 | | Asian or other-race Protestants | 45.8 | 39.8 | 51.7 | 30.4 | 25.0 | 35.9 | 2.1 | 699 | | White Catholics | 28.1 | 26.4 | 29.7 | 37.1 | 35.4 | 38.9 | 12.7 | 5,974 | | Hispanic Catholics | 29.4 | 25.2 | 33.6 | 57.0 | 52.5 | 61.5 | 4.0 | 1,351 | | Black Catholics | 42.2 | 32.0 | 52.5 | 76.0 | 67.2 | 84.8 | 0.6 | 260 | | Asian or other-race Catholics | 36.4 | 28.3 | 44.5 | 45.4 | 37.0 | 53.7 | 1.2 | 388 | | Jewish | 13.4 | 10.4 | 16.3 | 68.0 | 64.0 | 72.1 | 2.7 | 1,219 | | Mormon | 67.7 | 61.4 | 74.0 | 31.1 | 24.8 | 37.4 | 1.1 | 438 | | Muslim | 35.4 | 22.2 | 48.7 | 65.9 | 52.7 | 79.0 | 0.5 | 139 | | Orthodox Christian | 41.9 | 29.8 | 54.0 | 30.9 | 19.7 | 42.0 | 0.5 | 197 | | Buddhist or Hindu | 8.8 | 4.5 | 13.0 | 71.6 | 64.8 | 78.5 | 1.1 | 431 | | Another religion or something else | 29.6 | 26.7 | 32.4 | 43.9 | 40.8 | 46.9 | 7.7 | 3,082 | | Unaffiliated | 2.5 | 2.1 | 3.0 | 70.9 | 69.7 | 72.2 | 31.0 | 14,311 | Note: Voters who gave no attendance answer are left out of the attendance shares. A cell is drawn only when it has at least 30 respondents and an effective sample of at least 30. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so they cover sampling error and not how respondents were recruited. Source: Cooperative Election Study, 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/devotion_vs_vote.json ### Table 3. From 2008 to 2024 the Democratic share changed by −13.2 points among Hispanic Catholics and −10.3 among Black Protestants, against −6.2 among white born-again Protestants and −6.5 among white Catholics Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote by tradition and race, reported voters, percent, 2008 and a later election (the buttons switch the later election); 95% intervals | Later election | Group | Share 2008 (%) | Lower 2008 | Upper 2008 | Respondents 2008 | Share later (%) | Lower later | Upper later | Respondents later | Change (points) | Lower change | Upper change | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2024 | White born-again Protestants | 20.7 | 19.3 | 22.1 | 4,399 | 14.5 | 13.2 | 15.7 | 5,987 | −6.2 | −8.1 | −4.4 | | 2024 | White Protestants who are not born-again | 50.9 | 48.9 | 52.8 | 3,353 | 43.0 | 41.0 | 45.0 | 4,979 | −7.9 | −10.7 | −5.1 | | 2024 | Black Protestants | 93.4 | 90.9 | 95.9 | 456 | 83.1 | 80.3 | 86.0 | 1,889 | −10.3 | −14.1 | −6.5 | | 2024 | Hispanic Protestants | 36.4 | 28.7 | 44.1 | 176 | 33.1 | 27.3 | 38.9 | 646 | −3.3 | −13.0 | 6.4 | | 2024 | Asian or other-race Protestants | 29.3 | 23.7 | 34.9 | 340 | 30.4 | 25.0 | 35.9 | 699 | 1.2 | −6.7 | 9.0 | | 2024 | White Catholics | 43.6 | 41.9 | 45.3 | 4,264 | 37.1 | 35.4 | 38.9 | 5,974 | −6.5 | −8.9 | −4.0 | | 2024 | Hispanic Catholics | 70.2 | 65.8 | 74.6 | 599 | 57.0 | 52.5 | 61.5 | 1,351 | −13.2 | −19.5 | −6.9 | | 2024 | Black Catholics | 94.5 | 89.3 | 99.6 | 94 | 76.0 | 67.2 | 84.8 | 260 | −18.5 | −28.7 | −8.2 | | 2024 | Asian or other-race Catholics | 48.8 | 40.3 | 57.3 | 219 | 45.4 | 37.0 | 53.7 | 388 | −3.4 | −15.4 | 8.5 | | 2024 | Jewish | 71.3 | 67.1 | 75.6 | 552 | 68.0 | 64.0 | 72.1 | 1,219 | −3.3 | −9.2 | 2.5 | | 2024 | Mormon | 24.6 | 20.1 | 29.1 | 465 | 31.1 | 24.8 | 37.4 | 438 | 6.5 | −1.2 | 14.2 | | 2024 | Muslim | 96.0 | 89.4 | 100.0 | 50 | 65.9 | 52.7 | 79.0 | 139 | −30.1 | −44.8 | −15.4 | | 2024 | Orthodox Christian | 51.8 | 40.4 | 63.2 | 91 | 30.9 | 19.7 | 42.0 | 197 | −20.9 | −36.9 | −4.9 | | 2024 | Buddhist or Hindu | 91.1 | 85.9 | 96.3 | 150 | 71.6 | 64.8 | 78.5 | 431 | −19.5 | −28.1 | −10.9 | | 2024 | Another religion or something else | 58.4 | 56.4 | 60.4 | 3,778 | 43.9 | 40.8 | 46.9 | 3,082 | −14.5 | −18.2 | −10.9 | | 2024 | Unaffiliated | 76.5 | 75.0 | 78.1 | 4,544 | 70.9 | 69.7 | 72.2 | 14,311 | −5.6 | −7.6 | −3.7 | | 2020 | White born-again Protestants | 20.7 | 19.3 | 22.1 | 4,399 | 15.7 | 14.7 | 16.7 | 6,263 | −5.0 | −6.7 | −3.3 | | 2020 | White Protestants who are not born-again | 50.9 | 48.9 | 52.8 | 3,353 | 46.7 | 45.1 | 48.2 | 5,132 | −4.2 | −6.7 | −1.7 | | 2020 | Black Protestants | 93.4 | 90.9 | 95.9 | 456 | 91.3 | 89.5 | 93.0 | 2,191 | −2.1 | −5.2 | 0.9 | | 2020 | Hispanic Protestants | 36.4 | 28.7 | 44.1 | 176 | 51.5 | 45.6 | 57.5 | 778 | 15.1 | 5.4 | 24.9 | | 2020 | Asian or other-race Protestants | 29.3 | 23.7 | 34.9 | 340 | 35.4 | 30.4 | 40.4 | 713 | 6.1 | −1.4 | 13.6 | | 2020 | White Catholics | 43.6 | 41.9 | 45.3 | 4,264 | 40.4 | 39.0 | 41.8 | 6,265 | −3.2 | −5.4 | −1.0 | | 2020 | Hispanic Catholics | 70.2 | 65.8 | 74.6 | 599 | 66.2 | 62.2 | 70.2 | 1,621 | −4.0 | −9.9 | 1.9 | | 2020 | Black Catholics | 94.5 | 89.3 | 99.6 | 94 | 88.6 | 83.1 | 94.0 | 262 | −5.9 | −13.4 | 1.7 | | 2020 | Asian or other-race Catholics | 48.8 | 40.3 | 57.3 | 219 | 54.5 | 47.6 | 61.4 | 404 | 5.7 | −5.2 | 16.7 | | 2020 | Jewish | 71.3 | 67.1 | 75.6 | 552 | 71.5 | 68.9 | 74.2 | 1,323 | 0.2 | −4.8 | 5.2 | | 2020 | Mormon | 24.6 | 20.1 | 29.1 | 465 | 28.5 | 23.6 | 33.4 | 496 | 3.9 | −2.8 | 10.5 | | 2020 | Muslim | 96.0 | 89.4 | 100.0 | 50 | 84.8 | 76.0 | 93.6 | 179 | −11.1 | −22.1 | −0.2 | | 2020 | Orthodox Christian | 51.8 | 40.4 | 63.2 | 91 | 40.9 | 30.0 | 51.7 | 202 | −10.9 | −26.7 | 4.8 | | 2020 | Buddhist or Hindu | 91.1 | 85.9 | 96.3 | 150 | 74.3 | 69.2 | 79.4 | 495 | −16.8 | −24.1 | −9.5 | | 2020 | Another religion or something else | 58.4 | 56.4 | 60.4 | 3,778 | 51.7 | 49.1 | 54.2 | 2,716 | −6.7 | −9.9 | −3.5 | | 2020 | Unaffiliated | 76.5 | 75.0 | 78.1 | 4,544 | 73.1 | 72.1 | 74.0 | 14,815 | −3.4 | −5.2 | −1.7 | | 2016 | White born-again Protestants | 20.7 | 19.3 | 22.1 | 4,399 | 17.5 | 16.3 | 18.7 | 6,313 | −3.2 | −5.1 | −1.4 | | 2016 | White Protestants who are not born-again | 50.9 | 48.9 | 52.8 | 3,353 | 43.4 | 41.8 | 45.1 | 5,568 | −7.5 | −10.0 | −4.9 | | 2016 | Black Protestants | 93.4 | 90.9 | 95.9 | 456 | 92.9 | 91.2 | 94.6 | 2,337 | −0.5 | −3.5 | 2.6 | | 2016 | Hispanic Protestants | 36.4 | 28.7 | 44.1 | 176 | 46.1 | 39.9 | 52.2 | 774 | 9.7 | −0.2 | 19.6 | | 2016 | Asian or other-race Protestants | 29.3 | 23.7 | 34.9 | 340 | 39.9 | 35.1 | 44.6 | 714 | 10.6 | 3.3 | 18.0 | | 2016 | White Catholics | 43.6 | 41.9 | 45.3 | 4,264 | 41.4 | 40.0 | 42.9 | 6,737 | −2.2 | −4.4 | 0.1 | | 2016 | Hispanic Catholics | 70.2 | 65.8 | 74.6 | 599 | 73.2 | 69.3 | 77.1 | 1,725 | 3.0 | −2.8 | 8.8 | | 2016 | Black Catholics | 94.5 | 89.3 | 99.6 | 94 | 88.3 | 82.3 | 94.3 | 294 | −6.1 | −14.1 | 1.8 | | 2016 | Asian or other-race Catholics | 48.8 | 40.3 | 57.3 | 219 | 51.6 | 45.1 | 58.1 | 373 | 2.8 | −7.9 | 13.5 | | 2016 | Jewish | 71.3 | 67.1 | 75.6 | 552 | 71.8 | 68.8 | 74.8 | 1,200 | 0.5 | −4.7 | 5.7 | | 2016 | Mormon | 24.6 | 20.1 | 29.1 | 465 | 31.3 | 25.6 | 37.0 | 447 | 6.7 | −0.6 | 13.9 | | 2016 | Muslim | 96.0 | 89.4 | 100.0 | 50 | 86.3 | 79.6 | 92.9 | 163 | −9.7 | −19.0 | −0.4 | | 2016 | Orthodox Christian | 51.8 | 40.4 | 63.2 | 91 | 40.5 | 32.3 | 48.6 | 222 | −11.3 | −25.3 | 2.7 | | 2016 | Buddhist or Hindu | 91.1 | 85.9 | 96.3 | 150 | 77.6 | 72.5 | 82.8 | 435 | −13.5 | −20.8 | −6.2 | | 2016 | Another religion or something else | 58.4 | 56.4 | 60.4 | 3,778 | 58.1 | 55.1 | 61.0 | 2,022 | −0.3 | −3.9 | 3.3 | | 2016 | Unaffiliated | 76.5 | 75.0 | 78.1 | 4,544 | 68.2 | 67.1 | 69.4 | 11,528 | −8.3 | −10.2 | −6.4 | | 2012 | White born-again Protestants | 20.7 | 19.3 | 22.1 | 4,399 | 22.2 | 20.8 | 23.6 | 7,394 | 1.5 | −0.4 | 3.5 | | 2012 | White Protestants who are not born-again | 50.9 | 48.9 | 52.8 | 3,353 | 47.8 | 46.1 | 49.5 | 6,327 | −3.1 | −5.7 | −0.5 | | 2012 | Black Protestants | 93.4 | 90.9 | 95.9 | 456 | 95.9 | 94.6 | 97.3 | 1,979 | 2.5 | −0.3 | 5.4 | | 2012 | Hispanic Protestants | 36.4 | 28.7 | 44.1 | 176 | 46.7 | 39.8 | 53.7 | 549 | 10.3 | −0.1 | 20.7 | | 2012 | Asian or other-race Protestants | 29.3 | 23.7 | 34.9 | 340 | 37.8 | 32.0 | 43.5 | 706 | 8.5 | 0.5 | 16.5 | | 2012 | White Catholics | 43.6 | 41.9 | 45.3 | 4,264 | 43.3 | 41.7 | 45.0 | 6,570 | −0.3 | −2.6 | 2.1 | | 2012 | Hispanic Catholics | 70.2 | 65.8 | 74.6 | 599 | 69.6 | 65.5 | 73.8 | 1,191 | −0.6 | −6.5 | 5.4 | | 2012 | Black Catholics | 94.5 | 89.3 | 99.6 | 94 | 96.1 | 92.1 | 100.0 | 195 | 1.6 | −4.9 | 8.2 | | 2012 | Asian or other-race Catholics | 48.8 | 40.3 | 57.3 | 219 | 49.1 | 40.7 | 57.5 | 322 | 0.3 | −11.7 | 12.3 | | 2012 | Jewish | 71.3 | 67.1 | 75.6 | 552 | 66.7 | 62.5 | 70.9 | 1,031 | −4.7 | −10.6 | 1.3 | | 2012 | Mormon | 24.6 | 20.1 | 29.1 | 465 | 15.2 | 11.2 | 19.1 | 681 | −9.4 | −15.4 | −3.5 | | 2012 | Muslim | 96.0 | 89.4 | 100.0 | 50 | 81.1 | 67.7 | 94.6 | 69 | −14.8 | −29.8 | 0.1 | | 2012 | Orthodox Christian | 51.8 | 40.4 | 63.2 | 91 | 50.2 | 39.0 | 61.4 | 167 | −1.6 | −17.6 | 14.4 | | 2012 | Buddhist or Hindu | 91.1 | 85.9 | 96.3 | 150 | 86.8 | 81.1 | 92.6 | 316 | −4.3 | −12.1 | 3.4 | | 2012 | Another religion or something else | 58.4 | 56.4 | 60.4 | 3,778 | 64.3 | 60.8 | 67.7 | 1,777 | 5.9 | 1.9 | 9.9 | | 2012 | Unaffiliated | 76.5 | 75.0 | 78.1 | 4,544 | 73.6 | 72.2 | 75.1 | 8,449 | −2.9 | −5.0 | −0.8 | Views: 2008 and 2024 (later = 2024); 2008 and 2020 (later = 2020); 2008 and 2016 (later = 2016); 2008 and 2012 (later = 2012). Note: In the default view, 2008 and 2024, Mormon voters are the one group whose point estimate rose by more than a few points, and the interval of the change includes zero; in the other views other groups rise. A cell is drawn only when it has at least 30 respondents and an effective sample of at least 30. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so they cover sampling error and not how respondents were recruited. Source: Cooperative Election Study, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/vote_change.json ### Table 4. Inside tradition-by-race groups the vote differs by attendance in different directions: seldom minus frequent attenders in the Democratic share was +13.7 points among white Catholics, +10.1 among white born-again Protestants, +1.9 among Black Protestants and −5.4 among white Protestants who are not born-again, a sign that the GSS and ANES do not reproduce Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote among frequent attenders (weekly or more) and seldom attenders (a few times a year or never), by tradition and race, reported voters, percent, 2008 to 2024 pooled (buttons: single years and party identification); 95% intervals | View | Group | Frequent attenders (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | Seldom attenders (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | Seldom minus frequent (points) | Lower | Upper | Interval width (points) | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | votepool | Jewish | 49.0 | 43.3 | 54.7 | 581 | 72.8 | 71.0 | 74.6 | 4,178 | 23.8 | 17.9 | 29.8 | 11.9 | | votepool | Unaffiliated | 55.0 | 51.1 | 59.0 | 1,372 | 73.1 | 72.5 | 73.7 | 50,916 | 18.1 | 14.1 | 22.1 | 8.0 | | votepool | Mormon | 19.7 | 17.3 | 22.1 | 1,830 | 37.2 | 31.2 | 43.2 | 545 | 17.5 | 11.1 | 23.9 | 12.8 | | votepool | Another religion or something else | 44.6 | 42.4 | 46.8 | 3,889 | 61.4 | 59.8 | 62.9 | 8,245 | 16.8 | 14.1 | 19.5 | 5.4 | | votepool | Asian or other-race Protestants | 28.0 | 24.6 | 31.3 | 1,480 | 42.6 | 38.6 | 46.7 | 1,332 | 14.7 | 9.4 | 19.9 | 10.5 | | votepool | Orthodox Christian | 33.6 | 24.0 | 43.1 | 258 | 47.4 | 41.4 | 53.4 | 498 | 13.8 | 2.6 | 25.1 | 22.6 | | votepool | Hispanic Protestants | 37.0 | 32.9 | 41.1 | 1,455 | 50.8 | 46.1 | 55.5 | 1,085 | 13.8 | 7.5 | 20.0 | 12.5 | | votepool | White Catholics | 32.5 | 31.3 | 33.7 | 9,448 | 46.3 | 45.3 | 47.3 | 17,363 | 13.7 | 12.2 | 15.3 | 3.1 | | votepool | Asian or other-race Catholics | 41.8 | 36.2 | 47.4 | 661 | 55.4 | 50.6 | 60.3 | 862 | 13.6 | 6.2 | 21.0 | 14.8 | | votepool | Hispanic Catholics | 59.0 | 55.3 | 62.7 | 1,782 | 70.9 | 68.5 | 73.3 | 3,877 | 11.9 | 7.5 | 16.3 | 8.8 | | votepool | White born-again Protestants | 14.2 | 13.6 | 14.9 | 17,922 | 24.3 | 23.2 | 25.5 | 9,263 | 10.1 | 8.7 | 11.4 | 2.7 | | votepool | Black Protestants | 90.7 | 89.3 | 92.0 | 4,310 | 92.6 | 91.2 | 94.0 | 3,398 | 1.9 | 0.0 | 3.8 | 3.9 | | votepool | Black Catholics | 88.0 | 83.0 | 93.0 | 401 | 89.6 | 85.7 | 93.5 | 550 | 1.6 | −4.7 | 8.0 | 12.7 | | votepool | Buddhist or Hindu | 79.6 | 72.4 | 86.7 | 217 | 78.1 | 75.0 | 81.2 | 1,442 | −1.5 | −9.3 | 6.3 | 15.6 | | votepool | Muslim | 81.8 | 74.5 | 89.2 | 230 | 79.3 | 72.1 | 86.5 | 296 | −2.5 | −12.8 | 7.7 | 20.5 | | votepool | White Protestants who are not born-again | 50.5 | 48.7 | 52.4 | 4,868 | 45.1 | 44.1 | 46.0 | 17,790 | −5.4 | −7.5 | −3.4 | 4.1 | | vote2024 | Unaffiliated | 42.0 | 30.9 | 53.1 | 271 | 72.1 | 70.9 | 73.4 | 13,762 | 30.1 | 19.0 | 41.3 | 22.3 | | vote2024 | Jewish | 41.9 | 28.4 | 55.4 | 134 | 71.7 | 67.4 | 76.0 | 956 | 29.8 | 15.6 | 44.0 | 28.3 | | vote2024 | Another religion or something else | 32.1 | 26.8 | 37.4 | 804 | 50.0 | 46.1 | 53.9 | 2,022 | 17.9 | 11.4 | 24.5 | 13.1 | | vote2024 | Hispanic Catholics | 47.8 | 39.1 | 56.6 | 349 | 63.2 | 57.5 | 68.8 | 844 | 15.3 | 4.9 | 25.7 | 20.8 | | vote2024 | Asian or other-race Protestants | 23.0 | 15.2 | 30.8 | 287 | 36.4 | 28.2 | 44.5 | 346 | 13.4 | 2.1 | 24.6 | 22.5 | | vote2024 | White Catholics | 29.0 | 25.8 | 32.1 | 1,572 | 41.0 | 38.7 | 43.3 | 3,876 | 12.0 | 8.1 | 15.9 | 7.8 | | vote2024 | Mormon | 27.5 | 20.9 | 34.1 | 285 | 38.6 | 23.3 | 54.0 | 131 | 11.1 | −5.6 | 27.8 | 33.4 | | vote2024 | Hispanic Protestants | 29.2 | 21.1 | 37.2 | 316 | 39.8 | 30.1 | 49.5 | 254 | 10.6 | −2.0 | 23.2 | 25.2 | | vote2024 | White born-again Protestants | 10.7 | 9.3 | 12.2 | 3,267 | 20.2 | 17.8 | 22.7 | 2,113 | 9.5 | 6.6 | 12.4 | 5.7 | | vote2024 | Asian or other-race Catholics | 42.5 | 28.7 | 56.4 | 134 | 49.4 | 38.6 | 60.1 | 217 | 6.8 | −10.7 | 24.3 | 35.0 | | vote2024 | Black Protestants | 83.4 | 79.1 | 87.6 | 839 | 84.2 | 80.1 | 88.3 | 845 | 0.8 | −5.1 | 6.7 | 11.8 | | vote2024 | Black Catholics | 79.4 | 65.2 | 93.6 | 91 | 77.2 | 65.0 | 89.3 | 137 | −2.3 | −20.9 | 16.4 | 37.3 | | vote2024 | White Protestants who are not born-again | 46.6 | 42.3 | 50.9 | 904 | 42.5 | 40.2 | 44.8 | 3,588 | −4.1 | −9.0 | 0.8 | 9.8 | | vote2008 | Asian or other-race Catholics | 34.5 | 21.3 | 47.6 | 92 | 61.3 | 49.1 | 73.5 | 101 | 26.8 | 8.9 | 44.7 | 35.8 | | vote2008 | Jewish | 49.4 | 32.0 | 66.8 | 58 | 74.2 | 69.6 | 78.7 | 422 | 24.7 | 6.7 | 42.7 | 36.0 | | vote2008 | Asian or other-race Protestants | 21.1 | 13.9 | 28.3 | 181 | 44.0 | 33.9 | 54.1 | 114 | 22.9 | 10.5 | 35.3 | 24.8 | | vote2008 | White Catholics | 33.1 | 30.4 | 35.8 | 1,507 | 50.1 | 47.7 | 52.5 | 2,217 | 17.0 | 13.4 | 20.6 | 7.3 | | vote2008 | Another religion or something else | 49.6 | 46.6 | 52.6 | 1,664 | 66.2 | 63.3 | 69.1 | 1,676 | 16.6 | 12.4 | 20.8 | 8.4 | | vote2008 | Hispanic Catholics | 59.4 | 51.1 | 67.7 | 184 | 75.9 | 70.4 | 81.4 | 335 | 16.5 | 6.5 | 26.5 | 19.9 | | vote2008 | Mormon | 19.9 | 15.2 | 24.5 | 366 | 36.4 | 23.2 | 49.5 | 69 | 16.5 | 2.6 | 30.4 | 27.9 | | vote2008 | White born-again Protestants | 15.6 | 14.1 | 17.1 | 2,823 | 30.7 | 27.5 | 33.9 | 1,082 | 15.1 | 11.5 | 18.6 | 7.1 | | vote2008 | Hispanic Protestants | 33.1 | 22.5 | 43.8 | 87 | 42.2 | 27.4 | 57.0 | 56 | 9.1 | −9.1 | 27.3 | 36.4 | | vote2008 | Black Protestants | 91.6 | 87.8 | 95.5 | 229 | 96.5 | 93.3 | 99.7 | 156 | 4.9 | −0.1 | 9.9 | 10.1 | | vote2008 | Unaffiliated | 76.2 | 64.3 | 88.0 | 80 | 76.6 | 75.0 | 78.1 | 4,351 | 0.4 | −11.5 | 12.3 | 23.8 | | vote2008 | White Protestants who are not born-again | 54.2 | 49.8 | 58.6 | 648 | 49.8 | 47.4 | 52.2 | 2,298 | −4.4 | −9.4 | 0.6 | 10.0 | | partypool | Mormon | 17.2 | 15.0 | 19.3 | 2,269 | 41.3 | 35.8 | 46.8 | 684 | 24.1 | 18.3 | 30.0 | 11.7 | | partypool | Jewish | 51.3 | 45.9 | 56.7 | 734 | 74.2 | 72.4 | 75.9 | 4,510 | 22.8 | 17.2 | 28.5 | 11.4 | | partypool | Asian or other-race Catholics | 44.1 | 38.8 | 49.3 | 752 | 60.3 | 55.7 | 64.8 | 1,043 | 16.2 | 9.3 | 23.1 | 13.8 | | partypool | Asian or other-race Protestants | 31.5 | 28.1 | 34.9 | 1,651 | 47.6 | 43.6 | 51.6 | 1,475 | 16.1 | 10.8 | 21.3 | 10.5 | | partypool | Another religion or something else | 49.0 | 46.9 | 51.0 | 4,733 | 64.1 | 62.7 | 65.5 | 10,365 | 15.1 | 12.6 | 17.6 | 5.0 | | partypool | Hispanic Protestants | 40.8 | 37.1 | 44.4 | 2,136 | 54.8 | 50.6 | 59.1 | 1,641 | 14.1 | 8.5 | 19.6 | 11.2 | | partypool | White Catholics | 36.4 | 35.2 | 37.6 | 10,228 | 49.3 | 48.4 | 50.3 | 19,111 | 13.0 | 11.4 | 14.5 | 3.1 | | partypool | Unaffiliated | 61.5 | 58.3 | 64.8 | 2,102 | 74.3 | 73.8 | 74.9 | 61,418 | 12.8 | 9.5 | 16.1 | 6.6 | | partypool | Orthodox Christian | 38.8 | 31.1 | 46.4 | 358 | 51.2 | 45.3 | 57.1 | 634 | 12.4 | 2.8 | 22.1 | 19.3 | | partypool | White born-again Protestants | 15.5 | 14.8 | 16.2 | 19,881 | 26.7 | 25.5 | 27.8 | 10,637 | 11.2 | 9.9 | 12.5 | 2.7 | | partypool | Hispanic Catholics | 64.8 | 61.7 | 67.9 | 2,670 | 75.0 | 73.0 | 76.9 | 5,989 | 10.2 | 6.5 | 13.8 | 7.3 | | partypool | Muslim | 77.6 | 71.6 | 83.5 | 508 | 83.2 | 78.3 | 88.1 | 537 | 5.6 | −2.1 | 13.3 | 15.5 | | partypool | Buddhist or Hindu | 74.2 | 67.7 | 80.7 | 329 | 78.1 | 75.3 | 81.0 | 1,949 | 3.9 | −3.2 | 11.1 | 14.3 | | partypool | Black Protestants | 90.7 | 89.6 | 91.9 | 6,552 | 93.3 | 92.2 | 94.4 | 5,409 | 2.6 | 1.0 | 4.2 | 3.2 | | partypool | Black Catholics | 87.0 | 82.7 | 91.2 | 683 | 89.2 | 85.8 | 92.7 | 867 | 2.3 | −3.2 | 7.7 | 10.9 | | partypool | White Protestants who are not born-again | 49.6 | 47.7 | 51.4 | 5,161 | 45.9 | 44.9 | 46.8 | 19,334 | −3.7 | −5.8 | −1.7 | 4.1 | Views: Vote, 2008 to 2024 (view = votepool); Vote, 2024 (view = vote2024); Vote, 2008 (view = vote2008); Party identification, 2008 to 2024 (view = partypool). Note: Monthly attenders are in neither group. Frequent is the top two answers of the CES six-point item, once a week and more than once a week. A group is drawn when both attendance cells meet the sample floor, so fewer groups appear in a single year. A cell is drawn only when it has at least 30 respondents and an effective sample of at least 30. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so they cover sampling error and not how respondents were recruited. Source: Cooperative Election Study, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/attendance_gradient.json ### Table 5. Of the 27.7 point gap between seldom and frequent attenders in the 2024 vote, 14.6 points is a gap inside tradition-by-race groups and 13.1 points reflects which groups the two attendance levels contain Seldom minus frequent attenders in the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, percentage points, split into a within-group part and a mix part, 2008 to 2024; 95% intervals | Part | Election | Points | Lower | Upper | Voters | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Pooled gap | 2008 | 25.6 | 23.9 | 27.2 | 21,124 | | Gap inside groups | 2008 | 10.7 | 8.4 | 12.9 | 21,124 | | Mix of groups | 2008 | 14.9 | 13.1 | 16.7 | 21,124 | | Pooled gap | 2012 | 27.3 | 25.7 | 28.8 | 34,338 | | Gap inside groups | 2012 | 15.0 | 12.7 | 17.2 | 34,338 | | Mix of groups | 2012 | 12.3 | 10.5 | 14.2 | 34,338 | | Pooled gap | 2016 | 18.9 | 17.4 | 20.5 | 37,341 | | Gap inside groups | 2016 | 8.0 | 6.1 | 9.9 | 37,341 | | Mix of groups | 2016 | 11.0 | 9.4 | 12.5 | 37,341 | | Pooled gap | 2020 | 23.5 | 22.1 | 25.0 | 40,502 | | Gap inside groups | 2020 | 8.7 | 6.7 | 10.7 | 40,502 | | Mix of groups | 2020 | 14.8 | 13.3 | 16.4 | 40,502 | | Pooled gap | 2024 | 27.7 | 26.0 | 29.4 | 39,039 | | Gap inside groups | 2024 | 14.6 | 11.8 | 17.4 | 39,039 | | Mix of groups | 2024 | 13.1 | 10.6 | 15.5 | 39,039 | Note: The pooled gap here covers voters with a tradition-by-race group and an attendance answer in the frequent or seldom group, so it can differ by a few tenths of a point from the all-voter gap of the god-gap chapter. The within part weights each group's own gap by its average share of the two attendance groups, and the mix part prices the difference in the groups' shares at each group's average Democratic share; the two parts add to the pooled gap exactly. Note: Standard errors come from 1,000 seeded bootstrap resamples of respondents; the interval is a normal 95% interval around the estimate. The decomposition is an accounting of the gap and not a causal split. Note: The unaffiliated contribute 7.2 of the 14.6 points of the 2024 within-group part, and without them that part is 7.4 points. Their weekly cell has an effective sample of 77 respondents in 2024 against 134, 212 and 208 in 2012, 2016 and 2020, and their gap of +30.1 points in 2024 compares with +20.2, +15.7 and +14.3 in those elections. Source: Cooperative Election Study, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/gap_decomposition.json ### Table 6. White born-again Protestants contribute 10.2 points to the mix part of the 2024 gap and Black Protestants −1.8 points, while the unaffiliated contribute 7.2 points to the within-group part Each group's contribution to the gap between seldom and frequent attenders in the Democratic share of the two-party vote, percentage points, split into the group's own gap and the mix of attendance groups, 2024 (button: five elections pooled); 95% intervals | View | Group | Part | Contribution (points) | Lower | Upper | Share of frequent attenders (%) | Share of seldom attenders (%) | Voters in the group | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | pooled | White born-again Protestants | Gap inside the group | 2.3 | 2.0 | 2.7 | 37.3 | 9.2 | 27,185 | | pooled | White born-again Protestants | Mix of the attendance groups | 9.2 | 9.0 | 9.5 | 37.3 | 9.2 | 27,185 | | pooled | Unaffiliated | Gap inside the group | 3.9 | 3.1 | 4.8 | 2.9 | 40.5 | 52,288 | | pooled | Unaffiliated | Mix of the attendance groups | 4.5 | 3.8 | 5.2 | 2.9 | 40.5 | 52,288 | | pooled | White Catholics | Gap inside the group | 2.1 | 1.8 | 2.3 | 16.2 | 13.8 | 26,811 | | pooled | White Catholics | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 16.2 | 13.8 | 26,811 | | pooled | Another religion or something else | Gap inside the group | 1.5 | 1.2 | 1.7 | 9.7 | 7.8 | 12,134 | | pooled | Another religion or something else | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 9.7 | 7.8 | 12,134 | | pooled | Mormon | Gap inside the group | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.5 | 3.8 | 0.5 | 2,375 | | pooled | Mormon | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.8 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 3.8 | 0.5 | 2,375 | | pooled | Jewish | Gap inside the group | 0.5 | 0.4 | 0.6 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 4,759 | | pooled | Jewish | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 3.0 | 4,759 | | pooled | Asian or other-race Protestants | Gap inside the group | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 2.9 | 1.2 | 2,812 | | pooled | Asian or other-race Protestants | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.3 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 2.9 | 1.2 | 2,812 | | pooled | Hispanic Protestants | Gap inside the group | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.4 | 3.0 | 0.8 | 2,540 | | pooled | Hispanic Protestants | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 3.0 | 0.8 | 2,540 | | pooled | Hispanic Catholics | Gap inside the group | 0.4 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 5,659 | | pooled | Hispanic Catholics | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 3.7 | 3.6 | 5,659 | | pooled | Buddhist or Hindu | Gap inside the group | 0.0 | −0.1 | 0.0 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 1,659 | | pooled | Buddhist or Hindu | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.2 | 0.4 | 1.2 | 1,659 | | pooled | Asian or other-race Catholics | Gap inside the group | 0.1 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 1,523 | | pooled | Asian or other-race Catholics | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 1.3 | 0.7 | 1,523 | | pooled | Orthodox Christian | Gap inside the group | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 756 | | pooled | Orthodox Christian | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.4 | 756 | | pooled | Muslim | Gap inside the group | 0.0 | −0.1 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 526 | | pooled | Muslim | Mix of the attendance groups | −0.1 | −0.1 | 0.0 | 0.5 | 0.3 | 526 | | pooled | Black Catholics | Gap inside the group | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 951 | | pooled | Black Catholics | Mix of the attendance groups | −0.1 | −0.2 | −0.1 | 0.8 | 0.5 | 951 | | pooled | White Protestants who are not born-again | Gap inside the group | −0.6 | −0.8 | −0.4 | 7.6 | 13.5 | 22,658 | | pooled | White Protestants who are not born-again | Mix of the attendance groups | −0.3 | −0.3 | −0.2 | 7.6 | 13.5 | 22,658 | | pooled | Black Protestants | Gap inside the group | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 8.5 | 3.0 | 7,708 | | pooled | Black Protestants | Mix of the attendance groups | −2.2 | −2.3 | −2.0 | 8.5 | 3.0 | 7,708 | | y2024 | White born-again Protestants | Gap inside the group | 2.3 | 1.6 | 3.0 | 39.0 | 9.1 | 5,380 | | y2024 | White born-again Protestants | Mix of the attendance groups | 10.2 | 9.5 | 10.9 | 39.0 | 9.1 | 5,380 | | y2024 | Unaffiliated | Gap inside the group | 7.2 | 4.7 | 9.7 | 3.0 | 44.8 | 14,033 | | y2024 | Unaffiliated | Mix of the attendance groups | 3.1 | 1.0 | 5.3 | 3.0 | 44.8 | 14,033 | | y2024 | White Catholics | Gap inside the group | 1.5 | 1.0 | 2.0 | 13.3 | 12.0 | 5,448 | | y2024 | White Catholics | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.2 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 13.3 | 12.0 | 5,448 | | y2024 | Another religion or something else | Gap inside the group | 1.4 | 0.9 | 1.9 | 8.5 | 7.3 | 2,826 | | y2024 | Another religion or something else | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 8.5 | 7.3 | 2,826 | | y2024 | Hispanic Protestants | Gap inside the group | 0.3 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 4.3 | 1.1 | 570 | | y2024 | Hispanic Protestants | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.5 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 4.3 | 1.1 | 570 | | y2024 | Jewish | Gap inside the group | 0.7 | 0.3 | 1.0 | 1.3 | 3.0 | 1,090 | | y2024 | Jewish | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 1.3 | 3.0 | 1,090 | | y2024 | Asian or other-race Protestants | Gap inside the group | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.6 | 3.6 | 1.5 | 633 | | y2024 | Asian or other-race Protestants | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 3.6 | 1.5 | 633 | | y2024 | Mormon | Gap inside the group | 0.2 | −0.1 | 0.5 | 2.9 | 0.5 | 416 | | y2024 | Mormon | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.4 | 0.2 | 0.6 | 2.9 | 0.5 | 416 | | y2024 | Hispanic Catholics | Gap inside the group | 0.6 | 0.2 | 1.0 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 1,193 | | y2024 | Hispanic Catholics | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.0 | −0.1 | 0.0 | 4.3 | 3.5 | 1,193 | | y2024 | Buddhist or Hindu | Gap inside the group | 0.1 | −0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 406 | | y2024 | Buddhist or Hindu | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0.3 | 1.4 | 406 | | y2024 | Orthodox Christian | Gap inside the group | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 163 | | y2024 | Orthodox Christian | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.2 | 0.7 | 0.3 | 163 | | y2024 | Asian or other-race Catholics | Gap inside the group | 0.1 | −0.1 | 0.3 | 1.7 | 0.9 | 351 | | y2024 | Asian or other-race Catholics | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.0 | 0.0 | 0.1 | 1.7 | 0.9 | 351 | | y2024 | Muslim | Gap inside the group | 0.1 | 0.0 | 0.3 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 126 | | y2024 | Muslim | Mix of the attendance groups | 0.0 | −0.1 | 0.0 | 0.6 | 0.3 | 126 | | y2024 | Black Catholics | Gap inside the group | 0.0 | −0.2 | 0.1 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 228 | | y2024 | Black Catholics | Mix of the attendance groups | −0.2 | −0.3 | 0.0 | 1.0 | 0.5 | 228 | | y2024 | White Protestants who are not born-again | Gap inside the group | −0.4 | −0.8 | 0.1 | 6.9 | 10.7 | 4,492 | | y2024 | White Protestants who are not born-again | Mix of the attendance groups | −0.2 | −0.3 | −0.1 | 6.9 | 10.7 | 4,492 | | y2024 | Black Protestants | Gap inside the group | 0.0 | −0.3 | 0.4 | 8.4 | 3.0 | 1,684 | | y2024 | Black Protestants | Mix of the attendance groups | −1.8 | −2.2 | −1.5 | 8.4 | 3.0 | 1,684 | Views: 2024 (view = y2024); 2008 to 2024 pooled (view = pooled). Note: The unaffiliated within-group contribution rests on a small number of weekly attenders: the frequent cell has an effective sample of 77 in 2024. Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Note: A group enters when it has at least 30 voters with a frequent or seldom attendance answer in the sample. Source: Cooperative Election Study, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/group_contributions.json ### Table 7. In the GSS the Democratic share of party identifiers among white RELTRAD evangelical Protestants fell from 61.0% in 1972 to 1984 to 30.6% in 2010 to 2018, while Black Protestants stayed near 91.1% Democratic share of Democratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) by RELTRAD tradition, for all members and for frequent and seldom attenders, five survey windows from 1972 to 2022, percent; 95% intervals (button: the ANES presidential vote, 1980 to 2020) | Survey | Group | Group of attenders | Survey years | Democratic share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 1972 to 1984 | 88.5 | 86.5 | 90.5 | 1,537 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 1985 to 1996 | 88.5 | 86.5 | 90.4 | 1,576 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 1998 to 2008 | 90.9 | 89.0 | 92.7 | 1,266 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 2010 to 2018 | 91.1 | 88.6 | 93.6 | 752 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 2021 to 2022 | 88.5 | 83.5 | 93.5 | 320 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 1972 to 1984 | 89.1 | 85.9 | 92.3 | 586 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 1985 to 1996 | 90.2 | 87.2 | 93.1 | 592 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 1998 to 2008 | 91.0 | 88.1 | 93.9 | 532 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 2010 to 2018 | 93.1 | 89.5 | 96.7 | 299 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 2021 to 2022 | 91.0 | 82.9 | 99.2 | 126 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 1972 to 1984 | 89.4 | 86.0 | 92.8 | 512 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 1985 to 1996 | 86.6 | 83.0 | 90.2 | 496 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 1998 to 2008 | 89.8 | 86.2 | 93.4 | 383 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 2010 to 2018 | 90.0 | 85.3 | 94.7 | 236 | | GSS | Black Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 2021 to 2022 | 83.5 | 75.2 | 91.8 | 138 | | GSS | Catholics | All members | 1972 to 1984 | 72.4 | 70.7 | 74.1 | 3,635 | | GSS | Catholics | All members | 1985 to 1996 | 56.9 | 55.1 | 58.8 | 3,813 | | GSS | Catholics | All members | 1998 to 2008 | 56.9 | 55.0 | 58.9 | 3,354 | | GSS | Catholics | All members | 2010 to 2018 | 58.3 | 55.7 | 60.9 | 2,117 | | GSS | Catholics | All members | 2021 to 2022 | 53.2 | 49.1 | 57.3 | 1,188 | | GSS | Catholics | Frequent attenders | 1972 to 1984 | 71.3 | 68.9 | 73.8 | 1,788 | | GSS | Catholics | Frequent attenders | 1985 to 1996 | 57.1 | 54.2 | 60.0 | 1,552 | | GSS | Catholics | Frequent attenders | 1998 to 2008 | 53.6 | 50.3 | 56.9 | 1,210 | | GSS | Catholics | Frequent attenders | 2010 to 2018 | 54.1 | 49.3 | 58.9 | 642 | | GSS | Catholics | Frequent attenders | 2021 to 2022 | 52.0 | 44.0 | 60.0 | 315 | | GSS | Catholics | Seldom attenders | 1972 to 1984 | 72.1 | 69.3 | 74.9 | 1,349 | | GSS | Catholics | Seldom attenders | 1985 to 1996 | 57.9 | 55.1 | 60.7 | 1,576 | | GSS | Catholics | Seldom attenders | 1998 to 2008 | 58.7 | 55.8 | 61.5 | 1,555 | | GSS | Catholics | Seldom attenders | 2010 to 2018 | 60.6 | 57.0 | 64.2 | 1,062 | | GSS | Catholics | Seldom attenders | 2021 to 2022 | 53.4 | 48.2 | 58.5 | 743 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 1972 to 1984 | 61.0 | 59.0 | 63.0 | 3,099 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 1985 to 1996 | 43.8 | 42.0 | 45.5 | 3,902 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 1998 to 2008 | 35.3 | 33.4 | 37.2 | 3,076 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 2010 to 2018 | 30.6 | 28.1 | 33.1 | 1,855 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 2021 to 2022 | 16.0 | 12.4 | 19.6 | 834 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 1972 to 1984 | 55.0 | 52.0 | 58.1 | 1,415 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 1985 to 1996 | 37.4 | 34.9 | 40.0 | 1,684 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 1998 to 2008 | 26.5 | 24.0 | 29.0 | 1,517 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 2010 to 2018 | 23.2 | 20.0 | 26.4 | 941 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 2021 to 2022 | 13.7 | 9.2 | 18.3 | 488 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 1972 to 1984 | 67.4 | 64.3 | 70.5 | 1,217 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 1985 to 1996 | 49.3 | 46.5 | 52.0 | 1,522 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 1998 to 2008 | 45.8 | 42.4 | 49.3 | 1,020 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 2010 to 2018 | 40.2 | 35.5 | 44.9 | 606 | | GSS | White evangelical Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 2021 to 2022 | 18.4 | 11.6 | 25.3 | 231 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 1972 to 1984 | 45.4 | 43.6 | 47.2 | 4,018 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 1985 to 1996 | 42.2 | 40.3 | 44.1 | 3,117 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 1998 to 2008 | 41.6 | 39.3 | 43.9 | 2,215 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 2010 to 2018 | 40.9 | 37.3 | 44.5 | 1,091 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | All members | 2021 to 2022 | 45.0 | 39.9 | 50.1 | 641 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 1972 to 1984 | 38.6 | 35.5 | 41.8 | 1,224 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 1985 to 1996 | 40.4 | 36.8 | 44.0 | 877 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 1998 to 2008 | 34.9 | 30.9 | 38.9 | 674 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 2010 to 2018 | 44.4 | 37.8 | 50.9 | 344 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | Frequent attenders | 2021 to 2022 | 36.9 | 28.0 | 45.8 | 174 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 1972 to 1984 | 51.0 | 48.5 | 53.5 | 2,008 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 1985 to 1996 | 44.4 | 41.7 | 47.2 | 1,566 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 1998 to 2008 | 45.5 | 42.2 | 48.9 | 1,100 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 2010 to 2018 | 40.8 | 35.8 | 45.9 | 541 | | GSS | White mainline Protestants (RELTRAD) | Seldom attenders | 2021 to 2022 | 47.0 | 40.5 | 53.5 | 393 | | ANES | Black Protestants | All members | 1980 to 1988 | 91.7 | 88.6 | 94.9 | 303 | | ANES | Black Protestants | All members | 1992 to 2000 | 93.8 | 91.0 | 96.6 | 328 | | ANES | Black Protestants | All members | 2008 to 2012 | 97.6 | 96.2 | 99.1 | 918 | | ANES | Black Protestants | All members | 2016 to 2020 | 93.1 | 90.2 | 96.1 | 512 | | ANES | White Catholics | All members | 1980 to 1988 | 42.9 | 39.3 | 46.5 | 725 | | ANES | White Catholics | All members | 1992 to 2000 | 47.0 | 43.5 | 50.6 | 843 | | ANES | White Catholics | All members | 2008 to 2012 | 46.6 | 42.2 | 51.0 | 742 | | ANES | White Catholics | All members | 2016 to 2020 | 42.5 | 39.4 | 45.7 | 1,427 | | ANES | White Protestants who are not born-again | All members | 1980 to 1988 | 30.9 | 27.8 | 33.9 | 865 | | ANES | White Protestants who are not born-again | All members | 1992 to 2000 | 44.1 | 40.6 | 47.5 | 871 | | ANES | White Protestants who are not born-again | All members | 2008 to 2012 | 44.4 | 39.9 | 49.0 | 702 | | ANES | White Protestants who are not born-again | All members | 2016 to 2020 | 47.0 | 43.6 | 50.4 | 1,331 | | ANES | White born-again Protestants | All members | 1980 to 1988 | 30.1 | 26.8 | 33.5 | 710 | | ANES | White born-again Protestants | All members | 1992 to 2000 | 29.3 | 25.9 | 32.6 | 787 | | ANES | White born-again Protestants | All members | 2008 to 2012 | 21.9 | 18.6 | 25.2 | 854 | | ANES | White born-again Protestants | All members | 2016 to 2020 | 19.1 | 16.5 | 21.8 | 1,437 | Views: GSS party identification, 1972 to 2022 (source = GSS); ANES presidential vote, 1980 to 2020 (source = ANES). Note: GSS view: tradition follows RELTRAD (Steensland and others 2000) from the GSS denomination items; the 2024 GSS has no detailed denomination, so the series ends in 2022. White evangelical and white mainline Protestants are RELTRAD evangelical and mainline respondents whose GSS race is white, which includes white respondents of Hispanic origin. Catholics are all Catholics, since the GSS records Hispanic origin only from 2000. Note: Frequent attenders attend nearly every week or more; seldom attenders a few times a year or never. The window 2021 to 2022 mixes web and in-person interviews: 87.8% of 2021 respondents were interviewed on the web. Respondents that RELTRAD cannot place are left out, 7.6% of respondents in 2021 to 2022. A cell is drawn only when it has at least 30 respondents and an effective sample of at least 30. Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Note: ANES view: reported two-party presidential vote, with the born-again rule of the CES. The born-again item is asked in every presidential-year study from 1980 to 2020 except 2004, and a respondent with no answer is in neither white Protestant group. The 2012 and 2016 studies add web samples and the 2020 study was collected online, by telephone and by video, so the last windows mix interview modes with the in-person studies of earlier years; there are no mode weights for 2020. The ANES weight is 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990. The 2024 religion codes of the cumulative file are unusable, so the series ends in 2020. Source: General Social Survey, 1972-2022, and ANES Cumulative Data File, 1980-2020; weighted (weight_use and VCF0009z, each rescaled to average one within each survey year) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/long_run_by_tradition.json ### Table 8. The ANES and the CES differ by +13.2 points for white Protestants who are not born-again in 2024, and only the CES puts their attendance gap below zero Two checks on the CES tradition-by-race coding: 2024 levels in the CES and the ANES Time Series, and the attendance gap for white Protestants under each survey and coding #### Table 8.1. Levels in 2024 In 2024 the ANES places each of six groups above the CES, most for white Protestants who are not born-again and Hispanic Catholics, and the two surveys order the groups identically Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, reported voters, percent, 2024; white Protestants are split by the born-again rule in both surveys; 95% intervals | Group | Survey | Democratic share (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | White born-again Protestants | CES | 14.5 | 13.2 | 15.7 | 5,987 | | White born-again Protestants | ANES | 20.9 | 15.7 | 26.0 | 497 | | White Protestants who are not born-again | CES | 43.0 | 41.0 | 45.0 | 4,979 | | White Protestants who are not born-again | ANES | 56.1 | 49.9 | 62.3 | 478 | | Black Protestants | CES | 83.1 | 80.3 | 86.0 | 1,889 | | Black Protestants | ANES | 90.2 | 84.0 | 96.3 | 179 | | White Catholics | CES | 37.1 | 35.4 | 38.9 | 5,974 | | White Catholics | ANES | 44.4 | 38.2 | 50.5 | 540 | | Hispanic Catholics | CES | 57.0 | 52.5 | 61.5 | 1,351 | | Hispanic Catholics | ANES | 71.5 | 59.9 | 83.1 | 123 | | Unaffiliated | CES | 70.9 | 69.7 | 72.2 | 14,311 | | Unaffiliated | ANES | 78.6 | 74.6 | 82.5 | 854 | #### Table 8.2. Attendance gap by coding The attendance gap among born-again or evangelical white Protestants has a positive point estimate under every coding and survey, and among not born-again or mainline white Protestants it is negative only in the CES Seldom minus frequent attenders in the Democratic share, percentage points, for the evangelical and the mainline group of white Protestants, by survey and coding; 95% intervals | Group | Survey and coding | Gap (points) | Lower | Upper | Frequent and seldom respondents | Democratic share, all attendance (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents in the group | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Born-again or evangelical white Protestants | CES vote, born-again rule | 10.1 | 8.7 | 11.4 | 27,185 | 18.1 | 17.6 | 18.7 | 30,356 | | Not born-again or mainline white Protestants | CES vote, born-again rule | −5.4 | −7.5 | −3.4 | 22,658 | 46.4 | 45.6 | 47.2 | 25,359 | | Born-again or evangelical white Protestants | CES party, born-again rule | 11.2 | 9.9 | 12.5 | 30,518 | 19.8 | 19.3 | 20.4 | 34,215 | | Not born-again or mainline white Protestants | CES party, born-again rule | −3.7 | −5.8 | −1.7 | 24,495 | 46.7 | 45.9 | 47.5 | 27,509 | | Born-again or evangelical white Protestants | GSS party, RELTRAD | 19.3 | 14.6 | 24.1 | 2,134 | 31.3 | 29.2 | 33.5 | 2,527 | | Not born-again or mainline white Protestants | GSS party, RELTRAD | 2.8 | −3.8 | 9.4 | 1,343 | 40.8 | 37.9 | 43.7 | 1,656 | | Born-again or evangelical white Protestants | GSS party, born-again rule | 17.3 | 12.7 | 21.9 | 2,354 | 30.0 | 27.9 | 32.0 | 2,764 | | Not born-again or mainline white Protestants | GSS party, born-again rule | 5.7 | −0.5 | 12.0 | 1,743 | 43.4 | 40.9 | 46.0 | 2,074 | | Born-again or evangelical white Protestants | ANES vote, ANES summary | 11.9 | 0.1 | 23.8 | 378 | 19.0 | 13.7 | 24.2 | 412 | | Not born-again or mainline white Protestants | ANES vote, ANES summary | 11.6 | −3.4 | 26.6 | 396 | 57.6 | 51.0 | 64.1 | 456 | | Born-again or evangelical white Protestants | ANES vote, born-again rule | 8.3 | −3.6 | 20.1 | 451 | 20.9 | 15.7 | 26.0 | 497 | | Not born-again or mainline white Protestants | ANES vote, born-again rule | 6.2 | −7.9 | 20.3 | 421 | 56.1 | 49.9 | 62.3 | 478 | Note: The CES rule puts white Protestants who call themselves born-again or evangelical in the evangelical group and the others in the mainline group. The GSS RELTRAD rows use denomination, the ANES summary rows use the ANES major-group religion summary (V241445x), and the born-again rows in the GSS and the ANES apply the CES rule to those surveys. This chapter has not checked the ANES summary against RELTRAD. In the GSS, 61.3% of white Protestants with a born-again answer and a party identification fall in the same group under RELTRAD and the born-again rule, counting respondents RELTRAD cannot place as disagreeing and leaving out pure independents; among those RELTRAD places in the evangelical or mainline tradition the share is 70.7%. Note: Among white Protestants whom RELTRAD places in the evangelical or mainline tradition, 39.0% of those who are not born-again are RELTRAD evangelical and 22.3% of those who are born-again are RELTRAD mainline. Note: GSS rows cover the surveys of 2006 to 2018, in all interview modes those surveys used, which include some telephone interviews; the CES rows cover the five presidential elections, and the ANES rows 2024, which mixed in-person, web and mail-return samples under one post-election weight. Frequent in the GSS is nearly weekly or more and in the ANES weekly or almost weekly, one answer wider than the CES. A cell is drawn only when it has at least 30 respondents and an effective sample of at least 30. Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Source: Cooperative Election Study, 2008-2024; General Social Survey, 2006-2018; ANES 2024 Time Series; weighted (weight_cumulative, weight_use and V240107b) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/coding_and_survey_checks.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (191), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | an_wml | 56.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white respondents in an ANES Protestant category who do not call themselves born-again who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 49.9% to 62.3% | 478 | V240107b (post-election weight) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | ans_wml | 57.6% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white respondents the ANES codes mainline Protestant who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 51.0% to 64.1% | 456 | V240107b (post-election weight) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | ap_w1_wev | 44.0% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again who identify with or lean toward a party | 1980 to 1988 | 95% CI 40.8% to 47.1% | 944 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ap_w1_wml | 42.5% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again who identify with or lean toward a party | 1980 to 1988 | 95% CI 39.6% to 45.4% | 1,092 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ap_w4_wml | 42.0% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again who identify with or lean toward a party | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 38.9% to 45.0% | 1,579 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | av_w1_bp | 91.7% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Black non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 1980 to 1988 | 95% CI 88.6% to 94.9% | 303 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | av_w1_wc | 42.9% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 1980 to 1988 | 95% CI 39.3% to 46.5% | 725 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | av_w1_wev | 30.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 1980 to 1988 | 95% CI 26.8% to 33.5% | 710 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | av_w1_wml | 30.9% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 1980 to 1988 | 95% CI 27.8% to 33.9% | 865 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | av_w4_bp | 93.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Black non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 90.2% to 96.1% | 512 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | av_w4_wc | 42.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 39.4% to 45.7% | 1,427 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | av_w4_wev | 19.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 16.5% to 21.8% | 1,437 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | av_w4_wml | 47.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 43.6% to 50.4% | 1,331 | weight (VCF0009z), rescaled to average one within each study | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ba_2024_bp | 70.6% | percent of voters | weighted share who call themselves born-again or evangelical | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 67.1% to 74.0% | 1,887 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | boot_reps | 1,000 | resamples | number of bootstrap resamples of respondents | the decomposition of the attendance gap | 2008 to 2024 | | | none (rule) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cd_bp_una | −4.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the Democratic share of the first group minus the change of the second; four independent samples, standard errors combined | Black Protestant respondents and unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −8.9 to −0.4 | 21,200 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cd_hc_una | −7.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the Democratic share of the first group minus the change of the second; four independent samples, standard errors combined | Hispanic Catholic respondents and unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −14.2 to −1.0 | 20,805 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cd_hc_wc | −6.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the Democratic share of the first group minus the change of the second; four independent samples, standard errors combined | Hispanic Catholic respondents and white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −13.5 to 0.0 | 12,188 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | cd_hc_wev | −7.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | change in the Democratic share of the first group minus the change of the second; four independent samples, standard errors combined | Hispanic Catholic respondents and white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −13.5 to −0.4 | 12,336 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_bc_2008_2024 | −18.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | Black Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −28.7 to −8.2 | 354 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_bp_2008_2024 | −10.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −14.1 to −6.5 | 2,345 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_eas_2008_2024 | −19.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | Buddhist or Hindu respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −28.1 to −10.9 | 581 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_hc_2008_2024 | −13.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −19.5 to −6.9 | 1,950 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_hp_2008_2024 | −3.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | Hispanic Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −13.0 to 6.4 | 822 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_jew_2008_2024 | −3.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | Jewish respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −9.2 to 2.5 | 1,771 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_mor_2008_2024 | +6.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | Mormon respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −1.2 to 14.2 | 903 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_mus_2008_2024 | −30.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | Muslim respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −44.8 to −15.4 | 189 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_una_2008_2024 | −5.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −7.6 to −3.7 | 18,855 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_wc_2008_2024 | −6.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −8.9 to −4.0 | 10,238 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_wev_2008_2024 | −6.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −8.1 to −4.4 | 10,386 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ch_wml_2008_2024 | −7.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share in 2024 minus Democratic share in 2008; independent samples, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 to 2024 | 95% CI −10.7 to −5.1 | 8,332 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | chw_2122 | 18.0% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party; the respondents added follow Stetzer and Burge's reading of the omission | white respondents RELTRAD places in the evangelical tradition plus white respondents who say only Christian or interdenominational, who identify with or lean toward a party | 2021 to 2022 | 95% CI 14.4% to 21.6% | 895 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | ck_anes_ba_wml | +6.2 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share, seldom minus frequent attenders; ANES 2024 vote, born-again rule | white Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI −7.9 to 20.3 | 421 | V240107b (post-election weight) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | ck_anes_reltrad_wev | +11.9 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share, seldom minus frequent attenders; ANES 2024 vote, ANES major-group summary | white respondents in the ANES evangelical category of the major-group summary who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI 0.1 to 23.8 | 378 | V240107b (post-election weight) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | ck_anes_reltrad_wml | +11.6 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share, seldom minus frequent attenders; ANES 2024 vote, ANES major-group summary | white respondents in the ANES mainline category of the major-group summary who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI −3.4 to 26.6 | 396 | V240107b (post-election weight) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | ck_ces_party_wml | −3.7 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share, seldom minus frequent attenders; CES party identification, born-again rule | white Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who identify with or lean toward a party, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −5.8 to −1.7 | 24,495 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ck_ces_vote_wev | +10.1 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share, seldom minus frequent attenders; CES vote, born-again rule | white Protestant respondents who do call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 8.7 to 11.4 | 27,185 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ck_ces_vote_wml | −5.4 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share, seldom minus frequent attenders; CES vote, born-again rule | white Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −7.5 to −3.4 | 22,658 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ck_gss_ba_wml | +5.7 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share, seldom minus frequent attenders; GSS party identification, born-again rule | white Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who identify with or lean toward a party, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2006 to 2018 | 95% CI −0.5 to 12.0 | 1,743 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | ck_gss_reltrad_wev | +19.3 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share, seldom minus frequent attenders; GSS party identification, RELTRAD | white respondents RELTRAD places in the evangelical tradition who identify with or lean toward a party, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2006 to 2018 | 95% CI 14.6 to 24.1 | 2,134 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | ck_gss_reltrad_wml | +2.8 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share, seldom minus frequent attenders; GSS party identification, RELTRAD | white respondents RELTRAD places in the mainline tradition who identify with or lean toward a party, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2006 to 2018 | 95% CI −3.8 to 9.4 | 1,343 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | ck_wml_diff | +13.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | ANES Democratic share minus CES Democratic share, both under the born-again rule; independent surveys, standard errors combined | white Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again and who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 6.7 to 19.7 | 5,457 | V240107b (ANES) and weight_cumulative (CES) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | dc_2008_mix | 14.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | part from the mix of groups in the two attendance levels of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008 | 95% CI 13.1 to 16.7 | 21,124 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_2008_tot | 25.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | pooled gap of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008 | 95% CI 23.9 to 27.2 | 21,124 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_2008_win | 10.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | part inside tradition-by-race groups of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008 | 95% CI 8.4 to 12.9 | 21,124 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_2016_mix | 11.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | part from the mix of groups in the two attendance levels of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2016 | 95% CI 9.4 to 12.5 | 37,341 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_2016_tot | 18.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | pooled gap of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2016 | 95% CI 17.4 to 20.5 | 37,341 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_2016_win | 8.0 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | part inside tradition-by-race groups of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2016 | 95% CI 6.1 to 9.9 | 37,341 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_2024_mix | 13.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | part from the mix of groups in the two attendance levels of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI 10.6 to 15.5 | 39,039 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_2024_tot | 27.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | pooled gap of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI 26.0 to 29.4 | 39,039 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_2024_win | 14.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | part inside tradition-by-race groups of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI 11.8 to 17.4 | 39,039 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_min_part | 8.0 | percentage points | smallest of the ten within-group and mix parts across the five elections | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and an attendance answer | 2008 to 2024 | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_n_mix_larger | 3 | elections | count of elections in which the mix part exceeds the within-group part | the five presidential elections 2008 to 2024 | 2008 to 2024 | | | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_pool_mix | 13.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | part from the mix of groups in the two attendance levels of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 12.2 to 13.9 | 172,344 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_pool_tot | 24.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | pooled gap of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 23.7 to 25.1 | 172,344 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dc_pool_win | 11.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share (seldom minus frequent attenders) | part inside tradition-by-race groups of the seldom-minus-frequent gap in the Democratic share; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 10.3 to 12.4 | 172,344 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dcm_2024_bp | −1.8 | percentage points of the pooled gap | the group's mix part (the difference in its share between seldom and frequent attenders times its Democratic share relative to all voters); bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI −2.2 to −1.5 | 1,684 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | n counts the group's voters with a frequent or seldom attendance answer. | | dcm_2024_una | 3.1 | percentage points of the pooled gap | the group's mix part (the difference in its share between seldom and frequent attenders times its Democratic share relative to all voters); bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 1.0 to 5.3 | 14,033 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | n counts the group's voters with a frequent or seldom attendance answer. | | dcm_2024_wev | 10.2 | percentage points of the pooled gap | the group's mix part (the difference in its share between seldom and frequent attenders times its Democratic share relative to all voters); bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 9.5 to 10.9 | 5,380 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | n counts the group's voters with a frequent or seldom attendance answer. | | dcm_pool_wev | 9.2 | percentage points of the pooled gap | the group's mix part (the difference in its share between seldom and frequent attenders times its Democratic share relative to all voters); bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 9.0 to 9.5 | 27,185 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | n counts the group's voters with a frequent or seldom attendance answer. | | dcs_2024_una | 49.4% | percent of the within-group part | the unaffiliated group's within-group contribution as a share of the within-group part; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI 38.9% to 59.8% | 39,039 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dcw_2024_una | 7.2 | percentage points of the pooled gap | the group's within-group part (the group's own gap times its average share of the two attendance levels); bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 4.7 to 9.7 | 14,033 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | n counts the group's voters with a frequent or seldom attendance answer. | | dcw_2024_wc | 1.5 | percentage points of the pooled gap | the group's within-group part (the group's own gap times its average share of the two attendance levels); bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 1.0 to 2.0 | 5,448 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | n counts the group's voters with a frequent or seldom attendance answer. | | dcw_2024_wev | 2.3 | percentage points of the pooled gap | the group's within-group part (the group's own gap times its average share of the two attendance levels); bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 1.6 to 3.0 | 5,380 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | n counts the group's voters with a frequent or seldom attendance answer. | | dcw_pool_una | 3.9 | percentage points of the pooled gap | the group's within-group part (the group's own gap times its average share of the two attendance levels); bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 3.1 to 4.8 | 52,288 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | n counts the group's voters with a frequent or seldom attendance answer. | | dcx_2024_una | 7.4 | percentage points of the pooled gap | within-group part of the gap summed over every group except the unaffiliated; bootstrap standard error, 1000 resamples | reported voters with a tradition-by-race group and a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI 6.0 to 8.8 | 39,039 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | df_2024_bp_wev | 68.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among the first group minus that among the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | Black Protestant respondents and white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 65.6 to 71.7 | 7,876 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | df_2024_hc_hp | 23.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among the first group minus that among the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | Hispanic Catholic respondents and Hispanic Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 16.5 to 31.3 | 1,997 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | df_2024_hc_wc | 19.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among the first group minus that among the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | Hispanic Catholic respondents and white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 15.0 to 24.7 | 7,325 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | df_2024_wml_wev | 28.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party vote share | Democratic share among the first group minus that among the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical and white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 26.1 to 30.8 | 10,966 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dg_pool_jew_wev | 13.7 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | the seldom-minus-frequent gap of the first group minus that of the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | Jewish respondents and white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 7.6 to 19.8 | 31,944 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | dg_pool_wc_wev | 3.6 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | the seldom-minus-frequent gap of the first group minus that of the second; independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents and white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 1.6 to 5.7 | 53,996 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | floor_n | 30 | respondents | minimum respondents (and minimum Kish effective sample size) in a published cell | a cell published in a figure or the text | 2008 to 2024 | | | none (rule) | Cooperative Election Study | | | fq_2024_all | 26.7% | percent of voters | weighted share who attend religious services weekly or more | all respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 26.0% to 27.4% | 41,630 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fq_2024_bp | 47.3% | percent of voters | weighted share who attend religious services weekly or more | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 43.6% to 51.1% | 1,870 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fq_2024_hp | 55.6% | percent of voters | weighted share who attend religious services weekly or more | Hispanic Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 49.4% to 61.8% | 638 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fq_2024_mor | 67.7% | percent of voters | weighted share who attend religious services weekly or more | Mormon respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 61.4% to 74.0% | 438 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fq_2024_una | 2.5% | percent of voters | weighted share who attend religious services weekly or more | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 2.1% to 3.0% | 14,224 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | fq_2024_wev | 57.8% | percent of voters | weighted share who attend religious services weekly or more | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 56.0% to 59.5% | 5,904 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gfv_pool_bp | 90.7% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the vote | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, who attend weekly or more | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 89.3% to 92.0% | 4,310 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gfv_pool_wml | 50.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, who attend weekly or more | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 48.7% to 52.4% | 4,868 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gg_w1_wev | +12.4 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share of party identifiers, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (nearly every week or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 1972 to 1984 | 95% CI 8.0 to 16.8 | 2,632 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gg_w1_wml | +12.3 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share of party identifiers, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (nearly every week or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white RELTRAD mainline Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 1972 to 1984 | 95% CI 8.3 to 16.4 | 3,232 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gg_w4_wev | +17.1 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share of party identifiers, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (nearly every week or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2010 to 2018 | 95% CI 11.4 to 22.7 | 1,547 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gg_w4_wml | −3.5 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share of party identifiers, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (nearly every week or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white RELTRAD mainline Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2010 to 2018 | 95% CI −11.8 to 4.8 | 885 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gg_w5_wev | +4.7 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share of party identifiers, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (nearly every week or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2021 to 2022 | 95% CI −3.5 to 12.9 | 719 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gg_w5_wml | +10.1 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | Democratic share of party identifiers, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (nearly every week or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white RELTRAD mainline Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2021 to 2022 | 95% CI −0.9 to 21.2 | 567 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gh_nh_wev | 28.8% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | non-Hispanic white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2010 to 2018 | 95% CI 26.3% to 31.4% | 1,732 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gh_share_wev | 7.7% | percent of white RELTRAD evangelical Protestants | weighted share of Hispanic origin (the GSS race item counts them as white) | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant GSS respondents with a Hispanic origin answer | 2010 to 2018 | | 2,268 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w1_bp | 88.5% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | RELTRAD Black Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 1972 to 1984 | 95% CI 86.5% to 90.5% | 1,537 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w1_cat | 72.4% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | Catholic respondents of any race who identify with or lean toward a party | 1972 to 1984 | 95% CI 70.7% to 74.1% | 3,635 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w1_wev | 61.0% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 1972 to 1984 | 95% CI 59.0% to 63.0% | 3,099 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w1_wml | 45.4% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD mainline Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 1972 to 1984 | 95% CI 43.6% to 47.2% | 4,018 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w2_cat | 56.9% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | Catholic respondents of any race who identify with or lean toward a party | 1985 to 1996 | 95% CI 55.1% to 58.8% | 3,813 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w2_wev | 43.8% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 1985 to 1996 | 95% CI 42.0% to 45.5% | 3,902 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w3_wev | 35.3% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 1998 to 2008 | 95% CI 33.4% to 37.2% | 3,076 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w4_bp | 91.1% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | RELTRAD Black Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2010 to 2018 | 95% CI 88.6% to 93.6% | 752 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w4_cat | 58.3% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | Catholic respondents of any race who identify with or lean toward a party | 2010 to 2018 | 95% CI 55.7% to 60.9% | 2,117 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w4_wev | 30.6% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2010 to 2018 | 95% CI 28.1% to 33.1% | 1,855 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w4_wml | 40.9% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD mainline Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2010 to 2018 | 95% CI 37.3% to 44.5% | 1,091 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gl_w5_wev | 16.0% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2021 to 2022 | 95% CI 12.4% to 19.6% | 834 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | glf_w1_wev | 55.0% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents, who attend nearly every week or more who identify with or lean toward a party | 1972 to 1984 | 95% CI 52.0% to 58.1% | 1,415 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gls_w1_wev | 67.4% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents, who attend a few times a year or never who identify with or lean toward a party | 1972 to 1984 | 95% CI 64.3% to 70.5% | 1,217 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gm_2021web_wev | 21.3% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents interviewed on the web in 2021 who identify with or lean toward a party | 2021 | 95% CI 16.5% to 26.1% | 380 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gm_2022ftf_wev | 9.2% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents interviewed in person in 2022 who identify with or lean toward a party | 2022 | 95% CI 2.2% to 16.3% | 180 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gm_2022web_wev | 12.4% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white RELTRAD evangelical Protestant respondents interviewed on the web in 2022 who identify with or lean toward a party | 2022 | 95% CI 4.3% to 20.5% | 158 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gpp_pool_bp | +2.6 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | Black Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 1.0 to 4.2 | 11,961 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpp_pool_wev | +11.2 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who identify with or lean toward a party, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 9.9 to 12.5 | 30,518 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpp_pool_wml | −3.7 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who identify with or lean toward a party, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −5.8 to −1.7 | 24,495 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2008_bp | +4.9 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008 | 95% CI −0.1 to 9.9 | 385 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2008_una | +0.4 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008 | 95% CI −11.5 to 12.3 | 4,431 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2008_wev | +15.1 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008 | 95% CI 11.5 to 18.6 | 3,905 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2008_wml | −4.4 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008 | 95% CI −9.4 to 0.6 | 2,946 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2012_una | +20.2 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2012 | 95% CI 11.7 to 28.8 | 8,170 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2016_una | +15.7 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2016 | 95% CI 8.9 to 22.6 | 11,189 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2020_una | +14.3 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2020 | 95% CI 7.5 to 21.0 | 14,465 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2020_wml | −8.1 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2020 | 95% CI −12.2 to −4.0 | 4,587 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2024_bp | +0.8 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI −5.1 to 6.7 | 1,684 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2024_hc | +15.3 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI 4.9 to 25.7 | 1,193 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2024_hp | +10.6 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | Hispanic Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI −2.0 to 23.2 | 570 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2024_una | +30.1 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI 19.0 to 41.3 | 14,033 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2024_wc | +12.0 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI 8.1 to 15.9 | 5,448 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2024_wev | +9.5 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI 6.6 to 12.4 | 5,380 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_2024_wml | −4.1 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2024 | 95% CI −9.0 to 0.8 | 4,492 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_pool_bp | +1.9 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 0.0 to 3.8 | 7,708 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_pool_hc | +11.9 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 7.5 to 16.3 | 5,659 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_pool_hp | +13.8 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | Hispanic Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 7.5 to 20.0 | 2,540 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_pool_jew | +23.8 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | Jewish respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 17.9 to 29.8 | 4,759 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_pool_mor | +17.5 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | Mormon respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 11.1 to 23.9 | 2,375 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_pool_una | +18.1 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 14.1 to 22.1 | 52,288 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_pool_wc | +13.7 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 12.2 to 15.3 | 26,811 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_pool_wev | +10.1 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 8.7 to 11.4 | 27,185 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gpv_pool_wml | −5.4 | percentage points of Democratic share (seldom attenders minus frequent attenders) | weighted Democratic share of the vote, seldom attenders (a few times a year or never) minus frequent attenders (weekly or more); independent groups, standard errors combined | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, with a frequent or seldom attendance answer | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI −7.5 to −3.4 | 22,658 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gss_agree | 61.3% | percent of white Protestants | weighted share placed in the same group (evangelical or mainline) by RELTRAD and by the born-again rule; respondents RELTRAD cannot place count as disagreeing | white Protestant GSS respondents with a born-again answer and a party identification (pure independents excluded) | 2006 to 2018 | | 4,838 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gss_agree_placed | 70.7% | percent of white Protestants | weighted share placed in the same group by RELTRAD and by the born-again rule | white Protestant GSS respondents with a born-again answer and a party identification whom RELTRAD places in the evangelical or mainline tradition | 2006 to 2018 | | 4,183 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gss_ba_ml | 22.3% | percent of white Protestants | weighted share that RELTRAD places in the mainline tradition | white Protestant GSS respondents who call themselves born-again whom RELTRAD places in the evangelical or mainline tradition | 2006 to 2018 | | 2,960 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gss_nb_ev | 39.0% | percent of white Protestants | weighted share that RELTRAD places in the evangelical tradition | white Protestant GSS respondents who do not call themselves born-again whom RELTRAD places in the evangelical or mainline tradition | 2006 to 2018 | | 2,075 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | gsv_pool_bp | 92.6% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the vote | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, who attend a few times a year or never | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 91.2% to 94.0% | 3,398 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | gsv_pool_wml | 45.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, who attend a few times a year or never | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 44.1% to 46.0% | 17,790 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvp_2024_bp | 86.3% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | Black Protestant respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2024 | 95% CI 83.9% to 88.6% | 3,072 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvp_2024_wev | 13.7% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who identify with or lean toward a party | 2024 | 95% CI 12.5% to 15.0% | 6,484 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2008_bp | 93.4% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 90.9% to 95.9% | 456 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2008_hc | 70.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 65.8% to 74.6% | 599 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2008_wc | 43.6% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 41.9% to 45.3% | 4,264 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2008_wev | 20.7% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 19.3% to 22.1% | 4,399 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2008_wml | 50.9% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008 | 95% CI 48.9% to 52.8% | 3,353 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2024_bc | 76.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Black Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 67.2% to 84.8% | 260 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2024_bp | 83.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 80.3% to 86.0% | 1,889 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2024_hc | 57.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 52.5% to 61.5% | 1,351 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2024_hp | 33.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Hispanic Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 27.3% to 38.9% | 646 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2024_jew | 68.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Jewish respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 64.0% to 72.1% | 1,219 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2024_mor | 31.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Mormon respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 24.8% to 37.4% | 438 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2024_mus | 65.9% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Muslim respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 52.7% to 79.0% | 139 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2024_una | 70.9% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 69.7% to 72.2% | 14,311 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2024_wc | 37.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 35.4% to 38.9% | 5,974 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2024_wev | 14.5% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 13.2% to 15.7% | 5,987 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_2024_wml | 43.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who do not call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 41.0% to 45.0% | 4,979 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_pool_bp | 91.4% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 90.4% to 92.3% | 8,852 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | lvv_pool_wev | 18.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | 95% CI 17.6% to 18.7% | 30,356 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_anes_voters | 3,928 | respondents | count of respondents | ANES 2024 post-election respondents who reported a Harris or Trump vote | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | n_gss_classified | 68,896 | respondents | count of respondents | GSS respondents with a religious preference answer that RELTRAD can place | 1972 to 2022 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | | n_party | 227,049 | respondents | count of respondents | CES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_voters | 188,145 | respondents | count of respondents | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 pooled | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_voters_2024 | 42,008 | respondents | count of respondents | CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | nat_anes_2024 | 54.4% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | all ANES 2024 respondents who reported a Harris or Trump vote | 2024 | 95% CI 52.2% to 56.7% | 3,928 | V240107b (post-election weight) | ANES 2024 Time Series | | | nat_cert_2024 | 49.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | certified national Democratic share of the two-party vote | all votes cast for the Democratic and Republican candidates | 2024 presidential election | | | none (full counts) | State presidential returns | | | nat_ces_2024 | 49.0% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote | all CES respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 48.2% to 49.7% | 42,008 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shf_2024_bp | 8.4% | percent of weekly or more attenders who voted | weighted share of the attendance group that belongs to black protestants; bootstrap standard error | reported voters who attend weekly or more | 2024 | 95% CI 7.5% to 9.3% | 9,409 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shf_2024_una | 3.0% | percent of weekly or more attenders who voted | weighted share of the attendance group that belongs to unaffiliated; bootstrap standard error | reported voters who attend weekly or more | 2024 | 95% CI 2.3% to 3.6% | 9,409 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shf_2024_wev | 39.0% | percent of weekly or more attenders who voted | weighted share of the attendance group that belongs to white born-again protestants; bootstrap standard error | reported voters who attend weekly or more | 2024 | 95% CI 37.5% to 40.6% | 9,409 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shs_2024_bp | 3.0% | percent of seldom attenders who voted | weighted share of the attendance group that belongs to black protestants; bootstrap standard error | reported voters who attend a few times a year or never | 2024 | 95% CI 2.7% to 3.3% | 29,630 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shs_2024_una | 44.8% | percent of seldom attenders who voted | weighted share of the attendance group that belongs to unaffiliated; bootstrap standard error | reported voters who attend a few times a year or never | 2024 | 95% CI 43.9% to 45.7% | 29,630 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | shs_2024_wev | 9.1% | percent of seldom attenders who voted | weighted share of the attendance group that belongs to white born-again protestants; bootstrap standard error | reported voters who attend a few times a year or never | 2024 | 95% CI 8.6% to 9.7% | 29,630 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | ubw_2122 | 23.5% | percent of Democratic and Republican identifiers | weighted Democratic share of party identifiers, leaners with their party; the respondents added are an upper bound on the evangelical group | white respondents RELTRAD places in the evangelical tradition plus every white respondent it cannot place (Protestants with no denomination who attend less than monthly, and those who say only Christian or interdenominational), who identify with or lean toward a party | 2021 to 2022 | 95% CI 20.0% to 27.0% | 1,166 | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | una_neff_2008 | 51 | effective respondents | Kish effective sample size of the cell | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, who attend weekly or more | 2008 | | 80 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | una_neff_2012 | 134 | effective respondents | Kish effective sample size of the cell | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, who attend weekly or more | 2012 | | 266 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | una_neff_2016 | 212 | effective respondents | Kish effective sample size of the cell | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, who attend weekly or more | 2016 | | 386 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | una_neff_2020 | 208 | effective respondents | Kish effective sample size of the cell | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, who attend weekly or more | 2020 | | 369 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | una_neff_2024 | 77 | effective respondents | Kish effective sample size of the cell | unaffiliated respondents (atheist, agnostic or nothing in particular) who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, who attend weekly or more | 2024 | | 271 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | unclass_1012 | 5.3% | percent of respondents | weighted share that RELTRAD cannot place | GSS respondents with a religious preference answer | 2010 to 2018 | | | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | unclass_2122 | 7.6% | percent of respondents | weighted share that RELTRAD cannot place | GSS respondents with a religious preference answer | 2021 to 2022 | | | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | unclass_christian_2122 | 1.6% | percent of respondents | weighted share that RELTRAD cannot place: respondents who say only Christian or interdenominational | GSS respondents with a religious preference answer | 2021 to 2022 | | | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | unclass_nodenom_2122 | 5.4% | percent of respondents | weighted share that RELTRAD cannot place: Protestants with no denomination who attend less than monthly | GSS respondents with a religious preference answer | 2021 to 2022 | | | weight_use, rescaled to average one within each survey year | General Social Survey | | | vi_2024_all | 39.0% | percent of voters | weighted share who say religion is very important in their life | all respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 38.3% to 39.7% | 42,007 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | vi_2024_bp | 72.3% | percent of voters | weighted share who say religion is very important in their life | Black Protestant respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 68.9% to 75.7% | 1,889 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | vi_2024_wev | 79.8% | percent of voters | weighted share who say religion is very important in their life | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote | 2024 | 95% CI 78.4% to 81.2% | 5,987 | weight_cumulative | Cooperative Election Study | | | vv_2024_all | 49.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote with the validated-vote weight | all respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, whose turnout the CES validated | 2024 | 95% CI 48.3% to 49.9% | 32,948 | vvweight (validated vote) | Cooperative Election Study | | | vv_2024_hc | 59.6% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote with the validated-vote weight | Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, whose turnout the CES validated | 2024 | 95% CI 53.9% to 65.2% | 883 | vvweight (validated vote) | Cooperative Election Study | | | vv_2024_wc | 34.1% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote with the validated-vote weight | white non-Hispanic Catholic respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, whose turnout the CES validated | 2024 | 95% CI 32.4% to 35.8% | 4,669 | vvweight (validated vote) | Cooperative Election Study | | | vv_2024_wev | 13.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote with the validated-vote weight | white non-Hispanic Protestant respondents who call themselves born-again or evangelical who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote, whose turnout the CES validated | 2024 | 95% CI 11.9% to 14.4% | 4,816 | vvweight (validated vote) | Cooperative Election Study | | | web_share_2021 | 87.8% | percent of respondents | share interviewed on the web (count, unweighted) | GSS 2021 respondents with a religious preference answer | 2021 | | | none (count) | General Social Survey | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. ## Methods Sample. Cooperative Election Study (CES) cumulative file, presidential years 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024: 188,145 respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate (third-party and other votes are excluded), and 227,049 respondents who identify with or lean toward a party. Outcomes are the Democratic share of the reported two-party presidential vote and the Democratic share of Democratic and Republican identifiers (CES pid7 1 to 3 against 5 to 7, leaners with their party). Tradition and race in the CES. The cumulative file has religion (1 Protestant, 2 Catholic, 3 Mormon, 4 Orthodox, 5 Jewish, 6 Muslim, 7 Buddhist, 8 Hindu, 9 atheist, 10 agnostic, 11 nothing in particular, 12 something else), race (race5: white non-Hispanic, Black, Hispanic, Asian, other) and the born-again or evangelical self-description (relig_bornagain). White Protestants who say yes are white born-again Protestants and those who say no are white Protestants who are not born-again. Black, Hispanic and Asian or other-race Protestants and Black, Hispanic, white and Asian or other-race Catholics are separate groups. Codes 9 to 11 are the unaffiliated. There is no denomination item, so the born-again rule is a proxy for the evangelical and mainline traditions, and the chapter calls the CES groups by the rule and keeps the names evangelical and mainline for the denominational codings of the GSS and the ANES. Attendance is the six-point item church_attend_6pt: frequent is once a week or more than once a week (codes 5 and 6) and seldom is never, seldom or a few times a year (codes 1 to 3); monthly attenders (code 4) are in neither group. Weights and pooling. CES estimates use weight_cumulative, which sums to the same total in every year over all respondents, so pooled estimates over the five elections count each election by its weighted voters. It is used instead of the validated-vote weight vvweight because it is the only CES weight defined for all five elections (vvweight exists for 2018 to 2024, and it also requires a validated turnout record); the text gives the 2024 shares of three groups and of all voters under vvweight. Pooled GSS windows use weight_use rescaled to average one within each survey year. ANES 2024 estimates use the post-election weight V240107b. Estimators and intervals. A share is a weighted mean of a 0/1 variable, and a gap or a change is the difference of two independent shares with the standard errors combined in quadrature; a difference between two changes combines the four standard errors, and a difference between two gaps combines the two. Every interval is a 95% interval from the Kish effective sample size with a normal approximation. The CES is an opt-in online panel, so its intervals are model based and cover sampling error and not the recruitment of respondents, and none of the intervals follows the clustering of a sampling design. Suppression: a cell is published only with at least 30 respondents and an effective sample of at least 30. The figures draw the interval of every published cell, and the tables give its width. Decomposition. With p_gS and p_gF the shares of group g among seldom and frequent attenders and m_gS and m_gF its Democratic percentages, the seldom-minus-frequent gap equals the sum over groups of pbar_g (m_gS minus m_gF) plus the sum over groups of (p_gS minus p_gF) mbar_g, where pbar_g and mbar_g are averages of the two cells. The first sum is the within-group part and the second the mix part; subtracting the overall mean from mbar_g changes no total and gives each group's contribution. Standard errors are the standard deviation over 1,000 resamples of respondents with replacement (seed 12345), and the interval is a normal 95% interval around the estimate. The within-group part without the unaffiliated and the unaffiliated share of the within-group part use the same resamples. GSS RELTRAD. Tradition follows Steensland and others (2000), coded from the posted syntax of Jerry Park for the Association of Religion Data Archives (6 August 2018), which implements the scheme: relig (religious preference), the detailed denomination denom (the file's denom_7222, asked 1972 to 2022; the 2024 GSS has only a seven-group denom and no other-denomination code, so 2024 cannot be coded), the open-ended other-denomination code other, race and attend. The variable fund is not used by the syntax. Black Protestant: the National Baptist Conventions, the African Methodist Episcopal churches, a list of Black sectarian other codes, and Black respondents in other Baptist, American Baptist, Southern Baptist, Baptist-do-not-know-which, other Methodist and Methodist-do-not-know-which groups. Evangelical: a list of other codes, the American Baptist Association, Southern Baptist and other Baptist groups, white Baptist-do-not-know-which, white other Methodist, Missouri, Wisconsin and other Lutheran synods, the Presbyterian Church in America, and Protestants with no denomination who attend at least monthly. Mainline: a list of other codes, United Methodist, white Methodist-do-not-know-which, American Baptist Churches USA (white), the other Lutheran and Presbyterian groups and Episcopalians. Catholic, Jewish, other faith and unaffiliated follow relig and a list of other codes; Jacobite Apostolics are coded Orthodox. Respondents the syntax cannot place are left out of every tradition: Protestants with no denomination who attend less than monthly, respondents who answer only Christian or interdenominational, and other codes 161 and 185. The syntax's own comment says codes 161 and 185 are dropped but its order of statements leaves them classified; this chapter drops them. 68,896 respondents are placed. Stetzer and Burge (2016) describe the omission of generic Christian and interdenominational answers from the evangelical tradition. This chapter keeps the syntax as written and bounds the effect for 2021 to 2022: the text gives the white evangelical Democratic share when every white respondent RELTRAD cannot place (Protestants with no denomination who attend less than monthly, and those who say only Christian or interdenominational) is counted as evangelical, and when only those who say Christian or interdenominational are. Tradition by race in the GSS: white evangelical and white mainline Protestants are RELTRAD evangelical and mainline respondents whose race is white (race 1), which includes white respondents of Hispanic origin (Hispanic origin is recorded from 2000, and the text gives the non-Hispanic share for 2010 to 2018); Black Protestants are the RELTRAD Black Protestant category; Catholics are all Catholics; Black respondents that RELTRAD places in the evangelical or mainline traditions and respondents of other races in those two traditions belong to no group. Windows pool survey years (1972 to 1984, 1985 to 1996, 1998 to 2008, 2010 to 2018, 2021 to 2022). Party is partyid 0 to 2 against 4 to 6, and attendance groups are frequent (attend 6 to 8, nearly every week or more) and seldom (attend 0 to 3). The born-again rule in the GSS uses reborn (1 yes, 2 no) among white respondents who say Protestant, 2006 to 2018. The agreement between RELTRAD and the born-again rule is computed on white Protestants with a born-again answer and a party identification (pure independents out; respondents RELTRAD cannot place count as disagreeing) and, separately, among those RELTRAD places in the evangelical or mainline tradition; the cross-check of each group by the other rule uses white Protestants with a born-again answer whom RELTRAD places, with no condition on party identification. ANES 2024 Time Series. Religion is the ANES major-group summary V241445x (mainline, evangelical, Black Protestant, undifferentiated Protestant, Roman Catholic, other Christian, Jewish, other religion, not religious); this chapter has not checked its rules against RELTRAD. Race is V241501x. In the coding check the ANES evangelical and mainline groups are white respondents in those two ANES categories. For the comparison of levels with the CES, white Protestants are split by the born-again rule (V241442) among white respondents in the four ANES Protestant categories, as in the CES; Black and Hispanic Protestants are Black and Hispanic respondents in any Protestant category, and Catholics are split by race. Attendance is V241440 (frequent: every week or almost every week; seldom: a few times a year or never, with V241439 = no counted as never). A reported voter has V242095x = voted and V242096x = Harris or Trump; 3,928 respondents meet this. The 2024 study mixes face-to-face, web and mail-return samples under one weight and is not split by mode. ANES Cumulative Data File. Respondents in the presidential-year studies of 1980 to 2020 (the 2024 religion codes of the cumulative file are unusable); the midterm studies of the file carry no presidential vote. Groups follow the CES rule: white non-Hispanic Protestants (religion, race_4cat) who say they are born-again (born_again, asked in every presidential-year study from 1980 to 2020 except 2004) and who do not, Black non-Hispanic Protestants, and white non-Hispanic Catholics. A respondent without a born-again answer is in neither white Protestant group. Windows are 1980 to 1988, 1992 to 2000, 2008 to 2012 and 2016 to 2020. The vote is the reported two-party presidential vote of voters, and party identification is pid_7pt 1 to 3 against 5 to 7 among all respondents. The weight VCF0009z is 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990 and is rescaled to average one within each study among voters or among party identifiers. The 2012 and 2016 studies add web samples and the 2020 study was collected online, by telephone and by video, with no mode weights for 2020, so the last windows mix interview modes. Survey mode. The CES is online in every year. GSS survey years from 2021 include web interviews; the 2021 to 2022 window is flagged in the figure and the text, and the 2022 split by mode is reported for white RELTRAD evangelical Protestants. The GSS rows of the coding check use the surveys of 2006 to 2018 in all the interview modes those surveys used, which include some telephone interviews. ## What these data cannot show - Each survey interviews a different sample, so the gaps compare groups and say nothing about any voter changing. - Religious behavior and identity respond to politics as well as the reverse. - Panel studies find that partisan identity shapes whether people identify with a religion and how often they attend [5] [6]. - A gap between seldom and frequent attenders, or a difference between traditions, can therefore reflect people moving between groups, and the decomposition splits an observed gap into parts without saying what would happen if the mix of attenders changed. - Tradition in the CES is a proxy for denomination. - The CES cannot separate Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran and non-denominational respondents, cannot place Black Protestants by denomination, and cannot tell Pentecostal from other Hispanic Protestants. - The GSS codes tradition by denomination but stops in 2022, records Hispanic origin only from 2000, and leaves 5.3% of respondents in 2010 to 2018 unplaced. - The ANES 2024 rows of the coding check have wider intervals than the CES rows, and the ANES sample is too small to give a Hispanic Protestant estimate at all. - The levels depend on the survey and the weight. - The CES estimates use the cumulative-file weight because it is the one CES weight defined for all five elections; the validated-vote weight exists only for 2018 to 2024. - In 2024 it gives 34.1% (95% CI 32.4% to 35.8%) for white Catholics against 37.1%, 13.2% (95% CI 11.9% to 14.4%) for white born-again Protestants against 14.5% and 59.6% (95% CI 53.9% to 65.2%) for Hispanic Catholics against 57.0%. - The CES national Democratic share is 49.0% with the cumulative-file weight and 49.1% with the validated-vote weight, against a certified 49.2%. - Agreement at the national level does not show that a survey is accurate inside a tradition and race. - The ANES group levels exceed the CES levels by the most for white Protestants who are not born-again and Hispanic Catholics, and by more than the two national shares differ. - Small groups carry intervals as wide as the Muslim estimate, and the figures draw those intervals; the only cells removed are those under the floor. - The sample is voters who reported a Democratic or Republican vote, so nonvoters, third-party voters and respondents who did not answer are outside it. - The chapter has no measure of belief, congregation, region or age, and nothing in it identifies why Black Protestants and white born-again Protestants vote as they do. - The growth of the unaffiliated and their subtypes belong to Chapter 9.2, The rise of the nones (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-rise-of-the-nones; planned), and the link between attendance and moral attitudes to Chapter 9.5, Two moralities (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/two-moralities; planned). ## References 1. Steensland, Brian; Park, Jerry Z.; Regnerus, Mark D.; Robinson, Lynn D.; Wilcox, W. Bradford; Woodberry, Robert D. (2000). The Measure of American Religion: Toward Improving the State of the Art. Social Forces 79(1): 291-318. https://doi.org/10.2307/2675572 2. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 3. Lincoln, C. Eric; Mamiya, Lawrence H. (1990). The Black Church in the African American Experience. Duke University Press. 4. Stetzer, Ed; Burge, Ryan P. (2016). Reltrad Coding Problems and a New Repository. Politics and Religion 9(1): 187-190. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755048315000929 5. Margolis, Michele F. (2018). From Politics to the Pews: How Partisanship and the Political Environment Shape Religious Identity. University of Chicago Press. 6. Campbell, David E.; Layman, Geoffrey C.; Green, John C.; Sumaktoyo, Nathanael G. (2018). Putting Politics First: The Impact of Politics on American Religious and Secular Orientations. American Journal of Political Science 62(3): 551-565. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12365 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/religious-tradition-and-race/build.py (sha256 1fc932d2b4e66336cfeb12280889425da78054cfcd10e36ae38506209a1c1ca9) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes2024_ts/anes_timeseries_2024_spss_20260519.sav | 12,757,094 | 3107c838755f88353d0e3e39b2c3d5f76a2888cf56a179e3acac84ab431335d2 | bb318a018a39b4cf87ccc91b50a5b7c5b41746d28c0226f4a6c176e8c74966d6 | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/gss/gss_all_raw2024.parquet | 35,044,704 | 6f6560d1929e8a100f576317a296ee88f777ca061ab7dbc1471cbdc7b3563538 | 5c3294f206beb53d9a8387fccb1983bf3088818df090bd8ed3f378adadafcf9b | | data/state/1976-2024-president.csv | 514,108 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 8011c429e1e1a2f1cb3636b9a27d8590c6eba957e38abd5d6c627c36477e3516 | | figures/attendance_gradient.json | 2c3171b1f395bc9ff0049e93e4dff784505d99b5fdc821dd12561b916fd65f26 | | figures/coding_and_survey_checks.json | 65ff60ce2f8973f0401870387d7c1b552e1c985ce82684ce49004bdec696a2e1 | | figures/devotion_vs_vote.json | 7badcd43fed9198c674ce63aa5148afdd543e99702eef3c859292ab398efe5e6 | | figures/gap_decomposition.json | 02998becd1f02c96572f029d8af410aa77323fbe91fc36c4dd05dd58a7896f02 | | figures/group_contributions.json | 803fd09a1f1432846cb56944772936b022a6eac78cdf922b8e36319660004d49 | | figures/long_run_by_tradition.json | 55cb8ed2cace0f276e8b97f7afdd631ac862cafe59986fd24d4418379897208a | | figures/vote_by_group.json | 6cd3606f3757fbe624ea0acd923e33639c3046c93a8a1a41d8620d2e2abe1565 | | figures/vote_change.json | e279132c2aaca4b873734ffe0485a28d8faabadf8de9ee988d47c798006788a8 | | meta.json | 186463a060d4a9269bd826ccd6b3acb6f796f799df757e4d3e3ada154c4aeba3 | | refs.json | 15df4ac40d60a45602b72b38d2331b25ef98bdf617ac3eb2c363154a772d84e1 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/religious-tradition-and-race/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/religious-tradition-and-race/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/facts.json - Table 1, figure "vote_by_group" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/vote_by_group.json - Table 2, figure "devotion_vs_vote" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/devotion_vs_vote.json - Table 3, figure "vote_change" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/vote_change.json - Table 4, figure "attendance_gradient" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/attendance_gradient.json - Table 5, figure "gap_decomposition" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/gap_decomposition.json - Table 6, figure "group_contributions" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/group_contributions.json - Table 7, figure "long_run_by_tradition" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/long_run_by_tradition.json - Table 8, figure "coding_and_survey_checks" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/religious-tradition-and-race/figures/coding_and_survey_checks.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Nationalization of the county vote: report Chapter 10.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Nationalization of the county vote - Chapter: 10.1 (Part X, The nationalized map; The political map) - Question: How uniform are county swings in presidential elections, and how has that changed since 1868? - Dek: Counties moved more nearly in step in 2020 to 2024 than in any other pair of presidential elections since 1868, with a vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings of 4.5 points against 5.0 in 2008 to 2012, the next lowest. - Grain: places - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - County election returns. County presidential returns, 1868-2024: Algara and Amlani (1868-2020) and MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2024), repaired file; years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election, county-equal in one view - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026nationalizationofthecountyvote ```bibtex @misc{singh2026nationalizationofthecountyvote, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Nationalization of the county vote}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings about their weighted mean | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 4.5 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | sd_w_latest | | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings about their weighted mean | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2008 to 2012 | 5.0 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | sd_w_2012 | | threshold on the vote-weighted standard deviation | threshold for counting pairs | 1868-2024 | 10 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | cut | | count of pairs with a vote-weighted standard deviation above the threshold | pairs ending in 1984 or earlier | 1868 to 1984 | 28 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_early_above | | count of pairs | pairs ending in 1984 or earlier | 1868 to 1984 | 29 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_early | | count of pairs with a vote-weighted standard deviation below the threshold | pairs ending in 1988 or later | 1984 to 2024 | 9 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_late_below | | count of pairs | pairs ending in 1988 or later | 1984 to 2024 | 10 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_late | | count of counties matched on FIPS | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1868 to 1872 | 1,687 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_matched_first | | count of counties matched on FIPS | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 3,111 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_matched_latest | | share of two-party votes cast in matched counties | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1868 to 1872 | 91.7% | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | cov_first | | lowest share of two-party votes cast in matched counties, pairs after 1868 to 1872 | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1872 to 2024 | 97.7% | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | cov_min | ## Findings Counties moved more nearly in step in 2020 to 2024 than in any other pair of consecutive presidential elections since 1868. The spread of county swings, measured by its vote-weighted standard deviation, was 4.5 points in 2020 to 2024. It was above 10 points in 28 of the 29 pairs of consecutive elections through 1980 to 1984 and below 10 points in 9 of the 10 pairs from 1984 to 1988 on. The lead of 2020 to 2024 over 2008 to 2012, the next lowest pair, is small, and the last section checks that it holds under other measures. A county's swing is the change in its two-party margin from one presidential election to the next, in points of margin, and a positive swing is a move toward the Democrats. The national swing is the same change in the summed margin of the matched counties, the ones that reported in both elections. A county's relative swing is its swing minus the national swing, which is zero for a county that moved exactly with the country. If every county did, the spread of relative swings would be zero too. Political scientists call the loss of local variation in electoral change nationalization, and the spread of swings is this chapter's measure of it. That measure differs from the one that Amlani and Algara [1] apply to the same county returns for 1872 to 2020. (Note: Counties are weighted by their two-party votes in the later election unless a figure says otherwise, so a large county counts for more than a small one. Each pair of elections uses the counties that reported in both, matched on FIPS code, which gives 1,687 counties in 1868 to 1872 and 3,111 in 2020 to 2024. Florida, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia have no county rows for 1868, and Colorado, admitted in 1876, first appears in 1880. The first pair therefore covers 91.7% of the two-party votes cast in 1872, mainly because of those gaps, and every later pair covers at least 97.7% of the two-party votes cast in its later election.) The chapter keeps three readings of the returns apart. The spread of swings measures how far county swings disperse around their mean. The share of votes cast in counties close to the national swing measures distance from the national result, and the two readings differ when the mean county swing and the national swing differ. The correlation of county margins between consecutive elections measures how far differences in county levels persist from one election to the next. ### The spread of county swings narrowed after 1984 Table 1 plots the spread for every pair, at the later election. Through 1980 to 1984 only 1940 to 1944, at 6.4 points, was at or below 10 points. From 1984 to 1988 on only 2012 to 2016, at 10.8 points, was at or above it. The 9 later pairs below the cutoff ranged from 4.5 to 7.9 points, with the lowest value in 2020 to 2024 after 5.7 in 2016 to 2020. That value is 0.5 points below 2008 to 2012, the next lowest pair at 5.0. (Note: The counts of pairs above and below 10 points depend on the cutoff. At 8 points they are 28 of 29 and 9 of 10, and at 12 points they are 22 of 29 and 10 of 10.) Table 1. The spread of county swings was above 10 points in 28 of 29 pairs through 1984 and below it in 9 of 10 since Shaded columns mark pairs that are hard to compare with the rest. The two Reconstruction pairs come first. The others include an election in which candidates outside the two major parties won at least 10% of all votes, which happened in 1892, 1912, 1924, 1968, 1992 and 1996. The widest pair, 1892 to 1896, at 39.0 points, is one of them. The two-party margin leaves those votes out, and 7 of the ten largest spreads fall in shaded pairs. The spread rose in 4 of the 10 pairs from 1984 to 1988 on, and the largest rise, 5.8 points, came in 2012 to 2016. That pair had the lowest share of votes within 5 points of the national swing, 34.0%, of any pair after 1980 to 1984. The correlation of county margins with the previous election's fell to 0.96 from 0.99. Both recovered in 2016 to 2020. The spread measures how unevenly counties moved in 2016 and not which kinds of counties moved; Chapter 12.7, Education, ethnicity and the county shift, 2016 to 2024 (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift) follows the county shift from that year to 2024. Nationalization has a long literature. Stokes [2] distinguished national from sub-national electoral forces, and Bartels [3] estimated them from state-level presidential returns for 1868 to 1996 and found a system more nationalized than a century earlier. Claggett, Flanigan and Zingale [4] found no trend toward increasing nationalization of the vote from 1842 to 1970. Amlani and Algara [1] use the county file this chapter draws on, for presidential, Senate and gubernatorial elections from 1872 to 2020. They conclude that contemporary elections are highly nationalized and that presidential and Senate elections are more partisan than in any period since the Civil War. Caramani [5] traced the same process across Western European constituencies, and Hopkins [6] documents it in American attitudes and behavior with surveys and experiments. The spread of county swings does not reproduce the measures of these studies. How far counties sit from the national result in a single election, as against how far they moved, is the subject of Chapter 10.2, Distance from the national vote, 1868 to 2024 (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-landslide-county). ### Relative swings narrowed to a ridge near zero Table 2 shows the distribution behind the spread for nine pairs, the ones ending in 1876, 1896, 1916, 1936, 1956, 1976, 1996 and 2016, and the latest pair. The earliest ridges are low and reach past the edges of the plot. In 1892 to 1896, 10.0% of votes were cast in counties whose relative swing lay more than 60 points from zero on one side or the other. The last ridge is narrow, and 73.1% of the votes in 2020 to 2024 fall within 5 points of zero, against 22.7% in 1892 to 1896 and 20.3% in 1972 to 1976. Its mass sits above zero. The vote-weighted median county swing was +1.8 points relative to the national swing. 19.8% of votes were cast in counties that swung 5 or more points more toward the Democrats than the nation, and 7.1% in counties that swung that far more toward the Republicans. The reference behind this offset is discussed with Table 4. Table 2. Relative county swings lay far from zero in early pairs and sat in a narrow band just above zero in 2020 to 2024 ### Counties near the national swing, 1868 to 2024 Table 3 shows the same relative swings county by county, for the pair of elections chosen with the slider. The palest class holds counties within 5 points of the national swing. In 2020 to 2024, 75.6% of matched counties fall in that class, the largest share of the 39 pairs. The smallest share, 8.5%, is in 1924 to 1928, a pair that includes a strong third-party vote, and 1972 to 1976 gives 21.2%. The national swing in the last pair was −6.1 points, a move toward the Republicans, so a blue county in that pair moved less toward the Republicans than the nation did, or toward the Democrats. Table 3. The share of counties within 5 points of the national swing rose from 21.2% in 1972 to 1976 to 75.6% in 2020 to 2024 ### Share of votes near the national swing The share of votes cast in counties within 5 points of the national swing is a coarser summary than the spread, and it is easier to read. Table 4 plots it. The share was 73.3% in 2008 to 2012, fell to 34.0% in 2012 to 2016 and was 73.1% in 2020 to 2024. No pair through 1980 to 1984 exceeded 62.0%, the value for 1940 to 1944. The two records therefore fall in different pairs. The spread is lowest in 2020 to 2024, and the share of votes near the national swing is highest in 2008 to 2012. The spread gives large deviations more weight than the share does, which is why the two measures can rank neighboring pairs differently. Counted by county, the share was 75.6% in 2020 to 2024 and 58.8% in 2008 to 2012. It is higher than the vote share in 2020 to 2024 and lower in 2008 to 2012. The reference matters when the spread is small. Measured against the vote-weighted mean of county swings instead of the national swing, 80.0% of votes and 86.3% of counties were within 5 points in 2020 to 2024, against 73.1% and 75.6% for the national swing. This chapter uses the national swing. (Note: The national swing is the change in the summed margin, so it reflects where votes were cast as well as how counties voted. The vote-weighted mean of county swings gives each county its later-election weight in both elections and leaves that change out. In 2020 to 2024 the first was −6.1 points and the second −4.8, a gap of −1.3.) Table 4. The share of votes near the national swing was 73.3% in 2008 to 2012 and 73.1% in 2020 to 2024, the two highest of 39 pairs ### County swings in the South were wider until 1992 Table 5 splits the matched counties into the Census Bureau's South region and the rest and gives the spread inside each. Within the South the spread was larger than in the rest of the country in each of 13 consecutive pairs from 1940 to 1944 through 1988 to 1992. The run ends on small gaps. The South's spread exceeded the rest's by 1.6 points in 1984 to 1988 and 0.1 points in 1988 to 1992, and the rest of the country's was the larger by 1.7 points in 1992 to 1996. In 1960 to 1964 the spread was 33.5 points inside the South and 11.4 outside, and in 1972 to 1976 it was 20.7 and 9.7. The shaded pair of 1964 to 1968, which includes the 1968 third-party vote, was higher still inside the South, at 39.2 points. The shaded columns in Table 5 mark the same pairs as in Table 1. Before 1940 the pattern is mixed, and the rest of the country had the larger spread in 10 of the 18 pairs through 1936 to 1940. Switching to South against the nation compares the South's own margin swing with the national swing. A negative value means the South moved further toward the Republicans than the nation did. The South's margin swing differed from the nation's by +21.9 points in 1972 to 1976. Since 1984 to 1988 the difference has stayed within 2.4 points, and in 2020 to 2024 the spread is 4.4 points in the South and 4.5 elsewhere. Table 5. The spread of county swings was 33.5 points in the South and 11.4 elsewhere in 1960 to 1964, and 4.4 and 4.5 in 2020 to 2024 ### County margins and winners track the last election more closely A second view of nationalization asks how far differences in county levels persist, measured by how well a county's margin in one election predicts its margin in the next. Table 6 plots the vote-weighted correlation between county margins in each pair, and between margins four elections apart. The correlation with the previous election was 0.33 in 1892 to 1896, 0.51 in 1960 to 1964 and 0.51 in 1972 to 1976. It was above 0.9 in 3 of the 29 pairs through 1980 to 1984 and in all 10 pairs from 1984 to 1988 on. It is 0.99 in each of 2008 to 2012, 2016 to 2020 and 2020 to 2024, and 0.96 in 2012 to 2016. Across four elections the correlation was 0.85 between 1972 and 1988 and is 0.90 between 2008 and 2024. The correlation depends on how spread out county margins are as well as on the spread of swings, so it accompanies the spread measure and does not replace it. Table 6. County margins correlated with the previous election's margins above 0.9 in 3 of 29 pairs through 1984 and in all 10 pairs since County winners persisted in the same way. Applying the national swing to every county gives a test. A county's predicted margin is its margin in the earlier election plus the national swing, and its winner is called from the sign. Keeping each county's earlier winner instead gets 50.9% of counties wrong in 1972 to 1976, 1,584 counties, and 2.8% in 2020 to 2024, 87 counties. The national swing cuts the number of counties called wrong by 26% in 1972 to 1976 and 28% in 2020 to 2024, to 37.8% and 2.0% of counties. The fall in the error rate therefore follows the fall in the number of counties that changed winner and does not reflect a better fit of the uniform swing. The national swing comes from the later election's own results, so the test is a fit and not a forecast. The count depends on how many counties sit close to an even split as well as on how far they swing. ### The 2020 to 2024 low holds under other measures The lead of 2020 to 2024 over 2008 to 2012 is small, so this section asks whether it depends on the measure or on the counties included. Leaving out any one state or the District of Columbia in turn keeps 2020 to 2024 the lowest pair, with a gap to 2008 to 2012 of 0.3 to 0.7 points. The Votes and counties view of Table 1 adds a line that counts each county once. That gives a larger spread in 35 of the 39 pairs, so the small counties, which count for less in the vote-weighted figure, usually have the more varied swings. The vote-weighted spread is the larger one in 1932 to 1936, 2012 to 2016, 2016 to 2020 and 2020 to 2024. In 2020 to 2024 it is 4.5 points against 3.4 for the county-equal version, so votes are concentrated in counties whose swings sit further from the mean than the typical county's do. The county-equal lead is wider, 3.4 points in 2020 to 2024 against 5.2 in 2016 to 2020, the next lowest, a gap of 1.8 points. The main measure could also depend on how small counties, the changing county set or extreme counties are handled. There are five measures, each computed with vote weights and with each county counted once, which gives 10 versions, and 2020 to 2024 is the lowest pair in every one (Table 7). The measures are the standard deviation, the standard deviation after dropping counties with fewer than 1,000 two-party votes in either election, the standard deviation on the fixed panel of 1,652 counties with votes in all 40 elections, and two that give little weight to extreme counties, the median absolute deviation and the interquartile range. (Note: The median absolute deviation is the middle value of the distances of county swings from their median, and the interquartile range is the distance between the swings at the 25th and 75th percentiles. Each is scaled to equal the standard deviation for a normal distribution.) Table 7. 2020 to 2024 is the lowest pair under all 10 versions of the spread ### What these data cannot show County returns describe places, not voters. A county that swings with the nation can contain groups that moved in opposite directions, and returns cannot separate voters who changed their choice from people who started or stopped voting or moved in or out, a limit known as ecological inference. The national swing has a related limit. It is a change in a summed margin, so it counts where votes were cast as well as how counties voted, and in 2020 to 2024 it differed from the mean county swing by −1.3 points. The returns are full counts, so the figures carry no sampling intervals, and differences between measures come from how they are defined and which counties enter. The county set is one of those choices. Counties are matched on FIPS code and boundaries are not harmonized, so a county that gained or lost territory is treated as one unit, and the county-equal figures depend on how many small counties exist. The 53 county rows that have Democratic and Republican votes but no total vote count are left out, among them 27 Idaho counties in 1912, and keeping them changes no pair's spread by more than 0.12 points. Returns before 1965 count the votes of the people allowed to vote. In much of the South, barriers to voting kept many Black citizens from the ballot until the Voting Rights Act, so early margins describe smaller electorates than the populations of those counties. The two-party margin also leaves out third-party votes, which is why the shaded pairs in Table 1 are the least comparable with the rest. The chapter measures how uniformly counties moved and does not say why. How much of the county vote census characteristics account for is the subject of Chapter 12.1, Five axes of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote), and ticket splitting is taken up in Chapter 10.3, Down the ballot (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/down-the-ballot). Chapter 10.4, The Electoral College (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-electoral-college; planned) turns state margins into electoral outcomes, and Chapter 15.1, Party and place (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place) compares how far partisans' issue positions differ between deep-red and deep-blue counties with the gap between the parties. The series also makes no forecast. The spread was 5.0 points in 2008 to 2012 and 10.8 in 2012 to 2016. ## Tables ### Table 1. The spread of county swings was above 10 points in 28 of 29 pairs through 1984 and below it in 9 of 10 since Standard deviation of county swings in the two-party margin, percentage points; one point per pair of consecutive presidential elections, plotted at the later election | View | Pair of elections | Measure | Spread (points) | Counties | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | weighted | 1868–72 | Vote-weighted | 31.88 | 1,687 | | weighted | 1872–76 | Vote-weighted | 29.11 | 2,151 | | weighted | 1876–80 | Vote-weighted | 12.83 | 2,216 | | weighted | 1880–84 | Vote-weighted | 11.84 | 2,283 | | weighted | 1884–88 | Vote-weighted | 10.25 | 2,345 | | weighted | 1888–92 | Vote-weighted | 17.31 | 2,424 | | weighted | 1892–96 | Vote-weighted | 39.03 | 2,654 | | weighted | 1896–1900 | Vote-weighted | 22.85 | 2,695 | | weighted | 1900–04 | Vote-weighted | 16.53 | 2,680 | | weighted | 1904–08 | Vote-weighted | 14.91 | 2,707 | | weighted | 1908–12 | Vote-weighted | 23.94 | 2,832 | | weighted | 1912–16 | Vote-weighted | 26.08 | 2,942 | | weighted | 1916–20 | Vote-weighted | 17.04 | 3,018 | | weighted | 1920–24 | Vote-weighted | 16.74 | 3,048 | | weighted | 1924–28 | Vote-weighted | 31.49 | 3,083 | | weighted | 1928–32 | Vote-weighted | 20.79 | 3,095 | | weighted | 1932–36 | Vote-weighted | 14.55 | 3,095 | | weighted | 1936–40 | Vote-weighted | 12.05 | 3,094 | | weighted | 1940–44 | Vote-weighted | 6.44 | 3,093 | | weighted | 1944–48 | Vote-weighted | 11.85 | 3,095 | | weighted | 1948–52 | Vote-weighted | 13.28 | 3,094 | | weighted | 1952–56 | Vote-weighted | 10.04 | 3,097 | | weighted | 1956–60 | Vote-weighted | 14.58 | 3,100 | | weighted | 1960–64 | Vote-weighted | 21.24 | 3,102 | | weighted | 1964–68 | Vote-weighted | 21.29 | 3,107 | | weighted | 1968–72 | Vote-weighted | 17.72 | 3,109 | | weighted | 1972–76 | Vote-weighted | 19.29 | 3,110 | | weighted | 1976–80 | Vote-weighted | 10.90 | 3,112 | | weighted | 1980–84 | Vote-weighted | 11.19 | 3,112 | | weighted | 1984–88 | Vote-weighted | 6.15 | 3,114 | | weighted | 1988–92 | Vote-weighted | 7.61 | 3,114 | | weighted | 1992–96 | Vote-weighted | 7.86 | 3,114 | | weighted | 1996–2000 | Vote-weighted | 7.85 | 3,113 | | weighted | 2000–04 | Vote-weighted | 6.13 | 3,113 | | weighted | 2004–08 | Vote-weighted | 7.68 | 3,114 | | weighted | 2008–12 | Vote-weighted | 4.97 | 3,114 | | weighted | 2012–16 | Vote-weighted | 10.81 | 3,112 | | weighted | 2016–20 | Vote-weighted | 5.70 | 3,113 | | weighted | 2020–24 | Vote-weighted | 4.47 | 3,111 | | both | 1868–72 | Vote-weighted | 31.88 | 1,687 | | both | 1872–76 | Vote-weighted | 29.11 | 2,151 | | both | 1876–80 | Vote-weighted | 12.83 | 2,216 | | both | 1880–84 | Vote-weighted | 11.84 | 2,283 | | both | 1884–88 | Vote-weighted | 10.25 | 2,345 | | both | 1888–92 | Vote-weighted | 17.31 | 2,424 | | both | 1892–96 | Vote-weighted | 39.03 | 2,654 | | both | 1896–1900 | Vote-weighted | 22.85 | 2,695 | | both | 1900–04 | Vote-weighted | 16.53 | 2,680 | | both | 1904–08 | Vote-weighted | 14.91 | 2,707 | | both | 1908–12 | Vote-weighted | 23.94 | 2,832 | | both | 1912–16 | Vote-weighted | 26.08 | 2,942 | | both | 1916–20 | Vote-weighted | 17.04 | 3,018 | | both | 1920–24 | Vote-weighted | 16.74 | 3,048 | | both | 1924–28 | Vote-weighted | 31.49 | 3,083 | | both | 1928–32 | Vote-weighted | 20.79 | 3,095 | | both | 1932–36 | Vote-weighted | 14.55 | 3,095 | | both | 1936–40 | Vote-weighted | 12.05 | 3,094 | | both | 1940–44 | Vote-weighted | 6.44 | 3,093 | | both | 1944–48 | Vote-weighted | 11.85 | 3,095 | | both | 1948–52 | Vote-weighted | 13.28 | 3,094 | | both | 1952–56 | Vote-weighted | 10.04 | 3,097 | | both | 1956–60 | Vote-weighted | 14.58 | 3,100 | | both | 1960–64 | Vote-weighted | 21.24 | 3,102 | | both | 1964–68 | Vote-weighted | 21.29 | 3,107 | | both | 1968–72 | Vote-weighted | 17.72 | 3,109 | | both | 1972–76 | Vote-weighted | 19.29 | 3,110 | | both | 1976–80 | Vote-weighted | 10.90 | 3,112 | | both | 1980–84 | Vote-weighted | 11.19 | 3,112 | | both | 1984–88 | Vote-weighted | 6.15 | 3,114 | | both | 1988–92 | Vote-weighted | 7.61 | 3,114 | | both | 1992–96 | Vote-weighted | 7.86 | 3,114 | | both | 1996–2000 | Vote-weighted | 7.85 | 3,113 | | both | 2000–04 | Vote-weighted | 6.13 | 3,113 | | both | 2004–08 | Vote-weighted | 7.68 | 3,114 | | both | 2008–12 | Vote-weighted | 4.97 | 3,114 | | both | 2012–16 | Vote-weighted | 10.81 | 3,112 | | both | 2016–20 | Vote-weighted | 5.70 | 3,113 | | both | 2020–24 | Vote-weighted | 4.47 | 3,111 | | both | 1868–72 | Each county counted once | 40.76 | 1,687 | | both | 1872–76 | Each county counted once | 29.19 | 2,151 | | both | 1876–80 | Each county counted once | 18.71 | 2,216 | | both | 1880–84 | Each county counted once | 16.52 | 2,283 | | both | 1884–88 | Each county counted once | 16.63 | 2,345 | | both | 1888–92 | Each county counted once | 30.51 | 2,424 | | both | 1892–96 | Each county counted once | 49.35 | 2,654 | | both | 1896–1900 | Each county counted once | 25.60 | 2,695 | | both | 1900–04 | Each county counted once | 23.91 | 2,680 | | both | 1904–08 | Each county counted once | 18.98 | 2,707 | | both | 1908–12 | Each county counted once | 27.53 | 2,832 | | both | 1912–16 | Each county counted once | 26.23 | 2,942 | | both | 1916–20 | Each county counted once | 21.79 | 3,018 | | both | 1920–24 | Each county counted once | 18.48 | 3,048 | | both | 1924–28 | Each county counted once | 36.48 | 3,083 | | both | 1928–32 | Each county counted once | 23.56 | 3,095 | | both | 1932–36 | Each county counted once | 14.41 | 3,095 | | both | 1936–40 | Each county counted once | 16.03 | 3,094 | | both | 1940–44 | Each county counted once | 8.90 | 3,093 | | both | 1944–48 | Each county counted once | 16.75 | 3,095 | | both | 1948–52 | Each county counted once | 18.50 | 3,094 | | both | 1952–56 | Each county counted once | 15.20 | 3,097 | | both | 1956–60 | Each county counted once | 17.14 | 3,100 | | both | 1960–64 | Each county counted once | 36.80 | 3,102 | | both | 1964–68 | Each county counted once | 37.96 | 3,107 | | both | 1968–72 | Each county counted once | 27.04 | 3,109 | | both | 1972–76 | Each county counted once | 25.91 | 3,110 | | both | 1976–80 | Each county counted once | 12.75 | 3,112 | | both | 1980–84 | Each county counted once | 14.79 | 3,112 | | both | 1984–88 | Each county counted once | 8.57 | 3,114 | | both | 1988–92 | Each county counted once | 10.12 | 3,114 | | both | 1992–96 | Each county counted once | 8.22 | 3,114 | | both | 1996–2000 | Each county counted once | 9.40 | 3,113 | | both | 2000–04 | Each county counted once | 7.25 | 3,113 | | both | 2004–08 | Each county counted once | 10.18 | 3,114 | | both | 2008–12 | Each county counted once | 6.23 | 3,114 | | both | 2012–16 | Each county counted once | 10.44 | 3,112 | | both | 2016–20 | Each county counted once | 5.19 | 3,113 | | both | 2020–24 | Each county counted once | 3.36 | 3,111 | Views: Weighted by votes (view = weighted); Votes and counties (view = both). Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the estimates have no confidence interval. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/dispersion_series.json ### Table 2. Relative county swings lay far from zero in early pairs and sat in a narrow band just above zero in 2020 to 2024 Relative swing is a county's swing in the Democratic minus Republican margin minus the national swing, percentage points; height is the share of a pair's votes in each 2-point bin, nine pairs of presidential elections | Pair of elections | Bin center (points) | Share of votes (%) | | --- | ---: | ---: | | 1872–76 | −59 | 0.01 | | 1872–76 | −57 | 0.00 | | 1872–76 | −55 | 0.56 | | 1872–76 | −53 | 0.05 | | 1872–76 | −51 | 0.06 | | 1872–76 | −49 | 0.02 | | 1872–76 | −47 | 0.15 | | 1872–76 | −45 | 0.04 | | 1872–76 | −43 | 0.13 | | 1872–76 | −41 | 0.06 | | 1872–76 | −39 | 0.15 | | 1872–76 | −37 | 0.08 | | 1872–76 | −35 | 0.05 | | 1872–76 | −33 | 0.15 | | 1872–76 | −31 | 0.10 | | 1872–76 | −29 | 0.23 | | 1872–76 | −27 | 1.29 | | 1872–76 | −25 | 0.38 | | 1872–76 | −23 | 0.91 | | 1872–76 | −21 | 1.60 | | 1872–76 | −19 | 2.39 | | 1872–76 | −17 | 3.03 | | 1872–76 | −15 | 4.91 | | 1872–76 | −13 | 6.25 | | 1872–76 | −11 | 8.41 | | 1872–76 | −9 | 6.32 | | 1872–76 | −7 | 5.53 | | 1872–76 | −5 | 6.06 | | 1872–76 | −3 | 8.93 | | 1872–76 | −1 | 4.71 | | 1872–76 | +1 | 5.20 | | 1872–76 | +3 | 3.39 | | 1872–76 | +5 | 2.84 | | 1872–76 | +7 | 2.46 | | 1872–76 | +9 | 1.55 | | 1872–76 | +11 | 1.53 | | 1872–76 | +13 | 1.20 | | 1872–76 | +15 | 0.64 | | 1872–76 | +17 | 0.40 | | 1872–76 | +19 | 0.57 | | 1872–76 | +21 | 2.02 | | 1872–76 | +23 | 0.50 | | 1872–76 | +25 | 0.34 | | 1872–76 | +27 | 0.37 | | 1872–76 | +29 | 0.29 | | 1872–76 | +31 | 0.34 | | 1872–76 | +33 | 0.39 | | 1872–76 | +35 | 0.29 | | 1872–76 | +37 | 0.17 | | 1872–76 | +39 | 0.33 | | 1872–76 | +41 | 0.42 | | 1872–76 | +43 | 0.16 | | 1872–76 | +45 | 0.35 | | 1872–76 | +47 | 0.21 | | 1872–76 | +49 | 0.33 | | 1872–76 | +51 | 0.35 | | 1872–76 | +53 | 0.37 | | 1872–76 | +55 | 0.13 | | 1872–76 | +57 | 0.29 | | 1872–76 | +59 | 0.34 | | 1892–96 | −59 | 0.03 | | 1892–96 | −57 | 0.10 | | 1892–96 | −55 | 0.13 | | 1892–96 | −53 | 0.17 | | 1892–96 | −51 | 0.06 | | 1892–96 | −49 | 0.04 | | 1892–96 | −47 | 0.31 | | 1892–96 | −45 | 0.03 | | 1892–96 | −43 | 0.33 | | 1892–96 | −41 | 0.15 | | 1892–96 | −39 | 0.47 | | 1892–96 | −37 | 1.13 | | 1892–96 | −35 | 0.37 | | 1892–96 | −33 | 0.67 | | 1892–96 | −31 | 1.39 | | 1892–96 | −29 | 0.61 | | 1892–96 | −27 | 0.94 | | 1892–96 | −25 | 3.79 | | 1892–96 | −23 | 4.79 | | 1892–96 | −21 | 3.71 | | 1892–96 | −19 | 2.95 | | 1892–96 | −17 | 1.22 | | 1892–96 | −15 | 2.40 | | 1892–96 | −13 | 1.99 | | 1892–96 | −11 | 1.78 | | 1892–96 | −9 | 3.55 | | 1892–96 | −7 | 2.70 | | 1892–96 | −5 | 5.26 | | 1892–96 | −3 | 3.25 | | 1892–96 | −1 | 5.92 | | 1892–96 | +1 | 4.88 | | 1892–96 | +3 | 3.98 | | 1892–96 | +5 | 3.71 | | 1892–96 | +7 | 4.95 | | 1892–96 | +9 | 3.67 | | 1892–96 | +11 | 3.57 | | 1892–96 | +13 | 2.96 | | 1892–96 | +15 | 2.38 | | 1892–96 | +17 | 1.44 | | 1892–96 | +19 | 1.47 | | 1892–96 | +21 | 0.69 | | 1892–96 | +23 | 0.80 | | 1892–96 | +25 | 1.08 | | 1892–96 | +27 | 0.57 | | 1892–96 | +29 | 0.40 | | 1892–96 | +31 | 0.25 | | 1892–96 | +33 | 0.16 | | 1892–96 | +35 | 0.55 | | 1892–96 | +37 | 0.33 | | 1892–96 | +39 | 0.19 | | 1892–96 | +41 | 0.28 | | 1892–96 | +43 | 0.17 | | 1892–96 | +45 | 0.24 | | 1892–96 | +47 | 0.13 | | 1892–96 | +49 | 0.08 | | 1892–96 | +51 | 0.16 | | 1892–96 | +53 | 0.22 | | 1892–96 | +55 | 0.13 | | 1892–96 | +57 | 0.06 | | 1892–96 | +59 | 0.23 | | 1912–16 | −59 | 0.22 | | 1912–16 | −57 | 0.12 | | 1912–16 | −55 | 0.28 | | 1912–16 | −53 | 0.15 | | 1912–16 | −51 | 0.06 | | 1912–16 | −49 | 0.19 | | 1912–16 | −47 | 0.58 | | 1912–16 | −45 | 0.39 | | 1912–16 | −43 | 0.32 | | 1912–16 | −41 | 0.28 | | 1912–16 | −39 | 0.05 | | 1912–16 | −37 | 0.69 | | 1912–16 | −35 | 0.29 | | 1912–16 | −33 | 0.76 | | 1912–16 | −31 | 0.64 | | 1912–16 | −29 | 1.54 | | 1912–16 | −27 | 1.03 | | 1912–16 | −25 | 0.75 | | 1912–16 | −23 | 1.16 | | 1912–16 | −21 | 1.22 | | 1912–16 | −19 | 1.89 | | 1912–16 | −17 | 1.78 | | 1912–16 | −15 | 2.36 | | 1912–16 | −13 | 1.61 | | 1912–16 | −11 | 2.12 | | 1912–16 | −9 | 11.26 | | 1912–16 | −7 | 2.83 | | 1912–16 | −5 | 2.36 | | 1912–16 | −3 | 1.67 | | 1912–16 | −1 | 2.50 | | 1912–16 | +1 | 2.69 | | 1912–16 | +3 | 2.47 | | 1912–16 | +5 | 4.58 | | 1912–16 | +7 | 4.85 | | 1912–16 | +9 | 3.33 | | 1912–16 | +11 | 3.17 | | 1912–16 | +13 | 4.13 | | 1912–16 | +15 | 3.24 | | 1912–16 | +17 | 3.95 | | 1912–16 | +19 | 3.85 | | 1912–16 | +21 | 2.13 | | 1912–16 | +23 | 2.77 | | 1912–16 | +25 | 2.18 | | 1912–16 | +27 | 3.12 | | 1912–16 | +29 | 1.55 | | 1912–16 | +31 | 1.01 | | 1912–16 | +33 | 0.63 | | 1912–16 | +35 | 1.20 | | 1912–16 | +37 | 0.38 | | 1912–16 | +39 | 0.27 | | 1912–16 | +41 | 0.16 | | 1912–16 | +43 | 0.32 | | 1912–16 | +45 | 0.21 | | 1912–16 | +47 | 0.18 | | 1912–16 | +49 | 0.13 | | 1912–16 | +51 | 0.10 | | 1912–16 | +53 | 0.07 | | 1912–16 | +55 | 0.20 | | 1912–16 | +57 | 0.03 | | 1912–16 | +59 | 0.07 | | 1932–36 | −59 | 0.00 | | 1932–36 | −57 | 0.01 | | 1932–36 | −55 | 0.00 | | 1932–36 | −53 | 0.03 | | 1932–36 | −51 | 0.00 | | 1932–36 | −49 | 0.01 | | 1932–36 | −47 | 0.02 | | 1932–36 | −45 | 0.04 | | 1932–36 | −43 | 0.04 | | 1932–36 | −41 | 0.06 | | 1932–36 | −39 | 0.10 | | 1932–36 | −37 | 0.31 | | 1932–36 | −35 | 0.24 | | 1932–36 | −33 | 0.46 | | 1932–36 | −31 | 0.44 | | 1932–36 | −29 | 0.71 | | 1932–36 | −27 | 1.11 | | 1932–36 | −25 | 1.51 | | 1932–36 | −23 | 1.15 | | 1932–36 | −21 | 1.86 | | 1932–36 | −19 | 2.11 | | 1932–36 | −17 | 2.38 | | 1932–36 | −15 | 2.98 | | 1932–36 | −13 | 2.77 | | 1932–36 | −11 | 3.84 | | 1932–36 | −9 | 2.73 | | 1932–36 | −7 | 3.72 | | 1932–36 | −5 | 7.98 | | 1932–36 | −3 | 7.22 | | 1932–36 | −1 | 6.08 | | 1932–36 | +1 | 2.85 | | 1932–36 | +3 | 5.23 | | 1932–36 | +5 | 3.83 | | 1932–36 | +7 | 8.02 | | 1932–36 | +9 | 6.06 | | 1932–36 | +11 | 7.33 | | 1932–36 | +13 | 2.14 | | 1932–36 | +15 | 2.38 | | 1932–36 | +17 | 2.71 | | 1932–36 | +19 | 1.56 | | 1932–36 | +21 | 0.69 | | 1932–36 | +23 | 0.94 | | 1932–36 | +25 | 1.00 | | 1932–36 | +27 | 0.49 | | 1932–36 | +29 | 3.36 | | 1932–36 | +31 | 0.42 | | 1932–36 | +33 | 0.00 | | 1932–36 | +35 | 0.00 | | 1932–36 | +37 | 0.16 | | 1932–36 | +39 | 0.22 | | 1932–36 | +41 | 0.28 | | 1932–36 | +43 | 0.03 | | 1932–36 | +45 | 0.00 | | 1932–36 | +47 | 0.20 | | 1932–36 | +49 | 0.00 | | 1932–36 | +51 | 0.08 | | 1932–36 | +53 | 0.00 | | 1932–36 | +55 | 0.00 | | 1932–36 | +57 | 0.00 | | 1932–36 | +59 | 0.00 | | 1952–56 | −59 | 0.01 | | 1952–56 | −57 | 0.01 | | 1952–56 | −55 | 0.02 | | 1952–56 | −53 | 0.01 | | 1952–56 | −51 | 0.00 | | 1952–56 | −49 | 0.00 | | 1952–56 | −47 | 0.04 | | 1952–56 | −45 | 0.02 | | 1952–56 | −43 | 0.01 | | 1952–56 | −41 | 0.03 | | 1952–56 | −39 | 0.02 | | 1952–56 | −37 | 0.01 | | 1952–56 | −35 | 0.01 | | 1952–56 | −33 | 0.03 | | 1952–56 | −31 | 0.01 | | 1952–56 | −29 | 0.03 | | 1952–56 | −27 | 0.06 | | 1952–56 | −25 | 0.60 | | 1952–56 | −23 | 0.18 | | 1952–56 | −21 | 0.21 | | 1952–56 | −19 | 0.37 | | 1952–56 | −17 | 0.51 | | 1952–56 | −15 | 0.94 | | 1952–56 | −13 | 2.41 | | 1952–56 | −11 | 4.47 | | 1952–56 | −9 | 8.54 | | 1952–56 | −7 | 6.62 | | 1952–56 | −5 | 7.28 | | 1952–56 | −3 | 8.11 | | 1952–56 | −1 | 6.47 | | 1952–56 | +1 | 10.87 | | 1952–56 | +3 | 4.37 | | 1952–56 | +5 | 13.83 | | 1952–56 | +7 | 7.39 | | 1952–56 | +9 | 3.87 | | 1952–56 | +11 | 3.39 | | 1952–56 | +13 | 1.94 | | 1952–56 | +15 | 2.02 | | 1952–56 | +17 | 1.12 | | 1952–56 | +19 | 1.05 | | 1952–56 | +21 | 0.89 | | 1952–56 | +23 | 0.58 | | 1952–56 | +25 | 0.56 | | 1952–56 | +27 | 0.21 | | 1952–56 | +29 | 0.27 | | 1952–56 | +31 | 0.10 | | 1952–56 | +33 | 0.05 | | 1952–56 | +35 | 0.07 | | 1952–56 | +37 | 0.07 | | 1952–56 | +39 | 0.02 | | 1952–56 | +41 | 0.02 | | 1952–56 | +43 | 0.02 | | 1952–56 | +45 | 0.00 | | 1952–56 | +47 | 0.00 | | 1952–56 | +49 | 0.00 | | 1952–56 | +51 | 0.01 | | 1952–56 | +53 | 0.00 | | 1952–56 | +55 | 0.00 | | 1952–56 | +57 | 0.01 | | 1952–56 | +59 | 0.00 | | 1972–76 | −59 | 0.00 | | 1972–76 | −57 | 0.00 | | 1972–76 | −55 | 0.00 | | 1972–76 | −53 | 0.00 | | 1972–76 | −51 | 0.01 | | 1972–76 | −49 | 0.00 | | 1972–76 | −47 | 0.00 | | 1972–76 | −45 | 0.00 | | 1972–76 | −43 | 0.00 | | 1972–76 | −41 | 0.23 | | 1972–76 | −39 | 0.01 | | 1972–76 | −37 | 0.00 | | 1972–76 | −35 | 0.13 | | 1972–76 | −33 | 0.15 | | 1972–76 | −31 | 0.53 | | 1972–76 | −29 | 0.27 | | 1972–76 | −27 | 0.56 | | 1972–76 | −25 | 0.50 | | 1972–76 | −23 | 1.27 | | 1972–76 | −21 | 1.42 | | 1972–76 | −19 | 1.76 | | 1972–76 | −17 | 4.16 | | 1972–76 | −15 | 3.96 | | 1972–76 | −13 | 4.54 | | 1972–76 | −11 | 10.97 | | 1972–76 | −9 | 9.86 | | 1972–76 | −7 | 4.73 | | 1972–76 | −5 | 4.16 | | 1972–76 | −3 | 6.08 | | 1972–76 | −1 | 3.83 | | 1972–76 | +1 | 3.49 | | 1972–76 | +3 | 4.15 | | 1972–76 | +5 | 2.25 | | 1972–76 | +7 | 3.87 | | 1972–76 | +9 | 3.85 | | 1972–76 | +11 | 3.14 | | 1972–76 | +13 | 1.31 | | 1972–76 | +15 | 1.95 | | 1972–76 | +17 | 1.64 | | 1972–76 | +19 | 1.06 | | 1972–76 | +21 | 0.99 | | 1972–76 | +23 | 1.73 | | 1972–76 | +25 | 1.20 | | 1972–76 | +27 | 0.92 | | 1972–76 | +29 | 0.85 | | 1972–76 | +31 | 0.97 | | 1972–76 | +33 | 0.52 | | 1972–76 | +35 | 0.84 | | 1972–76 | +37 | 0.62 | | 1972–76 | +39 | 0.51 | | 1972–76 | +41 | 0.61 | | 1972–76 | +43 | 0.39 | | 1972–76 | +45 | 0.39 | | 1972–76 | +47 | 0.34 | | 1972–76 | +49 | 0.37 | | 1972–76 | +51 | 0.26 | | 1972–76 | +53 | 0.23 | | 1972–76 | +55 | 0.20 | | 1972–76 | +57 | 0.38 | | 1972–76 | +59 | 0.12 | | 1992–96 | −59 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −57 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −55 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −53 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −51 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −49 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −47 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −45 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −43 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −41 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −39 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −37 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −35 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | −33 | 0.02 | | 1992–96 | −31 | 0.02 | | 1992–96 | −29 | 0.01 | | 1992–96 | −27 | 0.02 | | 1992–96 | −25 | 0.06 | | 1992–96 | −23 | 0.05 | | 1992–96 | −21 | 0.36 | | 1992–96 | −19 | 0.43 | | 1992–96 | −17 | 0.40 | | 1992–96 | −15 | 1.22 | | 1992–96 | −13 | 2.14 | | 1992–96 | −11 | 2.31 | | 1992–96 | −9 | 4.32 | | 1992–96 | −7 | 7.22 | | 1992–96 | −5 | 6.41 | | 1992–96 | −3 | 9.24 | | 1992–96 | −1 | 10.91 | | 1992–96 | +1 | 13.27 | | 1992–96 | +3 | 9.34 | | 1992–96 | +5 | 6.44 | | 1992–96 | +7 | 6.25 | | 1992–96 | +9 | 4.87 | | 1992–96 | +11 | 4.88 | | 1992–96 | +13 | 3.78 | | 1992–96 | +15 | 3.93 | | 1992–96 | +17 | 1.13 | | 1992–96 | +19 | 0.52 | | 1992–96 | +21 | 0.19 | | 1992–96 | +23 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +25 | 0.01 | | 1992–96 | +27 | 0.21 | | 1992–96 | +29 | 0.01 | | 1992–96 | +31 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +33 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +35 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +37 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +39 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +41 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +43 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +45 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +47 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +49 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +51 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +53 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +55 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +57 | 0.00 | | 1992–96 | +59 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | −59 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | −57 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | −55 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | −53 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | −51 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | −49 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | −47 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | −45 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | −43 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | −41 | 0.01 | | 2012–16 | −39 | 0.01 | | 2012–16 | −37 | 0.03 | | 2012–16 | −35 | 0.08 | | 2012–16 | −33 | 0.11 | | 2012–16 | −31 | 0.28 | | 2012–16 | −29 | 0.49 | | 2012–16 | −27 | 0.49 | | 2012–16 | −25 | 0.72 | | 2012–16 | −23 | 1.21 | | 2012–16 | −21 | 1.13 | | 2012–16 | −19 | 1.41 | | 2012–16 | −17 | 2.19 | | 2012–16 | −15 | 2.64 | | 2012–16 | −13 | 2.38 | | 2012–16 | −11 | 4.13 | | 2012–16 | −9 | 3.47 | | 2012–16 | −7 | 6.19 | | 2012–16 | −5 | 5.31 | | 2012–16 | −3 | 5.33 | | 2012–16 | −1 | 9.77 | | 2012–16 | +1 | 4.89 | | 2012–16 | +3 | 7.38 | | 2012–16 | +5 | 7.62 | | 2012–16 | +7 | 6.08 | | 2012–16 | +9 | 7.27 | | 2012–16 | +11 | 6.75 | | 2012–16 | +13 | 3.44 | | 2012–16 | +15 | 5.03 | | 2012–16 | +17 | 2.72 | | 2012–16 | +19 | 0.78 | | 2012–16 | +21 | 0.11 | | 2012–16 | +23 | 0.01 | | 2012–16 | +25 | 0.21 | | 2012–16 | +27 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +29 | 0.09 | | 2012–16 | +31 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +33 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +35 | 0.25 | | 2012–16 | +37 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +39 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +41 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +43 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +45 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +47 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +49 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +51 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +53 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +55 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +57 | 0.00 | | 2012–16 | +59 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −59 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −57 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −55 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −53 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −51 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −49 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −47 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −45 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −43 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −41 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −39 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −37 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −35 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −33 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −31 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −29 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −27 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −25 | 0.00 | | 2020–24 | −23 | 0.01 | | 2020–24 | −21 | 0.13 | The first 500 of 540 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/swing_distribution.json. Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the estimates have no confidence interval. Note: The bins run from minus 60 to plus 60 points and swings beyond that range are not drawn; 1892 to 1896 has the largest share beyond it among the pairs shown. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/swing_distribution.json ### Table 3. The share of counties within 5 points of the national swing rose from 21.2% in 1972 to 1976 to 75.6% in 2020 to 2024 Change in each county's Democratic minus Republican margin, minus the national change, percentage points, for each of 39 pairs of presidential elections No inline rows: the values of Table 3 are in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/swing_map.json. Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the estimates have no confidence interval. Note: Counties are drawn on 2020 boundaries and matched across elections on FIPS code. A county with no return in one of the two elections, or whose code is absent from the 2020 map, draws as no data. Values are rounded to one decimal place, except that a county within 5 points of the national swing is never rounded to the edge of the palest class, so that class holds the counties counted in the text. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/swing_map.json ### Table 4. The share of votes near the national swing was 73.3% in 2008 to 2012 and 73.1% in 2020 to 2024, the two highest of 39 pairs Share of votes cast in counties whose swing is within 5 points of the national swing, percent; one point per pair of consecutive presidential elections, plotted at the later election | Counted by | Pair of elections | Reference swing | Share within the band (%) | Counties | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | Votes | 1868–72 | National swing | 22.5 | 1,687 | | Votes | 1868–72 | Mean county swing | 22.7 | 1,687 | | Counties | 1868–72 | National swing | 16.5 | 1,687 | | Counties | 1868–72 | Mean county swing | 16.7 | 1,687 | | Votes | 1872–76 | National swing | 26.1 | 2,151 | | Votes | 1872–76 | Mean county swing | 16.8 | 2,151 | | Counties | 1872–76 | National swing | 22.9 | 2,151 | | Counties | 1872–76 | Mean county swing | 17.4 | 2,151 | | Votes | 1876–80 | National swing | 61.1 | 2,216 | | Votes | 1876–80 | Mean county swing | 60.4 | 2,216 | | Counties | 1876–80 | National swing | 47.9 | 2,216 | | Counties | 1876–80 | Mean county swing | 47.7 | 2,216 | | Votes | 1880–84 | National swing | 51.5 | 2,283 | | Votes | 1880–84 | Mean county swing | 51.5 | 2,283 | | Counties | 1880–84 | National swing | 39.5 | 2,283 | | Counties | 1880–84 | Mean county swing | 39.5 | 2,283 | | Votes | 1884–88 | National swing | 60.8 | 2,345 | | Votes | 1884–88 | Mean county swing | 58.7 | 2,345 | | Counties | 1884–88 | National swing | 50.1 | 2,345 | | Counties | 1884–88 | Mean county swing | 48.3 | 2,345 | | Votes | 1888–92 | National swing | 60.6 | 2,424 | | Votes | 1888–92 | Mean county swing | 61.6 | 2,424 | | Counties | 1888–92 | National swing | 43.5 | 2,424 | | Counties | 1888–92 | Mean county swing | 44.1 | 2,424 | | Votes | 1892–96 | National swing | 22.7 | 2,654 | | Votes | 1892–96 | Mean county swing | 23.6 | 2,654 | | Counties | 1892–96 | National swing | 18.4 | 2,654 | | Counties | 1892–96 | Mean county swing | 21.3 | 2,654 | | Votes | 1896–1900 | National swing | 37.8 | 2,695 | | Votes | 1896–1900 | Mean county swing | 32.6 | 2,695 | | Counties | 1896–1900 | National swing | 30.1 | 2,695 | | Counties | 1896–1900 | Mean county swing | 25.3 | 2,695 | | Votes | 1900–04 | National swing | 29.1 | 2,680 | | Votes | 1900–04 | Mean county swing | 28.3 | 2,680 | | Counties | 1900–04 | National swing | 21.2 | 2,680 | | Counties | 1900–04 | Mean county swing | 22.0 | 2,680 | | Votes | 1904–08 | National swing | 25.4 | 2,707 | | Votes | 1904–08 | Mean county swing | 25.2 | 2,707 | | Counties | 1904–08 | National swing | 23.1 | 2,707 | | Counties | 1904–08 | Mean county swing | 22.8 | 2,707 | | Votes | 1908–12 | National swing | 16.8 | 2,832 | | Votes | 1908–12 | Mean county swing | 17.7 | 2,832 | | Counties | 1908–12 | National swing | 14.8 | 2,832 | | Counties | 1908–12 | Mean county swing | 15.8 | 2,832 | | Votes | 1912–16 | National swing | 11.7 | 2,942 | | Votes | 1912–16 | Mean county swing | 11.5 | 2,942 | | Counties | 1912–16 | National swing | 12.7 | 2,942 | | Counties | 1912–16 | Mean county swing | 11.9 | 2,942 | | Votes | 1916–20 | National swing | 21.4 | 3,018 | | Votes | 1916–20 | Mean county swing | 23.1 | 3,018 | | Counties | 1916–20 | National swing | 15.8 | 3,018 | | Counties | 1916–20 | Mean county swing | 15.9 | 3,018 | | Votes | 1920–24 | National swing | 30.6 | 3,048 | | Votes | 1920–24 | Mean county swing | 30.7 | 3,048 | | Counties | 1920–24 | National swing | 24.8 | 3,048 | | Counties | 1920–24 | Mean county swing | 25.1 | 3,048 | | Votes | 1924–28 | National swing | 10.7 | 3,083 | | Votes | 1924–28 | Mean county swing | 9.9 | 3,083 | | Counties | 1924–28 | National swing | 8.5 | 3,083 | | Counties | 1924–28 | Mean county swing | 7.9 | 3,083 | | Votes | 1928–32 | National swing | 16.9 | 3,095 | | Votes | 1928–32 | Mean county swing | 16.7 | 3,095 | | Counties | 1928–32 | National swing | 17.0 | 3,095 | | Counties | 1928–32 | Mean county swing | 16.5 | 3,095 | | Votes | 1932–36 | National swing | 28.1 | 3,095 | | Votes | 1932–36 | Mean county swing | 27.0 | 3,095 | | Counties | 1932–36 | National swing | 22.6 | 3,095 | | Counties | 1932–36 | Mean county swing | 20.8 | 3,095 | | Votes | 1936–40 | National swing | 41.0 | 3,094 | | Votes | 1936–40 | Mean county swing | 39.9 | 3,094 | | Counties | 1936–40 | National swing | 25.0 | 3,094 | | Counties | 1936–40 | Mean county swing | 24.4 | 3,094 | | Votes | 1940–44 | National swing | 62.0 | 3,093 | | Votes | 1940–44 | Mean county swing | 62.4 | 3,093 | | Counties | 1940–44 | National swing | 54.3 | 3,093 | | Counties | 1940–44 | Mean county swing | 54.8 | 3,093 | | Votes | 1944–48 | National swing | 32.9 | 3,095 | | Votes | 1944–48 | Mean county swing | 32.1 | 3,095 | | Counties | 1944–48 | National swing | 27.3 | 3,095 | | Counties | 1944–48 | Mean county swing | 27.5 | 3,095 | | Votes | 1948–52 | National swing | 36.7 | 3,094 | | Votes | 1948–52 | Mean county swing | 35.3 | 3,094 | | Counties | 1948–52 | National swing | 24.3 | 3,094 | | Counties | 1948–52 | Mean county swing | 24.2 | 3,094 | | Votes | 1952–56 | National swing | 39.1 | 3,097 | | Votes | 1952–56 | Mean county swing | 40.1 | 3,097 | | Counties | 1952–56 | National swing | 31.9 | 3,097 | | Counties | 1952–56 | Mean county swing | 32.4 | 3,097 | | Votes | 1956–60 | National swing | 27.1 | 3,100 | | Votes | 1956–60 | Mean county swing | 26.9 | 3,100 | | Counties | 1956–60 | National swing | 19.7 | 3,100 | | Counties | 1956–60 | Mean county swing | 19.3 | 3,100 | | Votes | 1960–64 | National swing | 29.4 | 3,102 | | Votes | 1960–64 | Mean county swing | 29.2 | 3,102 | | Counties | 1960–64 | National swing | 22.2 | 3,102 | | Counties | 1960–64 | Mean county swing | 22.0 | 3,102 | | Votes | 1964–68 | National swing | 37.1 | 3,107 | | Votes | 1964–68 | Mean county swing | 37.5 | 3,107 | | Counties | 1964–68 | National swing | 20.6 | 3,107 | | Counties | 1964–68 | Mean county swing | 20.8 | 3,107 | | Votes | 1968–72 | National swing | 28.9 | 3,109 | | Votes | 1968–72 | Mean county swing | 33.6 | 3,109 | | Counties | 1968–72 | National swing | 18.6 | 3,109 | | Counties | 1968–72 | Mean county swing | 19.6 | 3,109 | | Votes | 1972–76 | National swing | 20.3 | 3,110 | | Votes | 1972–76 | Mean county swing | 20.4 | 3,110 | | Counties | 1972–76 | National swing | 21.2 | 3,110 | | Counties | 1972–76 | Mean county swing | 20.4 | 3,110 | | Votes | 1976–80 | National swing | 37.1 | 3,112 | | Votes | 1976–80 | Mean county swing | 37.8 | 3,112 | | Counties | 1976–80 | National swing | 29.7 | 3,112 | | Counties | 1976–80 | Mean county swing | 29.3 | 3,112 | | Votes | 1980–84 | National swing | 33.7 | 3,112 | | Votes | 1980–84 | Mean county swing | 33.6 | 3,112 | | Counties | 1980–84 | National swing | 27.8 | 3,112 | | Counties | 1980–84 | Mean county swing | 27.9 | 3,112 | | Votes | 1984–88 | National swing | 61.7 | 3,114 | | Votes | 1984–88 | Mean county swing | 62.4 | 3,114 | | Counties | 1984–88 | National swing | 42.2 | 3,114 | | Counties | 1984–88 | Mean county swing | 42.4 | 3,114 | | Votes | 1988–92 | National swing | 48.6 | 3,114 | | Votes | 1988–92 | Mean county swing | 49.6 | 3,114 | | Counties | 1988–92 | National swing | 40.0 | 3,114 | | Counties | 1988–92 | Mean county swing | 39.4 | 3,114 | | Votes | 1992–96 | National swing | 48.8 | 3,114 | | Votes | 1992–96 | Mean county swing | 48.8 | 3,114 | | Counties | 1992–96 | National swing | 47.5 | 3,114 | | Counties | 1992–96 | Mean county swing | 44.9 | 3,114 | | Votes | 1996–2000 | National swing | 44.8 | 3,113 | | Votes | 1996–2000 | Mean county swing | 46.3 | 3,113 | | Counties | 1996–2000 | National swing | 32.2 | 3,113 | | Counties | 1996–2000 | Mean county swing | 31.4 | 3,113 | | Votes | 2000–04 | National swing | 61.6 | 3,113 | | Votes | 2000–04 | Mean county swing | 61.8 | 3,113 | | Counties | 2000–04 | National swing | 54.2 | 3,113 | | Counties | 2000–04 | Mean county swing | 53.7 | 3,113 | | Votes | 2004–08 | National swing | 56.5 | 3,114 | | Votes | 2004–08 | Mean county swing | 56.1 | 3,114 | | Counties | 2004–08 | National swing | 43.9 | 3,114 | | Counties | 2004–08 | Mean county swing | 43.5 | 3,114 | | Votes | 2008–12 | National swing | 73.3 | 3,114 | | Votes | 2008–12 | Mean county swing | 73.0 | 3,114 | | Counties | 2008–12 | National swing | 58.8 | 3,114 | | Counties | 2008–12 | Mean county swing | 58.3 | 3,114 | | Votes | 2012–16 | National swing | 34.0 | 3,112 | | Votes | 2012–16 | Mean county swing | 34.2 | 3,112 | | Counties | 2012–16 | National swing | 24.6 | 3,112 | | Counties | 2012–16 | Mean county swing | 23.6 | 3,112 | | Votes | 2016–20 | National swing | 69.1 | 3,113 | | Votes | 2016–20 | Mean county swing | 69.1 | 3,113 | | Counties | 2016–20 | National swing | 73.9 | 3,113 | | Counties | 2016–20 | Mean county swing | 73.9 | 3,113 | | Votes | 2020–24 | National swing | 73.1 | 3,111 | | Votes | 2020–24 | Mean county swing | 80.0 | 3,111 | | Counties | 2020–24 | National swing | 75.6 | 3,111 | | Counties | 2020–24 | Mean county swing | 86.3 | 3,111 | Views: Share of votes (basis = Votes, reference = National swing); Share of counties (basis = Counties, reference = National swing). Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the estimates have no confidence interval. Note: A county is near the national swing if its own swing differs from it by less than 5 points. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/share_near_national_swing.json ### Table 5. The spread of county swings was 33.5 points in the South and 11.4 elsewhere in 1960 to 1964, and 4.4 and 4.5 in 2020 to 2024 Standard deviation of county swings within each region, percentage points of the two-party margin, weighted by votes; one point per pair of elections, plotted at the later election | View | Pair of elections | Region | Value (points) | Counties | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | spread | 1868–72 | South | 39.98 | 670 | | spread | 1868–72 | Rest of the country | 28.60 | 1,017 | | offset | 1868–72 | South | −6.13 | 670 | | offset | 1868–72 | Rest of the country | 1.02 | 1,017 | | spread | 1872–76 | South | 23.21 | 1,059 | | spread | 1872–76 | Rest of the country | 31.15 | 1,092 | | offset | 1872–76 | South | 5.38 | 1,059 | | offset | 1872–76 | Rest of the country | −1.96 | 1,092 | | spread | 1876–80 | South | 22.54 | 1,084 | | spread | 1876–80 | Rest of the country | 6.53 | 1,132 | | offset | 1876–80 | South | 3.57 | 1,084 | | offset | 1876–80 | Rest of the country | −0.47 | 1,132 | | spread | 1880–84 | South | 16.59 | 1,106 | | spread | 1880–84 | Rest of the country | 9.22 | 1,177 | | offset | 1880–84 | South | −3.32 | 1,106 | | offset | 1880–84 | Rest of the country | 1.05 | 1,177 | | spread | 1884–88 | South | 17.09 | 1,142 | | spread | 1884–88 | Rest of the country | 6.22 | 1,203 | | offset | 1884–88 | South | 1.77 | 1,142 | | offset | 1884–88 | Rest of the country | −0.39 | 1,203 | | spread | 1888–92 | South | 23.35 | 1,164 | | spread | 1888–92 | Rest of the country | 14.20 | 1,260 | | offset | 1888–92 | South | 7.85 | 1,164 | | offset | 1888–92 | Rest of the country | −1.93 | 1,260 | | spread | 1892–96 | South | 24.96 | 1,197 | | spread | 1892–96 | Rest of the country | 42.19 | 1,457 | | offset | 1892–96 | South | −4.18 | 1,197 | | offset | 1892–96 | Rest of the country | 1.29 | 1,457 | | spread | 1896–1900 | South | 17.22 | 1,188 | | spread | 1896–1900 | Rest of the country | 24.15 | 1,507 | | offset | 1896–1900 | South | −0.17 | 1,188 | | offset | 1896–1900 | Rest of the country | 0.79 | 1,507 | | spread | 1900–04 | South | 16.19 | 1,164 | | spread | 1900–04 | Rest of the country | 13.74 | 1,516 | | offset | 1900–04 | South | 18.70 | 1,164 | | offset | 1900–04 | Rest of the country | −3.18 | 1,516 | | spread | 1904–08 | South | 12.32 | 1,185 | | spread | 1904–08 | Rest of the country | 13.67 | 1,522 | | offset | 1904–08 | South | −12.42 | 1,185 | | offset | 1904–08 | Rest of the country | 2.79 | 1,522 | | spread | 1908–12 | South | 22.53 | 1,320 | | spread | 1908–12 | Rest of the country | 24.00 | 1,512 | | offset | 1908–12 | South | −5.59 | 1,320 | | offset | 1908–12 | Rest of the country | 0.38 | 1,512 | | spread | 1912–16 | South | 23.35 | 1,356 | | spread | 1912–16 | Rest of the country | 26.50 | 1,586 | | offset | 1912–16 | South | 4.51 | 1,356 | | offset | 1912–16 | Rest of the country | 0.40 | 1,586 | | spread | 1916–20 | South | 15.08 | 1,375 | | spread | 1916–20 | Rest of the country | 15.27 | 1,643 | | offset | 1916–20 | South | 10.84 | 1,375 | | offset | 1916–20 | Rest of the country | −3.53 | 1,643 | | spread | 1920–24 | South | 14.72 | 1,382 | | spread | 1920–24 | Rest of the country | 16.16 | 1,666 | | offset | 1920–24 | South | 12.63 | 1,382 | | offset | 1920–24 | Rest of the country | −2.66 | 1,666 | | spread | 1924–28 | South | 25.15 | 1,405 | | spread | 1924–28 | Rest of the country | 24.93 | 1,678 | | offset | 1924–28 | South | −38.58 | 1,405 | | offset | 1924–28 | Rest of the country | 9.72 | 1,678 | | spread | 1928–32 | South | 24.02 | 1,411 | | spread | 1928–32 | Rest of the country | 18.64 | 1,684 | | offset | 1928–32 | South | 15.17 | 1,411 | | offset | 1928–32 | Rest of the country | −3.45 | 1,684 | | spread | 1932–36 | South | 13.20 | 1,412 | | spread | 1932–36 | Rest of the country | 14.49 | 1,683 | | offset | 1932–36 | South | −6.15 | 1,412 | | offset | 1932–36 | Rest of the country | 1.58 | 1,683 | | spread | 1936–40 | South | 10.70 | 1,411 | | spread | 1936–40 | Rest of the country | 11.44 | 1,683 | | offset | 1936–40 | South | 10.11 | 1,411 | | offset | 1936–40 | Rest of the country | −1.79 | 1,683 | | spread | 1940–44 | South | 9.64 | 1,411 | | spread | 1940–44 | Rest of the country | 5.25 | 1,682 | | offset | 1940–44 | South | −4.90 | 1,411 | | offset | 1940–44 | Rest of the country | 0.95 | 1,682 | | spread | 1944–48 | South | 17.49 | 1,412 | | spread | 1944–48 | Rest of the country | 10.30 | 1,683 | | offset | 1944–48 | South | −5.27 | 1,412 | | offset | 1944–48 | Rest of the country | 1.25 | 1,683 | | spread | 1948–52 | South | 18.79 | 1,411 | | spread | 1948–52 | Rest of the country | 10.40 | 1,683 | | offset | 1948–52 | South | −6.54 | 1,411 | | offset | 1948–52 | Rest of the country | 0.39 | 1,683 | | spread | 1952–56 | South | 13.77 | 1,414 | | spread | 1952–56 | Rest of the country | 8.76 | 1,683 | | offset | 1952–56 | South | −2.82 | 1,414 | | offset | 1952–56 | Rest of the country | 0.79 | 1,683 | | spread | 1956–60 | South | 18.23 | 1,417 | | spread | 1956–60 | Rest of the country | 12.63 | 1,683 | | offset | 1956–60 | South | −8.70 | 1,417 | | offset | 1956–60 | Rest of the country | 2.11 | 1,683 | | spread | 1960–64 | South | 33.49 | 1,415 | | spread | 1960–64 | Rest of the country | 11.44 | 1,687 | | offset | 1960–64 | South | −16.52 | 1,415 | | offset | 1960–64 | Rest of the country | 4.91 | 1,687 | | spread | 1964–68 | South | 39.16 | 1,419 | | spread | 1964–68 | Rest of the country | 9.43 | 1,688 | | offset | 1964–68 | South | 13.63 | 1,419 | | offset | 1964–68 | Rest of the country | −4.20 | 1,688 | | spread | 1968–72 | South | 25.37 | 1,422 | | spread | 1968–72 | Rest of the country | 9.99 | 1,687 | | offset | 1968–72 | South | −14.73 | 1,422 | | offset | 1968–72 | Rest of the country | 5.15 | 1,687 | | spread | 1972–76 | South | 20.70 | 1,422 | | spread | 1972–76 | Rest of the country | 9.66 | 1,688 | | offset | 1972–76 | South | 21.93 | 1,422 | | offset | 1972–76 | Rest of the country | −8.04 | 1,688 | | spread | 1976–80 | South | 11.08 | 1,425 | | spread | 1976–80 | Rest of the country | 10.57 | 1,687 | | offset | 1976–80 | South | −2.92 | 1,425 | | offset | 1976–80 | Rest of the country | 0.96 | 1,687 | | spread | 1980–84 | South | 12.04 | 1,425 | | spread | 1980–84 | Rest of the country | 8.01 | 1,687 | | offset | 1980–84 | South | −9.28 | 1,425 | | offset | 1980–84 | Rest of the country | 4.21 | 1,687 | | spread | 1984–88 | South | 6.97 | 1,425 | | spread | 1984–88 | Rest of the country | 5.39 | 1,689 | | offset | 1984–88 | South | −2.43 | 1,425 | | offset | 1984–88 | Rest of the country | 1.12 | 1,689 | | spread | 1988–92 | South | 7.65 | 1,425 | | spread | 1988–92 | Rest of the country | 7.54 | 1,689 | | offset | 1988–92 | South | 0.91 | 1,425 | | offset | 1988–92 | Rest of the country | −0.09 | 1,689 | | spread | 1992–96 | South | 6.66 | 1,424 | | spread | 1992–96 | Rest of the country | 8.33 | 1,690 | | offset | 1992–96 | South | −1.24 | 1,424 | | offset | 1992–96 | Rest of the country | 0.67 | 1,690 | | spread | 1996–2000 | South | 9.13 | 1,423 | | spread | 1996–2000 | Rest of the country | 6.92 | 1,690 | | offset | 1996–2000 | South | −1.98 | 1,423 | | offset | 1996–2000 | Rest of the country | 1.08 | 1,690 | | spread | 2000–04 | South | 6.58 | 1,423 | | spread | 2000–04 | Rest of the country | 5.83 | 1,690 | | offset | 2000–04 | South | −0.73 | 1,423 | | offset | 2000–04 | Rest of the country | 0.49 | 1,690 | | spread | 2004–08 | South | 9.30 | 1,423 | | spread | 2004–08 | Rest of the country | 6.34 | 1,691 | | offset | 2004–08 | South | −1.83 | 1,423 | | offset | 2004–08 | Rest of the country | 1.32 | 1,691 | | spread | 2008–12 | South | 4.50 | 1,423 | | spread | 2008–12 | Rest of the country | 5.18 | 1,691 | | offset | 2008–12 | South | 1.17 | 1,423 | | offset | 2008–12 | Rest of the country | −0.46 | 1,691 | | spread | 2012–16 | South | 9.20 | 1,422 | | spread | 2012–16 | Rest of the country | 11.61 | 1,690 | | offset | 2012–16 | South | 1.04 | 1,422 | | offset | 2012–16 | Rest of the country | −0.34 | 1,690 | | spread | 2016–20 | South | 6.68 | 1,422 | | spread | 2016–20 | Rest of the country | 5.03 | 1,691 | | offset | 2016–20 | South | 0.14 | 1,422 | | offset | 2016–20 | Rest of the country | −0.20 | 1,691 | | spread | 2020–24 | South | 4.40 | 1,422 | | spread | 2020–24 | Rest of the country | 4.50 | 1,689 | | offset | 2020–24 | South | 0.36 | 1,422 | | offset | 2020–24 | Rest of the country | −0.01 | 1,689 | Views: Spread within each region (view = spread); South against the nation (series = South, view = offset). Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the estimates have no confidence interval. Note: The South is the Census Bureau's South region: the states from Delaware, Maryland and West Virginia through Texas and Oklahoma, and the District of Columbia, which has returns from 1964. The national swing used in the second view is the one computed on all matched counties. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/south_and_rest.json ### Table 6. County margins correlated with the previous election's margins above 0.9 in 3 of 29 pairs through 1984 and in all 10 pairs since Vote-weighted correlation between a county's two-party margin and its margin in an earlier election, plotted at the later election | Elections compared | Compared with | Correlation | Counties | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | 1868–72 | Previous election | 0.542 | 1,687 | | 1872–76 | Previous election | 0.646 | 2,151 | | 1876–80 | Previous election | 0.887 | 2,216 | | 1880–84 | Previous election | 0.903 | 2,283 | | 1884–88 | Previous election | 0.911 | 2,345 | | 1888–92 | Previous election | 0.821 | 2,424 | | 1892–96 | Previous election | 0.334 | 2,654 | | 1896–1900 | Previous election | 0.741 | 2,695 | | 1900–04 | Previous election | 0.863 | 2,680 | | 1904–08 | Previous election | 0.897 | 2,707 | | 1908–12 | Previous election | 0.664 | 2,832 | | 1912–16 | Previous election | 0.590 | 2,942 | | 1916–20 | Previous election | 0.821 | 3,018 | | 1920–24 | Previous election | 0.895 | 3,048 | | 1924–28 | Previous election | 0.527 | 3,083 | | 1928–32 | Previous election | 0.685 | 3,095 | | 1932–36 | Previous election | 0.838 | 3,095 | | 1936–40 | Previous election | 0.887 | 3,094 | | 1940–44 | Previous election | 0.968 | 3,093 | | 1944–48 | Previous election | 0.874 | 3,095 | | 1948–52 | Previous election | 0.842 | 3,094 | | 1952–56 | Previous election | 0.897 | 3,097 | | 1956–60 | Previous election | 0.761 | 3,100 | | 1960–64 | Previous election | 0.514 | 3,102 | | 1964–68 | Previous election | 0.551 | 3,107 | | 1968–72 | Previous election | 0.674 | 3,109 | | 1972–76 | Previous election | 0.510 | 3,110 | | 1976–80 | Previous election | 0.854 | 3,112 | | 1980–84 | Previous election | 0.862 | 3,112 | | 1984–88 | Previous election | 0.959 | 3,114 | | 1988–92 | Previous election | 0.940 | 3,114 | | 1992–96 | Previous election | 0.943 | 3,114 | | 1996–2000 | Previous election | 0.958 | 3,113 | | 2000–04 | Previous election | 0.975 | 3,113 | | 2004–08 | Previous election | 0.964 | 3,114 | | 2008–12 | Previous election | 0.989 | 3,114 | | 2012–16 | Previous election | 0.958 | 3,112 | | 2016–20 | Previous election | 0.988 | 3,113 | | 2020–24 | Previous election | 0.992 | 3,111 | | 1868–84 | Four elections earlier | 0.673 | 1,688 | | 1872–88 | Four elections earlier | 0.499 | 2,155 | | 1876–92 | Four elections earlier | 0.709 | 2,227 | | 1880–96 | Four elections earlier | 0.593 | 2,287 | | 1884–1900 | Four elections earlier | 0.756 | 2,336 | | 1888–1904 | Four elections earlier | 0.784 | 2,398 | | 1892–1908 | Four elections earlier | 0.555 | 2,642 | | 1896–1912 | Four elections earlier | 0.533 | 2,693 | | 1900–16 | Four elections earlier | 0.807 | 2,710 | | 1904–20 | Four elections earlier | 0.830 | 2,720 | | 1908–24 | Four elections earlier | 0.860 | 2,850 | | 1912–28 | Four elections earlier | 0.282 | 2,943 | | 1916–32 | Four elections earlier | 0.750 | 3,020 | | 1920–36 | Four elections earlier | 0.524 | 3,052 | | 1924–40 | Four elections earlier | 0.573 | 3,080 | | 1928–44 | Four elections earlier | 0.533 | 3,094 | | 1932–48 | Four elections earlier | 0.733 | 3,095 | | 1936–52 | Four elections earlier | 0.689 | 3,092 | | 1940–56 | Four elections earlier | 0.724 | 3,091 | | 1944–60 | Four elections earlier | 0.588 | 3,092 | | 1948–64 | Four elections earlier | 0.053 | 3,090 | | 1952–68 | Four elections earlier | 0.653 | 3,094 | | 1956–72 | Four elections earlier | 0.233 | 3,095 | | 1960–76 | Four elections earlier | 0.763 | 3,100 | | 1964–80 | Four elections earlier | 0.451 | 3,104 | | 1968–84 | Four elections earlier | 0.724 | 3,108 | | 1972–88 | Four elections earlier | 0.847 | 3,109 | | 1976–92 | Four elections earlier | 0.644 | 3,112 | | 1980–96 | Four elections earlier | 0.721 | 3,111 | | 1984–2000 | Four elections earlier | 0.828 | 3,112 | | 1988–2004 | Four elections earlier | 0.810 | 3,111 | | 1992–2008 | Four elections earlier | 0.796 | 3,112 | | 1996–2012 | Four elections earlier | 0.842 | 3,112 | | 2000–16 | Four elections earlier | 0.842 | 3,111 | | 2004–20 | Four elections earlier | 0.864 | 3,112 | | 2008–24 | Four elections earlier | 0.900 | 3,112 | Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the estimates have no confidence interval. Note: A county needs returns in both elections to enter a correlation. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/margin_persistence.json ### Table 7. 2020 to 2024 is the lowest pair under all 10 versions of the spread Spread of county swings for 2020 to 2024 and for the next lowest pair under five measures, each weighted by votes and with each county counted once, percentage points | Measure | Counted | 2020 to 2024 (points) | Next lowest pair | Its value (points) | Margin (points) | | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | | Standard deviation | Weighted by votes | 4.47 | 2008–12 | 4.97 | 0.51 | | Standard deviation without small counties | Weighted by votes | 4.47 | 2008–12 | 4.97 | 0.50 | | Standard deviation on the fixed panel of counties | Weighted by votes | 4.19 | 2008–12 | 5.00 | 0.81 | | Median absolute deviation, scaled | Weighted by votes | 3.98 | 2008–12 | 4.19 | 0.21 | | Interquartile range, scaled | Weighted by votes | 3.96 | 2008–12 | 4.27 | 0.31 | | Standard deviation | Each county counted once | 3.36 | 2016–20 | 5.19 | 1.83 | | Standard deviation without small counties | Each county counted once | 3.31 | 2016–20 | 5.12 | 1.82 | | Standard deviation on the fixed panel of counties | Each county counted once | 2.84 | 2016–20 | 4.35 | 1.51 | | Median absolute deviation, scaled | Each county counted once | 2.74 | 2016–20 | 4.20 | 1.47 | | Interquartile range, scaled | Each county counted once | 2.76 | 2016–20 | 4.22 | 1.46 | Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the estimates have no confidence interval. Note: Dropping small counties removes counties with fewer than 1,000 two-party votes in either election of a pair. The fixed panel keeps the 1,652 counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections. The scaled median absolute deviation and the scaled interquartile range are rescaled to equal the standard deviation for a normal distribution. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/robustness_versions.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (98), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | band | 5 | percentage points of the two-party margin | definition of 'near the national swing' | half-width of the band around the national swing | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | bin_width | 2 | percentage points of the two-party margin | bin width | width of a bin in the distribution figure | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | corr1_1896 | 0.33 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between county margins in the pair's two elections | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1892 to 1896 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | corr1_1964 | 0.51 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between county margins in the pair's two elections | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1960 to 1964 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | corr1_1976 | 0.51 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between county margins in the pair's two elections | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | corr1_2012 | 0.99 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between county margins in the pair's two elections | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2008 to 2012 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | corr1_2016 | 0.96 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between county margins in the pair's two elections | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | corr1_latest | 0.99 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between county margins in the pair's two elections | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | corr4_1988 | 0.85 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between county margins four elections apart | counties with returns in 1972 and 1988 | 1972 to 1988 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | corr4_latest | 0.90 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between county margins four elections apart | counties with returns in 2008 and 2024 | 2008 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | corr_cut | 0.9 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | threshold on the vote-weighted correlation | threshold for counting pairs | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | counties_within_1928 | 8.5% | percent of matched counties | share of counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1924 to 1928 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | counties_within_1976 | 21.2% | percent of matched counties | share of counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | counties_within_2012 | 58.8% | percent of matched counties | share of counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2008 to 2012 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | counties_within_latest | 75.6% | percent of matched counties | share of counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | counties_within_mean_latest | 86.3% | percent of matched counties | share of counties within the band of the vote-weighted mean county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cov_first | 91.7% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in matched counties | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1868 to 1872 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cov_min | 97.7% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | lowest share of two-party votes cast in matched counties, pairs after 1868 to 1872 | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1872 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cut | 10 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | threshold on the vote-weighted standard deviation | threshold for counting pairs | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cut_hi | 12 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | threshold on the vote-weighted standard deviation | alternative threshold for counting pairs | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cut_lo | 8 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | threshold on the vote-weighted standard deviation | alternative threshold for counting pairs | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | dist_lim | 60 | percentage points of the two-party margin | half-width of the plotted range | range of the bins in the distribution figure | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | jack_gap_max | 0.7 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | largest difference between the vote-weighted standard deviations of the two pairs over the leave-one-state-out runs | matched counties with one state or the District of Columbia left out at a time | 2008 to 2012 and 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | jack_gap_min | 0.3 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | smallest difference between the vote-weighted standard deviations of the two pairs over the leave-one-state-out runs | matched counties with one state or the District of Columbia left out at a time | 2008 to 2012 and 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | mean_swing_latest | −4.8 | change in the two-party margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swings | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | n_corr_early_above | 3 | pairs | count of pairs whose vote-weighted correlation with the previous election exceeds the threshold | pairs ending in 1984 or earlier | 1868 to 1984 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_early | 29 | pairs | count of pairs | pairs ending in 1984 or earlier | 1868 to 1984 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_early_above | 28 | pairs | count of pairs with a vote-weighted standard deviation above the threshold | pairs ending in 1984 or earlier | 1868 to 1984 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_early_above_hi | 22 | pairs | count of pairs with a vote-weighted standard deviation above the alternative threshold | pairs ending in 1984 or earlier | 1868 to 1984 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_early_above_lo | 28 | pairs | count of pairs with a vote-weighted standard deviation above the alternative threshold | pairs ending in 1984 or earlier | 1868 to 1984 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_elections | 40 | presidential elections | count of elections | counties with returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_id_1912 | 27 | counties | count of rows dropped before any calculation because no total vote count is reported | Idaho counties in 1912 | 1912 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_late | 10 | pairs | count of pairs | pairs ending in 1988 or later | 1984 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_late_below | 9 | pairs | count of pairs with a vote-weighted standard deviation below the threshold | pairs ending in 1988 or later | 1984 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_late_below_hi | 10 | pairs | count of pairs with a vote-weighted standard deviation below the alternative threshold | pairs ending in 1988 or later | 1984 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_late_below_lo | 9 | pairs | count of pairs with a vote-weighted standard deviation below the alternative threshold | pairs ending in 1988 or later | 1984 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_late_rise | 4 | pairs | count of pairs whose vote-weighted standard deviation is higher than the previous pair's | pairs ending in 1988 or later | 1984 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_matched_first | 1,687 | counties | count of counties matched on FIPS | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1868 to 1872 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_matched_latest | 3,111 | counties | count of counties matched on FIPS | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_measures | 10 | versions of the spread | count of spread measures (five definitions, vote-weighted and county-equal) | pairs of consecutive presidential elections | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_no_total | 53 | county rows | count of rows dropped before any calculation | county rows with Democratic and Republican votes and no total vote count | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_pairs | 39 | pairs of consecutive presidential elections | count of pairs | counties with returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_panel | 1,652 | counties | count of counties in the fixed panel | counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_pre | 18 | pairs | count of pairs | pairs ending in 1940 or earlier | 1868 to 1940 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_rest_wider_pre | 10 | pairs | count of pairs in which the rest of the country's spread exceeds the South's | pairs ending in 1940 or earlier | 1868 to 1940 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_south_run | 13 | pairs | count of consecutive pairs in which the South's spread exceeds the rest of the country's | pairs from 1940 to 1944 through 1988 to 1992 | 1940-1992 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_top10_shaded | 7 | pairs | count of those pairs that are Reconstruction pairs or include a strong third-party election | the ten pairs with the largest vote-weighted standard deviation | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_u_larger | 35 | pairs | count of pairs where the county-equal standard deviation exceeds the vote-weighted one | pairs of consecutive presidential elections | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | naive_wrong_c_1976 | 50.9% | percent of matched counties | share of counties whose two-party winner differs from the earlier election's winner | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | naive_wrong_c_latest | 2.8% | percent of matched counties | share of counties whose two-party winner differs from the earlier election's winner | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | naive_wrong_n_1976 | 1,584 | counties | count of counties whose two-party winner differs from the earlier election's winner | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | naive_wrong_n_latest | 87 | counties | count of counties whose two-party winner differs from the earlier election's winner | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | nat_swing_latest | −6.1 | change in the two-party margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | change in the summed two-party margin of matched counties | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | no_total_max_shift | 0.12 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | largest change in any pair's vote-weighted standard deviation when the rows with no total_votes are kept | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | ref_gap_latest | −1.3 | percentage points of the two-party margin | national swing minus the vote-weighted mean of county swings | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | rel_median_latest | +1.8 | percentage points of the two-party margin, relative to the national swing | vote-weighted median of county swings minus the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | rest_gap_1996 | 1.7 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation within the rest of the country minus that within the South | counties in the Census South region and outside it | 1992 to 1996 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | rest_sd_1964 | 11.4 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings within the region | counties outside the Census South region | 1960 to 1964 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | rest_sd_1976 | 9.7 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings within the region | counties outside the Census South region | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | rest_sd_latest | 4.5 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings within the region | counties outside the Census South region | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | rise_2016 | 5.8 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation in 2012 to 2016 minus that in 2008 to 2012 | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2008 to 2012 and 2012 to 2016 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | robust_gap_min | 0.21 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | smallest difference, over the ten versions, between the next lowest pair's value and the 2020 to 2024 value | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 and the next lowest pair | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_u_2020 | 5.2 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal standard deviation of county swings | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_u_gap | 1.8 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal standard deviation in 2016 to 2020 minus that in 2020 to 2024 | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 and 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_u_latest | 3.4 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal standard deviation of county swings | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_w_1896 | 39.0 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings about their weighted mean | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1892 to 1896 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sd_w_1944 | 6.4 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings about their weighted mean | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1940 to 1944 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sd_w_2012 | 5.0 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings about their weighted mean | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2008 to 2012 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sd_w_2016 | 10.8 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings about their weighted mean | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sd_w_2020 | 5.7 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings about their weighted mean | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sd_w_gap_latest | 0.5 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation in 2008 to 2012 minus that in 2020 to 2024 | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2008 to 2012 and 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_w_late_max | 7.9 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | highest vote-weighted standard deviation among the pairs ending in 1988 or later that fall below the threshold | pairs ending in 1988 or later with a standard deviation below the threshold | 1984 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sd_w_latest | 4.5 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings about their weighted mean | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | small_floor | 1,000 | two-party votes | definition of a small county | floor for the small-county check, applied in both elections of a pair | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | south_above_1976 | 93.5% | percent of counties in the Census South region | share of counties that swung 5 or more points more toward the Democrats than the nation | counties in the Census South region | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | south_gap_1988 | 1.6 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation within the South minus that within the rest of the country | counties in the Census South region and outside it | 1984 to 1988 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | south_gap_1992 | 0.1 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation within the South minus that within the rest of the country | counties in the Census South region and outside it | 1988 to 1992 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | south_offset_1976 | +21.9 | change in the two-party margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | region's summed two-party margin swing minus the national swing | counties in the Census South region | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | south_offset_max | 2.4 | percentage points of the two-party margin | largest absolute value of the region's margin swing minus the national swing | counties in the Census South region | 1984 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | south_sd_1964 | 33.5 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings within the region | counties in the Census South region | 1960 to 1964 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | south_sd_1968 | 39.2 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings within the region | counties in the Census South region | 1964 to 1968 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | south_sd_1976 | 20.7 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings within the region | counties in the Census South region | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | south_sd_latest | 4.4 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings within the region | counties in the Census South region | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | tail_votes_1896 | 10.0% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties whose relative swing lies beyond the plotted range | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1892 to 1896 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | third_cut | 10% | percent of all votes cast | cutoff for a strong third-party vote | counties with returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | uniform_cut_1976 | 26% | percent fewer counties called wrong | one minus the count of counties called wrong by the uniform national swing over the count called wrong by keeping the earlier winner | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | uniform_cut_latest | 28% | percent fewer counties called wrong | one minus the count of counties called wrong by the uniform national swing over the count called wrong by keeping the earlier winner | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | uniform_wrong_c_1976 | 37.8% | percent of matched counties | share of counties whose winner differs from the winner predicted by the earlier margin plus the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | uniform_wrong_c_latest | 2.0% | percent of matched counties | share of counties whose winner differs from the winner predicted by the earlier margin plus the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | votes_above_latest | 19.8% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties that swung 5 or more points more toward the Democrats than the nation | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | votes_below_latest | 7.1% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties that swung 5 or more points more toward the Republicans than the nation | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | votes_within_1896 | 22.7% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1892 to 1896 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | votes_within_1976 | 20.3% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 1972 to 1976 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | votes_within_2012 | 73.3% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2008 to 2012 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | votes_within_2016 | 34.0% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | votes_within_early_max | 62.0% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | highest share of votes within the band of the national swing among pairs ending in 1984 or earlier | pairs ending in 1984 or earlier | 1940 to 1944 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | votes_within_latest | 73.1% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | votes_within_mean_latest | 80.0% | percent of the later election's two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties within the band of the vote-weighted mean county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | ## Definitions - Swing: The change in a place's two-party margin between two elections. In this book a positive swing is a move toward the Democrats. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - County two-party margin: The Democratic vote minus the Republican vote, divided by the sum of the two, so a positive value is a Democratic lead. Votes for other candidates are left out. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - National swing: The change between two elections in the Democratic minus Republican margin for the country as a whole. A county's own swing is compared with it to show whether the county moved with the nation or against it. - Matched counties: The counties that report a vote in both elections being compared. Changes are computed on them so that a county created, merged or renamed between the two elections does not distort the comparison. - Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them. ## Methods Sample: county presidential returns for the 40 elections from 1868 to 2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868 to 2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), from the repaired file whose 2024 totals are corrected for 173 counties in South Carolina, Wisconsin and West Virginia. Rows dropped before any calculation: 41 Alaska rows (Alaska reports election districts and has no returns before 2024), 50 rows with no FIPS code (defunct counties), 88 rows with no vote count, 53 more rows with Democratic and Republican votes but no total vote count (27 of them Idaho counties in 1912, so Idaho has no county in the pairs 1908 to 1912 and 1912 to 1916; keeping these rows changes no pair's vote-weighted standard deviation by more than 0.12 points and leaves 2020 to 2024 the lowest pair) and 74 rows with no two-party votes. Coverage shares are computed on the rows kept. Pairs: each pair of consecutive elections uses the counties present in both, matched on FIPS code, so a pair holds 1,687 to 3,114 counties; county boundaries are not harmonized. Estimand: the two-party margin is 100 times the Democratic minus the Republican votes over their sum; a county's swing is its margin in the later election minus its margin in the earlier one; the national swing is the same change in the summed margin of the matched counties; the relative swing is the county swing minus the national swing. Spread: the standard deviation of county swings about their own mean, population divisor, weighted by two-party votes in the later election (county-equal in one view). Share near the national swing: the absolute difference from the reference is below 5 points, counted by votes and by counties, against the national swing and against the vote-weighted mean county swing. Robustness: counties with fewer than 1,000 two-party votes in either election dropped; a fixed panel of 1,652 counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections; the median absolute deviation (multiplied by 1.4826) and the interquartile range (divided by 1.349), each weighted by two-party votes (a weighted quantile is the first value whose cumulative weight reaches the quantile) and county-equal (the sample median, and linear interpolation between order statistics for the quartiles); the vote-weighted standard deviation recomputed for every pair with one state or the District of Columbia left out at a time. Uniform-swing test: a county is called wrong when the sign of its earlier margin plus the national swing differs from the sign of its later margin. Persistence: Pearson correlation of the county margin with the margin one and four elections earlier, weighted by two-party votes in the later election. Regions: the Census South (AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV) against all other states. Weights: none from a survey, because the returns are full counts. Interval method: none; a full count has no sampling error, so no confidence interval is reported, and differences between measures come from definitions and the county set, not from chance. Suppression: none for the county series; a regional figure needs at least 30 matched counties in the region, and every pair meets that. ## What these data cannot show - County returns describe places, not voters. - A county that swings with the nation can contain groups that moved in opposite directions, and returns cannot separate voters who changed their choice from people who started or stopped voting or moved in or out, a limit known as ecological inference. - The national swing has a related limit. - It is a change in a summed margin, so it counts where votes were cast as well as how counties voted, and in 2020 to 2024 it differed from the mean county swing by −1.3 points. - The returns are full counts, so the figures carry no sampling intervals, and differences between measures come from how they are defined and which counties enter. - The county set is one of those choices. - Counties are matched on FIPS code and boundaries are not harmonized, so a county that gained or lost territory is treated as one unit, and the county-equal figures depend on how many small counties exist. - The 53 county rows that have Democratic and Republican votes but no total vote count are left out, among them 27 Idaho counties in 1912, and keeping them changes no pair's spread by more than 0.12 points. - Returns before 1965 count the votes of the people allowed to vote. - In much of the South, barriers to voting kept many Black citizens from the ballot until the Voting Rights Act, so early margins describe smaller electorates than the populations of those counties. - The two-party margin also leaves out third-party votes, which is why the shaded pairs in Table 1 are the least comparable with the rest. - The chapter measures how uniformly counties moved and does not say why. - How much of the county vote census characteristics account for is the subject of Chapter 12.1, Five axes of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote), and ticket splitting is taken up in Chapter 10.3, Down the ballot (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/down-the-ballot). - Chapter 10.4, The Electoral College (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-electoral-college; planned) turns state margins into electoral outcomes, and Chapter 15.1, Party and place (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place) compares how far partisans' issue positions differ between deep-red and deep-blue counties with the gap between the parties. - The series also makes no forecast. - The spread was 5.0 points in 2008 to 2012 and 10.8 in 2012 to 2016. ## References 1. Amlani, Sharif; Algara, Carlos (2021). Partisanship & Nationalization in American Elections: Evidence from Presidential, Senatorial, & Gubernatorial Elections in the U.S. Counties, 1872-2020. Electoral Studies 73: 102387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102387 2. Stokes, Donald E. (1967). Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces. In William Nisbet Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (eds.), The American Party Systems: Stages of Political Development, pp. 182-202. New York: Oxford University Press. 3. Bartels, Larry M. (1998). Electoral Continuity and Change, 1868-1996. Electoral Studies 17(3): 301-326. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0261-3794(98)00035-3 4. Claggett, William; Flanigan, William; Zingale, Nancy (1984). Nationalization of the American Electorate. American Political Science Review 78(1): 77-91. https://doi.org/10.2307/1961250 5. Caramani, Daniele (2004). The Nationalization of Politics: The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe. Cambridge University Press. 6. Hopkins, Daniel J. (2018). The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized. University of Chicago Press. ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/build.py (sha256 9b929588166924eec941d9a710fb7429c5e44c4d62556d809ee59c39d944d863) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/county/pres_county_1868_2024.parquet | 6,295,675 | bec11c7a0cb5d4180bbd6809d048bc892dd00dfcdde527fa4da871b1dd3f835f | b2a4f000f2eea72d09af8939555289e924875cca40cd95ec8869104cd575bed7 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 6381c8032eba068d911ea297533463f34fb33e5c4a82a0b68bd4e64cf816608e | | figures/dispersion_series.json | 440ee06fedbf1d9cfdb65ef083daa526c677c3bec2dabe3c09eaa33b3e7a84c2 | | figures/margin_persistence.json | d0f93f83fc6a88eb4a5575d3716d4521222022270f1f8bb3d293c51283bf6efd | | figures/robustness_versions.json | 4b5852b84bf5e930c3ff336c65ae1273c3f56a4d4e7ecac2a399a9f79945ade1 | | figures/share_near_national_swing.json | 32a963f65e3f2fbbab4371001ff93072b2b24b801811326e749bc5a7af8fb585 | | figures/south_and_rest.json | 71f17da7e36cdbf74c4030307b7c6f8f01fd20acdc4dd70f4f585e8421ba9b24 | | figures/swing_distribution.json | ee6364344e1ed5b7021922e0c47a84b2e4176ca7e98554e7633c82c1f18250ce | | figures/swing_map.json | 31dec551a60bcf9ca16d581c0367c4913af50f1ad9886af169cece7c37d945ec | | meta.json | 4494b84eb22a63e289eeb190f953920244b9a69cdbf0d740a0d42b6a1fb3fe78 | | public/data/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/swing_map.json | 508df5251e39fe2340235548a78786d05325902cc2b871e5d3a32e3fb19b90ba | | refs.json | 2f086df86ac5088d4430b2d860047987e091b111bf437d1a492f9c336a8d2ef0 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/facts.json - Table 1, figure "dispersion_series" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/dispersion_series.json - Table 2, figure "swing_distribution" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/swing_distribution.json - Table 3, figure "swing_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/swing_map.json - Table 4, figure "share_near_national_swing" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/share_near_national_swing.json - Table 5, figure "south_and_rest" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/south_and_rest.json - Table 6, figure "margin_persistence" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/margin_persistence.json - Table 7, figure "robustness_versions" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/figures/robustness_versions.json - Payload of "swing_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/nationalization-of-the-county-vote/swing_map.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Distance from the national vote, 1868 to 2024: report Chapter 10.2 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-landslide-county. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Distance from the national vote, 1868 to 2024 - Chapter: 10.2 (Part X, The nationalized map; The political map) - Question: What share of voters live in counties far from the national result, and how does today compare with the Solid South era? - Dek: The share of two-party votes cast in counties at least 20 points from the national margin rose from 25.5% in 1976 to 56.5% in 2024. - Grain: places - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - County election returns. County presidential returns, 1868-2024: Algara and Amlani (1868-2020) and MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2024), repaired file; years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts); shares of votes weight each county by its two-party votes, shares of counties count each county once - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-landslide-county - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-landslide-county/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-landslide-county/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026thelandslidecounty ```bibtex @misc{singh2026thelandslidecounty, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Distance from the national vote, 1868 to 2024}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-landslide-county}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | distance from the national margin that makes a county far | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | 20 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | cut | | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | 25.5% | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | far_v_1976 | | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 56.5% | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | far_v_2024 | | count of elections | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | 40 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_elections | | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2016 | 58.8% | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | far_v_2016 | | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1872 | 50.8% | | 2,160 | none (full counts) | County election returns | far_v_1872 | | absolute national two-party margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1972 | 23.6 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | nat_margin_1972 | | share of two-party votes cast in counties whose own margin is 20 or more points from an even split | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1972 | 59.0% | | 3,110 | none (full counts) | County election returns | raw20_v_1972 | | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1972 | 31.6% | | 3,110 | none (full counts) | County election returns | far_v_1972 | | cutoff for a strong third-party vote | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | 10% | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | third_cut | ## Findings Across the 40 presidential elections from 1868 to 2024, the share of two-party votes cast in far counties, those whose margin sits far from the national margin of the same election, was lowest in 1976, at 25.5%, and was 56.5% in 2024. Outside the third-party years, 2016, 2020 and 2024 have the three highest shares, led by 2016 at 58.8%, and the next highest is 1872, at 50.8%. A far county is a county whose two-party margin differs from the national margin of the same election by 20 or more points. It is this chapter's version of the landslide county, and it differs from an ordinary landslide county, whose own winning margin is lopsided. The margin is measured against the nation and not against an even split, so that a national landslide does not read as a geographic one. A county's margin relative to the nation is its two-party margin minus the national two-party margin of the same election, in points, and the national margin is computed on the counties kept for that election. In 1972 the Republican nominee led the two-party vote by 23.6 points, and 59.0% of votes were cast in counties whose own margin was 20 or more points from an even split, against 31.6% in counties that far from the national margin. A third-party year is an election in which candidates outside the two major parties won at least 10% of all votes, or 1948, when a States' Rights ticket won Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina. Alaska is left out, the District of Columbia enters in 1964, and the county handling is that of Chapter 10.1, Nationalization of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote), which measures how far counties moved between elections; this chapter measures how far they sit from the nation within one election. (Note: The returns for 1868 to 2020 are the Algara and Amlani county file, which Amlani and Algara [1] describe for 1872 to 2020, and those for 2024 come from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab.) The chapter follows the share of votes cast in far counties from 1868 to 2024, compares the former Confederacy with the rest of the country, and tests whether the result comes from the number or size of counties. ### A low in 1976, a plateau since 2016 Table 1 plots the share for every election. It reached a low of 25.5% in 1976 and rose by 33.3 points over the 10 elections to 2016, when it was 58.8%. It was 56.6% in 2020, and the plateau held in 2024. The share at 40 or more points from the nation peaked in 2016 at 30.2% and was 25.2% in 2024, so the plateau does not hold at that cutoff. (Note: From 1928 to 1972 the elections that are not third-party years lie between 31.6% and 40.9%, so the 1976 low is below that range and the rise is measured from a trough. Even 2024, the lowest of the last three shares, is 15.6 points above the top of the range. The 1868 value, 42.3%, is not on the same set of states as the values from 1872, because the 1868 returns lack Florida, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia. In 1904 the share was 48.1%, the highest value between 1876 and 1972 among the elections that are not third-party years. At 40 or more points the share was 3.7% in 1976, and its highest value before 2016 was 24.1%, in 1924.) Table 1. The share of votes cast in counties far from the national margin rose from 25.5% in 1976 to 58.8% in 2016 and was 56.5% in 2024 The third-party years are 1892, 1912, 1924, 1948, 1968, 1992 and 1996. The two-party margin leaves the third-party votes out, so the shares for those years describe the two major parties' voters only, with one exception. In Alabama in 1948 the returns file records the States' Rights ticket, which held the Democratic line because Truman was not on the ballot, as the Democratic vote. The highest value in the series, 61.3%, belongs to 1924, a third-party year. Counting each county once changes the date of the low. Counted by county, 79.1% of counties were far in 2024 and 37.3% in 1976, and the low falls in 1988, at 35.8%. In every election the share of counties is above the share of votes, which means that far counties are on average smaller than the others. The votes-and-counties toggle in Table 1 shows both. The rise did not come evenly. Table 2 gives the change from one election to the next since 1980. In 3 elections the share rose by more than 7 points, 1980 by +8.3, 2000 by +7.4 and 2016 by +8.3. No other election after 1976 changed it by more than 3.2 points, and the largest fall between 1976 and 2016 was 0.7 points. The 2000 step starts from 1996, a third-party year whose share describes the two major parties' voters only. The 1976 low is itself a fall from the 31.6% of 1972. The step in 1980 came outside the former Confederacy. Inside it the share was 29.6% in 1976 and 29.5% in 1980, while in the rest of the country it rose from 24.3% to 35.2%. The step in 2016 coincides with the one late rise in the spread of county swings that Chapter 10.1, Nationalization of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote) reports for 2012 to 2016. Table 2. The share rose by more than 7 points in 3 elections after 1976, in 1980, 2000 and 2016, and no other election moved it by more than 3.2 ### The former Confederacy stood apart until 1944; now every region is far The former Confederacy is the states that seceded and were readmitted after the Civil War. (Note: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia.) Table 3 gives the share of each region's own votes cast in far counties, measured against the national margin of each election. In every election from 1892 through 1944 except 1928, when it was 52.9%, at least 67.0% of the former Confederacy's votes were cast in far counties, and the share was 86.3% in 1904 and 94.1% in 1924. In 1904, 83.5% of the region's votes were cast in counties at least 20 points more Democratic than the nation. That is the Solid South, the one-party region whose politics Key described [2]. After 1944 the share fell, and from 1976 to 1996 it stayed between 29.5% and 35.2%. It reached 65.0% in 2016 and is 58.0% in 2024, below its 1904 level. The far counties of 2024 lean the other way. 41.2% of the region's votes were cast in counties at least 20 points more Republican than the nation and 16.8% in counties that far on the Democratic side. Table 3. The former Confederacy fell from 86.3% of its votes in far counties in 1904 to 58.0% in 2024, and the rest of the country rose to 55.7% The rest of the country never exceeded 49.0% in an election before 2016 that is not a third-party year, was 43.7% in 1904, fell to 24.3% in 1976 and is 55.7% in 2024. The five-region view shows how far the change reaches. In 2024 the share runs from 52.5% in the Northeast to 70.1% in Other South, the rest of the Census South. In 1976 it ran from 18.8% to 31.2%. In 1904 it was above 50% only in the South, and the Northeast, Midwest and West lay between 37.5% and 46.8%. The Solid South supplied a smaller part of the far-county vote than its extreme share suggests. The former Confederacy cast 10.2% of the nation's votes in 1904 and 32.5% in 2024, so its far counties held 18.4% of the far-county votes in 1904 and hold 33.4% in 2024. Most of the national share in 1904, 48.1%, therefore came from counties elsewhere, in a year when the Republican lead in the national margin was 19.9 points. ### Far counties are mostly Republican by count and even by votes Table 4 colors each county by its margin minus the national margin for seven elections, with the classes broken at the far and very far cutoffs. In 2024, 79.1% of counties fall in the two outer classes on either side, against 37.3% in 1976. In each of the five regions more than 50% of counties are far in 2024, from 53.9% in the Northeast to 91.8% in Other South. In 1976 only the former Confederacy exceeded 50% of its counties, at 50.7%, and the highest of the other four regions was 45.7%. Table 4. In 2024, 79.1% of counties were 20 or more points from the national margin, against 37.3% in 1976 By count the far counties of 2024 lean Republican, and by votes they divide evenly between the parties (Table 5). Of the 2,463 counties at least 20 points from the national margin, 2,234 were more Republican than the nation and 229 more Democratic. Far Democratic counties cast 28.2% of the two-party votes and far Republican counties 28.2%, because the average far Democratic county cast 9.8 times as many votes as the average far Republican county. In 1976, 704 far counties were more Democratic than the nation and 456 more Republican, and the two shares of votes were 13.2% and 12.3%. The 1904 and 1940 maps show the former Confederacy on the Democratic side of the nation, with 82.5% of its votes cast in counties at least 20 points more Democratic than the nation in 1940, against 83.5% in 1904. Table 5. In 2024, 229 far Democratic and 2,234 far Republican counties each cast 28.2% of two-party votes ### Fewer votes fall near the national margin, but not steadily Table 6 shows the distribution of county margins around the national margin for the same seven elections, with one ridge for each election and the share of votes within 5 points of the national margin beside each year. In 1976, 22.9% of votes were cast in counties within 5 points of the national margin, and in 2024 14.7% were. The 1976 share is the highest of the seven, 2016 is the lowest at 9.4%, and 1904 (13.5%) is below 2024, so the comparison of 1976 with 2024 is between two elections and not a trend. Between 1976 and 2024 the share within 5 points fell and the share beyond 40 points rose. Table 6. The share of votes cast within 5 points of the national margin was 22.9% in 1976, 9.4% in 2016 and 14.7% in 2024 Distance from the nation differs from competitiveness. When the national margin is far from even, a county 20 points from the nation can still have a close margin of its own, and a county at the national margin is lopsided. The competitiveness of counties is better read from their own margins. On that raw basis, 23.4% of votes were cast in counties whose own margin was within 5 points of an even split in 1976 and 13.2% in 2024. Counted by county, 591 of 3,113 counties were that close in 1976 and 155 are in 2024. (Note: The median county margin, ignoring its sign, rose from 14.4 points in 1976 to 43.9 in 2024.) Chapter 11.1, Precincts within counties (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/precincts-within-counties) looks below the county line, where a county's margin can hide neighborhoods that vote very differently. ### Fixed panels and state margins also show a rise The number of counties in the returns rose from 1,696 in 1868 to 3,113 in 2024, and smaller units could spread margins more by construction. The number is 3,113 in both 1976 and 2024, though the units are not all the same ones. Table 7 repeats the calculation on a fixed panel of 1,652 counties that report in every election from 1868. From 1976 to 2024 the panel's share rose by 38.5 points, against 31.0 for all counties, and from 2016 to 2024 it changed by +0.2 points where the share for all counties fell 2.3. The panel's share was 22.0% in 1976, the same at one decimal as in 1916 (22.0%), so the low is shared in the panel. (Note: The panel's share was 42.0% in 1868 and 45.5% in 1904, against 42.3% and 48.1% for all counties, and it was 60.3% in 2016, 59.4% in 2020 and 60.5% in 2024. Before 2016 it never exceeded 52.2%. The second view of the figure adds a panel that starts in 1872 and keeps Florida, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia; it has its low in 1976 and its three highest shares in 2016, 2020 and 2024.) Table 7. In a fixed panel of counties the share rose 38.5 points from 1976 to 2024, against 31.0 for all counties The states give a second check with units that change far less. The number of states, counting the District of Columbia, was 33 in 1868 and is 50 in both 1976 and 2024. Table 8 splits the vote-weighted standard deviation of county margins around the national margin into two parts. One is the spread of state margins around the national margin and the other is the spread of county margins around their own state's margin, and the squares of the two add to the square of the total. The spread between states, whose units are the same in 1976 and 2024, rose from 9.4 points in 1976 to 17.2 in 2024, so the rise since 1976 appears when the unit is the state. (Note: The cutoff of 20 points is a convention. At 25 and 30 points, 1976 is still the lowest election and 2016, 2020 and 2024 are still the three highest among the elections that are not third-party years. At 15 points, 1916 (37.8%) falls slightly below 1976 (38.3%), which is the one place where the lowest election changes.) Set against the Solid South era, the spread between states is smaller in 2024 than in any election from 1892 to 1924, and the spread within states is larger in 2024 than in any election before 2000. The 2016 and 2020 values between states are above the 1892 to 1924 minimum. The spread within states is measured on counties and so is open to the concern about unit size. The highest value before 2000 is the 1872 one, which rests on Reconstruction-era returns that the last section describes. (Note: Between states the spread was 26.4 points in 1904 and 31.8 in 1924, and within states it was 18.9 and 18.8. The share of the variance of county margins that lies within states was 33.9% in 1904 and 25.8% in 1924, against 72.4% in 2024.) Table 8. The spread of state margins around the national margin rose from 9.4 points in 1976 to 17.2 in 2024 ### The far share and the size of the national margin Measuring against the national margin removes the level of the nation's result, so the far share could still move with how lopsided that result was. Across the 33 elections that are not third-party years, the correlation between the far share and the size of the national margin is −0.07 (95% CI −0.40 to 0.28), close to zero. The sign differs between the eras. The correlation is +0.42 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.70) across the 26 through 1996 and −0.12 (95% CI −0.80 to 0.70) across the 7 from 2000, where the interval is wide. The intervals treat the elections as independent, which adjacent elections are not, so they are narrower than they should be. Since 1976 the share has risen through elections with national margins of different size. In 1984 the Republican lead was 18.3 points and the share was 35.9%, and in 2020 the Democratic lead was 4.6 points and the share was 56.6%. ### Several accounts of the rise fit these returns The returns show that far counties became more common and do not say why. Hopkins argues that American political behavior has nationalized, with voters attending more to national than to local politics [3]. Counties that swing together, the pattern in Chapter 10.1, Nationalization of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote), can still sit at different distances from the nation. Rodden traces an urban-rural divide in partisan geography [4]. The growth of the spread within states, from 15.7 points in 1976 to 30.3 in 2016, is consistent with a divide between cities and their rural surroundings inside states, though the returns contain no measure of density. Bishop and Cushing read the growth of landslide counties as evidence that people moved to places that share their politics [5], an account of party sorting by place. Their landslide counties are measured against an even split, the ordinary winning-margin definition. A cutoff of 20 points from an even split gives 26.7% for 1976 and 48.2% for 2004 in these returns, close to the shares they reported for those years, although theirs are shares of Americans and this one is a share of two-party votes. Abrams and Fiorina dispute the sorting account and recompute landslide counties from voter registration in place of presidential returns [6]. County returns record where votes were cast and not who cast them, who moved or why, so they cannot rank these accounts. Chapter 10.5, Reconstruction and the modern map (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/reconstruction-and-the-modern-map; planned) relates the Southern county map of the 1870s to that of 2024, and Chapter 1.7, The South (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-south; planned) takes up the region directly. ### What these data cannot show Returns record where votes were cast. A county far from the national margin can contain voters of both parties in large numbers, and returns cannot tell voters who changed their choice from people who started or stopped voting or moved in or out, a limit known as ecological inference. Returns also count votes cast and not residents. Where the franchise was restricted, as in the former Confederacy for much of the period before the Voting Rights Act, the shares for the region describe the electorate that voted and not the adult population. Southern returns from the Reconstruction years were collected under contested counts and political violence that the returns do not record. The two-party margin leaves out the third-party votes in the third-party years, and it cannot say where those voters would have gone. Counties are as reported in each election and their boundaries are not harmonized, so the fixed panels and the state comparison reduce the concern about unit size and do not remove it. The panels cover 63.5% and 74.7% of the 2024 votes and are not a sample of the country. The chapter measures how far counties sit from the nation in each election. It does not say what a far county is like, how competitive its own contests are, or whether the far counties of 2024 differ from those of 1904 in the kinds of people who live in them. The series ends with 2024 and makes no forecast. The share for all counties rose from 1976 to 2016 and has not risen since. The returns cannot say whether the plateau will hold. ## Tables ### Table 1. The share of votes cast in counties far from the national margin rose from 25.5% in 1976 to 58.8% in 2016 and was 56.5% in 2024 Share of two-party votes, or of counties in the second view, at least 20 (upper line) and 40 (lower line) points from the national margin of the same election, percent, 1868 to 2024 | Counted by | Election | Distance from national margin | Share (%) | Counties | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | --- | | Votes | 1868 | 20+ points | 42.3 | 1,696 | n/a | | Votes | 1868 | 40+ points | 17.9 | 1,696 | n/a | | Votes | 1872 | 20+ points | 50.8 | 2,160 | n/a | | Votes | 1872 | 40+ points | 20.0 | 2,160 | n/a | | Votes | 1876 | 20+ points | 38.1 | 2,230 | n/a | | Votes | 1876 | 40+ points | 12.4 | 2,230 | n/a | | Votes | 1880 | 20+ points | 38.1 | 2,291 | n/a | | Votes | 1880 | 40+ points | 12.2 | 2,291 | n/a | | Votes | 1884 | 20+ points | 30.8 | 2,351 | n/a | | Votes | 1884 | 40+ points | 9.4 | 2,351 | n/a | | Votes | 1888 | 20+ points | 29.9 | 2,429 | n/a | | Votes | 1888 | 40+ points | 9.1 | 2,429 | n/a | | Votes | 1892 | 20+ points | 33.4 | 2,658 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1892 | 40+ points | 13.8 | 2,658 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1896 | 20+ points | 41.1 | 2,715 | n/a | | Votes | 1896 | 40+ points | 16.9 | 2,715 | n/a | | Votes | 1900 | 20+ points | 32.9 | 2,711 | n/a | | Votes | 1900 | 40+ points | 11.7 | 2,711 | n/a | | Votes | 1904 | 20+ points | 48.1 | 2,723 | n/a | | Votes | 1904 | 40+ points | 17.7 | 2,723 | n/a | | Votes | 1908 | 20+ points | 32.9 | 2,856 | n/a | | Votes | 1908 | 40+ points | 10.0 | 2,856 | n/a | | Votes | 1912 | 20+ points | 49.9 | 2,943 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1912 | 40+ points | 18.9 | 2,943 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1916 | 20+ points | 29.8 | 3,022 | n/a | | Votes | 1916 | 40+ points | 8.9 | 3,022 | n/a | | Votes | 1920 | 20+ points | 44.0 | 3,054 | n/a | | Votes | 1920 | 40+ points | 12.2 | 3,054 | n/a | | Votes | 1924 | 20+ points | 61.3 | 3,083 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1924 | 40+ points | 24.1 | 3,083 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1928 | 20+ points | 39.0 | 3,097 | n/a | | Votes | 1928 | 40+ points | 12.1 | 3,097 | n/a | | Votes | 1932 | 20+ points | 40.9 | 3,096 | n/a | | Votes | 1932 | 40+ points | 11.2 | 3,096 | n/a | | Votes | 1936 | 20+ points | 39.2 | 3,095 | n/a | | Votes | 1936 | 40+ points | 10.2 | 3,095 | n/a | | Votes | 1940 | 20+ points | 33.3 | 3,094 | n/a | | Votes | 1940 | 40+ points | 11.6 | 3,094 | n/a | | Votes | 1944 | 20+ points | 33.9 | 3,095 | n/a | | Votes | 1944 | 40+ points | 10.7 | 3,095 | n/a | | Votes | 1948 | 20+ points | 28.6 | 3,096 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1948 | 40+ points | 8.3 | 3,096 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1952 | 20+ points | 36.8 | 3,098 | n/a | | Votes | 1952 | 40+ points | 6.3 | 3,098 | n/a | | Votes | 1956 | 20+ points | 32.5 | 3,100 | n/a | | Votes | 1956 | 40+ points | 4.9 | 3,100 | n/a | | Votes | 1960 | 20+ points | 32.8 | 3,105 | n/a | | Votes | 1960 | 40+ points | 4.2 | 3,105 | n/a | | Votes | 1964 | 20+ points | 32.5 | 3,107 | n/a | | Votes | 1964 | 40+ points | 5.5 | 3,107 | n/a | | Votes | 1968 | 20+ points | 37.2 | 3,111 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1968 | 40+ points | 8.9 | 3,111 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1972 | 20+ points | 31.6 | 3,110 | n/a | | Votes | 1972 | 40+ points | 3.9 | 3,110 | n/a | | Votes | 1976 | 20+ points | 25.5 | 3,113 | n/a | | Votes | 1976 | 40+ points | 3.7 | 3,113 | n/a | | Votes | 1980 | 20+ points | 33.8 | 3,112 | n/a | | Votes | 1980 | 40+ points | 4.3 | 3,112 | n/a | | Votes | 1984 | 20+ points | 35.9 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 1984 | 40+ points | 5.9 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 1988 | 20+ points | 35.8 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 1988 | 40+ points | 5.6 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 1992 | 20+ points | 38.6 | 3,115 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1992 | 40+ points | 6.9 | 3,115 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1996 | 20+ points | 37.9 | 3,114 | Third-party year | | Votes | 1996 | 40+ points | 7.9 | 3,114 | Third-party year | | Votes | 2000 | 20+ points | 45.3 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 2000 | 40+ points | 13.0 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 2004 | 20+ points | 46.9 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 2004 | 40+ points | 14.7 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 2008 | 20+ points | 47.3 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 2008 | 40+ points | 18.1 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 2012 | 20+ points | 50.5 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 2012 | 40+ points | 20.5 | 3,114 | n/a | | Votes | 2016 | 20+ points | 58.8 | 3,113 | n/a | | Votes | 2016 | 40+ points | 30.2 | 3,113 | n/a | | Votes | 2020 | 20+ points | 56.6 | 3,113 | n/a | | Votes | 2020 | 40+ points | 29.6 | 3,113 | n/a | | Votes | 2024 | 20+ points | 56.5 | 3,113 | n/a | | Votes | 2024 | 40+ points | 25.2 | 3,113 | n/a | | Counties | 1868 | 20+ points | 55.9 | 1,696 | n/a | | Counties | 1868 | 40+ points | 30.8 | 1,696 | n/a | | Counties | 1872 | 20+ points | 61.2 | 2,160 | n/a | | Counties | 1872 | 40+ points | 36.3 | 2,160 | n/a | | Counties | 1876 | 20+ points | 56.4 | 2,230 | n/a | | Counties | 1876 | 40+ points | 30.4 | 2,230 | n/a | | Counties | 1880 | 20+ points | 56.4 | 2,291 | n/a | | Counties | 1880 | 40+ points | 29.7 | 2,291 | n/a | | Counties | 1884 | 20+ points | 49.3 | 2,351 | n/a | | Counties | 1884 | 40+ points | 23.2 | 2,351 | n/a | | Counties | 1888 | 20+ points | 50.1 | 2,429 | n/a | | Counties | 1888 | 40+ points | 23.6 | 2,429 | n/a | | Counties | 1892 | 20+ points | 59.0 | 2,658 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1892 | 40+ points | 39.6 | 2,658 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1896 | 20+ points | 56.6 | 2,715 | n/a | | Counties | 1896 | 40+ points | 32.3 | 2,715 | n/a | | Counties | 1900 | 20+ points | 52.1 | 2,711 | n/a | | Counties | 1900 | 40+ points | 27.4 | 2,711 | n/a | | Counties | 1904 | 20+ points | 67.2 | 2,723 | n/a | | Counties | 1904 | 40+ points | 39.9 | 2,723 | n/a | | Counties | 1908 | 20+ points | 52.0 | 2,856 | n/a | | Counties | 1908 | 40+ points | 29.9 | 2,856 | n/a | | Counties | 1912 | 20+ points | 61.1 | 2,943 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1912 | 40+ points | 35.3 | 2,943 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1916 | 20+ points | 51.2 | 3,022 | n/a | | Counties | 1916 | 40+ points | 31.0 | 3,022 | n/a | | Counties | 1920 | 20+ points | 60.3 | 3,054 | n/a | | Counties | 1920 | 40+ points | 36.2 | 3,054 | n/a | | Counties | 1924 | 20+ points | 71.9 | 3,083 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1924 | 40+ points | 46.2 | 3,083 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1928 | 20+ points | 50.2 | 3,097 | n/a | | Counties | 1928 | 40+ points | 22.2 | 3,097 | n/a | | Counties | 1932 | 20+ points | 54.3 | 3,096 | n/a | | Counties | 1932 | 40+ points | 33.8 | 3,096 | n/a | | Counties | 1936 | 20+ points | 56.5 | 3,095 | n/a | | Counties | 1936 | 40+ points | 30.7 | 3,095 | n/a | | Counties | 1940 | 20+ points | 62.3 | 3,094 | n/a | | Counties | 1940 | 40+ points | 36.1 | 3,094 | n/a | | Counties | 1944 | 20+ points | 62.8 | 3,095 | n/a | | Counties | 1944 | 40+ points | 34.8 | 3,095 | n/a | | Counties | 1948 | 20+ points | 54.3 | 3,096 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1948 | 40+ points | 30.7 | 3,096 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1952 | 20+ points | 56.8 | 3,098 | n/a | | Counties | 1952 | 40+ points | 22.9 | 3,098 | n/a | | Counties | 1956 | 20+ points | 46.2 | 3,100 | n/a | | Counties | 1956 | 40+ points | 18.3 | 3,100 | n/a | | Counties | 1960 | 20+ points | 47.7 | 3,105 | n/a | | Counties | 1960 | 40+ points | 14.6 | 3,105 | n/a | | Counties | 1964 | 20+ points | 40.2 | 3,107 | n/a | | Counties | 1964 | 40+ points | 13.7 | 3,107 | n/a | | Counties | 1968 | 20+ points | 49.8 | 3,111 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1968 | 40+ points | 16.0 | 3,111 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1972 | 20+ points | 41.2 | 3,110 | n/a | | Counties | 1972 | 40+ points | 7.3 | 3,110 | n/a | | Counties | 1976 | 20+ points | 37.3 | 3,113 | n/a | | Counties | 1976 | 40+ points | 9.8 | 3,113 | n/a | | Counties | 1980 | 20+ points | 44.0 | 3,112 | n/a | | Counties | 1980 | 40+ points | 12.5 | 3,112 | n/a | | Counties | 1984 | 20+ points | 37.7 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 1984 | 40+ points | 7.3 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 1988 | 20+ points | 35.8 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 1988 | 40+ points | 5.4 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 1992 | 20+ points | 38.9 | 3,115 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1992 | 40+ points | 9.1 | 3,115 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1996 | 20+ points | 42.1 | 3,114 | Third-party year | | Counties | 1996 | 40+ points | 11.9 | 3,114 | Third-party year | | Counties | 2000 | 20+ points | 53.4 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 2000 | 40+ points | 19.6 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 2004 | 20+ points | 56.9 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 2004 | 40+ points | 22.3 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 2008 | 20+ points | 62.7 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 2008 | 40+ points | 31.9 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 2012 | 20+ points | 67.9 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 2012 | 40+ points | 36.7 | 3,114 | n/a | | Counties | 2016 | 20+ points | 80.1 | 3,113 | n/a | | Counties | 2016 | 40+ points | 56.1 | 3,113 | n/a | | Counties | 2020 | 20+ points | 80.2 | 3,113 | n/a | | Counties | 2020 | 40+ points | 56.6 | 3,113 | n/a | | Counties | 2024 | 20+ points | 79.1 | 3,113 | n/a | | Counties | 2024 | 40+ points | 54.0 | 3,113 | n/a | Views: Share of votes (basis = Votes); Share of counties (basis = Counties). Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; shares weighted by two-party votes unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/far_share.json ### Table 2. The share rose by more than 7 points in 3 elections after 1976, in 1980, 2000 and 2016, and no other election moved it by more than 3.2 Change from the previous election in the share of two-party votes cast in counties at least 20 points from the national margin, percentage points, 1980 to 2024 | Election | Change (points) | Share of votes in far counties (%) | Note | | --- | ---: | ---: | --- | | 1980 | +8.3 | 33.8 | n/a | | 1984 | +2.1 | 35.9 | n/a | | 1988 | −0.1 | 35.8 | n/a | | 1992 | +2.8 | 38.6 | Third-party year | | 1996 | −0.7 | 37.9 | Third-party year | | 2000 | +7.4 | 45.3 | n/a | | 2004 | +1.6 | 46.9 | n/a | | 2008 | +0.4 | 47.3 | n/a | | 2012 | +3.2 | 50.5 | n/a | | 2016 | +8.3 | 58.8 | n/a | | 2020 | −2.2 | 56.6 | n/a | | 2024 | −0.1 | 56.5 | n/a | Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; shares weighted by two-party votes unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/step_changes.json ### Table 3. The former Confederacy fell from 86.3% of its votes in far counties in 1904 to 58.0% in 2024, and the rest of the country rose to 55.7% Share of a region's two-party votes cast in counties at least 20 points from the national margin, percent, presidential elections 1868 to 2024 | View | Election | Region | Share of region's votes in far counties (%) | Region's share of national votes (%) | Counties | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | Two groups | 1868 | Confederacy | 63.1 | 14.5 | 485 | n/a | | Five regions | 1868 | Confederacy | 63.1 | 14.5 | 485 | n/a | | Five regions | 1868 | Other South | 75.4 | 6.0 | 190 | n/a | | Five regions | 1868 | Northeast | 38.6 | 38.6 | 214 | n/a | | Five regions | 1868 | Midwest | 34.8 | 38.4 | 725 | n/a | | Five regions | 1868 | West | 13.2 | 2.5 | 82 | n/a | | Two groups | 1868 | Rest of US | 38.8 | 85.5 | 1,211 | n/a | | Two groups | 1872 | Confederacy | 58.0 | 22.2 | 871 | n/a | | Five regions | 1872 | Confederacy | 58.0 | 22.2 | 871 | n/a | | Five regions | 1872 | Other South | 51.6 | 7.2 | 194 | n/a | | Five regions | 1872 | Northeast | 37.2 | 33.3 | 214 | n/a | | Five regions | 1872 | Midwest | 57.2 | 35.3 | 797 | n/a | | Five regions | 1872 | West | 79.8 | 2.0 | 84 | n/a | | Two groups | 1872 | Rest of US | 48.7 | 77.8 | 1,289 | n/a | | Two groups | 1876 | Confederacy | 59.3 | 21.5 | 901 | n/a | | Five regions | 1876 | Confederacy | 59.3 | 21.5 | 901 | n/a | | Five regions | 1876 | Other South | 31.3 | 7.2 | 197 | n/a | | Five regions | 1876 | Northeast | 29.4 | 31.8 | 214 | n/a | | Five regions | 1876 | Midwest | 36.0 | 37.1 | 829 | n/a | | Five regions | 1876 | West | 17.3 | 2.5 | 89 | n/a | | Two groups | 1876 | Rest of US | 32.3 | 78.5 | 1,329 | n/a | | Two groups | 1880 | Confederacy | 61.0 | 19.0 | 918 | n/a | | Five regions | 1880 | Confederacy | 61.0 | 19.0 | 918 | n/a | | Five regions | 1880 | Other South | 27.6 | 6.8 | 188 | n/a | | Five regions | 1880 | Northeast | 28.5 | 32.8 | 215 | n/a | | Five regions | 1880 | Midwest | 39.1 | 38.4 | 850 | n/a | | Five regions | 1880 | West | 10.6 | 3.1 | 120 | n/a | | Two groups | 1880 | Rest of US | 32.8 | 81.0 | 1,373 | n/a | | Two groups | 1884 | Confederacy | 57.0 | 19.4 | 945 | n/a | | Five regions | 1884 | Confederacy | 57.0 | 19.4 | 945 | n/a | | Five regions | 1884 | Other South | 23.9 | 7.0 | 199 | n/a | | Five regions | 1884 | Northeast | 18.8 | 30.2 | 215 | n/a | | Five regions | 1884 | Midwest | 29.5 | 40.1 | 862 | n/a | | Five regions | 1884 | West | 15.3 | 3.3 | 130 | n/a | | Two groups | 1884 | Rest of US | 24.4 | 80.6 | 1,406 | n/a | | Two groups | 1888 | Confederacy | 59.0 | 18.2 | 969 | n/a | | Five regions | 1888 | Confederacy | 59.0 | 18.2 | 969 | n/a | | Five regions | 1888 | Other South | 19.6 | 7.4 | 200 | n/a | | Five regions | 1888 | Northeast | 19.2 | 30.2 | 212 | n/a | | Five regions | 1888 | Midwest | 27.9 | 40.5 | 911 | n/a | | Five regions | 1888 | West | 15.5 | 3.7 | 137 | n/a | | Two groups | 1888 | Rest of US | 23.4 | 81.8 | 1,460 | n/a | | Two groups | 1892 | Confederacy | 70.8 | 16.0 | 999 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1892 | Confederacy | 70.8 | 16.0 | 999 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1892 | Other South | 19.4 | 7.5 | 200 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1892 | Northeast | 26.0 | 31.6 | 215 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1892 | Midwest | 27.5 | 40.8 | 1,012 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1892 | West | 29.6 | 4.1 | 232 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1892 | Rest of US | 26.3 | 84.0 | 1,659 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1896 | Confederacy | 67.0 | 15.7 | 1,006 | n/a | | Five regions | 1896 | Confederacy | 67.0 | 15.7 | 1,006 | n/a | | Five regions | 1896 | Other South | 22.8 | 7.7 | 201 | n/a | | Five regions | 1896 | Northeast | 47.6 | 28.0 | 213 | n/a | | Five regions | 1896 | Midwest | 28.2 | 42.3 | 1,018 | n/a | | Five regions | 1896 | West | 56.8 | 6.3 | 277 | n/a | | Two groups | 1896 | Rest of US | 36.3 | 84.3 | 1,709 | n/a | | Two groups | 1900 | Confederacy | 69.0 | 13.1 | 994 | n/a | | Five regions | 1900 | Confederacy | 69.0 | 13.1 | 994 | n/a | | Five regions | 1900 | Other South | 22.0 | 8.0 | 201 | n/a | | Five regions | 1900 | Northeast | 31.1 | 28.7 | 216 | n/a | | Five regions | 1900 | Midwest | 25.7 | 43.3 | 1,018 | n/a | | Five regions | 1900 | West | 29.9 | 6.9 | 282 | n/a | | Two groups | 1900 | Rest of US | 27.5 | 86.9 | 1,717 | n/a | | Two groups | 1904 | Confederacy | 86.3 | 10.2 | 1,000 | n/a | | Five regions | 1904 | Confederacy | 86.3 | 10.2 | 1,000 | n/a | | Five regions | 1904 | Other South | 61.7 | 7.9 | 201 | n/a | | Five regions | 1904 | Northeast | 37.5 | 31.5 | 216 | n/a | | Five regions | 1904 | Midwest | 44.5 | 42.5 | 1,020 | n/a | | Five regions | 1904 | West | 46.8 | 7.8 | 286 | n/a | | Two groups | 1904 | Rest of US | 43.7 | 89.8 | 1,723 | n/a | | Two groups | 1908 | Confederacy | 75.8 | 10.8 | 1,045 | n/a | | Five regions | 1908 | Confederacy | 75.8 | 10.8 | 1,045 | n/a | | Five regions | 1908 | Other South | 29.5 | 8.8 | 276 | n/a | | Five regions | 1908 | Northeast | 33.5 | 29.1 | 216 | n/a | | Five regions | 1908 | Midwest | 23.5 | 43.0 | 1,027 | n/a | | Five regions | 1908 | West | 27.4 | 8.3 | 292 | n/a | | Two groups | 1908 | Rest of US | 27.7 | 89.2 | 1,811 | n/a | | Two groups | 1912 | Confederacy | 81.4 | 12.5 | 1,078 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1912 | Confederacy | 81.4 | 12.5 | 1,078 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1912 | Other South | 47.3 | 10.1 | 279 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1912 | Northeast | 51.2 | 28.3 | 216 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1912 | Midwest | 36.6 | 39.8 | 1,043 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1912 | West | 63.9 | 9.3 | 327 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1912 | Rest of US | 45.4 | 87.5 | 1,865 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1916 | Confederacy | 79.2 | 10.1 | 1,100 | n/a | | Five regions | 1916 | Confederacy | 79.2 | 10.1 | 1,100 | n/a | | Five regions | 1916 | Other South | 23.6 | 8.2 | 279 | n/a | | Five regions | 1916 | Northeast | 31.5 | 24.9 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1916 | Midwest | 20.7 | 43.1 | 1,049 | n/a | | Five regions | 1916 | West | 22.4 | 13.7 | 377 | n/a | | Two groups | 1916 | Rest of US | 24.2 | 89.9 | 1,922 | n/a | | Two groups | 1920 | Confederacy | 84.4 | 10.0 | 1,105 | n/a | | Five regions | 1920 | Confederacy | 84.4 | 10.0 | 1,105 | n/a | | Five regions | 1920 | Other South | 42.1 | 10.2 | 279 | n/a | | Five regions | 1920 | Northeast | 28.8 | 28.1 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1920 | Midwest | 46.8 | 42.5 | 1,051 | n/a | | Five regions | 1920 | West | 35.4 | 9.2 | 402 | n/a | | Two groups | 1920 | Rest of US | 39.4 | 90.0 | 1,949 | n/a | | Two groups | 1924 | Confederacy | 94.1 | 9.9 | 1,126 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1924 | Confederacy | 94.1 | 9.9 | 1,126 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1924 | Other South | 77.0 | 9.6 | 279 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1924 | Northeast | 44.6 | 31.0 | 217 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1924 | Midwest | 61.4 | 40.6 | 1,056 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1924 | West | 65.4 | 8.8 | 405 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1924 | Rest of US | 57.7 | 90.1 | 1,957 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1928 | Confederacy | 52.9 | 9.1 | 1,134 | n/a | | Five regions | 1928 | Confederacy | 52.9 | 9.1 | 1,134 | n/a | | Five regions | 1928 | Other South | 24.2 | 8.4 | 279 | n/a | | Five regions | 1928 | Northeast | 46.7 | 32.4 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1928 | Midwest | 33.1 | 39.7 | 1,057 | n/a | | Five regions | 1928 | West | 37.9 | 10.4 | 410 | n/a | | Two groups | 1928 | Rest of US | 37.6 | 90.9 | 1,963 | n/a | | Two groups | 1932 | Confederacy | 81.4 | 9.7 | 1,133 | n/a | | Five regions | 1932 | Confederacy | 81.4 | 9.7 | 1,133 | n/a | | Five regions | 1932 | Other South | 30.9 | 8.4 | 279 | n/a | | Five regions | 1932 | Northeast | 69.3 | 30.4 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1932 | Midwest | 20.2 | 39.9 | 1,057 | n/a | | Five regions | 1932 | West | 11.7 | 11.6 | 410 | n/a | | Two groups | 1932 | Rest of US | 36.6 | 90.3 | 1,963 | n/a | | Two groups | 1936 | Confederacy | 80.6 | 9.4 | 1,133 | n/a | | Five regions | 1936 | Confederacy | 80.6 | 9.4 | 1,133 | n/a | | Five regions | 1936 | Other South | 20.5 | 8.0 | 279 | n/a | | Five regions | 1936 | Northeast | 51.3 | 32.3 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1936 | Midwest | 27.1 | 38.7 | 1,056 | n/a | | Five regions | 1936 | West | 25.1 | 11.7 | 410 | n/a | | Two groups | 1936 | Rest of US | 34.9 | 90.6 | 1,962 | n/a | | Two groups | 1940 | Confederacy | 85.0 | 9.6 | 1,132 | n/a | | Five regions | 1940 | Confederacy | 85.0 | 9.6 | 1,132 | n/a | | Five regions | 1940 | Other South | 24.9 | 7.0 | 279 | n/a | | Five regions | 1940 | Northeast | 29.8 | 31.9 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1940 | Midwest | 29.8 | 38.8 | 1,056 | n/a | | Five regions | 1940 | West | 18.0 | 12.7 | 410 | n/a | | Two groups | 1940 | Rest of US | 27.8 | 90.4 | 1,962 | n/a | | Two groups | 1944 | Confederacy | 80.6 | 9.7 | 1,133 | n/a | | Five regions | 1944 | Confederacy | 80.6 | 9.7 | 1,133 | n/a | | Five regions | 1944 | Other South | 27.8 | 7.0 | 279 | n/a | | Five regions | 1944 | Northeast | 28.4 | 31.6 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1944 | Midwest | 34.5 | 38.1 | 1,056 | n/a | | Five regions | 1944 | West | 15.0 | 13.6 | 410 | n/a | | Two groups | 1944 | Rest of US | 28.9 | 90.3 | 1,962 | n/a | | Two groups | 1948 | Confederacy | 62.8 | 9.0 | 1,134 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1948 | Confederacy | 62.8 | 9.0 | 1,134 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1948 | Other South | 34.7 | 7.0 | 279 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1948 | Northeast | 31.3 | 31.9 | 217 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1948 | Midwest | 23.3 | 37.2 | 1,056 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1948 | West | 12.7 | 14.9 | 410 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1948 | Rest of US | 25.2 | 91.0 | 1,962 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1952 | Confederacy | 44.9 | 13.8 | 1,135 | n/a | | Five regions | 1952 | Confederacy | 44.9 | 13.8 | 1,135 | n/a | | Five regions | 1952 | Other South | 29.8 | 6.4 | 279 | n/a | | Five regions | 1952 | Northeast | 45.9 | 30.1 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1952 | Midwest | 36.7 | 34.7 | 1,056 | n/a | | Five regions | 1952 | West | 14.3 | 15.0 | 411 | n/a | | Two groups | 1952 | Rest of US | 35.5 | 86.2 | 1,963 | n/a | | Two groups | 1956 | Confederacy | 42.2 | 13.5 | 1,138 | n/a | | Five regions | 1956 | Confederacy | 42.2 | 13.5 | 1,138 | n/a | | Five regions | 1956 | Other South | 27.7 | 6.2 | 279 | n/a | | Five regions | 1956 | Northeast | 49.0 | 30.4 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1956 | Midwest | 26.0 | 34.2 | 1,055 | n/a | | Five regions | 1956 | West | 8.1 | 15.6 | 411 | n/a | | Two groups | 1956 | Rest of US | 31.0 | 86.5 | 1,962 | n/a | | Two groups | 1960 | Confederacy | 42.3 | 14.5 | 1,139 | n/a | | Five regions | 1960 | Confederacy | 42.3 | 14.5 | 1,139 | n/a | | Five regions | 1960 | Other South | 36.0 | 6.0 | 279 | n/a | | Five regions | 1960 | Northeast | 38.2 | 29.3 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1960 | Midwest | 35.2 | 33.6 | 1,055 | n/a | | Five regions | 1960 | West | 9.2 | 16.6 | 415 | n/a | | Two groups | 1960 | Rest of US | 31.2 | 85.5 | 1,966 | n/a | | Two groups | 1964 | Confederacy | 50.3 | 17.5 | 1,139 | n/a | | Five regions | 1964 | Confederacy | 50.3 | 17.5 | 1,139 | n/a | | Five regions | 1964 | Other South | 35.3 | 6.1 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 1964 | Northeast | 41.2 | 27.8 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1964 | Midwest | 22.9 | 31.5 | 1,056 | n/a | | Five regions | 1964 | West | 17.1 | 17.2 | 415 | n/a | | Two groups | 1964 | Rest of US | 28.8 | 82.5 | 1,968 | n/a | | Two groups | 1968 | Confederacy | 45.8 | 16.1 | 1,143 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1968 | Confederacy | 45.8 | 16.1 | 1,143 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1968 | Other South | 39.9 | 5.9 | 280 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1968 | Northeast | 42.4 | 27.9 | 217 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1968 | Midwest | 34.1 | 31.8 | 1,056 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1968 | West | 26.0 | 18.3 | 415 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1968 | Rest of US | 35.5 | 83.9 | 1,968 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1972 | Confederacy | 46.5 | 19.9 | 1,142 | n/a | | Five regions | 1972 | Confederacy | 46.5 | 19.9 | 1,142 | n/a | | Five regions | 1972 | Other South | 35.9 | 6.0 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 1972 | Northeast | 32.4 | 25.9 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1972 | Midwest | 27.2 | 30.0 | 1,056 | n/a | | Five regions | 1972 | West | 19.9 | 18.2 | 415 | n/a | | Two groups | 1972 | Rest of US | 27.9 | 80.1 | 1,968 | n/a | | Two groups | 1976 | Confederacy | 29.6 | 22.7 | 1,145 | n/a | | Five regions | 1976 | Confederacy | 29.6 | 22.7 | 1,145 | n/a | | Five regions | 1976 | Other South | 31.2 | 6.0 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 1976 | Northeast | 25.3 | 24.0 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1976 | Midwest | 25.4 | 29.6 | 1,056 | n/a | | Five regions | 1976 | West | 18.8 | 17.6 | 415 | n/a | | Two groups | 1976 | Rest of US | 24.3 | 77.3 | 1,968 | n/a | | Two groups | 1980 | Confederacy | 29.5 | 25.0 | 1,145 | n/a | | Five regions | 1980 | Confederacy | 29.5 | 25.0 | 1,145 | n/a | | Five regions | 1980 | Other South | 40.9 | 6.1 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 1980 | Northeast | 26.3 | 21.7 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1980 | Midwest | 37.5 | 29.2 | 1,055 | n/a | | Five regions | 1980 | West | 40.1 | 18.0 | 415 | n/a | | Two groups | 1980 | Rest of US | 35.2 | 75.0 | 1,967 | n/a | | Two groups | 1984 | Confederacy | 32.6 | 25.3 | 1,145 | n/a | | Five regions | 1984 | Confederacy | 32.6 | 25.3 | 1,145 | n/a | | Five regions | 1984 | Other South | 40.6 | 6.0 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 1984 | Northeast | 35.3 | 22.2 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1984 | Midwest | 41.6 | 27.5 | 1,055 | n/a | | Five regions | 1984 | West | 31.4 | 19.0 | 417 | n/a | | Two groups | 1984 | Rest of US | 37.1 | 74.7 | 1,969 | n/a | | Two groups | 1988 | Confederacy | 35.2 | 25.5 | 1,145 | n/a | | Five regions | 1988 | Confederacy | 35.2 | 25.5 | 1,145 | n/a | | Five regions | 1988 | Other South | 42.7 | 5.8 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 1988 | Northeast | 34.1 | 21.7 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 1988 | Midwest | 41.3 | 27.0 | 1,055 | n/a | | Five regions | 1988 | West | 28.8 | 19.9 | 417 | n/a | | Two groups | 1988 | Rest of US | 36.0 | 74.5 | 1,969 | n/a | | Two groups | 1992 | Confederacy | 35.2 | 27.5 | 1,145 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1992 | Confederacy | 35.2 | 27.5 | 1,145 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1992 | Other South | 42.1 | 6.0 | 280 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1992 | Northeast | 34.0 | 20.8 | 217 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1992 | Midwest | 41.3 | 26.2 | 1,055 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1992 | West | 43.7 | 19.5 | 418 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1992 | Rest of US | 39.9 | 72.5 | 1,970 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1996 | Confederacy | 35.2 | 28.1 | 1,144 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1996 | Confederacy | 35.2 | 28.1 | 1,144 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1996 | Other South | 39.3 | 5.7 | 280 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1996 | Northeast | 37.1 | 20.2 | 217 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1996 | Midwest | 37.9 | 25.7 | 1,055 | Third-party year | | Five regions | 1996 | West | 42.1 | 20.3 | 418 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 1996 | Rest of US | 39.0 | 71.9 | 1,970 | Third-party year | | Two groups | 2000 | Confederacy | 43.8 | 28.4 | 1,144 | n/a | | Five regions | 2000 | Confederacy | 43.8 | 28.4 | 1,144 | n/a | | Five regions | 2000 | Other South | 54.5 | 5.8 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 2000 | Northeast | 43.3 | 19.8 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 2000 | Midwest | 43.2 | 25.7 | 1,055 | n/a | | Five regions | 2000 | West | 49.3 | 20.3 | 418 | n/a | | Two groups | 2000 | Rest of US | 45.9 | 71.6 | 1,970 | n/a | | Two groups | 2004 | Confederacy | 49.2 | 28.9 | 1,143 | n/a | | Five regions | 2004 | Confederacy | 49.2 | 28.9 | 1,143 | n/a | | Five regions | 2004 | Other South | 60.2 | 5.8 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 2004 | Northeast | 39.7 | 19.2 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 2004 | Midwest | 44.2 | 25.4 | 1,055 | n/a | | Five regions | 2004 | West | 49.8 | 20.8 | 419 | n/a | | Two groups | 2004 | Rest of US | 45.9 | 71.1 | 1,971 | n/a | | Two groups | 2008 | Confederacy | 52.3 | 30.2 | 1,143 | n/a | | Five regions | 2008 | Confederacy | 52.3 | 30.2 | 1,143 | n/a | | Five regions | 2008 | Other South | 68.3 | 5.6 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 2008 | Northeast | 37.3 | 18.7 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 2008 | Midwest | 43.2 | 24.5 | 1,055 | n/a | | Five regions | 2008 | West | 48.4 | 21.0 | 419 | n/a | | Two groups | 2008 | Rest of US | 45.2 | 69.8 | 1,971 | n/a | | Two groups | 2012 | Confederacy | 53.9 | 30.9 | 1,143 | n/a | | Five regions | 2012 | Confederacy | 53.9 | 30.9 | 1,143 | n/a | | Five regions | 2012 | Other South | 71.9 | 5.6 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 2012 | Northeast | 43.0 | 18.2 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 2012 | Midwest | 46.9 | 24.2 | 1,055 | n/a | | Five regions | 2012 | West | 50.5 | 21.1 | 419 | n/a | | Two groups | 2012 | Rest of US | 49.0 | 69.1 | 1,971 | n/a | | Two groups | 2016 | Confederacy | 65.0 | 31.8 | 1,142 | n/a | | Five regions | 2016 | Confederacy | 65.0 | 31.8 | 1,142 | n/a | | Five regions | 2016 | Other South | 75.9 | 5.7 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 2016 | Northeast | 49.8 | 18.1 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 2016 | Midwest | 60.5 | 23.3 | 1,055 | n/a | | Five regions | 2016 | West | 50.6 | 21.1 | 419 | n/a | | Two groups | 2016 | Rest of US | 55.9 | 68.2 | 1,971 | n/a | | Two groups | 2020 | Confederacy | 59.6 | 31.7 | 1,142 | n/a | | Five regions | 2020 | Confederacy | 59.6 | 31.7 | 1,142 | n/a | | Five regions | 2020 | Other South | 74.1 | 5.3 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 2020 | Northeast | 50.5 | 17.8 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 2020 | Midwest | 58.4 | 22.1 | 1,055 | n/a | | Five regions | 2020 | West | 51.3 | 23.1 | 419 | n/a | | Two groups | 2020 | Rest of US | 55.1 | 68.3 | 1,971 | n/a | | Two groups | 2024 | Confederacy | 58.0 | 32.5 | 1,142 | n/a | | Five regions | 2024 | Confederacy | 58.0 | 32.5 | 1,142 | n/a | | Five regions | 2024 | Other South | 70.1 | 5.3 | 280 | n/a | | Five regions | 2024 | Northeast | 52.5 | 17.7 | 217 | n/a | | Five regions | 2024 | Midwest | 56.5 | 22.2 | 1,056 | n/a | | Five regions | 2024 | West | 54.1 | 22.2 | 418 | n/a | | Two groups | 2024 | Rest of US | 55.7 | 67.5 | 1,971 | n/a | Views: Former Confederacy and the rest (grouping = Two groups); Five regions (grouping = Five regions). Note: A region-year cell needs at least 30 counties; every cell meets that floor, so none is dropped. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; shares weighted by two-party votes unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/far_by_region.json ### Table 4. In 2024, 79.1% of counties were 20 or more points from the national margin, against 37.3% in 1976 County two-party margin minus the national two-party margin of the same election, percentage points (positive is more Democratic than the nation), seven presidential elections from 1876 to 2024 No inline rows: the values of Table 4 are in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/the-landslide-county/county_margin_map.json. Note: Counties are drawn on 2020 boundaries and joined on FIPS code. A county with no return, or whose code is absent from the 2020 map, draws as no data: not counting Alaska, 885 of the 3,113 counties on the map have no return in 1876 and 393 have none in 1904, and no other frame has more than 26, after retired county codes are mapped to their 2020 successors. None of the seven elections is a third-party year. The classes break at minus and plus 40, 20 and 5 points. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; shares weighted by two-party votes unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/county_margin_map.json ### Table 5. In 2024, 229 far Democratic and 2,234 far Republican counties each cast 28.2% of two-party votes Counties at least 20 points more Democratic or more Republican than the national margin: share of two-party votes in the first view and count of counties in the second, 1976 and 2024 | Election | Side of the national margin | Far counties | Share of all counties (%) | Share of votes (%) | Counties in the election | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1876 | Far Democratic | 724 | 32.5 | 18.1 | 2,230 | | 1876 | Far Republican | 533 | 23.9 | 20.0 | 2,230 | | 1904 | Far Democratic | 1,117 | 41.0 | 22.0 | 2,723 | | 1904 | Far Republican | 714 | 26.2 | 26.1 | 2,723 | | 1940 | Far Democratic | 1,153 | 37.3 | 12.7 | 3,094 | | 1940 | Far Republican | 774 | 25.0 | 20.6 | 3,094 | | 1976 | Far Democratic | 704 | 22.6 | 13.2 | 3,113 | | 1976 | Far Republican | 456 | 14.6 | 12.3 | 3,113 | | 2000 | Far Democratic | 192 | 6.2 | 22.8 | 3,114 | | 2000 | Far Republican | 1,472 | 47.3 | 22.5 | 3,114 | | 2016 | Far Democratic | 224 | 7.2 | 27.8 | 3,113 | | 2016 | Far Republican | 2,270 | 72.9 | 31.0 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Far Democratic | 229 | 7.4 | 28.2 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Far Republican | 2,234 | 71.8 | 28.2 | 3,113 | Views: Share of votes (shown = true); Number of counties (shown = true). Note: Show data lists all seven map elections from 1876 to 2024. None of them is a third-party year. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; shares weighted by two-party votes unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/county_counts.json ### Table 6. The share of votes cast within 5 points of the national margin was 22.9% in 1976, 9.4% in 2016 and 14.7% in 2024 Share of two-party votes, or of counties in the second view, by bin of the county margin minus the national margin, percentage points, seven presidential elections from 1876 to 2024 | Election | Bin center (points) | Share of votes (%) | Share of counties (%) | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1876 | −97.5 | 0.00 | 0.09 | | 1876 | −92.5 | 0.02 | 0.13 | | 1876 | −87.5 | 0.03 | 0.27 | | 1876 | −82.5 | 0.11 | 0.27 | | 1876 | −77.5 | 0.08 | 0.36 | | 1876 | −72.5 | 0.15 | 0.67 | | 1876 | −67.5 | 0.21 | 0.63 | | 1876 | −62.5 | 0.31 | 1.03 | | 1876 | −57.5 | 0.68 | 1.21 | | 1876 | −52.5 | 0.90 | 1.61 | | 1876 | −47.5 | 1.07 | 1.84 | | 1876 | −42.5 | 1.50 | 2.06 | | 1876 | −37.5 | 1.85 | 2.15 | | 1876 | −32.5 | 3.23 | 3.18 | | 1876 | −27.5 | 3.46 | 3.54 | | 1876 | −22.5 | 6.40 | 4.71 | | 1876 | −17.5 | 6.52 | 4.08 | | 1876 | −12.5 | 9.54 | 6.77 | | 1876 | −7.5 | 8.26 | 5.34 | | 1876 | −2.5 | 9.47 | 6.19 | | 1876 | +2.5 | 8.61 | 5.70 | | 1876 | +7.5 | 7.92 | 5.92 | | 1876 | +12.5 | 5.22 | 5.47 | | 1876 | +17.5 | 6.33 | 4.17 | | 1876 | +22.5 | 2.81 | 3.72 | | 1876 | +27.5 | 5.22 | 3.77 | | 1876 | +32.5 | 1.17 | 2.33 | | 1876 | +37.5 | 1.59 | 2.56 | | 1876 | +42.5 | 1.28 | 2.42 | | 1876 | +47.5 | 1.09 | 2.15 | | 1876 | +52.5 | 1.03 | 2.29 | | 1876 | +57.5 | 0.77 | 1.79 | | 1876 | +62.5 | 0.49 | 1.61 | | 1876 | +67.5 | 0.56 | 1.61 | | 1876 | +72.5 | 0.48 | 1.52 | | 1876 | +77.5 | 0.41 | 1.39 | | 1876 | +82.5 | 0.32 | 1.12 | | 1876 | +87.5 | 0.25 | 0.99 | | 1876 | +92.5 | 0.24 | 1.17 | | 1876 | +97.5 | 0.38 | 2.02 | | 1904 | −97.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1904 | −92.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1904 | −87.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1904 | −82.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1904 | −77.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1904 | −72.5 | 0.01 | 0.04 | | 1904 | −67.5 | 0.05 | 0.26 | | 1904 | −62.5 | 0.29 | 0.77 | | 1904 | −57.5 | 0.33 | 0.92 | | 1904 | −52.5 | 1.11 | 1.65 | | 1904 | −47.5 | 4.01 | 2.90 | | 1904 | −42.5 | 3.39 | 2.79 | | 1904 | −37.5 | 2.91 | 3.56 | | 1904 | −32.5 | 3.80 | 4.00 | | 1904 | −27.5 | 3.74 | 4.26 | | 1904 | −22.5 | 6.49 | 5.07 | | 1904 | −17.5 | 7.87 | 4.59 | | 1904 | −12.5 | 8.31 | 4.85 | | 1904 | −7.5 | 7.00 | 4.41 | | 1904 | −2.5 | 5.60 | 3.78 | | 1904 | +2.5 | 7.91 | 4.15 | | 1904 | +7.5 | 4.86 | 3.97 | | 1904 | +12.5 | 6.48 | 4.33 | | 1904 | +17.5 | 3.87 | 2.68 | | 1904 | +22.5 | 5.27 | 3.45 | | 1904 | +27.5 | 5.46 | 2.83 | | 1904 | +32.5 | 1.56 | 2.02 | | 1904 | +37.5 | 1.17 | 2.13 | | 1904 | +42.5 | 0.93 | 2.02 | | 1904 | +47.5 | 0.62 | 1.62 | | 1904 | +52.5 | 0.68 | 2.02 | | 1904 | +57.5 | 0.60 | 1.58 | | 1904 | +62.5 | 0.48 | 1.36 | | 1904 | +67.5 | 0.52 | 2.13 | | 1904 | +72.5 | 0.58 | 1.51 | | 1904 | +77.5 | 0.59 | 2.17 | | 1904 | +82.5 | 0.45 | 1.40 | | 1904 | +87.5 | 0.34 | 1.58 | | 1904 | +92.5 | 0.59 | 2.31 | | 1904 | +97.5 | 0.42 | 2.13 | | 1940 | −97.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1940 | −92.5 | 0.01 | 0.03 | | 1940 | −87.5 | 0.01 | 0.03 | | 1940 | −82.5 | 0.02 | 0.06 | | 1940 | −77.5 | 0.02 | 0.13 | | 1940 | −72.5 | 0.08 | 0.23 | | 1940 | −67.5 | 0.12 | 0.29 | | 1940 | −62.5 | 0.14 | 0.32 | | 1940 | −57.5 | 0.31 | 0.52 | | 1940 | −52.5 | 0.74 | 1.13 | | 1940 | −47.5 | 1.38 | 1.97 | | 1940 | −42.5 | 1.79 | 2.59 | | 1940 | −37.5 | 3.11 | 3.56 | | 1940 | −32.5 | 2.97 | 4.30 | | 1940 | −27.5 | 4.25 | 4.56 | | 1940 | −22.5 | 5.62 | 5.30 | | 1940 | −17.5 | 6.37 | 6.24 | | 1940 | −12.5 | 7.84 | 5.24 | | 1940 | −7.5 | 6.11 | 5.79 | | 1940 | −2.5 | 5.74 | 5.95 | | 1940 | +2.5 | 12.08 | 4.27 | | 1940 | +7.5 | 12.19 | 3.56 | | 1940 | +12.5 | 10.70 | 3.68 | | 1940 | +17.5 | 5.70 | 3.01 | | 1940 | +22.5 | 2.84 | 2.71 | | 1940 | +27.5 | 1.54 | 2.29 | | 1940 | +32.5 | 0.69 | 1.78 | | 1940 | +37.5 | 0.60 | 1.65 | | 1940 | +42.5 | 0.84 | 2.07 | | 1940 | +47.5 | 0.56 | 1.87 | | 1940 | +52.5 | 0.70 | 1.68 | | 1940 | +57.5 | 0.74 | 2.59 | | 1940 | +62.5 | 1.01 | 3.01 | | 1940 | +67.5 | 0.90 | 3.30 | | 1940 | +72.5 | 0.69 | 3.30 | | 1940 | +77.5 | 0.42 | 2.07 | | 1940 | +82.5 | 0.49 | 3.56 | | 1940 | +87.5 | 0.63 | 5.11 | | 1940 | +92.5 | 0.04 | 0.29 | | 1940 | +97.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | −97.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | −92.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | −87.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | −82.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | −77.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | −72.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | −67.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | −62.5 | 0.00 | 0.03 | | 1976 | −57.5 | 0.00 | 0.13 | | 1976 | −52.5 | 0.15 | 0.26 | | 1976 | −47.5 | 0.19 | 0.35 | | 1976 | −42.5 | 0.47 | 0.87 | | 1976 | −37.5 | 1.05 | 1.38 | | 1976 | −32.5 | 1.67 | 2.51 | | 1976 | −27.5 | 4.23 | 3.92 | | 1976 | −22.5 | 4.56 | 5.20 | | 1976 | −17.5 | 7.69 | 6.46 | | 1976 | −12.5 | 10.28 | 8.96 | | 1976 | −7.5 | 10.47 | 9.16 | | 1976 | −2.5 | 12.84 | 9.83 | | 1976 | +2.5 | 10.07 | 9.03 | | 1976 | +7.5 | 9.22 | 7.55 | | 1976 | +12.5 | 8.81 | 6.26 | | 1976 | +17.5 | 5.09 | 5.49 | | 1976 | +22.5 | 4.55 | 5.08 | | 1976 | +27.5 | 1.72 | 4.02 | | 1976 | +32.5 | 2.27 | 2.83 | | 1976 | +37.5 | 1.77 | 2.54 | | 1976 | +42.5 | 0.95 | 2.12 | | 1976 | +47.5 | 1.10 | 2.15 | | 1976 | +52.5 | 0.31 | 1.67 | | 1976 | +57.5 | 0.16 | 1.03 | | 1976 | +62.5 | 0.32 | 0.74 | | 1976 | +67.5 | 0.03 | 0.26 | | 1976 | +72.5 | 0.03 | 0.19 | | 1976 | +77.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | +82.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | +87.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | +92.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 1976 | +97.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2000 | −97.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2000 | −92.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2000 | −87.5 | 0.00 | 0.03 | | 2000 | −82.5 | 0.02 | 0.26 | | 2000 | −77.5 | 0.01 | 0.26 | | 2000 | −72.5 | 0.18 | 0.64 | | 2000 | −67.5 | 0.25 | 1.48 | | 2000 | −62.5 | 0.25 | 1.77 | | 2000 | −57.5 | 0.58 | 2.57 | | 2000 | −52.5 | 0.95 | 3.47 | | 2000 | −47.5 | 1.32 | 3.37 | | 2000 | −42.5 | 1.75 | 4.40 | | 2000 | −37.5 | 3.19 | 5.46 | | 2000 | −32.5 | 3.52 | 7.06 | | 2000 | −27.5 | 4.95 | 8.03 | | 2000 | −22.5 | 5.50 | 8.48 | | 2000 | −17.5 | 6.10 | 8.54 | | 2000 | −12.5 | 7.99 | 8.35 | | 2000 | −7.5 | 8.00 | 8.22 | | 2000 | −2.5 | 8.83 | 6.52 | | 2000 | +2.5 | 7.86 | 5.52 | | 2000 | +7.5 | 6.60 | 4.34 | | 2000 | +12.5 | 4.54 | 2.70 | | 2000 | +17.5 | 4.80 | 2.38 | | 2000 | +22.5 | 4.33 | 1.64 | | 2000 | +27.5 | 5.06 | 1.51 | | 2000 | +32.5 | 4.08 | 1.09 | | 2000 | +37.5 | 1.65 | 0.55 | | 2000 | +42.5 | 2.83 | 0.32 | | 2000 | +47.5 | 0.89 | 0.29 | | 2000 | +52.5 | 0.92 | 0.19 | | 2000 | +57.5 | 0.13 | 0.10 | | 2000 | +62.5 | 1.12 | 0.26 | | 2000 | +67.5 | 1.12 | 0.06 | | 2000 | +72.5 | 0.19 | 0.10 | | 2000 | +77.5 | 0.30 | 0.03 | | 2000 | +82.5 | 0.19 | 0.03 | | 2000 | +87.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2000 | +92.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2000 | +97.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2016 | −97.5 | 0.00 | 0.03 | | 2016 | −92.5 | 0.00 | 0.29 | | 2016 | −87.5 | 0.03 | 0.58 | | 2016 | −82.5 | 0.23 | 2.18 | | 2016 | −77.5 | 0.36 | 3.28 | | 2016 | −72.5 | 0.75 | 4.47 | | 2016 | −67.5 | 1.14 | 5.56 | | 2016 | −62.5 | 1.61 | 7.07 | | 2016 | −57.5 | 2.81 | 8.67 | | 2016 | −52.5 | 2.86 | 7.55 | | 2016 | −47.5 | 2.65 | 6.68 | | 2016 | −42.5 | 3.12 | 6.81 | | 2016 | −37.5 | 3.43 | 5.75 | | 2016 | −32.5 | 3.53 | 4.69 | | 2016 | −27.5 | 4.20 | 5.14 | | 2016 | −22.5 | 4.29 | 4.18 | | 2016 | −17.5 | 4.19 | 4.24 | | 2016 | −12.5 | 4.44 | 2.89 | | 2016 | −7.5 | 3.94 | 2.83 | | 2016 | −2.5 | 4.56 | 2.28 | | 2016 | +2.5 | 4.83 | 2.12 | | 2016 | +7.5 | 7.27 | 2.41 | | 2016 | +12.5 | 5.92 | 1.54 | | 2016 | +17.5 | 6.07 | 1.57 | | 2016 | +22.5 | 3.26 | 1.32 | | 2016 | +27.5 | 3.80 | 0.96 | | 2016 | +32.5 | 2.71 | 1.03 | | 2016 | +37.5 | 3.39 | 0.93 | | 2016 | +42.5 | 1.70 | 0.74 | | 2016 | +47.5 | 0.50 | 0.45 | | 2016 | +52.5 | 6.34 | 0.45 | | 2016 | +57.5 | 1.19 | 0.35 | | 2016 | +62.5 | 1.68 | 0.32 | | 2016 | +67.5 | 1.35 | 0.26 | | 2016 | +72.5 | 0.08 | 0.10 | | 2016 | +77.5 | 1.22 | 0.16 | | 2016 | +82.5 | 0.30 | 0.10 | | 2016 | +87.5 | 0.23 | 0.03 | | 2016 | +92.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2016 | +97.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2024 | −97.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2024 | −92.5 | 0.00 | 0.13 | | 2024 | −87.5 | 0.01 | 0.32 | | 2024 | −82.5 | 0.08 | 1.03 | | 2024 | −77.5 | 0.28 | 2.83 | | 2024 | −72.5 | 0.59 | 4.40 | | 2024 | −67.5 | 1.10 | 6.49 | | 2024 | −62.5 | 1.51 | 8.06 | | 2024 | −57.5 | 1.69 | 6.84 | | 2024 | −52.5 | 2.37 | 7.61 | | 2024 | −47.5 | 2.40 | 6.71 | | 2024 | −42.5 | 2.99 | 6.75 | | 2024 | −37.5 | 3.17 | 5.59 | | 2024 | −32.5 | 4.02 | 5.69 | | 2024 | −27.5 | 3.12 | 4.27 | | 2024 | −22.5 | 4.90 | 5.04 | | 2024 | −17.5 | 4.24 | 4.47 | | 2024 | −12.5 | 4.62 | 3.05 | | 2024 | −7.5 | 4.07 | 2.47 | | 2024 | −2.5 | 8.27 | 3.02 | | 2024 | +2.5 | 6.47 | 2.31 | | 2024 | +7.5 | 3.56 | 1.73 | | 2024 | +12.5 | 6.13 | 2.12 | | 2024 | +17.5 | 6.17 | 1.70 | | 2024 | +22.5 | 5.46 | 1.57 | | 2024 | +27.5 | 3.95 | 1.12 | | 2024 | +32.5 | 3.01 | 1.03 | | 2024 | +37.5 | 3.59 | 0.77 | | 2024 | +42.5 | 3.97 | 0.84 | | 2024 | +47.5 | 2.44 | 0.58 | | 2024 | +52.5 | 1.32 | 0.32 | | 2024 | +57.5 | 1.54 | 0.35 | | 2024 | +62.5 | 0.73 | 0.22 | | 2024 | +67.5 | 1.42 | 0.29 | | 2024 | +72.5 | 0.19 | 0.13 | | 2024 | +77.5 | 0.41 | 0.10 | | 2024 | +82.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2024 | +87.5 | 0.21 | 0.03 | | 2024 | +92.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | | 2024 | +97.5 | 0.00 | 0.00 | Views: Share of votes; Share of counties. Note: Bins run from minus 100 to plus 100 points. Counties beyond that range are not drawn. They matter mainly in 1904, when they hold 1.7% of votes and 8.8% of counties, all of them heavily Democratic counties in a year when the national margin was Republican. Note: The share within 5 points does not depend on the bin width, because the two bins next to zero make it up. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; shares weighted by two-party votes unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/margin_distribution.json ### Table 7. In a fixed panel of counties the share rose 38.5 points from 1976 to 2024, against 31.0 for all counties Share of two-party votes cast in counties at least 20 points from the national margin, percent, for all counties in each election and for a panel of 1,652 counties that report in every election from 1868, through 2024, with a second panel from 1872 in the second view | Counties | Election | Share of votes in far counties (%) | Counties | Share of the election's votes in these counties (%) | Note | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | All counties | 1868 | 42.3 | 1,696 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1868 | 42.0 | 1,652 | 99.1 | n/a | | All counties | 1872 | 50.8 | 2,160 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1872 | 50.1 | 1,652 | 90.8 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1872 | 50.5 | 2,068 | 98.3 | n/a | | All counties | 1876 | 38.1 | 2,230 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1876 | 34.4 | 1,652 | 90.3 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1876 | 38.1 | 2,068 | 97.7 | n/a | | All counties | 1880 | 38.1 | 2,291 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1880 | 33.0 | 1,652 | 89.4 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1880 | 37.4 | 2,068 | 96.3 | n/a | | All counties | 1884 | 30.8 | 2,351 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1884 | 29.8 | 1,652 | 86.9 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1884 | 29.8 | 2,068 | 95.5 | n/a | | All counties | 1888 | 29.9 | 2,429 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1888 | 27.3 | 1,652 | 86.7 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1888 | 28.8 | 2,068 | 94.7 | n/a | | All counties | 1892 | 33.4 | 2,658 | 100.0 | Third-party year | | 1868 panel | 1892 | 29.0 | 1,652 | 87.1 | Third-party year | | 1872 panel | 1892 | 34.6 | 2,068 | 93.4 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1896 | 41.1 | 2,715 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1896 | 37.2 | 1,652 | 83.5 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1896 | 38.5 | 2,068 | 90.4 | n/a | | All counties | 1900 | 32.9 | 2,711 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1900 | 28.4 | 1,652 | 83.4 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1900 | 31.0 | 2,068 | 89.7 | n/a | | All counties | 1904 | 48.1 | 2,723 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1904 | 45.5 | 1,652 | 84.2 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1904 | 46.6 | 2,068 | 89.0 | n/a | | All counties | 1908 | 32.9 | 2,856 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1908 | 28.9 | 1,652 | 81.3 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1908 | 32.4 | 2,068 | 86.3 | n/a | | All counties | 1912 | 49.9 | 2,943 | 100.0 | Third-party year | | 1868 panel | 1912 | 46.8 | 1,652 | 79.9 | Third-party year | | 1872 panel | 1912 | 48.9 | 2,068 | 85.2 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1916 | 29.8 | 3,022 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1916 | 22.0 | 1,652 | 79.2 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1916 | 26.4 | 2,068 | 84.0 | n/a | | All counties | 1920 | 44.0 | 3,054 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1920 | 43.2 | 1,652 | 81.3 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1920 | 44.2 | 2,068 | 85.4 | n/a | | All counties | 1924 | 61.3 | 3,083 | 100.0 | Third-party year | | 1868 panel | 1924 | 52.2 | 1,652 | 81.1 | Third-party year | | 1872 panel | 1924 | 55.8 | 2,068 | 85.7 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1928 | 39.0 | 3,097 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1928 | 36.1 | 1,652 | 81.2 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1928 | 37.5 | 2,068 | 85.2 | n/a | | All counties | 1932 | 40.9 | 3,096 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1932 | 37.2 | 1,652 | 80.2 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1932 | 38.6 | 2,068 | 84.4 | n/a | | All counties | 1936 | 39.2 | 3,095 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1936 | 34.6 | 1,652 | 81.1 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1936 | 36.6 | 2,068 | 84.9 | n/a | | All counties | 1940 | 33.3 | 3,094 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1940 | 28.9 | 1,652 | 80.4 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1940 | 29.9 | 2,068 | 84.4 | n/a | | All counties | 1944 | 33.9 | 3,095 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1944 | 33.1 | 1,652 | 81.3 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1944 | 33.3 | 2,068 | 85.1 | n/a | | All counties | 1948 | 28.6 | 3,096 | 100.0 | Third-party year | | 1868 panel | 1948 | 25.6 | 1,652 | 80.7 | Third-party year | | 1872 panel | 1948 | 27.2 | 2,068 | 84.4 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1952 | 36.8 | 3,098 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1952 | 34.6 | 1,652 | 78.7 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1952 | 33.4 | 2,068 | 83.6 | n/a | | All counties | 1956 | 32.5 | 3,100 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1956 | 33.4 | 1,652 | 78.9 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1956 | 33.0 | 2,068 | 83.6 | n/a | | All counties | 1960 | 32.8 | 3,105 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1960 | 31.6 | 1,652 | 78.1 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1960 | 32.1 | 2,068 | 83.0 | n/a | | All counties | 1964 | 32.5 | 3,107 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1964 | 29.1 | 1,652 | 76.3 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1964 | 31.1 | 2,068 | 82.0 | n/a | | All counties | 1968 | 37.2 | 3,111 | 100.0 | Third-party year | | 1868 panel | 1968 | 35.4 | 1,652 | 76.3 | Third-party year | | 1872 panel | 1968 | 36.2 | 2,068 | 81.8 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1972 | 31.6 | 3,110 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1972 | 30.0 | 1,652 | 74.0 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1972 | 30.9 | 2,068 | 80.8 | n/a | | All counties | 1976 | 25.5 | 3,113 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1976 | 22.0 | 1,652 | 72.4 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1976 | 22.5 | 2,068 | 79.9 | n/a | | All counties | 1980 | 33.8 | 3,112 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1980 | 30.8 | 1,652 | 70.8 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1980 | 30.3 | 2,068 | 79.1 | n/a | | All counties | 1984 | 35.9 | 3,114 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1984 | 31.4 | 1,652 | 70.1 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1984 | 30.0 | 2,068 | 78.6 | n/a | | All counties | 1988 | 35.8 | 3,114 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 1988 | 32.4 | 1,652 | 69.6 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 1988 | 32.1 | 2,068 | 78.4 | n/a | | All counties | 1992 | 38.6 | 3,115 | 100.0 | Third-party year | | 1868 panel | 1992 | 33.5 | 1,652 | 69.5 | Third-party year | | 1872 panel | 1992 | 37.5 | 2,068 | 78.5 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1996 | 37.9 | 3,114 | 100.0 | Third-party year | | 1868 panel | 1996 | 37.4 | 1,652 | 68.2 | Third-party year | | 1872 panel | 1996 | 39.4 | 2,068 | 77.5 | Third-party year | | All counties | 2000 | 45.3 | 3,114 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 2000 | 44.2 | 1,652 | 67.8 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 2000 | 45.1 | 2,068 | 77.4 | n/a | | All counties | 2004 | 46.9 | 3,114 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 2004 | 48.0 | 1,652 | 67.1 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 2004 | 47.0 | 2,068 | 76.9 | n/a | | All counties | 2008 | 47.3 | 3,114 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 2008 | 48.5 | 1,652 | 66.4 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 2008 | 47.7 | 2,068 | 76.7 | n/a | | All counties | 2012 | 50.5 | 3,114 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 2012 | 50.7 | 1,652 | 65.8 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 2012 | 51.8 | 2,068 | 76.2 | n/a | | All counties | 2016 | 58.8 | 3,113 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 2016 | 60.3 | 1,652 | 65.2 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 2016 | 61.2 | 2,068 | 76.0 | n/a | | All counties | 2020 | 56.6 | 3,113 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 2020 | 59.4 | 1,652 | 64.0 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 2020 | 60.4 | 2,068 | 74.9 | n/a | | All counties | 2024 | 56.5 | 3,113 | 100.0 | n/a | | 1868 panel | 2024 | 60.5 | 1,652 | 63.5 | n/a | | 1872 panel | 2024 | 61.0 | 2,068 | 74.7 | n/a | Views: Panel from 1868 (main = true); Adding the panel from 1872. Note: A panel keeps the counties with a positive two-party vote in every election from its first year. The panel from 1868 lacks every state admitted after 1868 and every county created later; the panel from 1872 keeps Florida, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia and lacks the later ones. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; shares weighted by two-party votes unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/fixed_panel.json ### Table 8. The spread of state margins around the national margin rose from 9.4 points in 1976 to 17.2 in 2024 Vote-weighted standard deviation of two-party margins, percentage points: county margins around the national margin, state margins around the national margin, and county margins around their own state's margin, 1868 to 2024 | Measure | Election | Standard deviation (points) | Units | Note | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | All counties | 1868 | 30.6 | 1,696 | n/a | | Between states | 1868 | 18.3 | 33 | n/a | | Within states | 1868 | 24.6 | 1,696 | n/a | | All counties | 1872 | 34.4 | 2,160 | n/a | | Between states | 1872 | 21.1 | 37 | n/a | | Within states | 1872 | 27.2 | 2,160 | n/a | | All counties | 1876 | 26.8 | 2,230 | n/a | | Between states | 1876 | 15.2 | 37 | n/a | | Within states | 1876 | 22.1 | 2,230 | n/a | | All counties | 1880 | 26.8 | 2,291 | n/a | | Between states | 1880 | 16.5 | 38 | n/a | | Within states | 1880 | 21.1 | 2,291 | n/a | | All counties | 1884 | 24.3 | 2,351 | n/a | | Between states | 1884 | 14.1 | 38 | n/a | | Within states | 1884 | 19.8 | 2,351 | n/a | | All counties | 1888 | 24.5 | 2,429 | n/a | | Between states | 1888 | 15.9 | 38 | n/a | | Within states | 1888 | 18.7 | 2,429 | n/a | | All counties | 1892 | 30.9 | 2,658 | Third-party year | | Between states | 1892 | 25.5 | 44 | Third-party year | | Within states | 1892 | 17.4 | 2,658 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1896 | 33.0 | 2,715 | n/a | | Between states | 1896 | 27.6 | 45 | n/a | | Within states | 1896 | 18.1 | 2,715 | n/a | | All counties | 1900 | 25.3 | 2,711 | n/a | | Between states | 1900 | 17.9 | 45 | n/a | | Within states | 1900 | 17.9 | 2,711 | n/a | | All counties | 1904 | 32.4 | 2,723 | n/a | | Between states | 1904 | 26.4 | 45 | n/a | | Within states | 1904 | 18.9 | 2,723 | n/a | | All counties | 1908 | 26.1 | 2,856 | n/a | | Between states | 1908 | 20.0 | 46 | n/a | | Within states | 1908 | 16.8 | 2,856 | n/a | | All counties | 1912 | 30.6 | 2,943 | Third-party year | | Between states | 1912 | 23.5 | 47 | Third-party year | | Within states | 1912 | 19.7 | 2,943 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1916 | 25.3 | 3,022 | n/a | | Between states | 1916 | 19.6 | 48 | n/a | | Within states | 1916 | 16.0 | 3,022 | n/a | | All counties | 1920 | 29.8 | 3,054 | n/a | | Between states | 1920 | 24.7 | 48 | n/a | | Within states | 1920 | 16.7 | 3,054 | n/a | | All counties | 1924 | 37.0 | 3,083 | Third-party year | | Between states | 1924 | 31.8 | 48 | Third-party year | | Within states | 1924 | 18.8 | 3,083 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1928 | 25.6 | 3,097 | n/a | | Between states | 1928 | 15.9 | 48 | n/a | | Within states | 1928 | 20.0 | 3,097 | n/a | | All counties | 1932 | 26.4 | 3,096 | n/a | | Between states | 1932 | 19.5 | 48 | n/a | | Within states | 1932 | 17.7 | 3,096 | n/a | | All counties | 1936 | 24.9 | 3,095 | n/a | | Between states | 1936 | 15.7 | 48 | n/a | | Within states | 1936 | 19.4 | 3,095 | n/a | | All counties | 1940 | 25.8 | 3,094 | n/a | | Between states | 1940 | 18.2 | 48 | n/a | | Within states | 1940 | 18.3 | 3,094 | n/a | | All counties | 1944 | 25.1 | 3,095 | n/a | | Between states | 1944 | 16.8 | 48 | n/a | | Within states | 1944 | 18.7 | 3,095 | n/a | | All counties | 1948 | 22.6 | 3,096 | Third-party year | | Between states | 1948 | 12.9 | 48 | Third-party year | | Within states | 1948 | 18.6 | 3,096 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1952 | 22.5 | 3,098 | n/a | | Between states | 1952 | 12.6 | 48 | n/a | | Within states | 1952 | 18.7 | 3,098 | n/a | | All counties | 1956 | 21.4 | 3,100 | n/a | | Between states | 1956 | 10.9 | 48 | n/a | | Within states | 1956 | 18.4 | 3,100 | n/a | | All counties | 1960 | 20.9 | 3,105 | n/a | | Between states | 1960 | 8.8 | 49 | n/a | | Within states | 1960 | 19.0 | 3,105 | n/a | | All counties | 1964 | 22.2 | 3,107 | n/a | | Between states | 1964 | 16.4 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 1964 | 14.9 | 3,107 | n/a | | All counties | 1968 | 23.3 | 3,111 | Third-party year | | Between states | 1968 | 13.6 | 50 | Third-party year | | Within states | 1968 | 18.9 | 3,111 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1972 | 20.5 | 3,110 | n/a | | Between states | 1972 | 13.4 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 1972 | 15.5 | 3,110 | n/a | | All counties | 1976 | 18.4 | 3,113 | n/a | | Between states | 1976 | 9.4 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 1976 | 15.7 | 3,113 | n/a | | All counties | 1980 | 20.9 | 3,112 | n/a | | Between states | 1980 | 11.4 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 1980 | 17.5 | 3,112 | n/a | | All counties | 1984 | 21.7 | 3,114 | n/a | | Between states | 1984 | 10.4 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 1984 | 19.0 | 3,114 | n/a | | All counties | 1988 | 21.3 | 3,114 | n/a | | Between states | 1988 | 10.3 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 1988 | 18.7 | 3,114 | n/a | | All counties | 1992 | 22.1 | 3,115 | Third-party year | | Between states | 1992 | 10.9 | 50 | Third-party year | | Within states | 1992 | 19.2 | 3,115 | Third-party year | | All counties | 1996 | 23.6 | 3,114 | Third-party year | | Between states | 1996 | 13.1 | 50 | Third-party year | | Within states | 1996 | 19.6 | 3,114 | Third-party year | | All counties | 2000 | 26.5 | 3,114 | n/a | | Between states | 2000 | 15.5 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 2000 | 21.5 | 3,114 | n/a | | All counties | 2004 | 27.3 | 3,114 | n/a | | Between states | 2004 | 14.9 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 2004 | 23.0 | 3,114 | n/a | | All counties | 2008 | 28.8 | 3,114 | n/a | | Between states | 2008 | 16.2 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 2008 | 23.8 | 3,114 | n/a | | All counties | 2012 | 31.1 | 3,114 | n/a | | Between states | 2012 | 17.4 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 2012 | 25.7 | 3,114 | n/a | | All counties | 2016 | 35.9 | 3,113 | n/a | | Between states | 2016 | 19.3 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 2016 | 30.3 | 3,113 | n/a | | All counties | 2020 | 34.0 | 3,113 | n/a | | Between states | 2020 | 18.3 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 2020 | 28.6 | 3,113 | n/a | | All counties | 2024 | 32.7 | 3,113 | n/a | | Between states | 2024 | 17.2 | 50 | n/a | | Within states | 2024 | 27.9 | 3,113 | n/a | Note: States are the states and the District of Columbia with returns in the election; a state's margin is its summed two-party margin. The number of states is 33 in 1868, when four Confederate states have no returns, and 50 in both 1976 and 2024, so the between-state series compares the same units in those two elections. The within-state series is measured on counties. The 1872 values rest on Reconstruction-era returns. Source: County presidential returns, 1868-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868-2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024); full counts, not survey estimates; shares weighted by two-party votes unless stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/states_and_counties.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (160), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | all_fall_2016_2024 | 2.3 | percentage points of the share of votes | fall in the share of votes cast in far counties, all counties | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded shares. | | all_rise_1976_2024 | 31.0 | percentage points of the share of votes | rise in the share of votes cast in far counties, all counties | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 against 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded shares. | | band | 5 | percentage points of two-party margin | distance from the national margin that makes a county near | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | big_step_cut | 7 | percentage points of the share of votes | size of a large step | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | bin_alt | 10 | percentage points of two-party margin | a wider bin of the county margin relative to the national margin, used to test the height of the ridges | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | bin_width | 5 | percentage points of two-party margin | width of a bin of the county margin relative to the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | chg_1980 | +8.3 | percentage points of the share of votes | change in the share of votes cast in far counties from the previous election | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1980 against 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded shares. | | chg_2000 | +7.4 | percentage points of the share of votes | change in the share of votes cast in far counties from the previous election | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2000 against 1996 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded shares. | | chg_2016 | +8.3 | percentage points of the share of votes | change in the share of votes cast in far counties from the previous election | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2016 against 2012 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded shares. | | chg_other_max | 3.2 | percentage points of the share of votes | largest absolute change in the share from the previous election among the other elections since 1976 | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1984-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded shares. | | confed_c_1976 | 50.7% | percent of counties | share of counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_contrib_1904 | 18.4% | percent of votes cast in far counties | share of the nation's votes in far counties that were cast in the former Confederacy | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1904 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_contrib_2024 | 33.4% | percent of votes cast in far counties | share of the nation's votes in far counties that were cast in the former Confederacy | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_dem_far_1904 | 83.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points more Democratic than the nation | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1904 | | 1,000 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_dem_far_1940 | 82.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points more Democratic than the nation | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1940 | | 1,132 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_dem_far_2024 | 16.8% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points more Democratic than the nation | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 1,142 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_far_1904 | 86.3% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1904 | | 1,000 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_far_1924 | 94.1% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1924 | | 1,126 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_far_1928 | 52.9% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1928 | | 1,134 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_far_1976 | 29.6% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 1,145 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_far_1980 | 29.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1980 | | 1,145 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_far_2016 | 65.0% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 2016 | | 1,142 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_far_2024 | 58.0% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 1,142 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_far_hi_1976_96 | 35.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | highest share of the region's votes cast in far counties over the six elections | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1976-1996 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_far_lo_1976_96 | 29.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | lowest share of the region's votes cast in far counties over the six elections | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1976-1996 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_far_min | 67.0% | percent of the election's two-party votes | lowest share of the region's votes cast in far counties | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1892-1944 except 1928 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_rep_far_2024 | 41.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points more Republican than the nation | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 1,142 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_vote_1904 | 10.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the nation's two-party votes cast in the former Confederacy | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 1904 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | confed_vote_2024 | 32.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the nation's two-party votes cast in the former Confederacy | counties in the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Alaska excluded | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | corr_abs_margin | −0.07 | correlation coefficient | correlation across elections between the absolute national two-party margin and the share of votes cast in far counties | the 33 elections that are not third-party years | 1868-2024 | 95% CI −0.40 to 0.28 | 33 | none (full counts) | County election returns | Pearson correlation; the interval is a Fisher z interval that treats the elections as independent, and adjacent elections are not independent. | | corr_from2000 | −0.12 | correlation coefficient | correlation across elections between the absolute national two-party margin and the share of votes cast in far counties | the 7 elections from 2000 to 2024 (none is a third-party year) | 2000-2024 | 95% CI −0.80 to 0.70 | 7 | none (full counts) | County election returns | Pearson correlation; the interval is a Fisher z interval that treats the elections as independent, and adjacent elections are not independent. | | corr_pre2000 | +0.42 | correlation coefficient | correlation across elections between the absolute national two-party margin and the share of votes cast in far counties | the 26 elections from 1868 to 1996 that are not third-party years | 1868-1996 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.70 | 26 | none (full counts) | County election returns | Pearson correlation; the interval is a Fisher z interval that treats the elections as independent, and adjacent elections are not independent. | | cov_panel72_2024 | 74.7% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the election's two-party votes cast in the larger fixed panel | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 39 elections from 1872, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 2,068 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cov_panel_1868 | 99.1% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the election's two-party votes cast in the fixed panel | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 1868 | | 1,652 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cov_panel_2024 | 63.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the election's two-party votes cast in the fixed panel | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 1,652 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cut | 20 | percentage points of two-party margin | distance from the national margin that makes a county far | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cut_15 | 15 | percentage points of two-party margin | alternative distance from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cut_25 | 25 | percentage points of two-party margin | alternative distance from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cut_30 | 30 | percentage points of two-party margin | alternative distance from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | cut_very | 40 | percentage points of two-party margin | distance from the national margin that makes a county very far | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | dist_lim | 100 | percentage points of two-party margin | distance from the national margin beyond which a county is not drawn | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | fall_max | 0.7 | percentage points of the share of votes | largest fall in the share from the previous election between 1976 and 2016 | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1980-2016 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded shares. | | far15_v_1916 | 37.8% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 15 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1916 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far15_v_1976 | 38.3% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 15 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_c_1976 | 37.3% | percent of counties | share of counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_c_1988 | 35.8% | percent of counties | share of counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1988 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_c_2024 | 79.1% | percent of counties | share of counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_dem_c_1976 | 704 | counties | count of counties 20 or more points more Democratic than the nation | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_dem_c_2024 | 229 | counties | count of counties 20 or more points more Democratic than the nation | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_dem_v_1976 | 13.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points more Democratic than the nation | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_dem_v_2024 | 28.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points more Democratic than the nation | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_rep_c_1976 | 456 | counties | count of counties 20 or more points more Republican than the nation | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_rep_c_2024 | 2,234 | counties | count of counties 20 or more points more Republican than the nation | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_rep_v_1976 | 12.3% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points more Republican than the nation | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_rep_v_2024 | 28.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points more Republican than the nation | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_size_ratio_2024 | 9.8 | ratio of mean two-party votes per county | mean two-party votes in a county at least 20 points more Democratic than the nation over the mean in a county at least 20 points more Republican | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_v_1868 | 42.3% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868 | | 1,696 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_v_1872 | 50.8% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1872 | | 2,160 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_v_1904 | 48.1% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | 2,723 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_v_1924 | 61.3% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1924 | | 3,083 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_v_1972 | 31.6% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1972 | | 3,110 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_v_1976 | 25.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_v_1984 | 35.9% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1984 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_v_2016 | 58.8% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2016 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_v_2020 | 56.6% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2020 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | far_v_2024 | 56.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | gap_2024_mid_hi | 15.6 | percentage points of the share of votes | share of votes cast in far counties in 2024 minus the highest share among the elections from 1928 to 1972 that are not third-party years | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 against 1928-1972 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded shares. | | mark50 | 50% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of a region's votes that marks a majority | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | med_abs_1976 | 14.4 | points of two-party margin | median over counties of the absolute county two-party margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Raw basis: the county's own margin, not its margin relative to the nation; each county counts once. | | med_abs_2024 | 43.9 | points of two-party margin | median over counties of the absolute county two-party margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Raw basis: the county's own margin, not its margin relative to the nation; each county counts once. | | mid_hi | 40.9% | percent of the election's two-party votes | highest share of votes cast in far counties | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1928-1972 except third-party years | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | mid_lo | 31.6% | percent of the election's two-party votes | lowest share of votes cast in far counties | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1928-1972 except third-party years | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_big_steps | 3 | presidential elections | count of elections that raised the share by more than 7 points | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_close_1976 | 591 | counties | count of counties whose own margin is within 5 points of an even split | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Raw basis: the county's own margin, not its margin relative to the nation. | | n_close_2024 | 155 | counties | count of counties whose own margin is within 5 points of an even split | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Raw basis: the county's own margin, not its margin relative to the nation. | | n_counties_1868 | 1,696 | counties | count of counties with two-party returns | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_counties_1976 | 3,113 | counties | count of counties with two-party returns | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_counties_2024 | 3,113 | counties | count of counties with two-party returns | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_elections | 40 | presidential elections | count of elections | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_far_c_2024 | 2,463 | counties | count of counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_from2000 | 7 | presidential elections | count of elections from 2000 that are not third-party years | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2000-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_map_units | 3,113 | counties | count of counties drawn on the map, Alaska excluded | counties on the 2020 map, Alaska excluded | 2020 boundaries | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_panel | 1,652 | counties | count of counties in the fixed panel | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_panel72 | 2,068 | counties | count of counties in the larger fixed panel | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 39 elections from 1872, Alaska excluded | 1872-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_pre2000 | 26 | presidential elections | count of elections through 1996 that are not third-party years | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-1996 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_rise | 10 | presidential elections | count of elections between the 1976 low and the 2016 high | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976-2016 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_states_1868 | 33 | states and the District of Columbia | count of states and DC with two-party returns | states and DC with returns in the election, Alaska excluded | 1868 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_states_1976 | 50 | states and the District of Columbia | count of states and DC with two-party returns | states and DC with returns in the election, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_unflagged | 33 | presidential elections | count of elections that are not third-party years | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | nat_margin_1904 | 19.9 | points of Republican lead in the two-party margin | absolute national two-party margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | 2,723 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | nat_margin_1972 | 23.6 | points of Republican lead in the two-party margin | absolute national two-party margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1972 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | nat_margin_1984 | 18.3 | points of Republican lead in the two-party margin | absolute national two-party margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1984 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | nat_margin_2020 | 4.6 | points of Democratic lead in the two-party margin | absolute national two-party margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2020 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | near5_c_1976 | 18.9% | percent of counties | share of counties within 5 points of the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | near5_c_2016 | 4.4% | percent of counties | share of counties within 5 points of the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2016 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | near5_c_2024 | 5.3% | percent of counties | share of counties within 5 points of the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | near5_v_1904 | 13.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties within 5 points of the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | 2,723 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | near5_v_1976 | 22.9% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties within 5 points of the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | near5_v_2016 | 9.4% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties within 5 points of the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2016 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | near5_v_2024 | 14.7% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties within 5 points of the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | nodata_1876 | 885 | counties | count of map counties with no return, drawn as no data | counties on the 2020 map, Alaska excluded | 1876 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | nodata_1904 | 393 | counties | count of map counties with no return, drawn as no data | counties on the 2020 map, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | nodata_other_max | 26 | counties | largest count of map counties with no return among the other five frames | counties on the 2020 map, Alaska excluded | 1940, 1976, 2000, 2016 and 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | north_max_1904 | 46.8% | percent of the election's two-party votes | highest regional share of votes cast in far counties | counties in the Northeast, Midwest and West, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | north_min_1904 | 37.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | lowest regional share of votes cast in far counties | counties in the Northeast, Midwest and West, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | other_c_max_1976 | 45.7% | percent of counties | highest regional share of counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties in the four other regions, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pan72_far_1976 | 22.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the panel's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the panel's own margin | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 39 elections from 1872, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 2,068 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pan72_far_2024 | 61.0% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the panel's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the panel's own margin | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 39 elections from 1872, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 2,068 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pan_chg_2016_2024 | +0.2 | percentage points of the share of votes | change in the share of the panel's votes cast in far counties | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | | 1,652 | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded shares. | | pan_far_1868 | 42.0% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the panel's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the panel's own margin | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 1868 | | 1,652 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pan_far_1904 | 45.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the panel's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the panel's own margin | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | 1,652 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pan_far_1916 | 22.0% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the panel's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the panel's own margin | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 1916 | | 1,652 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pan_far_1976 | 22.0% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the panel's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the panel's own margin | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 1,652 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pan_far_2016 | 60.3% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the panel's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the panel's own margin | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 2016 | | 1,652 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pan_far_2020 | 59.4% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the panel's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the panel's own margin | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 2020 | | 1,652 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pan_far_2024 | 60.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the panel's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the panel's own margin | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 1,652 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pan_far_max_before_2016 | 52.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | highest share of the panel's votes cast in far counties before 2016 | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 1868-2012 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pan_rise_1976_2024 | 38.5 | percentage points of the share of votes | rise in the share of the panel's votes cast in far counties | the fixed panel of counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections, Alaska excluded | 2024 against 1976 | | 1,652 | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded shares. | | raw20_v_1972 | 59.0% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties whose own margin is 20 or more points from an even split | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1972 | | 3,110 | none (full counts) | County election returns | Raw basis: the county's own margin, not its margin relative to the nation. | | raw20_v_1976 | 26.7% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties whose own margin is 20 or more points from an even split | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | Raw basis: the county's own margin, not its margin relative to the nation. | | raw20_v_2004 | 48.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties whose own margin is 20 or more points from an even split | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2004 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County election returns | Raw basis: the county's own margin, not its margin relative to the nation. | | raw5_v_1976 | 23.4% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties whose own margin is within 5 points of an even split | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | Raw basis: the county's own margin, not its margin relative to the nation. | | raw5_v_2024 | 13.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties whose own margin is within 5 points of an even split | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | Raw basis: the county's own margin, not its margin relative to the nation. | | reg_c_max_2024 | 91.8% | percent of counties | highest regional share of counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties in the region, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | reg_c_min_2024 | 53.9% | percent of counties | lowest regional share of counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties in the region, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | reg_max_1976 | 31.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | highest regional share of votes cast in far counties | counties in the region, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | reg_max_2024 | 70.1% | percent of the election's two-party votes | highest regional share of votes cast in far counties | counties in the region, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | reg_min_1976 | 18.8% | percent of the election's two-party votes | lowest regional share of votes cast in far counties | counties in the region, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | reg_min_2024 | 52.5% | percent of the election's two-party votes | lowest regional share of votes cast in far counties | counties in the region, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | rest_far_1904 | 43.7% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties outside the former Confederacy, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | 1,723 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | rest_far_1976 | 24.3% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties outside the former Confederacy, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 1,968 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | rest_far_1980 | 35.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties outside the former Confederacy, Alaska excluded | 1980 | | 1,967 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | rest_far_2024 | 55.7% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of the region's two-party votes cast in counties 20 or more points from the national margin | counties outside the former Confederacy, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 1,971 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | rest_far_max | 49.0% | percent of the election's two-party votes | highest share of the region's votes cast in far counties | counties outside the former Confederacy, Alaska excluded | 1868-2012 except third-party years | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | rise_1976_2016 | 33.3 | percentage points of the share of votes | rise in the share of votes cast in far counties | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2016 against 1976 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded shares. | | sd_all_1976 | 18.4 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | vote-weighted standard deviation of county margins around the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_all_2024 | 32.7 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | vote-weighted standard deviation of county margins around the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_between_1904 | 26.4 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | vote-weighted standard deviation of state margins around the national margin | states and DC, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | 45 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_between_1924 | 31.8 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | vote-weighted standard deviation of state margins around the national margin | states and DC, Alaska excluded | 1924 | | 48 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_between_1976 | 9.4 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | vote-weighted standard deviation of state margins around the national margin | states and DC, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 50 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_between_2024 | 17.2 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | vote-weighted standard deviation of state margins around the national margin | states and DC, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 50 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_between_gap | 0.7 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | lowest spread of state margins from 1892 to 1924 minus the spread in 2024 | states and DC, Alaska excluded | 2024 against 1892-1924 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded values. | | sd_between_min | 17.9 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | lowest vote-weighted standard deviation of state margins around the national margin | states and DC, Alaska excluded | 1892-1924 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_within_1904 | 18.9 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | vote-weighted standard deviation of county margins around their own state's margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | 2,723 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_within_1924 | 18.8 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | vote-weighted standard deviation of county margins around their own state's margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1924 | | 3,083 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_within_1976 | 15.7 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | vote-weighted standard deviation of county margins around their own state's margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_within_2016 | 30.3 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | vote-weighted standard deviation of county margins around their own state's margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2016 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_within_2024 | 27.9 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | vote-weighted standard deviation of county margins around their own state's margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | sd_within_gap | 0.7 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | spread of county margins around their own state's margin in 2024 minus the highest value before 2000 | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 against 1868-1996 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | Difference of the two rounded values. | | sd_within_prior_max | 27.2 | percentage points of two-party margin (standard deviation) | highest vote-weighted standard deviation of county margins around their own state's margin before 2000 | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-1996 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | tail_counties_1904 | 8.8% | percent of counties | share of counties more than 100 points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | tail_votes_1904 | 1.7% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of votes in counties more than 100 points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | third_cut | 10% | percent of all votes cast | cutoff for a strong third-party vote | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1868-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | very_v_1924 | 24.1% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 40 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1924 | | 3,083 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | very_v_1976 | 3.7% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 40 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1976 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | very_v_2016 | 30.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 40 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2016 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | very_v_2024 | 25.2% | percent of the election's two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties 40 or more points from the national margin | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | within_share_1904 | 33.9% | percent of the variance of county margins around the nation | share of the vote-weighted variance of county margins that lies within states | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1904 | | 2,723 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | within_share_1924 | 25.8% | percent of the variance of county margins around the nation | share of the vote-weighted variance of county margins that lies within states | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 1924 | | 3,083 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | within_share_2024 | 72.4% | percent of the variance of county margins around the nation | share of the vote-weighted variance of county margins that lies within states | counties with two-party returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | ## Definitions - County two-party margin: The Democratic vote minus the Republican vote, divided by the sum of the two, so a positive value is a Democratic lead. Votes for other candidates are left out. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Party sorting: The alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. - Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them. ## Methods Sample: county presidential returns for the 40 elections from 1868 to 2024 (Algara and Amlani for 1868 to 2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), from the repaired file whose 2024 totals are corrected for 173 counties in South Carolina, Wisconsin and West Virginia. The county handling is that of chapter 10.1: 41 Alaska rows are dropped (Alaska reports election districts and has no returns before 2024), then 50 rows with no FIPS code (defunct counties), 88 rows with no vote count, 53 more rows with two-party votes but no total (chapter 10.1 drops them too; keeping them changes no share by more than 0.2 points) and 74 rows with no two-party votes. A year holds 1,696 to 3,115 counties. Counties are as reported in each election and their boundaries are not harmonized. The District of Columbia enters in 1964, and the 1868 returns lack Florida, Mississippi, Texas and Virginia, so the 1868 values are not on the same set of states as those of 1872. Estimand: the two-party margin is 100 times the Democratic minus the Republican votes over their sum; the national margin is the same quantity on the summed votes of the kept counties; a county's relative margin is its margin minus the national margin of the same election; a county is far when the absolute relative margin is at least 20 points and very far at 40 points. The headline is the share of the election's two-party votes cast in far counties, with a second version that counts each county once. The raw version compares the county's own margin with an even split. Weights: none from a survey, because the returns are full counts; shares of votes weight each county by its two-party votes. Third-party years: elections in which candidates outside the two major-party nominees won at least 10% of all votes (1892, 1912, 1924, 1968, 1992, 1996) and 1948, when a States' Rights ticket won Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina; they are shaded in the figures and not removed. In Alabama in 1948 the returns file records the States' Rights ticket, which held the Democratic line because Truman was not on the ballot, as the Democratic vote, so those votes are in the two-party margin, and the state's total in the file counts them again. Regions: the former Confederacy (AL, AR, FL, GA, LA, MS, NC, SC, TN, TX, VA), Other South (DE, DC, KY, MD, OK, WV), Northeast (CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT), Midwest (IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI) and West (the rest, without Alaska); the two South groups make up the Census South of chapter 10.1. Robustness: a fixed panel of 1,652 counties with a positive two-party vote in all 40 elections and a panel of 2,068 counties from 1872, each measured against its own summed margin; the vote-weighted standard deviation of county margins around the national margin, split into the standard deviation of state margins around the national margin and of county margins around their own state's margin (the variances add); cutoffs of 15, 25 and 30 points in place of 20. Distribution: shares of votes and of counties in bins of 5 points of relative margin from minus 100 to plus 100. Map: each county's margin minus the national margin is rounded to one decimal place, and a county whose rounded value would fall in another class of the map keeps the fewest further decimals that leave it in the class of its unrounded margin, so the classes count the counties named in the title; the classes break at minus and plus 40, 20 and 5 points. Correlations: Pearson correlations across elections between the absolute national margin and the share of votes cast in far counties, over the 33 elections that are not third-party years, the 26 of them through 1996 and the 7 from 2000. Interval method: none for shares, counts and spreads; a full count has no sampling error, so no confidence interval is reported, and differences between measures come from definitions and the county set, not from chance. The three correlations carry 95% Fisher z intervals that treat the elections as independent, which adjacent elections are not, so the intervals are narrower than they should be. Suppression: a region-year cell needs at least 30 counties, and every cell meets that floor. ## What these data cannot show - Returns record where votes were cast. - A county far from the national margin can contain voters of both parties in large numbers, and returns cannot tell voters who changed their choice from people who started or stopped voting or moved in or out, a limit known as ecological inference. - Returns also count votes cast and not residents. - Where the franchise was restricted, as in the former Confederacy for much of the period before the Voting Rights Act, the shares for the region describe the electorate that voted and not the adult population. - Southern returns from the Reconstruction years were collected under contested counts and political violence that the returns do not record. - The two-party margin leaves out the third-party votes in the third-party years, and it cannot say where those voters would have gone. - Counties are as reported in each election and their boundaries are not harmonized, so the fixed panels and the state comparison reduce the concern about unit size and do not remove it. - The panels cover 63.5% and 74.7% of the 2024 votes and are not a sample of the country. - The chapter measures how far counties sit from the nation in each election. - It does not say what a far county is like, how competitive its own contests are, or whether the far counties of 2024 differ from those of 1904 in the kinds of people who live in them. - The series ends with 2024 and makes no forecast. - The share for all counties rose from 1976 to 2016 and has not risen since. - The returns cannot say whether the plateau will hold. ## References 1. Amlani, Sharif; Algara, Carlos (2021). Partisanship & Nationalization in American Elections: Evidence from Presidential, Senatorial, & Gubernatorial Elections in the U.S. Counties, 1872-2020. Electoral Studies 73: 102387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102387 2. Key, V. O., Jr., with the assistance of Alexander Heard (1949). Southern Politics in State and Nation. Alfred A. Knopf. 3. Hopkins, Daniel J. (2018). The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized. University of Chicago Press. 4. Rodden, Jonathan A. (2019). Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Political Divide. Basic Books. 5. Bishop, Bill, with Robert G. Cushing (2008). The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart. Houghton Mifflin. 6. Abrams, Samuel J.; Fiorina, Morris P. (2012). “The Big Sort” That Wasn’t: A Skeptical Reexamination. PS: Political Science & Politics 45(2): 203-210. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096512000017 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/the-landslide-county/build.py (sha256 66fe27dd4140f86d20c0eb2a96e17b034b7f68359fd3bc815fd6e17d9e9e14a6) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/county/pres_county_1868_2024.parquet | 6,295,675 | bec11c7a0cb5d4180bbd6809d048bc892dd00dfcdde527fa4da871b1dd3f835f | b2a4f000f2eea72d09af8939555289e924875cca40cd95ec8869104cd575bed7 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 90c1469f140b8c5aee48e8089f092252d4becb8478257ca356be0d71c2409f9e | | figures/county_counts.json | 3729c0ecb6f4ce10a7d27ca531519bc8643b8f638924af27f809b906331a1243 | | figures/county_margin_map.json | aca94ff8228f0c36785138025ca0fdd08cac52a753fea78bd0098aff621188a9 | | figures/far_by_region.json | f64edef1158c4bc97e1511c5b3a7597ae38222c1d088b62ae518d5bc82fb033f | | figures/far_share.json | d7e4918fda6923a5001f7f38a70b8575ce35016b3998d84a8d18bb5f2ff46a37 | | figures/fixed_panel.json | 8a9c5cec4c962199a6cbd688653b0ca39af0620fd256e20ecef14e4820272aa5 | | figures/margin_distribution.json | a081d20520413fac757a0f0f7febb77737897ad3bf8b697590049058975a3d3a | | figures/states_and_counties.json | 51fc58b9d77fa26d54e60b4615ab8cdf4a4b630f68fea6d17fedd9a604942124 | | figures/step_changes.json | 4608cd901bb56a6753ea93f6f5ed9fa5b3fd261a93567982763d7bf7d7d59e54 | | meta.json | 5a49ba1aa7c6a38ecc185a7615baff6fb064ae2e3979ec8b9358c37ed13a74c5 | | public/data/the-landslide-county/county_margin_map.json | 5113ca666ebcca37db1bfaf01158f408cf7853c92e404a5c9edc53a504cee801 | | refs.json | 4a329e24f6775c11c567d41dab94baa819a2ec2b2cc011a3e6d1cdfdaddc3199 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-landslide-county/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-landslide-county/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/facts.json - Table 1, figure "far_share" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/far_share.json - Table 2, figure "step_changes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/step_changes.json - Table 3, figure "far_by_region" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/far_by_region.json - Table 4, figure "county_margin_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/county_margin_map.json - Table 5, figure "county_counts" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/county_counts.json - Table 6, figure "margin_distribution" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/margin_distribution.json - Table 7, figure "fixed_panel" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/fixed_panel.json - Table 8, figure "states_and_counties" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-landslide-county/figures/states_and_counties.json - Payload of "county_margin_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/the-landslide-county/county_margin_map.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Down the ballot: report Chapter 10.3 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/down-the-ballot. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Down the ballot - Chapter: 10.3 (Part X, The nationalized map; The political map) - Question: How much ticket splitting remains, among voters and among counties? - Dek: Among ANES voters who reported major-party votes for president and the House, 4.7% chose different parties in 2024, against 22.3% in 1992 and 29.5% in 1972. - Grain: places - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - ANES Cumulative Data File. Cumulative Data File 1948-2024: president, House and Senate vote items (VCF0704, VCF0707, VCF0708), combined item VCF0709 for 1952 to 2020; post-election weight; mode weights for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight_postelection (VCF9999) where the file has it and VCF0009z elsewhere (VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988); weight_ftf and weight_web for the mode split - County election returns. County returns for President, U.S. House and U.S. Senate, 1992-2024, 48 contiguous states (Heideman 2026, summary and candidate-level files); years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts); vote-weighted statistics weight each county by its presidential two-party votes - State presidential returns. State presidential returns, 2024, certified national Democratic share of the two-party vote (benchmark for the ANES 2024 sample); years: 1976-2024 (13 elections); weights: none (full counts) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/down-the-ballot - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/down-the-ballot/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/down-the-ballot/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026downtheballot ```bibtex @misc{singh2026downtheballot, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Down the ballot}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/down-the-ballot}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2024 | 4.7% | 95% CI 3.7% to 5.7% | 3,515 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | split_h_2024 | | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1992 | 22.3% | 95% CI 19.9% to 24.8% | 1,126 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | split_h_1992 | | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1972 | 29.5% | 95% CI 27.1% to 32.0% | 1,293 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | split_h_1972 | | count of studies with the president and House vote items | ANES presidential-election studies | 1952-2024 | 19 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_studies | | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the House winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2024 | 2.8% | | 2,695 | none (full counts) | County election returns | house_div_2024 | | count of counties in the main House sample | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2024 | 2,695 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_house_2024 | | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the House winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992 | 31.0% | | 2,735 | none (full counts) | County election returns | house_div_1992 | | count of counties in the main House sample | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992 | 2,735 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_house_1992 | | count of respondents with a post-election weight in the 19 studies | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1952-2024 | 29,103 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_house | | count of respondents with a post-election weight in the 19 studies | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 1952-2024 | 20,334 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | n_senate | | count of counties with presidential two-party votes | counties in the 48 contiguous states with presidential votes | 2024 | 3,107 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_pres_counties_2024 | | count of presidential elections compared | presidential elections in the county file | 1992-2024 | 9 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_elections | ## Findings In 2024, 4.7% (95% CI 3.7% to 5.7%) of voters in the American National Election Studies (ANES) who reported a major-party vote for president and for the House chose candidates of different parties. The rate was 22.3% (95% CI 19.9% to 24.8%) in 1992 and 29.5% (95% CI 27.1% to 32.0%) in 1972, the highest rate among the 19 studies from 1952 to 2024. In county returns, the presidential and House winners differed in 2.8% of the 2,695 counties in which every district part of the House race was contested in 2024, against 31.0% of 2,735 counties in 1992. Ticket splitting is a vote for one party's candidate for one office and for another party's candidate for a second office on the same ballot. The ANES asks respondents for both votes, so it measures splitting directly, by self-report, and the reported 2024 presidential vote leans Democratic against the certified count (the last section gives the figures). (Note: The individual sample is 29,103 respondents in 19 presidential-election studies from 1952 to 2024 who reported a major-party vote for president and the House, and 20,334 who reported one for president and the Senate. Estimates use the survey weight and intervals use the Kish effective sample size [1], which treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample.) County returns count each candidate's votes in a place and never match one voter's two choices. They show how often the two winners in a county differed. Splitting can produce that result, but the two races also draw different numbers of voters, and splits in opposite directions cancel in a county total. This chapter calls a county whose presidential and House winners differ a divided county. (Note: The county sample is the contiguous states, with 3,107 counties holding presidential votes in 2024, in the 9 presidential elections from 1992 to 2024. The rules for which counties enter each comparison are given below and in the methods note.) Chapter 10.1, Nationalization of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote) measures how uniformly counties moved between presidential elections; this chapter compares two offices in the same election. Burden and Kimball [2] studied presidential, House and Senate voting from 1952 to 1996. They linked ticket splitting to the similarity of the candidates' platforms, to candidate characteristics and to changes in congressional campaigns such as the rise of incumbency advantage and of money, and not to voters balancing the parties. Jacobson [3] reports that the electoral advantage of House incumbents fell to levels not seen since the 1950s, together with an increase in party loyalty, straight-ticket voting and president-centered nationalization. Hopkins [4] documents the nationalization of American political behavior. Kuriwaki [5] uses cast vote records, which show one voter's choices across offices, and finds ticket splitting higher in state and local offices than in Congress. This chapter describes how much splitting there is for Congress and does not test any of these explanations. ### Self-reported splitting was highest from 1972 to 1988 and lowest in 2024 Table 1 plots the share of voters who split between president and House, with the Senate beside it. From 1952 to 1968 the president and House rate was between 12.6% and 17.8% in every study. It was 29.5% (95% CI 27.1% to 32.0%) in 1972 and between 24.8% and 29.5% in each study from 1972 to 1988. In 1992 it was 22.3% (95% CI 19.9% to 24.8%), and in each study from 1996 to 2008 it was between 16.7% and 18.3%. The later studies give 9.8% (95% CI 8.5% to 11.1%) in 2012, 15.3% (95% CI 13.4% to 17.1%) in 2016, 11.4% (95% CI 10.1% to 12.6%) in 2020 and 4.7% (95% CI 3.7% to 5.7%) in 2024. The 2024 interval lies below the interval of every earlier study. The rate was 6.7 (95% CI 5.1 to 8.2) points lower in 2024 than in 2020, 17.7 (95% CI 15.0 to 20.3) points lower than in 1992 and 24.9 (95% CI 22.2 to 27.5) points lower than in 1972. Table 1. Self-reported ticket splitting between president and House fell from 29.5% of voters in 1972 to 4.7% in 2024 The cumulative file's combined president and House item (VCF0709) is missing for 2024, so every year here uses a split rebuilt from the presidential vote item (VCF0704) and the House vote item (VCF0707). The rebuilt code covers 3,530 respondents in 2024. In the 18 studies where VCF0709 exists, it equals the rebuilt code for all 25,637 respondents who have both. The 2 respondents in 1984 who have VCF0709 but a missing vote item are left out. The vote items are post-election, so estimates use the post-election weight in the studies that have one and the full-sample weight in the others, 2012 included. 64 respondents with both votes in 2016, 2020 and 2024 lack the post-election weight and are left out. The president and Senate rate is close to the House rate in level, with a correlation of +0.94 across the 19 studies, but it does not move with it at every step. It was 28.5% (95% CI 25.3% to 31.7%) in 1972, 7.2% (95% CI 5.9% to 8.5%) in 2020 and 6.8% (95% CI 5.4% to 8.3%) in 2024, with overlapping intervals for 2020 and 2024. The Senate item is asked only where the respondent's state held a Senate race. The fall since 2008 is not smooth for the House. The rate dropped by 6.9 (95% CI 4.0 to 9.8) points between 2008 and 2012, rose in 2016 and dropped again by 2024. The 2008 to 2012 fall crosses the addition of the web sample. Among in-person respondents alone the rate went from 16.8% (95% CI 14.2% to 19.4%) to 11.0% (95% CI 8.5% to 13.6%), a fall of 5.7 (95% CI 2.1 to 9.4) points, so the fall is not solely a change of mode. The Senate rate did not fall over those years. It was 12.9% (95% CI 9.9% to 15.9%) in 2008 and 11.1% (95% CI 9.5% to 12.6%) in 2012, a change of −1.8 (95% CI −5.2 to 1.6) points with an interval that includes zero. ### The 2016 rise appears among web respondents in the House item The ANES interviewed respondents mostly in person through 2008 and added a web sample alongside the in-person sample in 2012, 2016 and 2024. The 2020 study has no separate weights by interview mode, so it enters only the all-interview series. The all-interview rate for the House rose from 9.8% in 2012 to 15.3% in 2016, a change of +5.5 (95% CI 3.2 to 7.7) points. The rise is larger among web respondents, who moved from 9.2% (95% CI 7.7% to 10.7%) to 17.4% (95% CI 15.1% to 19.6%), a change of +8.2 (95% CI 5.4 to 10.9) points. In-person respondents moved from 11.0% (95% CI 8.5% to 13.6%) to 10.2% (95% CI 7.2% to 13.1%), a change of −0.9 (95% CI −4.8 to 3.1) points. That interval includes zero and also a rise of several points, so the data do not confine the rise to the web sample. Table 2 compares the two modes within each study. In 2016 web respondents split more than in-person respondents by +7.2 (95% CI 3.4 to 10.9) points for the House. The Senate item shows less. Web minus in-person was +3.7 (95% CI −0.6 to 8.0) points in 2016, +1.1 (95% CI −2.2 to 4.4) in 2012 and −1.7 (95% CI −5.8 to 2.5) in 2024, and the web change from 2012 to 2016 was +2.5 (95% CI −0.5 to 5.5) points. All four intervals include zero, so the 2016 jump is clear in the House item and not in the Senate item. For the House, the difference was −1.9 (95% CI −4.9 to 1.1) points in 2012 and −0.3 (95% CI −3.2 to 2.7) points in 2024, when in-person respondents split at 5.3% (95% CI 2.8% to 7.8%) and web respondents at 5.0% (95% CI 3.4% to 6.6%). Both of those intervals include zero and exclude a gap the size of the 2016 gap. Both still allow differences of a few points, which is wide against a rate near 4.7%. The fall from 2016 to 2024 appears in both modes, at 4.9 (95% CI 1.0 to 8.8) points among in-person respondents and 12.4 (95% CI 9.6 to 15.2) points among web respondents. Table 2. Web respondents reported more ticket splitting than in-person respondents for the House in 2016 by +7.2 points, against −1.9 in 2012 and −0.3 in 2024 The two modes are separately recruited samples, so the comparison cannot separate an effect of the interview mode from a difference between the people who answered. The mode estimates use the in-person and web weights, because the file has no post-election mode weights. The 2024 mode weights cover only the newly recruited samples. The 1,709 panel and paper respondents with both votes are in neither mode, and they split at 3.7% (95% CI 2.4% to 4.9%), which is why the all-interview rate for 2024 sits below the rate in each mode. The fall from 2020 to 2024 is read from the all-interview series because 2020 has no mode weights. ### Republican president, Democratic House was the usual split from 1972 to 1988 Table 3 separates the two kinds of split. Voters who chose a Republican for president and a Democrat for the House were 25.0% (95% CI 22.6% to 27.3%) of voters in 1972 and 18.3% (95% CI 15.9% to 20.6%) in 1988. In every study from 1972 to 1988 that line is above the other kind, with separate intervals. In 1996 the order reversed, with 13.4% (95% CI 10.9% to 15.8%) choosing a Democrat for president and a Republican for the House against 4.3% (95% CI 2.8% to 5.7%) for the opposite combination. From 1996 on the Democratic-president, Republican-House kind has the higher estimate in 7 of the 8 studies. The intervals separate only in 1996 and 2020, when the two kinds were 6.8% (95% CI 5.8% to 7.8%) and 4.6% (95% CI 3.8% to 5.4%). In 2024 they are 3.0% (95% CI 2.2% to 3.8%) and 1.7% (95% CI 1.1% to 2.3%). Splits in opposite directions offset each other in a vote total, so the net effect on the House vote is smaller than the share who split. Among the same voters, the House Democratic share minus the presidential Democratic share was +20.4 (95% CI 17.7 to 23.2) points in 1972 and −9.1 (95% CI −12.0 to −6.1) points in 1996, when the House vote was less Democratic than the presidential vote. In 1992 22.3% of voters split, and the net difference was +2.1 (95% CI −0.6 to 4.9) points, an interval that includes zero. In 2024 it was −1.3 (95% CI −2.3 to −0.2) points. The second view of the figure plots this net effect. Table 3. Voters who chose a Republican for president and a Democrat for the House were 25.0% in 1972 and 1.7% in 2024 ### The divided-county share fell from 2008 to 2012 and again by 2020 A county is divided when the party that won more of the Democratic and Republican presidential votes differs from the party that won more of the House votes. The comparison needs rules for races without a real contest and for defects in the county file. A county is left out for an exact tie. Jackson County, Missouri, is left out in the 6 elections from 2004 to 2024, because the file leaves out the part of the county in Kansas City. Senate races in which the file codes an independent as a major-party candidate (Maine and Vermont in 2012 and Nebraska in 2024, 123 county-years) are left out, because the file codes the same candidates as independents in other years. A totals screen leaves out county rows whose House or Senate total votes fall outside 0.7 to 1.3 times the presidential total. It removes 687 of 27,567 House county-years (2.5%) and 398 of 18,645 Senate county-years (2.1%). The named defects are the Iowa 2012 House file, which double counts the votes (99 counties), the Georgia Senate vote in 1992 and 2008, where the file holds a later runoff round (158 and 157 counties), and the Louisiana Senate vote in 1992, which is the October primary (61 counties). The other 588 House and 22 Senate county-years have totals far from the presidential total for reasons the file does not give. Of the House ones, 150 would otherwise be in the main sample. Dropping the screen changes the yearly share of divided counties by at most 0.5 points for the House and 1.3 points for the Senate. A race is a two-party race when the Democratic and Republican candidates together won at least 80% of its votes. The rule leaves out races with a strong independent, and it fails in 14 House races and 1 Senate race with candidates of both parties. A race is contested when both candidates received votes. A House race is a district. A county enters the main sample only when every district part of it was a contested two-party race, because a county that holds parts of several districts sums parts of several races. A Senate race is a state. Among the county-years that pass the first two rules, the race rules remove 3,097 House and 295 Senate county-years. A second sample, all returns, keeps the counties in uncontested two-party races. Table 4 plots the share of divided counties in the House sample. It was 31.0% in 1992, among 2,735 counties, and stayed between 25.5% and 31.0% in every election through 2008. It was 9.7% in 2012, which is 16.9 points below 2008, 7.7% in 2016, 3.0% in 2020 and 2.8% in 2024. No election after 2008 exceeded 9.7%. Weighted by votes, the divided counties held 27.9% of the presidential two-party votes cast in the sample in 1992 and 5.5% in 2024, so the divided counties of 2024 were larger than the typical county. Keeping the counties in uncontested races gives 30.6% in 1992 and 2.7% in 2024. It changes the county share by at most 2.1 points in any election, the largest change being in 2004. Table 4. Counties whose presidential and House winners differed fell from 31.0% of counties in 1992 to 2.8% in 2024 The Senate fall comes later in the pooled series. The share of counties divided between president and Senate was 30.9% in 1992, 29.6% in 2004 and 24.4% in 2008, then 18.2% in 2012, 6.2% in 2016, 1.9% in 2020 and 3.0% in 2024. It fell by 6.2 points from 2008 to 2012 and by 11.9 points from 2012 to 2016, against 16.9 points for the House from 2008 to 2012. The Senate sample is the 29 states with a contested regular race in 2024 and differs from election to election, so that comparison mixes states. The cleaner comparison is by Senate class, the seats that come up together, so that the same states vote in every third presidential election. In the class that voted in 2000, 2012 and 2024 the share of divided counties was 21.1%, 18.2% and 3.0%. In the class of 1996, 2008 and 2020 it was 20.2%, 24.4% and 1.9%, and in the class of 1992, 2004 and 2016 it was 30.9%, 29.6% and 6.2%. In each class the latest of the three elections has the lowest share. That pattern is consistent with a fall after 2008 or 2012 and does not date it. ### Divided counties mostly had a Republican president and a Democratic House The direction views of Table 4 count the divided counties of each kind. Counties with a Republican for president and a Democrat for the House outnumbered the reverse in 7 of the 9 elections. The exceptions are 1996 and 2020. The counts were 573 against 276 in 1992, 226 against 466 in 1996, 40 against 47 in 2020 and 49 against 27 in 2024. In the Senate the Republican-president kind led in 6 elections, and the reverse led in 1992, 1996 and 2020, with 369 against 94 in 1996 and 22 against 21 in 2020. In 2024 the Senate counts were 45 and 8. The House exceptions, 1996 and 2020, are also the two studies in which the ANES intervals separate with the Democratic-president kind larger. In most other years after 1996 the ANES point estimates favor that kind while the county counts favor the opposite. The two count different things, voters and county winners, and counties weigh a small county as much as a large one. Table 5 colors each county in the sample by its two winners. In 1992 the share of counties that were divided was 32.5% in the Census Bureau's South and 29.9% in the rest of the country. In 2004 the South's share was higher, at 30.5% against 22.2%. In 2012 and 2016 it was lower, at 7.6% against 11.2% and 5.1% against 9.6%. In 2024 the two shares were 2.9% and 2.7%. The South stood out in some elections and not in others, in both directions. Table 5. Counties with different presidential and House winners were spread across regions in 1992, 32.5% of the South's counties and 29.9% of the other regions' counties ### County margins converged on the presidential margin A second view of the same counties compares margins and not winners. Table 6 plots the correlation across counties between the two-party margin for president and the margin for the House, weighted by presidential votes. It was +0.65 (95% CI 0.56 to 0.72) in 1992 and +0.82 (95% CI 0.76 to 0.86) in 2008. It reached +0.95 (95% CI 0.93 to 0.96) in 2012, +0.99 (95% CI 0.98 to 0.99) in 2020 and +0.99 (95% CI 0.99 to 0.99) in 2024. The county-equal correlation, which counts each county once, was +0.58 (95% CI 0.47 to 0.67) in 1992 and +0.98 (95% CI 0.98 to 0.99) in 2024. For the Senate the correlation was +0.63 (95% CI 0.47 to 0.79) in 1992 and +0.98 (95% CI 0.97 to 0.99) in 2024. The intervals resample whole states, so they show how much each value depends on which states are in the sample. Table 6. The correlation between county presidential and House margins rose from +0.65 in 1992 to +0.99 in 2024 A correlation measures whether counties keep their order, and it would be high if every county's House margin were its presidential margin plus a constant. The second view of the figure plots the size of the gap in points. The vote-weighted average absolute gap between the House margin and the presidential margin was 16.4 (95% CI 14.5 to 18.7) points in 1992 and 3.7 (95% CI 3.2 to 4.2) points in 2024. For the Senate it was 15.9 (95% CI 12.1 to 21.1) points in 1992 and 4.6 (95% CI 3.4 to 6.0) points in 2024. ### Most of the gap is a district-wide or statewide shift The gap between the down-ballot margin and the presidential margin can be split into the average gap of the district or state a county sits in, and the variation among counties inside it. Table 7 plots the root mean square of the gap, which weights large gaps more than the average absolute gap does, and the root mean square of what remains once each district's or state's average is removed. The House gap, for counties wholly inside one district, was 27.0 points in 1992 and 5.5 points in 2024. The part that varies among counties inside a district was 9.1 and 2.3. The district average is 89% of the mean square of the gap in 1992 and 83% in 2024, and it is between 82% and 94% in every election. For the Senate the gap in 2024 was 6.1 points, and 2.5 points of it varied inside states. The state average is between 64% and 91% of the mean square across elections and 83% in 2024. Table 7. A shift shared by the counties of one district or state accounts for most of the gap between presidential and down-ballot margins These shares use districts and states with more than one county in the sample, and they correct the part inside each unit for the number of counties, because a unit's own average absorbs part of its counties' deviations. Without the correction the House share is between 84% and 94%. A county's down-ballot result therefore differs from its presidential result mostly by an amount that its neighbors in the same district or state share. The data describe where the gap lies and not what produces it. ### Both measures fell from 2008 to 2012 and then parted Table 8 puts the two measures on one scale for the nine presidential elections. The share of ANES voters who split between president and House fell from 22.3% in 1992 to 4.7% in 2024, a fall of 17.7 points, and the share of divided counties fell by 28.2 points. Both fell between 2008 and 2012, from 16.7% to 9.8% for voters and from 26.6% to 9.7% for counties. They then part. The voter rate rose to 15.3% in 2016, the House-item rise of the mode section, while the county share fell to 7.7%. Table 8. Between 1992 and 2024 the share of ANES voters who split their ticket fell by 17.7 points and the share of divided counties by 28.2 points The two lines are shares of different things and cannot be derived from each other. A county can be divided with few voters splitting, if its two races were close and drew different electorates, and a county can have a high rate of splitting with the same winner in both races, if splits run in both directions. The ANES records a respondent's state and no county, so it cannot say which kinds of place have the most individual splitting. ### Which counties are in the comparison Table 9 lists the counties and the votes behind each main sample, with the share of divided counties for the House and the Senate. The House sample holds between 71% and 84% of the presidential two-party votes of the contiguous states, and 81% in 2024. The rest are in counties with an uncontested race, no usable returns in the file or a failed totals screen. The Senate sample holds between 49% and 74% because only states with a contested regular Senate race enter. Keeping the counties in uncontested Senate races changes the share of divided counties by at most 1.0 points in any election. Table 9. The main House sample holds between 71% and 84% of the presidential votes of the contiguous states and the main Senate sample between 49% and 74% ### What these data cannot show County returns cannot identify who splits a ticket. A county in which the two winners agree can contain many voters who split in opposite directions, and a divided county can arise from close races and unequal turnout with few splitters. Robinson [6] showed that a correlation across places can differ in size and sign from the relationship among the individuals who live in them. The ANES has state geography only, so it cannot say where individual splitting is highest. Amlani and Algara [7] study nationalization in county presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial returns from 1872 to 2020, a longer period and a different measure than the comparisons here. The ANES measure is self-reported. Respondents describe their votes after the election, and the file has no validated vote. The ANES voters in the 2024 sample are 55.3% (95% CI 53.0% to 57.7%) Democratic in the major-party presidential vote against 49.2% in the certified national count, so self-reported votes lean Democratic. A lean that differed between voters who split and voters who did not would change the rate of splitting, and the chapter cannot say whether it does. The samples are respondents who reported a major-party vote in both races, so voters who chose a third-party candidate, left a race blank or did not vote are out. The Cooperative Election Study file used in this book has no House, Senate or governor vote choice, so it gives no second individual-level source for 2006 to 2024. The full cumulative file has those items and would add that check, but it is not part of this build. The chapter describes and does not explain. Incumbency, candidate quality and redistricting are possible reasons for the fall in divided counties and for the shared shifts by district and state, and nothing here tests them. The county fall from 2008 to 2012 comes between two elections separated by the 2010 midterm and by redistricting after the 2010 census, and timing alone does not say which of these matters, if any. Chapter 14.5, Candidate extremity and vote share (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/candidate-extremity-and-vote-share; planned), a planned chapter, asks whether more extreme House candidates lose vote share. The county file holds only president, House and Senate, so it says nothing about governors, state legislators or local offices, where Kuriwaki [5] finds more splitting than in Congress. The county comparison depends on its rules and on the file. The main sample leaves out uncontested races, and uncontested seats are not a random draw of places. The file has defects that the rules remove or work around, such as the missing Kansas City part of Jackson County, runoffs stored as general elections and an Iowa file that double counts votes, and others may remain. The House samples use different district maps in different decades, and the Senate samples use different states in different elections. Presidential margins leave out third-party votes, which were a larger share of the vote in 1992 and 1996 than in later elections. Alaska and Hawaii are not in the county file. County returns are full counts and carry no sampling interval. The intervals on the correlations treat states as independent, and the shared-shift decomposition describes where the gap lies without saying why it lies there. ## Tables ### Table 1. Self-reported ticket splitting between president and House fell from 29.5% of voters in 1972 to 4.7% in 2024 Share of voters who reported different parties' candidates for president and for the House (or Senate), voters with a major-party vote in both races, ANES studies 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals | Races | Interview mode | Study | Share who split (%) | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | President and House | all | 1952 | 12.6 | 10.5 | 14.6 | 1,009 | | President and House | all | 1956 | 15.6 | 13.5 | 17.6 | 1,151 | | President and House | all | 1960 | 14.0 | 11.1 | 16.9 | 766 | | President and House | all | 1964 | 15.1 | 12.8 | 17.4 | 947 | | President and House | all | 1968 | 17.8 | 15.1 | 20.5 | 776 | | President and House | all | 1972 | 29.5 | 27.1 | 32.0 | 1,293 | | President and House | all | 1976 | 24.8 | 22.1 | 27.4 | 1,049 | | President and House | all | 1980 | 27.7 | 24.5 | 30.9 | 762 | | President and House | all | 1984 | 25.4 | 22.9 | 27.9 | 1,142 | | President and House | all | 1988 | 25.3 | 22.7 | 28.0 | 1,030 | | President and House | all | 1992 | 22.3 | 19.9 | 24.8 | 1,126 | | President and House | all | 1996 | 17.7 | 14.9 | 20.4 | 926 | | President and House | all | 2000 | 18.3 | 15.5 | 21.2 | 882 | | President and House | all | 2004 | 16.8 | 13.8 | 19.8 | 701 | | President and House | all | 2008 | 16.7 | 14.1 | 19.3 | 1,222 | | President and House | all | 2012 | 9.8 | 8.5 | 11.1 | 3,501 | | President and House | all | 2016 | 15.3 | 13.4 | 17.1 | 2,138 | | President and House | all | 2020 | 11.4 | 10.1 | 12.6 | 5,167 | | President and House | all | 2024 | 4.7 | 3.7 | 5.7 | 3,515 | | President and House | ftf | 2008 | 16.8 | 14.2 | 19.4 | 1,222 | | President and House | ftf | 2012 | 11.0 | 8.5 | 13.6 | 1,065 | | President and House | ftf | 2016 | 10.2 | 7.2 | 13.1 | 619 | | President and House | ftf | 2024 | 5.3 | 2.8 | 7.8 | 579 | | President and House | web | 2012 | 9.2 | 7.7 | 10.7 | 2,436 | | President and House | web | 2016 | 17.4 | 15.1 | 19.6 | 1,519 | | President and House | web | 2024 | 5.0 | 3.4 | 6.6 | 1,227 | | President and Senate | all | 1952 | 12.0 | 9.8 | 14.3 | 797 | | President and Senate | all | 1956 | 16.1 | 13.6 | 18.5 | 878 | | President and Senate | all | 1960 | 11.1 | 7.7 | 14.5 | 455 | | President and Senate | all | 1964 | 17.2 | 14.5 | 19.8 | 787 | | President and Senate | all | 1968 | 19.2 | 16.1 | 22.4 | 603 | | President and Senate | all | 1972 | 28.5 | 25.3 | 31.7 | 765 | | President and Senate | all | 1976 | 23.6 | 20.5 | 26.6 | 768 | | President and Senate | all | 1980 | 23.7 | 20.2 | 27.3 | 539 | | President and Senate | all | 1984 | 22.7 | 19.7 | 25.8 | 717 | | President and Senate | all | 1988 | 23.3 | 20.4 | 26.2 | 819 | | President and Senate | all | 1992 | 19.2 | 16.4 | 21.9 | 795 | | President and Senate | all | 1996 | 14.7 | 11.4 | 18.0 | 548 | | President and Senate | all | 2000 | 14.0 | 11.2 | 16.8 | 726 | | President and Senate | all | 2004 | 14.5 | 11.2 | 17.9 | 508 | | President and Senate | all | 2008 | 12.9 | 9.9 | 15.9 | 786 | | President and Senate | all | 2012 | 11.1 | 9.5 | 12.6 | 2,814 | | President and Senate | all | 2016 | 13.0 | 11.0 | 15.0 | 1,625 | | President and Senate | all | 2020 | 7.2 | 5.9 | 8.5 | 2,879 | | President and Senate | all | 2024 | 6.8 | 5.4 | 8.3 | 2,525 | | President and Senate | ftf | 2008 | 12.8 | 9.9 | 15.8 | 786 | | President and Senate | ftf | 2012 | 10.4 | 7.6 | 13.1 | 837 | | President and Senate | ftf | 2016 | 10.3 | 6.7 | 13.9 | 447 | | President and Senate | ftf | 2024 | 7.9 | 4.4 | 11.4 | 433 | | President and Senate | web | 2012 | 11.5 | 9.6 | 13.3 | 1,977 | | President and Senate | web | 2016 | 14.0 | 11.6 | 16.4 | 1,178 | | President and Senate | web | 2024 | 6.2 | 4.1 | 8.3 | 923 | Views: All interviews (mode = all); In person (mode = ftf); Web (mode = web). Note: The 2024 president and House estimate is rebuilt from the presidential and House vote items because the cumulative file's combined item (VCF0709) is missing for 2024. In the 18 earlier studies the rebuilt code equals VCF0709 for all 25,637 respondents with both. Note: The Senate item is asked only where the respondent's state had a Senate race. The 2020 study has no mode weights, so the mode views leave 2020 open. The all-interview estimates use the post-election weight in the studies that have one and VCF0009z in the others, 2012 included; the mode estimates use the in-person and web weights. Weights equal one in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2024; weighted (post-election weight where the file has one, VCF0009z elsewhere; mode weights weight_ftf and weight_web for 2008, 2012, 2016 and 2024) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/split_by_year.json ### Table 2. Web respondents reported more ticket splitting than in-person respondents for the House in 2016 by +7.2 points, against −1.9 in 2012 and −0.3 in 2024 Share of voters who reported different parties' candidates for president and the House (or Senate), by interview mode, ANES 2012, 2016 and 2024; 95% intervals | ftf | ftf_hi | ftf_lo | label | n_ftf | n_web | web | web_hi | web_lo | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 11.04 | 13.62 | 8.45 | House, 2012 | 1,065 | 2,436 | 9.18 | 10.69 | 7.66 | | 10.17 | 13.15 | 7.18 | House, 2016 | 619 | 1,519 | 17.35 | 19.62 | 15.09 | | 5.27 | 7.76 | 2.79 | House, 2024 | 579 | 1,227 | 5.00 | 6.63 | 3.36 | | 10.36 | 13.09 | 7.63 | Senate, 2012 | 837 | 1,977 | 11.47 | 13.33 | 9.60 | | 10.28 | 13.85 | 6.71 | Senate, 2016 | 447 | 1,178 | 14.01 | 16.37 | 11.65 | | 7.88 | 11.41 | 4.35 | Senate, 2024 | 433 | 923 | 6.23 | 8.34 | 4.11 | Note: The 2024 mode weights cover the newly recruited in-person and web samples. The 1,709 voters in the panel and paper samples belong to neither mode row. Note: The 2020 study has no mode weights and is not shown. The file has no post-election mode weights, so these estimates use the full-sample in-person and web weights. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 2012, 2016 and 2024; weighted (weight_ftf and weight_web) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/split_by_mode.json ### Table 3. Voters who chose a Republican for president and a Democrat for the House were 25.0% in 1972 and 1.7% in 2024 Share of voters with a major-party vote for president and for the House, by which party won each vote, ANES studies 1952 to 2024; 95% intervals | View | Measure | Study | Estimate | Lower | Upper | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1952 | 10.3 | 8.4 | 12.2 | 1,009 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1956 | 13.5 | 11.5 | 15.4 | 1,151 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1960 | 9.8 | 7.3 | 12.3 | 766 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1964 | 6.4 | 4.9 | 8.0 | 947 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1968 | 10.8 | 8.6 | 13.0 | 776 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1972 | 25.0 | 22.6 | 27.3 | 1,293 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1976 | 15.5 | 13.3 | 17.7 | 1,049 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1980 | 19.8 | 17.0 | 22.6 | 762 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1984 | 19.8 | 17.5 | 22.1 | 1,142 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1988 | 18.3 | 15.9 | 20.6 | 1,030 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1992 | 12.2 | 10.3 | 14.2 | 1,126 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 1996 | 4.3 | 2.8 | 5.7 | 926 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 2000 | 8.5 | 6.5 | 10.5 | 882 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 2004 | 9.6 | 7.2 | 12.0 | 701 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 2008 | 7.9 | 6.0 | 9.8 | 1,222 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 2012 | 4.0 | 3.2 | 4.9 | 3,501 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 2016 | 6.5 | 5.2 | 7.8 | 2,138 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 2020 | 4.6 | 3.8 | 5.4 | 5,167 | | direction | Republican for president, Democratic for House | 2024 | 1.7 | 1.1 | 2.3 | 3,515 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1952 | 2.3 | 1.4 | 3.2 | 1,009 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1956 | 2.1 | 1.3 | 2.9 | 1,151 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1960 | 4.2 | 2.5 | 5.9 | 766 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1964 | 8.7 | 6.9 | 10.5 | 947 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1968 | 7.0 | 5.2 | 8.8 | 776 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1972 | 4.6 | 3.4 | 5.7 | 1,293 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1976 | 9.3 | 7.5 | 11.0 | 1,049 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1980 | 7.9 | 6.0 | 9.8 | 762 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1984 | 5.6 | 4.3 | 6.9 | 1,142 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1988 | 7.1 | 5.5 | 8.7 | 1,030 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1992 | 10.1 | 8.3 | 11.9 | 1,126 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 1996 | 13.4 | 10.9 | 15.8 | 926 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 2000 | 9.8 | 7.7 | 12.0 | 882 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 2004 | 7.2 | 5.1 | 9.3 | 701 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 2008 | 8.9 | 6.9 | 10.8 | 1,222 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 2012 | 5.8 | 4.7 | 6.8 | 3,501 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 2016 | 8.8 | 7.3 | 10.2 | 2,138 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 2020 | 6.8 | 5.8 | 7.8 | 5,167 | | direction | Democratic for president, Republican for House | 2024 | 3.0 | 2.2 | 3.8 | 3,515 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1952 | 8.0 | 5.9 | 10.2 | 1,009 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1956 | 11.4 | 9.2 | 13.6 | 1,151 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1960 | 5.6 | 2.5 | 8.6 | 766 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1964 | −2.2 | −4.7 | 0.3 | 947 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1968 | 3.9 | 0.9 | 6.8 | 776 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1972 | 20.4 | 17.7 | 23.2 | 1,293 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1976 | 6.3 | 3.2 | 9.3 | 1,049 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1980 | 11.9 | 8.3 | 15.6 | 762 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1984 | 14.2 | 11.4 | 17.0 | 1,142 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1988 | 11.2 | 8.2 | 14.2 | 1,030 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1992 | 2.1 | −0.6 | 4.9 | 1,126 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 1996 | −9.1 | −12.0 | −6.1 | 926 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 2000 | −1.4 | −4.5 | 1.8 | 882 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 2004 | 2.4 | −0.9 | 5.7 | 701 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 2008 | −1.0 | −3.8 | 1.9 | 1,222 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 2012 | −1.7 | −3.1 | −0.3 | 3,501 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 2016 | −2.3 | −4.3 | −0.2 | 2,138 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 2020 | −2.2 | −3.5 | −0.9 | 5,167 | | net | House Democratic share minus presidential Democratic share | 2024 | −1.3 | −2.3 | −0.2 | 3,515 | Views: Which kind of split (panel = direction); Net effect on the House vote (panel = net). Note: Net effect, second view: the weighted mean of the House Democratic vote minus the presidential Democratic vote among the same voters, in points. Zero means the two Democratic shares are equal even if many voters split in each direction. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1952-2024; weighted (post-election weight where the file has one, VCF0009z elsewhere) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/split_direction.json ### Table 4. Counties whose presidential and House winners differed fell from 31.0% of counties in 1992 to 2.8% in 2024 Share of counties, and of presidential two-party votes, where the Democratic and Republican presidential winner differs from the House winner, counties with a contested House race, 1992 to 2024 | Office | View | Measure | Election | Share (%) | Counties | Counties in sample | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | House | share | Counties | 1992 | 31.0 | n/a | 2,735 | | House | share | Presidential votes | 1992 | 27.9 | n/a | 2,735 | | House | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 1992 | 30.6 | n/a | 2,843 | | House | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 1992 | n/a | 573 | 2,735 | | House | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 1992 | n/a | 276 | 2,735 | | House | share | Counties | 1996 | 25.6 | n/a | 2,703 | | House | share | Presidential votes | 1996 | 24.8 | n/a | 2,703 | | House | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 1996 | 25.4 | n/a | 2,769 | | House | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 1996 | n/a | 226 | 2,703 | | House | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 1996 | n/a | 466 | 2,703 | | House | share | Counties | 2000 | 27.0 | n/a | 2,555 | | House | share | Presidential votes | 2000 | 21.8 | n/a | 2,555 | | House | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2000 | 26.2 | n/a | 2,918 | | House | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2000 | n/a | 521 | 2,555 | | House | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2000 | n/a | 170 | 2,555 | | House | share | Counties | 2004 | 25.5 | n/a | 2,479 | | House | share | Presidential votes | 2004 | 21.5 | n/a | 2,479 | | House | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2004 | 23.3 | n/a | 2,848 | | House | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2004 | n/a | 516 | 2,479 | | House | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2004 | n/a | 115 | 2,479 | | House | share | Counties | 2008 | 26.6 | n/a | 2,661 | | House | share | Presidential votes | 2008 | 18.3 | n/a | 2,661 | | House | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2008 | 26.8 | n/a | 2,925 | | House | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2008 | n/a | 560 | 2,661 | | House | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2008 | n/a | 148 | 2,661 | | House | share | Counties | 2012 | 9.7 | n/a | 2,609 | | House | share | Presidential votes | 2012 | 10.9 | n/a | 2,609 | | House | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2012 | 9.2 | n/a | 2,857 | | House | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2012 | n/a | 162 | 2,609 | | House | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2012 | n/a | 90 | 2,609 | | House | share | Counties | 2016 | 7.7 | n/a | 2,427 | | House | share | Presidential votes | 2016 | 8.7 | n/a | 2,427 | | House | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2016 | 7.1 | n/a | 2,921 | | House | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2016 | n/a | 131 | 2,427 | | House | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2016 | n/a | 57 | 2,427 | | House | share | Counties | 2020 | 3.0 | n/a | 2,884 | | House | share | Presidential votes | 2020 | 5.1 | n/a | 2,884 | | House | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2020 | 3.4 | n/a | 3,084 | | House | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2020 | n/a | 40 | 2,884 | | House | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2020 | n/a | 47 | 2,884 | | House | share | Counties | 2024 | 2.8 | n/a | 2,695 | | House | share | Presidential votes | 2024 | 5.5 | n/a | 2,695 | | House | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2024 | 2.7 | n/a | 3,017 | | House | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2024 | n/a | 49 | 2,695 | | House | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2024 | n/a | 27 | 2,695 | | Senate | share | Counties | 1992 | 30.9 | n/a | 1,824 | | Senate | share | Presidential votes | 1992 | 29.3 | n/a | 1,824 | | Senate | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 1992 | 30.9 | n/a | 1,824 | | Senate | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 1992 | n/a | 271 | 1,824 | | Senate | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 1992 | n/a | 293 | 1,824 | | Senate | share | Counties | 1996 | 20.2 | n/a | 2,288 | | Senate | share | Presidential votes | 1996 | 18.1 | n/a | 2,288 | | Senate | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 1996 | 20.2 | n/a | 2,288 | | Senate | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 1996 | n/a | 94 | 2,288 | | Senate | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 1996 | n/a | 369 | 2,288 | | Senate | share | Counties | 2000 | 21.1 | n/a | 1,858 | | Senate | share | Presidential votes | 2000 | 22.9 | n/a | 1,858 | | Senate | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2000 | 21.1 | n/a | 1,858 | | Senate | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2000 | n/a | 256 | 1,858 | | Senate | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2000 | n/a | 136 | 1,858 | | Senate | share | Counties | 2004 | 29.6 | n/a | 2,006 | | Senate | share | Presidential votes | 2004 | 26.6 | n/a | 2,006 | | Senate | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2004 | 29.0 | n/a | 2,050 | | Senate | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2004 | n/a | 506 | 2,006 | | Senate | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2004 | n/a | 88 | 2,006 | | Senate | share | Counties | 2008 | 24.4 | n/a | 2,055 | | Senate | share | Presidential votes | 2008 | 15.2 | n/a | 2,055 | | Senate | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2008 | 24.4 | n/a | 2,055 | | Senate | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2008 | n/a | 436 | 2,055 | | Senate | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2008 | n/a | 65 | 2,055 | | Senate | share | Counties | 2012 | 18.2 | n/a | 1,843 | | Senate | share | Presidential votes | 2012 | 13.4 | n/a | 1,843 | | Senate | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2012 | 18.2 | n/a | 1,843 | | Senate | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2012 | n/a | 315 | 1,843 | | Senate | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2012 | n/a | 20 | 1,843 | | Senate | share | Counties | 2016 | 6.2 | n/a | 1,989 | | Senate | share | Presidential votes | 2016 | 10.7 | n/a | 1,989 | | Senate | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2016 | 7.2 | n/a | 2,045 | | Senate | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2016 | n/a | 84 | 1,989 | | Senate | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2016 | n/a | 40 | 1,989 | | Senate | share | Counties | 2020 | 1.9 | n/a | 2,212 | | Senate | share | Presidential votes | 2020 | 3.6 | n/a | 2,212 | | Senate | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2020 | 1.9 | n/a | 2,212 | | Senate | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2020 | n/a | 21 | 2,212 | | Senate | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2020 | n/a | 22 | 2,212 | | Senate | share | Counties | 2024 | 3.0 | n/a | 1,749 | | Senate | share | Presidential votes | 2024 | 8.7 | n/a | 1,749 | | Senate | share | Counties, uncontested races included | 2024 | 3.0 | n/a | 1,749 | | Senate | direction | Republican for president, Democratic down the ballot | 2024 | n/a | 45 | 1,749 | | Senate | direction | Democratic for president, Republican down the ballot | 2024 | n/a | 8 | 1,749 | Views: House (office = House, panel = share); Senate (office = Senate, panel = share); House, which kind (office = House, panel = direction); Senate, which kind (office = Senate, panel = direction). Note: Full counts of votes, so the county series have no sampling interval. Note: A winner is the party with more Democratic or Republican votes; third-party votes are left out, as in the two-party margin. A county is in the House sample when every district part of it was a contested race (both major parties on the ballot, together at least 80% of the votes). Jackson County, Missouri, is left out from 2004 to 2024 because the file omits the part of the county in Kansas City. Source: County returns for President, U.S. House and U.S. Senate, 1992-2024 (Heideman 2026, with MIT Election Data and Science Lab presidential returns); full counts, unweighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/county_winners.json ### Table 5. Counties with different presidential and House winners were spread across regions in 1992, 32.5% of the South's counties and 29.9% of the other regions' counties Counties by the party that won the presidential vote and the party that won the House vote, counties in contested House races, each presidential election from 1992 to 2024 No inline rows: the values of Table 5 are in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/down-the-ballot/divided_counties.json. Views: House; Senate. Note: Full counts of votes, so the county series have no sampling interval. Note: Only counties in the main sample are colored: contested races in every district part, totals screen passed. Counties in uncontested races, in states without a Senate race (Senate view), counties with no usable returns and Jackson County, Missouri, from 2004 to 2024 (the file omits the part in Kansas City) draw as no data. Alaska and Hawaii are not in the county file. The South is the Census Bureau's South region. Source: County returns for President, U.S. House and U.S. Senate, 1992-2024 (Heideman 2026, with MIT Election Data and Science Lab presidential returns); full counts, unweighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/county_map.json ### Table 6. The correlation between county presidential and House margins rose from +0.65 in 1992 to +0.99 in 2024 Vote-weighted correlation across counties between the Democratic minus Republican margin for president and for the House (or Senate), counties in contested races, 1992 to 2024; 95% intervals | Office | Measure | Election | Estimate | Lower | Upper | Counties | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | House | correlation | 1992 | 0.65 | 0.56 | 0.72 | 2,735 | | House | gap | 1992 | 16.36 | 14.55 | 18.69 | 2,735 | | House | correlation | 1996 | 0.79 | 0.73 | 0.84 | 2,703 | | House | gap | 1996 | 16.53 | 14.96 | 18.33 | 2,703 | | House | correlation | 2000 | 0.74 | 0.66 | 0.80 | 2,555 | | House | gap | 2000 | 17.98 | 16.05 | 19.89 | 2,555 | | House | correlation | 2004 | 0.78 | 0.69 | 0.84 | 2,479 | | House | gap | 2004 | 15.62 | 13.82 | 17.68 | 2,479 | | House | correlation | 2008 | 0.82 | 0.76 | 0.86 | 2,661 | | House | gap | 2008 | 13.49 | 12.08 | 15.24 | 2,661 | | House | correlation | 2012 | 0.95 | 0.93 | 0.96 | 2,609 | | House | gap | 2012 | 7.63 | 6.79 | 8.53 | 2,609 | | House | correlation | 2016 | 0.93 | 0.89 | 0.96 | 2,427 | | House | gap | 2016 | 8.73 | 7.58 | 10.01 | 2,427 | | House | correlation | 2020 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 2,884 | | House | gap | 2020 | 4.32 | 3.77 | 4.91 | 2,884 | | House | correlation | 2024 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 2,695 | | House | gap | 2024 | 3.70 | 3.24 | 4.22 | 2,695 | | Senate | correlation | 1992 | 0.63 | 0.47 | 0.79 | 1,824 | | Senate | gap | 1992 | 15.93 | 12.12 | 21.09 | 1,824 | | Senate | correlation | 1996 | 0.84 | 0.76 | 0.91 | 2,288 | | Senate | gap | 1996 | 10.89 | 7.78 | 14.96 | 2,288 | | Senate | correlation | 2000 | 0.82 | 0.72 | 0.88 | 1,858 | | Senate | gap | 2000 | 13.89 | 10.78 | 18.45 | 1,858 | | Senate | correlation | 2004 | 0.78 | 0.67 | 0.87 | 2,006 | | Senate | gap | 2004 | 18.05 | 13.51 | 23.38 | 2,006 | | Senate | correlation | 2008 | 0.87 | 0.80 | 0.92 | 2,055 | | Senate | gap | 2008 | 12.06 | 8.82 | 15.77 | 2,055 | | Senate | correlation | 2012 | 0.93 | 0.88 | 0.97 | 1,843 | | Senate | gap | 2012 | 8.71 | 5.66 | 12.50 | 1,843 | | Senate | correlation | 2016 | 0.93 | 0.91 | 0.96 | 1,989 | | Senate | gap | 2016 | 10.11 | 7.72 | 13.04 | 1,989 | | Senate | correlation | 2020 | 0.99 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 2,212 | | Senate | gap | 2020 | 3.93 | 3.24 | 4.90 | 2,212 | | Senate | correlation | 2024 | 0.98 | 0.97 | 0.99 | 1,749 | | Senate | gap | 2024 | 4.57 | 3.44 | 6.04 | 1,749 | Views: Correlation (measure = correlation); Average gap in points (measure = gap). Note: County returns are full counts. The intervals show how much the correlation depends on which states are in the sample: whole states are resampled in a bootstrap, and the methods note gives the replicates and seed. Note: The gap view plots the vote-weighted mean absolute difference between the down-ballot margin and the presidential margin, in points of margin. Source: County returns for President, U.S. House and U.S. Senate, 1992-2024 (Heideman 2026, with MIT Election Data and Science Lab presidential returns); full counts, unweighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/margin_tracking.json ### Table 7. A shift shared by the counties of one district or state accounts for most of the gap between presidential and down-ballot margins Vote-weighted root mean square of the down-ballot margin minus the presidential margin, in points of margin, and the part that varies among counties inside one district (House) or state (Senate), 1992 to 2024 | Series | Election | Root mean square (points) | Counties | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | House, whole gap | 1992 | 27.0 | 2,348 | | House, variation inside a district | 1992 | 9.1 | 2,348 | | House, whole gap | 1996 | 23.4 | 2,329 | | House, variation inside a district | 1996 | 7.3 | 2,329 | | House, whole gap | 2000 | 28.4 | 2,190 | | House, variation inside a district | 2000 | 7.1 | 2,190 | | House, whole gap | 2004 | 27.8 | 2,078 | | House, variation inside a district | 2004 | 7.4 | 2,078 | | House, whole gap | 2008 | 24.8 | 2,280 | | House, variation inside a district | 2008 | 7.4 | 2,280 | | House, whole gap | 2012 | 12.5 | 2,229 | | House, variation inside a district | 2012 | 5.0 | 2,229 | | House, whole gap | 2016 | 14.3 | 2,037 | | House, variation inside a district | 2016 | 6.0 | 2,037 | | House, whole gap | 2020 | 6.3 | 2,445 | | House, variation inside a district | 2020 | 2.6 | 2,445 | | House, whole gap | 2024 | 5.5 | 2,277 | | House, variation inside a district | 2024 | 2.3 | 2,277 | | Senate, whole gap | 1992 | 20.5 | 1,823 | | Senate, variation inside a state | 1992 | 8.0 | 1,823 | | Senate, whole gap | 1996 | 15.2 | 2,288 | | Senate, variation inside a state | 1996 | 5.7 | 2,288 | | Senate, whole gap | 2000 | 18.5 | 1,858 | | Senate, variation inside a state | 2000 | 6.0 | 1,858 | | Senate, whole gap | 2004 | 22.7 | 2,006 | | Senate, variation inside a state | 2004 | 6.9 | 2,006 | | Senate, whole gap | 2008 | 16.0 | 2,055 | | Senate, variation inside a state | 2008 | 6.6 | 2,055 | | Senate, whole gap | 2012 | 12.6 | 1,843 | | Senate, variation inside a state | 2012 | 4.5 | 1,843 | | Senate, whole gap | 2016 | 13.4 | 1,989 | | Senate, variation inside a state | 2016 | 8.0 | 1,989 | | Senate, whole gap | 2020 | 5.5 | 2,212 | | Senate, variation inside a state | 2020 | 3.0 | 2,212 | | Senate, whole gap | 2024 | 6.1 | 1,749 | | Senate, variation inside a state | 2024 | 2.5 | 1,749 | Note: Full counts of votes, so the county series have no sampling interval. Note: A root mean square is the square root of the vote-weighted mean of the squared gap, so large gaps count more than in an average of absolute gaps. Districts and states with one county in the sample are left out, and the part inside each unit is multiplied by n over n minus one for a unit of n counties, because a unit's own average absorbs part of its counties' deviations. Source: County returns for President, U.S. House and U.S. Senate, 1992-2024 (Heideman 2026, with MIT Election Data and Science Lab presidential returns); full counts, unweighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/gap_components.json ### Table 8. Between 1992 and 2024 the share of ANES voters who split their ticket fell by 17.7 points and the share of divided counties by 28.2 points Share of ANES voters whose presidential and House votes were for different parties (95% intervals), and share of counties in contested House races with different presidential and House winners, 1992 to 2024 | Measure | Election | Share (%) | Respondents or counties | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Voters who split their ticket (ANES) | 1992 | 22.3 | 1,126 | | Counties with different winners | 1992 | 31.0 | 2,735 | | Voters who split their ticket (ANES) | 1996 | 17.7 | 926 | | Counties with different winners | 1996 | 25.6 | 2,703 | | Voters who split their ticket (ANES) | 2000 | 18.3 | 882 | | Counties with different winners | 2000 | 27.0 | 2,555 | | Voters who split their ticket (ANES) | 2004 | 16.8 | 701 | | Counties with different winners | 2004 | 25.5 | 2,479 | | Voters who split their ticket (ANES) | 2008 | 16.7 | 1,222 | | Counties with different winners | 2008 | 26.6 | 2,661 | | Voters who split their ticket (ANES) | 2012 | 9.8 | 3,501 | | Counties with different winners | 2012 | 9.7 | 2,609 | | Voters who split their ticket (ANES) | 2016 | 15.3 | 2,138 | | Counties with different winners | 2016 | 7.7 | 2,427 | | Voters who split their ticket (ANES) | 2020 | 11.4 | 5,167 | | Counties with different winners | 2020 | 3.0 | 2,884 | | Voters who split their ticket (ANES) | 2024 | 4.7 | 3,515 | | Counties with different winners | 2024 | 2.8 | 2,695 | Note: The voter line is the ANES rate of self-reported splitting among respondents with a major-party vote for president and the House. The county line is a share of counties and has no sampling interval. Source: ANES Cumulative Data File, 1992-2024, weighted (post-election weight where the file has one, VCF0009z elsewhere); county returns for President and U.S. House, 1992-2024, full counts, unweighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/both_measures.json ### Table 9. The main House sample holds between 71% and 84% of the presidential votes of the contiguous states and the main Senate sample between 49% and 74% Counties, share of the 48 contiguous states' presidential two-party votes, and share of divided counties in the main House and Senate samples, by election | Election | Counties with presidential votes | House sample, counties | House sample, share of presidential votes (%) | House sample, divided counties (%) | Senate class | Senate sample, counties | Senate sample, share of presidential votes (%) | Senate sample, divided counties (%) | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1992 | 3,109 | 2,735 | 77 | 31.0 | 3 | 1,824 | 68 | 30.9 | | 1996 | 3,108 | 2,703 | 83 | 25.6 | 2 | 2,288 | 53 | 20.2 | | 2000 | 3,107 | 2,555 | 71 | 27.0 | 1 | 1,858 | 74 | 21.1 | | 2004 | 3,108 | 2,479 | 71 | 25.5 | 3 | 2,006 | 72 | 29.6 | | 2008 | 3,108 | 2,661 | 77 | 26.6 | 2 | 2,055 | 49 | 24.4 | | 2012 | 3,108 | 2,609 | 79 | 9.7 | 1 | 1,843 | 73 | 18.2 | | 2016 | 3,107 | 2,427 | 71 | 7.7 | 3 | 1,989 | 62 | 6.2 | | 2020 | 3,107 | 2,884 | 84 | 3.0 | 2 | 2,212 | 51 | 1.9 | | 2024 | 3,107 | 2,695 | 81 | 2.8 | 1 | 1,749 | 73 | 3.0 | Note: Full counts of votes, so the county series have no sampling interval. Note: A Senate class is the set of seats that come up together every six years. In presidential years the three classes alternate, so a class comes up in 1992, 2004 and 2016 (class 3), 1996, 2008 and 2020 (class 2) and 2000, 2012 and 2024 (class 1). The Senate sample is the states with a contested regular race. Source: County returns for President, U.S. House and U.S. Senate, 1992-2024 (Heideman 2026, with MIT Election Data and Science Lab presidential returns); full counts, unweighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/coverage.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (191), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | anes_dem_2024 | 55.3% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | weighted Democratic share of the major-party presidential vote | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2024 | 95% CI 53.0% to 57.7% | 3,515 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | both_chg_anes | 17.7 | percentage points | 1992 share who split minus 2024 share | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1992 to 2024 | | | none (summary of the yearly estimates) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | cert_dem_2024 | 49.2% | percent of the two-party presidential vote | certified Democratic share of the Democratic and Republican presidential votes | all states and the District of Columbia | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | State presidential returns | | | drh_1972 | 4.6% | percent of voters | weighted share who voted Democratic for president and Republican for the House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1972 | 95% CI 3.4% to 5.7% | 1,293 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | drh_1996 | 13.4% | percent of voters | weighted share who voted Democratic for president and Republican for the House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1996 | 95% CI 10.9% to 15.8% | 926 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | drh_2020 | 6.8% | percent of voters | weighted share who voted Democratic for president and Republican for the House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2020 | 95% CI 5.8% to 7.8% | 5,167 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | drh_2024 | 3.0% | percent of voters | weighted share who voted Democratic for president and Republican for the House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2024 | 95% CI 2.2% to 3.8% | 3,515 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | drop_h_1972_2024 | 24.9 | percentage points | decrease in the weighted share who split, 1972 minus 2024 (two separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1972 to 2024 | 95% CI 22.2 to 27.5 | 4,808 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | drop_h_1992_2024 | 17.7 | percentage points | decrease in the weighted share who split, 1992 minus 2024 (two separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1992 to 2024 | 95% CI 15.0 to 20.3 | 4,641 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | drop_h_2008_2012 | 6.9 | percentage points | decrease in the weighted share who split, 2008 minus 2012 (two separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI 4.0 to 9.8 | 4,723 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | drop_h_2020_2024 | 6.7 | percentage points | decrease in the weighted share who split, 2020 minus 2024 (two separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 5.1 to 8.2 | 8,682 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ftf_chg_2012_2016 | −0.9 | percentage points | difference in weighted shares who split, 2016 minus 2012 (separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2012 to 2016, in-person respondents, president and House | 95% CI −4.8 to 3.1 | 1,684 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ftf_drop_2008_2012 | 5.7 | percentage points | decrease in the weighted share who split among in-person respondents, 2008 minus 2012 (two separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2008 to 2012, in-person respondents | 95% CI 2.1 to 9.4 | 2,287 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ftf_drop_2016_2024 | 4.9 | percentage points | decrease in the weighted share who split, 2016 minus 2024 (two separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2016 to 2024, in-person respondents | 95% CI 1.0 to 8.8 | 1,198 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_all_div_1992 | 30.6% | percent of counties | share of divided counties, all returns that pass rules 1 to 3 | counties with House returns, uncontested races included | 1992 | | 2,843 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_all_div_2024 | 2.7% | percent of counties | share of divided counties, all returns that pass rules 1 to 3 | counties with House returns, uncontested races included | 2024 | | 3,017 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_between_1992 | 89% | percent of the mean square | share of the vote-weighted mean square of the gap that is the district mean gap, corrected by n/(n-1) | counties wholly inside one contested House district, in districts with at least two such counties | 1992 | | 2,348 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_between_2024 | 83% | percent of the mean square | share of the vote-weighted mean square of the gap that is the district mean gap, corrected by n/(n-1) | counties wholly inside one contested House district, in districts with at least two such counties | 2024 | | 2,277 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_between_hi | 94% | percent of the mean square | highest yearly corrected share of the mean square of the gap that is the district mean gap | counties wholly inside one contested House district, in districts with at least two such counties | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_between_lo | 82% | percent of the mean square | lowest yearly corrected share of the mean square of the gap that is the district mean gap | counties wholly inside one contested House district, in districts with at least two such counties | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_between_raw_hi | 94% | percent of the mean square | highest yearly share of the mean square that is the district mean gap, without the n/(n-1) correction | counties wholly inside one contested House district, in districts with at least two such counties | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_between_raw_lo | 84% | percent of the mean square | lowest yearly share of the mean square that is the district mean gap, without the n/(n-1) correction | counties wholly inside one contested House district, in districts with at least two such counties | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_cov_2024 | 81% | percent of presidential two-party votes | share of the presidential two-party votes of the 48 contiguous states cast in the main House sample | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_cov_hi | 84% | percent of presidential two-party votes | highest yearly share of the presidential two-party votes of the 48 contiguous states cast in the main House sample | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_cov_lo | 71% | percent of presidential two-party votes | lowest yearly share of the presidential two-party votes of the 48 contiguous states cast in the main House sample | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_dem_rep_1992 | 276 | counties | count of counties won by the Democrat for president and the Republican for the House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_dem_rep_1996 | 466 | counties | count of counties won by the Democrat for president and the Republican for the House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1996 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_dem_rep_2020 | 47 | counties | count of counties won by the Democrat for president and the Republican for the House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_dem_rep_2024 | 27 | counties | count of counties won by the Democrat for president and the Republican for the House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_div_1992 | 31.0% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the House winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992 | | 2,735 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_div_2008 | 26.6% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the House winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2008 | | 2,661 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_div_2012 | 9.7% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the House winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2012 | | 2,609 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_div_2016 | 7.7% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the House winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2016 | | 2,427 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_div_2020 | 3.0% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the House winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2020 | | 2,884 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_div_2024 | 2.8% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the House winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2024 | | 2,695 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_early_hi | 31.0% | percent of counties | highest yearly share of divided counties, House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992-2008 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_early_lo | 25.5% | percent of counties | lowest yearly share of divided counties, House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992-2008 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_fall_0812 | 16.9 | percentage points | 2008 share of divided counties minus 2012 share, House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2008 to 2012 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_fall_1992_2024 | 28.2 | percentage points | 1992 share of divided counties minus 2024 share, House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_late_hi | 9.7% | percent of counties | highest yearly share of divided counties from 2012 on, House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2012-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_mad_1992 | 16.4 | points of margin | vote-weighted mean absolute difference between the House margin and the presidential margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992 | 95% CI 14.5 to 18.7 | 2,735 | presidential two-party votes in the county | County election returns | | | house_mad_2024 | 3.7 | points of margin | vote-weighted mean absolute difference between the House margin and the presidential margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2024 | 95% CI 3.2 to 4.2 | 2,695 | presidential two-party votes in the county | County election returns | | | house_r_1992 | +0.65 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the county presidential margin and the House margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992 | 95% CI 0.56 to 0.72 | 2,735 | presidential two-party votes in the county | County election returns | | | house_r_2008 | +0.82 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the county presidential margin and the House margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2008 | 95% CI 0.76 to 0.86 | 2,661 | presidential two-party votes in the county | County election returns | | | house_r_2012 | +0.95 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the county presidential margin and the House margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2012 | 95% CI 0.93 to 0.96 | 2,609 | presidential two-party votes in the county | County election returns | | | house_r_2020 | +0.99 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the county presidential margin and the House margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2020 | 95% CI 0.98 to 0.99 | 2,884 | presidential two-party votes in the county | County election returns | | | house_r_2024 | +0.99 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the county presidential margin and the House margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2024 | 95% CI 0.99 to 0.99 | 2,695 | presidential two-party votes in the county | County election returns | | | house_rep_dem_1992 | 573 | counties | count of counties won by the Republican for president and the Democrat for the House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rep_dem_1996 | 226 | counties | count of counties won by the Republican for president and the Democrat for the House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1996 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rep_dem_2020 | 40 | counties | count of counties won by the Republican for president and the Democrat for the House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rep_dem_2024 | 49 | counties | count of counties won by the Republican for president and the Democrat for the House | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rest_1992 | 29.9% | percent of counties | share of counties that are divided, rest of the country | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part, outside the Census South region | 1992 | | 1,528 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rest_2004 | 22.2% | percent of counties | share of counties that are divided, rest of the country | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part, outside the Census South region | 2004 | | 1,494 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rest_2012 | 11.2% | percent of counties | share of counties that are divided, rest of the country | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part, outside the Census South region | 2012 | | 1,480 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rest_2016 | 9.6% | percent of counties | share of counties that are divided, rest of the country | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part, outside the Census South region | 2016 | | 1,424 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rest_2024 | 2.7% | percent of counties | share of counties that are divided, rest of the country | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part, outside the Census South region | 2024 | | 1,575 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rms_1992 | 27.0 | points of margin | vote-weighted root mean square of the House margin minus the presidential margin | counties wholly inside one contested House district, in districts with at least two such counties | 1992 | | 2,348 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rms_2024 | 5.5 | points of margin | vote-weighted root mean square of the House margin minus the presidential margin | counties wholly inside one contested House district, in districts with at least two such counties | 2024 | | 2,277 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rms_in_1992 | 9.1 | points of margin | vote-weighted root mean square of the gap after subtracting each district mean gap, corrected by n/(n-1) | counties wholly inside one contested House district, in districts with at least two such counties | 1992 | | 2,348 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_rms_in_2024 | 2.3 | points of margin | vote-weighted root mean square of the gap after subtracting each district mean gap, corrected by n/(n-1) | counties wholly inside one contested House district, in districts with at least two such counties | 2024 | | 2,277 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_ru_1992 | +0.58 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the county presidential margin and the House margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992 | 95% CI 0.47 to 0.67 | 2,735 | none (each county counted once) | County election returns | | | house_ru_2024 | +0.98 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the county presidential margin and the House margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2024 | 95% CI 0.98 to 0.99 | 2,695 | none (each county counted once) | County election returns | | | house_senate_r | +0.94 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | correlation across the 19 studies between the yearly president and House share who split and the president and Senate share | ANES studies with both series | 1952-2024 | | | none (summary of the yearly estimates) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | house_sens_max | 2.1 | percentage points | largest yearly difference in the share of divided counties between the main sample and all returns, House | counties with House returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_sens_year | 2004 | year | election with the largest difference between the main sample and all returns, House | counties with House returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_south_1992 | 32.5% | percent of counties | share of counties that are divided, South | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part, Census South region | 1992 | | 1,207 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_south_2004 | 30.5% | percent of counties | share of counties that are divided, South | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part, Census South region | 2004 | | 985 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_south_2012 | 7.6% | percent of counties | share of counties that are divided, South | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part, Census South region | 2012 | | 1,129 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_south_2016 | 5.1% | percent of counties | share of counties that are divided, South | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part, Census South region | 2016 | | 1,003 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_south_2024 | 2.9% | percent of counties | share of counties that are divided, South | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part, Census South region | 2024 | | 1,120 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_votes_1992 | 27.9% | percent of presidential two-party votes | share of presidential two-party votes cast in counties whose presidential winner differs from the House winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992 | | 2,735 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | house_votes_2024 | 5.5% | percent of presidential two-party votes | share of presidential two-party votes cast in counties whose presidential winner differs from the House winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2024 | | 2,695 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | major_min | 80% | percent of votes in the race | least share of all votes that the two major-party candidates together must win for a race to count as a two-party race | county races | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | mid_hi | 18.3% | percent of voters | highest of the yearly shares who split, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1996-2008 | | | none (summary of the yearly estimates) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mid_lo | 16.7% | percent of voters | lowest of the yearly shares who split, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1996-2008 | | | none (summary of the yearly estimates) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_diff_2012 | −1.9 | percentage points | web minus in-person difference in the weighted share who split, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2012 | 95% CI −4.9 to 1.1 | 3,501 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_diff_2016 | +7.2 | percentage points | web minus in-person difference in the weighted share who split, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2016 | 95% CI 3.4 to 10.9 | 2,138 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | mode_diff_2024 | −0.3 | percentage points | web minus in-person difference in the weighted share who split, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2024 | 95% CI −3.2 to 2.7 | 1,806 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_2024_other | 1,709 | respondents | count in neither mode group (panel and paper cases) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_check_both | 25,637 | respondents | count of respondents whose rebuilt code is compared with VCF0709 | respondents with VCF0709 and both vote items | 1952-2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_check_only_vcf | 2 | respondents | count with VCF0709 but a missing presidential or House vote item | 1984 respondents with VCF0709 | 1984 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_check_years | 18 | studies | count of studies in which the rebuilt code is compared with VCF0709 | ANES studies with VCF0709 | 1952-2020 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_common | 19 | studies | count of studies in the correlation between the House and Senate series | ANES studies with both series | 1952-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_drh_larger | 7 | studies | count of studies in which the Democratic-president, Republican-House share exceeds the Republican-president, Democratic-House share (point estimates) | ANES studies from 1996 to 2024 | 1996-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_elections | 9 | elections | count of presidential elections compared | presidential elections in the county file | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_house | 29,103 | respondents | count of respondents with a post-election weight in the 19 studies | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1952-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_house_1992 | 2,735 | counties | count of counties in the main House sample | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_house_2024 | 2,695 | counties | count of counties in the main House sample | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_house_race_binds | 14 | races | count of House races that fail only the 80% condition | House races with candidates of both parties | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_house_race_rule | 3,097 | county-years | count removed because the race was not a contested two-party race | county-years that pass rules 1 and 2, House | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_house_rd_larger | 7 | elections | count of elections in which counties with a Republican for president and a Democrat for the House outnumber the reverse | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested House race in every district part | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_house_returns | 27,567 | county-years | count of county-years with presidential votes and House returns | county-years with presidential votes and House returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_house_screen | 687 | county-years | count removed by the totals screen | county-years with presidential votes and House returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_indep_senate | 123 | county-years | count removed because an independent is coded as a major-party candidate (Maine and Vermont 2012, Nebraska 2024) | county-years with presidential votes and Senate returns | 2012 and 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_kc_years | 6 | elections | count of elections in which Jackson County is left out because the file omits the Kansas City part | Jackson County, Missouri | 2004-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_no_post_weight | 64 | respondents | count with both votes but no post-election weight in a study that has one | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_post96 | 8 | studies | count of ANES studies from 1996 to 2024 | ANES studies from 1996 to 2024 | 1996-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_pres_counties_2024 | 3,107 | counties | count of counties with presidential two-party votes | counties in the 48 contiguous states with presidential votes | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_rebuilt_2024 | 3,530 | respondents | count of respondents whose president-House code exists only in the rebuilt version | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_screen_ga_1992 | 158 | county-years | count removed by the totals screen | Georgia Senate 1992 | 1992 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_screen_ga_2008 | 157 | county-years | count removed by the totals screen | Georgia Senate 2008 | 2008 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_screen_ia_2012 | 99 | county-years | count removed by the totals screen | Iowa House 2012 | 2012 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_screen_la_1992 | 61 | county-years | count removed by the totals screen | Louisiana Senate 1992 | 1992 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_screen_other_house | 588 | county-years | count removed by the totals screen outside the Iowa 2012 file | county-years with presidential votes and House returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_screen_other_house_c | 150 | county-years | count of those that would otherwise be in the main House sample | county-years with presidential votes and House returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_screen_other_senate | 22 | county-years | count removed by the totals screen outside the three named Senate state-years | county-years with presidential votes and Senate returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_senate | 20,334 | respondents | count of respondents with a post-election weight in the 19 studies | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 1952-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | n_senate_race_binds | 1 | races | count of Senate races that fail only the 80% condition | Senate races with candidates of both parties | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_senate_race_rule | 295 | county-years | count removed because the race was not a contested two-party race | county-years that pass rules 1 and 2, Senate | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_senate_rd_larger | 6 | elections | count of elections in which counties with a Republican for president and a Democrat for the Senate outnumber the reverse | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_senate_returns | 18,645 | county-years | count of county-years with presidential votes and Senate returns | county-years with presidential votes and Senate returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_senate_screen | 398 | county-years | count removed by the totals screen | county-years with presidential votes and Senate returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_senate_states_2024 | 29 | states | count of states in the main Senate sample | states with a contested Senate race in 2024 | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_studies | 19 | studies | count of studies with the president and House vote items | ANES presidential-election studies | 1952-2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | net_1972 | +20.4 | percentage points | weighted mean of the House Democratic vote minus the presidential Democratic vote, in points (the net effect of splitting on the House vote) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1972 | 95% CI 17.7 to 23.2 | 1,293 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | net_1992 | +2.1 | percentage points | weighted mean of the House Democratic vote minus the presidential Democratic vote, in points (the net effect of splitting on the House vote) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1992 | 95% CI −0.6 to 4.9 | 1,126 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | net_1996 | −9.1 | percentage points | weighted mean of the House Democratic vote minus the presidential Democratic vote, in points (the net effect of splitting on the House vote) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1996 | 95% CI −12.0 to −6.1 | 926 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | net_2024 | −1.3 | percentage points | weighted mean of the House Democratic vote minus the presidential Democratic vote, in points (the net effect of splitting on the House vote) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2024 | 95% CI −2.3 to −0.2 | 3,515 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | plateau_hi | 29.5% | percent of voters | highest of the yearly shares who split, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1972-1988 | | | none (summary of the yearly estimates) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | plateau_lo | 24.8% | percent of voters | lowest of the yearly shares who split, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1972-1988 | | | none (summary of the yearly estimates) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pre_hi | 17.8% | percent of voters | highest of the yearly shares who split, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1952-1968 | | | none (summary of the yearly estimates) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | pre_lo | 12.6% | percent of voters | lowest of the yearly shares who split, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1952-1968 | | | none (summary of the yearly estimates) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | ratio_hi | 1.3 | ratio of votes | upper bound of the totals screen: down-ballot total votes over presidential total votes | county races | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | ratio_lo | 0.7 | ratio of votes | lower bound of the totals screen: down-ballot total votes over presidential total votes | county races | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | rdh_1972 | 25.0% | percent of voters | weighted share who voted Republican for president and Democratic for the House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1972 | 95% CI 22.6% to 27.3% | 1,293 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rdh_1988 | 18.3% | percent of voters | weighted share who voted Republican for president and Democratic for the House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1988 | 95% CI 15.9% to 20.6% | 1,030 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rdh_1996 | 4.3% | percent of voters | weighted share who voted Republican for president and Democratic for the House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1996 | 95% CI 2.8% to 5.7% | 926 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rdh_2020 | 4.6% | percent of voters | weighted share who voted Republican for president and Democratic for the House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2020 | 95% CI 3.8% to 5.4% | 5,167 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rdh_2024 | 1.7% | percent of voters | weighted share who voted Republican for president and Democratic for the House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2024 | 95% CI 1.1% to 2.3% | 3,515 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | rise_h_2012_2016 | +5.5 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who split, 2016 minus 2012 (two separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 3.2 to 7.7 | 5,639 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | s_mode_diff_2012 | +1.1 | percentage points | web minus in-person difference in the weighted share who split, president and Senate | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 2012 | 95% CI −2.2 to 4.4 | 2,814 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | s_mode_diff_2016 | +3.7 | percentage points | web minus in-person difference in the weighted share who split, president and Senate | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 2016 | 95% CI −0.6 to 8.0 | 1,625 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | s_mode_diff_2024 | −1.7 | percentage points | web minus in-person difference in the weighted share who split, president and Senate | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 2024 | 95% CI −5.8 to 2.5 | 1,356 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | s_web_rise_2012_2016 | +2.5 | percentage points | difference in weighted shares who split, 2016 minus 2012 (separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 2012 to 2016, web respondents, president and Senate | 95% CI −0.5 to 5.5 | 3,155 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | screen_sens_house | 0.5 | percentage points | largest yearly change in the share of divided counties if the totals screen is dropped | counties in the main House sample | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | screen_sens_senate | 1.3 | percentage points | largest yearly change in the share of divided counties if the totals screen is dropped | counties in the main Senate sample | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_between_2024 | 83% | percent of the mean square | share of the vote-weighted mean square of the gap that is the state mean gap, corrected by n/(n-1) | counties in a contested Senate race, in states with at least two such counties | 2024 | | 1,749 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_between_hi | 91% | percent of the mean square | highest yearly corrected share of the mean square of the gap that is the state mean gap | counties in a contested Senate race, in states with at least two such counties | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_between_lo | 64% | percent of the mean square | lowest yearly corrected share of the mean square of the gap that is the state mean gap | counties in a contested Senate race, in states with at least two such counties | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_chg_2008_2012 | −1.8 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who split, president and Senate, 2012 minus 2008 (two separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −5.2 to 1.6 | 3,600 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | senate_cov_hi | 74% | percent of presidential two-party votes | highest yearly share of the presidential two-party votes of the 48 contiguous states cast in the main Senate sample | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_cov_lo | 49% | percent of presidential two-party votes | lowest yearly share of the presidential two-party votes of the 48 contiguous states cast in the main Senate sample | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_dem_rep_1996 | 369 | counties | count of counties won by the Democrat for president and the Republican for the Senate | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 1996 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_dem_rep_2020 | 22 | counties | count of counties won by the Democrat for president and the Republican for the Senate | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_dem_rep_2024 | 8 | counties | count of counties won by the Democrat for president and the Republican for the Senate | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_div_1992 | 30.9% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the Senate winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 1992 | | 1,824 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_div_1996 | 20.2% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the Senate winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 1996 | | 2,288 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_div_2000 | 21.1% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the Senate winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2000 | | 1,858 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_div_2004 | 29.6% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the Senate winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2004 | | 2,006 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_div_2008 | 24.4% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the Senate winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2008 | | 2,055 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_div_2012 | 18.2% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the Senate winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2012 | | 1,843 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_div_2016 | 6.2% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the Senate winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2016 | | 1,989 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_div_2020 | 1.9% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the Senate winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2020 | | 2,212 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_div_2024 | 3.0% | percent of counties | share of counties whose presidential winner differs from the Senate winner | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2024 | | 1,749 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_fall_0812 | 6.2 | percentage points | 2008 share of divided counties minus 2012 share, Senate | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2008 to 2012 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_fall_1216 | 11.9 | percentage points | 2012 share of divided counties minus 2016 share, Senate | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2012 to 2016 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_mad_1992 | 15.9 | points of margin | vote-weighted mean absolute difference between the Senate margin and the presidential margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 1992 | 95% CI 12.1 to 21.1 | 1,824 | presidential two-party votes in the county | County election returns | | | senate_mad_2024 | 4.6 | points of margin | vote-weighted mean absolute difference between the Senate margin and the presidential margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2024 | 95% CI 3.4 to 6.0 | 1,749 | presidential two-party votes in the county | County election returns | | | senate_r_1992 | +0.63 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the county presidential margin and the Senate margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 1992 | 95% CI 0.47 to 0.79 | 1,824 | presidential two-party votes in the county | County election returns | | | senate_r_2024 | +0.98 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the county presidential margin and the Senate margin | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2024 | 95% CI 0.97 to 0.99 | 1,749 | presidential two-party votes in the county | County election returns | | | senate_rep_dem_1996 | 94 | counties | count of counties won by the Republican for president and the Democrat for the Senate | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 1996 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_rep_dem_2020 | 21 | counties | count of counties won by the Republican for president and the Democrat for the Senate | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_rep_dem_2024 | 45 | counties | count of counties won by the Republican for president and the Democrat for the Senate | counties in the 48 contiguous states with a contested Senate race | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_rms_2024 | 6.1 | points of margin | vote-weighted root mean square of the Senate margin minus the presidential margin | counties in a contested Senate race, in states with at least two such counties | 2024 | | 1,749 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_rms_in_2024 | 2.5 | points of margin | vote-weighted root mean square of the gap after subtracting each state mean gap, corrected by n/(n-1) | counties in a contested Senate race, in states with at least two such counties | 2024 | | 1,749 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | senate_sens_max | 1.0 | percentage points | largest yearly difference in the share of divided counties between the main sample and all returns, Senate | counties with Senate returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | share_house_screen | 2.5% | percent of county-years | share removed by the totals screen | county-years with presidential votes and House returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | share_senate_screen | 2.1% | percent of county-years | share removed by the totals screen | county-years with presidential votes and Senate returns | 1992-2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | split_h_1952 | 12.6% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1952 | 95% CI 10.5% to 14.6% | 1,009 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_1972 | 29.5% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1972 | 95% CI 27.1% to 32.0% | 1,293 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_1992 | 22.3% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 1992 | 95% CI 19.9% to 24.8% | 1,126 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2008 | 16.7% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2008 | 95% CI 14.1% to 19.3% | 1,222 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2008_ftf | 16.8% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2008, in-person respondents | 95% CI 14.2% to 19.4% | 1,222 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2012 | 9.8% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2012 | 95% CI 8.5% to 11.1% | 3,501 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2012_ftf | 11.0% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2012, in-person respondents | 95% CI 8.5% to 13.6% | 1,065 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2012_web | 9.2% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2012, web respondents | 95% CI 7.7% to 10.7% | 2,436 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2016 | 15.3% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2016 | 95% CI 13.4% to 17.1% | 2,138 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2016_ftf | 10.2% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2016, in-person respondents | 95% CI 7.2% to 13.1% | 619 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2016_web | 17.4% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2016, web respondents | 95% CI 15.1% to 19.6% | 1,519 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2020 | 11.4% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2020 | 95% CI 10.1% to 12.6% | 5,167 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2024 | 4.7% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2024 | 95% CI 3.7% to 5.7% | 3,515 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2024_ftf | 5.3% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2024, in-person respondents | 95% CI 2.8% to 7.8% | 579 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2024_other | 3.7% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | 2024 panel and paper respondents with a major-party presidential and House vote | 2024 | 95% CI 2.4% to 4.9% | 1,709 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_h_2024_web | 5.0% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and House | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2024, web respondents | 95% CI 3.4% to 6.6% | 1,227 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_s_1972 | 28.5% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and Senate | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 1972 | 95% CI 25.3% to 31.7% | 765 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_s_2008 | 12.9% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and Senate | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 2008 | 95% CI 9.9% to 15.9% | 786 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_s_2012 | 11.1% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and Senate | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 2012 | 95% CI 9.5% to 12.6% | 2,814 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_s_2020 | 7.2% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and Senate | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 2020 | 95% CI 5.9% to 8.5% | 2,879 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | split_s_2024 | 6.8% | percent of voters | weighted share whose reported votes were for different parties, president and Senate | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party Senate vote (states with a Senate race) | 2024 | 95% CI 5.4% to 8.3% | 2,525 | weight_postelection (VCF9999) in 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024 and VCF0009z in the other studies including 2012; VCF0009z equals 1 for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | web_drop_2016_2024 | 12.4 | percentage points | decrease in the weighted share who split, 2016 minus 2024 (two separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2016 to 2024, web respondents | 95% CI 9.6 to 15.2 | 2,746 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | web_rise_2012_2016 | +8.2 | percentage points | difference in weighted shares who split, 2016 minus 2012 (separate samples) | respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote and a major-party House vote | 2012 to 2016, web respondents, president and House | 95% CI 5.4 to 10.9 | 3,955 | weight_ftf (VCF0009x) for in-person respondents and weight_web (VCF0009y) for web respondents | ANES Cumulative Data File | | ## Definitions - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Survey mode: How respondents were interviewed: in person, by phone, on paper or online. Mode can change answers, so a change in mode can look like a change in opinion. - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - County two-party margin: The Democratic vote minus the Republican vote, divided by the sum of the two, so a positive value is a Democratic lead. Votes for other candidates are left out. ## Methods Individuals, sample. ANES Cumulative Data File respondents in the 19 presidential-election studies from 1952 to 2024 who reported a vote for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate (VCF0704 coded 1 or 2) and for the Democratic or Republican candidate for the House (VCF0707 coded 1 or 2) and who have a weight: 29,103 respondents. The Senate series uses VCF0708 and covers 20,334 respondents in states with a Senate race. Voters for other presidential candidates, respondents who skipped a race and non-voters are left out. Votes are self-reported; the file has no validated vote. Individuals, estimand. A respondent splits when the two reported votes are for different parties. The yearly estimate is the weighted share who split, in percent. The two directions are the weighted shares who voted Democratic for president and Republican for the House and the reverse; the net effect is the weighted mean of the House Democratic vote minus the presidential Democratic vote, in points. The president and House split is rebuilt from VCF0704 and VCF0707 in every study because VCF0709 (the combined item) is missing for 2024. In the 18 studies from 1952 to 2020 the rebuilt code equals VCF0709 for all 25,637 respondents with both, whatever their weight; 2 respondents in 1984 have VCF0709 but a missing vote item and are left out. Weights and intervals. The vote items are post-election, so the all-interview estimates use weight_postelection (VCF9999) in the studies that have it (1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2016, 2020 and 2024) and VCF0009z in the others, including 2012, which has no post-election weight in the file. VCF0009z equals one for every respondent in 1952, 1956, 1964, 1968, 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988, so those studies are unweighted. 64 respondents with both votes in 2016, 2020 and 2024 lack the post-election weight and are left out. Intervals are 95% intervals from the Kish effective sample size with a normal approximation, which treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample and ignores the strata and clusters of the sampling design. Differences between two estimates (two studies, or the two interview modes in one study) combine the two standard errors in quadrature. A yearly cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100; no cell was dropped. Mode. The in-person and web estimates use weight_ftf and weight_web (VCF0009x and VCF0009y), the full-sample in-person and web weights, because the cumulative file has no post-election mode weights; the all-interview and mode estimates for one study therefore use different weights. The 2008 study was interviewed in person only, and its in-person estimate is used for the 2008 to 2012 comparison among in-person respondents. The 2020 study has no mode weights, so it enters only the all-interview series. The 2024 mode weights cover the newly recruited in-person and web samples; the 1,709 panel and paper respondents with both votes are in the all-interview estimate and in neither mode. Places, sample. County presidential, House and Senate returns for the nine presidential elections from 1992 to 2024 in the 48 contiguous states (Heideman 2026, version 1.0.0; the presidential rows come from the same file). Oglala Lakota County, South Dakota, appears under two codes (46113 and 46102); the build uses 46102. Rule 1: a county needs presidential two-party votes and returns for the office, and is left out for an exact tie in either race; for Jackson County, Missouri, in 2004, 2008, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024, because the file's county rows leave out the part of the county in Kansas City (the file's presidential two-party votes for the county are 55% to 59% of the project's other presidential file in 2004 to 2020, and in 2024 that file reports Kansas City separately); for the Senate races in which the file codes an independent as a Democrat (Maine and Vermont 2012, Nebraska 2024), because the same candidates are coded as independents in other years (123 county-years); and for a House county flagged excludes_unopposed_seat (57 county-years). Rule 2, the totals screen: the office's total votes in the county are between 0.7 and 1.3 times its presidential total votes and the row is not flagged totals_possibly_inflated. It removes 687 of 27,567 House county-years with returns and 398 of 18,645 Senate county-years, among them Iowa 2012 House (99 counties, each vote counted twice), Georgia Senate 1992 and 2008 (158 and 157 counties; the file holds a later runoff round) and Louisiana Senate 1992 (61 counties; the October primary); of the other 588 House and 22 Senate county-years, 150 House county-years would otherwise be in the main sample. Dropping the screen changes the yearly share of divided counties by at most 0.5 points for the House and 1.3 for the Senate. Rule 3, a two-party race: the Democratic and Republican candidates together won at least 80% of the votes in the race (fails in 14 House races and 1 Senate race that have candidates of both parties). A House race is a district (a county can hold parts of several districts, and every district part has to qualify); the district has to be identified in the file and cannot have been decided in a later round. Where the file gives no district (Nevada and Washington in 2000 to 2008, parts of Iowa, Arizona, Delaware and New York), the county counts as one block that qualifies when the two parties hold at least 80% of its votes and as contested when it lists as many Democratic as Republican candidates, at least one of each. A Senate race is the state; special Senate elections are not in the file. Rule 4, a contested race (the main sample): both the Democratic and the Republican candidate received votes, in every district part for the House. Among the county-years that pass rules 1 and 2, rules 3 and 4 remove 3,097 House and 295 Senate county-years. The sensitivity sample, all returns, applies rules 1 to 3 and keeps counties in uncontested two-party races. Places, estimands. The margin is the Democratic minus the Republican votes over their sum. A county is divided when the sign of the presidential margin differs from the sign of the down-ballot margin. The share of counties counts each county once; the share of votes weights each county by its presidential two-party votes. The correlation across counties is weighted by presidential two-party votes (the county-equal version is in the text). The gap is the down-ballot margin minus the presidential margin in points; the average absolute gap and the root mean square are vote-weighted. The shared-shift decomposition subtracts each district's (House, counties wholly inside one district) or state's (Senate) vote-weighted mean gap and compares the mean squares before and after; districts and states with one county are left out, and the part inside each unit is multiplied by n over n minus one for a unit of n counties. Places, intervals. County returns are full counts, so shares of counties and votes carry no sampling interval. The intervals on the correlation and the average gap are percentile intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states (2000 replicates, seed 12345), which shows how much each statistic depends on which states are in the sample and treats states as independent. Benchmark and region. The certified 2024 Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote is computed from the state presidential returns for all states and the District of Columbia. The South is the Census Bureau's South region among the contiguous states: AL, AR, DE, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA and WV. ## What these data cannot show - County returns cannot identify who splits a ticket. - A county in which the two winners agree can contain many voters who split in opposite directions, and a divided county can arise from close races and unequal turnout with few splitters. - Robinson [6] showed that a correlation across places can differ in size and sign from the relationship among the individuals who live in them. - The ANES has state geography only, so it cannot say where individual splitting is highest. - Amlani and Algara [7] study nationalization in county presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial returns from 1872 to 2020, a longer period and a different measure than the comparisons here. - The ANES measure is self-reported. - Respondents describe their votes after the election, and the file has no validated vote. - The ANES voters in the 2024 sample are 55.3% (95% CI 53.0% to 57.7%) Democratic in the major-party presidential vote against 49.2% in the certified national count, so self-reported votes lean Democratic. - A lean that differed between voters who split and voters who did not would change the rate of splitting, and the chapter cannot say whether it does. - The samples are respondents who reported a major-party vote in both races, so voters who chose a third-party candidate, left a race blank or did not vote are out. - The Cooperative Election Study file used in this book has no House, Senate or governor vote choice, so it gives no second individual-level source for 2006 to 2024. - The full cumulative file has those items and would add that check, but it is not part of this build. - The chapter describes and does not explain. - Incumbency, candidate quality and redistricting are possible reasons for the fall in divided counties and for the shared shifts by district and state, and nothing here tests them. - The county fall from 2008 to 2012 comes between two elections separated by the 2010 midterm and by redistricting after the 2010 census, and timing alone does not say which of these matters, if any. - Chapter 14.5, Candidate extremity and vote share (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/candidate-extremity-and-vote-share; planned), a planned chapter, asks whether more extreme House candidates lose vote share. - The county file holds only president, House and Senate, so it says nothing about governors, state legislators or local offices, where Kuriwaki [5] finds more splitting than in Congress. - The county comparison depends on its rules and on the file. - The main sample leaves out uncontested races, and uncontested seats are not a random draw of places. - The file has defects that the rules remove or work around, such as the missing Kansas City part of Jackson County, runoffs stored as general elections and an Iowa file that double counts votes, and others may remain. - The House samples use different district maps in different decades, and the Senate samples use different states in different elections. - Presidential margins leave out third-party votes, which were a larger share of the vote in 1992 and 1996 than in later elections. - Alaska and Hawaii are not in the county file. - County returns are full counts and carry no sampling interval. - The intervals on the correlations treat states as independent, and the shared-shift decomposition describes where the gap lies without saying why it lies there. ## References 1. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 2. Burden, Barry C.; Kimball, David C. (2002). Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition, and Divided Government. University of Michigan Press. https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.22995 3. Jacobson, Gary C. (2015). It's Nothing Personal: The Decline of the Incumbency Advantage in US House Elections. The Journal of Politics 77(3): 861-873. https://doi.org/10.1086/681670 4. Hopkins, Daniel J. (2018). The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized. University of Chicago Press. https://doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226530406.001.0001 5. Kuriwaki, Shiro (2026). Ticket Splitting in a Nationalized Era. The Journal of Politics 88(1): 47-62. https://doi.org/10.1086/734263 6. Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. American Sociological Review 15(3): 351-357. https://doi.org/10.2307/2087176 7. Amlani, Sharif; Algara, Carlos (2021). Partisanship & nationalization in American elections: Evidence from presidential, senatorial, & gubernatorial elections in the U.S. counties, 1872-2020. Electoral Studies 73: 102387. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2021.102387 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/down-the-ballot/build.py (sha256 6538154e3cca6a785c4f063ccdbd25876f84879208ec8869d3738b624c373603) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/county/county_results_1990_2024.parquet | 6,554,860 | 2e4ea32b709fb41c3a006bf13716ffbae4fb4a80932690dacc588ad19be98b47 | 3e146fd50172039009ba8729d0e96e560fa268de208f4b780950bf45cd292b67 | | data/county/county_results_1990_2024_long.parquet | 2,836,074 | 650f9dabffe29f9b255fb32c44b7472700a2d7e4aabc6d183cbe3ae00b455c78 | b384a8ab4071e715877cbffda146db5a57e5ec145308bb062d0a363bb146051a | | data/county/pres_county_1868_2024.parquet | 6,295,675 | bec11c7a0cb5d4180bbd6809d048bc892dd00dfcdde527fa4da871b1dd3f835f | b2a4f000f2eea72d09af8939555289e924875cca40cd95ec8869104cd575bed7 | | data/state/1976-2024-president.csv | 514,108 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 38bbe58284f092485c3f67187db287401e48860b36b61d9d4c60c22c09997a6c | | figures/both_measures.json | 9892edbb61e66c7c0f44e01aeded6419a01424ab8fbfb50aade209b974e348c2 | | figures/county_map.json | 442fcc78af818eaa31e4b6fe54a8fde62a1c0a3563041d032ef5e4488a4be1a6 | | figures/county_winners.json | ee937b2b23cdd9c9a628626a2df0b180863899c7217e4c8c32268b8e68410ed2 | | figures/coverage.json | b17645931a1a0714b42237bfe7b42382751241bd561faf227068d0a874a087a5 | | figures/gap_components.json | de16ff2b733115558a93ae08feca81f35dc9988f476472565ef40fab2c43ea2d | | figures/margin_tracking.json | 0f4736c57b5b35522f831629b696abea3ccc99891f48199d775d813865b15633 | | figures/split_by_mode.json | d2e3d7a72917536510154b1c25e9e4b753dafbe13e50a73d30d188f548fa5ff2 | | figures/split_by_year.json | d36e5d8fd3a1633d1d4fc44aceab2326c4bb25282d95e6dd3b8c8327903b256d | | figures/split_direction.json | e9b666a9d01eae141cc896273f8b293057e7753b7a496d69a4892bd4dad312b1 | | meta.json | ef058a8e743433894c233fb570b00d2b2835c2416d5d4f9729c588b29e0ee78b | | public/data/down-the-ballot/divided_counties.json | 2122b83b544b3f463ae907f31b5a6a0f32ddb2ceab0a259b663a82d97800e19c | | refs.json | 01365855b2f9ea94c99d3758a1e875b8890d4306c4faf60f703757e0f3b5b092 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/down-the-ballot/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/down-the-ballot/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/facts.json - Table 1, figure "split_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/split_by_year.json - Table 2, figure "split_by_mode" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/split_by_mode.json - Table 3, figure "split_direction" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/split_direction.json - Table 4, figure "county_winners" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/county_winners.json - Table 5, figure "county_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/county_map.json - Table 6, figure "margin_tracking" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/margin_tracking.json - Table 7, figure "gap_components" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/gap_components.json - Table 8, figure "both_measures" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/both_measures.json - Table 9, figure "coverage" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/down-the-ballot/figures/coverage.json - Payload of "county_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/down-the-ballot/divided_counties.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Precincts within counties: report Chapter 11.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/precincts-within-counties. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Precincts within counties - Chapter: 11.1 (Part XI, Below the county line; The political map) - Question: How much do precinct margins vary inside a county, and which counties vary most? - Dek: In 2024, 65.0% of two-party presidential votes in the sample were cast in precincts decided by 20 points or more, against 57.2% in counties decided by that margin. - Grain: places - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - Precinct presidential returns. MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2024 presidential returns by precinct (Harvard Dataverse), two-party votes per reporting unit; years: 2016, 2020, 2024; weights: none (full counts); statistics weighted by two-party votes - County election returns. Certified 2024 county totals from the repaired county file, used to check each county's precinct rows; years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts) - County demographics panel. County panel: ACS 2024 nonwhite share, rural share and Rural-Urban Continuum Code 2023; years: 2000-2024 (election years, interpolated between census and survey anchors); weights: none (county values; counties weighted by two-party votes in the correlations) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/precincts-within-counties - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/precincts-within-counties/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/precincts-within-counties/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026precinctswithincounties ```bibtex @misc{singh2026precinctswithincounties, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Precincts within counties}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/precincts-within-counties}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | share of votes cast in precincts in the band | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | 65.0% | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | share_land_precinct | | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | 20 | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | cut_land | | share of votes cast in counties in the band | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | 57.2% | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | share_land_county | | sum of Democratic and Republican votes | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | 149.0 million | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | votes_sample | | share of votes cast in precincts in the band | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | 18.5% | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | share_comp_precinct | | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | 10 | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | cut_comp | | share of votes cast in counties in the band | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | 23.1% | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | share_comp_county | | mean of county spreads weighted by two-party votes | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 23.3 | 95% CI 22.5 to 24.1 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | sd_vw_mean | | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | 5 | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | cut_near | | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | 20 | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | cut_near_units | | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | 60% | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | land_equiv | | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | 55% | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | comp_equiv | | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | 30 | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | cut_sd | | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | 15 | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | sd_equiv | | two-party margin, Democratic positive | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | −0.1 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | bucks_margin | | count | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | 304 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | bucks_units | | vote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | 14.8 | | 304 | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | bucks_sd | | share of votes cast in precincts decided by under 10 points | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | 50.0% | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | bucks_comp | | margin of the most Democratic precinct | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | 42.0 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | bucks_max_d | | margin of the most Republican precinct, as a Republican lead | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | 33.7 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | bucks_max_r | | two-party margin, Democratic positive | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | +2.9 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | centre_margin | | count | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | 87 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | centre_units | | vote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | 36.3 | | 87 | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | centre_sd | | share of votes cast in precincts decided by under 10 points | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | 5.5% | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | centre_comp | | margin of the most Democratic precinct | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | 65.0 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | centre_max_d | | margin of the most Republican precinct, as a Republican lead | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | 75.2 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | centre_max_r | | count | reporting units (precincts) in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | 175,345 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | n_units | | count | counties in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | 3,043 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | n_counties | | count | states in the analysis sample, not counting the District of Columbia | 2024 presidential general election | 48 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | n_states | | count | Louisiana parishes | 2024 presidential general election | 64 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | n_out_la | | ratio of precinct votes to certified votes | Louisiana parishes | 2024 presidential general election | 51.5% | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | la_share | | count | counties outside Louisiana whose precinct rows do not add to the certified total | 2024 presidential general election | 6 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | n_out_other | | count | counties whose precinct rows do not add to the certified total (Louisiana and others) | 2024 presidential general election | 70 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | n_out_total | | share | all counties with returns | 2024 presidential general election | 2.0% | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | out_share_cert | | share of certified two-party votes cast in Alaska | all counties with returns | 2024 presidential general election | 0.2% | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | alaska_share_cert | | count | counties in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | 190 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | n_below_floor | | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | 5 | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | cut_floor_units | | count | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 2,853 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | n_counties_disp | | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | 2,000 | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | n_boot | ## Findings In 2024, 65.0% of the 149.0 million two-party presidential votes in this chapter's sample were cast in precincts decided by 20 points or more, against 57.2% cast in counties decided by that margin. At the other end, 18.5% of votes were cast in precincts decided by under 10 points, against 23.1% in counties. A precinct here is a reporting unit, the area for which an election office reports its votes, and not a neighborhood. A county's margin is the average of its precinct margins weighted by their votes. This chapter measures how far the precinct margins vary around that average, and which counties vary most. The standard deviation of precinct margins inside a county, called its spread here, has a mean across counties of 23.3 (95% CI 22.5 to 24.1) points when each county counts in proportion to its votes. Spread is higher in metro counties and in counties that lean Democratic, and it varies widely among counties that finished near a tie, with a margin under 5 points and at least 20 precincts. A two-party margin is the Democratic vote minus the Republican vote over their sum, in points, and a positive margin is a Democratic lead. A margin of 20 points gives the winner 60% of the two-party vote, and a margin of 10 points gives the winner 55%. The spread is weighted by each precinct's two-party votes and stated in the same points. A county that cast equal numbers of votes in precincts at Democratic +30 and at Republican +30 would have a margin of zero and a spread of 30, which is 15 points of Democratic vote share. Third-party votes are left out. Two Pennsylvania counties that finished nearly even show what spread measures. Table 1 gives the share of each county's votes by the margin of the precinct where they were cast. Bucks County finished at a margin of −0.1 points, with 304 precincts and a spread of 14.8, and 50.0% of its votes were cast in precincts decided by under 10 points. Its most Democratic precinct had a margin of 42.0 points and its most Republican a Trump lead of 33.7. Centre County finished at +2.9 with 87 precincts and a spread of 36.3, and only 5.5% of its votes were cast in precincts that close. The most Democratic precinct in Centre County had a margin of 65.0 points and the most Republican a Trump lead of 75.2. The [Neighborhoods explorer](https://vishalsingh.org/politics/explore/neighborhoods) will map these counties and others below the precinct level. Table 1. Bucks County precincts cluster near an even split, while Centre County precincts form two groups, one on each side How the gap between precincts and counties changes across scales, from states to blocks, is the subject of Chapter 11.2, Sorting by geographic scale, 2016 to 2024 (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sorting-by-geographic-scale; planned), a planned chapter. This chapter asks what the precinct distribution looks like inside each county, which is the information that a county color leaves out. County-level maps supported the argument that Americans sort into like-minded places [1], a claim that others contested [2], and address-level data show that many voters live with almost no exposure to voters of the other party [3]. Precinct returns sit between the two scales. The sample covers 175,345 reporting units in 3,043 counties in 48 states and the District of Columbia; Alaska and Louisiana are absent. (Note: The precinct file from the MIT Election Data and Science Lab reports votes by whatever unit each state or county election office uses, so a precinct here is a reporting unit and differs in size and kind by state. Alaska is left out because its 2024 county codes are election districts. So are the 64 Louisiana parishes, where the precinct rows hold 51.5% of the certified vote, and 6 other counties whose precinct rows do not add to the certified county total. The 70 excluded counties hold 2.0% of certified votes, and Alaska holds a further 0.2%. 190 counties in the sample have too few reporting units for a spread.) A county needs at least 5 reporting units to have a spread, which leaves 2,853 counties. The returns are full counts, so shares and spreads carry no sampling error; a statistic across counties, such as a mean or a correlation, carries a 95% interval from resampling counties 2,000 times. ### Precincts are more lopsided than the counties that contain them Table 2 counts the same votes by the margin of the precinct they were cast in, by the margin of the county, and by the margin of a simulated precinct. Precincts hold more of the votes in landslides and fewer in close contests. Precincts decided by 40 points or more held 36.4% of votes, against 25.4% for counties decided by that margin. Table 2. Precincts are more often lopsided, and less often close, than counties or than random assignment of voters would make them Because each county margin is the average of its precinct margins weighted by their votes, precinct margins are at least as spread out as county margins, counting each vote once. That alone does not put more votes in landslide precincts, since a county decided by a landslide can split into precincts of which some are not. The simulation is a benchmark for how much of the gap chance alone would produce. In each of 200 runs, every precinct keeps its number of votes and its county's Democratic share, and its Democratic votes are drawn at random. The simulated precincts hold 56.6% of votes in landslide precincts, 23.3% in close ones and 25.0% in very lopsided ones, within about 0.7 points of the county shares. Each share moves by at most 0.4 points from run to run. Small units alone therefore do not produce the gap between precincts and counties. Precinct margins inside a county vary more than random assignment of voters would make them. Random assignment still leaves some spread. If the voters of a county were assigned to its precincts at random, the spread would be 3.1 points on average across counties, weighted by votes, and 3.4 points in the median near-tied county. ### Spread is widest in Mississippi and Alabama Across the 2,853 counties with at least 5 reporting units, the median county, counted once, has a spread of 15.6 (95% CI 15.0 to 16.0) points. That is lower than the vote-weighted mean because counties with more votes tend to have wider spreads, as the next sections show. A spread of 30 points or more occurs in 368 counties, which hold 18.7% of the votes cast in the 2,853 counties. Table 3 maps the spread, and its second view maps the county margin. Table 3. Spread inside counties is widest in Mississippi and Alabama and scattered across the Southwest and Plains The vote-weighted mean spread is 38.2 (95% CI 34.9 to 41.5) points in Mississippi and 32.2 (95% CI 25.2 to 38.3) in Alabama, the two highest of the 48 states and the District of Columbia. The units that election offices report differ in size by state. The median precinct holds 227 two-party votes in Kansas and 2,083 in Connecticut, and California reports 578 precincts per county on average while North Dakota reports 7. Smaller units can show more spread, so a comparison of spread across states mixes the electorate with the way votes are counted. Counties with few reporting units also have spreads that one unit can move a long way. Of the 33 counties with a spread of 50 points or more, 4 have fewer than 10 reporting units. The state controls in Table 6 address part of that mix. Among the 318 counties with at least 100,000 two-party votes, the widest spreads are in Kings County, New York (54.9 points), Jefferson County, Alabama (53.5) and Mobile County, Alabama (50.2). The narrowest are in Arlington County, Virginia (6.5) and the District of Columbia (5.9), whose margins are +59.9 and +86.6 points. #### Spread falls from metro to less urban counties Table 4 groups counties by Rural-Urban Continuum Code. The vote-weighted mean spread falls from 24.8 (95% CI 23.5 to 26.1) points in the largest metro counties to 22.7 in smaller metro counties, 19.4 in the larger nonmetro counties and 15.5 (95% CI 14.6 to 16.5) in the least urban ones. The two ends of the scale also differ in lean. The vote-weighted mean margin is +11.7 (95% CI 7.3 to 15.7) points in the largest metro counties and −45.2 (95% CI −47.6 to −42.7) in the least urban, so the next section separates lean from size. The demographics panel has no code for 10 counties, which are left out of the bars: the Connecticut counties, Kansas City, Missouri, and Oglala Lakota County, South Dakota. Table 4. Spread of precinct margins falls from the largest metro counties to the least urban ones ### Spread rises with Democratic lean, partly through county size Table 5 plots each county's spread against its margin. Weighted by votes, the correlation is +0.41 (95% CI 0.33 to 0.49) across 2,853 counties. The binned means rise from 6.7 (95% CI 5.2 to 8.0) points in counties near Trump +82 to 25.4 (95% CI 23.4 to 27.5) in counties near Trump +14. The 6 bins from there to Harris +34 have means between 24.1 and 28.4. The highest bin, 31.1 (95% CI 24.7 to 36.8) near Harris +43, has an interval that overlaps each of them. The interval for its difference from each of them includes zero, except for the lowest, near Trump +4, where the difference is 6.9 (95% CI 0.7 to 12.9) points. The data show a rise and then a plateau, with the highest bin distinguishable from only the lowest of the bins before it. The 12 counties near Harris +66 average 19.3 (95% CI 15.3 to 23.9), which is 11.8 (95% CI 3.9 to 18.9) points below the highest bin, and few counties are that blue. Table 5. Spread rises from the reddest counties to about Trump +14, then levels off Bluer counties are also larger. The correlation of county margin with the log of two-party votes (the natural logarithm, so that each doubling of a county's votes adds the same amount) is +0.64 (95% CI 0.59 to 0.69), in line with the concentration of Democratic voters in dense places [4]. The correlation of spread with the log of votes is +0.40 (95% CI 0.33 to 0.46). Larger counties have more precincts, and with more precincts there is more room for very different ones. Table 6 holds fixed the log of a county's votes and the log of its number of precincts, and the correlation of lean with spread falls from +0.41 to +0.21 (95% CI 0.12 to 0.30). It then adds state fixed effects, which compare counties within the same state and so absorb each state's own precinct conventions, and the correlation is +0.28 (95% CI 0.19 to 0.37). With both controls, a county 10 points more Democratic has a spread 0.9 (95% CI 0.6 to 1.3) points wider, against 1.1 (95% CI 0.8 to 1.4) points without them. The correlation is also positive when each county counts once, so its sign does not depend on the vote weights. Table 6. Spread rises with Democratic lean, with or without controls for county size and state Two county characteristics measured outside the vote show a similar pattern. Across 2,843 counties with demographic data, which leaves out the Connecticut counties, spread correlates +0.43 (95% CI 0.36 to 0.50) with the nonwhite share of residents (the share who are not non-Hispanic white, American Community Survey, 2024). It correlates −0.36 (95% CI −0.41 to −0.30) with the rural share (the share living outside urban areas as the 2020 Census defines them). With size and state held fixed the two are +0.31 (95% CI 0.22 to 0.40) and −0.13 (95% CI −0.19 to −0.08), so the tie to the nonwhite share weakens less than the tie to the rural share does. ### Spread falls with distance from an even split Distance from an even split is the size of a county's margin, whichever party leads. One might expect the counties closest to a tie to be the most divided, because a near-tied county needs votes from precincts on both sides. Across all counties, the correlation of spread with distance from an even split is −0.29 (95% CI −0.39 to −0.20) when weighted by votes, and it stays negative with size and state held fixed, at −0.19 and −0.25. Counting each county once, it is −0.55 (95% CI −0.57 to −0.52). Spread is lower in counties that are farther from an even split. Among the 1,725 counties with a margin of 50 points or less, the vote-weighted correlation is −0.04 (95% CI −0.18 to 0.08), an interval that includes zero, against −0.26 (95% CI −0.30 to −0.22) when each county counts once. The vote-weighted result depends on the cutoff, as Table 7 shows. Its interval excludes zero only from 60 points up, where the correlation is −0.15. The absence of a link is specific to the vote-weighted comparison of counties within 50 points or less, and it is not a finding about counties in general. Table 7. Spread falls with distance from an even split, except in vote-weighted comparisons of counties within 50 points The negative correlation grows as the tails are added. Precinct margins cannot pass 100 points in either direction, so a county with a margin near the limit has little room for spread. Among the 260 counties with a margin beyond 70 points, however, the widest spread is 34.7 points, against a limit of 71.4 at a margin of 70 points. The highest ratio of a county's spread to the limit at its own margin is 49%. (Note: The largest spread a county can have is the square root of 100 squared minus its margin squared, so it falls to zero as the margin approaches 100. Among the 260 counties beyond 70 points, the mean ratio of a county's spread to the limit at its own margin is 12%.) The limit therefore does not account for the low spread in lopsided counties, and the data cannot say what does. One candidate is that the losing party has few precincts in those counties, and another is that margins are compressed near one side of the scale well short of the mathematical limit. This chapter reports the pattern and does not read the negative correlation as a finding about competitiveness. The link of spread to Democratic lean does not come from the tails. Within 50 points the correlation of spread with lean is +0.41 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.49), against +0.41 (95% CI 0.33 to 0.49) across all counties. ### Near-tied counties differ widely in spread A near-tied county has a margin under 5 points and at least 20 precincts. The group has 111 counties with 18.9 million two-party votes. Table 8 shows their spreads. The median is 23.9 (95% CI 22.8 to 24.9) points, against 3.4 for the median county if voters were assigned to precincts at random, and the range runs from 10.1 to 58.1. A spread of 30 points or more occurs in 29 counties, 26.1% of the group. Table 8. Near-tied counties differ widely in how much their precinct margins vary The median near-tied spread is above the 15.6 of all counties. Near-tied counties are larger, though, with a median of 78,269 two-party votes against 13,707 for the median county with a spread, and larger counties have wider spreads. The comparison of the two medians therefore mixes closeness with size. Their votes are spread across the range of precinct margins. Near-tied counties cast 35.6% of their votes in precincts decided by under 10 points, against 18.5% in all precincts, and 38.2% in precincts decided by 20 points or more, against 65.0%. The landslide share divides into 17.5% in Democratic precincts and 20.7% in Republican ones, and precincts decided by 40 points or more held 10.5%. A county built from two landslides would have at least 20% of its votes in Democratic landslide precincts and at least 20% in Republican ones. Of the 111 counties, 39 (35.1%) meet that test. The near-tied counties as a group hold more of their votes in close precincts than the country does and fewer in landslide precincts, and they differ from one another in how the votes divide. The counties in Table 1 fall at different points of this range. Bucks County, with a spread of 14.8, is in the lowest bin of Table 8, and Centre County, at 36.3, is past the 30-point line. ### What these data cannot show The chapter describes one election. It says nothing about whether precinct margins are spreading or narrowing, and it makes no comparison with earlier years. Chapter 11.2, Sorting by geographic scale, 2016 to 2024 (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sorting-by-geographic-scale; planned), a planned chapter, will compare precincts across elections, and Chapter 10.1, Nationalization of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote) measures how closely county results move together from one election to the next. A precinct is a reporting unit and not a neighborhood. The file has no boundaries, so the data cannot say which precincts are adjacent, and a county with a wide spread need not have opposed precincts next to each other. Units also differ in kind. Units labelled absentee, provisional, early voting, mail, failsafe, military or overseas, and units labelled as statistical adjustments, hold 1.5% of votes across 870 units, and they are buckets of ballots and not places. Table 9 repeats the main statistics without them and without the counties where they hold 20% of votes or more. That leaves 2,721 counties with a spread and 106 near-tied counties, against 111 in the full sample. Table 9. Dropping ballot-bucket units moves each correlation by at most 0.02 and each vote share by at most 0.3 points A precinct margin describes a place and not the voters in it. A precinct that gave one party 60% or more still holds voters of the other. Ecological inference, which moves from places to individuals, can fail, because a pattern across places can differ from the pattern among individuals [5]. The results also depend on the units. Shares and spreads change with the size and shape of the areas, a problem known as the modifiable areal unit problem [6], and this chapter uses the units that election offices happened to report. The 64 Louisiana parishes, the 6 other counties and Alaska that are left out are not a random set. The cutoffs for near-tied counties and for a wide spread are choices, and so are the vote weights and the 50-point cutoff behind the correlation of spread with distance from an even split. That correlation is near zero only in the vote-weighted comparisons within 50 points or less. A single spread cannot tell a county with two humps from a county with a long tail. The random-assignment benchmark holds each unit's size and its county's margin fixed and does not model why voters differ across precincts. Nothing here identifies why spread is wider in some counties. It goes with lean, size, nonwhite share and place type, and the controls are few and linear. ## Tables ### Table 1. Bucks County precincts cluster near an even split, while Centre County precincts form two groups, one on each side Share of each county's 2024 two-party votes cast in precincts in each 10-point band of margin | county | n | share | x0 | x1 | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Bucks County, PA | 0 | 0 | −100 | −90 | | Bucks County, PA | 0 | 0 | −90 | −80 | | Bucks County, PA | 0 | 0 | −80 | −70 | | Bucks County, PA | 0 | 0 | −70 | −60 | | Bucks County, PA | 0 | 0 | −60 | −50 | | Bucks County, PA | 0 | 0 | −50 | −40 | | Bucks County, PA | 4 | 1.05 | −40 | −30 | | Bucks County, PA | 25 | 8.35 | −30 | −20 | | Bucks County, PA | 54 | 17.71 | −20 | −10 | | Bucks County, PA | 83 | 27.62 | −10 | 0 | | Bucks County, PA | 68 | 22.48 | 0 | 10 | | Bucks County, PA | 40 | 13.77 | 10 | 20 | | Bucks County, PA | 15 | 5.06 | 20 | 30 | | Bucks County, PA | 13 | 3.63 | 30 | 40 | | Bucks County, PA | 2 | 0.315 | 40 | 50 | | Bucks County, PA | 0 | 0 | 50 | 60 | | Bucks County, PA | 0 | 0 | 60 | 70 | | Bucks County, PA | 0 | 0 | 70 | 80 | | Bucks County, PA | 0 | 0 | 80 | 90 | | Bucks County, PA | 0 | 0 | 90 | 100 | | Centre County, PA | 0 | 0 | −100 | −90 | | Centre County, PA | 0 | 0 | −90 | −80 | | Centre County, PA | 1 | 0.333 | −80 | −70 | | Centre County, PA | 5 | 4.17 | −70 | −60 | | Centre County, PA | 8 | 6.12 | −60 | −50 | | Centre County, PA | 12 | 6.15 | −50 | −40 | | Centre County, PA | 7 | 7.06 | −40 | −30 | | Centre County, PA | 8 | 10.56 | −30 | −20 | | Centre County, PA | 5 | 5.43 | −20 | −10 | | Centre County, PA | 3 | 4.12 | −10 | 0 | | Centre County, PA | 2 | 1.34 | 0 | 10 | | Centre County, PA | 7 | 11.96 | 10 | 20 | | Centre County, PA | 8 | 14.10 | 20 | 30 | | Centre County, PA | 7 | 12.99 | 30 | 40 | | Centre County, PA | 7 | 9.71 | 40 | 50 | | Centre County, PA | 3 | 2.83 | 50 | 60 | | Centre County, PA | 4 | 3.13 | 60 | 70 | | Centre County, PA | 0 | 0 | 70 | 80 | | Centre County, PA | 0 | 0 | 80 | 90 | | Centre County, PA | 0 | 0 | 90 | 100 | Note: The number in the tooltip is the number of precincts in the band. The two counties were chosen for the contrast between them, not at random. Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the shares carry no confidence interval. Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2024 precinct-level presidential returns; county totals summed from the precincts; full counts of votes, not survey estimates, so nothing is weighted except by two-party votes where stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/example_counties.json ### Table 2. Precincts are more often lopsided, and less often close, than counties or than random assignment of voters would make them Share of 2024 two-party presidential votes cast in units decided by each margin, in percent of votes | band | share | unit | | --- | ---: | --- | | Under 10 points | 18.52 | Precincts | | Under 10 points | 23.13 | Counties | | Under 10 points | 23.32 | Simulated precincts | | 20 points or more | 64.97 | Precincts | | 20 points or more | 57.25 | Counties | | 20 points or more | 56.58 | Simulated precincts | | 40 points or more | 36.37 | Precincts | | 40 points or more | 25.38 | Counties | | 40 points or more | 24.96 | Simulated precincts | Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the shares carry no confidence interval. Note: The simulated bars are means over 200 runs and move by at most 0.4 points across runs. Note: The sample is 175,345 reporting units in 3,043 counties: Alaska, the 64 Louisiana parishes and 6 other counties whose precinct rows do not match the certified total are left out. Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2024 precinct-level presidential returns; county totals summed from the precincts; full counts of votes, not survey estimates, so nothing is weighted except by two-party votes where stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/landslide_shares.json ### Table 3. Spread inside counties is widest in Mississippi and Alabama and scattered across the Southwest and Plains Vote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins inside each county, 2024, in points of two-party margin; counties with at least 5 reporting units No inline rows: the values of Table 3 are in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/precincts-within-counties/county_sd_map.json. Views: Spread inside the county; County margin. Note: Counties with fewer than 5 reporting units (190 of the 3,043 in the sample), the 64 Louisiana parishes, 6 other counties whose precinct rows do not match the certified total, Alaska and Kansas City, Missouri are drawn as no data. Note: A county near the floor of 5 reporting units has a spread that one unit can move a long way. Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so county margins and spreads carry no sampling error. Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2024 precinct-level presidential returns; county totals summed from the precincts; full counts of votes, not survey estimates, so nothing is weighted except by two-party votes where stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/county_sd_map.json ### Table 4. Spread of precinct margins falls from the largest metro counties to the least urban ones Vote-weighted mean of county spreads by Rural-Urban Continuum Code group, 2024, in points of two-party margin | Place type | Description | Rural-Urban Continuum Code | Mean spread (points) | Interval, low | Interval, high | Counties | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Largest metro | Metro area of 1 million or more | 1 | 24.8 | 23.5 | 26.1 | 419 | | Smaller metro | Smaller metro area | 2 to 3 | 22.7 | 21.9 | 23.5 | 690 | | Larger nonmetro | Nonmetro, larger towns | 4 to 7 | 19.4 | 18.7 | 20.1 | 861 | | Least urban | Nonmetro, smaller towns and open country | 8 to 9 | 15.5 | 14.6 | 16.5 | 873 | Note: The number in the tooltip is the number of counties in the group. 2,853 counties have at least 5 reporting units; 10 of them have no code in the demographics panel (the Connecticut counties, Kansas City, Missouri, and Oglala Lakota County, South Dakota) and are left out of the bars. Note: The returns are full counts with no sampling error. The whiskers show how much a mean would move with a different set of counties, from a county bootstrap. Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2024 precinct-level presidential returns; county totals summed from the precincts; full counts of votes, not survey estimates, so nothing is weighted except by two-party votes where stated; county demographics panel (ACS 2024, Rural-Urban Continuum Code 2023) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/sd_by_place_type.json ### Table 5. Spread rises from the reddest counties to about Trump +14, then levels off Vote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins inside each county against the county two-party margin, 2024; one dot per county, sized by two-party votes | County | Margin (points) | Spread (points) | Two-party votes | Precincts | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Autauga, AL | −46.7 | 17.4 | 27,923 | 21 | | Baldwin, AL | −58.7 | 16.3 | 120,732 | 61 | | Barbour, AL | −14.8 | 32.1 | 9,764 | 18 | | Bibb, AL | −64.8 | 24.6 | 9,191 | 10 | | Blount, AL | −81.6 | 6.7 | 27,930 | 26 | | Bullock, AL | +46.1 | 42.8 | 4,084 | 10 | | Butler, AL | −22.8 | 41.2 | 8,423 | 23 | | Calhoun, AL | −45.1 | 37.0 | 48,106 | 44 | | Chambers, AL | −23.4 | 30.5 | 14,116 | 18 | | Cherokee, AL | −75.9 | 9.7 | 12,911 | 25 | | Chilton, AL | −72.5 | 15.5 | 19,618 | 20 | | Choctaw, AL | −24.0 | 55.1 | 6,618 | 34 | | Clarke, AL | −17.1 | 41.6 | 11,892 | 31 | | Clay, AL | −70.5 | 19.7 | 6,727 | 17 | | Cleburne, AL | −84.1 | 8.2 | 7,593 | 16 | | Coffee, AL | −58.4 | 26.2 | 22,096 | 29 | | Colbert, AL | −46.8 | 26.4 | 26,851 | 36 | | Conecuh, AL | −14.0 | 52.0 | 6,003 | 28 | | Coosa, AL | −43.5 | 48.4 | 5,236 | 14 | | Covington, AL | −72.8 | 15.1 | 16,991 | 27 | | Crenshaw, AL | −54.9 | 31.7 | 6,457 | 17 | | Cullman, AL | −81.1 | 9.6 | 42,743 | 51 | | Dale, AL | −52.7 | 20.9 | 18,960 | 20 | | Dallas, AL | +32.7 | 47.3 | 15,426 | 31 | | Dekalb, AL | −74.4 | 10.2 | 29,391 | 46 | | Elmore, AL | −52.5 | 22.7 | 41,148 | 31 | | Escambia, AL | −46.6 | 39.9 | 14,848 | 31 | | Etowah, AL | −56.1 | 37.1 | 45,680 | 33 | | Fayette, AL | −72.5 | 21.8 | 8,300 | 26 | | Franklin, AL | −73.8 | 17.8 | 11,985 | 26 | | Geneva, AL | −77.4 | 10.6 | 12,320 | 23 | | Greene, AL | +55.9 | 21.4 | 4,018 | 16 | | Hale, AL | +6.9 | 37.0 | 7,237 | 16 | | Henry, AL | −51.1 | 24.4 | 9,252 | 16 | | Houston, AL | −48.2 | 31.8 | 43,821 | 30 | | Jackson, AL | −71.9 | 8.8 | 23,349 | 32 | | Jefferson, AL | +10.6 | 53.5 | 293,235 | 179 | | Lamar, AL | −76.4 | 15.6 | 6,839 | 27 | | Lauderdale, AL | −52.0 | 27.6 | 43,034 | 33 | | Lawrence, AL | −62.7 | 37.2 | 16,007 | 31 | | Lee, AL | −28.2 | 28.7 | 71,818 | 27 | | Limestone, AL | −44.4 | 24.2 | 52,468 | 27 | | Lowndes, AL | +37.5 | 44.6 | 5,625 | 14 | | Macon, AL | +56.7 | 38.4 | 7,766 | 16 | | Madison, AL | −9.1 | 31.9 | 193,254 | 81 | | Marengo, AL | −3.8 | 38.7 | 9,626 | 20 | | Marion, AL | −82.2 | 4.1 | 13,442 | 17 | | Marshall, AL | −72.2 | 7.1 | 39,987 | 31 | | Mobile, AL | −16.6 | 50.2 | 172,814 | 82 | | Monroe, AL | −23.3 | 50.6 | 9,747 | 29 | | Montgomery, AL | +31.1 | 40.0 | 88,423 | 53 | | Morgan, AL | −53.1 | 31.9 | 52,841 | 41 | | Perry, AL | +42.9 | 46.9 | 4,443 | 14 | | Pickens, AL | −23.5 | 47.9 | 8,853 | 21 | | Pike, AL | −25.3 | 41.8 | 13,123 | 36 | | Randolph, AL | −65.2 | 23.0 | 11,022 | 22 | | Russell, AL | +1.7 | 40.2 | 20,500 | 20 | | St. Clair, AL | −64.6 | 14.0 | 43,141 | 32 | | Shelby, AL | −41.3 | 16.8 | 112,753 | 40 | | Sumter, AL | +41.4 | 23.8 | 5,267 | 15 | | Talladega, AL | −33.9 | 30.2 | 32,998 | 28 | | Tallapoosa, AL | −49.9 | 37.2 | 19,859 | 28 | | Tuscaloosa, AL | −20.6 | 47.1 | 84,123 | 56 | | Walker, AL | −72.3 | 16.2 | 29,566 | 47 | | Washington, AL | −55.6 | 35.8 | 8,397 | 21 | | Wilcox, AL | +31.6 | 48.9 | 5,242 | 21 | | Winston, AL | −84.0 | 4.8 | 11,075 | 20 | | Apache, AZ | +19.2 | 57.9 | 31,667 | 44 | | Cochise, AZ | −23.4 | 26.6 | 58,232 | 54 | | Coconino, AZ | +20.2 | 34.4 | 69,080 | 75 | | Gila, AZ | −37.9 | 28.2 | 27,405 | 39 | | Graham, AZ | −48.6 | 34.3 | 15,044 | 23 | | Greenlee, AZ | −41.5 | 17.5 | 3,262 | 6 | | La Paz, AZ | −44.5 | 22.5 | 7,571 | 11 | | Maricopa, AZ | −3.5 | 24.2 | 2,031,547 | 907 | | Mohave, AZ | −56.1 | 9.4 | 109,725 | 24 | | Navajo, AZ | −17.4 | 52.7 | 50,234 | 17 | | Pima, AZ | +15.3 | 24.6 | 507,119 | 265 | | Pinal, AZ | −22.3 | 17.9 | 207,582 | 108 | | Santa Cruz, AZ | +18.8 | 19.2 | 18,950 | 31 | | Yavapai, AZ | −34.0 | 20.9 | 147,083 | 54 | | Yuma, AZ | −20.6 | 24.2 | 67,568 | 44 | | Arkansas, AR | −44.9 | 39.5 | 5,454 | 30 | | Ashley, AR | −48.7 | 40.0 | 6,919 | 30 | | Baxter, AR | −57.8 | 5.8 | 20,594 | 11 | | Benton, AR | −27.7 | 20.6 | 124,948 | 426 | | Boone, AR | −66.1 | 9.1 | 16,822 | 12 | | Bradley, AR | −39.4 | 44.8 | 3,174 | 14 | | Calhoun, AR | −63.1 | 18.1 | 2,053 | 8 | | Carroll, AR | −32.4 | 33.2 | 11,282 | 11 | | Chicot, AR | +4.0 | 49.0 | 3,454 | 7 | | Clark, AR | −20.9 | 35.2 | 7,485 | 20 | | Clay, AR | −62.8 | 9.1 | 4,875 | 17 | | Cleburne, AR | −69.0 | 9.7 | 12,536 | 34 | | Cleveland, AR | −68.5 | 22.5 | 3,328 | 17 | | Columbia, AR | −37.0 | 35.1 | 7,833 | 14 | | Conway, AR | −41.3 | 25.2 | 8,342 | 31 | | Craighead, AR | −38.3 | 27.2 | 36,362 | 53 | | Crawford, AR | −59.3 | 7.5 | 23,368 | 13 | | Crittenden, AR | +2.3 | 41.8 | 14,390 | 17 | | Cross, AR | −48.6 | 40.6 | 6,395 | 14 | | Dallas, AR | −30.0 | 47.2 | 2,280 | 9 | | Desha, AR | −4.9 | 45.7 | 3,443 | 21 | | Drew, AR | −34.4 | 29.2 | 6,253 | 17 | | Faulkner, AR | −33.1 | 29.8 | 53,109 | 51 | | Franklin, AR | −63.8 | 9.4 | 6,814 | 39 | | Fulton, AR | −63.4 | 9.0 | 4,946 | 10 | | Garland, AR | −37.1 | 20.5 | 41,374 | 52 | | Grant, AR | −70.0 | 9.4 | 7,947 | 18 | | Greene, AR | −62.3 | 8.9 | 15,552 | 11 | | Hempstead, AR | −40.5 | 41.1 | 5,969 | 24 | | Hot Spring, AR | −53.2 | 29.0 | 12,044 | 32 | | Howard, AR | −47.4 | 34.8 | 4,404 | 9 | | Independence, AR | −60.8 | 17.1 | 13,712 | 34 | | Izard, AR | −67.3 | 9.2 | 5,803 | 45 | | Jackson, AR | −49.6 | 30.7 | 4,692 | 45 | | Jefferson, AR | +20.4 | 59.6 | 21,270 | 169 | | Johnson, AR | −52.5 | 12.6 | 8,873 | 11 | | Lafayette, AR | −39.0 | 42.9 | 2,287 | 9 | | Lawrence, AR | −65.4 | 9.2 | 5,573 | 28 | | Lee, AR | +3.6 | 43.2 | 2,451 | 9 | | Lincoln, AR | −51.0 | 51.2 | 3,315 | 26 | | Little River, AR | −55.1 | 27.9 | 4,828 | 20 | | Logan, AR | −63.5 | 9.4 | 8,031 | 36 | | Lonoke, AR | −54.8 | 20.0 | 30,015 | 55 | | Madison, AR | −59.6 | 6.2 | 7,376 | 10 | | Marion, AR | −61.2 | 9.2 | 7,731 | 29 | | Miller, AR | −51.7 | 35.1 | 15,611 | 19 | | Mississippi, AR | −32.2 | 45.1 | 10,537 | 16 | | Monroe, AR | −16.0 | 48.4 | 2,387 | 24 | | Montgomery, AR | −64.5 | 9.0 | 3,632 | 16 | | Nevada, AR | −40.4 | 43.2 | 2,851 | 20 | | Newton, AR | −65.3 | 18.2 | 3,707 | 19 | | Ouachita, AR | −19.4 | 38.3 | 8,468 | 18 | | Perry, AR | −58.8 | 9.1 | 4,482 | 17 | | Phillips, AR | +13.5 | 39.5 | 4,852 | 10 | | Pike, AR | −74.0 | 14.3 | 4,306 | 11 | | Poinsett, AR | −64.5 | 9.4 | 6,966 | 12 | | Polk, AR | −71.8 | 7.5 | 8,132 | 17 | | Pope, AR | −53.5 | 18.9 | 23,605 | 55 | | Prairie, AR | −66.8 | 16.1 | 3,152 | 24 | | Pulaski, AR | +22.7 | 35.3 | 150,015 | 132 | | Randolph, AR | −65.0 | 10.6 | 6,505 | 29 | | St Francis, AR | +0.8 | 53.8 | 5,862 | 15 | | Saline, AR | −41.0 | 20.1 | 56,345 | 42 | | Scott, AR | −74.5 | 10.5 | 3,338 | 26 | | Searcy, AR | −73.2 | 8.1 | 3,816 | 15 | | Sebastian, AR | −38.5 | 27.2 | 44,371 | 180 | | Sevier, AR | −62.8 | 18.8 | 4,634 | 9 | | Sharp, AR | −63.9 | 10.4 | 7,294 | 25 | | Stone, AR | −63.1 | 7.6 | 5,897 | 18 | | Union, AR | −34.0 | 41.0 | 15,215 | 28 | | Van Buren, AR | −61.5 | 11.9 | 7,460 | 21 | | Washington, AR | −6.9 | 33.1 | 94,022 | 224 | | White, AR | −62.6 | 14.1 | 30,155 | 92 | | Woodruff, AR | −33.1 | 45.0 | 2,273 | 20 | | Yell, AR | −61.9 | 16.1 | 6,360 | 28 | | Alameda, CA | +56.0 | 26.1 | 640,028 | 822 | | Alpine, CA | +32.7 | 20.6 | 722 | 5 | | Amador, CA | −28.5 | 20.3 | 21,742 | 79 | | Butte, CA | −3.1 | 31.4 | 91,203 | 212 | | Calaveras, CA | −28.8 | 25.8 | 25,806 | 50 | | Colusa, CA | −29.0 | 20.6 | 6,845 | 19 | | Contra Costa, CA | +39.3 | 24.3 | 510,211 | 1,202 | | Del Norte, CA | −16.8 | 18.1 | 10,257 | 36 | | El Dorado, CA | −12.3 | 25.0 | 108,695 | 260 | | Fresno, CA | −4.5 | 27.6 | 316,996 | 684 | | Glenn, CA | −35.7 | 27.4 | 9,928 | 113 | | Humboldt, CA | +29.8 | 30.0 | 61,284 | 164 | | Imperial, CA | −0.7 | 23.3 | 52,228 | 215 | | Inyo, CA | −2.9 | 19.6 | 8,650 | 28 | | Kern, CA | −21.6 | 26.4 | 275,461 | 1,082 | | Kings, CA | −23.4 | 21.6 | 40,435 | 174 | | Lake, CA | −1.4 | 14.4 | 25,945 | 73 | | Lassen, CA | −55.2 | 16.0 | 10,972 | 65 | | Los Angeles, CA | +34.0 | 29.4 | 3,605,749 | 4,808 | | Madera, CA | −21.3 | 21.1 | 53,240 | 112 | | Marin, CA | +65.7 | 14.9 | 140,102 | 217 | | Mariposa, CA | −21.5 | 25.8 | 9,159 | 32 | | Mendocino, CA | +28.1 | 25.1 | 37,197 | 240 | | Merced, CA | −3.9 | 28.4 | 82,772 | 621 | | Modoc, CA | −48.1 | 14.3 | 3,874 | 30 | | Mono, CA | +21.1 | 31.4 | 5,808 | 22 | | Monterey, CA | +30.8 | 20.8 | 142,286 | 403 | | Napa, CA | +36.1 | 17.7 | 63,325 | 336 | | Nevada, CA | +12.7 | 31.3 | 59,904 | 180 | | Orange, CA | +2.8 | 25.4 | 1,346,071 | 2,899 | | Placer, CA | −8.7 | 23.9 | 227,596 | 468 | | Plumas, CA | −17.5 | 20.0 | 9,745 | 28 | | Riverside, CA | −1.3 | 24.9 | 914,400 | 1,711 | | Sacramento, CA | +20.4 | 27.2 | 633,476 | 1,249 | | San Benito, CA | +12.9 | 22.8 | 26,881 | 80 | | San Bernardino, CA | −2.1 | 24.1 | 738,081 | 2,738 | | San Diego, CA | +17.3 | 26.6 | 1,433,911 | 3,315 | | San Francisco, CA | +67.6 | 18.0 | 386,298 | 1,014 | | San Joaquin, CA | −0.9 | 25.2 | 255,429 | 437 | | San Luis Obispo, CA | +11.2 | 28.3 | 146,169 | 251 | | San Mateo, CA | +52.1 | 15.9 | 319,349 | 523 | | Santa Barbara, CA | +27.6 | 31.9 | 178,735 | 424 | | Santa Clara, CA | +41.6 | 20.7 | 721,284 | 1,311 | | Santa Cruz, CA | +56.6 | 17.8 | 128,801 | 282 | | Shasta, CA | −37.4 | 16.0 | 86,661 | 128 | | Sierra, CA | −24.9 | 22.6 | 1,707 | 19 | | Siskiyou, CA | −19.9 | 29.1 | 20,790 | 105 | | Solano, CA | +23.8 | 24.9 | 184,102 | 366 | | Sonoma, CA | +47.8 | 14.5 | 242,395 | 755 | | Stanislaus, CA | −11.2 | 22.6 | 192,155 | 469 | | Sutter, CA | −32.2 | 14.8 | 38,388 | 48 | | Tehama, CA | −42.7 | 16.5 | 25,869 | 68 | | Trinity, CA | −9.8 | 13.5 | 5,428 | 14 | | Tulare, CA | −21.2 | 24.3 | 135,075 | 584 | | Tuolumne, CA | −22.4 | 17.8 | 28,098 | 78 | | Ventura, CA | +15.6 | 24.4 | 374,949 | 1,715 | | Yolo, CA | +37.6 | 31.3 | 89,249 | 95 | | Yuba, CA | −26.6 | 20.2 | 29,216 | 63 | | Adams, CO | +9.3 | 20.1 | 227,080 | 275 | | Alamosa, CO | −11.1 | 20.4 | 7,301 | 8 | | Arapahoe, CO | +20.7 | 16.7 | 316,036 | 394 | | Archuleta, CO | −14.4 | 9.9 | 9,122 | 8 | | Baca, CO | −72.0 | 7.4 | 1,961 | 9 | | Bent, CO | −39.7 | 24.7 | 2,141 | 5 | | Boulder, CO | +57.3 | 17.6 | 190,907 | 190 | | Broomfield, CO | +29.4 | 10.9 | 45,497 | 58 | | Chaffee, CO | +14.0 | 20.3 | 14,026 | 11 | | Cheyenne, CO | −79.2 | 10.3 | 1,038 | 5 | | Clear Creek, CO | +17.1 | 9.3 | 5,916 | 9 | | Conejos, CO | −18.3 | 27.8 | 3,985 | 10 | | Costilla, CO | +15.2 | 23.8 | 2,005 | 8 | | Crowley, CO | −48.9 | 4.9 | 1,653 | 6 | | Delta, CO | −36.5 | 23.3 | 18,978 | 20 | | Denver, CO | +57.7 | 16.6 | 353,399 | 301 | | Douglas, CO | −7.2 | 14.3 | 237,859 | 204 | | Eagle, CO | +25.1 | 17.1 | 27,091 | 34 | | Elbert, CO | −52.3 | 8.5 | 19,977 | 18 | | El Paso, CO | −10.1 | 21.0 | 370,530 | 324 | | Fremont, CO | −39.4 | 9.3 | 24,839 | 20 | | Garfield, CO | +2.1 | 38.2 | 29,621 | 27 | | Gilpin, CO | +13.2 | 16.6 | 3,983 | 6 | | Grand, CO | −0.8 | 28.9 | 9,565 | 12 | | Gunnison, CO | +30.2 | 31.2 | 10,576 | 15 | | Huerfano, CO | −8.8 | 9.5 | 4,311 | 5 | | Jefferson, CO | +20.0 | 14.1 | 351,380 | 296 | | Kit Carson, CO | −69.4 | 7.6 | 3,639 | 13 | | Lake, CO | +17.1 | 7.9 | 3,756 | 6 | | La Plata, CO | +19.2 | 33.6 | 34,701 | 33 | | Larimer, CO | +18.1 | 25.8 | 219,056 | 155 | | Las Animas, CO | −13.8 | 21.7 | 7,604 | 7 | | Lincoln, CO | −65.7 | 7.5 | 2,522 | 13 | | Logan, CO | −57.8 | 15.9 | 9,953 | 16 | | Mesa, CO | −24.9 | 19.2 | 89,412 | 67 | | Moffat, CO | −64.2 | 9.5 | 6,525 | 13 | | Montezuma, CO | −21.5 | 21.8 | 14,765 | 12 | | Montrose, CO | −33.3 | 17.0 | 25,058 | 21 | | Morgan, CO | −49.8 | 15.6 | 13,121 | 18 | | Otero, CO | −27.1 | 24.2 | 8,684 | 17 | | Ouray, CO | +21.6 | 23.8 | 4,015 | 5 | | Park, CO | −17.0 | 17.1 | 11,669 | 13 | | Phillips, CO | −64.2 | 8.7 | 2,300 | 8 | | Pitkin, CO | +45.2 | 5.2 | 10,924 | 12 | | Prowers, CO | −51.5 | 11.6 | 5,060 | 5 | | Pueblo, CO | −5.3 | 24.3 | 83,016 | 144 | | Rio Blanco, CO | −64.9 | 9.8 | 3,625 | 5 | | Rio Grande, CO | −23.8 | 18.5 | 6,049 | 15 | | Routt, CO | +28.5 | 26.9 | 15,884 | 19 | | Saguache, CO | +3.9 | 34.0 | 3,281 | 7 | | San Miguel, CO | +50.7 | 30.0 | 4,683 | 6 | | Sedgwick, CO | −57.5 | 7.5 | 1,331 | 5 | | Summit, CO | +38.3 | 8.9 | 17,006 | 20 | | Teller, CO | −36.4 | 5.6 | 15,921 | 14 | | Washington, CO | −76.2 | 4.3 | 2,765 | 6 | | Weld, CO | −21.5 | 21.9 | 175,221 | 184 | | Yuma, CO | −66.8 | 8.3 | 4,565 | 14 | | Fairfield, CT | +19.9 | 17.6 | 445,282 | 190 | | Hartford, CT | +22.9 | 23.7 | 421,938 | 167 | | Litchfield, CT | −8.2 | 20.7 | 104,392 | 48 | | Middlesex, CT | +13.1 | 13.5 | 95,827 | 33 | | New Haven, CT | +12.2 | 27.5 | 390,416 | 204 | | New London, CT | +12.8 | 17.2 | 135,048 | 54 | | Tolland, CT | +8.2 | 18.5 | 80,084 | 28 | | Windham, CT | −10.4 | 17.3 | 55,984 | 32 | | Kent, DE | +2.0 | 30.3 | 86,680 | 98 | | New Castle, DE | +33.1 | 23.3 | 271,568 | 312 | | Sussex, DE | −11.1 | 23.7 | 145,861 | 119 | | District of Columbia, DC | +86.6 | 5.9 | 315,261 | 144 | | Alachua, FL | +21.3 | 29.3 | 134,517 | 63 | | Baker, FL | −73.4 | 12.3 | 14,908 | 9 | | Bay, FL | −47.9 | 17.0 | 96,698 | 29 | | Bradford, FL | −57.5 | 28.2 | 13,866 | 13 | | Brevard, FL | −21.0 | 13.4 | 357,766 | 150 | | Broward, FL | +17.1 | 26.3 | 866,280 | 358 | | Calhoun, FL | −68.0 | 22.5 | 6,388 | 10 | | Charlotte, FL | −34.2 | 10.4 | 122,930 | 81 | | Citrus, FL | −46.2 | 7.7 | 97,632 | 32 | | Clay, FL | −39.6 | 24.6 | 125,637 | 48 | | Collier, FL | −33.3 | 12.6 | 214,987 | 67 | | Columbia, FL | −50.5 | 21.0 | 33,358 | 26 | | Desoto, FL | −43.2 | 28.7 | 12,413 | 15 | | Dixie, FL | −70.8 | 13.2 | 8,103 | 10 | | Duval, FL | −1.5 | 31.3 | 465,650 | 160 | | Escambia, FL | −19.8 | 28.8 | 161,008 | 80 | | Flagler, FL | −28.4 | 9.5 | 79,445 | 21 | | Franklin, FL | −44.2 | 28.6 | 6,701 | 8 | | Gadsden, FL | +30.9 | 39.8 | 21,698 | 25 | | Gilchrist, FL | −68.6 | 7.2 | 10,593 | 10 | | Glades, FL | −53.5 | 24.5 | 5,256 | 13 | | Gulf, FL | −54.5 | 24.1 | 8,654 | 10 | | Hamilton, FL | −39.3 | 30.8 | 5,691 | 8 | | Hardee, FL | −56.7 | 23.6 | 8,088 | 12 | | Hendry, FL | −38.6 | 29.0 | 13,349 | 10 | | Hernando, FL | −37.3 | 9.7 | 109,877 | 32 | | Highlands, FL | −41.0 | 17.3 | 51,609 | 25 | | Hillsborough, FL | −3.1 | 24.2 | 663,472 | 448 | | Holmes, FL | −80.6 | 4.5 | 9,075 | 8 | | Indian River, FL | −27.5 | 10.9 | 98,391 | 34 | | Jackson, FL | −46.4 | 25.2 | 21,966 | 14 | | Jefferson, FL | −18.7 | 20.3 | 8,440 | 16 | | Lafayette, FL | −76.4 | 15.5 | 3,737 | 5 | | Lake, FL | −24.9 | 17.6 | 225,046 | 92 | | Lee, FL | −28.6 | 13.8 | 389,901 | 99 | | Leon, FL | +22.0 | 29.8 | 154,917 | 132 | | Levy, FL | −50.5 | 14.5 | 24,239 | 13 | | Liberty, FL | −67.3 | 30.8 | 3,464 | 8 | | Madison, FL | −29.0 | 34.1 | 9,105 | 11 | | Manatee, FL | −23.7 | 15.2 | 227,160 | 71 | | Marion, FL | −31.9 | 17.7 | 212,609 | 106 | | Martin, FL | −31.3 | 10.8 | 97,660 | 28 | | Miami-Dade, FL | −11.5 | 34.0 | 1,085,945 | 721 | | Monroe, FL | −18.5 | 22.9 | 43,997 | 33 | | Nassau, FL | −47.3 | 22.6 | 65,088 | 18 | | Okaloosa, FL | −42.9 | 15.4 | 112,383 | 52 | | Okeechobee, FL | −54.1 | 10.9 | 15,986 | 11 | | Orange, FL | +13.8 | 21.1 | 599,086 | 257 | | Osceola, FL | −1.5 | 20.2 | 170,918 | 127 | | Palm Beach, FL | +0.8 | 23.9 | 739,348 | 781 | | Pasco, FL | −25.5 | 12.8 | 315,229 | 120 | | Pinellas, FL | −5.3 | 22.8 | 511,924 | 286 | | Polk, FL | −20.9 | 23.0 | 345,923 | 172 | | Putnam, FL | −48.1 | 27.6 | 36,054 | 37 | | St. Johns, FL | −31.6 | 11.1 | 195,621 | 53 | | St. Lucie, FL | −9.1 | 18.9 | 183,810 | 61 | | Santa Rosa, FL | −51.4 | 11.7 | 111,349 | 41 | | Sarasota, FL | −18.3 | 16.8 | 275,887 | 103 | | Seminole, FL | −3.6 | 14.8 | 250,452 | 82 | | Sumter, FL | −37.8 | 8.9 | 104,685 | 30 | | Suwannee, FL | −61.3 | 18.6 | 21,778 | 14 | | Taylor, FL | −60.0 | 35.5 | 9,945 | 14 | | Union, FL | −68.7 | 7.0 | 6,195 | 8 | | Volusia, FL | −21.9 | 19.0 | 307,823 | 143 | | Wakulla, FL | −44.7 | 7.9 | 19,687 | 12 | | Walton, FL | −58.2 | 9.9 | 49,257 | 21 | | Washington, FL | −65.8 | 15.0 | 12,510 | 12 | | Appling, GA | −62.5 | 36.4 | 8,321 | 9 | | Baker, GA | −19.9 | 24.0 | 1,473 | 5 | | Baldwin, GA | −2.2 | 35.8 | 18,733 | 14 | | Banks, GA | −78.3 | 3.8 | 10,494 | 13 | | Barrow, GA | −40.7 | 11.2 | 43,679 | 8 | | Bartow, GA | −51.3 | 13.9 | 57,213 | 17 | | Berrien, GA | −70.0 | 7.4 | 8,050 | 5 | | Bibb, GA | +22.5 | 40.6 | 68,830 | 31 | | Brooks, GA | −26.9 | 30.5 | 7,189 | 7 | | Bryan, GA | −36.5 | 16.0 | 24,517 | 10 | | Bulloch, GA | −29.1 | 28.5 | 32,499 | 16 | | Burke, GA | −9.4 | 24.6 | 11,021 | 16 | | Calhoun, GA | +12.3 | 32.5 | 2,053 | 5 | | Camden, GA | −35.9 | 12.4 | 26,224 | 11 | | Carroll, GA | −41.4 | 25.7 | 60,170 | 28 | | Catoosa, GA | −55.8 | 6.7 | 34,854 | 11 | | Charlton, GA | −56.4 | 25.1 | 4,614 | 6 | | Chatham, GA | +18.1 | 38.5 | 140,094 | 87 | | Chattooga, GA | −64.4 | 9.1 | 10,665 | 7 | | Cherokee, GA | −39.3 | 15.3 | 160,980 | 42 | | Clarke, GA | +38.7 | 16.1 | 52,346 | 24 | | Clay, GA | +7.5 | 32.0 | 1,434 | 5 | | Clayton, GA | +69.6 | 13.5 | 111,080 | 70 | | Clinch, GA | −51.6 | 14.2 | 2,903 | 5 | | Cobb, GA | +15.0 | 26.6 | 397,083 | 148 | | Coffee, GA | −45.2 | 15.7 | 15,683 | 6 | | Colquitt, GA | −50.3 | 35.0 | 16,565 | 19 | | Columbia, GA | −25.8 | 21.5 | 85,281 | 46 | | Cook, GA | −46.6 | 35.4 | 7,330 | 8 | | Coweta, GA | −34.1 | 22.6 | 85,315 | 24 | | Crawford, GA | −50.0 | 29.3 | 6,324 | 5 | | Crisp, GA | −26.0 | 39.3 | 8,092 | 5 | | Dade, GA | −67.0 | 9.1 | 8,147 | 7 | | Decatur, GA | −24.0 | 27.9 | 11,512 | 10 | | Dekalb, GA | +65.4 | 24.7 | 362,252 | 191 | | Dodge, GA | −50.0 | 21.6 | 8,330 | 16 | | Dooly, GA | −7.7 | 13.6 | 4,164 | 5 | | Dougherty, GA | +41.3 | 36.0 | 33,735 | 25 | | Douglas, GA | +31.7 | 32.1 | 70,236 | 25 | | Early, GA | −11.5 | 37.5 | 4,876 | 5 | | Effingham, GA | −49.3 | 12.0 | 36,087 | 20 | | Elbert, GA | −43.5 | 23.5 | 9,560 | 11 | | Emanuel, GA | −44.3 | 23.7 | 9,592 | 11 | | Fannin, GA | −65.0 | 5.0 | 16,039 | 12 | | Fayette, GA | −3.2 | 32.7 | 73,999 | 36 | | Floyd, GA | −42.2 | 25.2 | 44,493 | 19 | | Forsyth, GA | −33.5 | 16.9 | 136,790 | 29 | | Franklin, GA | −72.8 | 8.4 | 12,106 | 7 | | Fulton, GA | +45.4 | 38.7 | 529,389 | 450 | | Gilmer, GA | −62.9 | 4.9 | 18,389 | 13 | | Glynn, GA | −26.1 | 29.2 | 43,702 | 17 | | Gordon, GA | −63.7 | 13.3 | 27,477 | 12 | | Grady, GA | −38.4 | 40.4 | 10,675 | 13 | | Greene, GA | −29.1 | 25.6 | 12,729 | 5 | | Gwinnett, GA | +16.7 | 21.3 | 415,548 | 156 | | Habersham, GA | −65.2 | 6.0 | 23,178 | 6 | | Hall, GA | −44.1 | 22.0 | 101,338 | 31 | | Hancock, GA | +35.5 | 33.4 | 4,228 | 10 | | Haralson, GA | −74.7 | 6.9 | 16,304 | 12 | | Harris, GA | −46.3 | 12.1 | 22,259 | 12 | | Hart, GA | −55.0 | 12.1 | 14,274 | 7 | | Heard, GA | −72.3 | 8.4 | 6,194 | 6 | | Henry, GA | +29.8 | 31.3 | 128,235 | 37 | | Houston, GA | −11.3 | 23.5 | 80,997 | 17 | | Jeff Davis, GA | −68.5 | 25.6 | 5,859 | 9 | | Jefferson, GA | −1.2 | 26.3 | 7,439 | 8 | | Jenkins, GA | −30.6 | 37.0 | 3,396 | 5 | | Jones, GA | −38.2 | 25.0 | 16,038 | 10 | | Laurens, GA | −32.8 | 36.7 | 23,280 | 15 | | Lee, GA | −43.7 | 11.7 | 17,612 | 10 | | Liberty, GA | +17.5 | 25.7 | 22,900 | 12 | | Lincoln, GA | −45.0 | 23.6 | 4,910 | 7 | | Long, GA | −29.6 | 17.9 | 7,033 | 7 | | Lowndes, GA | −18.1 | 35.3 | 47,568 | 18 | | McDuffie, GA | −25.0 | 41.4 | 10,499 | 7 | | McIntosh, GA | −28.7 | 25.4 | 7,375 | 5 | | Macon, GA | +18.0 | 24.0 | 4,671 | 5 | | Madison, GA | −55.1 | 18.5 | 16,704 | 12 | | Marion, GA | −30.4 | 44.3 | 3,601 | 5 | | Meriwether, GA | −25.6 | 25.4 | 11,748 | 14 | | Mitchell, GA | −16.4 | 39.9 | 8,851 | 11 | | Monroe, GA | −46.8 | 27.1 | 17,643 | 14 | | Morgan, GA | −46.2 | 28.5 | 13,122 | 5 | | Murray, GA | −71.8 | 5.0 | 17,424 | 7 | | Muscogee, GA | +23.5 | 40.3 | 80,029 | 25 | | Newton, GA | +15.2 | 39.9 | 58,732 | 19 | | Oconee, GA | −36.3 | 11.8 | 27,044 | 8 | | Paulding, GA | −24.3 | 21.1 | 94,571 | 21 | | Peach, GA | −6.1 | 36.1 | 13,397 | 7 | | Pickens, GA | −66.1 | 9.0 | 20,803 | 12 | | Pierce, GA | −77.6 | 9.0 | 9,744 | 8 | | Pike, GA | −73.7 | 7.9 | 12,512 | 8 | | Polk, GA | −60.7 | 14.7 | 19,101 | 7 | | Putnam, GA | −42.4 | 25.2 | 12,832 | 5 | | Randolph, GA | +7.7 | 28.5 | 2,974 | 6 | | Richmond, GA | +36.3 | 38.6 | 83,129 | 68 | | Rockdale, GA | +47.8 | 20.9 | 44,876 | 16 | | Screven, GA | −25.3 | 28.7 | 6,906 | 7 | | Seminole, GA | −40.5 | 46.9 | 4,002 | 5 | | Spalding, GA | −16.8 | 38.4 | 32,863 | 17 | | Sumter, GA | +2.2 | 38.7 | 12,005 | 11 | | Talbot, GA | +12.0 | 27.3 | 3,371 | 7 | | Tattnall, GA | −53.6 | 13.7 | 8,482 | 8 | | Telfair, GA | −39.4 | 24.1 | 4,204 | 6 | | Terrell, GA | +4.1 | 42.3 | 4,328 | 6 | | Thomas, GA | −24.2 | 39.7 | 22,017 | 20 | | Tift, GA | −35.8 | 39.4 | 16,934 | 12 | | Toombs, GA | −50.9 | 17.8 | 10,882 | 5 | | Troup, GA | −24.5 | 36.5 | 31,149 | 13 | | Twiggs, GA | −14.7 | 34.9 | 4,444 | 5 | | Union, GA | −62.8 | 4.1 | 17,786 | 11 | | Walker, GA | −59.6 | 10.7 | 31,898 | 11 | | Walton, GA | −46.2 | 20.7 | 58,012 | 19 | | Ware, GA | −43.3 | 46.6 | 14,347 | 13 | | Washington, GA | −1.9 | 20.9 | 9,467 | 8 | | Wayne, GA | −59.9 | 29.0 | 13,519 | 12 | | White, GA | −68.8 | 8.9 | 16,745 | 10 | | Whitfield, GA | −44.7 | 23.6 | 39,608 | 23 | | Wilcox, GA | −49.3 | 34.2 | 3,340 | 6 | | Wilkes, GA | −16.9 | 33.8 | 5,083 | 7 | | Wilkinson, GA | −17.9 | 42.4 | 4,900 | 9 | | Worth, GA | −50.5 | 36.8 | 9,291 | 12 | | Hawaii, HI | +28.9 | 19.7 | 80,911 | 64 | | Honolulu, HI | +22.0 | 23.7 | 334,790 | 302 | | Kauai, HI | +19.9 | 21.2 | 29,478 | 31 | | Maui, HI | +26.5 | 19.3 | 61,526 | 70 | | Ada, ID | −10.6 | 34.1 | 259,875 | 197 | | Adams, ID | −55.9 | 15.1 | 2,614 | 5 | | Bannock, ID | −25.9 | 21.6 | 38,635 | 57 | | Bear Lake, ID | −78.7 | 8.2 | 3,254 | 15 | | Benewah, ID | −62.8 | 12.8 | 5,029 | 11 | | Bingham, ID | −61.3 | 22.4 | 20,066 | 27 | | Blaine, ID | +32.6 | 27.8 | 12,705 | 16 | | Boise, ID | −55.6 | 12.5 | 4,792 | 7 | | Bonner, ID | −47.2 | 25.2 | 29,002 | 30 | | Bonneville, ID | −47.0 | 16.8 | 54,511 | 51 | | Boundary, ID | −67.0 | 14.7 | 6,939 | 7 | | Canyon, ID | −47.8 | 15.2 | 98,424 | 51 | | Caribou, ID | −73.4 | 6.6 | 3,351 | 9 | | Cassia, ID | −70.8 | 11.7 | 9,318 | 24 | | Clearwater, ID | −64.2 | 7.7 | 4,324 | 14 | | Custer, ID | −54.6 | 28.4 | 2,584 | 9 | | Elmore, ID | −49.8 | 6.5 | 10,402 | 17 | | Franklin, ID | −79.9 | 4.6 | 6,982 | 18 | | Fremont, ID | −71.1 | 12.3 | 6,599 | 13 | | Gem, ID | −67.3 | 8.8 | 10,406 | 14 | | Gooding, ID | −61.9 | 8.7 | 5,776 | 6 | | Idaho, ID | −69.6 | 10.9 | 9,608 | 28 | | Jefferson, ID | −75.4 | 5.2 | 15,372 | 21 | The first 500 of 2853 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/sd_by_margin.json. Note: The number in the tooltip is the county's number of reporting units. Kings County, New York, and the two Pennsylvania counties named in the text are labeled. Note: The returns are full counts with no sampling error. The whiskers show how much a mean would move with a different set of counties, from a county bootstrap. Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2024 precinct-level presidential returns; county totals summed from the precincts; full counts of votes, not survey estimates, so nothing is weighted except by two-party votes where stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/sd_by_margin.json ### Table 6. Spread rises with Democratic lean, with or without controls for county size and state Correlation between the spread of precinct margins and the county two-party margin, Democratic positive, across 2,853 counties, 2024, with 95% intervals | Weighting | Controls | Correlation | Interval, low | Interval, high | Counties | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Vote-weighted | No controls | +0.41 | +0.33 | +0.49 | 2,853 | | Vote-weighted | Size fixed | +0.21 | +0.12 | +0.30 | 2,853 | | Vote-weighted | Size and state fixed | +0.28 | +0.19 | +0.37 | 2,853 | | Unweighted | No controls | +0.54 | +0.51 | +0.56 | 2,853 | | Unweighted | Size fixed | +0.46 | +0.43 | +0.50 | 2,853 | | Unweighted | Size and state fixed | +0.47 | +0.43 | +0.51 | 2,853 | Note: Each interval resamples counties 2,000 times; a full count has no sampling error, so the interval says how much the correlation would move with a different set of counties. Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2024 precinct-level presidential returns; county totals summed from the precincts; full counts of votes, not survey estimates, so nothing is weighted except by two-party votes where stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/dispersion_partials.json ### Table 7. Spread falls with distance from an even split, except in vote-weighted comparisons of counties within 50 points Correlation between the spread of precinct margins and the size of the county margin, among counties with a margin at or below each cutoff, 2024, with 95% intervals | Cutoff (points of margin) | Weighting | Counties | No controls | Size fixed | Size and state fixed | | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | 30 | Vote-weighted | 954 | −0.02 [−0.13, +0.08] | +0.01 [−0.09, +0.10] | −0.07 [−0.18, +0.02] | | 30 | Unweighted | 954 | −0.12 [−0.18, −0.06] | −0.13 [−0.19, −0.07] | −0.17 [−0.23, −0.11] | | 40 | Vote-weighted | 1,321 | −0.07 [−0.18, +0.04] | −0.03 [−0.13, +0.05] | −0.08 [−0.20, 0.00] | | 40 | Unweighted | 1,321 | −0.20 [−0.25, −0.14] | −0.21 [−0.26, −0.15] | −0.25 [−0.30, −0.20] | | 50 | Vote-weighted | 1,725 | −0.04 [−0.18, +0.08] | +0.01 [−0.12, +0.12] | −0.04 [−0.19, +0.06] | | 50 | Unweighted | 1,725 | −0.26 [−0.30, −0.22] | −0.26 [−0.30, −0.21] | −0.31 [−0.36, −0.27] | | 60 | Vote-weighted | 2,156 | −0.15 [−0.26, −0.04] | −0.08 [−0.18, +0.03] | −0.11 [−0.24, −0.02] | | 60 | Unweighted | 2,156 | −0.38 [−0.41, −0.34] | −0.36 [−0.39, −0.32] | −0.39 [−0.44, −0.35] | | 70 | Vote-weighted | 2,593 | −0.24 [−0.34, −0.13] | −0.15 [−0.25, −0.04] | −0.20 [−0.33, −0.10] | | 70 | Unweighted | 2,593 | −0.48 [−0.51, −0.45] | −0.44 [−0.47, −0.40] | −0.48 [−0.52, −0.45] | | 100 | Vote-weighted | 2,853 | −0.29 [−0.39, −0.20] | −0.19 [−0.30, −0.09] | −0.25 [−0.37, −0.16] | | 100 | Unweighted | 2,853 | −0.55 [−0.57, −0.52] | −0.49 [−0.52, −0.46] | −0.55 [−0.58, −0.52] | Note: The last cutoff, 100 points, includes every county, because no margin can be larger. The number in the tooltip is the number of counties in the row. Each interval resamples the counties of the row 2,000 times; a full count has no sampling error, so the interval says how much the correlation would move with a different set of counties. Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2024 precinct-level presidential returns; county totals summed from the precincts; full counts of votes, not survey estimates, so nothing is weighted except by two-party votes where stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/ext_by_cutoff.json ### Table 8. Near-tied counties differ widely in how much their precinct margins vary Share of the near-tied counties in each 5-point bin of spread of precinct margins, 2024; margin under 5 points and at least 20 precincts | n | share | x0 | x1 | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 11 | 9.91 | 10 | 15 | | 21 | 18.92 | 15 | 20 | | 34 | 30.63 | 20 | 25 | | 16 | 14.41 | 25 | 30 | | 11 | 9.91 | 30 | 35 | | 11 | 9.91 | 35 | 40 | | 5 | 4.50 | 40 | 45 | | 1 | 0.901 | 45 | 50 | | 0 | 0 | 50 | 55 | | 1 | 0.901 | 55 | 60 | Note: The number in the tooltip is the number of counties in the bin. Note: Full counts of votes: there is no sampling, so the shares carry no confidence interval. Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2024 precinct-level presidential returns; county totals summed from the precincts; full counts of votes, not survey estimates, so nothing is weighted except by two-party votes where stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/near_tied_sd.json ### Table 9. Dropping ballot-bucket units moves each correlation by at most 0.02 and each vote share by at most 0.3 points Main statistics in the full sample and in a side check that drops ballot-bucket units, 2024 two-party presidential returns | Statistic | Full sample | Without ballot-bucket units | | --- | --- | --- | | Counties with a spread | 2,853 | 2,721 | | Near-tied counties | 111 | 106 | | Median spread of near-tied counties (points) | 23.9 | 24.0 | | Correlation of spread with Democratic lean | +0.41 | +0.40 | | Same, with county size and state fixed | +0.28 | +0.27 | | Correlation of spread with distance from an even split, counties within 50 points | −0.04 | −0.04 | | Votes in precincts decided by 20 points or more | 65.0% | 64.8% | | Votes in precincts decided by under 10 points | 18.5% | 18.6% | Note: The changes in the title are the largest differences before rounding, rounded up to the decimals printed. Source: MIT Election Data and Science Lab, 2024 precinct-level presidential returns; county totals summed from the precincts; full counts of votes, not survey estimates, so nothing is weighted except by two-party votes where stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/side_check.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (160), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | alaska_share_cert | 0.2% | percent of the certified two-party votes | share of certified two-party votes cast in Alaska | all counties with returns | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | all_median_votes | 13,707 | two-party votes | median county size | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | | 2,853 | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | | | beyond_max_sd | 34.7 | points of two-party margin | largest county spread | counties with a margin larger than 70 points | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | beyond_n | 260 | counties | count of counties with a margin larger than 70 points | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | beyond_ratio_max | 49% | percent of the limit | largest ratio of a county's spread to the largest spread its margin allows | counties with a margin larger than 70 points | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | beyond_ratio_mean | 12% | percent of the limit | mean ratio of a county's spread to the largest spread its margin allows | counties with a margin larger than 70 points | 2024 presidential general election | | 260 | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | | | bin_blue_end | 19.3 | points of two-party margin | mean county spread weighted by votes | counties in the analysis sample in a 10-point bin of county margin (at least 10 counties) | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 15.3 to 23.9 | 12 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | bin_blue_end_n | 12 | counties | count | counties in that bin | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | bin_blue_end_x | 66 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted mean county margin | counties in the analysis sample in that bin | 2024 presidential general election | | 12 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | bin_diff_gap | 6.9 | points of two-party margin | difference between the vote-weighted mean spreads of the highest bin and that bin | counties in the highest bin and in that bin | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.7 to 12.9 | 203 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from resampling the counties of each bin separately (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | bin_diff_x | 4 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted mean county margin (Republican lead) | counties in that bin | 2024 presidential general election | | 169 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | The one bin of the run, other than the highest bin, whose difference from the highest bin has a 95% interval that excludes zero. | | bin_gap_blue | 11.8 | points of two-party margin | difference between the vote-weighted mean spreads of the two bins | counties in the highest bin and in the bluest bin | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 3.9 to 18.9 | 46 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from resampling the counties of each bin separately (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | bin_peak | 31.1 | points of two-party margin | mean county spread weighted by votes | counties in the analysis sample in a 10-point bin of county margin (at least 10 counties) | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 24.7 to 36.8 | 34 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | bin_peak_x | 43 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted mean county margin | counties in the analysis sample in that bin | 2024 presidential general election | | 34 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | bin_plat_end_x | 34 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted mean county margin (Democratic lead) | counties in that bin | 2024 presidential general election | | 50 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | bin_plat_max | 28.4 | points of two-party margin | largest binned mean among those bins | counties in the analysis sample in a 10-point bin of county margin (at least 10 counties) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | bin_plat_min | 24.1 | points of two-party margin | smallest binned mean among those bins | counties in the analysis sample in a 10-point bin of county margin (at least 10 counties) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | bin_plat_n | 6 | bins | count | bins whose intervals overlap the interval of the highest bin, counted back from it, other than the highest bin | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | bin_plat_start | 25.4 | points of two-party margin | mean county spread weighted by votes | counties in the analysis sample in a 10-point bin of county margin (at least 10 counties) | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 23.4 to 27.5 | 201 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | bin_plat_start_x | 14 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted mean county margin (Republican lead) | counties in that bin | 2024 presidential general election | | 201 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | bin_red_end | 6.7 | points of two-party margin | mean county spread weighted by votes | counties in the analysis sample in a 10-point bin of county margin (at least 10 counties) | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 5.2 to 8.0 | 40 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | bin_red_end_x | 82 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted mean county margin | counties in the analysis sample in that bin | 2024 presidential general election | | 40 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | bin_width | 10 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Width of the margin bins used for the binned means and the precinct histograms. | | bound_at_cut | 71.4 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Precinct margins lie between -100 and 100, so a county with margin M cannot have a spread above the square root of 100 squared minus M squared; this is the limit for a margin of 70 points. | | bucks_comp | 50.0% | percent of the county's two-party votes | share of votes cast in precincts decided by under 10 points | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | bucks_margin | −0.1 | points of two-party margin | two-party margin, Democratic positive | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | bucks_max_d | 42.0 | points of two-party margin | margin of the most Democratic precinct | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | bucks_max_r | 33.7 | points of two-party margin | margin of the most Republican precinct, as a Republican lead | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | bucks_sd | 14.8 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | 304 | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | bucks_units | 304 | precincts | count | Bucks County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | centre_comp | 5.5% | percent of the county's two-party votes | share of votes cast in precincts decided by under 10 points | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | centre_margin | +2.9 | points of two-party margin | two-party margin, Democratic positive | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | centre_max_d | 65.0 | points of two-party margin | margin of the most Democratic precinct | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | centre_max_r | 75.2 | points of two-party margin | margin of the most Republican precinct, as a Republican lead | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | centre_sd | 36.3 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | 87 | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | centre_units | 87 | precincts | count | Centre County, PA | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | comp_equiv | 55% | percent of the two-party vote | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A margin of 10 points is a 55 to 45 split of the two-party vote. | | cut_beyond | 70 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Counties with a margin larger than this are the tails of the distribution. | | cut_big_votes | 100,000 | two-party votes | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Counties with at least this many two-party votes are called large. | | cut_comp | 10 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A place is called close when its two-party margin is smaller than this. | | cut_deep | 40 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A place is called very lopsided when its two-party margin is this large or larger. | | cut_floor_units | 5 | reporting units | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A county needs at least this many reporting units for a spread estimate. | | cut_land | 20 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A place is called a landslide when its two-party margin is this large or larger. | | cut_mid_lo | 15 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Lower end of the middle range of near-tied spreads: a spread of this many points or more and under the wide-spread cutoff. | | cut_near | 5 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A county is near-tied when its two-party margin is smaller than this. | | cut_near_units | 20 | precincts | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A near-tied county needs at least this many precincts. | | cut_nongeo_share | 20% | percent of the county's votes | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Counties in which ballot-bucket units (absentee, provisional, early voting and the like) hold this share of votes or more are left out of the side check. | | cut_sd | 30 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A county spread of 30 points is called wide. | | cut_sd_top | 50 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A county is called one of the widest-spread counties when its spread is this many points or more. | | cut_small_units | 10 | reporting units | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A county with fewer reporting units than this is called small in the note on the map. | | cut_two_share | 20% | percent of the county's votes | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Share of a county's votes in landslide precincts of one party for the two-landslide test. | | cut_within | 50 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Counties with a margin of this many points or less (a margin of exactly this size included) are used for the check that leaves out the tails. | | cutoff_30 | 30 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A cutoff of the county margin in the check of how the distance correlation depends on the cutoff (counties with a margin of this many points or less). | | cutoff_40 | 40 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A cutoff of the county margin in the check of how the distance correlation depends on the cutoff (counties with a margin of this many points or less). | | cutoff_60 | 60 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A cutoff of the county margin in the check of how the distance correlation depends on the cutoff (counties with a margin of this many points or less). | | floor_vw_mean | 3.1 | points of two-party margin | mean of the spread expected if voters were assigned to precincts at random, weighted by votes | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | la_share | 51.5% | percent of the certified two-party votes | ratio of precinct votes to certified votes | Louisiana parishes | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | land_equiv | 60% | percent of the two-party vote | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A margin of 20 points is a 60 to 40 split of the two-party vote. | | margin_arlington | +59.9 | points of two-party margin | two-party margin, Democratic positive | Arlington (a county with at least 100,000 two-party votes) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | margin_dc | +86.6 | points of two-party margin | two-party margin, Democratic positive | District of Columbia (a county with at least 100,000 two-party votes) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | margin_max | 100 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | The largest possible two-party margin, in points. | | margin_metro1 | +11.7 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted mean county margin | metro counties of 1 million or more in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 7.3 to 15.7 | 419 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | margin_open | −45.2 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted mean county margin | the least urban nonmetro counties in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI −47.6 to −42.7 | 873 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | min_bin_counties | 10 | counties | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A bin of county margin is shown only when it holds at least this many counties. | | n_acs | 2,843 | counties | count | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units and ACS measures | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | n_below_floor | 190 | counties | count | counties in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | Counties with fewer than 5 reporting units have no spread estimate. | | n_big | 318 | counties | count | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_boot | 2,000 | resamples | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Number of county resamples behind each interval. | | n_counties | 3,043 | counties | count | counties in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_counties_disp | 2,853 | counties | count | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_no_rucc | 10 | counties | count of counties with no Rural-Urban Continuum Code in the panel | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | The Connecticut counties (the panel uses the 2022 planning regions), Kansas City, Missouri, and Oglala Lakota County, South Dakota. | | n_out_la | 64 | parishes | count | Louisiana parishes | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_out_other | 6 | counties | count | counties outside Louisiana whose precinct rows do not add to the certified total | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_out_total | 70 | counties | count | counties whose precinct rows do not add to the certified total (Louisiana and others) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_sd30 | 368 | counties | count | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_sd_top | 33 | counties | count of counties with a spread of 50 points or more | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_sd_top_msal | 20 | counties | count of those counties in Mississippi or Alabama | counties in the analysis sample with a spread of 50 points or more | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_sd_top_small | 4 | counties | count of those counties with fewer than 10 reporting units | counties in the analysis sample with a spread of 50 points or more | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_sim | 200 | simulated assignments | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Number of simulated assignments of voters to precincts behind the random-assignment bars. | | n_states | 48 | states | count | states in the analysis sample, not counting the District of Columbia | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_units | 175,345 | reporting units | count | reporting units (precincts) in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | n_within50 | 1,725 | counties | count | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units and a margin of 50 points or less | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_floor | 3.4 | points of two-party margin | median of the spread expected if voters were assigned to precincts at random | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | 111 | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_max_sd | 58.1 | points of two-party margin | largest county spread | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_median_sd | 23.9 | points of two-party margin | median of county spreads | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 22.8 to 24.9 | 111 | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | near_median_votes | 78,269 | two-party votes | median county size | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | 111 | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_min_sd | 10.1 | points of two-party margin | smallest county spread | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_n | 111 | counties | count | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_n_sd30 | 29 | counties | count with a spread of 30 or more | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_n_two | 39 | counties | count with one fifth or more of the votes in Democratic landslide precincts and one fifth or more in Republican landslide precincts | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_share_comp | 35.6% | percent of the two-party votes of these counties | share of votes cast in precincts in the band | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_share_deep | 10.5% | percent of the two-party votes of these counties | share of votes cast in precincts in the band | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_share_land | 38.2% | percent of the two-party votes of these counties | share of votes cast in precincts in the band | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_share_land_d | 17.5% | percent of the two-party votes of these counties | share of votes cast in precincts in the band | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_share_land_r | 20.7% | percent of the two-party votes of these counties | share of votes cast in precincts in the band | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_share_mid | 64.0% | percent of counties | share with a spread of 15 points or more and under 30 | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_share_sd30 | 26.1% | percent of counties | share with a spread of 30 or more | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_share_two | 35.1% | percent of counties | share of counties in the previous count | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | | | near_votes | 18.9 million | two-party votes | sum | near-tied counties in the analysis sample: two-party margin within 5 points and at least 20 precincts | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | nongeo_share | 1.5% | percent of two-party votes | share of votes in units labelled as ballot buckets: absentee, provisional, early voting, mail, failsafe, military, overseas and statistical-adjustment | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | nongeo_units | 870 | reporting units | count | reporting units (precincts) in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | out_share_cert | 2.0% | percent of the certified two-party votes | share | all counties with returns | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | The 70 counties left out by the reconciliation rule; Alaska is a further share. | | r_cut60 | −0.15 | correlation coefficient | correlation of distance from an even split with county spread | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units and a margin of 60 points or less | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI −0.26 to −0.04 | 2,156 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_cutallu | −0.55 | correlation coefficient | correlation of distance from an even split with county spread, each county counted once | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI −0.57 to −0.52 | 2,853 | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_ext50_raw | −0.04 | correlation coefficient | correlation of distance from an even split with county spread | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units and a margin of 50 points or less | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI −0.18 to 0.08 | 1,725 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_ext50u_raw | −0.26 | correlation coefficient | correlation of distance from an even split with county spread, each county counted once | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units and a margin of 50 points or less | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI −0.30 to −0.22 | 1,725 | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_ext_fe | −0.25 | correlation coefficient | correlation of distance from an even split with county spread after size and state controls | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI −0.37 to −0.16 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_ext_raw | −0.29 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county margin's distance from zero with county spread | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI −0.39 to −0.20 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_ext_size | −0.19 | correlation coefficient | correlation of distance from an even split with county spread after removing size | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI −0.30 to −0.09 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_lean50_raw | +0.41 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county margin with county spread | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units and a margin of 50 points or less | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.49 | 1,725 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_lean_fe | +0.28 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county margin with county spread after removing the linear effects of log votes and log precincts and state means | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.37 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_lean_logvotes | +0.64 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county margin with the log of two-party votes | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.59 to 0.69 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_lean_raw | +0.41 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county margin with county spread | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.49 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_lean_size | +0.21 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county margin with county spread after removing linear effects of log votes and log precincts | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.12 to 0.30 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_lean_unw | +0.54 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county margin with county spread, each county counted once | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.51 to 0.56 | 2,853 | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_lean_unw_fe | +0.47 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county margin with county spread after size and state controls, each county counted once | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.43 to 0.51 | 2,853 | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_nonwhite_fe | +0.31 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the nonwhite share with county spread after size and state controls | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units and ACS measures | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.22 to 0.40 | 2,843 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_nonwhite_raw | +0.43 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the nonwhite share (ACS 2024) with county spread | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units and ACS measures | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.36 to 0.50 | 2,843 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_rural_fe | −0.13 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the rural share with county spread after size and state controls | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units and ACS measures | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI −0.19 to −0.08 | 2,843 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_rural_raw | −0.36 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the rural share (2020 census urban area definition, county panel) with county spread | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units and ACS measures | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI −0.41 to −0.30 | 2,843 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | r_sd_logvotes | +0.40 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county spread with the log of two-party votes | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.46 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | rb_dcorr_max | 0.02 | correlation coefficient | largest absolute change, rounded up to two decimals, across the correlations of spread with lean (raw and with size and state fixed) and with distance from an even split within 50 points | counties in the side check and in the full sample | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | rb_dshare_max | 0.3 | percentage points of votes | largest absolute change, rounded up to one decimal, across the shares of votes in precincts decided by 20 points or more and by under 10 points | units in the side check and in the full sample | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | rb_n_counties | 2,721 | counties | count | counties in the side check | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | rb_near_n | 106 | counties | count | near-tied counties in the side check | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | sd_al | 32.2 | points of two-party margin | mean of county spreads weighted by votes | Alabama counties with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 25.2 to 38.3 | 67 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345), resampling the counties of the state. | | sd_arlington | 6.5 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins | Arlington (a county with at least 100,000 two-party votes) | 2024 presidential general election | | 55 | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | sd_bin_width | 5 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Width of the spread bins in the histogram of near-tied counties. | | sd_dc | 5.9 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins | District of Columbia (a county with at least 100,000 two-party votes) | 2024 presidential general election | | 144 | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | sd_equiv | 15 | points of Democratic vote share | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | A spread of 30 margin points is a spread of 15 points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote. | | sd_jeffal | 53.5 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins | Jefferson County, AL, 2024 (a county with at least 100,000 two-party votes) | 2024 presidential general election | | 179 | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | sd_kings | 54.9 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins | Kings County, NY, 2024 (a county with at least 100,000 two-party votes) | 2024 presidential general election | | 1,341 | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | sd_median | 15.6 | points of two-party margin | median of county spreads | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 15.0 to 16.0 | 2,853 | none (full counts); each county counted once | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | sd_metro1 | 24.8 | points of two-party margin | mean of county spreads weighted by two-party votes | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units, metro area of 1 million or more (Rural-Urban Continuum Code 1, 2023) | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 23.5 to 26.1 | 419 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | sd_metro2 | 22.7 | points of two-party margin | mean of county spreads weighted by two-party votes | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units, smaller metro area (Rural-Urban Continuum Code 2 to 3, 2023) | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 21.9 to 23.5 | 690 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | sd_mobile | 50.2 | points of two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of precinct margins | Mobile County, AL, 2024 (a county with at least 100,000 two-party votes) | 2024 presidential general election | | 82 | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | sd_ms | 38.2 | points of two-party margin | mean of county spreads weighted by votes | Mississippi counties with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 34.9 to 41.5 | 82 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345), resampling the counties of the state. | | sd_open | 15.5 | points of two-party margin | mean of county spreads weighted by two-party votes | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units, nonmetro, smaller towns and open country (Rural-Urban Continuum Code 8 to 9, 2023) | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 14.6 to 16.5 | 873 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | sd_town | 19.4 | points of two-party margin | mean of county spreads weighted by two-party votes | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units, nonmetro, larger towns (Rural-Urban Continuum Code 4 to 7, 2023) | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 18.7 to 20.1 | 861 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | sd_vw_mean | 23.3 | points of two-party margin | mean of county spreads weighted by two-party votes | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 22.5 to 24.1 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | share_comp_county | 23.1% | percent of two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties in the band | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | share_comp_precinct | 18.5% | percent of two-party votes | share of votes cast in precincts in the band | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | share_comp_random | 23.3% | percent of two-party votes | mean over 200 simulated assignments of the share of votes in precincts in the band, when each precinct's Democratic votes are a binomial draw of its votes at its county's Democratic share | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | 200 | none; simulation with unit sizes and county margins held fixed (seed 12345) | Precinct presidential returns | | | share_deep_county | 25.4% | percent of two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties in the band | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | share_deep_precinct | 36.4% | percent of two-party votes | share of votes cast in precincts in the band | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | share_deep_random | 25.0% | percent of two-party votes | mean over 200 simulated assignments of the share of votes in precincts in the band, when each precinct's Democratic votes are a binomial draw of its votes at its county's Democratic share | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | 200 | none; simulation with unit sizes and county margins held fixed (seed 12345) | Precinct presidential returns | | | share_land_county | 57.2% | percent of two-party votes | share of votes cast in counties in the band | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | share_land_precinct | 65.0% | percent of two-party votes | share of votes cast in precincts in the band | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | share_land_random | 56.6% | percent of two-party votes | mean over 200 simulated assignments of the share of votes in precincts in the band, when each precinct's Democratic votes are a binomial draw of its votes at its county's Democratic share | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | 200 | none; simulation with unit sizes and county margins held fixed (seed 12345) | Precinct presidential returns | | | sim_county_gap | 0.7 | percentage points of votes | largest absolute difference across the three bands between the random-assignment share and the county share | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); precinct results weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | | sim_range | 0.4 | percentage points of votes | largest difference between the highest and lowest of the simulated shares, across the three bands | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | 200 | none; simulation (seed 12345) | Precinct presidential returns | | | slope_fe | 0.9 | points of spread per 10 points of margin | weighted least squares slope of county spread on county margin, times 10, with log votes, log precincts and state means | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.6 to 1.3 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | slope_raw | 1.1 | points of spread per 10 points of margin | weighted least squares slope of county spread on county margin, times 10 | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | 95% CI 0.8 to 1.4 | 2,853 | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345). | | slope_step | 10 | points of two-party margin | definition | definition used in this chapter | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (definition) | Precinct presidential returns | Step in county margin for the slope of spread on margin. | | unit_ca_per_county | 578 | precincts per county | mean count of reporting units per county | California counties in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | unit_med_max | 2,083 | two-party votes per precinct | median precinct size | Connecticut precincts in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | | 756 | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | unit_med_min | 227 | two-party votes per precinct | median precinct size | Kansas precincts in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | | 3,737 | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | unit_nd_per_county | 7 | precincts per county | mean count of reporting units per county | North Dakota counties in the analysis sample | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | votes_sample | 149.0 million | two-party votes | sum of Democratic and Republican votes | two-party presidential votes in the analysis sample (counties whose precinct rows match the certified total; Alaska left out) | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts) | Precinct presidential returns | | | votes_sd30 | 18.7% | percent of two-party votes | share of the votes of these counties cast in counties with a spread of 30 or more | counties in the analysis sample with at least 5 reporting units | 2024 presidential general election | | | none (full counts); counties weighted by their two-party votes | Precinct presidential returns | | ## Definitions - Precinct: The smallest area for which election officials report votes, usually the voters assigned to one polling place. Precinct boundaries change between elections, so the same precinct cannot be followed over time. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - County two-party margin: The Democratic vote minus the Republican vote, divided by the sum of the two, so a positive value is a Democratic lead. Votes for other candidates are left out. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Rural-Urban Continuum Code: A USDA scheme that sorts counties into nine classes, from large metropolitan areas to remote rural ones, by population size and nearness to a metropolitan area. The 2013 and 2023 editions classify some counties differently. - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Fixed effects: Regression terms that give each group, such as each country or each year, its own baseline. The other coefficients then compare respondents within the same group. - Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them. ## Methods Sample: the 2024 presidential returns in the MIT Election Data and Science Lab precinct file, two-party votes per reporting unit (Democratic: Harris; Republican: Trump; write-ins and other candidates left out) from b3.load.precinct_two_party, which takes a precinct's TOTAL row where the state reports one and otherwise adds the rows for each voting mode. A 'precinct' is the unit the state or county election office reports, so it varies in size and kind by state. Rules applied in order: units with no two-party vote or a negative count are dropped (15,602 units, three of them Michigan statistical adjustments); Alaska is dropped (523 units; its 2024 county codes are election districts); 4 units with no county code are dropped; 123 Kansas City units are moved from code 36000 to 2938000, the code of the county file; a county is kept only when its precinct rows add to between 95% and 105% of its certified two-party vote in the repaired county file, which removes 70 counties (64 Louisiana parishes, where the precinct rows hold about 52% of the certified vote, and 6 others, four of them with rows that appear twice, in Bergen and Gloucester, NJ, and Hendricks and St. Joseph, IN). The analysis sample is 175,345 units, 148,953,406 two-party votes and 3,043 counties in 48 states and the District of Columbia; the 70 excluded counties hold 2.0% of the certified votes and Alaska a further 0.2%. Estimands: a precinct or county margin is 100 times the Democratic minus the Republican votes over their sum; the spread of a county is the standard deviation of its precinct margins about the county margin, weighted by each precinct's two-party votes (population divisor), and needs at least 5 reporting units; the spread expected from chance is 200 times the square root of p(1 - p) times the number of units over the votes, with p the Democratic two-party share, which is the spread if each voter were assigned to a unit at random. Near-tied counties have a margin below 5 points in absolute value and at least 20 precincts. Shares of votes in bands use exact tests on vote counts (a margin of 20 points or more is 5 |D - R| >= D + R). Random-assignment benchmark for the shares in bands: 200 simulated assignments (seed 12345) in which each precinct keeps its two-party votes and its county's Democratic share and its Democratic votes are a binomial draw; the figure shows the mean of the runs, and the largest range of a share across runs is 0.4 points. County correlations are weighted by two-party votes unless the text says each county is counted once; holding county size fixed removes the linear effect of the log of two-party votes and the log of the number of units, and holding state fixed removes each state's weighted mean from every variable (equal to a regression with state dummies). The slope of spread on margin is the coefficient of a weighted regression with the same controls, per 10 points of margin. Counties within 50 points have a margin of 50 points or less in absolute value; the correlation of spread with distance from an even split is also computed at cutoffs of 30, 40, 60 and 70 points and across all counties, weighted and counting each county once, each with no controls, with county size fixed and with size and state fixed; the correlation of spread with lean is computed weighted and counting each county once, with the same three sets of controls. Binned means use 10-point bins of county margin and need 10 counties. Place types use the USDA Rural-Urban Continuum Code, 2023 edition (1; 2 and 3; 4 to 7; 8 and 9); nonwhite share is 100 minus the non-Hispanic white share (ACS 2024) and rural share is the share of residents outside 2020 census urban areas, both from the county demographics panel, which has no values for the Connecticut counties, Kansas City, Missouri, and Oglala Lakota County, South Dakota. Weights: none from a survey, because the returns are full counts; statistics are weighted by two-party votes as stated. Intervals: the returns have no sampling error, so shares, counts and county spreads carry no interval; a correlation, a slope, a mean or a median across a set of counties has a 95% percentile interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345); the interval for the difference between two bins of county margin resamples the counties of each bin separately, and a state mean resamples the counties of the state. Side check: dropping the units labelled as absentee, provisional, early voting, mail, failsafe, military, overseas and statistical-adjustment units (870 units, found by these words in the label: absen(tee), abs, provisional, prov, early voting, early vote, earlyvote, early on its own, EV, mail, statistical adjustments, military, overseas, failsafe) and the counties where they hold 20% of the votes or more leaves 2,721 counties with a spread; the results are printed beside the full-sample values in the section on what the data cannot show. Suppression: no county with fewer than 5 reporting units enters a spread statistic; no other cell is suppressed. Everything is a 2024 cross-section. ## What these data cannot show - The chapter describes one election. - It says nothing about whether precinct margins are spreading or narrowing, and it makes no comparison with earlier years. - Chapter 11.2, Sorting by geographic scale, 2016 to 2024 (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/sorting-by-geographic-scale; planned), a planned chapter, will compare precincts across elections, and Chapter 10.1, Nationalization of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote) measures how closely county results move together from one election to the next. - A precinct is a reporting unit and not a neighborhood. - The file has no boundaries, so the data cannot say which precincts are adjacent, and a county with a wide spread need not have opposed precincts next to each other. - Units also differ in kind. - Units labelled absentee, provisional, early voting, mail, failsafe, military or overseas, and units labelled as statistical adjustments, hold 1.5% of votes across 870 units, and they are buckets of ballots and not places. - Table 9 repeats the main statistics without them and without the counties where they hold 20% of votes or more. - That leaves 2,721 counties with a spread and 106 near-tied counties, against 111 in the full sample. - Table 9. - Dropping ballot-bucket units moves each correlation by at most 0.02 and each vote share by at most 0.3 points - A precinct margin describes a place and not the voters in it. - A precinct that gave one party 60% or more still holds voters of the other. - Ecological inference, which moves from places to individuals, can fail, because a pattern across places can differ from the pattern among individuals [5]. - The results also depend on the units. - Shares and spreads change with the size and shape of the areas, a problem known as the modifiable areal unit problem [6], and this chapter uses the units that election offices happened to report. - The 64 Louisiana parishes, the 6 other counties and Alaska that are left out are not a random set. - The cutoffs for near-tied counties and for a wide spread are choices, and so are the vote weights and the 50-point cutoff behind the correlation of spread with distance from an even split. - That correlation is near zero only in the vote-weighted comparisons within 50 points or less. - A single spread cannot tell a county with two humps from a county with a long tail. - The random-assignment benchmark holds each unit's size and its county's margin fixed and does not model why voters differ across precincts. - Nothing here identifies why spread is wider in some counties. - It goes with lean, size, nonwhite share and place type, and the controls are few and linear. ## References 1. Bishop, Bill; Cushing, Robert G. (2008). The Big Sort: Why the Clustering of Like-Minded America Is Tearing Us Apart. Houghton Mifflin. 2. Abrams, Samuel J.; Fiorina, Morris P. (2012). "The Big Sort" That Wasn't: A Skeptical Reexamination. PS: Political Science and Politics 45(2): 203-210. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096512000017 3. Brown, Jacob R.; Enos, Ryan D. (2021). The Measurement of Partisan Sorting for 180 Million Voters. Nature Human Behaviour 5: 998-1008. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-021-01066-z 4. Rodden, Jonathan A. (2019). Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Political Divide. Basic Books. 5. Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. American Sociological Review 15(3): 351-357. 6. Openshaw, Stan (1984). The Modifiable Areal Unit Problem. Concepts and Techniques in Modern Geography 38, Norwich: Geo Books. ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/precincts-within-counties/build.py (sha256 6ee74aa11054b92466524b4220c8cb6f1c7b699f116c5ba88fdf1807d0399232) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/county/pres_county_1868_2024.parquet | 6,295,675 | bec11c7a0cb5d4180bbd6809d048bc892dd00dfcdde527fa4da871b1dd3f835f | b2a4f000f2eea72d09af8939555289e924875cca40cd95ec8869104cd575bed7 | | data/county/pres_county_2000_2024.parquet | 5,622,625 | 89e55d8bb32746282a8a0880a7d0e82892acf449eaea71ac1aa7466cc9b0cc23 | d6c6a14fdff6f54e9ee88e46c71dce64ee40b940e050f92d18540e4889f4a0f3 | | data/precinct/pres_precinct_2016_2020_2024.parquet | 12,200,115 | 53917fd567a1a7267fb02b7f7c0f229d3b251f32be472968a3fd4577653b4956 | 7868d4ba4664ffc59db2f5966b3f8812b455b6ab9d8bd52781768a925552efd3 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | b70068b8a5df4f5b567913a6a808faccbb78c09e76ae98eaa0eed42710d9917c | | figures/county_sd_map.json | 580882435f9a85273f55857706f49cf5508aae9e94b6e74cee02c2e019b63f26 | | figures/dispersion_partials.json | c5284a237834227b33ae4e818434b3d324f472cd0d0016b6884cd8a101a4260a | | figures/example_counties.json | 32e2dc507cf27a8d8ef8e47f8aa8352b11ff9a886f1872af7d6c9f5eb07a8232 | | figures/ext_by_cutoff.json | cb056155db52387ece816472721c76e8257657306cfee99fea7feb8c50269768 | | figures/landslide_shares.json | 4140795df5735dc90b90f59f9edb9f3430b121cad17b9da46a23dd3f21474b4a | | figures/near_tied_sd.json | 5e3c59449bdd3e963161dde8b8b0d3a10bb423c20f4474e0d72bfd7606dff632 | | figures/sd_by_margin.json | d99808d3ebcbffbda1bc79e7c17d8ac7e8904b4fc3cf0ec8a8cbf85473d4ccb7 | | figures/sd_by_place_type.json | 7703748d9a9d0d0201bf1339f7572ff87568f0601f0640f02904922db6535f94 | | figures/side_check.json | 1341b4adf2a5a5ba4213bcec84f760b77c5a1c3cc3c38126e6ecb80d5056d13a | | meta.json | e260af1fb522731536555d015f996b818ab3c4e075fb043f1f9c2ef3c42535c0 | | public/data/precincts-within-counties/county_sd_map.json | eb9534e8c372ae01eb2b210f6b3fcff02124f3cfd187128d4fe4d31e4075f66c | | refs.json | 599f99d0ff52632f0953ee9d7ed096112f2155d3d572417ab8ae566107896f1a | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/precincts-within-counties/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/precincts-within-counties/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/facts.json - Table 1, figure "example_counties" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/example_counties.json - Table 2, figure "landslide_shares" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/landslide_shares.json - Table 3, figure "county_sd_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/county_sd_map.json - Table 4, figure "sd_by_place_type" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/sd_by_place_type.json - Table 5, figure "sd_by_margin" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/sd_by_margin.json - Table 6, figure "dispersion_partials" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/dispersion_partials.json - Table 7, figure "ext_by_cutoff" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/ext_by_cutoff.json - Table 8, figure "near_tied_sd" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/near_tied_sd.json - Table 9, figure "side_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/precincts-within-counties/figures/side_check.json - Payload of "county_sd_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/precincts-within-counties/county_sd_map.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Five axes of the county vote: report Chapter 12.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Five axes of the county vote - Chapter: 12.1 (Part XII, Demographic axes of the vote; The political map) - Question: How do education, income, race and ethnicity, age and rurality rank as correlates of the county vote? - Dek: In 2024, college share had the largest correlation with the county two-party margin among five county characteristics, +0.66 vote-weighted, and it is not separated from rural share's −0.65. - Grain: places - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - County election returns. County presidential returns, 2000-2024: Algara and Amlani (2000-2020) and MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2024), repaired file; years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts of votes); statistics weighted by two-party votes in the election, or county-equal - County demographics panel. County demographics panel, 2000-2024: education, income, race and ethnicity, age and rural share, with the rural-urban continuum code and its edition; years: 2000-2024 (election years, interpolated between census and survey anchors); weights: none (census and American Community Survey estimates, interpolated to election years; sampling error not carried) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026fiveaxesofthecountyvote ```bibtex @misc{singh2026fiveaxesofthecountyvote, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Five axes of the county vote}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | correlation of the county two-party margin with college share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | +0.66 | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.72 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | r_edu_2024_w | | correlation of the county two-party margin with rural share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | −0.65 | 95% CI −0.74 to −0.56 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | r_rural_2024_w | | correlation of the county two-party margin with non-Hispanic white share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | −0.57 | 95% CI −0.71 to −0.44 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | r_race_2024_w | | absolute correlation of the first-ranked axis minus that of the second-ranked axis | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | +0.01 | 95% CI −0.05 to 0.09 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | gap_2024_w | | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2024 presidential election | 60% | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | first_edu_2024_w | | share of resamples in which rural share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2024 presidential election | 38% | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | first_rural_2024_w | | correlation of the county two-party margin with non-Hispanic white share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | −0.52 | 95% CI −0.68 to −0.36 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | r_race_2000_w | | correlation of the county two-party margin with rural share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | −0.46 | 95% CI −0.56 to −0.36 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | r_rural_2000_w | | correlation of the county two-party margin with college share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | +0.28 | 95% CI 0.18 to 0.38 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | r_edu_2000_w | | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2000 presidential election | 87% | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | first_race_2000_w | | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 41% | 95% CI 30% to 56% | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | r2_2000_w | | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 69% | 95% CI 63% to 78% | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | r2_2024_w | | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 20% | 95% CI 11% to 33% | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | r2_2000_u | | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 59% | 95% CI 49% to 71% | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | r2_2024_u | | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 74% | 95% CI 65% to 82% | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | r2fe_2000_w | | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 87% | 95% CI 84% to 90% | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | r2fe_2024_w | | change between the two elections in the weighted standard deviation of the margin fitted by the five axes (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | +10.3 | 95% CI 7.0 to 13.8 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | chs_explained_2000_2024_w | | change between the two elections in the weighted standard deviation of the margin left over after the five axes (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | −2.0 | 95% CI −3.6 to −0.7 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | chs_resid_2000_2024_w | | smallest number of counties in an election's sample | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 3,103 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_min | | largest number of counties in an election's sample | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 3,113 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_max | | number of bootstrap replicates | resamples of states | 2000 to 2024 | 2,000 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_reps | | share of two-party votes cast in the Connecticut counties left out for a missing census measure | two-party votes in counties with returns, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | 1.16% | | 8 | none (full counts) | County election returns | ct_votes_2020 | | share of two-party votes cast in the Connecticut counties left out for a missing census measure | two-party votes in counties with returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 1.14% | | 8 | none (full counts) | County election returns | ct_votes_2024 | ## Findings In 2024, college share, rural share and the non-Hispanic white share had the three largest correlations with the county two-party margin among five county characteristics. Vote-weighted, the correlations were +0.66 (95% CI 0.60 to 0.72) for college share, −0.65 for rural share and −0.57 for the white share. The first two are not separated. Their absolute correlations differ by +0.01 (95% CI −0.05 to 0.09), an interval that includes zero, and college share has the largest absolute correlation in 60% of resamples of states, against 38% for rural share. In 2000 the white share led, at −0.52 against −0.46 for rural share and +0.28 for college share, in 87% of resamples. Which axis ranks first depends on the election, on the weighting and on whether the other axes are held fixed, and in several elections the data do not separate the leading axes. Together the five characteristics reproduce 41% (95% CI 30% to 56%) of the variance of the county margin in 2000 and 69% (95% CI 63% to 78%) in 2024, vote-weighted. These shares are in-sample fits of a linear regression, estimated and scored on the same counties, and not forecasts. Counting every county once, the shares are 20% (95% CI 11% to 33%) and 59% (95% CI 49% to 71%), and with a baseline margin for each state the vote-weighted shares are 74% (95% CI 65% to 82%) and 87% (95% CI 84% to 90%). The rise combines a wider fitted part of the margin and a narrower left-over part, by +10.3 (95% CI 7.0 to 13.8) and −2.0 (95% CI −3.6 to −0.7) points of standard deviation, vote-weighted. This chapter is the common baseline for the geographic chapters that follow. It ranks five axes, education, income, race and ethnicity, age and rurality, as correlates of the county margin, in three steps. The first is the correlation of each axis alone with the margin, a raw association. The second is the coefficient of each axis when all five are held together, a conditional association. The third is the share of the variance of county margins that the five together reproduce, the fitted variance. Every statement describes an association among counties and not an effect on voters. Each axis is one measure: the share of adults with a bachelor's degree or more (education), median household income in 2024 dollars (income), the non-Hispanic white share of residents (race and ethnicity), median age (age) and the share of residents living in rural areas as the Census Bureau defines them (rurality). The margin is the Democratic minus the Republican votes over their sum, so a positive correlation means that counties with more of a characteristic voted more Democratic. A vote-weighted statistic counts each county in proportion to its two-party votes in the election, and a county-equal statistic counts each county once. Both are shown throughout, because the largest counties dominate the first and the many small counties the second. Each election uses 3,103 to 3,113 counties, those with returns and every census measure, and Table 1 lists which comparisons use the same counties, the same weights and the same other variables. (Note: Intervals on correlations and coefficients are 95% intervals with standard errors clustered by state [1]. Intervals on R-squared, on spreads, on differences between statistics and on the share of resamples in which an axis leads come from a bootstrap that resamples whole states (2,000 replicates). Returns are full counts, so the intervals say how much a number depends on which states are in the set. The census measures are interpolated between survey years and carry sampling error that no interval includes.) Alaska is not in the sample, because it reports returns by election district. Kansas City is added to Jackson County, Missouri in 2024, as it already is in earlier years, so that the unit matches its census measures. The Connecticut counties lack census measures in 2020 and 2024 and are left out, with 1.16% and 1.14% of the two-party votes. Table 1. Every comparison in the chapter uses the same outcome and the same counties within an election, and differs in what it holds fixed ### Alone, the white share led through 2016; the leader since is unsettled Table 2 plots the correlation of each axis with the margin in each election from 2000 to 2024. Through 2016 the white share has the largest absolute correlation in every election and both weightings in the point estimates, from −0.52 in 2000 to −0.68 in 2016 vote-weighted. It leads in 76% to 93% of resamples of states vote-weighted (79% in 2016) and in 70% to 98% county-equal (85% in 2016). In 2020 no axis leads clearly. Vote-weighted, rural share (−0.67) leads in 60% of resamples, the white share (−0.63) in 23% and college share (+0.64) in 17%. Counting each county once, college share (+0.53) and the white share (−0.53) are level in the point estimates. The white share leads in 52% of resamples, college share in 34% and rural share in 14%. In 2024 college share has the largest absolute correlation in both weightings, ahead of rural share by +0.01 (95% CI −0.05 to 0.09) vote-weighted and +0.03 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.10) county-equal. Both intervals include zero, and college share leads in 60% and 59% of resamples. The white share, the smallest of the three, exceeds income by +0.18 (95% CI 0.05 to 0.34) vote-weighted, so income and age are separated from the three largest axes. Table 2. Vote-weighted, the correlation of college share with the county margin rose from +0.28 in 2000 to +0.66 in 2024, while the white share's moved from −0.52 to −0.57 The new order comes from college share rising. Vote-weighted, college share's correlation changed by +0.38 (95% CI 0.31 to 0.47) between 2000 and 2024, rural share's by −0.19 (95% CI −0.27 to −0.11) and the white share's by −0.05 (95% CI −0.13 to 0.03), an interval that includes zero. Income's correlation went from +0.10 to +0.40 and median age's from −0.08 to −0.31. Zingher [2] documents the rise of the education divide after 2000 in surveys and in aggregate alignment, and Chapter 12.2, The diploma map (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-map) follows the education gradient across counties in detail. Chapter 12.3, Income and the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/income-and-the-county-vote; planned) takes up income and Chapter 12.5, Rural counties (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/rural-counties; planned) takes up rurality. Scala and Johnson [3] found that Democratic candidates did well in densely populated counties and poorly on the rural side of the urban-rural interface in 2000 to 2016, which matches the sign of rural share's correlation here. ### Held together, college share leads in 2024 and income changes sign The five axes overlap across counties, so a correlation mixes an axis with the others. Table 3 compares each correlation with the coefficient of the same axis in one regression on all five, in standard deviations of the margin per standard deviation of the axis. A fixed effect for each state gives every state its own baseline margin, so a regression with state baselines compares counties within the same state. Vote-weighted in 2024, college share goes from +0.66 alone to +0.71 (95% CI 0.63 to 0.79) with the other four axes held fixed, and the white share from −0.57 to −0.43 (95% CI −0.57 to −0.29). College share has the largest coefficient in 100% of resamples vote-weighted and 77% county-equal. Rural share goes from −0.65 to −0.12 (95% CI −0.25 to 0.01), an interval that includes zero. Income changes sign, from +0.40 alone to −0.26 (95% CI −0.40 to −0.11). Among counties with the same college share, white share, median age and rural share, those with higher median household income voted more Republican. Median age goes from −0.31 to +0.04 (95% CI −0.13 to 0.21). In points of margin, one vote-weighted standard deviation of college share (11.8 points of college share) goes with +23.4 (95% CI 20.7 to 26.1) points of margin in the joint model, against +6.7 (95% CI 3.0 to 10.5) in 2000. One standard deviation of the white share (21.1 points of white share) goes with −14.1 (95% CI −18.7 to −9.6) points of margin, against −13.4 (95% CI −17.4 to −9.4) in 2000. Table 3. Held together, college share's coefficient is +0.71 against a correlation of +0.66, and income's is −0.26 against +0.40, vote-weighted in 2024 The sign of income describes a regression among counties and not households. Counties with higher median incomes also have higher college shares, and the coefficient on income is what remains once college share, the white share, age and rurality are fixed. Gelman and colleagues [4] found that income relates to Republican voting more strongly in poor states than in rich states, and Chapter 3.3, The income ladder (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder) reports the income profile of individual voters. Adding a baseline for each state keeps the order of the point estimates in 2024 and changes some sizes. Vote-weighted, college share is +0.73 (95% CI 0.65 to 0.80), the white share −0.62 (95% CI −0.76 to −0.48), income −0.40 (95% CI −0.48 to −0.33), rural share −0.09 (95% CI −0.14 to −0.04) and median age +0.08 (95% CI 0.02 to 0.13). In 2000 the white share's coefficient is −0.77 with state baselines against −0.50 without them, and it is the largest in 100% of resamples with baselines. In 2024 college share has the largest coefficient with baselines in 90% of resamples vote-weighted. Counting each county once, with state baselines, the white share's coefficient is −0.68 in 2000 and −0.73 in 2024, the largest in 98% of resamples in 2024. College share's is +0.54. Which coefficient is largest is often unsettled (Table 4). Vote-weighted, college share has the largest coefficient in 65% of resamples in 2016 and 100% in 2024, but in 51% in 2004 and 55% in 2008, when the white share has 49% and 45%. The white share leads in 97% of resamples in 2000 and 73% in 2012. Counting each county once, the white share has the largest coefficient in the point estimates through 2016 and college share from 2020, with college share first in 56% of resamples in 2020 and 77% in 2024. College share's county-equal coefficient rose from +0.03 in 2000 to +0.56 in 2024, and income's is −0.14 in 2024. Table 4. Held together, college share's coefficient rose from +0.25 in 2000 to +0.71 in 2024 and income's was below zero in every election, vote-weighted Dropping an axis from the five-axis regression lowers the vote-weighted R-squared in 2024 by 16.9 (95% CI 12.1 to 22.8) points of variance for college share and 11.0 (95% CI 5.1 to 17.5) for the white share, against 2.7 for income, 0.7 for rural share and 0.1 for age. In 2000 the largest loss was the white share's, 15.1 points, and college share's was 2.4. Counting each county once, the white share's loss in 2024 (17.6) exceeds college share's (12.8) in the point estimates, the reverse of the order of the coefficients. The loss also depends on how much of an axis's variation the other axes already contain. ### The five axes reproduce more of the county margin than in 2000 The R-squared of a regression is the share of the variance of county margins that its fitted values reproduce. It is an in-sample fit, estimated and scored on the same counties, and not a forecast. Table 5 plots it by election. Vote-weighted, the five axes reproduce 41% (95% CI 30% to 56%) in 2000, 52% in 2012 and 72% (95% CI 67% to 79%) in 2016, then 72% in 2020 and 69% (95% CI 63% to 78%) in 2024. The rise from 2000 to 2016 is +31.3 (95% CI 22.0 to 39.1) points of variance, and the change from 2016 to 2024 is −3.6 (95% CI −7.1 to 1.5), an interval that includes zero. Most of the rise falls between 2012 and 2016, +19.9 (95% CI 15.3 to 23.6) points. Counting each county once the shares are 20% (95% CI 11% to 33%) in 2000, 33% in 2012, 58% in 2016 and 59% (95% CI 49% to 71%) in 2024. State baselines alone reproduce 34% (95% CI 24% to 43%) of the variance in 2000 and 27% (95% CI 19% to 34%) in 2024, a change of −6.7 (95% CI −16.8 to 4.2) points whose interval includes zero. Adding the five axes to state baselines raises the share to 74% (95% CI 65% to 82%) in 2000 and 87% (95% CI 84% to 90%) in 2024. The share of the variance within states that the five axes reproduce rises from 61% (95% CI 50% to 72%) to 82% (95% CI 77% to 88%). Counting each county once, the five axes with state baselines reproduce 61% in 2000 and 82% in 2024. Nine measures, which add the Black, Hispanic and Asian shares and the foreign-born share to the five axes, reproduce 49% in 2000 and 71% in 2024 vote-weighted, so the extra measures add more in 2000 than in 2024. Table 5. Vote-weighted, the five axes reproduce 41% of the variance of the county margin in 2000 and 69% in 2024, and 87% in 2024 with state baselines A higher R-squared can come from a wider fitted part of the margin or from a narrower left-over part. Table 6 separates them. Vote-weighted, the standard deviation of county margins rose from 26.5 points in 2000 to 35.9 in 2016 and was 32.8 in 2024. The fitted part went from 16.9 (95% CI 13.4 to 20.9) to 27.2 (95% CI 24.7 to 30.4), a change of +10.3 (95% CI 7.0 to 13.8) points. The left-over part went from 20.4 (95% CI 18.0 to 21.9) to 18.4 (95% CI 15.5 to 19.7), a change of −2.0 (95% CI −3.6 to −0.7) points. Holding the left-over part at its 2000 value would put the 2024 share at 61% (95% CI 53% to 71%) instead of 69%, so the narrower left-over part accounts for 7.2 (95% CI 2.5 to 13.3) of the +27.8 (95% CI 18.9 to 37.3) points of the rise. With state baselines added, the left-over part went from 13.5 to 12.0. Counting each county once, the standard deviation of margins rose from 24.5 to 31.7, the fitted part went from 10.9 to 24.3 and the left-over part from 22.0 to 20.4. Table 6. Vote-weighted, the part of the county margin that the five axes leave over narrowed from 20.4 to 18.4 points while the part they fit widened from 16.9 to 27.2 The census measures are interpolated, which could change the early R-squared if the early measures are noisier. The last four views of Table 5 hold the measures of one year fixed for every election. With the 2024 measures, the vote-weighted five-axis share is 35% in 2000, 71% in 2016 and 69% in 2024, and with the 2000 measures it is 41%, 72% and 68%. Counting each county once the shares are 18% in 2000 and 59% in 2024 with the 2024 measures, and 20% and 58% with the 2000 measures. The rise from 2012 to 2016 holds under each choice, at +19.9 points with the measures of the year, +20.9 with the 2024 measures and +19.3 with the 2000 measures. Small differences do not hold. The change from 2016 to 2024 is −3.6 points, −2.0 and −4.5 under the three choices. The census definition of rural also changes with the 2020 census, and the county-equal mean rural share goes from 59.6% in 2012 to 64.0% in 2020, while the population-weighted mean goes from 19.4% to 20.0%. Chapter 10.1, Nationalization of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote) measures the spread of county swings and Chapter 10.2, Distance from the national vote, 1868 to 2024 (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-landslide-county) the distance of counties from the national margin, which are different quantities from the spread of margins here. Chapter 15.5, Composition and behavior in county change (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/composition-and-behavior-in-county-change; planned) separates change in composition from change in behavior. ### Weighting changes the level of the correlations and the likeliest 2020 leader Table 7 compares the vote-weighted and county-equal correlations for 2000 and 2024. In 2000 the vote-weighted correlation of college share exceeds the county-equal one by +0.18 (95% CI 0.09 to 0.26), and that of rural share is more negative by −0.19 (95% CI −0.26 to −0.12). In 2024 the differences are +0.11 (95% CI 0.02 to 0.20) and −0.13 (95% CI −0.20 to −0.05), and the white share's is −0.08 (95% CI −0.17 to 0.04), an interval that includes zero. For income the difference goes from +0.08 (95% CI −0.05 to 0.19) to +0.09 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.22) and for median age from +0.09 (95% CI −0.03 to 0.20) to −0.11 (95% CI −0.20 to −0.01). The R-squared of the five axes is higher vote-weighted in every election, by +21.2 (95% CI 9.5 to 31.9) points in 2000 and +9.9 (95% CI 0.8 to 18.5) in 2024, and by +13.4 (95% CI 5.3 to 20.9) and +4.7 (95% CI 1.2 to 8.6) points with state baselines. Table 7. The vote-weighted correlation of college share exceeds the county-equal one by +0.18 in 2000 and by +0.11 in 2024 A vote-weighted statistic describes the counties where the votes are, and a county-equal statistic describes the typical county. The 135 counties with 250,000 or more two-party votes cast 46% of the votes in 2024 and 76 such counties cast 35% in 2000, so the vote-weighted figures describe the large counties more than the county-equal ones do. Solon, Haider and Wooldridge [5] discuss the reasons for weighting a regression aimed at causal effects and find that each sometimes does not apply where practitioners assume it does. The regressions here are descriptive, and the chapter reports both weightings and does not choose between them. They agree on the sign of every correlation in every election. They differ in the leader of the point estimates in 2020, where rural share leads vote-weighted and college share and the white share are level county-equal. They also differ in the share of the margin that the five axes reproduce in the early elections. ### Each axis is several measures Table 8 replaces the single measure of each axis with alternatives, for 2024 and the same counties. Within education, the share of adults with a bachelor's degree has a vote-weighted correlation of +0.66 (95% CI 0.60 to 0.72) and the share without a high school diploma has −0.03 (95% CI −0.20 to 0.14), an interval that includes zero, so the education axis here is the top of the schooling distribution. Within income, median household income has +0.40 (95% CI 0.29 to 0.50), per capita income +0.55 (95% CI 0.47 to 0.64) and the poverty rate −0.03 (95% CI −0.14 to 0.09), an interval that includes zero. Within age, median age has −0.31, the share aged 65 or older −0.34 and the share under 30 +0.12 (95% CI 0.00 to 0.25). Table 8. The correlation depends on the measure within an axis in 2024, from −0.03 for the share without a high school diploma to +0.66 for college share, vote-weighted Race and ethnicity is measured by five shares here. The white share has −0.57 (95% CI −0.71 to −0.44), and the Black, Hispanic, Asian and foreign-born shares have +0.39, +0.24 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.38), +0.52 and +0.54. Counting each county once, the Hispanic share's correlation is +0.11 (95% CI −0.09 to 0.30), an interval that includes zero. Per capita income (+0.55), the Asian share (+0.52) and the foreign-born share (+0.54) have correlations about the size of the white share's. The ranking of the five axes in the first figure is therefore a ranking of five chosen measures, and a different measure of an axis can change it. Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) and Chapter 12.7, Education, ethnicity and the county shift, 2016 to 2024 (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift) follow the group shares, and Chapter 3.6, Age and generation (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/age-and-generation) takes up age. The rural-urban continuum code is the other common measure of rurality. Its 2013 edition covers the elections through 2016 and its 2023 edition covers 2020 and 2024. Vote-weighted, its correlation with the margin is −0.51 in 2016 and −0.52 in 2020, and that of rural share is −0.65 and −0.67, so the change of edition leaves both series without a break. The code's correlation in 2024 is −0.51 (95% CI −0.58 to −0.44), smaller in size than rural share's −0.65 (95% CI −0.74 to −0.56). ### The gaps from the fit run by region Table 9 maps the gap between each county's margin and the margin fitted by the vote-weighted five-axis regression, estimated separately for 2000 and 2024. A negative gap means the county voted more Republican than the five axes fit. The standard deviation of the gap is 20.4 points in 2000 and 18.4 in 2024, and counties more than 20 points from the fit cast 35% of the votes in 2000 and 25% in 2024. Table 9. In 2024 the mean gap between a county's margin and the five-axis fit is −10.8 points in the Census South and +6.7 points in the rest of the country, vote-weighted The gaps run by region. In 2024 the vote-weighted mean gap is −10.8 points in the Census South, the Census Bureau's South region, and +6.7 in the rest of the country, against −11.5 and +6.0 in 2000. By state, Texas is −21.7 and Vermont +42.6 in 2024. State baselines absorb the state-level part of these gaps, and the vote-weighted five-axis R-squared goes from 69% to 87% in 2024 when they are added. Among counties with 100,000 or more two-party votes, the three largest gaps above the fit in 2024 are Clayton County, Georgia (+52.2), Sonoma County, California (+48.2) and Prince George's County, Maryland (+48.1). The three largest below are Forsyth County, Georgia (−52.9), Williamson County, Tennessee (−52.1) and Shelby County, Alabama (−47.4). Miami-Dade County, Florida, is fitted at +35.3 and voted −11.5, a gap of −46.8 points. A gap compares votes with the characteristics of residents, so it can reflect candidates, campaigns, turnout and characteristics the five axes omit as well as place. Chapter 15.1, Party and place (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place) compares partisans in counties with different margins, and Chapter 12.7, Education, ethnicity and the county shift, 2016 to 2024 (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift) follows the high-Hispanic counties across 2016 to 2024. ### What these data cannot show Every statistic above is a property of counties. A pattern across places can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them, a limit known as ecological inference. Robinson [6] showed that a correlation across areas can have the opposite sign from the correlation across individuals. The characteristics describe residents, including residents who are not citizens or not of voting age, and the margin describes voters. A sign such as income's negative coefficient is a feature of one regression among counties and says nothing about how households of different incomes voted. The five axes are five chosen measures. The ranking changes with the measure within an axis (Table 8), and the axes omit religion, occupation, density, the age of housing and every characteristic that is not in the county panel. A standardized coefficient depends on the spread of the axis across counties, which differs between the weightings and between elections, so a coefficient that rises can reflect a change in spread as well as a steeper slope. The R-squared values are in-sample fits of linear regressions and not forecasts. State baselines absorb every difference between states, including differences in composition that sit at the state level, so the within-state results describe counties compared inside states and not the effect of removing state context. The census measures are decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years. Only 2000 and 2024 are close to a direct measurement, and the elections between are blends of adjacent releases, so the measures for those years carry sampling error and interpolation error that no interval includes. Rural share is anchored to the decennial censuses and has one value for 2020 and 2024. The county set is not harmonized across boundary changes, a few small counties lack measures in some years, and the counties are the units of the returns and not of any community. The intervals show dependence on which states are in the set. They are not sampling error of the vote, which is a full count, and the bootstrap intervals for differences between statistics treat the states as the only source of variation. The chapter has no data on turnout by group, on candidates or on campaigns, so it cannot say why the order of the axes changed after 2016 or why the fit improved. ## Tables ### Table 1. Every comparison in the chapter uses the same outcome and the same counties within an election, and differs in what it holds fixed The outcome, sample, period, weights and other variables of each comparison; the outcome is the county two-party margin, Democratic minus Republican | Comparison | Counties | Elections | Weights | Other variables held fixed | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | Correlation of one axis with the margin | Counties with returns and every census measure; the same counties for every comparison in an election | Each presidential election, 2000 to 2024 | Vote-weighted and county-equal | Nothing else | | Regression of the margin on the five axes | Same counties | Each election, 2000 to 2024 | Vote-weighted and county-equal | The other four axes | | The same regression with state baselines | Same counties | Each election, 2000 to 2024 | Vote-weighted and county-equal | The other four axes and a baseline margin for each state | | Share of the variance of the margin reproduced (R-squared) | Same counties | Each election, 2000 to 2024 | Vote-weighted and county-equal | Five axes; five axes with state baselines; state baselines alone; nine measures | | Checks with fixed census measures | Counties that also have the fixed measures, a few fewer | Each election, 2000 to 2024 | Vote-weighted and county-equal | The 2024 census measures, or the 2000 census measures, used for every election | | Alternative measures within each axis | The 2024 counties of the main sample | 2024 | Vote-weighted and county-equal | Nothing else | | Map of the gap between margin and fit | The 2000 and 2024 counties of the main sample | 2000 and 2024 | Fit weighted by two-party votes | The five axes | Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes; county demographics panel (census and American Community Survey); both weightings reported Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/comparisons.json ### Table 2. Vote-weighted, the correlation of college share with the county margin rose from +0.28 in 2000 to +0.66 in 2024, while the white share's moved from −0.52 to −0.57 Correlation between a county characteristic and the county two-party margin in the same presidential election, 2000 to 2024, counties weighted by two-party votes | Election | Axis | Measure | Weighting | Correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Share of resamples with the largest absolute correlation (%) | Counties | | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2000 | Education | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.28 | +0.18 | +0.38 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Education | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.38 | +0.28 | +0.47 | 2 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Education | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.43 | +0.34 | +0.51 | 1 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Education | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.41 | +0.34 | +0.49 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Education | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.58 | +0.51 | +0.64 | 1 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Education | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.64 | +0.58 | +0.70 | 17 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Education | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.66 | +0.60 | +0.72 | 60 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Income | Median household income | Vote-weighted | +0.10 | −0.01 | +0.20 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Income | Median household income | Vote-weighted | +0.12 | +0.01 | +0.23 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Income | Median household income | Vote-weighted | +0.17 | +0.05 | +0.28 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Income | Median household income | Vote-weighted | +0.16 | +0.04 | +0.27 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Income | Median household income | Vote-weighted | +0.32 | +0.19 | +0.44 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Income | Median household income | Vote-weighted | +0.39 | +0.29 | +0.49 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Income | Median household income | Vote-weighted | +0.40 | +0.29 | +0.50 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | Vote-weighted | −0.52 | −0.68 | −0.36 | 87 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | Vote-weighted | −0.50 | −0.65 | −0.35 | 77 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | Vote-weighted | −0.55 | −0.67 | −0.42 | 76 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | Vote-weighted | −0.59 | −0.72 | −0.47 | 93 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | Vote-weighted | −0.68 | −0.79 | −0.57 | 79 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | Vote-weighted | −0.63 | −0.75 | −0.51 | 23 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | Vote-weighted | −0.57 | −0.71 | −0.44 | 2 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Age | Median age | Vote-weighted | −0.08 | −0.19 | +0.04 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Age | Median age | Vote-weighted | −0.11 | −0.22 | −0.01 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Age | Median age | Vote-weighted | −0.22 | −0.32 | −0.12 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Age | Median age | Vote-weighted | −0.24 | −0.35 | −0.13 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Age | Median age | Vote-weighted | −0.36 | −0.46 | −0.26 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Age | Median age | Vote-weighted | −0.34 | −0.43 | −0.24 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Age | Median age | Vote-weighted | −0.31 | −0.41 | −0.21 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Rurality | Rural share | Vote-weighted | −0.46 | −0.56 | −0.36 | 13 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Rurality | Rural share | Vote-weighted | −0.46 | −0.55 | −0.38 | 22 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Rurality | Rural share | Vote-weighted | −0.52 | −0.60 | −0.43 | 24 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Rurality | Rural share | Vote-weighted | −0.52 | −0.61 | −0.44 | 7 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Rurality | Rural share | Vote-weighted | −0.65 | −0.74 | −0.56 | 20 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Rurality | Rural share | Vote-weighted | −0.67 | −0.76 | −0.58 | 60 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Rurality | Rural share | Vote-weighted | −0.65 | −0.74 | −0.56 | 38 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Education | College share | County-equal | +0.10 | +0.01 | +0.20 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Education | College share | County-equal | +0.21 | +0.13 | +0.29 | 2 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Education | College share | County-equal | +0.31 | +0.24 | +0.37 | 12 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Education | College share | County-equal | +0.30 | +0.23 | +0.38 | 1 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Education | College share | County-equal | +0.46 | +0.38 | +0.55 | 6 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Education | College share | County-equal | +0.53 | +0.45 | +0.61 | 34 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Education | College share | County-equal | +0.56 | +0.47 | +0.64 | 59 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Income | Median household income | County-equal | +0.02 | −0.10 | +0.14 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Income | Median household income | County-equal | +0.03 | −0.08 | +0.14 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Income | Median household income | County-equal | +0.12 | +0.01 | +0.22 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Income | Median household income | County-equal | +0.08 | −0.05 | +0.21 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Income | Median household income | County-equal | +0.19 | +0.05 | +0.33 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Income | Median household income | County-equal | +0.28 | +0.14 | +0.41 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Income | Median household income | County-equal | +0.30 | +0.17 | +0.43 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | County-equal | −0.40 | −0.54 | −0.26 | 98 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | County-equal | −0.36 | −0.52 | −0.20 | 92 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | County-equal | −0.36 | −0.51 | −0.21 | 70 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | County-equal | −0.44 | −0.61 | −0.28 | 88 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | County-equal | −0.57 | −0.73 | −0.41 | 85 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | County-equal | −0.53 | −0.73 | −0.33 | 52 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | County-equal | −0.50 | −0.71 | −0.28 | 30 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Age | Median age | County-equal | −0.17 | −0.28 | −0.05 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Age | Median age | County-equal | −0.14 | −0.25 | −0.03 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Age | Median age | County-equal | −0.16 | −0.26 | −0.07 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Age | Median age | County-equal | −0.18 | −0.27 | −0.08 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Age | Median age | County-equal | −0.26 | −0.33 | −0.18 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Age | Median age | County-equal | −0.23 | −0.30 | −0.15 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Age | Median age | County-equal | −0.20 | −0.27 | −0.12 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Rurality | Rural share | County-equal | −0.27 | −0.36 | −0.18 | 2 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Rurality | Rural share | County-equal | −0.26 | −0.34 | −0.18 | 6 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Rurality | Rural share | County-equal | −0.33 | −0.40 | −0.26 | 19 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Rurality | Rural share | County-equal | −0.35 | −0.42 | −0.29 | 11 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Rurality | Rural share | County-equal | −0.49 | −0.56 | −0.42 | 9 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Rurality | Rural share | County-equal | −0.52 | −0.59 | −0.45 | 14 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Rurality | Rural share | County-equal | −0.53 | −0.59 | −0.46 | 11 | 3,103 | Views: Vote-weighted (weighting = Vote-weighted); County-equal (weighting = County-equal); Education, both weightings (axis = Education); Share of resamples in which an axis leads, vote-weighted (weighting = Vote-weighted); Share of resamples in which an axis leads, county-equal (weighting = County-equal). Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so they carry no sampling error. The 95% intervals use errors clustered by state, so they show how much a number depends on which states are in the set. They do not include the sampling error of the county characteristics, which are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated between years. Note: Each county's measures are those of the election year, interpolated between census and survey years; see Methods. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 2000 to 2020; MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), full counts of votes; county characteristics from the decennial census and American Community Survey, interpolated to election years; estimates weighted by two-party votes or counting each county once, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/corr_by_year.json ### Table 3. Held together, college share's coefficient is +0.71 against a correlation of +0.66, and income's is −0.26 against +0.40, vote-weighted in 2024 Standardized coefficients for the county two-party margin in 2024: each axis alone, all five axes together, and all five with a baseline for each state; two weightings | Election | Weighting | Axis | Model | Coefficient | Interval low | Interval high | Counties | | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Education | Each axis alone | +0.66 | +0.60 | +0.72 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Education | Each axis alone | +0.28 | +0.18 | +0.38 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Income | Each axis alone | +0.40 | +0.29 | +0.50 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Income | Each axis alone | +0.10 | −0.01 | +0.20 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Race and ethnicity | Each axis alone | −0.57 | −0.71 | −0.44 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Race and ethnicity | Each axis alone | −0.52 | −0.68 | −0.36 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Age | Each axis alone | −0.31 | −0.41 | −0.21 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Age | Each axis alone | −0.08 | −0.19 | +0.04 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Rurality | Each axis alone | −0.65 | −0.74 | −0.56 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Rurality | Each axis alone | −0.46 | −0.56 | −0.36 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Education | Each axis alone | +0.56 | +0.47 | +0.64 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Education | Each axis alone | +0.10 | +0.01 | +0.20 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Income | Each axis alone | +0.30 | +0.17 | +0.43 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Income | Each axis alone | +0.02 | −0.10 | +0.14 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Race and ethnicity | Each axis alone | −0.50 | −0.71 | −0.28 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Race and ethnicity | Each axis alone | −0.40 | −0.54 | −0.26 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Age | Each axis alone | −0.20 | −0.27 | −0.12 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Age | Each axis alone | −0.17 | −0.28 | −0.05 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Rurality | Each axis alone | −0.53 | −0.59 | −0.46 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Rurality | Each axis alone | −0.27 | −0.36 | −0.18 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Education | All five together | +0.71 | +0.63 | +0.80 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Education | All five together | +0.25 | +0.11 | +0.39 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Income | All five together | −0.26 | −0.40 | −0.11 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Income | All five together | −0.17 | −0.28 | −0.06 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Race and ethnicity | All five together | −0.43 | −0.57 | −0.29 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Race and ethnicity | All five together | −0.50 | −0.66 | −0.35 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Age | All five together | +0.04 | −0.13 | +0.21 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Age | All five together | +0.29 | +0.10 | +0.49 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Rurality | All five together | −0.12 | −0.25 | +0.01 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Rurality | All five together | −0.25 | −0.38 | −0.11 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Education | All five together | +0.56 | +0.48 | +0.64 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Education | All five together | +0.03 | −0.09 | +0.14 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Income | All five together | −0.14 | −0.23 | −0.06 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Income | All five together | −0.01 | −0.12 | +0.10 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Race and ethnicity | All five together | −0.47 | −0.67 | −0.28 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Race and ethnicity | All five together | −0.39 | −0.55 | −0.22 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Age | All five together | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.20 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Age | All five together | +0.09 | −0.02 | +0.20 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Rurality | All five together | −0.20 | −0.30 | −0.10 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Rurality | All five together | −0.20 | −0.28 | −0.12 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Education | All five with state baselines | +0.73 | +0.65 | +0.80 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Education | All five with state baselines | +0.26 | +0.14 | +0.38 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Income | All five with state baselines | −0.41 | −0.48 | −0.33 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Income | All five with state baselines | −0.25 | −0.32 | −0.17 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Race and ethnicity | All five with state baselines | −0.62 | −0.76 | −0.48 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Race and ethnicity | All five with state baselines | −0.77 | −0.90 | −0.64 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Age | All five with state baselines | +0.08 | +0.02 | +0.14 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Age | All five with state baselines | +0.22 | +0.11 | +0.33 | 3,113 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Rurality | All five with state baselines | −0.09 | −0.14 | −0.04 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Rurality | All five with state baselines | −0.10 | −0.19 | −0.01 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Education | All five with state baselines | +0.54 | +0.47 | +0.60 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Education | All five with state baselines | +0.15 | +0.06 | +0.24 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Income | All five with state baselines | −0.18 | −0.23 | −0.13 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Income | All five with state baselines | −0.15 | −0.23 | −0.08 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Race and ethnicity | All five with state baselines | −0.73 | −0.84 | −0.61 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Race and ethnicity | All five with state baselines | −0.68 | −0.76 | −0.60 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Age | All five with state baselines | +0.10 | +0.06 | +0.15 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Age | All five with state baselines | +0.12 | +0.06 | +0.17 | 3,113 | | 2024 | County-equal | Rurality | All five with state baselines | −0.11 | −0.15 | −0.06 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Rurality | All five with state baselines | −0.11 | −0.17 | −0.05 | 3,113 | Views: 2024 (year = 2024); 2000 (year = 2000). Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so they carry no sampling error. The 95% intervals use errors clustered by state, so they show how much a number depends on which states are in the set. They do not include the sampling error of the county characteristics, which are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated between years. Note: Standardization uses the weighted mean and standard deviation of the weighting shown, in the election shown. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 2000 to 2020; MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), full counts of votes; county characteristics from the decennial census and American Community Survey, interpolated to election years; estimates weighted by two-party votes or counting each county once, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/rank_ladder.json ### Table 4. Held together, college share's coefficient rose from +0.25 in 2000 to +0.71 in 2024 and income's was below zero in every election, vote-weighted Standardized coefficients from a regression of the county two-party margin on all five axes, 2000 to 2024, counties weighted by two-party votes | Election | Weighting | Model | Axis | Coefficient | Interval low | Interval high | Share of resamples with the largest absolute coefficient (%) | Counties | | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Education | +0.25 | +0.11 | +0.39 | 1 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Education | +0.49 | +0.35 | +0.62 | 51 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Education | +0.51 | +0.40 | +0.62 | 55 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Education | +0.51 | +0.40 | +0.63 | 27 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Education | +0.62 | +0.54 | +0.71 | 65 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Education | +0.66 | +0.58 | +0.74 | 99 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Education | +0.71 | +0.63 | +0.80 | 100 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Income | −0.17 | −0.28 | −0.06 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Income | −0.31 | −0.42 | −0.20 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Income | −0.29 | −0.41 | −0.17 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Income | −0.30 | −0.43 | −0.17 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Income | −0.25 | −0.37 | −0.13 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Income | −0.23 | −0.36 | −0.10 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Income | −0.26 | −0.40 | −0.11 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.50 | −0.66 | −0.35 | 97 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.47 | −0.61 | −0.33 | 49 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.49 | −0.62 | −0.36 | 45 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.56 | −0.69 | −0.42 | 73 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.59 | −0.70 | −0.48 | 35 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.51 | −0.63 | −0.39 | 1 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.43 | −0.57 | −0.29 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Age | +0.29 | +0.10 | +0.49 | 1 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Age | +0.28 | +0.09 | +0.47 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Age | +0.20 | +0.02 | +0.38 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Age | +0.20 | +0.01 | +0.40 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Age | +0.10 | −0.04 | +0.24 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Age | +0.07 | −0.09 | +0.22 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Age | +0.04 | −0.13 | +0.21 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Rurality | −0.25 | −0.38 | −0.11 | 2 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Rurality | −0.18 | −0.33 | −0.03 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Rurality | −0.18 | −0.31 | −0.04 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Rurality | −0.14 | −0.29 | 0.00 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Rurality | −0.11 | −0.23 | 0.00 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Rurality | −0.13 | −0.24 | −0.01 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | All five together | Rurality | −0.12 | −0.25 | +0.01 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | All five together | Education | +0.03 | −0.09 | +0.14 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | All five together | Education | +0.26 | +0.14 | +0.38 | 19 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | All five together | Education | +0.34 | +0.23 | +0.46 | 41 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | All five together | Education | +0.36 | +0.24 | +0.48 | 18 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | All five together | Education | +0.51 | +0.41 | +0.60 | 23 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | All five together | Education | +0.55 | +0.46 | +0.64 | 56 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | All five together | Education | +0.56 | +0.48 | +0.64 | 77 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | All five together | Income | −0.01 | −0.12 | +0.10 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | All five together | Income | −0.15 | −0.25 | −0.05 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | All five together | Income | −0.13 | −0.25 | −0.02 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | All five together | Income | −0.17 | −0.31 | −0.03 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | All five together | Income | −0.17 | −0.28 | −0.05 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | All five together | Income | −0.14 | −0.24 | −0.04 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | All five together | Income | −0.14 | −0.23 | −0.06 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.39 | −0.55 | −0.22 | 99 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.35 | −0.53 | −0.17 | 80 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.36 | −0.53 | −0.19 | 59 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.45 | −0.63 | −0.27 | 81 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.57 | −0.72 | −0.42 | 77 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.52 | −0.70 | −0.35 | 45 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | All five together | Race and ethnicity | −0.47 | −0.67 | −0.28 | 23 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | All five together | Age | +0.09 | −0.02 | +0.20 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | All five together | Age | +0.12 | +0.01 | +0.23 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | All five together | Age | +0.14 | +0.04 | +0.23 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | All five together | Age | +0.17 | +0.08 | +0.26 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | All five together | Age | +0.16 | +0.09 | +0.22 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | All five together | Age | +0.14 | +0.08 | +0.21 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | All five together | Age | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.20 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | All five together | Rurality | −0.20 | −0.28 | −0.12 | 1 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | All five together | Rurality | −0.15 | −0.24 | −0.06 | 1 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | All five together | Rurality | −0.17 | −0.27 | −0.08 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | All five together | Rurality | −0.19 | −0.30 | −0.09 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | All five together | Rurality | −0.19 | −0.29 | −0.10 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | All five together | Rurality | −0.20 | −0.30 | −0.10 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | All five together | Rurality | −0.20 | −0.30 | −0.10 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.26 | +0.14 | +0.38 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.47 | +0.33 | +0.62 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.49 | +0.36 | +0.62 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.47 | +0.34 | +0.60 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.62 | +0.53 | +0.70 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.67 | +0.60 | +0.74 | 40 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.73 | +0.65 | +0.80 | 90 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.25 | −0.32 | −0.17 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.37 | −0.42 | −0.31 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.38 | −0.44 | −0.32 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.39 | −0.45 | −0.33 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.35 | −0.40 | −0.29 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.37 | −0.43 | −0.30 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.41 | −0.48 | −0.33 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.77 | −0.90 | −0.64 | 100 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.77 | −0.89 | −0.66 | 100 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.76 | −0.88 | −0.65 | 100 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.81 | −0.91 | −0.70 | 100 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.79 | −0.88 | −0.71 | 100 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.69 | −0.81 | −0.58 | 60 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.62 | −0.76 | −0.48 | 10 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.22 | +0.11 | +0.33 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.23 | +0.11 | +0.35 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.15 | +0.05 | +0.25 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.14 | +0.05 | +0.23 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.10 | +0.04 | +0.16 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.08 | +0.03 | +0.14 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.08 | +0.02 | +0.14 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.10 | −0.19 | −0.01 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.04 | −0.12 | +0.04 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.05 | −0.12 | +0.02 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.04 | −0.10 | +0.03 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.04 | −0.09 | +0.01 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.09 | −0.14 | −0.03 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.09 | −0.14 | −0.04 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.15 | +0.06 | +0.24 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.33 | +0.23 | +0.43 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.35 | +0.26 | +0.44 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.34 | +0.26 | +0.42 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.49 | +0.43 | +0.56 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.53 | +0.47 | +0.58 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Education | +0.54 | +0.47 | +0.60 | 2 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.15 | −0.23 | −0.08 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.24 | −0.31 | −0.18 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.23 | −0.28 | −0.17 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.23 | −0.28 | −0.17 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.20 | −0.24 | −0.15 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.18 | −0.22 | −0.14 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Income | −0.18 | −0.23 | −0.13 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.68 | −0.76 | −0.60 | 100 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.70 | −0.79 | −0.61 | 100 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.75 | −0.85 | −0.66 | 100 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.80 | −0.89 | −0.71 | 100 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.83 | −0.91 | −0.75 | 100 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.77 | −0.86 | −0.68 | 100 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Race and ethnicity | −0.73 | −0.84 | −0.61 | 98 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.12 | +0.06 | +0.17 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.13 | +0.07 | +0.20 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.12 | +0.06 | +0.17 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.13 | +0.08 | +0.18 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.11 | +0.07 | +0.16 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.10 | +0.06 | +0.15 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Age | +0.10 | +0.06 | +0.15 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.11 | −0.17 | −0.05 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.04 | −0.10 | +0.02 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.06 | −0.12 | −0.01 | 0 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.07 | −0.12 | −0.02 | 0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.08 | −0.12 | −0.03 | 0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.10 | −0.14 | −0.05 | 0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | All five with state baselines | Rurality | −0.11 | −0.15 | −0.06 | 0 | 3,103 | Views: Vote-weighted (model = All five together, weighting = Vote-weighted); County-equal (model = All five together, weighting = County-equal); Vote-weighted, with state baselines (model = All five with state baselines, weighting = Vote-weighted); County-equal, with state baselines (model = All five with state baselines, weighting = County-equal). Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so they carry no sampling error. The 95% intervals use errors clustered by state, so they show how much a number depends on which states are in the set. They do not include the sampling error of the county characteristics, which are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated between years. Note: Standardization uses the weighted mean and standard deviation of the weighting shown, in the election shown. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 2000 to 2020; MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), full counts of votes; county characteristics from the decennial census and American Community Survey, interpolated to election years; estimates weighted by two-party votes or counting each county once, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/joint_by_year.json ### Table 5. Vote-weighted, the five axes reproduce 41% of the variance of the county margin in 2000 and 69% in 2024, and 87% in 2024 with state baselines Share of the variance of the county two-party margin reproduced by regressions on county characteristics, 2000 to 2024, counties weighted by two-party votes | Election | Weighting | Census measures | Regression | R-squared (%) | Interval low | Interval high | Counties | | ---: | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 40.8 | 29.6 | 56.0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 43.5 | 34.6 | 56.7 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 48.2 | 39.6 | 59.8 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 52.3 | 44.3 | 63.2 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 72.2 | 67.0 | 79.3 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 72.0 | 67.1 | 79.5 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 68.6 | 63.1 | 78.1 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 74.1 | 64.8 | 82.0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 74.7 | 67.9 | 81.9 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 79.9 | 74.6 | 85.4 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 81.9 | 77.1 | 86.8 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 88.9 | 86.6 | 91.7 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 88.3 | 85.6 | 91.4 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 86.6 | 83.6 | 90.4 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 34.2 | 24.3 | 42.7 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 29.5 | 21.1 | 37.7 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 31.6 | 24.1 | 38.2 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 31.4 | 23.2 | 38.6 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 28.9 | 18.5 | 37.2 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 28.9 | 19.2 | 36.7 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 27.4 | 19.0 | 34.4 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 49.2 | 38.6 | 62.8 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 50.1 | 41.8 | 61.5 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 52.1 | 44.6 | 62.6 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 56.4 | 49.3 | 66.5 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 73.8 | 69.1 | 80.8 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 73.4 | 69.8 | 80.5 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 71.1 | 67.2 | 79.2 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 19.6 | 11.4 | 33.3 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 19.8 | 11.7 | 34.3 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 25.5 | 17.4 | 39.9 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 33.1 | 23.9 | 48.8 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 57.8 | 49.1 | 70.2 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 59.7 | 50.6 | 71.9 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes | 58.7 | 49.4 | 71.4 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 60.7 | 53.9 | 66.8 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 63.0 | 56.6 | 68.4 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 70.9 | 65.4 | 75.3 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 74.0 | 68.9 | 78.1 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 81.9 | 78.9 | 84.8 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 83.4 | 80.8 | 86.0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Five axes and state baselines | 82.0 | 79.2 | 84.9 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 33.7 | 23.4 | 42.6 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 33.1 | 22.8 | 41.5 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 35.5 | 26.2 | 43.3 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 35.8 | 26.9 | 43.6 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 33.0 | 24.3 | 41.5 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 34.8 | 26.7 | 42.4 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | State baselines alone | 34.6 | 26.7 | 41.6 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 26.6 | 19.6 | 38.2 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 27.7 | 21.0 | 39.0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 30.5 | 23.1 | 43.1 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 38.8 | 29.8 | 52.0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 62.2 | 54.0 | 72.2 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 65.7 | 58.7 | 74.1 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | Election-year census measures | Nine measures | 66.0 | 59.0 | 74.3 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 35.1 | 26.7 | 48.1 | 3,102 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 39.6 | 32.8 | 51.4 | 3,103 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 45.2 | 37.9 | 56.5 | 3,103 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 49.7 | 42.2 | 61.0 | 3,103 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 70.5 | 65.0 | 78.2 | 3,104 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 71.5 | 66.6 | 79.4 | 3,104 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 68.6 | 63.1 | 78.1 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 68.8 | 59.8 | 77.1 | 3,102 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 70.9 | 62.8 | 79.3 | 3,103 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 77.8 | 71.7 | 84.2 | 3,103 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 80.3 | 74.6 | 85.9 | 3,103 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 88.4 | 85.9 | 91.2 | 3,104 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 88.3 | 85.6 | 91.4 | 3,104 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 86.6 | 83.6 | 90.4 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 33.8 | 23.2 | 42.9 | 3,102 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 29.4 | 20.9 | 37.9 | 3,103 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 31.4 | 23.7 | 37.6 | 3,103 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 31.2 | 22.6 | 37.6 | 3,103 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 28.8 | 18.3 | 37.2 | 3,104 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 28.9 | 19.2 | 36.7 | 3,104 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 27.4 | 19.0 | 34.4 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 43.5 | 34.8 | 57.0 | 3,102 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 45.9 | 39.5 | 57.1 | 3,103 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 49.1 | 42.5 | 59.6 | 3,103 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 53.9 | 47.1 | 64.4 | 3,103 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 72.2 | 67.4 | 79.4 | 3,104 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 73.0 | 69.2 | 80.5 | 3,104 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 71.1 | 67.2 | 79.2 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 17.8 | 11.4 | 29.5 | 3,102 | | 2004 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 19.6 | 13.1 | 31.9 | 3,103 | | 2008 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 24.3 | 16.7 | 37.5 | 3,103 | | 2012 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 31.2 | 21.7 | 47.0 | 3,103 | | 2016 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 55.5 | 45.9 | 68.3 | 3,104 | | 2020 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 58.7 | 49.3 | 71.2 | 3,104 | | 2024 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes | 58.7 | 49.4 | 71.4 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 55.1 | 48.3 | 61.7 | 3,102 | | 2004 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 58.6 | 52.1 | 64.5 | 3,103 | | 2008 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 67.7 | 62.5 | 72.1 | 3,103 | | 2012 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 71.4 | 67.0 | 75.4 | 3,103 | | 2016 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 79.9 | 76.6 | 83.0 | 3,104 | | 2020 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 82.5 | 79.7 | 85.3 | 3,104 | | 2024 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 82.0 | 79.2 | 84.9 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 33.7 | 23.5 | 42.8 | 3,102 | | 2004 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 33.1 | 22.5 | 41.5 | 3,103 | | 2008 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 35.4 | 26.2 | 43.1 | 3,103 | | 2012 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 35.6 | 26.8 | 43.4 | 3,103 | | 2016 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 32.6 | 24.2 | 40.7 | 3,104 | | 2020 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 34.8 | 26.6 | 42.4 | 3,104 | | 2024 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 34.6 | 26.7 | 41.6 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 26.2 | 19.8 | 36.6 | 3,102 | | 2004 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 28.1 | 21.9 | 38.3 | 3,103 | | 2008 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 29.7 | 22.3 | 41.2 | 3,103 | | 2012 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 37.5 | 28.0 | 50.5 | 3,103 | | 2016 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 60.6 | 52.0 | 70.6 | 3,104 | | 2020 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 65.1 | 57.8 | 73.7 | 3,104 | | 2024 | County-equal | 2024 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 66.0 | 59.0 | 74.3 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 40.8 | 29.6 | 56.0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 43.1 | 33.3 | 56.5 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 47.9 | 38.0 | 60.2 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 52.8 | 43.4 | 64.5 | 3,113 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 72.0 | 64.9 | 79.7 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 71.5 | 65.4 | 79.0 | 3,111 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 67.6 | 61.1 | 76.6 | 3,110 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 74.1 | 64.8 | 82.0 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 74.5 | 67.5 | 82.0 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 79.2 | 73.7 | 85.1 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 81.2 | 76.4 | 86.4 | 3,113 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 88.0 | 85.3 | 90.8 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 86.4 | 83.2 | 89.8 | 3,111 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 84.0 | 80.7 | 88.1 | 3,110 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 34.2 | 24.3 | 42.7 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 29.5 | 21.1 | 37.7 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 31.6 | 24.1 | 38.2 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 31.3 | 23.2 | 38.6 | 3,113 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 28.9 | 18.4 | 37.2 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 29.0 | 19.3 | 36.8 | 3,111 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 27.6 | 19.2 | 35.1 | 3,110 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 49.2 | 38.6 | 62.8 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 49.8 | 41.1 | 61.3 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 52.2 | 43.7 | 62.8 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 57.4 | 49.1 | 67.5 | 3,113 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 74.3 | 68.2 | 81.0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 73.6 | 68.6 | 80.5 | 3,111 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 70.8 | 65.8 | 78.6 | 3,110 | | 2000 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 19.6 | 11.4 | 33.3 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 19.5 | 10.8 | 34.2 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 25.5 | 16.7 | 40.3 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 33.0 | 22.5 | 49.6 | 3,113 | | 2016 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 57.4 | 47.3 | 70.6 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 59.1 | 48.7 | 72.5 | 3,111 | | 2024 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes | 58.4 | 47.8 | 71.8 | 3,110 | | 2000 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 60.7 | 53.9 | 66.8 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 63.1 | 56.7 | 68.6 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 71.2 | 66.0 | 75.4 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 74.7 | 69.9 | 78.5 | 3,113 | | 2016 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 82.5 | 79.9 | 85.1 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 83.5 | 81.2 | 86.1 | 3,111 | | 2024 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Five axes and state baselines | 82.5 | 80.1 | 85.2 | 3,110 | | 2000 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 33.7 | 23.4 | 42.6 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 33.1 | 22.8 | 41.5 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 35.5 | 26.2 | 43.3 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 35.6 | 26.7 | 43.4 | 3,113 | | 2016 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 32.9 | 24.3 | 41.5 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 35.2 | 26.8 | 43.2 | 3,111 | | 2024 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | State baselines alone | 35.1 | 26.9 | 42.4 | 3,110 | | 2000 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 26.6 | 19.6 | 38.2 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 26.8 | 19.7 | 38.7 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 29.6 | 21.8 | 43.1 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 37.7 | 27.8 | 52.1 | 3,113 | | 2016 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 61.2 | 52.1 | 72.1 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 64.2 | 56.3 | 73.9 | 3,111 | | 2024 | County-equal | 2000 census measures for every election | Nine measures | 64.3 | 56.7 | 73.6 | 3,110 | Views: Vote-weighted (measures = Election-year census measures, weighting = Vote-weighted); County-equal (measures = Election-year census measures, weighting = County-equal); Vote-weighted, 2024 census measures (measures = 2024 census measures for every election, weighting = Vote-weighted); County-equal, 2024 census measures (measures = 2024 census measures for every election, weighting = County-equal); Vote-weighted, 2000 census measures (measures = 2000 census measures for every election, weighting = Vote-weighted); County-equal, 2000 census measures (measures = 2000 census measures for every election, weighting = County-equal). Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so they carry no sampling error. The 95% intervals come from a bootstrap that resamples whole states, so they show how much a number depends on which states are in the set. They do not include the sampling error of the county characteristics, which are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated between years. Note: In the last four views the counties that lack the fixed census measures are dropped from every election. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 2000 to 2020; MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), full counts of votes; county characteristics from the decennial census and American Community Survey, interpolated to election years; estimates weighted by two-party votes or counting each county once, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/r2_by_year.json ### Table 6. Vote-weighted, the part of the county margin that the five axes leave over narrowed from 20.4 to 18.4 points while the part they fit widened from 16.9 to 27.2 Standard deviation across counties of the two-party margin, the margin fitted by the five axes and the margin left over, 2000 to 2024, counties weighted by two-party votes | Election | Weighting | Part of the margin | Standard deviation (points) | Interval low | Interval high | Counties | | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Margin | 26.5 | 24.0 | 28.6 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | Margin | 27.4 | 25.2 | 29.1 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | Margin | 28.8 | 26.5 | 30.7 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | Margin | 31.1 | 28.7 | 33.1 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | Margin | 35.9 | 33.3 | 37.9 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | Margin | 34.1 | 31.8 | 36.1 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Margin | 32.8 | 30.6 | 35.0 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Fitted by the five axes | 16.9 | 13.4 | 20.9 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | Fitted by the five axes | 18.0 | 15.0 | 21.4 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | Fitted by the five axes | 20.0 | 17.0 | 23.1 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | Fitted by the five axes | 22.5 | 19.5 | 25.7 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | Fitted by the five axes | 30.5 | 27.7 | 33.3 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | Fitted by the five axes | 28.9 | 26.4 | 31.8 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Fitted by the five axes | 27.2 | 24.7 | 30.4 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes | 20.4 | 18.0 | 21.9 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes | 20.6 | 18.4 | 21.7 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes | 20.7 | 18.1 | 22.2 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes | 21.5 | 18.8 | 23.0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes | 18.9 | 16.5 | 20.3 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes | 18.0 | 15.5 | 19.3 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes | 18.4 | 15.5 | 19.7 | 3,103 | | 2000 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 13.5 | 11.7 | 14.7 | 3,113 | | 2004 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 13.8 | 11.9 | 14.9 | 3,113 | | 2008 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 12.9 | 11.3 | 13.9 | 3,113 | | 2012 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 13.2 | 11.5 | 14.3 | 3,112 | | 2016 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 12.0 | 10.4 | 13.0 | 3,111 | | 2020 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 11.7 | 10.2 | 12.6 | 3,103 | | 2024 | Vote-weighted | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 12.0 | 10.4 | 12.9 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Margin | 24.5 | 22.3 | 26.3 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | Margin | 25.4 | 23.2 | 27.1 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | Margin | 28.1 | 25.7 | 30.1 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | Margin | 30.1 | 27.4 | 32.3 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | Margin | 32.3 | 29.8 | 34.5 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | Margin | 32.6 | 30.3 | 34.8 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | Margin | 31.7 | 29.5 | 33.7 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Fitted by the five axes | 10.8 | 8.2 | 14.3 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | Fitted by the five axes | 11.3 | 8.6 | 14.9 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | Fitted by the five axes | 14.2 | 11.7 | 17.7 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | Fitted by the five axes | 17.3 | 14.6 | 21.0 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | Fitted by the five axes | 24.6 | 21.8 | 27.9 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | Fitted by the five axes | 25.2 | 22.4 | 28.8 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | Fitted by the five axes | 24.3 | 21.3 | 27.8 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes | 22.0 | 19.2 | 23.9 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes | 22.7 | 19.8 | 24.5 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes | 24.3 | 20.9 | 26.5 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes | 24.6 | 20.8 | 27.1 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes | 21.0 | 17.6 | 23.2 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes | 20.7 | 17.1 | 23.0 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes | 20.4 | 16.9 | 22.6 | 3,103 | | 2000 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 15.4 | 14.0 | 16.4 | 3,113 | | 2004 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 15.4 | 14.2 | 16.4 | 3,113 | | 2008 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 15.2 | 14.0 | 16.1 | 3,113 | | 2012 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 15.3 | 14.2 | 16.3 | 3,112 | | 2016 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 13.7 | 12.5 | 14.7 | 3,111 | | 2020 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 13.3 | 12.1 | 14.3 | 3,103 | | 2024 | County-equal | Left over after the five axes and state baselines | 13.4 | 12.1 | 14.4 | 3,103 | Views: Vote-weighted (weighting = Vote-weighted); County-equal (weighting = County-equal). Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so they carry no sampling error. The 95% intervals come from a bootstrap that resamples whole states, so they show how much a number depends on which states are in the set. They do not include the sampling error of the county characteristics, which are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated between years. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 2000 to 2020; MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), full counts of votes; county characteristics from the decennial census and American Community Survey, interpolated to election years; estimates weighted by two-party votes or counting each county once, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/spread_by_year.json ### Table 7. The vote-weighted correlation of college share exceeds the county-equal one by +0.18 in 2000 and by +0.11 in 2024 Correlation of each axis with the county two-party margin when counties are weighted by two-party votes and when each county counts once, 2000 and 2024 | axis | ce_high | ce_low | county_equal | election | n_units | vote_weighted | vw_high | vw_low | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Education | 0.195 | 0.005 | 0.100 | 2000 | 3,113 | 0.282 | 0.381 | 0.182 | | Income | 0.137 | −0.101 | 0.018 | 2000 | 3,113 | 0.096 | 0.198 | −0.005 | | Race and ethnicity | −0.259 | −0.541 | −0.400 | 2000 | 3,113 | −0.519 | −0.357 | −0.681 | | Age | −0.054 | −0.283 | −0.169 | 2000 | 3,113 | −0.076 | 0.036 | −0.187 | | Rurality | −0.180 | −0.357 | −0.269 | 2000 | 3,113 | −0.461 | −0.357 | −0.565 | | Education | 0.638 | 0.474 | 0.556 | 2024 | 3,103 | 0.663 | 0.722 | 0.604 | | Income | 0.434 | 0.173 | 0.304 | 2024 | 3,103 | 0.397 | 0.504 | 0.290 | | Race and ethnicity | −0.285 | −0.707 | −0.496 | 2024 | 3,103 | −0.574 | −0.440 | −0.707 | | Age | −0.118 | −0.272 | −0.195 | 2024 | 3,103 | −0.310 | −0.214 | −0.406 | | Rurality | −0.462 | −0.592 | −0.527 | 2024 | 3,103 | −0.653 | −0.564 | −0.741 | Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so they carry no sampling error. The 95% intervals use errors clustered by state, so they show how much a number depends on which states are in the set. They do not include the sampling error of the county characteristics, which are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated between years. Note: The difference in the last column is its own estimate; its 95% interval from a bootstrap over states is in the text. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 2000 to 2020; MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), full counts of votes; county characteristics from the decennial census and American Community Survey, interpolated to election years; estimates weighted by two-party votes or counting each county once, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/weighting_gap.json ### Table 8. The correlation depends on the measure within an axis in 2024, from −0.03 for the share without a high school diploma to +0.66 for college share, vote-weighted Correlation of fifteen county measures, grouped by the five axes, with the county two-party margin in 2024, vote-weighted and county-equal | Axis | Measure | Weighting | Correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Counties | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Education | Bachelor's degree or more | Vote-weighted | +0.66 | +0.60 | +0.72 | 3,103 | | Education | Bachelor's degree or more | County-equal | +0.56 | +0.47 | +0.64 | 3,103 | | Education | No high school diploma | Vote-weighted | −0.03 | −0.20 | +0.14 | 3,103 | | Education | No high school diploma | County-equal | −0.15 | −0.26 | −0.04 | 3,103 | | Income | Median household income | Vote-weighted | +0.40 | +0.29 | +0.50 | 3,103 | | Income | Median household income | County-equal | +0.30 | +0.17 | +0.43 | 3,103 | | Income | Per capita income | Vote-weighted | +0.55 | +0.47 | +0.64 | 3,103 | | Income | Per capita income | County-equal | +0.39 | +0.27 | +0.51 | 3,103 | | Income | Poverty rate | Vote-weighted | −0.03 | −0.14 | +0.09 | 3,103 | | Income | Poverty rate | County-equal | +0.05 | −0.09 | +0.20 | 3,103 | | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | Vote-weighted | −0.57 | −0.71 | −0.44 | 3,103 | | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic white share | County-equal | −0.50 | −0.71 | −0.28 | 3,103 | | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic Black share | Vote-weighted | +0.39 | +0.24 | +0.54 | 3,103 | | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic Black share | County-equal | +0.44 | +0.35 | +0.52 | 3,103 | | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic share | Vote-weighted | +0.24 | +0.10 | +0.38 | 3,103 | | Race and ethnicity | Hispanic share | County-equal | +0.10 | −0.09 | +0.30 | 3,103 | | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic Asian share | Vote-weighted | +0.53 | +0.36 | +0.69 | 3,103 | | Race and ethnicity | Non-Hispanic Asian share | County-equal | +0.45 | +0.31 | +0.58 | 3,103 | | Race and ethnicity | Foreign-born share | Vote-weighted | +0.54 | +0.36 | +0.72 | 3,103 | | Race and ethnicity | Foreign-born share | County-equal | +0.37 | +0.22 | +0.53 | 3,103 | | Age | Median age | Vote-weighted | −0.31 | −0.41 | −0.21 | 3,103 | | Age | Median age | County-equal | −0.20 | −0.27 | −0.12 | 3,103 | | Age | Share aged 65 and over | Vote-weighted | −0.34 | −0.45 | −0.23 | 3,103 | | Age | Share aged 65 and over | County-equal | −0.20 | −0.28 | −0.12 | 3,103 | | Age | Share under 30 | Vote-weighted | +0.13 | 0.00 | +0.25 | 3,103 | | Age | Share under 30 | County-equal | +0.13 | +0.05 | +0.21 | 3,103 | | Rurality | Rural share | Vote-weighted | −0.65 | −0.74 | −0.56 | 3,103 | | Rurality | Rural share | County-equal | −0.53 | −0.59 | −0.46 | 3,103 | | Rurality | Rural-urban continuum code | Vote-weighted | −0.51 | −0.58 | −0.44 | 3,103 | | Rurality | Rural-urban continuum code | County-equal | −0.41 | −0.49 | −0.34 | 3,103 | Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so they carry no sampling error. The 95% intervals use errors clustered by state, so they show how much a number depends on which states are in the set. They do not include the sampling error of the county characteristics, which are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated between years. Note: Poverty rate is listed with income because it measures the same dimension from the other end; the chapters on hardship take it up. The rural-urban continuum code runs from the most urban class to the most rural class, in the 2023 edition. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani for 2000 to 2020; MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), full counts of votes; county characteristics from the decennial census and American Community Survey, interpolated to election years; estimates weighted by two-party votes or counting each county once, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/measures_2024.json ### Table 9. In 2024 the mean gap between a county's margin and the five-axis fit is −10.8 points in the Census South and +6.7 points in the rest of the country, vote-weighted County two-party margin minus the margin fitted by a regression on the five axes weighted by two-party votes, 2000 and 2024, in percentage points of margin | Election | Position | County | Margin minus fit (points) | Margin (points) | Fitted margin (points) | Two-party votes | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2024 | Largest gaps below the fit | Forsyth, GA | −52.9 | −33.5 | +19.4 | 136,790 | | 2024 | Largest gaps below the fit | Williamson, TN | −52.1 | −32.9 | +19.2 | 142,257 | | 2024 | Largest gaps below the fit | Shelby, AL | −47.4 | −41.3 | +6.1 | 112,753 | | 2024 | Largest gaps below the fit | Comal, TX | −46.8 | −46.0 | +0.9 | 102,436 | | 2024 | Largest gaps below the fit | Miami-Dade, FL | −46.8 | −11.5 | +35.3 | 1,085,945 | | 2024 | Largest gaps below the fit | Lubbock, TX | −46.2 | −39.9 | +6.2 | 123,695 | | 2024 | Largest gaps below the fit | Montgomery, TX | −45.2 | −45.9 | −0.8 | 304,241 | | 2024 | Largest gaps below the fit | Collin, TX | −45.0 | −11.4 | +33.5 | 501,649 | | 2024 | Largest gaps above the fit | Clayton, GA | +52.2 | +69.6 | +17.4 | 111,080 | | 2024 | Largest gaps above the fit | Sonoma, CA | +48.2 | +47.8 | −0.4 | 243,026 | | 2024 | Largest gaps above the fit | Prince George's, MD | +48.1 | +77.0 | +29.0 | 392,046 | | 2024 | Largest gaps above the fit | Santa Cruz, CA | +46.8 | +56.6 | +9.8 | 128,976 | | 2024 | Largest gaps above the fit | Baltimore City, MD | +42.7 | +74.9 | +32.2 | 223,093 | | 2024 | Largest gaps above the fit | Multnomah, OR | +42.5 | +64.3 | +21.8 | 396,686 | | 2024 | Largest gaps above the fit | Marin, CA | +40.1 | +65.7 | +25.6 | 140,206 | | 2024 | Largest gaps above the fit | St. Louis, MN | +36.8 | +14.0 | −22.8 | 116,400 | | 2000 | Largest gaps below the fit | Collin, TX | −49.0 | −49.9 | −0.9 | 171,063 | | 2000 | Largest gaps below the fit | Montgomery, TX | −40.5 | −55.2 | −14.7 | 103,886 | | 2000 | Largest gaps below the fit | Utah, UT | −39.5 | −71.3 | −31.8 | 114,700 | | 2000 | Largest gaps below the fit | Greenville, SC | −37.0 | −35.8 | +1.2 | 136,524 | | 2000 | Largest gaps below the fit | Sarasota, FL | −36.9 | −6.6 | +30.4 | 155,986 | | 2000 | Largest gaps below the fit | Fort Bend, TX | −36.9 | −21.5 | +15.4 | 121,136 | | 2000 | Largest gaps below the fit | Lee, FL | −35.9 | −18.1 | +17.7 | 179,722 | | 2000 | Largest gaps below the fit | Denton, TX | −35.7 | −43.6 | −7.9 | 142,315 | | 2000 | Largest gaps above the fit | Bristol, MA | +45.7 | +36.9 | −8.8 | 199,173 | | 2000 | Largest gaps above the fit | Bronx, NY | +42.9 | +76.0 | +33.1 | 302,046 | | 2000 | Largest gaps above the fit | Philadelphia, PA | +40.6 | +63.3 | +22.7 | 550,141 | | 2000 | Largest gaps above the fit | Kings, NY | +40.0 | +67.5 | +27.5 | 594,122 | | 2000 | Largest gaps above the fit | Suffolk, MA | +38.3 | +55.4 | +17.1 | 199,329 | | 2000 | Largest gaps above the fit | Baltimore City, MD | +37.5 | +70.8 | +33.3 | 185,915 | | 2000 | Largest gaps above the fit | District Of Columbia , DC | +36.8 | +81.0 | +44.2 | 189,996 | | 2000 | Largest gaps above the fit | Providence, RI | +36.6 | +39.8 | +3.1 | 203,847 | The map draws every unit from https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/residual_map.json; the rows above are the subset the figure file carries. Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so the map draws no intervals. The map is drawn on 2020 county boundaries and a county with no fit draws as no data. Alaska is not in the sample, because it reports returns by election district; the Connecticut counties draw in 2000 and not in 2024, because they lack 2024 census measures; Kansas City is added to Jackson County, Missouri in 2024. Note: The data table lists the eight counties at each end of the gap for each year, among counties above the vote cut named in the caption, not the whole map. Source: County presidential returns, 2000 and 2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes; fitted values from a regression weighted by two-party votes on county characteristics from the census and American Community Survey Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/residual_map.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (219), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | age_old_cut | 65 | years of age | age at which the older-adult share starts | residents | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | age_young_cut | 30 | years of age | age below which the younger share counts | residents | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | b_age_2000_w | +0.29 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on median age in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.49 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_age_2024_w | +0.04 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on median age in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.13 to 0.21 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_edu_2000_u | +0.03 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on college share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.09 to 0.14 | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_edu_2000_w | +0.25 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on college share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 0.11 to 0.39 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_edu_2024_u | +0.56 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on college share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.48 to 0.64 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_edu_2024_w | +0.71 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on college share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.63 to 0.79 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_inc_2000_w | −0.17 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on median household income in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.28 to −0.06 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_inc_2024_u | −0.14 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on median household income in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.23 to −0.06 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_inc_2024_w | −0.26 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on median household income in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.40 to −0.11 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_race_2000_w | −0.50 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on non-Hispanic white share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.65 to −0.35 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_race_2016_w | −0.59 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on non-Hispanic white share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI −0.70 to −0.48 | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_race_2024_w | −0.43 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on non-Hispanic white share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.57 to −0.29 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_rural_2000_w | −0.25 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on rural share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.38 to −0.11 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_rural_2024_w | −0.12 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on rural share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.25 to 0.01 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | bfe_age_2024_w | +0.08 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on median age in a regression of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.13 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | bfe_edu_2024_u | +0.54 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on college share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.48 to 0.60 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | bfe_edu_2024_w | +0.73 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on college share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.65 to 0.80 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | bfe_inc_2024_w | −0.40 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on median household income in a regression of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.48 to −0.33 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | bfe_race_2000_u | −0.68 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on non-Hispanic white share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.76 to −0.60 | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | bfe_race_2000_w | −0.77 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on non-Hispanic white share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.90 to −0.64 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | bfe_race_2024_u | −0.73 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on non-Hispanic white share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.84 to −0.61 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | bfe_race_2024_w | −0.62 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on non-Hispanic white share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.76 to −0.48 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | bfe_rural_2024_w | −0.09 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on rural share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.14 to −0.04 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | big_cut | 250,000 | two-party votes | vote cut for a large county | counties | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | big_n_2000 | 76 | counties | count of counties with 250,000 or more two-party votes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | big_n_2024 | 135 | counties | count of counties with 250,000 or more two-party votes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | 3,103 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | big_share_2000 | 35% | share of two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties with 250,000 or more two-party votes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | | 3,113 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | big_share_2024 | 46% | share of two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in counties with 250,000 or more two-party votes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | 3,103 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | chr_edu_2000_2024_w | +0.38 | change in correlation | change between the two elections in the correlation of the county margin with college share (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.31 to 0.47 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | chr_race_2000_2024_w | −0.05 | change in correlation | change between the two elections in the correlation of the county margin with non-Hispanic white share (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.13 to 0.03 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | chr_rural_2000_2024_w | −0.19 | change in correlation | change between the two elections in the correlation of the county margin with rural share (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.27 to −0.11 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | chs_explained_2000_2024_w | +10.3 | percentage points of margin | change between the two elections in the weighted standard deviation of the margin fitted by the five axes (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 7.0 to 13.8 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | chs_resid_2000_2024_w | −2.0 | percentage points of margin | change between the two elections in the weighted standard deviation of the margin left over after the five axes (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI −3.6 to −0.7 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | chv_five_2000_2016_w | +31.3 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | change between the two elections in the R-squared of the five-axis regression (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2016 | 95% CI 22.0 to 39.1 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | chv_five_2000_2024_w | +27.8 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | change between the two elections in the R-squared of the five-axis regression (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 18.9 to 37.3 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | chv_five_2012_2016_w | +19.9 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | change between the two elections in the R-squared of the five-axis regression (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 15.3 to 23.6 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | chv_five_2016_2024_w | −3.6 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | change between the two elections in the R-squared of the five-axis regression (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −7.1 to 1.5 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | chv_state_2000_2024_w | −6.7 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | change between the two elections in the R-squared of a baseline for each state alone (the same states are drawn for both elections) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI −16.8 to 4.2 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | ct_votes_2020 | 1.16% | percent of two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in the Connecticut counties left out for a missing census measure | two-party votes in counties with returns, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | | 8 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | ct_votes_2024 | 1.14% | percent of two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in the Connecticut counties left out for a missing census measure | two-party votes in counties with returns, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | 8 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | first_edu_2020_u | 34% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2020 presidential election | | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | first_edu_2020_w | 17% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2020 presidential election | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | first_edu_2024_u | 59% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2024 presidential election | | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | first_edu_2024_w | 60% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2024 presidential election | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | first_race_2000_w | 87% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2000 presidential election | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | first_race_2016_u | 85% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2016 presidential election | | 3,111 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | first_race_2016_w | 79% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2016 presidential election | | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | first_race_2020_u | 52% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2020 presidential election | | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | first_race_2020_w | 23% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2020 presidential election | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | first_race_hi_u | 98% | share of resamples | highest over the elections of 2000 to 2016 of the share of resamples in which the white share has the largest absolute correlation | resamples of states | 2000 to 2016 | | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | first_race_hi_w | 93% | share of resamples | highest over the elections of 2000 to 2016 of the share of resamples in which the white share has the largest absolute correlation | resamples of states | 2000 to 2016 | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | first_race_lo_u | 70% | share of resamples | lowest over the elections of 2000 to 2016 of the share of resamples in which the white share has the largest absolute correlation | resamples of states | 2000 to 2016 | | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | first_race_lo_w | 76% | share of resamples | lowest over the elections of 2000 to 2016 of the share of resamples in which the white share has the largest absolute correlation | resamples of states | 2000 to 2016 | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | first_rural_2020_u | 14% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which rural share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2020 presidential election | | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | first_rural_2020_w | 60% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which rural share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2020 presidential election | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | first_rural_2024_w | 38% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which rural share has the largest absolute correlation with the county margin of the five axes | 2,000 resamples of states | 2024 presidential election | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | gap_2024_u | +0.03 | difference in absolute correlation | absolute correlation of the first-ranked axis minus that of the second-ranked axis | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.10 | | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | gap_2024_w | +0.01 | difference in absolute correlation | absolute correlation of the first-ranked axis minus that of the second-ranked axis | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.05 to 0.09 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | jffirst_edu_2024_w | 90% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression with state baselines | resamples of states | 2024 presidential election | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | jffirst_race_2000_w | 100% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression with state baselines | resamples of states | 2000 presidential election | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | jffirst_race_2024_u | 98% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression with state baselines | resamples of states | 2024 presidential election | | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | jfirst_edu_2004_w | 51% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression | resamples of states | 2004 presidential election | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | jfirst_edu_2008_w | 55% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression | resamples of states | 2008 presidential election | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | jfirst_edu_2016_w | 65% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression | resamples of states | 2016 presidential election | | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | jfirst_edu_2020_u | 56% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression | resamples of states | 2020 presidential election | | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | jfirst_edu_2024_u | 77% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression | resamples of states | 2024 presidential election | | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | jfirst_edu_2024_w | 100% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which college share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression | resamples of states | 2024 presidential election | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | jfirst_race_2000_w | 97% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression | resamples of states | 2000 presidential election | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | jfirst_race_2004_w | 49% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression | resamples of states | 2004 presidential election | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | jfirst_race_2008_w | 45% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression | resamples of states | 2008 presidential election | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | jfirst_race_2012_w | 73% | share of resamples | share of resamples in which non-Hispanic white share has the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression | resamples of states | 2012 presidential election | | 3,112 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | m_age29_w | +0.12 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with share under 30 | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.00 to 0.25 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_age65_w | −0.34 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with share aged 65 and over | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.45 to −0.23 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_age_w | −0.31 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with median age | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.41 to −0.21 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_asian_w | +0.52 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with non-Hispanic Asian share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.36 to 0.69 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_ba_w | +0.66 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with bachelor's degree or more | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.72 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_black_w | +0.39 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with non-Hispanic Black share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.24 to 0.54 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_foreign_w | +0.54 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with foreign-born share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.37 to 0.72 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_hisp_u | +0.11 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with hispanic share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.09 to 0.30 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_hisp_w | +0.24 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with hispanic share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.38 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_inc_w | +0.40 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with median household income | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.29 to 0.50 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_lesshs_w | −0.03 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with no high school diploma | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.20 to 0.14 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_pci_w | +0.55 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with per capita income | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.47 to 0.64 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_pov_w | −0.03 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with poverty rate | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.14 to 0.09 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_rucc_w | −0.51 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with rural-urban continuum code | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.58 to −0.44 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_rural_w | −0.65 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with rural share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.74 to −0.56 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | m_white_w | −0.57 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with non-Hispanic white share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.71 to −0.44 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | n_max | 3,113 | counties | largest number of counties in an election's sample | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_min | 3,103 | counties | smallest number of counties in an election's sample | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_reps | 2,000 | bootstrap replicates | number of bootstrap replicates | resamples of states | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | pg_race_inc_2024_w | +0.18 | difference in absolute correlation | absolute correlation of non-Hispanic white share minus that of median household income | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.05 to 0.34 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | pts_edu_2000_w | +6.7 | percentage points of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on college share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes, in points of margin | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 3.0 to 10.5 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | pts_edu_2024_w | +23.4 | percentage points of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on college share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes, in points of margin | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 20.7 to 26.1 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | pts_race_2000_w | −13.4 | percentage points of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on non-Hispanic white share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes, in points of margin | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −17.4 to −9.4 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | pts_race_2024_w | −14.1 | percentage points of margin per standard deviation of the axis | coefficient on non-Hispanic white share in a regression of the county margin on the five axes, in points of margin | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −18.7 to −9.6 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r2_2000_u | 20% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 11% to 33% | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2_2000_w | 41% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 30% to 56% | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2_2012_u | 33% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2012 presidential election | 95% CI 24% to 49% | 3,112 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2_2012_w | 52% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2012 presidential election | 95% CI 44% to 63% | 3,112 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2_2016_u | 58% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI 49% to 70% | 3,111 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2_2016_w | 72% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI 67% to 79% | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2_2020_w | 72% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 67% to 80% | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2_2024_u | 59% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 49% to 71% | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2_2024_w | 69% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 63% to 78% | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2cf_2024_w | 61% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared in 2024 if the left-over spread of the five-axis regression stayed at its 2000 value | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 53% to 71% | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2cfgap_2024_w | 7.2 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | part of the 2000 to 2024 rise in R-squared that comes from the narrower left-over spread | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.5 to 13.3 | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2d_2000 | +21.2 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | vote-weighted R-squared of the five-axis regression minus the county-equal R-squared | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 9.5 to 31.9 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2d_2024 | +9.9 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | vote-weighted R-squared of the five-axis regression minus the county-equal R-squared | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.8 to 18.5 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2dfe_2000 | +13.4 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | vote-weighted R-squared of the five-axis regression with state baselines minus the county-equal R-squared | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 5.3 to 20.9 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2dfe_2024 | +4.7 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | vote-weighted R-squared of the five-axis regression with state baselines minus the county-equal R-squared | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 1.2 to 8.6 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2fe_2000_u | 61% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 54% to 67% | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2fe_2000_w | 74% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 65% to 82% | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2fe_2024_u | 82% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 79% to 85% | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2fe_2024_w | 87% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 84% to 90% | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2fu_2000_w | 49% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes plus the Black, Hispanic and Asian shares and the foreign-born share (nine measures) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 39% to 63% | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2fu_2024_w | 71% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes plus the Black, Hispanic and Asian shares and the foreign-born share (nine measures) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 67% to 79% | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2st_2000_w | 34% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on a baseline for each state alone | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 24% to 43% | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2st_2024_w | 27% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on a baseline for each state alone | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 19% to 34% | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2wi_2000_w | 61% | share of the within-state variance of the county margin | share of the within-state variance of the county margin that the five axes reproduce | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 50% to 72% | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r2wi_2024_w | 82% | share of the within-state variance of the county margin | share of the within-state variance of the county margin that the five axes reproduce | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 77% to 88% | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_age_2000_w | −0.08 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with median age | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.19 to 0.04 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_age_2024_w | −0.31 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with median age | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.41 to −0.21 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_edu_2000_u | +0.10 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with college share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.19 | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_edu_2000_w | +0.28 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with college share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 0.18 to 0.38 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_edu_2020_u | +0.53 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with college share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 0.45 to 0.61 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_edu_2020_w | +0.64 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with college share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 0.58 to 0.70 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_edu_2024_u | +0.56 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with college share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.47 to 0.64 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_edu_2024_w | +0.66 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with college share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.72 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_inc_2000_w | +0.10 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with median household income | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.20 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_inc_2024_w | +0.40 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with median household income | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.29 to 0.50 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_race_2000_w | −0.52 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with non-Hispanic white share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.68 to −0.36 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_race_2016_w | −0.68 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with non-Hispanic white share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI −0.79 to −0.57 | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_race_2020_u | −0.53 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with non-Hispanic white share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −0.73 to −0.33 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_race_2020_w | −0.63 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with non-Hispanic white share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −0.75 to −0.51 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_race_2024_w | −0.57 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with non-Hispanic white share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.71 to −0.44 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_rural_2000_u | −0.27 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with rural share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.36 to −0.18 | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_rural_2000_w | −0.46 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with rural share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.56 to −0.36 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_rural_2020_w | −0.67 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with rural share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −0.76 to −0.58 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | r_rural_2024_w | −0.65 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with rural share | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.74 to −0.56 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | rc_rucc_2016_w | −0.51 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with the rural-urban continuum code (edition 2013) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 presidential election | | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rc_rucc_2020_w | −0.52 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with the rural-urban continuum code (edition 2023) | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rc_rural_2016_w | −0.65 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with rural share of residents | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 presidential election | | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rc_rural_2020_w | −0.67 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county two-party margin with rural share of residents | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rcm_12086_2024 | −11.5 | percentage points of margin | county two-party margin, Democratic positive | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | rcp_12086_2024 | +35.3 | percentage points of margin | county margin fitted by the vote-weighted five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rcr_01117_2024 | −47.4 | percentage points of margin | county margin minus the margin fitted by the vote-weighted five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rcr_06097_2024 | +48.2 | percentage points of margin | county margin minus the margin fitted by the vote-weighted five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rcr_12086_2024 | −46.8 | percentage points of margin | county margin minus the margin fitted by the vote-weighted five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rcr_13063_2024 | +52.2 | percentage points of margin | county margin minus the margin fitted by the vote-weighted five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rcr_13117_2024 | −52.9 | percentage points of margin | county margin minus the margin fitted by the vote-weighted five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rcr_24033_2024 | +48.1 | percentage points of margin | county margin minus the margin fitted by the vote-weighted five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rcr_47187_2024 | −52.1 | percentage points of margin | county margin minus the margin fitted by the vote-weighted five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | res_band | 20 | percentage points of margin | distance from the fitted margin used to flag a county | counties | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | res_big_2000 | 35% | share of two-party votes | share of two-party votes in counties whose margin is more than 20 points from the five-axis fit | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | res_big_2024 | 25% | share of two-party votes | share of two-party votes in counties whose margin is more than 20 points from the five-axis fit | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | res_cut | 100,000 | two-party votes | vote cut for naming counties | counties | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | res_rest_2000 | +6.0 | percentage points of margin | vote-weighted mean residual of the five-axis regression among counties outside the Census South | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | | 1,690 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | res_rest_2024 | +6.7 | percentage points of margin | vote-weighted mean residual of the five-axis regression among counties outside the Census South | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | 1,681 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | res_sd_2000 | 20.4 | percentage points of margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of the five-axis residual | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | res_sd_2024 | 18.4 | percentage points of margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of the five-axis residual | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | res_south_2000 | −11.5 | percentage points of margin | vote-weighted mean residual of the five-axis regression among counties in the Census South | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | | 1,423 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | res_south_2024 | −10.8 | percentage points of margin | vote-weighted mean residual of the five-axis regression among counties in the Census South | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | 1,422 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | res_tx_2024 | −21.7 | percentage points of margin | vote-weighted mean residual of the five-axis regression in TX counties | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | res_vt_2024 | +42.6 | percentage points of margin | vote-weighted mean residual of the five-axis regression in VT counties | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | rural_mean_p_2012 | 19.4% | percent of residents | mean rural share of residents across counties, weighted by county population | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2012 presidential election | | 3,112 | county population | County demographics panel | | | rural_mean_p_2020 | 20.0% | percent of residents | mean rural share of residents across counties, weighted by county population | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | | 3,103 | county population | County demographics panel | | | rural_mean_u_2012 | 59.6% | percent of residents | mean rural share of residents across counties, each county counted once | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2012 presidential election | | 3,112 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | rural_mean_u_2020 | 64.0% | percent of residents | mean rural share of residents across counties, each county counted once | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2020 presidential election | | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | | | sde_2000_u | 10.9 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the margin fitted by the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 8.2 to 14.3 | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sde_2000_w | 16.9 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the margin fitted by the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 13.4 to 20.9 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sde_2024_u | 24.3 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the margin fitted by the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 21.3 to 27.8 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sde_2024_w | 27.2 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the margin fitted by the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 24.7 to 30.4 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdr_2000_u | 22.0 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the margin left over after the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 19.2 to 23.9 | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdr_2000_w | 20.4 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the margin left over after the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 18.0 to 21.9 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdr_2024_u | 20.4 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the margin left over after the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 16.9 to 22.6 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdr_2024_w | 18.4 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the margin left over after the five axes | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 15.5 to 19.7 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdrf_2000_w | 13.5 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the margin left over after the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 11.7 to 14.7 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdrf_2024_w | 12.0 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the margin left over after the five axes and a baseline for each state | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 10.4 to 12.9 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdt_2000_u | 24.5 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the county margin | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 22.3 to 26.3 | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdt_2000_w | 26.5 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the county margin | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 24.0 to 28.6 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdt_2016_w | 35.9 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the county margin | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI 33.3 to 37.9 | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdt_2024_u | 31.7 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the county margin | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 29.5 to 33.7 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdt_2024_w | 32.8 | percentage points of margin | weighted standard deviation of the county margin | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 30.6 to 35.0 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sdx_edu_2024_w | 11.8 | percentage points of adults | vote-weighted standard deviation of college share across counties | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | sdx_race_2024_w | 21.1 | percentage points of residents | vote-weighted standard deviation of non-Hispanic white share across counties | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | uniq_age_2024_w | 0.1 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | drop in R-squared when median age is removed from the five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.0 to 2.6 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | uniq_edu_2000_w | 2.4 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | drop in R-squared when college share is removed from the five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 0.5 to 5.4 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | uniq_edu_2024_u | 12.8 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | drop in R-squared when college share is removed from the five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 8.6 to 16.9 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | uniq_edu_2024_w | 16.9 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | drop in R-squared when college share is removed from the five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 12.1 to 22.8 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | uniq_inc_2024_w | 2.7 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | drop in R-squared when median household income is removed from the five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.8 to 6.9 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | uniq_race_2000_w | 15.1 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | drop in R-squared when non-Hispanic white share is removed from the five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 6.9 to 23.8 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | uniq_race_2024_u | 17.6 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | drop in R-squared when non-Hispanic white share is removed from the five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 8.0 to 31.2 | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | uniq_race_2024_w | 11.0 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | drop in R-squared when non-Hispanic white share is removed from the five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 5.1 to 17.5 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | uniq_rural_2024_w | 0.7 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | drop in R-squared when rural share is removed from the five-axis regression | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.0 to 2.8 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | v00chg_2012_2016_w | +19.3 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | change in the R-squared of the five-axis regression with the 2000 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | v00chg_2016_2024_w | −4.5 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | change in the R-squared of the five-axis regression with the 2000 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | | 3,110 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | v00r2_2000_u | 20% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes, with the 2000 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 11% to 33% | 3,113 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | v00r2_2000_w | 41% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes, with the 2000 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 30% to 56% | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | v00r2_2016_w | 72% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes, with the 2000 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI 65% to 80% | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | v00r2_2024_u | 58% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes, with the 2000 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 48% to 72% | 3,110 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | v00r2_2024_w | 68% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes, with the 2000 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 61% to 77% | 3,110 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | v24chg_2012_2016_w | +20.9 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | change in the R-squared of the five-axis regression with the 2024 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | | 3,104 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | v24chg_2016_2024_w | −2.0 | percentage points of the variance of the county margin | change in the R-squared of the five-axis regression with the 2024 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | v24r2_2000_u | 18% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes, with the 2024 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 11% to 29% | 3,102 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | v24r2_2000_w | 35% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes, with the 2024 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 27% to 48% | 3,102 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | v24r2_2016_w | 71% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes, with the 2024 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2016 presidential election | 95% CI 65% to 78% | 3,104 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | v24r2_2024_u | 59% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes, with the 2024 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 49% to 71% | 3,103 | none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | v24r2_2024_w | 69% | share of the variance of the county margin | R-squared of the county margin on the five axes, with the 2024 census measures used for every election | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 63% to 78% | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wd_age_2000 | +0.09 | difference in correlation | vote-weighted correlation of median age with the county margin minus the county-equal correlation | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.03 to 0.20 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wd_age_2024 | −0.11 | difference in correlation | vote-weighted correlation of median age with the county margin minus the county-equal correlation | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.20 to −0.01 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wd_edu_2000 | +0.18 | difference in correlation | vote-weighted correlation of college share with the county margin minus the county-equal correlation | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI 0.09 to 0.26 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wd_edu_2024 | +0.11 | difference in correlation | vote-weighted correlation of college share with the county margin minus the county-equal correlation | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI 0.02 to 0.20 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wd_inc_2000 | +0.08 | difference in correlation | vote-weighted correlation of median household income with the county margin minus the county-equal correlation | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.05 to 0.19 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wd_inc_2024 | +0.09 | difference in correlation | vote-weighted correlation of median household income with the county margin minus the county-equal correlation | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.22 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wd_race_2024 | −0.08 | difference in correlation | vote-weighted correlation of non-Hispanic white share with the county margin minus the county-equal correlation | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.17 to 0.04 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wd_rural_2000 | −0.19 | difference in correlation | vote-weighted correlation of rural share with the county margin minus the county-equal correlation | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2000 presidential election | 95% CI −0.26 to −0.12 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wd_rural_2024 | −0.13 | difference in correlation | vote-weighted correlation of rural share with the county margin minus the county-equal correlation | counties with returns and a complete set of census measures, Alaska excluded | 2024 presidential election | 95% CI −0.20 to −0.05 | | two-party votes minus none (each county counts once) | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | ## Definitions - County two-party margin: The Democratic vote minus the Republican vote, divided by the sum of the two, so a positive value is a Democratic lead. Votes for other candidates are left out. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. - Fixed effects: Regression terms that give each group, such as each country or each year, its own baseline. The other coefficients then compare respondents within the same group. - Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them. ## Methods Sample: presidential returns for the 7 elections from 2000 to 2024 (Algara and Amlani for 2000 to 2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), from the repaired county file whose 2024 totals are corrected for 173 counties in South Carolina, Wisconsin and West Virginia. The 41 Alaska rows (election districts) are dropped before any calculation; in these years no other row lacks a FIPS code, a vote count or two-party votes. Kansas City, Missouri is a separate row (FIPS 2938000) in 2024 only; its votes are added to Jackson County (29095), which holds them in 2000 to 2020 and whose census measures cover the whole county. The 2024 returns carry Oglala Lakota County, South Dakota, under its former code 46113, and it is recoded to 46102 to match the census panel. An election's sample is the set of counties with two-party votes and a complete set of the census measures below (3,103 to 3,113 counties); every comparison in an election uses that same set, and the sample is not harmonized across boundary changes. Counties that lack a census measure are left out: 10 county rows in 2020 and 9 in 2024. Among them are the eight old Connecticut counties, for which the census panel has no 2020 or 2024 values (it fills the new planning-region rows only at the 2024 anchor); they hold 1.16% and 1.14% of the two-party votes in 2020 and 2024. The rest are single counties with a missing income or rural-urban code, among them Clifton Forge city, Virginia, in 2000 (no rural-urban code, which every county in the sample needs) and Oglala Lakota County in 2012 and 2016. Outcome: the county two-party margin, 100 times the Democratic votes minus the Republican votes over their sum, so a positive value favors the Democrats. Axes and measures: education is the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more; income is median household income in 2024 dollars; race and ethnicity is the non-Hispanic white share of residents; age is median age; rurality is the share of residents living in rural areas. The nine-measure model adds the non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic and non-Hispanic Asian shares and the foreign-born share to the five axes. The 2024 comparison of measures adds the share without a high school diploma, per capita income, the poverty rate, the share aged 65 and over, the share under 30 and the rural-urban continuum code (1 most urban to 9 most rural). Census measures come from the county demographics panel, which interpolates between anchors: 2000 is the decennial census long form, 2004 and 2008 interpolate between it and the American Community Survey release for 2012, 2012, 2016 and 2020 are midpoints of adjacent releases, and 2024 is the 2024 release; so only 2000 and 2024 are close to a direct measurement and the other years carry interpolation and sampling error that no interval includes. Rural share is anchored to the decennial censuses and has one value for 2020 and 2024; the census definition of rural changed with the 2020 census, and the mean rural share in the sample (county-equal, and weighted by county population) is reported for 2012, 2016 and 2020. The rural-urban continuum code uses the 2013 edition through 2016 and the 2023 edition for 2020 and 2024. Weights: two-party votes in the election (vote-weighted) or one per county (county-equal); both are computed for every statistic. Coefficients: weighted least squares of the standardized margin on standardized axes, standardized with the weighted mean and standard deviation of the weighting used, so a one-variable coefficient equals the correlation; the joint regression uses the other four axes, and the state-baseline regression adds an indicator for each state and the District of Columbia. R-squared is the weighted share of the variance of the margin reproduced by the fitted values; the share within states is the R-squared with baselines minus that of baselines alone, over one minus the latter; the unique contribution of an axis is the R-squared of the five-axis regression minus that of the regression without the axis, in points of variance. Spreads are weighted standard deviations of the margin, of the five-axis fitted values and of the residual, with and without state baselines; the 2024 R-squared with the left-over spread held at its 2000 value is one minus the squared ratio of the 2000 left-over spread to the 2024 spread of the margin. Fixed-measure checks: the same statistics with the 2024 census measures, and with the 2000 census measures, used for every election, on the counties that have them. Ranks: the share of resamples in which an axis has the largest absolute correlation (alone), the largest absolute coefficient in the five-axis regression, or the largest absolute coefficient with state baselines; and the difference in absolute size between two axes, with its interval. Intervals: normal 95% intervals with errors clustered by state (49 to 50 clusters) for correlations and coefficients; 95% percentile intervals from a bootstrap over whole states for R-squared, spreads, unique contributions, differences between two statistics, rank shares and rank differences (2,000 replicates, seed 12345; a state drawn twice counts as two clusters; the weightings share draws; changes between elections draw the same states for both elections). Returns are full counts, so the intervals show dependence on which states are in the set and not sampling error of the vote, and they do not include the sampling error of the census measures. Map: the residual of the vote-weighted five-axis regression, estimated separately for 2000 and 2024, in points of margin; the Census South is the Census Bureau's South region (16 states and the District of Columbia). Suppression: none, since all figures are county-level counts or fits. ## What these data cannot show - Every statistic above is a property of counties. - A pattern across places can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them, a limit known as ecological inference. - Robinson [6] showed that a correlation across areas can have the opposite sign from the correlation across individuals. - The characteristics describe residents, including residents who are not citizens or not of voting age, and the margin describes voters. - A sign such as income's negative coefficient is a feature of one regression among counties and says nothing about how households of different incomes voted. - The five axes are five chosen measures. - The ranking changes with the measure within an axis (Table 8), and the axes omit religion, occupation, density, the age of housing and every characteristic that is not in the county panel. - A standardized coefficient depends on the spread of the axis across counties, which differs between the weightings and between elections, so a coefficient that rises can reflect a change in spread as well as a steeper slope. - The R-squared values are in-sample fits of linear regressions and not forecasts. - State baselines absorb every difference between states, including differences in composition that sit at the state level, so the within-state results describe counties compared inside states and not the effect of removing state context. - The census measures are decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years. - Only 2000 and 2024 are close to a direct measurement, and the elections between are blends of adjacent releases, so the measures for those years carry sampling error and interpolation error that no interval includes. - Rural share is anchored to the decennial censuses and has one value for 2020 and 2024. - The county set is not harmonized across boundary changes, a few small counties lack measures in some years, and the counties are the units of the returns and not of any community. - The intervals show dependence on which states are in the set. - They are not sampling error of the vote, which is a full count, and the bootstrap intervals for differences between statistics treat the states as the only source of variation. - The chapter has no data on turnout by group, on candidates or on campaigns, so it cannot say why the order of the axes changed after 2016 or why the fit improved. ## References 1. Cameron, A. Colin; Miller, Douglas L. (2015). A Practitioner's Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference. Journal of Human Resources 50(2): 317-372. https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.50.2.317 2. Zingher, Joshua N. (2022). TRENDS: Diploma divide: Educational attainment and the realignment of the American electorate. Political Research Quarterly 75(2): 263-277. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129221079862 3. Scala, Dante J.; Johnson, Kenneth M. (2017). Political Polarization along the Rural-Urban Continuum? The Geography of the Presidential Vote, 2000-2016. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 672(1): 162-184. https://doi.org/10.1177/0002716217712696 4. Gelman, Andrew; Shor, Boris; Bafumi, Joseph; Park, David (2008). Rich State, Poor State, Red State, Blue State: What's the Matter with Connecticut?. Quarterly Journal of Political Science 2(4): 345-367. https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00006026 5. Solon, Gary; Haider, Steven J.; Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (2015). What Are We Weighting For?. Journal of Human Resources 50(2): 301-316. https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.50.2.301 6. Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. American Sociological Review 15(3): 351-357. https://doi.org/10.2307/2087176 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/build.py (sha256 50f084b91944586425d808eca30561f581a4db0cd6db11e7d724d3f2f88ddbab) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/county/county_demographics_2000_2024.parquet | 4,334,220 | 45cdaf63128da1aa0c12e1196d7e60835697d7432ab9bff1acd2f5559fdb5130 | 90293a64867bf37645b53eaf5ab343f3b284c0d2c3fc3b8e0f38d32f1649fee4 | | data/county/pres_county_1868_2024.parquet | 6,295,675 | bec11c7a0cb5d4180bbd6809d048bc892dd00dfcdde527fa4da871b1dd3f835f | b2a4f000f2eea72d09af8939555289e924875cca40cd95ec8869104cd575bed7 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | f188c9446d53ad519e7bb0475cafb4d1392b5a78dd8075e8699990a74b5628b2 | | figures/comparisons.json | 64f3089e242b2c3341345e1ca1abc59171d7b7bb1c0c54111f555599d20ab549 | | figures/corr_by_year.json | c23ab9dbf72458967c9d3ffab0dbab846065e9d8c19e92b6c44af6f040cb1149 | | figures/joint_by_year.json | aa9afd12ad53565197c38df0bb691121767c94cefbcf3d22201b896fb203dbb2 | | figures/measures_2024.json | d3db866cf5abcf04a66382a829e4698981112727db5c1c4c898ceefdc4418d2f | | figures/r2_by_year.json | 9673228c9670b060bbad25be79ebcb8bc9cb6c796efb6dc0607d76b89613394f | | figures/rank_ladder.json | f8ac8a627ca6a8b37f55eee2ea47e09c042f221402ff01a55f6ecc4281bbd239 | | figures/residual_map.json | 1e24e02e6ca728a1d8d8e1fe47e6f709b004b5f692d017e47c2bc67c41da10f9 | | figures/spread_by_year.json | 5326b48e0d17682547430250ec49c3d9c1b7c1a5b299fcd7eddce00212785564 | | figures/weighting_gap.json | d8ad0c453435deb7ac01d692fe13f7dda059eac1790e3f465af94d8e60d4af23 | | meta.json | 8fef78ae87a98f2efd4e40f93e789adfae85913c4c5de05efb5f55cecd351be1 | | public/data/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/residual_map.json | 5ba456efc43f908dc8950083183153828480e3fc982246ef86932461b46c1dcf | | refs.json | 349d51d4e94d916899b00d6795c91c84727e07a60072d34cddaff59dacebf031 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/facts.json - Table 1, figure "comparisons" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/comparisons.json - Table 2, figure "corr_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/corr_by_year.json - Table 3, figure "rank_ladder" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/rank_ladder.json - Table 4, figure "joint_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/joint_by_year.json - Table 5, figure "r2_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/r2_by_year.json - Table 6, figure "spread_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/spread_by_year.json - Table 7, figure "weighting_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/weighting_gap.json - Table 8, figure "measures_2024" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/measures_2024.json - Table 9, figure "residual_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/figures/residual_map.json - Payload of "residual_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/five-axes-of-the-county-vote/residual_map.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # The diploma map: report Chapter 12.2 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-map. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: The diploma map - Chapter: 12.2 (Part XII, Demographic axes of the vote; The political map) - Question: How large is the county education gap in the vote, and when did it open? - Dek: Counting counties by their votes, a county with 10 more points of college share had a Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote 9.2 points higher in 2024, against 3.9 points in 2000. - Grain: places - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - County election returns. County presidential returns, 1972-2024 (2000-2024 for the estimates; 1972-1996 for the 2000-ranking check): Algara and Amlani (to 2020) and MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2024), repaired file; years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts of votes); estimates weighted by two-party votes in the election, or county-equal - County demographics panel. County demographics panel, 2000-2024: share of residents 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more, and non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares; years: 2000-2024 (election years, interpolated between census and survey anchors); weights: none (census and American Community Survey estimates, interpolated to election years; sampling error not carried) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-map - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-map/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-map/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026thediplomamap ```bibtex @misc{singh2026thediplomamap, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {The diploma map}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-map}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | definition of the slope unit | unit of the slope | 2000 to 2024 | 10 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | x_unit | | slope of the Democratic share on college share | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 9.2 | 95% CI 8.4 to 10.1 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | slope_w_2024 | | slope of the Democratic share on college share | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 3.9 | 95% CI 2.5 to 5.1 | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | slope_w_2000 | | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | 0.0 | 95% CI −0.4 to 0.4 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | step_w_1624 | | lowest of the 2016 to 2024 changes in the slope across five adjusted versions (race and ethnicity held fixed, within states, both, 2000 college share held fixed, 2024 college share held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | +0.4 | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | adj_step_min_w | | highest of the 2016 to 2024 changes in the slope across five adjusted versions (race and ethnicity held fixed, within states, both, 2000 college share held fixed, 2024 college share held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | +1.1 | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | adj_step_max_w | | lower age limit of the college share | residents counted in the college share | 2000 to 2024 | 25 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | age_floor | | correlation of college share with the Democratic share of the two-party vote | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | +0.66 | 95% CI 0.62 to 0.71 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | corr_w_2024 | | correlation of college share with the Democratic share of the two-party vote | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | +0.56 | 95% CI 0.45 to 0.66 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | corr_u_2024 | | correlation of college share with the Democratic share of the two-party vote | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | +0.28 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.37 | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | corr_w_2000 | | correlation of college share with the Democratic share of the two-party vote | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | +0.10 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.20 | 3,114 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | corr_u_2000 | | count of elections | elections with county college share | 2000 to 2024 | 7 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | n_years | | count of counties in the estimates | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 3,114 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_counties_2000 | | count of counties in the estimates | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 3,103 | | 3,103 | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_counties_2024 | | count of states, not counting the District of Columbia | states with counties in these data, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 49 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_states_only | | number of bootstrap replicates | bootstrap over states | 2000 to 2024 | 2,000 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | boot_reps | ## Findings In 2024, a county with 10 more points of college share, the share of its residents with a bachelor's degree, had a Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote 9.2 (95% CI 8.4 to 10.1) points higher, counting counties by their votes. In 2000 the difference was 3.9 (95% CI 2.5 to 5.1) points. The slope rose from 2000 to 2008 and from 2012 to 2016. Whether it kept rising after 2016 depends on the version of the slope. Vote-weighted and unadjusted, its change from 2016 to 2024 is 0.0 (95% CI −0.4 to 0.4) points, an interval that includes zero. In five adjusted versions the change after 2016 is positive, between +0.4 and +1.1 points vote-weighted, so the slope is level after 2016 only in the unadjusted vote-weighted version. Both measures describe counties. Education is the share of a county's residents 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more, and the vote is the Democratic share of Democratic and Republican votes, in points. A vote-weighted estimate counts each county in proportion to its two-party votes in that election, so the largest counties count most, and a county-equal estimate counts every county once. The weightings agree on direction and differ in size, most in 2000, and this chapter reports both. The numbers cannot say how graduates voted, because a county with more graduates also differs from other counties in many other ways. Chapter 3.2, The diploma divide (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide) asks the question of individuals. Its population is survey respondents who reported a vote, grouped by their own degree, and its shares are of the voters within each group; here the population is counties, and the share is of each county's two-party vote. As correlations, the association was +0.66 (95% CI 0.62 to 0.71) vote-weighted and +0.56 (95% CI 0.45 to 0.66) county-equal in 2024, against +0.28 (95% CI 0.19 to 0.37) and +0.10 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.20) in 2000. A correlation also reflects how much counties differ on each measure, so the two scales can move apart, as they did after 2016. Chapter 12.1, Five axes of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote) ranks education against income, race, age and rurality, and Chapter 12.7, Education, ethnicity and the county shift, 2016 to 2024 (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift) takes up the change in county swings from 2016 to 2024. This chapter measures the education gradient and when it appeared. County college share is available for the 7 presidential elections from 2000 to 2024 in the data used here, and the dating below covers those years, with 3,114 counties in 2000 and 3,103 in 2024. The county panel takes college share from the 2000 census sample and from five-year American Community Survey estimates centered on 2010, 2014, 2018 and 2022, and interpolates between those anchors. The elections of 2012, 2016 and 2020 fall midway between two anchors, 2004 and 2008 are interpolated between the 2000 and 2010 anchors, and 2024 takes the 2022 anchor with no extrapolation. (Note: The 95% intervals in this chapter come from a bootstrap that resamples whole states, 49 states and the District of Columbia, 2,000 times. They show how much a number depends on which states are in the set. The returns are full counts of votes, so the intervals are not sampling error of the vote, and they leave out the sampling error of the college shares. The interval of a change between two elections is computed inside each resample, so it reflects both elections together. The within-state slopes in Table 7 use HC3 robust standard errors and treat counties as independent.) The last section applies each county's 2000 college share to elections from 1972 to 1996, which ranks counties and does not measure education in those years. ### The slope rose from 2000 to 2008 and from 2012 to 2016 Table 1 plots the slope for each election. Vote-weighted, it was 3.9 (95% CI 2.5 to 5.1) points in 2000, 5.2 (95% CI 3.9 to 6.4) in 2004, 5.9 (95% CI 4.7 to 7.0) in 2008 and 6.0 (95% CI 4.9 to 7.0) in 2012, then 9.2 (95% CI 8.2 to 10.3) in 2016, 9.3 (95% CI 8.5 to 10.3) in 2020 and 9.2 (95% CI 8.4 to 10.1) in 2024. The rise from 2000 to 2008 was +2.1 (95% CI 1.3 to 3.0) points, with +1.3 (95% CI 0.9 to 1.7) to 2004 and +0.8 (95% CI 0.2 to 1.4) to 2008. The change from 2012 to 2016 was +3.2 (95% CI 2.7 to 3.8) points, the largest between consecutive elections. The changes from 2008 to 2012, 2016 to 2020 and 2020 to 2024 were +0.1 (95% CI −0.2 to 0.3), +0.1 (95% CI −0.3 to 0.5) and −0.1 (95% CI −0.3 to 0.0), and each interval includes zero. A slope unit of 10 points is close to one standard deviation of college share across counties in 2024, 10.3 points counting each county once and 11.8 vote-weighted. Table 1. Vote-weighted, the slope of the vote on county college share rose from 3.9 to 9.2 points per 10 points of college share, in steps before 2008 and between 2012 and 2016 Counting each county once, the slope was 1.6 (95% CI 0.1 to 3.0) in 2000, with an interval that reaches almost to zero, and it rose by +1.7 (95% CI 1.2 to 2.2) and +1.8 (95% CI 1.1 to 2.6) points in the next two elections. It did not change from 2008 to 2012 (0.0 (95% CI −0.4 to 0.4)), rose by +2.8 (95% CI 2.3 to 3.4) to 2016 and by a further +0.8 (95% CI 0.5 to 1.1) to 2020, and did not change from 2020 to 2024 (−0.1 (95% CI −0.3 to 0.0)). Both weightings put the largest step between 2012 and 2016. The county-equal slope was still rising from 2016 to 2020, which is why its change from 2016 to 2024, +0.6 (95% CI 0.2 to 1.0) points, has an interval above zero. The slope after 2016 depends on the version of the slope. Table 2 gives the changes from 2000 to 2008, 2012 to 2016 and 2016 to 2024 in six versions: college share alone, race and ethnicity held fixed, within states, within states with race and ethnicity held fixed, and the slope on each county's 2000 or 2024 college share held fixed for every election. The rises from 2000 to 2008 and from 2012 to 2016 have intervals above zero in all six versions and in both weightings. The change from 2016 to 2024 includes zero only for college share alone, vote-weighted. In the five other versions it is between +0.4 and +1.1 points vote-weighted and between +0.7 and +1.8 counting each county once, each with an interval above zero. These data therefore date the rises to 2008 and to 2016, and show a smaller change after 2016 whose size depends on the version. Table 2. Vote-weighted, the slope rose from 2000 to 2008 and from 2012 to 2016 in all six versions, and from 2016 to 2024 it changed by +0.4 to +1.1 in the five adjusted versions and by 0.0 with college share alone The correlation does not follow the unadjusted slope after 2016. The vote-weighted correlation was +0.42 (95% CI 0.35 to 0.48) in 2012, +0.58 (95% CI 0.53 to 0.64) in 2016 and +0.66 (95% CI 0.62 to 0.71) in 2024, a change of +0.09 (95% CI 0.07 to 0.10) from 2016 to 2024 (the correlation view of Table 1). A correlation equals the slope per point of college share multiplied by the standard deviation of college share and divided by that of the Democratic share across counties. From 2016 to 2024 the vote-weighted standard deviation of college share rose from 11.2 to 11.8 points and that of the Democratic share fell from 17.9 to 16.4, so the correlation rose while the unadjusted vote-weighted slope stayed level. The slope says how many points more Democratic a county with more graduates was, and the correlation also reflects how much counties differ on each measure. A study that combined survey and county data found that a county's share of residents with a bachelor's degree was among the strongest predictors of the change in its vote share between 2000 and 2020 [1]. The estimates here describe the level of the vote in each election and not a county's own change, which Chapter 12.7, Education, ethnicity and the county shift, 2016 to 2024 (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift) follows. ### The widening comes mostly from the least educated counties Table 3 ranks the counties of each election into five equal-sized groups by college share. In 2000 the vote-weighted Democratic share was 43.7% (95% CI 42.2% to 45.5%) in the least educated fifth and 53.0% (95% CI 49.4% to 56.0%) in the most educated, a gap of 9.3 (95% CI 5.3 to 12.6) points, and the mean college share of the groups ran from 9.0% to 29.1%. In 2024 the two were 26.4% (95% CI 23.4% to 29.7%) and 56.1% (95% CI 53.2% to 59.0%), a gap of 29.8 (95% CI 26.4 to 33.0), with mean college shares from 13.8% to 41.2%. The least educated fifth changed by −17.4 (95% CI −20.7 to −14.0) points between the two elections and the most educated by +3.1 (95% CI 0.5 to 5.5), so most of the change in the gap is in the least educated counties. Over the same years the vote-weighted Democratic share of all counties went from 50.3% to 49.2%. Table 3. The most educated fifth of counties voted 29.8 points more Democratic than the least educated fifth in 2024, against 9.3 in 2000 The groups are equal in counties and not in votes. The most educated fifth cast 64.4% of the two-party votes in 2024 and the least educated 3.6%, so the vote-weighted figures describe mainly the most educated counties. Counting each county once, the 2000 picture is different. The least educated fifth (44.0%) and the most educated (44.6%) had similar Democratic shares, and the gap of 0.6 (95% CI −2.6 to 3.9) points has an interval that includes zero. Both were above the three groups between them, so the 2000 relationship was U-shaped, with the lowest mean, 37.9%, in the fourth fifth. In 2024 the county-equal means were 26.3%, 26.5% and 27.4% in the three least educated fifths, 32.1% in the fourth and 48.3% in the most educated, and the gap was 22.0 (95% CI 17.6 to 26.0) points. The gap changed by +21.4 (95% CI 17.9 to 24.9) points from 2000 to 2024 counting each county once and by +20.5 (95% CI 16.7 to 24.4) vote-weighted. ### The 2000 slope depends on the weighting and on the large counties In 2000 the vote-weighted slope was 3.9 (95% CI 2.5 to 5.1) and the county-equal slope 1.6 (95% CI 0.1 to 3.0), and in 2024 they were 9.2 (95% CI 8.4 to 10.1) and 8.6 (95% CI 7.2 to 9.8). Table 4 separates large counties, those with 250,000 or more two-party votes in the election, from the rest. In 2000 the 76 large counties cast 35.1% of the votes. They had a mean college share of 30.2% against 16.2% in the other counties, and a mean Democratic share of 57.7% against 40.8%. Table 4. Counting each county once, the 2000 slope inside large counties and inside other counties each had an interval that includes zero, and by 2024 both were above zero Inside each class, counting each county once, the 2000 slope was 0.6 (95% CI −2.9 to 4.1) among the large counties and 0.7 (95% CI −0.8 to 2.0) among the others, and both intervals include zero. Vote-weighted, the 2000 slope was 2.4 (95% CI 1.3 to 3.8) among the other counties, an interval above zero, and 0.2 (95% CI −3.4 to 3.0) among the large counties, an interval that includes zero. Splitting the vote-weighted covariance of college share and the Democratic share, 61% (95% CI 43% to 87%) lies between the two classes and 39% (95% CI 13% to 57%) inside them in 2000. The difference between large and other counties and a gradient inside the other counties both contribute to the vote-weighted slope of 2000, and the intervals are wide. In 2024 the two shares are 38% (95% CI 28% to 48%) and 62% (95% CI 52% to 72%). By 2024 the county-equal slope was 5.9 (95% CI 3.4 to 8.0) inside the large counties and 7.8 (95% CI 6.2 to 9.1) inside the others. The correlations, +0.04 (95% CI −0.23 to 0.32) and +0.04 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.13) in 2000, were +0.46 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.64) and +0.50 (95% CI 0.38 to 0.61). The mean Democratic share of the large counties changed by −0.1 points between 2000 and 2024 and that of the other counties by −9.9. The large counties are a different set in 2000 and in 2024, with 76 counties and 135. The change in means is in the other counties. ### Holding race and ethnicity fixed lowers the slope, which still rises Counties with more graduates differ in racial and ethnic composition from other counties, so the slope of college share alone may carry part of the relation between composition and the vote. Table 5 adds the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents to the regression, so the slope compares counties with the same four shares, each entering as a straight line. Vote-weighted, the slope goes from 3.9 (95% CI 2.5 to 5.1) to 2.0 (95% CI −0.1 to 3.4) in 2000 and from 9.2 (95% CI 8.4 to 10.1) to 7.8 (95% CI 7.0 to 8.9) in 2024, and the 2000 interval includes zero. Counting each county once, it goes from 1.6 (95% CI 0.1 to 3.0) to 0.8 (95% CI −1.5 to 2.3) in 2000 and from 8.6 (95% CI 7.2 to 9.8) to 8.5 (95% CI 7.5 to 9.3) in 2024. Table 5. Vote-weighted, the slope with state and race held fixed went from 0.5 in 2000 to 7.6 in 2024 Vote-weighted, the adjustment lowers the slope by 1.8 (95% CI 0.8 to 3.5) points in 2000 and 1.4 (95% CI 0.2 to 2.3) in 2024. The difference between the two reductions is −0.5 (95% CI −2.3 to 0.3), an interval that includes zero, so these data do not show that race matters less to the slope in 2024 than in 2000. Counting each county once, the reduction goes from 0.7 to 0.1 and the difference is −0.6 (95% CI −2.2 to 0.0), an interval whose upper end is at zero. With race held fixed, the rise from 2000 to 2024 is +5.8 (95% CI 4.7 to 8.2) points vote-weighted and +7.6 (95% CI 6.5 to 9.6) county-equal, and the largest change between consecutive elections is again from 2012 to 2016, at +3.2 (95% CI 2.8 to 3.9) and +3.1 (95% CI 2.6 to 3.6). A straight-line control can miss a pattern that differs between kinds of counties. Table 6 therefore fits the slope separately inside four groups of counties by non-Hispanic white share: under 50%, 50% to under 75%, 75% to under 90%, and 90% or more. In the most white group the county-equal slope was 0.1 (95% CI −2.2 to 2.1) in 2000, an interval that includes zero, and 8.7 (95% CI 5.2 to 11.8) in 2024, a change of +8.6 (95% CI 5.4 to 11.3) points. The vote-weighted change is +9.7 (95% CI 6.8 to 12.1) in that group and +1.8 (95% CI −0.6 to 6.7) in the group under 50% white, where the 2024 slope was 6.2 (95% CI 4.5 to 7.3). The change is smallest in the least white group in the point estimates in both weightings, and its interval includes zero in both (+3.7 (95% CI −0.2 to 7.2) county-equal). The interval of that change nearly touches the interval of the change in the most white group vote-weighted and overlaps it county-equal, so these data do not rank the two changes. In 2024 the slope is above zero, with the whole interval above, in all four groups in both weightings. From the least white group to the most white, the groups held 253, 635, 724 and 1,502 counties in 2000 and 404, 855, 1,057 and 787 in 2024. Table 6. The slope was higher in 2024 than in 2000 in all four groups of counties by white share, with the largest point change among counties 90% white or more ### Inside states the slope is lower and, vote-weighted, positive everywhere by 2024 A second comparison asks the question inside states, which share candidates, campaigns and election law, by giving each state its own baseline (fixed effects). Vote-weighted, the within-state slope is 2.4 (95% CI 1.2 to 3.6) in 2000 and 8.3 (95% CI 7.6 to 9.1) in 2024, against 3.9 and 9.2 across all counties. Counting each county once it is 1.2 (95% CI −0.2 to 2.6) and 7.3 (95% CI 6.2 to 8.3). The within-state slope is lower than the slope across all counties in every election in both weightings. Vote-weighted, the reduction is 1.5 points in 2000 and 1.0 in 2024, a difference of −0.5 (95% CI −1.2 to 0.2), an interval that includes zero. With state and race and ethnicity held fixed together, the vote-weighted slope is 0.5 (95% CI −0.7 to 1.6) in 2000, an interval that includes zero, and 7.6 (95% CI 6.9 to 8.4) in 2024, a change of +7.1 (95% CI 6.1 to 8.2) points. Counting each county once the two are 0.7 (95% CI −0.7 to 2.1) and 7.6 (95% CI 6.8 to 8.5). Table 7 gives the slope inside each of the 39 states with at least 20 counties in both 2000 and 2024, counting counties by their votes. It was positive in 29 of them in 2000 and in 39 in 2024. Counting each county once the numbers are 26 and 36, and the interval lies above zero in 12 states in 2000 and 30 in 2024. In 2000 the county-equal slope was negative in 13 states: Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Indiana, Mississippi, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, West Virginia and Wisconsin. In 4 of them, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee and Texas, the whole interval lies below zero. In 2024 only Mississippi, South Carolina and South Dakota have a negative county-equal slope, and each interval includes zero. Table 7. The vote-weighted slope was positive in every one of the 39 states in 2024, against 29 in 2000 ### Democratic counties at or below the median college share became rare Table 8 classes each county in each election by two facts: whether its college share is above the median of that election's counties, and whether Democrats won a majority of its two-party vote. The median county college share was 14.5% in 2000 and 22.1% in 2024. Counties at or below the median with a Democratic majority numbered 325 in 2000 and 93 in 2024. Counties above the median with a Democratic majority numbered 350 and 352, and counties at or below the median with a Republican majority went from 1,232 to 1,459. The two classes in which college share and the majority line up were 50.8% of counties and 55.1% of two-party votes in 2000, and 58.4% and 60.8% in 2024. Table 8. Counties at or below the median college share with a Democratic majority fell from 325 in 2000 to 93 in 2024 Of the 325 counties at or below the median with a Democratic majority in 2000, 66% had a non-Hispanic white share of 50% or more. Of those 212 counties with a 2024 return, 208 had a Republican majority in 2024. The other four were Russell County, Alabama, Crittenden County, Arkansas, Wyandotte County, Kansas and St. John the Baptist Parish, Louisiana, and Clifton Forge city, Virginia, has no 2024 return. The 93 such counties in 2024 are mostly in the South (86%), 17 of them in Mississippi, and the rest are in New Mexico, South Dakota, North Dakota, Arizona, Kansas, Montana and Wisconsin. In all of them the non-Hispanic white share is under 50%, and 82% have a non-Hispanic Black share of 25% or more. The map describes a majority in each county and cannot say which residents voted for which party. ### Before 2000 the college-share ranking has a mixed relation with the vote The data hold no county college share before 2000, so the education of residents at the time cannot be compared with earlier votes. Table 9 instead applies each county's 2000 college share to the elections from 1972 to 1996 and to those of 2000 to 2024 alike. College share in 2000 and in 2024 has a correlation of +0.94 across counties, so the ranking changed slowly over those years, and the data cannot show whether it changed as slowly before 2000. The 2000 ranking is a different measure from the education of a county's residents in 1980, and a county that gained graduates before 2000 is placed by its 2000 level. Table 9. Counting each county once, the correlation with 2000 college share was positive in 1972, negative in the point estimates from 1976 to 1996 and positive from 2000 Counting each county once, the correlation was +0.10 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.18) in 1972, close to its 2000 value of +0.10 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.20), then −0.33 (95% CI −0.39 to −0.27) in 1976 and −0.20 (95% CI −0.27 to −0.10) in 1980. From 1984 to 1996 it was between −0.10 and −0.07 in the point estimates. Vote-weighted it was +0.24 (95% CI 0.12 to 0.34) in 1972, against +0.28 (95% CI 0.19 to 0.37) in 2000, then −0.21 (95% CI −0.34 to −0.09) in 1976 and −0.05 (95% CI −0.14 to 0.05) in 1980. From 1984 to 1996 it was between +0.09 and +0.15. The two weightings differ in sign from 1984 to 1996, so the earlier relationship, like that of 2000, depends on how counties are weighted. Within 2000 to 2024 the 2000 ranking dates the rise as the election-year college share does. With each county's 2000 college share held fixed, the vote-weighted slope rose by +4.0 (95% CI 3.5 to 4.6) points from 2012 to 2016, against +3.2 (95% CI 2.7 to 3.8) with the election-year share. The larger step reflects that college share in 2000 is less spread out across counties than in 2016. The vote-weighted correlation with 2000 college share went from +0.39 (95% CI 0.32 to 0.46) in 2012 to +0.55 (95% CI 0.50 to 0.62) in 2016, and in 2024 it is +0.64 (95% CI 0.60 to 0.69), near the +0.66 found with the 2024 college share. The interpolated college shares of 2004 to 2020 therefore do not account for the step to 2016. ### What these data cannot show Every estimate here describes counties, and a pattern across places can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them, a limit known as ecological inference. Robinson [2] showed that a correlation across places can have the opposite sign from the correlation across individuals. College share counts residents 25 and older with a degree, not voters, and a county with more graduates also has different occupations, ages, densities and histories. The chapter holds only race and ethnicity composition and state fixed. Counties also gain or lose graduates by migration, so a change in the slope can reflect where people live as well as how they vote. A book-length account of the diploma divide among individuals is [3], and Chapter 3.2, The diploma divide (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide) uses survey respondents. The dates are the dates of elections. College share for 2004 to 2020 is interpolated between anchors, and the 2000 value comes from a census sample, so the college shares carry sampling error, most in small counties, that no interval includes. Counties are not harmonized across boundary changes. In 2024, 9 of the 3,112 counties with returns have no county characteristics, among them the Connecticut counties. Kansas City's votes, a separate unit in the 2024 returns, are added to Jackson County, Missouri, whose census figures are county-wide. The vote is the Democratic share of Democratic and Republican votes cast, so it leaves out third-party votes and people who did not vote, and a change in turnout can change a county's share without any voter changing party. The intervals say how much a number depends on which states are in the set, and the within-state intervals treat counties as independent. The weightings, the large-county cut, the white-share groups and the median split of the map are rules that move the estimates, and the section on weighting shows how far the weighting moves them. The state comparison and the controls for race and ethnicity do not hold income, age, occupation, density or religion fixed, which Chapter 12.1, Five axes of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote) and Chapter 12.3, Income and the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/income-and-the-county-vote; planned) take up. The data used here have no measure of attitudes, candidates, campaigns or turnout by group, so they cannot say why the slope rose when it did. They hold no county college share before 2000, so they cannot date the start of the gradient, only describe how the 2000 ranking lined up with earlier votes. ## Tables ### Table 1. Vote-weighted, the slope of the vote on county college share rose from 3.9 to 9.2 points per 10 points of college share, in steps before 2008 and between 2012 and 2016 Slope of a county's Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote on the share of its residents 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more, 2000 to 2024, vote-weighted and county-equal | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | measure | n_units | weighting | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | 5.14 | 2.45 | 3.87 | Slope | 3,114 | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 6.38 | 3.90 | 5.18 | Slope | 3,113 | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 7.02 | 4.73 | 5.94 | Slope | 3,113 | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 7.00 | 4.89 | 5.99 | Slope | 3,112 | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 10.26 | 8.23 | 9.23 | Slope | 3,113 | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 10.30 | 8.52 | 9.35 | Slope | 3,105 | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 10.12 | 8.42 | 9.22 | Slope | 3,103 | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 2.99 | 0.089 | 1.56 | Slope | 3,114 | County-equal | 2000 | | 4.58 | 1.96 | 3.30 | Slope | 3,113 | County-equal | 2004 | | 6.15 | 4.06 | 5.11 | Slope | 3,113 | County-equal | 2008 | | 6.36 | 3.93 | 5.15 | Slope | 3,112 | County-equal | 2012 | | 9.36 | 6.48 | 7.95 | Slope | 3,113 | County-equal | 2016 | | 10.03 | 7.31 | 8.73 | Slope | 3,105 | County-equal | 2020 | | 9.79 | 7.24 | 8.59 | Slope | 3,103 | County-equal | 2024 | | 0.365 | 0.189 | 0.282 | Correlation | 3,114 | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 0.453 | 0.297 | 0.378 | Correlation | 3,113 | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 0.491 | 0.357 | 0.427 | Correlation | 3,113 | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 0.478 | 0.351 | 0.415 | Correlation | 3,112 | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 0.637 | 0.528 | 0.577 | Correlation | 3,113 | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 0.693 | 0.594 | 0.637 | Correlation | 3,105 | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 0.713 | 0.621 | 0.663 | Correlation | 3,103 | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 0.196 | 0.005 | 0.099 | Correlation | 3,114 | County-equal | 2000 | | 0.304 | 0.118 | 0.211 | Correlation | 3,113 | County-equal | 2004 | | 0.395 | 0.231 | 0.310 | Correlation | 3,113 | County-equal | 2008 | | 0.398 | 0.219 | 0.305 | Correlation | 3,112 | County-equal | 2012 | | 0.564 | 0.355 | 0.460 | Correlation | 3,113 | County-equal | 2016 | | 0.626 | 0.427 | 0.530 | Correlation | 3,105 | County-equal | 2020 | | 0.656 | 0.452 | 0.559 | Correlation | 3,103 | County-equal | 2024 | Views: Slope (measure = Slope); Correlation (measure = Correlation). Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so they carry no sampling error. The 95% intervals come from a bootstrap that resamples whole states, so they show how much a number depends on which states are in the set. They do not include the sampling error of the county college shares, which are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated between years. Note: 3,114 counties in 2000 and 3,103 in 2024; Alaska and counties without college share are left out, and in 2024 the votes of Kansas City are added to Jackson County, Missouri. See Methods. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/gradient_by_year.json ### Table 2. Vote-weighted, the slope rose from 2000 to 2008 and from 2012 to 2016 in all six versions, and from 2016 to 2024 it changed by +0.4 to +1.1 in the five adjusted versions and by 0.0 with college share alone Change in the slope of the county Democratic share on county college share between elections, six versions of the slope, vote-weighted and county-equal | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n_units | period | version | weighting | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | 3.01 | 1.28 | 2.08 | 3,113 | 2000 to 2008 | College share alone | Vote-weighted | | 3.78 | 2.75 | 3.24 | 3,113 | 2012 to 2016 | College share alone | Vote-weighted | | 0.381 | −0.381 | −0.015 | 3,103 | 2016 to 2024 | College share alone | Vote-weighted | | 3.73 | 1.25 | 2.09 | 3,113 | 2000 to 2008 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 3.88 | 2.84 | 3.24 | 3,113 | 2012 to 2016 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 1.25 | 0.177 | 0.640 | 3,103 | 2016 to 2024 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 2.73 | 1.56 | 2.14 | 3,113 | 2000 to 2008 | Within states | Vote-weighted | | 4.03 | 2.92 | 3.46 | 3,113 | 2012 to 2016 | Within states | Vote-weighted | | 0.664 | 0.066 | 0.355 | 3,103 | 2016 to 2024 | Within states | Vote-weighted | | 3.41 | 2.08 | 2.67 | 3,113 | 2000 to 2008 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 4.05 | 3.26 | 3.64 | 3,113 | 2012 to 2016 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 1.46 | 0.747 | 1.11 | 3,103 | 2016 to 2024 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 3.07 | 1.41 | 2.17 | 3,113 | 2000 to 2008 | 2000 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 4.56 | 3.51 | 3.98 | 3,111 | 2012 to 2016 | 2000 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 1.05 | 0.319 | 0.671 | 3,102 | 2016 to 2024 | 2000 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 2.37 | 0.925 | 1.58 | 3,103 | 2000 to 2008 | 2024 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 3.70 | 2.76 | 3.20 | 3,105 | 2012 to 2016 | 2024 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 0.835 | 0.110 | 0.442 | 3,103 | 2016 to 2024 | 2024 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | | 4.48 | 2.56 | 3.55 | 3,113 | 2000 to 2008 | College share alone | County-equal | | 3.37 | 2.30 | 2.80 | 3,113 | 2012 to 2016 | College share alone | County-equal | | 1.01 | 0.246 | 0.641 | 3,103 | 2016 to 2024 | College share alone | County-equal | | 5.14 | 2.59 | 3.57 | 3,113 | 2000 to 2008 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | | 3.60 | 2.65 | 3.08 | 3,113 | 2012 to 2016 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | | 1.26 | 0.564 | 0.944 | 3,103 | 2016 to 2024 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | | 2.76 | 1.68 | 2.24 | 3,113 | 2000 to 2008 | Within states | County-equal | | 3.67 | 2.92 | 3.29 | 3,113 | 2012 to 2016 | Within states | County-equal | | 1.01 | 0.316 | 0.673 | 3,103 | 2016 to 2024 | Within states | County-equal | | 3.75 | 2.23 | 2.92 | 3,113 | 2000 to 2008 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | | 3.71 | 2.95 | 3.33 | 3,113 | 2012 to 2016 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | | 1.07 | 0.280 | 0.690 | 3,103 | 2016 to 2024 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | | 4.99 | 3.12 | 4.09 | 3,113 | 2000 to 2008 | 2000 college share held fixed | County-equal | | 4.52 | 3.36 | 3.92 | 3,111 | 2012 to 2016 | 2000 college share held fixed | County-equal | | 2.24 | 1.42 | 1.83 | 3,102 | 2016 to 2024 | 2000 college share held fixed | County-equal | | 3.65 | 2.34 | 3.02 | 3,103 | 2000 to 2008 | 2024 college share held fixed | County-equal | | 3.30 | 2.25 | 2.75 | 3,105 | 2012 to 2016 | 2024 college share held fixed | County-equal | | 1.94 | 1.26 | 1.60 | 3,103 | 2016 to 2024 | 2024 college share held fixed | County-equal | Views: Vote-weighted (weighting = Vote-weighted); County-equal (weighting = County-equal). Note: Intervals resample whole states; see Methods. The 2000 and 2024 college share versions use each county's college share in that year for every election, so they leave out counties without a value in that year. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/step_sensitivity.json ### Table 3. The most educated fifth of counties voted 29.8 points more Democratic than the least educated fifth in 2024, against 9.3 in 2000 Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote against the share of residents 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more, by county, 2024 and 2000, with the mean of five equal-sized groups of counties | County (largest only) | College share, 2024 (%) | Democratic share, 2024 (%) | College share, 2000 (%) | Democratic share, 2000 (%) | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Maricopa, AZ | 36.7 | 48.2 | 25.9 | 44.6 | | Pima, AZ | 36.8 | 57.7 | 26.7 | 54.2 | | Alameda, CA | 52.2 | 78.0 | 34.9 | 74.2 | | Contra Costa, CA | 45.2 | 69.6 | 35.0 | 61.3 | | Fresno, CA | 24.3 | 47.7 | 17.5 | 44.8 | | Los Angeles, CA | 36.0 | 67.0 | 24.9 | 66.2 | | Orange, CA | 44.1 | 51.4 | 30.8 | 42.0 | | Riverside, CA | 25.6 | 49.4 | 16.6 | 46.6 | | Sacramento, CA | 34.1 | 60.2 | 24.8 | 52.1 | | San Bernardino, CA | 23.3 | 48.9 | 15.9 | 49.2 | | San Diego, CA | 43.2 | 58.6 | 29.5 | 47.9 | | San Francisco, CA | 60.3 | 83.8 | 45.0 | 82.4 | | San Mateo, CA | 53.7 | 76.0 | 39.0 | 67.5 | | Santa Clara, CA | 56.5 | 70.8 | 40.5 | 63.8 | | Ventura, CA | 36.1 | 57.8 | 26.9 | 49.5 | | Arapahoe, CO | 46.5 | 60.3 | 37.0 | 45.8 | | Denver, CO | 56.5 | 78.8 | 34.5 | 66.7 | | El Paso, CO | 41.9 | 45.0 | 31.8 | 32.5 | | Jefferson, CO | 52.0 | 60.0 | 36.5 | 45.7 | | District Of Columbia, DC | 64.2 | 93.3 | 39.1 | 90.5 | | Brevard, FL | 34.2 | 39.5 | 23.6 | 45.8 | | Broward, FL | 36.7 | 58.6 | 24.5 | 68.5 | | Duval, FL | 34.4 | 49.3 | 21.9 | 41.5 | | Hillsborough, FL | 38.1 | 48.5 | 25.1 | 48.4 | | Lee, FL | 31.2 | 35.7 | 21.1 | 40.9 | | Miami-Dade, FL | 34.4 | 44.2 | 21.7 | 53.2 | | Orange, FL | 39.3 | 56.9 | 26.1 | 51.0 | | Palm Beach, FL | 40.5 | 50.4 | 27.7 | 63.8 | | Pasco, FL | 29.2 | 37.3 | 13.1 | 50.4 | | Pinellas, FL | 36.8 | 47.4 | 22.9 | 52.1 | | Polk, FL | 23.5 | 39.6 | 14.9 | 45.4 | | Volusia, FL | 28.4 | 39.0 | 17.6 | 54.2 | | Cobb, GA | 50.8 | 57.5 | 39.8 | 38.2 | | DeKalb, GA | 47.4 | 82.7 | 36.3 | 72.4 | | Fulton, GA | 58.5 | 72.7 | 41.4 | 59.2 | | Gwinnett, GA | 39.0 | 58.4 | 34.1 | 33.5 | | Honolulu, HI | 38.5 | 61.0 | 27.9 | 58.0 | | Cook, IL | 42.7 | 71.3 | 28.0 | 70.6 | | DuPage, IL | 51.8 | 56.8 | 41.7 | 43.1 | | Lake, IL | 47.7 | 60.5 | 38.6 | 48.7 | | Will, IL | 37.5 | 50.8 | 25.5 | 48.7 | | Marion, IN | 34.8 | 64.1 | 25.4 | 49.3 | | Johnson, KS | 57.6 | 54.3 | 47.7 | 37.8 | | Jefferson, KY | 37.0 | 58.4 | 24.8 | 50.8 | | Anne Arundel, MD | 45.8 | 57.2 | 30.6 | 46.2 | | Baltimore, MD | 42.3 | 62.6 | 30.6 | 54.7 | | Montgomery, MD | 60.6 | 77.4 | 54.6 | 65.1 | | Prince George's, MD | 36.7 | 88.5 | 27.2 | 81.2 | | Essex, MA | 43.0 | 60.4 | 31.3 | 61.9 | | Middlesex, MA | 59.5 | 70.2 | 43.6 | 67.0 | | Norfolk, MA | 58.8 | 64.7 | 42.9 | 63.8 | | Worcester, MA | 39.7 | 55.1 | 26.9 | 60.4 | | Kent, MI | 40.8 | 52.7 | 25.8 | 39.1 | | Macomb, MI | 27.7 | 43.0 | 17.6 | 51.2 | | Oakland, MI | 51.0 | 55.4 | 38.2 | 50.6 | | Wayne, MI | 27.6 | 65.0 | 17.2 | 70.4 | | Hennepin, MN | 54.1 | 71.8 | 39.1 | 57.7 | | Jackson, MO | 34.0 | 59.8 | 23.4 | 60.6 | | St Louis County, MO | 47.4 | 61.9 | 35.4 | 52.7 | | Clark, NV | 27.8 | 51.3 | 17.3 | 53.4 | | Bergen, NJ | 53.1 | 51.7 | 38.2 | 57.0 | | Essex, NJ | 39.1 | 72.8 | 27.5 | 73.5 | | Middlesex, NJ | 45.6 | 54.1 | 33.0 | 62.4 | | Monmouth, NJ | 51.3 | 44.2 | 34.6 | 52.4 | | Ocean, NJ | 34.4 | 31.8 | 19.5 | 49.1 | | Bernalillo, NM | 38.2 | 60.8 | 30.5 | 51.1 | | Bronx, NY | 22.4 | 72.7 | 14.6 | 88.0 | | Erie, NY | 38.0 | 54.8 | 24.5 | 60.0 | | Kings, NY | 42.1 | 72.0 | 21.8 | 83.7 | | Monroe, NY | 41.5 | 59.5 | 31.2 | 53.4 | | Nassau, NY | 49.7 | 47.9 | 35.4 | 60.1 | | New York, NY | 64.2 | 82.4 | 49.4 | 84.7 | | Queens, NY | 36.1 | 62.3 | 24.3 | 77.4 | | Suffolk, NY | 40.2 | 45.0 | 27.5 | 56.0 | | Westchester, NY | 53.1 | 63.1 | 40.9 | 61.0 | | Mecklenburg, NC | 49.2 | 66.7 | 37.1 | 48.6 | | Wake, NC | 57.2 | 63.0 | 43.9 | 46.4 | | Cuyahoga, OH | 36.5 | 65.9 | 25.1 | 65.2 | | Franklin, OH | 42.1 | 64.3 | 31.8 | 50.5 | | Hamilton, OH | 41.8 | 57.5 | 29.2 | 44.2 | | Multnomah, OR | 48.9 | 82.2 | 30.7 | 69.2 | | Allegheny, PA | 45.8 | 60.3 | 28.3 | 58.4 | | Bucks, PA | 44.8 | 50.0 | 31.2 | 52.2 | | Chester, PA | 57.1 | 57.3 | 42.5 | 45.0 | | Delaware, PA | 41.9 | 62.0 | 30.0 | 56.0 | | Montgomery, PA | 53.0 | 61.5 | 38.7 | 55.0 | | Philadelphia, PA | 35.4 | 79.8 | 17.9 | 81.6 | | Shelby, TN | 34.3 | 62.9 | 25.3 | 57.3 | | Bexar, TX | 31.8 | 54.9 | 22.7 | 46.2 | | Collin, TX | 56.2 | 44.3 | 47.3 | 25.1 | | Dallas, TX | 35.7 | 61.3 | 27.0 | 46.1 | | Denton, TX | 49.4 | 43.3 | 36.6 | 28.2 | | Fort Bend, TX | 50.2 | 50.8 | 36.9 | 39.3 | | Harris, TX | 34.2 | 52.8 | 26.9 | 44.1 | | Montgomery, TX | 38.8 | 27.0 | 25.3 | 22.4 | | Tarrant, TX | 34.8 | 47.4 | 26.6 | 37.7 | | Travis, TX | 56.6 | 70.0 | 40.6 | 47.1 | | Williamson, TX | 48.4 | 48.8 | 33.6 | 29.0 | | Salt Lake, UT | 39.4 | 55.3 | 27.4 | 38.5 | | Fairfax, VA | 65.0 | 68.0 | 54.8 | 49.3 | | King, WA | 56.7 | 76.8 | 40.0 | 63.6 | | Pierce, WA | 30.9 | 55.5 | 20.6 | 53.9 | | Snohomish, WA | 38.2 | 59.8 | 24.4 | 54.2 | | Dane, WI | 55.3 | 76.2 | 40.6 | 65.3 | | Milwaukee, WI | 34.7 | 69.6 | 23.6 | 60.7 | | n/a | 29.1 | 26.6 | 18.0 | 29.2 | | n/a | 33.7 | 20.7 | 23.1 | 25.5 | | n/a | 10.6 | 42.6 | 10.9 | 50.4 | | n/a | 11.7 | 17.6 | 7.1 | 38.8 | | n/a | 15.8 | 9.2 | 9.6 | 28.2 | | n/a | 8.1 | 73.0 | 7.7 | 70.3 | | n/a | 13.5 | 38.6 | 10.4 | 46.6 | | n/a | 20.6 | 27.4 | 15.2 | 41.4 | | n/a | 14.9 | 38.3 | 9.5 | 48.2 | | n/a | 16.5 | 12.0 | 9.7 | 45.7 | | n/a | 16.5 | 13.8 | 9.9 | 32.3 | | n/a | 15.8 | 38.0 | 9.6 | 50.7 | | n/a | 15.0 | 41.4 | 12.1 | 43.9 | | n/a | 14.7 | 14.8 | 7.8 | 35.5 | | n/a | 17.0 | 8.0 | 9.2 | 33.3 | | n/a | 22.5 | 20.8 | 19.3 | 34.4 | | n/a | 21.7 | 26.6 | 14.1 | 50.1 | | n/a | 13.4 | 43.0 | 9.2 | 50.8 | | n/a | 13.9 | 28.2 | 8.0 | 46.9 | | n/a | 17.2 | 13.6 | 12.2 | 33.1 | | n/a | 18.7 | 22.6 | 11.2 | 40.9 | | n/a | 19.7 | 9.4 | 11.9 | 33.7 | | n/a | 20.4 | 23.6 | 14.0 | 31.7 | | n/a | 17.5 | 66.4 | 13.9 | 59.8 | | n/a | 14.1 | 12.8 | 8.3 | 35.5 | | n/a | 25.4 | 23.8 | 16.6 | 28.4 | | n/a | 13.5 | 26.7 | 10.6 | 39.3 | | n/a | 18.1 | 22.0 | 13.4 | 45.3 | | n/a | 14.9 | 13.8 | 9.2 | 40.1 | | n/a | 15.8 | 13.1 | 9.7 | 43.9 | | n/a | 13.2 | 11.3 | 8.7 | 29.6 | | n/a | 15.1 | 78.0 | 10.5 | 80.5 | | n/a | 17.6 | 53.4 | 8.1 | 60.9 | | n/a | 21.8 | 24.5 | 14.1 | 40.7 | | n/a | 23.0 | 25.9 | 18.4 | 29.8 | | n/a | 15.9 | 14.0 | 10.4 | 51.7 | | n/a | 36.2 | 55.3 | 24.6 | 48.4 | | n/a | 12.1 | 11.8 | 7.8 | 37.2 | | n/a | 29.8 | 24.0 | 18.5 | 44.3 | | n/a | 15.2 | 18.6 | 7.5 | 52.6 | | n/a | 42.4 | 35.9 | 27.9 | 39.4 | | n/a | 30.2 | 27.8 | 16.9 | 38.8 | | n/a | 14.4 | 68.7 | 11.0 | 73.6 | | n/a | 21.1 | 78.3 | 18.8 | 87.5 | | n/a | 46.4 | 45.4 | 34.3 | 43.7 | | n/a | 19.5 | 48.1 | 12.1 | 50.8 | | n/a | 13.3 | 8.9 | 8.0 | 40.0 | | n/a | 21.5 | 13.9 | 13.9 | 37.8 | | n/a | 26.0 | 41.7 | 18.6 | 42.9 | | n/a | 11.7 | 38.4 | 11.8 | 42.1 | | n/a | 34.5 | 65.5 | 28.5 | 51.0 | | n/a | 23.3 | 23.5 | 18.4 | 38.4 | | n/a | 15.8 | 71.4 | 10.0 | 69.9 | | n/a | 13.1 | 38.3 | 9.8 | 49.0 | | n/a | 28.0 | 37.3 | 18.4 | 41.8 | | n/a | 18.4 | 17.4 | 10.0 | 39.9 | | n/a | 18.2 | 50.8 | 9.7 | 57.5 | | n/a | 21.4 | 17.7 | 11.1 | 27.5 | | n/a | 46.8 | 29.3 | 36.8 | 21.7 | | n/a | 19.0 | 70.7 | 12.4 | 73.0 | | n/a | 16.5 | 33.0 | 11.2 | 44.9 | | n/a | 20.3 | 25.1 | 14.1 | 38.7 | | n/a | 32.1 | 39.7 | 24.0 | 42.0 | | n/a | 16.6 | 13.9 | 9.1 | 46.3 | | n/a | 17.0 | 22.2 | 8.6 | 45.1 | | n/a | 12.9 | 65.8 | 10.1 | 67.5 | | n/a | 14.3 | 8.0 | 8.3 | 29.6 | | n/a | 16.6 | 59.6 | 11.3 | 68.7 | | n/a | 28.1 | 38.3 | 18.8 | 42.4 | | n/a | 40.3 | 60.1 | 29.9 | 53.6 | | n/a | 18.7 | 31.0 | 13.9 | 45.7 | | n/a | 14.6 | 25.7 | 11.8 | 35.8 | | n/a | 20.9 | 29.2 | 12.2 | 42.9 | | n/a | 13.5 | 27.8 | 8.7 | 41.0 | | n/a | 15.2 | 21.9 | 9.9 | 41.7 | | n/a | 19.1 | 41.3 | 12.3 | 48.8 | | n/a | 22.5 | 38.9 | 11.9 | 49.4 | | n/a | 23.1 | 59.4 | 15.2 | 61.0 | | n/a | 30.3 | 32.9 | 21.1 | 37.5 | | n/a | 16.8 | 39.7 | 11.8 | 43.4 | | n/a | 13.6 | 27.6 | 12.2 | 46.2 | | n/a | 12.8 | 25.6 | 10.1 | 52.3 | | n/a | 19.4 | 21.1 | 12.8 | 40.6 | | n/a | 37.8 | 36.1 | 20.3 | 33.2 | | n/a | 17.2 | 17.0 | 12.7 | 34.4 | | n/a | 15.3 | 30.3 | 11.9 | 54.2 | | n/a | 19.8 | 18.5 | 7.3 | 47.4 | | n/a | 20.0 | 33.8 | 13.8 | 39.3 | | n/a | 18.0 | 52.0 | 11.7 | 64.3 | | n/a | 26.2 | 39.5 | 19.8 | 55.2 | | n/a | 15.3 | 18.6 | 7.4 | 61.0 | | n/a | 18.4 | 15.5 | 13.9 | 41.8 | | n/a | 19.7 | 15.7 | 10.0 | 45.7 | | n/a | 21.9 | 31.5 | 16.8 | 44.4 | | n/a | 19.9 | 29.4 | 11.5 | 49.7 | | n/a | 29.7 | 30.8 | 20.9 | 50.4 | | n/a | 20.0 | 20.3 | 9.7 | 36.8 | | n/a | 17.0 | 51.2 | 12.8 | 55.2 | | n/a | 18.4 | 25.7 | 9.9 | 50.5 | | n/a | 11.3 | 35.0 | 9.6 | 52.1 | | n/a | 12.6 | 47.6 | 11.1 | 63.4 | | n/a | 25.6 | 32.8 | 17.3 | 52.6 | | n/a | 35.0 | 33.4 | 25.2 | 42.7 | | n/a | 14.5 | 18.1 | 11.0 | 44.9 | | n/a | 16.0 | 18.3 | 10.5 | 49.3 | | n/a | 25.3 | 31.5 | 18.0 | 45.3 | | n/a | 21.5 | 15.0 | 11.0 | 43.6 | | n/a | 16.9 | 18.9 | 10.9 | 52.0 | | n/a | 16.3 | 29.8 | 11.0 | 54.7 | | n/a | 17.5 | 23.4 | 11.2 | 52.3 | | n/a | 16.2 | 26.3 | 11.6 | 47.0 | | n/a | 18.1 | 19.6 | 13.7 | 45.6 | | n/a | 19.7 | 16.4 | 11.7 | 52.9 | | n/a | 14.7 | 25.2 | 10.3 | 61.6 | | n/a | 20.1 | 60.2 | 15.7 | 66.9 | | n/a | 17.8 | 23.7 | 13.1 | 47.2 | | n/a | 9.0 | 30.5 | 9.5 | 54.0 | | n/a | 14.5 | 17.3 | 8.5 | 55.3 | | n/a | 7.2 | 51.8 | 7.3 | 66.9 | | n/a | 12.0 | 24.5 | 7.6 | 56.2 | | n/a | 17.2 | 22.5 | 9.9 | 55.8 | | n/a | 16.7 | 18.2 | 9.4 | 42.3 | | n/a | 22.1 | 22.6 | 14.6 | 39.2 | | n/a | 12.9 | 20.2 | 10.1 | 37.8 | | n/a | 14.9 | 19.4 | 10.4 | 39.6 | | n/a | 15.0 | 24.1 | 12.5 | 46.3 | | n/a | 13.7 | 33.9 | 11.3 | 57.8 | | n/a | 12.7 | 42.0 | 8.4 | 59.0 | | n/a | 16.7 | 17.8 | 8.8 | 40.3 | | n/a | 13.8 | 29.8 | 10.7 | 51.0 | | n/a | 15.7 | 17.4 | 11.8 | 32.3 | | n/a | 16.3 | 40.3 | 12.7 | 53.6 | | n/a | 16.5 | 20.6 | 11.1 | 43.8 | | n/a | 15.0 | 56.8 | 12.4 | 65.6 | | n/a | 19.1 | 13.0 | 10.1 | 41.4 | | n/a | 11.4 | 17.7 | 6.3 | 57.9 | | n/a | 17.8 | 14.1 | 10.9 | 33.5 | | n/a | 24.7 | 23.2 | 19.0 | 37.2 | | n/a | 18.2 | 16.6 | 9.0 | 45.6 | | n/a | 37.9 | 61.4 | 28.1 | 55.0 | | n/a | 12.1 | 17.5 | 10.6 | 53.0 | | n/a | 14.2 | 50.4 | 9.6 | 59.4 | | n/a | 29.4 | 29.5 | 16.4 | 40.6 | | n/a | 13.0 | 12.7 | 8.4 | 37.6 | | n/a | 15.0 | 13.4 | 8.4 | 32.0 | | n/a | 23.3 | 30.8 | 16.6 | 39.8 | | n/a | 9.3 | 18.6 | 9.2 | 49.8 | | n/a | 13.9 | 18.0 | 10.3 | 46.7 | | n/a | 15.8 | 18.5 | 9.8 | 43.8 | | n/a | 19.1 | 33.0 | 14.9 | 42.0 | | n/a | 15.0 | 19.3 | 11.5 | 47.9 | | n/a | 35.2 | 46.6 | 24.5 | 43.1 | | n/a | 20.4 | 18.7 | 15.5 | 38.8 | | n/a | 16.2 | 33.4 | 8.0 | 65.4 | | n/a | 14.9 | 19.1 | 10.9 | 48.7 | | n/a | 41.1 | 66.3 | 28.2 | 48.5 | | n/a | 22.4 | 35.7 | 16.6 | 40.3 | | n/a | 31.9 | 48.4 | 21.8 | 40.7 | | n/a | 23.9 | 35.6 | 17.1 | 40.1 | | n/a | 16.4 | 35.5 | 10.6 | 32.5 | | n/a | 21.4 | 41.6 | 11.0 | 40.8 | | n/a | 40.0 | 43.8 | 26.5 | 38.4 | | n/a | 15.1 | 32.1 | 10.7 | 30.1 | | n/a | 33.1 | 64.9 | 23.0 | 51.7 | | n/a | 16.1 | 49.6 | 10.3 | 55.3 | | n/a | 31.5 | 48.5 | 17.1 | 36.0 | | n/a | 18.8 | 39.2 | 13.5 | 37.4 | | n/a | 13.6 | 38.2 | 10.4 | 40.3 | | n/a | 17.8 | 49.3 | 12.1 | 55.2 | | n/a | 13.1 | 22.3 | 10.7 | 29.6 | | n/a | 17.9 | 39.3 | 12.0 | 36.5 | | n/a | 61.1 | 82.8 | 51.3 | 69.4 | | n/a | 31.8 | 39.2 | 20.2 | 37.3 | | n/a | 25.2 | 64.0 | 20.2 | 57.5 | | n/a | 15.3 | 47.8 | 11.0 | 46.5 | | n/a | 24.8 | 25.9 | 12.4 | 24.1 | | n/a | 32.2 | 60.6 | 28.9 | 43.8 | | n/a | 28.2 | 65.4 | 22.5 | 60.7 | | n/a | 39.8 | 68.0 | 26.4 | 57.7 | | n/a | 41.5 | 56.3 | 26.1 | 40.5 | | n/a | 43.2 | 45.6 | 30.3 | 37.8 | | n/a | 22.5 | 41.3 | 17.5 | 35.3 | | n/a | 24.1 | 56.5 | 17.1 | 56.6 | | n/a | 22.7 | 49.5 | 14.5 | 49.4 | | n/a | 39.8 | 55.6 | 26.7 | 43.9 | | n/a | 36.8 | 63.8 | 29.4 | 50.7 | | n/a | 43.9 | 78.3 | 34.2 | 69.2 | | n/a | 23.8 | 31.3 | 16.6 | 31.7 | | n/a | 25.8 | 37.6 | 17.2 | 31.5 | | n/a | 23.3 | 40.1 | 17.7 | 34.1 | | n/a | 28.8 | 61.8 | 21.4 | 59.3 | | n/a | 38.5 | 73.9 | 28.5 | 64.9 | | n/a | 19.6 | 44.4 | 14.1 | 45.7 | | n/a | 20.9 | 33.9 | 15.3 | 32.7 | | n/a | 19.3 | 28.6 | 11.3 | 32.9 | | n/a | 22.4 | 45.1 | 15.5 | 36.6 | | n/a | 16.6 | 39.4 | 11.5 | 37.9 | | n/a | 24.6 | 38.8 | 16.1 | 41.5 | | n/a | 44.8 | 68.8 | 34.1 | 59.4 | | n/a | 17.7 | 36.7 | 10.3 | 36.1 | | n/a | 29.0 | 54.6 | 17.4 | 53.2 | | n/a | 32.4 | 44.4 | 27.0 | 46.2 | | n/a | 40.9 | 42.8 | 29.0 | 32.4 | | n/a | 24.7 | 14.0 | 14.0 | 24.2 | | n/a | 15.7 | 30.1 | 11.5 | 41.7 | | n/a | 64.2 | 78.7 | 52.4 | 57.9 | | n/a | 60.3 | 64.7 | n/a | n/a | | n/a | 47.0 | 57.0 | 24.3 | 39.2 | | n/a | 26.1 | 10.4 | 14.2 | 17.9 | | n/a | 57.5 | 58.6 | 38.8 | 49.3 | | n/a | 25.7 | 40.8 | 14.4 | 49.7 | | n/a | 24.9 | 57.6 | 12.8 | 67.7 | | n/a | 12.4 | 25.5 | 11.9 | 37.4 | | n/a | 43.7 | 31.5 | 26.7 | 25.9 | | n/a | 26.6 | 31.8 | 17.6 | 28.1 | | n/a | 28.1 | 23.2 | 13.5 | 28.3 | | n/a | 62.0 | 46.4 | 51.9 | 32.6 | | n/a | 50.9 | 62.5 | 42.6 | 48.6 | | n/a | 36.1 | 23.9 | 26.6 | 27.4 | | n/a | 22.0 | 30.3 | 13.5 | 34.8 | | n/a | 33.6 | 51.1 | 23.8 | 40.1 | | n/a | 52.8 | 56.6 | 31.2 | 52.2 | | n/a | 42.7 | 49.6 | 34.5 | 39.3 | | n/a | 64.7 | 65.1 | 43.6 | 49.4 | | n/a | 47.7 | 43.6 | 34.9 | 37.3 | | n/a | 26.4 | 45.6 | 16.1 | 50.5 | | n/a | 31.3 | 21.4 | 19.9 | 20.2 | | n/a | 20.1 | 12.1 | 16.1 | 22.5 | | n/a | 20.4 | 15.3 | 15.4 | 24.1 | | n/a | 49.5 | 58.5 | 19.5 | 55.1 | | n/a | 49.3 | 59.6 | 36.4 | 44.0 | | n/a | 53.0 | 59.1 | 39.5 | 42.5 | | n/a | 19.3 | 43.1 | 16.2 | 55.8 | | n/a | 26.1 | 17.1 | 13.2 | 23.8 | | n/a | 20.1 | 21.1 | 14.6 | 29.3 | | n/a | 32.3 | 37.5 | 22.0 | 32.3 | | n/a | 51.7 | 43.2 | 31.2 | 36.4 | | n/a | 19.4 | 17.9 | 12.5 | 24.2 | | n/a | 31.3 | 39.2 | 21.0 | 29.3 | | n/a | 28.7 | 33.3 | 18.7 | 30.4 | | n/a | 17.8 | 25.1 | 13.5 | 33.5 | | n/a | 18.2 | 36.4 | 15.4 | 42.1 | | n/a | 56.5 | 60.8 | 36.8 | 35.5 | | n/a | 41.6 | 41.5 | 30.3 | 39.4 | | n/a | 31.5 | 17.9 | 19.9 | 26.4 | | n/a | 62.8 | 72.6 | 57.1 | 61.7 | | n/a | 19.3 | 24.2 | 11.9 | 31.0 | | n/a | 25.6 | 47.4 | 18.3 | 55.9 | | n/a | 24.7 | 17.6 | 19.5 | 19.9 | | n/a | 34.5 | 38.1 | 18.8 | 35.4 | | n/a | 54.2 | 64.3 | 42.5 | 48.5 | | n/a | 31.3 | 51.9 | 19.6 | 51.5 | | n/a | 52.1 | 66.7 | 43.7 | 41.5 | | n/a | 64.9 | 75.4 | 48.5 | 60.5 | | n/a | 27.2 | 21.3 | 13.4 | 30.5 | | n/a | 55.0 | 69.2 | 48.3 | 54.1 | | n/a | 37.9 | 31.8 | 31.7 | 29.8 | | n/a | 24.9 | 11.9 | 14.3 | 20.3 | | n/a | 33.2 | 39.2 | 21.6 | 38.5 | | n/a | 25.3 | 16.6 | 15.5 | 25.5 | | n/a | n/a | n/a | 39.9 | 54.8 | | n/a | n/a | n/a | 29.6 | 63.4 | | n/a | n/a | n/a | 27.5 | 51.6 | | n/a | n/a | n/a | 33.8 | 59.7 | | n/a | n/a | n/a | 27.6 | 61.7 | | n/a | n/a | n/a | 26.2 | 59.5 | | n/a | n/a | n/a | 32.8 | 57.6 | | n/a | n/a | n/a | 19.0 | 59.0 | | n/a | 27.5 | 51.0 | 18.6 | 48.6 | | n/a | 39.7 | 66.5 | 29.5 | 61.9 | | n/a | 33.0 | 44.5 | 16.6 | 46.2 | | n/a | 48.8 | 60.6 | 38.7 | 58.1 | | n/a | 17.8 | 13.3 | 8.2 | 29.9 | | n/a | 29.6 | 26.1 | 17.7 | 32.8 | | n/a | 15.2 | 21.2 | 8.4 | 36.2 | | n/a | 13.6 | 16.0 | 7.7 | 42.9 | | n/a | 27.0 | 32.9 | 17.6 | 45.6 | | n/a | 20.6 | 26.9 | 13.2 | 46.1 | | n/a | 28.3 | 30.2 | 20.1 | 25.9 | | n/a | 40.3 | 33.4 | 27.9 | 33.1 | | n/a | 16.8 | 24.7 | 10.9 | 39.1 | | n/a | 10.8 | 28.4 | 8.4 | 43.8 | | n/a | 10.7 | 14.6 | 6.8 | 40.4 | | n/a | 29.7 | 40.1 | 21.0 | 35.9 | | n/a | 31.3 | 35.8 | 21.2 | 52.4 | | n/a | 27.9 | 27.9 | 12.4 | 45.5 | | n/a | 21.3 | 65.5 | 12.9 | 67.1 | | n/a | 15.3 | 15.7 | 9.4 | 36.7 | | n/a | 13.4 | 23.2 | 9.8 | 43.9 | | n/a | 23.5 | 22.8 | 10.1 | 40.3 | | n/a | 11.0 | 30.3 | 7.3 | 44.5 | | n/a | 12.1 | 21.7 | 8.4 | 38.3 | | n/a | 12.2 | 30.7 | 8.2 | 40.6 | | n/a | 21.1 | 31.3 | 12.7 | 51.6 | | n/a | 20.5 | 29.5 | 13.6 | 41.2 | | n/a | 12.5 | 9.7 | 8.8 | 30.3 | | n/a | 33.8 | 36.2 | 23.1 | 40.8 | | n/a | 15.1 | 26.8 | 12.8 | 42.9 | | n/a | 19.2 | 40.6 | 16.9 | 55.1 | | n/a | 9.9 | 11.8 | 7.2 | 32.1 | | n/a | 27.8 | 37.6 | 16.6 | 42.2 | | n/a | 48.9 | 61.0 | 41.7 | 61.1 | | n/a | 16.5 | 24.7 | 10.6 | 44.0 | | n/a | 16.5 | 16.3 | 7.4 | 43.6 | | n/a | 13.9 | 35.5 | 10.2 | 49.8 | | n/a | 35.4 | 38.2 | 20.8 | 45.9 | | n/a | 23.4 | 34.1 | 13.7 | 44.8 | | n/a | 37.1 | 34.3 | 26.3 | 43.9 | | n/a | 38.6 | 40.8 | 25.5 | 50.7 | | n/a | 35.6 | 26.3 | 18.9 | 29.8 | | n/a | 34.8 | 28.5 | 24.2 | 24.6 | | n/a | 15.8 | 23.0 | 8.9 | 47.6 | | n/a | 29.8 | 49.3 | 15.7 | 51.8 | | n/a | 14.5 | 25.9 | 9.4 | 47.4 | | n/a | 50.9 | 34.2 | 33.1 | 33.0 | | n/a | 26.7 | 45.4 | 15.1 | 54.5 | | n/a | 32.0 | 24.3 | 22.9 | 26.1 | | n/a | 40.8 | 40.8 | 27.4 | 46.7 | | n/a | 42.7 | 48.2 | 31.0 | 43.9 | | n/a | 35.3 | 31.1 | 12.2 | 44.3 | | n/a | 16.6 | 19.4 | 10.5 | 33.7 | | n/a | 16.5 | 20.0 | 8.9 | 39.5 | | n/a | 11.1 | 15.7 | 7.5 | 37.6 | | n/a | 23.3 | 27.6 | 15.7 | 46.0 | | n/a | 35.0 | 20.9 | 16.2 | 31.7 | | n/a | 11.5 | 17.1 | 9.2 | 35.9 | | n/a | 11.2 | 18.7 | 8.4 | 34.7 | | n/a | 8.9 | 23.0 | 6.9 | 40.1 | | n/a | 10.4 | 13.4 | 6.6 | 32.2 | | n/a | 16.7 | 40.1 | 10.7 | 59.2 | | n/a | 24.4 | 48.9 | 16.2 | 49.4 | | n/a | 18.6 | 10.8 | 8.6 | 27.6 | | n/a | 21.2 | 29.6 | 10.9 | 31.6 | | n/a | 24.3 | 24.4 | 14.1 | 33.8 | | n/a | 13.0 | 33.9 | 9.5 | 48.4 | | n/a | 15.7 | 15.0 | 9.4 | 37.6 | | n/a | 26.3 | 61.3 | 21.3 | 50.9 | | n/a | 19.8 | 22.2 | 12.5 | 34.3 | | n/a | 14.5 | 8.7 | 6.2 | 30.6 | | n/a | 15.8 | 36.6 | 11.3 | 46.6 | | n/a | 36.1 | 31.7 | 19.3 | 31.0 | | n/a | 32.5 | 35.4 | 25.4 | 38.2 | | n/a | 15.5 | 45.3 | 9.5 | 52.4 | | n/a | 14.4 | 27.3 | 8.6 | 41.6 | | n/a | 13.0 | 56.2 | 11.7 | 59.0 | | n/a | 24.6 | 32.1 | 16.0 | 36.3 | | n/a | 16.0 | 26.2 | 10.2 | 39.1 | | n/a | 23.8 | 29.3 | 16.5 | 34.9 | | n/a | 24.2 | 22.1 | 13.8 | 31.3 | | n/a | 12.3 | 21.8 | 6.4 | 36.4 | | n/a | 37.7 | 59.1 | 25.0 | 49.8 | | n/a | 29.6 | 41.7 | 25.0 | 50.4 | | n/a | 12.0 | 17.8 | 7.7 | 42.8 | | n/a | 41.1 | 30.3 | 27.0 | 24.4 | | n/a | 47.4 | 69.3 | 39.8 | 56.1 | | n/a | 23.4 | 53.8 | 10.1 | 64.7 | | n/a | 22.5 | 84.8 | 16.6 | 66.7 | | n/a | 9.1 | 24.2 | 10.4 | 42.8 | | n/a | 13.9 | 27.4 | 10.0 | 38.4 | | n/a | 15.5 | 24.8 | 11.4 | 33.4 | | n/a | 38.5 | 37.1 | 32.0 | 25.2 | | n/a | 17.9 | 26.7 | 8.1 | 41.8 | | n/a | 36.2 | 32.9 | 20.6 | 29.8 | | n/a | 14.5 | 25.0 | 6.8 | 43.2 | | n/a | 15.3 | 37.0 | 12.8 | 40.8 | | n/a | 18.4 | 16.5 | 10.9 | 32.8 | | n/a | 36.4 | 17.2 | 18.1 | 25.7 | | n/a | 15.1 | 38.0 | 12.1 | 44.8 | | n/a | 17.2 | 25.0 | 11.6 | 40.1 | | n/a | 14.8 | 46.1 | 9.6 | 54.5 | | n/a | 22.8 | 70.6 | 17.8 | 57.6 | | n/a | 30.8 | 65.8 | 19.2 | 37.1 | | n/a | 14.7 | 44.3 | 12.6 | 45.6 | | n/a | 15.7 | 8.9 | 8.4 | 30.7 | | n/a | 27.2 | 25.3 | 13.6 | 30.6 | | n/a | 16.3 | 28.2 | 9.8 | 43.7 | | n/a | 13.5 | 27.9 | 10.1 | 45.9 | | n/a | 14.5 | 28.7 | 9.0 | 39.8 | | n/a | 24.2 | 17.5 | 10.4 | 33.4 | | n/a | 49.9 | 48.4 | 36.2 | 28.9 | | n/a | 25.9 | 28.9 | 15.8 | 38.8 | | n/a | 57.1 | 33.3 | 34.6 | 19.4 | | n/a | 17.8 | 13.6 | 10.3 | 35.8 | | n/a | 24.9 | 18.6 | 12.9 | 31.1 | | n/a | 17.0 | 8.0 | 6.5 | 24.6 | | n/a | 32.4 | 36.9 | 23.8 | 35.2 | | n/a | 18.8 | 18.1 | 10.6 | 33.7 | | n/a | 16.4 | 30.8 | 10.6 | 41.1 | | n/a | 37.8 | 35.5 | 17.6 | 41.8 | | n/a | 24.6 | 17.4 | 15.8 | 26.6 | | n/a | 27.3 | 28.0 | 18.7 | 27.7 | | n/a | 10.3 | 67.7 | 9.8 | 78.5 | | n/a | 17.0 | 12.7 | 9.0 | 35.8 | | n/a | 38.0 | 26.8 | 21.1 | 34.4 | | n/a | 20.8 | 22.5 | 13.5 | 42.9 | The first 500 of 3115 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/vote_by_college.json. Views: 2024; 2000. Note: Intervals resample whole states; see Methods. The number of counties in each group is in the tooltip. Note: Groups are formed within each election, so a county can move between groups from one election to the next. Counties without college share are left out of that election. Dots are all the same size, so the vote-weighted lines, which pool votes, can lie away from the middle of the dots; the file names only the largest counties, to keep it small. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/vote_by_college.json ### Table 4. Counting each county once, the 2000 slope inside large counties and inside other counties each had an interval that includes zero, and by 2024 both were above zero Slope of the county Democratic share on county college share inside large counties and inside other counties, with the all-county slope, 2000 to 2024, counting each county once or by two-party votes | basis | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | measure | n_units | series | year | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | County-equal | 2.99 | 0.089 | 1.56 | Slope | 3,114 | All counties | 2000 | | County-equal | 4.58 | 1.96 | 3.30 | Slope | 3,113 | All counties | 2004 | | County-equal | 6.15 | 4.06 | 5.11 | Slope | 3,113 | All counties | 2008 | | County-equal | 6.36 | 3.93 | 5.15 | Slope | 3,112 | All counties | 2012 | | County-equal | 9.36 | 6.48 | 7.95 | Slope | 3,113 | All counties | 2016 | | County-equal | 10.03 | 7.31 | 8.73 | Slope | 3,105 | All counties | 2020 | | County-equal | 9.79 | 7.24 | 8.59 | Slope | 3,103 | All counties | 2024 | | County-equal | 4.10 | −2.89 | 0.564 | Slope | 76 | Large counties | 2000 | | County-equal | 5.94 | −1.09 | 2.37 | Slope | 96 | Large counties | 2004 | | County-equal | 5.61 | −0.223 | 2.70 | Slope | 110 | Large counties | 2008 | | County-equal | 5.30 | −0.788 | 2.39 | Slope | 107 | Large counties | 2012 | | County-equal | 7.31 | 1.68 | 4.69 | Slope | 107 | Large counties | 2016 | | County-equal | 7.43 | 2.70 | 5.15 | Slope | 139 | Large counties | 2020 | | County-equal | 8.05 | 3.42 | 5.85 | Slope | 135 | Large counties | 2024 | | County-equal | 1.99 | −0.763 | 0.688 | Slope | 3,038 | Other counties | 2000 | | County-equal | 3.62 | 0.960 | 2.38 | Slope | 3,017 | Other counties | 2004 | | County-equal | 5.30 | 3.10 | 4.23 | Slope | 3,003 | Other counties | 2008 | | County-equal | 5.43 | 2.84 | 4.19 | Slope | 3,005 | Other counties | 2012 | | County-equal | 8.39 | 5.26 | 6.89 | Slope | 3,006 | Other counties | 2016 | | County-equal | 9.17 | 6.12 | 7.72 | Slope | 2,966 | Other counties | 2020 | | County-equal | 9.13 | 6.23 | 7.76 | Slope | 2,968 | Other counties | 2024 | | County-equal | 0.196 | 0.005 | 0.099 | Correlation | 3,114 | All counties | 2000 | | County-equal | 0.304 | 0.118 | 0.211 | Correlation | 3,113 | All counties | 2004 | | County-equal | 0.395 | 0.231 | 0.310 | Correlation | 3,113 | All counties | 2008 | | County-equal | 0.398 | 0.219 | 0.305 | Correlation | 3,112 | All counties | 2012 | | County-equal | 0.564 | 0.355 | 0.460 | Correlation | 3,113 | All counties | 2016 | | County-equal | 0.626 | 0.427 | 0.530 | Correlation | 3,105 | All counties | 2020 | | County-equal | 0.656 | 0.452 | 0.559 | Correlation | 3,103 | All counties | 2024 | | County-equal | 0.325 | −0.232 | 0.043 | Correlation | 76 | Large counties | 2000 | | County-equal | 0.431 | −0.084 | 0.178 | Correlation | 96 | Large counties | 2004 | | County-equal | 0.418 | −0.017 | 0.203 | Correlation | 110 | Large counties | 2008 | | County-equal | 0.402 | −0.056 | 0.177 | Correlation | 107 | Large counties | 2012 | | County-equal | 0.549 | 0.120 | 0.346 | Correlation | 107 | Large counties | 2016 | | County-equal | 0.584 | 0.204 | 0.403 | Correlation | 139 | Large counties | 2020 | | County-equal | 0.636 | 0.258 | 0.465 | Correlation | 135 | Large counties | 2024 | | County-equal | 0.133 | −0.043 | 0.043 | Correlation | 3,038 | Other counties | 2000 | | County-equal | 0.242 | 0.056 | 0.148 | Correlation | 3,017 | Other counties | 2004 | | County-equal | 0.333 | 0.167 | 0.247 | Correlation | 3,003 | Other counties | 2008 | | County-equal | 0.338 | 0.150 | 0.240 | Correlation | 3,005 | Other counties | 2012 | | County-equal | 0.509 | 0.277 | 0.393 | Correlation | 3,006 | Other counties | 2016 | | County-equal | 0.575 | 0.345 | 0.462 | Correlation | 2,966 | Other counties | 2020 | | County-equal | 0.610 | 0.379 | 0.497 | Correlation | 2,968 | Other counties | 2024 | | Vote-weighted | 5.14 | 2.45 | 3.87 | Slope | 3,114 | All counties | 2000 | | Vote-weighted | 6.38 | 3.90 | 5.18 | Slope | 3,113 | All counties | 2004 | | Vote-weighted | 7.02 | 4.73 | 5.94 | Slope | 3,113 | All counties | 2008 | | Vote-weighted | 7.00 | 4.89 | 5.99 | Slope | 3,112 | All counties | 2012 | | Vote-weighted | 10.26 | 8.23 | 9.23 | Slope | 3,113 | All counties | 2016 | | Vote-weighted | 10.30 | 8.52 | 9.35 | Slope | 3,105 | All counties | 2020 | | Vote-weighted | 10.12 | 8.42 | 9.22 | Slope | 3,103 | All counties | 2024 | | Vote-weighted | 2.96 | −3.39 | 0.150 | Slope | 76 | Large counties | 2000 | | Vote-weighted | 4.92 | −1.55 | 2.00 | Slope | 96 | Large counties | 2004 | | Vote-weighted | 4.46 | −0.642 | 2.14 | Slope | 110 | Large counties | 2008 | | Vote-weighted | 4.10 | −0.929 | 1.85 | Slope | 107 | Large counties | 2012 | | Vote-weighted | 6.23 | 1.74 | 3.99 | Slope | 107 | Large counties | 2016 | | Vote-weighted | 6.98 | 2.91 | 4.82 | Slope | 139 | Large counties | 2020 | | Vote-weighted | 7.70 | 3.56 | 5.54 | Slope | 135 | Large counties | 2024 | | Vote-weighted | 3.75 | 1.26 | 2.42 | Slope | 3,038 | Other counties | 2000 | | Vote-weighted | 4.91 | 2.29 | 3.54 | Slope | 3,017 | Other counties | 2004 | | Vote-weighted | 5.44 | 3.45 | 4.43 | Slope | 3,003 | Other counties | 2008 | | Vote-weighted | 5.32 | 3.30 | 4.28 | Slope | 3,005 | Other counties | 2012 | | Vote-weighted | 8.70 | 6.68 | 7.66 | Slope | 3,006 | Other counties | 2016 | | Vote-weighted | 9.14 | 7.35 | 8.25 | Slope | 2,966 | Other counties | 2020 | | Vote-weighted | 9.22 | 7.52 | 8.35 | Slope | 2,968 | Other counties | 2024 | | Vote-weighted | 0.365 | 0.189 | 0.282 | Correlation | 3,114 | All counties | 2000 | | Vote-weighted | 0.453 | 0.297 | 0.378 | Correlation | 3,113 | All counties | 2004 | | Vote-weighted | 0.491 | 0.357 | 0.427 | Correlation | 3,113 | All counties | 2008 | | Vote-weighted | 0.478 | 0.351 | 0.415 | Correlation | 3,112 | All counties | 2012 | | Vote-weighted | 0.637 | 0.528 | 0.577 | Correlation | 3,113 | All counties | 2016 | | Vote-weighted | 0.693 | 0.594 | 0.637 | Correlation | 3,105 | All counties | 2020 | | Vote-weighted | 0.713 | 0.621 | 0.663 | Correlation | 3,103 | All counties | 2024 | | Vote-weighted | 0.213 | −0.257 | 0.011 | Correlation | 76 | Large counties | 2000 | | Vote-weighted | 0.343 | −0.118 | 0.145 | Correlation | 96 | Large counties | 2004 | | Vote-weighted | 0.333 | −0.050 | 0.161 | Correlation | 110 | Large counties | 2008 | | Vote-weighted | 0.309 | −0.067 | 0.137 | Correlation | 107 | Large counties | 2012 | | Vote-weighted | 0.464 | 0.125 | 0.297 | Correlation | 107 | Large counties | 2016 | | Vote-weighted | 0.561 | 0.236 | 0.396 | Correlation | 139 | Large counties | 2020 | | Vote-weighted | 0.611 | 0.292 | 0.458 | Correlation | 135 | Large counties | 2024 | | Vote-weighted | 0.287 | 0.099 | 0.192 | Correlation | 3,038 | Other counties | 2000 | | Vote-weighted | 0.367 | 0.175 | 0.272 | Correlation | 3,017 | Other counties | 2004 | | Vote-weighted | 0.402 | 0.249 | 0.325 | Correlation | 3,003 | Other counties | 2008 | | Vote-weighted | 0.384 | 0.229 | 0.307 | Correlation | 3,005 | Other counties | 2012 | | Vote-weighted | 0.586 | 0.432 | 0.511 | Correlation | 3,006 | Other counties | 2016 | | Vote-weighted | 0.650 | 0.512 | 0.586 | Correlation | 2,966 | Other counties | 2020 | | Vote-weighted | 0.673 | 0.537 | 0.612 | Correlation | 2,968 | Other counties | 2024 | Views: Slope, county-equal (basis = County-equal, measure = Slope); Slope, vote-weighted (basis = Vote-weighted, measure = Slope); Correlation, county-equal (basis = County-equal, measure = Correlation). Note: Intervals resample whole states; see Methods. Note: Large counties: 250,000 or more two-party votes in the election; 76 counties in 2000 and 135 in 2024. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/size_classes.json ### Table 5. Vote-weighted, the slope with state and race held fixed went from 0.5 in 2000 to 7.6 in 2024 Slope of the county Democratic share on county college share alone, with race and ethnicity held fixed, within states, and within states with race and ethnicity held fixed, 2000 to 2024 | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n_units | specification | weighting | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | | 5.14 | 2.45 | 3.87 | 3,114 | College share alone | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 6.38 | 3.90 | 5.18 | 3,113 | College share alone | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 7.02 | 4.73 | 5.94 | 3,113 | College share alone | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 7.00 | 4.89 | 5.99 | 3,112 | College share alone | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 10.26 | 8.23 | 9.23 | 3,113 | College share alone | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 10.30 | 8.52 | 9.35 | 3,105 | College share alone | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 10.12 | 8.42 | 9.22 | 3,103 | College share alone | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 3.39 | −0.120 | 2.04 | 3,114 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 4.72 | 1.71 | 3.46 | 3,113 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 5.30 | 2.82 | 4.13 | 3,113 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 5.11 | 2.62 | 3.96 | 3,112 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 8.32 | 6.26 | 7.20 | 3,113 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 8.94 | 7.00 | 7.85 | 3,105 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 8.94 | 7.03 | 7.84 | 3,103 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 3.62 | 1.24 | 2.41 | 3,114 | Within states | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 5.18 | 2.83 | 3.97 | 3,113 | Within states | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 5.49 | 3.55 | 4.55 | 3,113 | Within states | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 5.37 | 3.49 | 4.45 | 3,112 | Within states | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 8.85 | 7.05 | 7.90 | 3,113 | Within states | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 9.13 | 7.43 | 8.19 | 3,105 | Within states | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 9.09 | 7.58 | 8.26 | 3,103 | Within states | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 1.55 | −0.698 | 0.496 | 3,114 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 3.21 | 0.969 | 2.15 | 3,113 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 4.17 | 2.19 | 3.17 | 3,113 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 3.77 | 1.88 | 2.80 | 3,112 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 7.40 | 5.64 | 6.44 | 3,113 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 8.23 | 6.59 | 7.35 | 3,105 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 8.35 | 6.87 | 7.55 | 3,103 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 5.14 | 2.45 | 3.87 | 3,114 | 2000 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 4.80 | 2.55 | 3.81 | 3,103 | 2024 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 6.42 | 3.84 | 5.14 | 3,113 | 2000 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 5.70 | 3.63 | 4.76 | 3,103 | 2024 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 7.27 | 4.80 | 6.04 | 3,113 | 2000 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 6.27 | 4.36 | 5.39 | 3,103 | 2024 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 7.44 | 5.03 | 6.21 | 3,111 | 2000 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 6.45 | 4.58 | 5.58 | 3,104 | 2024 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 11.61 | 8.96 | 10.19 | 3,111 | 2000 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 9.79 | 7.80 | 8.77 | 3,105 | 2024 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 12.11 | 9.65 | 10.79 | 3,103 | 2000 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 10.12 | 8.35 | 9.17 | 3,105 | 2024 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 12.20 | 9.71 | 10.86 | 3,102 | 2000 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 10.12 | 8.42 | 9.22 | 3,103 | 2024 college share held fixed | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 2.99 | 0.089 | 1.56 | 3,114 | College share alone | County-equal | 2000 | | 4.58 | 1.96 | 3.30 | 3,113 | College share alone | County-equal | 2004 | | 6.15 | 4.06 | 5.11 | 3,113 | College share alone | County-equal | 2008 | | 6.36 | 3.93 | 5.15 | 3,112 | College share alone | County-equal | 2012 | | 9.36 | 6.48 | 7.95 | 3,113 | College share alone | County-equal | 2016 | | 10.03 | 7.31 | 8.73 | 3,105 | College share alone | County-equal | 2020 | | 9.79 | 7.24 | 8.59 | 3,103 | College share alone | County-equal | 2024 | | 2.28 | −1.51 | 0.814 | 3,114 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2000 | | 4.10 | 0.763 | 2.67 | 3,113 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2004 | | 5.63 | 3.01 | 4.38 | 3,113 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2008 | | 5.66 | 3.10 | 4.44 | 3,112 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2012 | | 8.60 | 6.43 | 7.52 | 3,113 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2016 | | 9.48 | 7.50 | 8.51 | 3,105 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2020 | | 9.35 | 7.49 | 8.46 | 3,103 | Race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2024 | | 2.56 | −0.203 | 1.19 | 3,114 | Within states | County-equal | 2000 | | 3.73 | 1.28 | 2.47 | 3,113 | Within states | County-equal | 2004 | | 4.53 | 2.39 | 3.43 | 3,113 | Within states | County-equal | 2008 | | 4.46 | 2.24 | 3.32 | 3,112 | Within states | County-equal | 2012 | | 7.83 | 5.42 | 6.61 | 3,113 | Within states | County-equal | 2016 | | 8.40 | 6.30 | 7.33 | 3,105 | Within states | County-equal | 2020 | | 8.32 | 6.25 | 7.28 | 3,103 | Within states | County-equal | 2024 | | 2.13 | −0.716 | 0.731 | 3,114 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2000 | | 3.78 | 0.917 | 2.30 | 3,113 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2004 | | 4.94 | 2.53 | 3.65 | 3,113 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2008 | | 4.81 | 2.48 | 3.58 | 3,112 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2012 | | 8.07 | 5.91 | 6.92 | 3,113 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2016 | | 8.72 | 6.91 | 7.77 | 3,105 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2020 | | 8.49 | 6.79 | 7.61 | 3,103 | Within states, race and ethnicity held fixed | County-equal | 2024 | | 2.99 | 0.089 | 1.56 | 3,114 | 2000 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2000 | | 2.13 | −0.178 | 1.01 | 3,103 | 2024 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2000 | | 4.75 | 2.03 | 3.44 | 3,113 | 2000 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2004 | | 3.48 | 1.19 | 2.39 | 3,103 | 2024 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2004 | | 6.75 | 4.54 | 5.65 | 3,113 | 2000 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2008 | | 5.00 | 3.04 | 4.03 | 3,103 | 2024 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2008 | | 7.34 | 4.73 | 6.07 | 3,111 | 2000 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2012 | | 5.37 | 3.02 | 4.24 | 3,104 | 2024 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2012 | | 11.46 | 8.41 | 9.99 | 3,111 | 2000 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2016 | | 8.41 | 5.51 | 6.99 | 3,105 | 2024 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2016 | | 12.90 | 10.14 | 11.55 | 3,103 | 2000 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2020 | | 9.61 | 6.87 | 8.30 | 3,105 | 2024 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2020 | | 13.10 | 10.51 | 11.82 | 3,102 | 2000 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2024 | | 9.79 | 7.24 | 8.59 | 3,103 | 2024 college share held fixed | County-equal | 2024 | Views: Vote-weighted (weighting = Vote-weighted); County-equal (weighting = County-equal). Note: Intervals resample whole states; see Methods. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/specifications.json ### Table 6. The slope was higher in 2024 than in 2000 in all four groups of counties by white share, with the largest point change among counties 90% white or more Slope of the county Democratic share on county college share inside four groups of counties by non-Hispanic white share of residents at the election, 2000 to 2024, vote-weighted and county-equal | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | group | n_units | weighting | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | 7.27 | −1.22 | 4.38 | Under 50% white | 253 | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 8.39 | 2.10 | 5.89 | Under 50% white | 284 | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 7.14 | 2.70 | 5.13 | Under 50% white | 309 | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 6.19 | 2.04 | 4.51 | Under 50% white | 339 | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 7.78 | 4.81 | 6.57 | Under 50% white | 360 | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 7.51 | 4.44 | 6.19 | Under 50% white | 386 | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 7.28 | 4.45 | 6.16 | Under 50% white | 404 | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 6.13 | 0.488 | 3.59 | Under 50% white | 253 | County-equal | 2000 | | 7.84 | 2.91 | 5.49 | Under 50% white | 284 | County-equal | 2004 | | 7.67 | 3.61 | 5.63 | Under 50% white | 309 | County-equal | 2008 | | 7.65 | 2.87 | 5.42 | Under 50% white | 339 | County-equal | 2012 | | 9.37 | 5.13 | 7.44 | Under 50% white | 360 | County-equal | 2016 | | 9.96 | 4.84 | 7.56 | Under 50% white | 386 | County-equal | 2020 | | 9.36 | 4.44 | 7.29 | Under 50% white | 404 | County-equal | 2024 | | 5.17 | 1.95 | 3.49 | 50 to under 75% white | 635 | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 6.14 | 3.51 | 4.71 | 50 to under 75% white | 661 | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 7.39 | 4.45 | 5.93 | 50 to under 75% white | 710 | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 7.18 | 4.23 | 5.71 | 50 to under 75% white | 740 | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 9.66 | 7.13 | 8.36 | 50 to under 75% white | 767 | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 10.18 | 7.67 | 8.99 | 50 to under 75% white | 816 | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 10.43 | 7.70 | 9.14 | 50 to under 75% white | 855 | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 4.46 | 1.12 | 2.85 | 50 to under 75% white | 635 | County-equal | 2000 | | 6.24 | 3.43 | 4.78 | 50 to under 75% white | 661 | County-equal | 2004 | | 8.39 | 5.85 | 7.01 | 50 to under 75% white | 710 | County-equal | 2008 | | 7.59 | 5.07 | 6.23 | 50 to under 75% white | 740 | County-equal | 2012 | | 9.93 | 7.09 | 8.45 | 50 to under 75% white | 767 | County-equal | 2016 | | 10.65 | 7.93 | 9.25 | 50 to under 75% white | 816 | County-equal | 2020 | | 10.21 | 7.71 | 8.95 | 50 to under 75% white | 855 | County-equal | 2024 | | 5.44 | 1.41 | 3.51 | 75 to under 90% white | 724 | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 6.73 | 3.13 | 5.08 | 75 to under 90% white | 784 | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 6.69 | 3.24 | 5.11 | 75 to under 90% white | 808 | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 6.60 | 2.95 | 5.00 | 75 to under 90% white | 841 | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 9.53 | 6.50 | 8.11 | 75 to under 90% white | 900 | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 9.61 | 7.25 | 8.43 | 75 to under 90% white | 998 | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 9.48 | 7.06 | 8.25 | 75 to under 90% white | 1,057 | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 4.29 | 1.38 | 2.85 | 75 to under 90% white | 724 | County-equal | 2000 | | 6.18 | 3.23 | 4.82 | 75 to under 90% white | 784 | County-equal | 2004 | | 7.58 | 4.93 | 6.36 | 75 to under 90% white | 808 | County-equal | 2008 | | 7.63 | 4.92 | 6.35 | 75 to under 90% white | 841 | County-equal | 2012 | | 10.13 | 8.09 | 9.12 | 75 to under 90% white | 900 | County-equal | 2016 | | 10.62 | 8.82 | 9.71 | 75 to under 90% white | 998 | County-equal | 2020 | | 10.35 | 8.55 | 9.41 | 75 to under 90% white | 1,057 | County-equal | 2024 | | 2.94 | −0.508 | 1.15 | 90% or more white | 1,502 | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 4.76 | 0.371 | 2.42 | 90% or more white | 1,384 | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 7.60 | 2.71 | 5.10 | 90% or more white | 1,286 | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 8.69 | 3.90 | 6.34 | 90% or more white | 1,192 | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 12.09 | 7.50 | 9.88 | 90% or more white | 1,086 | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 13.21 | 7.54 | 10.38 | 90% or more white | 905 | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 13.77 | 7.69 | 10.84 | 90% or more white | 787 | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 2.13 | −2.22 | 0.068 | 90% or more white | 1,502 | County-equal | 2000 | | 3.73 | −0.633 | 1.54 | 90% or more white | 1,384 | County-equal | 2004 | | 6.45 | 1.80 | 4.13 | 90% or more white | 1,286 | County-equal | 2008 | | 7.40 | 2.03 | 4.71 | 90% or more white | 1,192 | County-equal | 2012 | | 10.78 | 5.35 | 8.03 | 90% or more white | 1,086 | County-equal | 2016 | | 12.05 | 5.78 | 8.98 | 90% or more white | 905 | County-equal | 2020 | | 11.81 | 5.24 | 8.71 | 90% or more white | 787 | County-equal | 2024 | Note: Intervals resample whole states; see Methods. Groups are formed from the non-Hispanic white share at each election, so a county can change group. Note: Counties per group in 2000 and 2024: under 50% white, 253 and 404; 50% to under 75%, 635 and 855; 75% to under 90%, 724 and 1,057; 90% or more, 1,502 and 787. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/white_groups.json ### Table 7. The vote-weighted slope was positive in every one of the 39 states in 2024, against 29 in 2000 Slope of the county Democratic share on county college share inside each state with at least 20 counties, 2000 and 2024, vote-weighted, with 95% intervals | hi_2000 | hi_2024 | lo_2000 | lo_2024 | n_units | slope_2000 | slope_2024 | state | weighting | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | 4.25 | 12.24 | −6.92 | 1.34 | 67 | −1.34 | 6.79 | Alabama | Vote-weighted | | 13.48 | 19.68 | −12.63 | 0.982 | 75 | 0.425 | 10.33 | Arkansas | Vote-weighted | | 11.81 | 9.90 | 3.16 | 5.28 | 58 | 7.49 | 7.59 | California | Vote-weighted | | 7.60 | 14.37 | −3.08 | 1.89 | 64 | 2.26 | 8.13 | Colorado | Vote-weighted | | 9.36 | 12.15 | 0.601 | 4.17 | 67 | 4.98 | 8.16 | Florida | Vote-weighted | | 9.90 | 12.46 | −2.74 | 4.17 | 159 | 3.58 | 8.32 | Georgia | Vote-weighted | | 8.05 | 13.60 | 4.30 | 6.56 | 44 | 6.17 | 10.08 | Idaho | Vote-weighted | | 12.60 | 21.38 | −8.53 | 3.36 | 102 | 2.03 | 12.37 | Illinois | Vote-weighted | | 7.35 | 16.66 | −9.34 | −3.48 | 92 | −0.995 | 6.59 | Indiana | Vote-weighted | | 5.86 | 12.39 | 1.35 | 6.24 | 99 | 3.61 | 9.32 | Iowa | Vote-weighted | | 5.74 | 13.32 | −5.26 | 1.08 | 105 | 0.241 | 7.20 | Kansas | Vote-weighted | | 7.28 | 17.28 | −1.38 | 7.64 | 120 | 2.95 | 12.46 | Kentucky | Vote-weighted | | 13.94 | 23.63 | −8.09 | −0.026 | 64 | 2.92 | 11.80 | Louisiana | Vote-weighted | | 9.81 | 12.59 | −7.36 | −1.57 | 24 | 1.22 | 5.51 | Maryland | Vote-weighted | | 4.57 | 10.15 | −6.20 | 1.34 | 83 | −0.812 | 5.74 | Michigan | Vote-weighted | | 7.01 | 14.69 | 1.68 | 8.83 | 87 | 4.34 | 11.76 | Minnesota | Vote-weighted | | 7.05 | 6.86 | −8.14 | −2.35 | 82 | −0.545 | 2.25 | Mississippi | Vote-weighted | | 5.46 | 16.31 | 1.81 | 10.60 | 115 | 3.64 | 13.45 | Missouri | Vote-weighted | | 8.07 | 14.05 | −4.05 | 3.24 | 56 | 2.01 | 8.64 | Montana | Vote-weighted | | 11.30 | 20.28 | 3.98 | 9.52 | 93 | 7.64 | 14.90 | Nebraska | Vote-weighted | | 1.35 | 6.84 | −9.13 | −4.96 | 21 | −3.89 | 0.942 | New Jersey | Vote-weighted | | 11.83 | 15.93 | −2.57 | 5.33 | 33 | 4.63 | 10.63 | New Mexico | Vote-weighted | | 15.46 | 14.71 | −8.09 | −1.12 | 62 | 3.68 | 6.79 | New York | Vote-weighted | | 5.92 | 11.89 | 0.959 | 6.47 | 100 | 3.44 | 9.18 | North Carolina | Vote-weighted | | 6.72 | 20.34 | −2.70 | −1.48 | 53 | 2.01 | 9.43 | North Dakota | Vote-weighted | | 7.27 | 16.51 | −2.12 | 4.59 | 88 | 2.57 | 10.55 | Ohio | Vote-weighted | | −2.06 | 18.15 | −6.05 | 8.21 | 77 | −4.06 | 13.18 | Oklahoma | Vote-weighted | | 19.45 | 19.07 | 0.858 | 7.39 | 36 | 10.15 | 13.23 | Oregon | Vote-weighted | | 7.90 | 12.77 | −5.45 | 6.25 | 67 | 1.23 | 9.51 | Pennsylvania | Vote-weighted | | 8.05 | 8.64 | −10.77 | −0.770 | 46 | −1.36 | 3.93 | South Carolina | Vote-weighted | | 8.01 | 10.23 | −2.92 | 1.17 | 65 | 2.55 | 5.70 | South Dakota | Vote-weighted | | 7.22 | 18.79 | −5.77 | −0.834 | 95 | 0.726 | 8.98 | Tennessee | Vote-weighted | | 2.84 | 11.09 | −5.23 | 2.76 | 254 | −1.20 | 6.92 | Texas | Vote-weighted | | 11.47 | 18.18 | −13.16 | −4.08 | 29 | −0.844 | 7.05 | Utah | Vote-weighted | | 3.36 | 8.88 | 0.238 | 5.81 | 133 | 1.80 | 7.35 | Virginia | Vote-weighted | | 14.86 | 11.70 | 1.24 | 8.65 | 39 | 8.05 | 10.17 | Washington | Vote-weighted | | 3.59 | 12.71 | −4.17 | 6.28 | 55 | −0.291 | 9.50 | West Virginia | Vote-weighted | | 15.00 | 17.54 | −11.78 | −1.89 | 72 | 1.61 | 7.82 | Wisconsin | Vote-weighted | | 8.04 | 15.78 | 3.21 | 6.61 | 23 | 5.62 | 11.19 | Wyoming | Vote-weighted | | 1.13 | 6.80 | −8.94 | −3.22 | 67 | −3.90 | 1.79 | Alabama | County-equal | | 1.32 | 10.30 | −9.57 | −0.588 | 75 | −4.12 | 4.85 | Arkansas | County-equal | | 11.95 | 11.52 | 6.92 | 8.36 | 58 | 9.43 | 9.94 | California | County-equal | | 6.89 | 12.04 | 2.32 | 8.40 | 64 | 4.61 | 10.22 | Colorado | County-equal | | 6.07 | 10.24 | 0.225 | 5.77 | 67 | 3.15 | 8.00 | Florida | County-equal | | 1.72 | 7.03 | −5.22 | 1.36 | 159 | −1.75 | 4.20 | Georgia | County-equal | | 10.19 | 13.08 | 2.40 | 4.49 | 44 | 6.29 | 8.79 | Idaho | County-equal | | 3.00 | 13.11 | −1.04 | 9.00 | 102 | 0.980 | 11.06 | Illinois | County-equal | | 3.53 | 11.24 | −4.22 | 5.41 | 92 | −0.342 | 8.33 | Indiana | County-equal | | 5.35 | 10.77 | −0.203 | 6.34 | 99 | 2.57 | 8.55 | Iowa | County-equal | | 7.13 | 12.34 | 0.182 | 4.14 | 105 | 3.65 | 8.24 | Kansas | County-equal | | 4.51 | 11.15 | −0.847 | 7.64 | 120 | 1.83 | 9.39 | Kentucky | County-equal | | 6.18 | 14.00 | −5.89 | −0.050 | 64 | 0.147 | 6.97 | Louisiana | County-equal | | 7.05 | 11.24 | 0.035 | 6.30 | 24 | 3.54 | 8.77 | Maryland | County-equal | | 4.12 | 9.52 | −2.23 | 6.37 | 83 | 0.944 | 7.94 | Michigan | County-equal | | 4.49 | 11.92 | −0.147 | 7.39 | 87 | 2.17 | 9.65 | Minnesota | County-equal | | 2.14 | 3.05 | −6.67 | −5.03 | 82 | −2.26 | −0.988 | Mississippi | County-equal | | 4.65 | 13.54 | 0.435 | 8.00 | 115 | 2.54 | 10.77 | Missouri | County-equal | | 7.97 | 12.09 | −1.91 | 1.13 | 56 | 3.03 | 6.61 | Montana | County-equal | | 6.62 | 11.06 | −3.30 | −0.415 | 93 | 1.66 | 5.32 | Nebraska | County-equal | | 0.535 | 5.35 | −6.43 | −0.762 | 21 | −2.95 | 2.29 | New Jersey | County-equal | | 11.60 | 12.67 | −7.84 | 2.12 | 33 | 1.88 | 7.40 | New Mexico | County-equal | | 10.01 | 11.39 | 3.23 | 6.91 | 62 | 6.62 | 9.15 | New York | County-equal | | 4.17 | 8.09 | −2.25 | 2.66 | 100 | 0.958 | 5.38 | North Carolina | County-equal | | 7.72 | 11.88 | −4.56 | −9.19 | 53 | 1.58 | 1.34 | North Dakota | County-equal | | 4.79 | 12.17 | −1.84 | 6.20 | 88 | 1.48 | 9.19 | Ohio | County-equal | | −3.50 | 9.28 | −13.85 | 1.95 | 77 | −8.68 | 5.62 | Oklahoma | County-equal | | 16.56 | 16.26 | 2.82 | 10.08 | 36 | 9.69 | 13.17 | Oregon | County-equal | | 8.32 | 13.51 | 1.93 | 8.75 | 67 | 5.12 | 11.13 | Pennsylvania | County-equal | | −1.12 | 2.56 | −14.77 | −6.26 | 46 | −7.94 | −1.85 | South Carolina | County-equal | | 6.13 | 5.60 | −7.79 | −7.61 | 65 | −0.828 | −1.01 | South Dakota | County-equal | | −0.877 | 11.72 | −6.73 | 3.37 | 95 | −3.80 | 7.55 | Tennessee | County-equal | | −3.14 | 6.14 | −9.29 | 1.66 | 254 | −6.21 | 3.90 | Texas | County-equal | | 10.29 | 12.33 | −7.18 | 5.39 | 29 | 1.55 | 8.86 | Utah | County-equal | | 2.69 | 9.15 | −0.437 | 6.47 | 133 | 1.13 | 7.81 | Virginia | County-equal | | 11.47 | 13.43 | 1.37 | 8.37 | 39 | 6.42 | 10.90 | Washington | County-equal | | 4.10 | 10.47 | −6.09 | 7.28 | 55 | −0.995 | 8.87 | West Virginia | County-equal | | 5.28 | 10.39 | −5.93 | 2.56 | 72 | −0.327 | 6.48 | Wisconsin | County-equal | | 8.10 | 16.43 | 4.45 | 6.79 | 23 | 6.27 | 11.61 | Wyoming | County-equal | Views: Vote-weighted (weighting = Vote-weighted); County-equal (weighting = County-equal). Note: Intervals are HC3 robust and treat counties as independent; see Methods. States with fewer than 20 counties in either year, and Alaska, are left out. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/state_slopes.json ### Table 8. Counties at or below the median college share with a Democratic majority fell from 325 in 2000 to 93 in 2024 Each county by whether its college share is above the median of that election's counties and whether Democrats won a majority of its two-party vote, 2000 to 2024, Alaska excluded | Election | County | College share (%) | Democratic share of two-party vote (%) | Two-party votes | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2000 | Pasco, FL | 13.1 | 50.4 | 138,183 | | 2000 | Hidalgo, TX | 12.9 | 61.6 | 99,691 | | 2000 | Trumbull, OH | 14.5 | 62.5 | 92,297 | | 2000 | Jefferson, MO | 12.1 | 51.2 | 75,382 | | 2000 | Muskegon, MI | 13.9 | 55.8 | 67,893 | | 2000 | Hernando, FL | 12.7 | 51.6 | 63,306 | | 2000 | Cameron, TX | 13.4 | 54.4 | 61,014 | | 2000 | Monroe, MI | 14.3 | 52.2 | 60,495 | | 2000 | Cambria, PA | 13.7 | 52.0 | 58,309 | | 2000 | Bay, MI | 14.2 | 56.1 | 50,401 | | 2004 | Hidalgo, TX | 14.0 | 55.0 | 113,300 | | 2004 | Trumbull, OH | 15.2 | 61.9 | 107,650 | | 2004 | Muskegon, MI | 15.0 | 55.6 | 79,584 | | 2004 | Fayette, PA | 12.5 | 53.8 | 54,165 | | 2004 | Wyandotte, KS | 13.4 | 66.1 | 52,842 | | 2004 | Cumberland, NJ | 12.7 | 53.4 | 52,237 | | 2004 | Ashtabula, OH | 11.8 | 53.4 | 45,098 | | 2004 | Laporte, IN | 15.1 | 50.2 | 42,030 | | 2004 | Cowlitz, WA | 14.1 | 51.6 | 41,806 | | 2004 | Webb, TX | 15.1 | 57.1 | 41,407 | | 2008 | Stanislaus, CA | 15.8 | 50.9 | 157,776 | | 2008 | Hidalgo, TX | 15.1 | 69.5 | 129,929 | | 2008 | Trumbull, OH | 16.0 | 61.5 | 104,309 | | 2008 | Jefferson, MO | 16.0 | 51.3 | 104,271 | | 2008 | Muskegon, MI | 16.2 | 64.9 | 82,966 | | 2008 | St. Clair, MI | 14.9 | 51.4 | 79,213 | | 2008 | Cameron, TX | 14.6 | 64.5 | 75,151 | | 2008 | Merced, CA | 12.2 | 54.2 | 62,735 | | 2008 | Cumberland, NJ | 13.6 | 61.0 | 57,279 | | 2008 | Madison, IN | 16.5 | 53.3 | 56,555 | | 2012 | Stanislaus, CA | 16.4 | 51.4 | 151,183 | | 2012 | Hidalgo, TX | 16.5 | 71.1 | 137,834 | | 2012 | Trumbull, OH | 17.2 | 61.7 | 99,951 | | 2012 | Cameron, TX | 15.8 | 65.7 | 76,074 | | 2012 | Muskegon, MI | 17.4 | 59.0 | 75,320 | | 2012 | Merced, CA | 13.1 | 54.5 | 60,586 | | 2012 | Cumberland, NJ | 14.2 | 62.2 | 54,713 | | 2012 | Wyandotte, KS | 15.8 | 68.9 | 49,798 | | 2012 | Webb, TX | 17.2 | 77.2 | 48,675 | | 2012 | Oswego, NY | 17.0 | 54.1 | 43,495 | | 2016 | San Joaquin, CA | 18.7 | 56.8 | 191,036 | | 2016 | Hidalgo, TX | 18.4 | 71.0 | 167,451 | | 2016 | Stanislaus, CA | 17.1 | 50.7 | 152,594 | | 2016 | Clayton, GA | 19.1 | 86.1 | 90,865 | | 2016 | Cameron, TX | 17.5 | 66.8 | 88,874 | | 2016 | Muskegon, MI | 18.9 | 50.8 | 73,431 | | 2016 | Merced, CA | 13.9 | 55.3 | 59,706 | | 2016 | Webb, TX | 18.1 | 76.6 | 55,254 | | 2016 | Cumberland, NJ | 15.4 | 53.2 | 52,224 | | 2016 | Wyandotte, KS | 17.3 | 65.4 | 44,866 | | 2020 | San Joaquin, CA | 21.0 | 57.1 | 282,235 | | 2020 | Hidalgo, TX | 20.0 | 58.6 | 218,726 | | 2020 | Stanislaus, CA | 18.7 | 50.4 | 209,986 | | 2020 | Cameron, TX | 20.1 | 56.6 | 113,095 | | 2020 | Clayton, GA | 20.8 | 85.8 | 111,277 | | 2020 | Muskegon, MI | 20.5 | 50.3 | 90,776 | | 2020 | Merced, CA | 14.7 | 55.4 | 88,388 | | 2020 | Webb, TX | 20.1 | 61.8 | 67,718 | | 2020 | Cumberland, NJ | 17.8 | 53.1 | 61,694 | | 2020 | Imperial, CA | 15.7 | 62.5 | 55,525 | | 2024 | Wyandotte, KS | 21.2 | 62.1 | 49,805 | | 2024 | Wilson, NC | 21.7 | 50.2 | 39,659 | | 2024 | Orangeburg, SC | 19.4 | 62.4 | 36,582 | | 2024 | Apache, AZ | 16.6 | 59.6 | 31,667 | | 2024 | McKinley, NM | 13.3 | 62.7 | 25,075 | | 2024 | Edgecombe, NC | 17.5 | 61.4 | 24,255 | | 2024 | Halifax, NC | 16.1 | 58.9 | 23,792 | | 2024 | Liberty, GA | 20.5 | 58.8 | 22,900 | | 2024 | Gadsden, FL | 21.3 | 65.5 | 21,698 | | 2024 | Jefferson, AR | 20.1 | 60.2 | 21,270 | The map draws every unit from https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/the-diploma-map/diploma_classes.json; the rows above are the subset the figure file carries. Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so the map draws no intervals. A county's class depends on the national result of the election as well as on its own vote. Counties are drawn on 2020 boundaries and matched on FIPS code; a county with no return or no college share in an election draws as no data. Kansas City's votes, a separate unit in the 2024 returns, are added to Jackson County, Missouri. The data table lists ten counties for each election, not the whole map. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, not weighted; college share from the county demographics panel (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/diploma_map.json ### Table 9. Counting each county once, the correlation with 2000 college share was positive in 1972, negative in the point estimates from 1976 to 1996 and positive from 2000 Correlation of a county's share of residents with a bachelor's degree or more in 2000 with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in each presidential election, 1972 to 2024 | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n_units | weighting | year | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | | 0.340 | 0.123 | 0.243 | 3,107 | Vote-weighted | 1972 | | −0.094 | −0.340 | −0.213 | 3,110 | Vote-weighted | 1976 | | 0.047 | −0.143 | −0.048 | 3,110 | Vote-weighted | 1980 | | 0.198 | −0.015 | 0.100 | 3,112 | Vote-weighted | 1984 | | 0.197 | −0.036 | 0.087 | 3,112 | Vote-weighted | 1988 | | 0.246 | 0.005 | 0.133 | 3,113 | Vote-weighted | 1992 | | 0.247 | 0.027 | 0.147 | 3,113 | Vote-weighted | 1996 | | 0.365 | 0.189 | 0.282 | 3,114 | Vote-weighted | 2000 | | 0.439 | 0.283 | 0.363 | 3,113 | Vote-weighted | 2004 | | 0.477 | 0.336 | 0.406 | 3,113 | Vote-weighted | 2008 | | 0.458 | 0.319 | 0.387 | 3,113 | Vote-weighted | 2012 | | 0.616 | 0.497 | 0.551 | 3,111 | Vote-weighted | 2016 | | 0.673 | 0.568 | 0.612 | 3,111 | Vote-weighted | 2020 | | 0.694 | 0.596 | 0.641 | 3,111 | Vote-weighted | 2024 | | 0.178 | 0.028 | 0.099 | 3,107 | County-equal | 1972 | | −0.270 | −0.387 | −0.332 | 3,110 | County-equal | 1976 | | −0.102 | −0.270 | −0.198 | 3,110 | County-equal | 1980 | | −0.016 | −0.180 | −0.105 | 3,112 | County-equal | 1984 | | 0.000 | −0.168 | −0.087 | 3,112 | County-equal | 1988 | | 0.009 | −0.179 | −0.091 | 3,113 | County-equal | 1992 | | 0.028 | −0.152 | −0.066 | 3,113 | County-equal | 1996 | | 0.196 | 0.005 | 0.099 | 3,114 | County-equal | 2000 | | 0.305 | 0.118 | 0.211 | 3,113 | County-equal | 2004 | | 0.399 | 0.231 | 0.313 | 3,113 | County-equal | 2008 | | 0.404 | 0.225 | 0.314 | 3,113 | County-equal | 2012 | | 0.579 | 0.382 | 0.483 | 3,111 | County-equal | 2016 | | 0.639 | 0.463 | 0.554 | 3,111 | County-equal | 2020 | | 0.666 | 0.494 | 0.583 | 3,111 | County-equal | 2024 | Note: Intervals resample whole states; see Methods. The data hold no county college share before 2000; the 2000 value is applied to earlier elections as a ranking of counties. Note: Counties are matched on FIPS code to the 2000 census; a county with no 2000 value is left out of that election, which removes under one percent of two-party votes before 2000. Source: County presidential returns, 1972-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and the 2000 census county college share; weighted by two-party votes in the election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/before_2000.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (200), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | adj_step_max_u | +1.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | highest of the 2016 to 2024 changes in the slope across five adjusted versions (race and ethnicity held fixed, within states, both, 2000 college share held fixed, 2024 college share held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | | | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | adj_step_max_w | +1.1 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | highest of the 2016 to 2024 changes in the slope across five adjusted versions (race and ethnicity held fixed, within states, both, 2000 college share held fixed, 2024 college share held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | adj_step_min_u | +0.7 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | lowest of the 2016 to 2024 changes in the slope across five adjusted versions (race and ethnicity held fixed, within states, both, 2000 college share held fixed, 2024 college share held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | | | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | adj_step_min_w | +0.4 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | lowest of the 2016 to 2024 changes in the slope across five adjusted versions (race and ethnicity held fixed, within states, both, 2000 college share held fixed, 2024 college share held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | age_floor | 25 | years of age | lower age limit of the college share | residents counted in the college share | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | aligned_2000 | 50.8% | percent of counties | share of counties that are above the median college share with a Democratic majority or at or below it with a Republican majority | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | aligned_2024 | 58.4% | percent of counties | share of counties that are above the median college share with a Democratic majority or at or below it with a Republican majority | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,103 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | aligned_votes_2000 | 55.1% | percent of two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in the counties that are above the median college share with a Democratic majority or at or below it with a Republican majority | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | aligned_votes_2024 | 60.8% | percent of two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in the counties that are above the median college share with a Democratic majority or at or below it with a Republican majority | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,103 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | back_max_u | −0.07 | correlation coefficient | highest of the point estimates of the correlation across the elections of 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 1984 to 1996 | | | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | back_max_w | +0.15 | correlation coefficient | highest of the point estimates of the correlation across the elections of 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 1984 to 1996 | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | back_min_u | −0.10 | correlation coefficient | lowest of the point estimates of the correlation across the elections of 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 1984 to 1996 | | | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | back_min_w | +0.09 | correlation coefficient | lowest of the point estimates of the correlation across the elections of 1984, 1988, 1992 and 1996 | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 1984 to 1996 | | | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | back_u_1972 | +0.10 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 1972 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.18 | 3,107 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | back_u_1976 | −0.33 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 1976 | 95% CI −0.39 to −0.27 | 3,110 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | back_u_1980 | −0.20 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 1980 | 95% CI −0.27 to −0.10 | 3,110 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | back_u_2000 | +0.10 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.20 | 3,114 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | back_u_2024 | +0.58 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 0.49 to 0.67 | 3,111 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | back_w_1972 | +0.24 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 1972 | 95% CI 0.12 to 0.34 | 3,107 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | back_w_1976 | −0.21 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 1976 | 95% CI −0.34 to −0.09 | 3,110 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | back_w_1980 | −0.05 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 1980 | 95% CI −0.14 to 0.05 | 3,110 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | back_w_2000 | +0.28 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.37 | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | back_w_2012 | +0.39 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 2012 | 95% CI 0.32 to 0.46 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | back_w_2016 | +0.55 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 2016 | 95% CI 0.50 to 0.62 | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | back_w_2024 | +0.64 | correlation coefficient | correlation of the county's 2000 college share with its Democratic share of the two-party vote in the election | counties with returns and a 2000 college share, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.69 | 3,111 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | big_cut | 250,000 | two-party votes in the election | definition of a large county | threshold for a large county | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | black_cut | 25% | percent of residents | definition of a county group | non-Hispanic Black share cut-off | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | boot_reps | 2,000 | replicates | number of bootstrap replicates | bootstrap over states | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | corr_step_w_1624 | +0.09 | correlation coefficient, change between two elections | change in the correlation of college share with the Democratic share, 2024 minus 2016 | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.10 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | corr_u_2000 | +0.10 | correlation coefficient | correlation of college share with the Democratic share of the two-party vote | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.20 | 3,114 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | corr_u_2024 | +0.56 | correlation coefficient | correlation of college share with the Democratic share of the two-party vote | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 0.45 to 0.66 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | corr_w_2000 | +0.28 | correlation coefficient | correlation of college share with the Democratic share of the two-party vote | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.37 | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | corr_w_2012 | +0.42 | correlation coefficient | correlation of college share with the Democratic share of the two-party vote | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 | 95% CI 0.35 to 0.48 | 3,112 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | corr_w_2016 | +0.58 | correlation coefficient | correlation of college share with the Democratic share of the two-party vote | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 | 95% CI 0.53 to 0.64 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | corr_w_2024 | +0.66 | correlation coefficient | correlation of college share with the Democratic share of the two-party vote | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 0.62 to 0.71 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | fe_u_2000 | 1.2 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share within states (state fixed effects) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI −0.2 to 2.6 | 3,114 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | fe_u_2024 | 7.3 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share within states (state fixed effects) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 6.2 to 8.3 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | fe_w_2000 | 2.4 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share within states (state fixed effects) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 1.2 to 3.6 | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | fe_w_2024 | 8.3 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share within states (state fixed effects) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 7.6 to 9.1 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | fer_step_w_0024 | +7.1 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share within states with the four race and ethnicity shares held fixed, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 6.1 to 8.2 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | fer_u_2000 | 0.7 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share within states with the four race and ethnicity shares held fixed | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI −0.7 to 2.1 | 3,114 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | fer_u_2024 | 7.6 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share within states with the four race and ethnicity shares held fixed | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 6.8 to 8.5 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | fer_w_2000 | 0.5 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share within states with the four race and ethnicity shares held fixed | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI −0.7 to 1.6 | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | fer_w_2024 | 7.6 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share within states with the four race and ethnicity shares held fixed | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 6.9 to 8.4 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | fx00_step_w_1216 | +4.0 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on the 2000 college share of the county, held fixed across elections, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 3.5 to 4.6 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | label_cut | 300,000 | two-party votes in 2024 | definition of the named counties | threshold for naming a county in the scatter figure | 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | lod_black25_2024 | 82% | percent of counties | share of the counties whose non-Hispanic Black share is 25 percent or more | counties at or below the median college share with a Democratic majority | 2024 | | 93 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | lod_ms_2024 | 17 | counties | count of the counties in Mississippi | counties at or below the median college share with a Democratic majority | 2024 | | 93 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | lod_n_2000 | 325 | counties | count of counties | counties at or below the median college share with a Democratic majority | 2000 | | 325 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | lod_south_2024 | 86% | percent of counties | share of the counties in the 17 Census Bureau South states and the District of Columbia | counties at or below the median college share with a Democratic majority | 2024 | | 93 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | lod_white_majority_2000 | 66% | percent of counties | share of the counties whose non-Hispanic white share is 50 percent or more | counties at or below the median college share with a Democratic majority | 2000 | | 325 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | lod_wm_matched | 212 | counties | count of the counties that have 2024 returns and characteristics | counties at or below the median college share with a Democratic majority and a non-Hispanic white share of 50 percent or more in 2000, with a 2024 return | 2000 and 2024 | | 213 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | lod_wm_rep_2024 | 208 | counties | count of the counties with a Republican majority in 2024 | counties at or below the median college share with a Democratic majority and a non-Hispanic white share of 50 percent or more in 2000 | 2000 and 2024 | | 213 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | mean_ds_w_2000 | 50.3% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | mean county Democratic share of the two-party vote (the pooled share of the counties when vote-weighted) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County election returns | | | mean_ds_w_2024 | 49.2% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | mean county Democratic share of the two-party vote (the pooled share of the counties when vote-weighted) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County election returns | | | med_ba_2000 | 14.5% | percent of residents 25 and older | median county share with a bachelor's degree or more | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | med_ba_2024 | 22.1% | percent of residents 25 and older | median county share with a bachelor's degree or more | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,103 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | n_big_2000 | 76 | counties | count of counties in the size class | large counties | 2000 | | 76 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_big_2024 | 135 | counties | count of counties in the size class | large counties | 2024 | | 135 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_counties_2000 | 3,114 | counties | count of counties in the estimates | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_counties_2024 | 3,103 | counties | count of counties in the estimates | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,103 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_hid_2000 | 350 | counties | count of counties above the median college share, Democratic majority | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_hid_2024 | 352 | counties | count of counties above the median college share, Democratic majority | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,103 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_lod_2000 | 325 | counties | count of counties at or below the median college share, Democratic majority | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_lod_2024 | 93 | counties | count of counties at or below the median college share, Democratic majority | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,103 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_lor_2000 | 1,232 | counties | count of counties at or below the median college share, Republican majority | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | | 3,114 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_lor_2024 | 1,459 | counties | count of counties at or below the median college share, Republican majority | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,103 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_no_comp_2024 | 9 | counties | counties with returns and no county characteristics | counties with 2024 returns | 2024 | | 3,112 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | n_returns_2024 | 3,112 | counties | count of counties with returns | counties with two-party votes, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,112 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_states_only | 49 | states | count of states, not counting the District of Columbia | states with counties in these data, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_years | 7 | presidential elections | count of elections | elections with county college share | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | q1_u_2000 | 44.0% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 1 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2000 | 95% CI 42.1% to 46.1% | 623 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | q1_u_2024 | 26.3% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 1 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2024 | 95% CI 23.0% to 30.1% | 621 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | q1_w_2000 | 43.7% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 1 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2000 | 95% CI 42.2% to 45.5% | 623 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | q1_w_2024 | 26.4% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 1 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2024 | 95% CI 23.4% to 29.7% | 621 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | q2_u_2024 | 26.5% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 2 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2024 | 95% CI 24.2% to 29.1% | 620 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | q3_u_2024 | 27.4% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 3 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2024 | 95% CI 24.8% to 30.4% | 621 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | q4_u_2000 | 37.9% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 4 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2000 | 95% CI 34.9% to 41.6% | 623 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | q4_u_2024 | 32.1% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 4 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2024 | 95% CI 29.0% to 35.4% | 620 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | q5_u_2000 | 44.6% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 5 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2000 | 95% CI 41.7% to 47.5% | 623 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | q5_u_2024 | 48.3% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 5 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2024 | 95% CI 45.3% to 51.1% | 621 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | q5_w_2000 | 53.0% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 5 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2000 | 95% CI 49.4% to 56.0% | 623 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | q5_w_2024 | 56.1% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in a fifth of counties ranked by college share in that election | counties in fifth 5 of 5 by college share, from least to most | 2024 | 95% CI 53.2% to 59.0% | 621 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | qba1_2000 | 9.0% | percent of residents 25 and older | mean county share with a bachelor's degree or more in the fifth | counties in fifth 1 of 5 by college share | 2000 | | 623 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | qba1_2024 | 13.8% | percent of residents 25 and older | mean county share with a bachelor's degree or more in the fifth | counties in fifth 1 of 5 by college share | 2024 | | 621 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | qba5_2000 | 29.1% | percent of residents 25 and older | mean county share with a bachelor's degree or more in the fifth | counties in fifth 5 of 5 by college share | 2000 | | 623 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | qba5_2024 | 41.2% | percent of residents 25 and older | mean county share with a bachelor's degree or more in the fifth | counties in fifth 5 of 5 by college share | 2024 | | 621 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | qchg1_w | −17.4 | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote, change | change in the Democratic share of a fifth of counties ranked by college share in each election | counties in fifth 1 by college share in each election | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI −20.7 to −14.0 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | qchg5_w | +3.1 | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote, change | change in the Democratic share of a fifth of counties ranked by college share in each election | counties in fifth 5 by college share in each election | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.5 to 5.5 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | qgap_u_2000 | 0.6 | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote, most minus least educated fifth | Democratic share in the fifth of counties with the highest college share minus that in the fifth with the lowest | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI −2.6 to 3.9 | 3,114 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | qgap_u_2024 | 22.0 | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote, most minus least educated fifth | Democratic share in the fifth of counties with the highest college share minus that in the fifth with the lowest | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 17.6 to 26.0 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | qgap_w_2000 | 9.3 | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote, most minus least educated fifth | Democratic share in the fifth of counties with the highest college share minus that in the fifth with the lowest | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 5.3 to 12.6 | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | qgap_w_2024 | 29.8 | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote, most minus least educated fifth | Democratic share in the fifth of counties with the highest college share minus that in the fifth with the lowest | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 26.4 to 33.0 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | qgapchg_u | +21.4 | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote, change in the gap | change in the most-minus-least-educated fifth gap | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 17.9 to 24.9 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | qgapchg_w | +20.5 | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote, change in the gap | change in the most-minus-least-educated fifth gap | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 16.7 to 24.4 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | qvotes1_2024 | 3.6% | percent of two-party votes in the analysis counties | share of the two-party votes cast in the fifth | counties in fifth 1 by college share | 2024 | | 621 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | qvotes5_2024 | 64.4% | percent of two-party votes in the analysis counties | share of the two-party votes cast in the fifth | counties in fifth 5 by college share | 2024 | | 621 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | r_ba_0024 | +0.94 | correlation coefficient | correlation across counties of college share in 2000 with college share in 2024 | counties with college share in both 2000 and 2024 | 2000 and 2024 | | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | race_step_u_0024 | +7.6 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 6.5 to 9.6 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | race_step_u_1216 | +3.1 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 2.6 to 3.6 | 3,113 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | race_step_w_0024 | +5.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 4.7 to 8.2 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | race_step_w_1216 | +3.2 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 2.8 to 3.9 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | race_u_2000 | 0.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI −1.5 to 2.3 | 3,114 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | race_u_2024 | 8.5 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 7.5 to 9.3 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | race_w_2000 | 2.0 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI −0.1 to 3.4 | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | race_w_2024 | 7.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 7.0 to 8.9 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | red_fe_w_2000 | 1.5 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, reduction | slope of college share alone minus the slope of the specification (slope of the Democratic share on college share within states (state fixed effects)) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 0.5 to 2.4 | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | red_fe_w_2024 | 1.0 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, reduction | slope of college share alone minus the slope of the specification (slope of the Democratic share on college share within states (state fixed effects)) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 0.5 to 1.5 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | red_race_u_2000 | 0.7 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, reduction | slope of college share alone minus the slope of the specification (slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI −0.2 to 2.5 | 3,114 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | red_race_u_2024 | 0.1 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, reduction | slope of college share alone minus the slope of the specification (slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI −1.0 to 1.2 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | red_race_w_2000 | 1.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, reduction | slope of college share alone minus the slope of the specification (slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 0.8 to 3.5 | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | red_race_w_2024 | 1.4 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, reduction | slope of college share alone minus the slope of the specification (slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 0.2 to 2.3 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | reddiff_fe_w | −0.5 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change in the reduction | reduction in the slope in 2024 minus the reduction in 2000 (slope of the Democratic share on college share within states (state fixed effects)) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI −1.2 to 0.2 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | reddiff_race_u | −0.6 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change in the reduction | reduction in the slope in 2024 minus the reduction in 2000 (slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI −2.2 to 0.0 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | reddiff_race_w | −0.5 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change in the reduction | reduction in the slope in 2024 minus the reduction in 2000 (slope of the Democratic share on college share with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares of residents held fixed) | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI −2.3 to 0.3 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sd_ba_u_2024 | 10.3 | standard deviation, percentage points of college share | standard deviation of county college share about its mean | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | sd_ba_w_2016 | 11.2 | standard deviation, percentage points of college share | standard deviation of county college share about its mean | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | sd_ba_w_2024 | 11.8 | standard deviation, percentage points of college share | standard deviation of county college share about its mean | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | sd_ds_w_2016 | 17.9 | standard deviation, percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | standard deviation of the county Democratic two-party share about its mean | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 | | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County election returns | | | sd_ds_w_2024 | 16.4 | standard deviation, percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | standard deviation of the county Democratic two-party share about its mean | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County election returns | | | size_ba_big_2000 | 30.2% | percent of residents 25 and older | mean county share with a bachelor's degree or more | large counties | 2000 | | 76 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | size_ba_oth_2000 | 16.2% | percent of residents 25 and older | mean county share with a bachelor's degree or more | other counties | 2000 | | 3,038 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | size_btw_2000 | 61% | percent of the vote-weighted covariance of college share and the Democratic share | share of the vote-weighted covariance of college share and the Democratic share that lies between the two size classes | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 43% to 87% | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_btw_2024 | 38% | percent of the vote-weighted covariance of college share and the Democratic share | share of the vote-weighted covariance of college share and the Democratic share that lies between the two size classes | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 28% to 48% | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_corr_big_u_2000 | +0.04 | correlation coefficient | correlation of college share with the Democratic share inside the size class | large counties | 2000 | 95% CI −0.23 to 0.32 | 76 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_corr_big_u_2024 | +0.46 | correlation coefficient | correlation of college share with the Democratic share inside the size class | large counties | 2024 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.64 | 135 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_corr_oth_u_2000 | +0.04 | correlation coefficient | correlation of college share with the Democratic share inside the size class | other counties | 2000 | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.13 | 3,038 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_corr_oth_u_2024 | +0.50 | correlation coefficient | correlation of college share with the Democratic share inside the size class | other counties | 2024 | 95% CI 0.38 to 0.61 | 2,968 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_ds_big_2000 | 57.7% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | mean county Democratic share of the two-party vote | large counties | 2000 | | 76 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | | | size_ds_chg_big | −0.1 | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote, change | change in the mean county Democratic share, counting each county once | large counties | 2000 to 2024 | | 135 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | | | size_ds_chg_oth | −9.9 | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote, change | change in the mean county Democratic share, counting each county once | other counties | 2000 to 2024 | | 2,968 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | | | size_ds_oth_2000 | 40.8% | percentage points of the Democratic share of the two-party vote | mean county Democratic share of the two-party vote | other counties | 2000 | | 3,038 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | | | size_slope_big_u_2000 | 0.6 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the size class | large counties | 2000 | 95% CI −2.9 to 4.1 | 76 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_slope_big_u_2024 | 5.9 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the size class | large counties | 2024 | 95% CI 3.4 to 8.0 | 135 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_slope_big_w_2000 | 0.2 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the size class | large counties | 2000 | 95% CI −3.4 to 3.0 | 76 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_slope_oth_u_2000 | 0.7 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the size class | other counties | 2000 | 95% CI −0.8 to 2.0 | 3,038 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_slope_oth_u_2024 | 7.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the size class | other counties | 2024 | 95% CI 6.2 to 9.1 | 2,968 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_slope_oth_w_2000 | 2.4 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the size class | other counties | 2000 | 95% CI 1.3 to 3.8 | 3,038 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_wth_2000 | 39% | percent of the vote-weighted covariance of college share and the Democratic share | share of the vote-weighted covariance of college share and the Democratic share that lies inside the size classes | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 13% to 57% | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | size_wth_2024 | 62% | percent of the vote-weighted covariance of college share and the Democratic share | share of the vote-weighted covariance of college share and the Democratic share that lies inside the size classes | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 52% to 72% | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | slope_u_2000 | 1.6 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 0.1 to 3.0 | 3,114 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | slope_u_2024 | 8.6 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 7.2 to 9.8 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | slope_w_2000 | 3.9 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 | 95% CI 2.5 to 5.1 | 3,114 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | slope_w_2004 | 5.2 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2004 | 95% CI 3.9 to 6.4 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | slope_w_2008 | 5.9 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2008 | 95% CI 4.7 to 7.0 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | slope_w_2012 | 6.0 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 | 95% CI 4.9 to 7.0 | 3,112 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | slope_w_2016 | 9.2 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 | 95% CI 8.2 to 10.3 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | slope_w_2020 | 9.3 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 | 95% CI 8.5 to 10.3 | 3,105 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | slope_w_2024 | 9.2 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2024 | 95% CI 8.4 to 10.1 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | st_min_counties | 20 | counties | definition of the state set | minimum number of counties in a state in the within-state comparison | 2000 and 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | st_n | 39 | states | count of states in the within-state comparison | states with at least 20 counties in 2000 and 2024, Alaska excluded | 2000 and 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | st_neg_u_2000 | 13 | states | count of states with a negative slope | states with at least 20 counties | 2000 | | 39 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | st_negsig_u_2000 | 4 | states | count of states whose interval lies below zero | states with at least 20 counties | 2000 | | 39 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | st_pos_u_2000 | 26 | states | count of states with a positive slope | states with at least 20 counties | 2000 | | 39 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | st_pos_u_2024 | 36 | states | count of states with a positive slope | states with at least 20 counties | 2024 | | 39 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | st_pos_w_2000 | 29 | states | count of states with a positive slope | states with at least 20 counties | 2000 | | 39 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | st_pos_w_2024 | 39 | states | count of states with a positive slope | states with at least 20 counties | 2024 | | 39 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | st_sig_u_2000 | 12 | states | count of states whose interval lies above zero | states with at least 20 counties | 2000 | | 39 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | st_sig_u_2024 | 30 | states | count of states whose interval lies above zero | states with at least 20 counties | 2024 | | 39 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | st_sig_w_2000 | 12 | states | count of states whose interval lies above zero | states with at least 20 counties | 2000 | | 39 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | st_sig_w_2024 | 28 | states | count of states whose interval lies above zero | states with at least 20 counties | 2024 | | 39 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | | | step_u_0004 | +1.7 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2004 | 95% CI 1.2 to 2.2 | 3,113 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_u_0408 | +1.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2004 to 2008 | 95% CI 1.1 to 2.6 | 3,113 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_u_0812 | 0.0 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −0.4 to 0.4 | 3,112 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_u_1216 | +2.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 2.3 to 3.4 | 3,113 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_u_1620 | +0.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 0.5 to 1.1 | 3,105 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_u_1624 | +0.6 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.2 to 1.0 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_u_2024 | −0.1 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.3 to 0.0 | 3,103 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_w_0004 | +1.3 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2004 | 95% CI 0.9 to 1.7 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_w_0008 | +2.1 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2000 to 2008 | 95% CI 1.3 to 3.0 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_w_0408 | +0.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2004 to 2008 | 95% CI 0.2 to 1.4 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_w_0812 | +0.1 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −0.2 to 0.3 | 3,112 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_w_1216 | +3.2 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 2.7 to 3.8 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_w_1620 | +0.1 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.3 to 0.5 | 3,105 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_w_1624 | 0.0 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.4 to 0.4 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | step_w_2024 | −0.1 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change between two elections | change in the slope of the Democratic share on college share, later election minus earlier election | counties with returns and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.3 to 0.0 | 3,103 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | vshare_big_2000 | 35.1% | percent of two-party votes in the analysis counties | share of the two-party votes cast in the size class | large counties | 2000 | | 76 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | wg_90p_u_2000 | 0.1 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the group of counties | counties in the group 90% or more white | 2000 | 95% CI −2.2 to 2.1 | 1,502 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wg_90p_u_2024 | 8.7 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the group of counties | counties in the group 90% or more white | 2024 | 95% CI 5.2 to 11.8 | 787 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wg_90p_w_2000 | 1.1 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the group of counties | counties in the group 90% or more white | 2000 | 95% CI −0.5 to 2.9 | 1,502 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wg_90p_w_2024 | 10.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the group of counties | counties in the group 90% or more white | 2024 | 95% CI 7.7 to 13.8 | 787 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wg_cut50 | 50% | percent of residents | definition of a county group | non-Hispanic white share cut-off for the county groups | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | wg_cut75 | 75% | percent of residents | definition of a county group | non-Hispanic white share cut-off for the county groups | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | wg_cut90 | 90% | percent of residents | definition of a county group | non-Hispanic white share cut-off for the county groups | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | wg_lt50_w_2000 | 4.4 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the group of counties | counties in the group Under 50% white | 2000 | 95% CI −1.2 to 7.3 | 253 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wg_lt50_w_2024 | 6.2 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share | slope of the Democratic share on college share inside the group of counties | counties in the group Under 50% white | 2024 | 95% CI 4.5 to 7.3 | 404 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wgchg_90p_u | +8.6 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change | change in the slope inside the group, 2024 minus 2000 | counties in the group 90% or more white | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 5.4 to 11.3 | 787 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wgchg_90p_w | +9.7 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change | change in the slope inside the group, 2024 minus 2000 | counties in the group 90% or more white | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI 6.8 to 12.1 | 787 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wgchg_lt50_u | +3.7 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change | change in the slope inside the group, 2024 minus 2000 | counties in the group Under 50% white | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.2 to 7.2 | 404 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wgchg_lt50_w | +1.8 | points of Democratic two-party share per 10 points of college share, change | change in the slope inside the group, 2024 minus 2000 | counties in the group Under 50% white | 2000 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.6 to 6.7 | 404 | two-party votes in the election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wgn_50_75_2000 | 635 | counties | count of counties in the group | counties in the group 50 to under 75% white | 2000 | | 635 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | wgn_50_75_2024 | 855 | counties | count of counties in the group | counties in the group 50 to under 75% white | 2024 | | 855 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | wgn_75_90_2000 | 724 | counties | count of counties in the group | counties in the group 75 to under 90% white | 2000 | | 724 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | wgn_75_90_2024 | 1,057 | counties | count of counties in the group | counties in the group 75 to under 90% white | 2024 | | 1,057 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | wgn_90p_2000 | 1,502 | counties | count of counties in the group | counties in the group 90% or more white | 2000 | | 1,502 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | wgn_90p_2024 | 787 | counties | count of counties in the group | counties in the group 90% or more white | 2024 | | 787 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | wgn_lt50_2000 | 253 | counties | count of counties in the group | counties in the group Under 50% white | 2000 | | 253 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | wgn_lt50_2024 | 404 | counties | count of counties in the group | counties in the group Under 50% white | 2024 | | 404 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | wm_cut | 50% | percent of residents | definition of a county group | non-Hispanic white share cut-off | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | x_unit | 10 | points of college share | definition of the slope unit | unit of the slope | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - HC3 robust standard errors: A way of computing standard errors that stays valid when the spread of the outcome differs across respondents, with a correction for small samples. The book uses it for regressions that have no clusters. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Fixed effects: Regression terms that give each group, such as each country or each year, its own baseline. The other coefficients then compare respondents within the same group. - Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them. ## Methods Sample: presidential returns for the 7 elections from 2000 to 2024 (Algara and Amlani for 2000 to 2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), from the repaired county file whose 2024 totals are corrected for 173 counties in South Carolina, Wisconsin and West Virginia. The Alaska rows (election districts) are dropped before any calculation, as are 5 rows with no vote count and 0 rows with no FIPS code or no two-party votes in 1972 to 2024. County characteristics come from the county demographics panel. Its anchors are the 2000 census sample and the American Community Survey five-year estimates for 2008 to 2012, 2012 to 2016, 2016 to 2020 and 2020 to 2024, placed at their midpoints, 2010, 2014, 2018 and 2022, with linear interpolation between anchors: 2004 and 2008 lie 40% and 80% of the way from the 2000 anchor to the 2010 anchor, 2012, 2016 and 2020 lie midway between two anchors, and 2024 takes the 2022 anchor (the nearest anchor; there is no extrapolation), so college share for 2004 to 2020 is an interpolation. The characteristics are the share of residents 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more (college share) and the non-Hispanic white, non-Hispanic Black, Hispanic and non-Hispanic Asian shares of residents, each at the election year. An election's estimates use the 3,103 to 3,114 counties with returns and all five characteristics; county boundaries are not harmonized, so a few counties drop out in some years (the Connecticut counties in 2020 and 2024, Broomfield County in 2004 and 2008, Shannon County and Bedford city in 2012, Oglala Lakota County in 2024). Kansas City, Missouri is a separate unit (FIPS code 2938000) in the 2024 returns; in every election where the unit appears (2024 only) its votes are added to Jackson County (29095), whose census figures are county-wide, as in the 2000 to 2020 returns. Estimand: the outcome is a county's Democratic share of the two-party vote, 100 times Democratic votes over Democratic plus Republican votes (a slope on the margin is twice a slope on the share; correlations are the same); the gradient is the least-squares slope of that share on college share, per 10 points of college share, or the Pearson correlation of the two. Weights: two-party votes in the election (vote-weighted) or one per county (county-equal). Specifications: college share alone; with the non-Hispanic white, Black, Hispanic and Asian shares entered as straight lines (race and ethnicity held fixed; the omitted remainder is other and multiple races); within states, with each state's weighted mean removed from the share and every regressor (state fixed effects); both; and the slope on each county's 2000 college share, or on its 2024 college share, applied to every election (a county with no value in that year is left out of that version). The reduction in the slope by a control is the slope of college share alone minus the slope in the specification, and the change in the reduction between 2000 and 2024 is computed inside each bootstrap replicate. Groups: five equal-sized groups of counties (fifths) ranked by college share within each election, with ties broken by FIPS order, whose Democratic share is the mean of the county shares weighted as stated (vote-weighted, this is the pooled two-party vote of the group); large counties are those with 250,000 or more two-party votes in the election (slopes inside a size class are shown counting each county once and by two-party votes; the decomposition splits the vote-weighted covariance of college share and the Democratic share into the covariance of the class means, weighted by the classes' votes, and the votes-weighted average of the within-class covariances, and the between-class share is the first over the sum); the four groups by non-Hispanic white share (under 50%, 50% to under 75%, 75% to under 90%, and 90% or more) are formed at each election; the map classes compare a county's college share with the median college share of that election's counties and its Democratic share with 50%. Within-state slopes (the state figure) are county regressions inside each state with at least 20 counties in both 2000 and 2024, with HC3 errors that treat counties as independent. Intervals: 95% percentile intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states (49 states and the District of Columbia, 2,000 replicates, seed 12345; every estimate shares the same state draws, Connecticut is a resampling unit with no counties in 2020 and 2024, so a change between elections or specifications is computed inside each replicate, and group membership is held fixed across replicates). The returns are full counts, so these intervals show how much a number depends on which states are in the set; they are not sampling error of the vote and they do not include the sampling error of the college shares. Before 2000: the 2000 college share of each county, matched on FIPS code, is applied to the presidential elections of 1972 to 2024 from the same county file (under one percent of two-party votes in 1972 to 1996 are in counties with no 2000 value); before 2000 this ranks counties and does not measure education at the time. Differences are computed before rounding, so a printed difference can differ by 0.1 from the difference of two printed values. Suppression: none; every estimate rests on counties, and the smallest group has 253 counties. ## What these data cannot show - Every estimate here describes counties, and a pattern across places can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them, a limit known as ecological inference. - Robinson [2] showed that a correlation across places can have the opposite sign from the correlation across individuals. - College share counts residents 25 and older with a degree, not voters, and a county with more graduates also has different occupations, ages, densities and histories. - The chapter holds only race and ethnicity composition and state fixed. - Counties also gain or lose graduates by migration, so a change in the slope can reflect where people live as well as how they vote. - A book-length account of the diploma divide among individuals is [3], and Chapter 3.2, The diploma divide (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-divide) uses survey respondents. - The dates are the dates of elections. - College share for 2004 to 2020 is interpolated between anchors, and the 2000 value comes from a census sample, so the college shares carry sampling error, most in small counties, that no interval includes. - Counties are not harmonized across boundary changes. - In 2024, 9 of the 3,112 counties with returns have no county characteristics, among them the Connecticut counties. - Kansas City's votes, a separate unit in the 2024 returns, are added to Jackson County, Missouri, whose census figures are county-wide. - The vote is the Democratic share of Democratic and Republican votes cast, so it leaves out third-party votes and people who did not vote, and a change in turnout can change a county's share without any voter changing party. - The intervals say how much a number depends on which states are in the set, and the within-state intervals treat counties as independent. - The weightings, the large-county cut, the white-share groups and the median split of the map are rules that move the estimates, and the section on weighting shows how far the weighting moves them. - The state comparison and the controls for race and ethnicity do not hold income, age, occupation, density or religion fixed, which Chapter 12.1, Five axes of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote) and Chapter 12.3, Income and the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/income-and-the-county-vote; planned) take up. - The data used here have no measure of attitudes, candidates, campaigns or turnout by group, so they cannot say why the slope rose when it did. - They hold no county college share before 2000, so they cannot date the start of the gradient, only describe how the 2000 ranking lined up with earlier votes. ## References 1. Zingher, Joshua N. (2022). Diploma Divide: Educational Attainment and the Realignment of the American Electorate. Political Research Quarterly 75(2): 263-277. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129221079862 2. Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. American Sociological Review 15(3): 351-357. 3. Grossmann, Matt; Hopkins, David A. (2024). Polarized by Degrees: How the Diploma Divide and the Culture War Transformed American Politics. Cambridge University Press. ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/the-diploma-map/build.py (sha256 239be004a382ed21f0d5d017d71ba55b2f0209702da689561f26a47447df8f03) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/county/county_demographics_2000_2024.parquet | 4,334,220 | 45cdaf63128da1aa0c12e1196d7e60835697d7432ab9bff1acd2f5559fdb5130 | 90293a64867bf37645b53eaf5ab343f3b284c0d2c3fc3b8e0f38d32f1649fee4 | | data/county/pres_county_1868_2024.parquet | 6,295,675 | bec11c7a0cb5d4180bbd6809d048bc892dd00dfcdde527fa4da871b1dd3f835f | b2a4f000f2eea72d09af8939555289e924875cca40cd95ec8869104cd575bed7 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 3f4f57fb46b5ffc1ab4b1045a4ab3df5940791202b2a04946962ac729b4d0d99 | | figures/before_2000.json | 94c47e47338d873f9a27822c5e95c042f812a56ac79dd2634785043d6341cbe5 | | figures/diploma_map.json | 1f5cfb59929696bccca120faa6314e44e9ddf5be6ae554c82d3d0354b91b5f96 | | figures/gradient_by_year.json | 8a9e62403c1957fb35de63e3f01aac2e078825591f8643c2b1ad0bf032d3a8d4 | | figures/size_classes.json | 08d1145e26cb1c1d21f053ca1e3dcb5a59fd174c5e5697d0ab4377b3a9eb52c2 | | figures/specifications.json | c84c6aa95c8570bbbd6b60c0523e6b48dc53f7aa09549a32b57a0984499d81ea | | figures/state_slopes.json | b80e52871854c40ce4c87d3fd9d9b79eb5a0b33d52bbc38c3b43629d8554319a | | figures/step_sensitivity.json | 0f8656f70da33238b1c8646b6ffaa6cfdc8097d3d816e2a65fe1c43b047e0f6f | | figures/vote_by_college.json | 9c4f02b6840434e811b2e9074def6d582fada68c869ad416bc4d6502b4d3e7ff | | figures/white_groups.json | a04269ab38217529b5af6b027f6c93dd1c643eb08b81d531664ca8cb5ccc2949 | | meta.json | d38129f7ebc35dee0bf178ec841131d70cd03abf7cbc472b36a8759262f5889b | | public/data/the-diploma-map/diploma_classes.json | 154cdd25db8b6f25633ea658121b25ec0963513fc0879425d2ae2ecefe81e25c | | refs.json | c1b1574220dc9931998a1cd051161a72ad9c360ff5f59cc7d740dcb61ab7016e | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-map/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-map/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/facts.json - Table 1, figure "gradient_by_year" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/gradient_by_year.json - Table 2, figure "step_sensitivity" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/step_sensitivity.json - Table 3, figure "vote_by_college" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/vote_by_college.json - Table 4, figure "size_classes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/size_classes.json - Table 5, figure "specifications" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/specifications.json - Table 6, figure "white_groups" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/white_groups.json - Table 7, figure "state_slopes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/state_slopes.json - Table 8, figure "diploma_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/diploma_map.json - Table 9, figure "before_2000" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-diploma-map/figures/before_2000.json - Payload of "diploma_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/the-diploma-map/diploma_classes.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote: report Chapter 12.4 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote - Chapter: 12.4 (Part XII, Demographic axes of the vote; The political map) - Question: Do ZIP codes with more capital income or more wage-credit filers vote differently once education is held fixed? - Dek: From 2016 to 2020, ZIP codes in the highest decile of capital-gains returns swung 5.4 points toward the Democrats and those in the highest decile of earned income tax credit returns 5.2 points toward the Republicans, links that depend on the controls. - Grain: places - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - Precinct votes on census geographies. Precinct votes allocated to ZIP code tabulation areas, contiguous states, 2016 and 2020 (Fekrazad 2025, RLCR), joined to the project's ZIP-code demographic file (ACS-based; release not recorded); years: 2016 and 2020 (contiguous United States only); weights: 2020 votes in each ZIP code (pres_tot_2020); ZIP codes with 100 or fewer votes dropped - IRS SOI ZIP code data. IRS Statistics of Income ZIP-code data, tax year 2022: share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, share reporting a net capital gain, mean effective tax rate; years: Tax year as distributed with the ZCTA atlas file.; weights: none (administrative counts by ZIP code); ZIP codes weighted by 2020 votes in the analysis - County election returns. County presidential returns, 2016 and 2020, repaired file; the county swing and the county weights; years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts); county estimates weighted by 2020 two-party votes - County demographics panel. County demographics panel, 2020 election-year row: bachelor's share, poverty, Black and Hispanic shares; years: 2000-2024 (election years, interpolated between census and survey anchors); weights: none (full counts and interpolated estimates) - Cooperative Election Study. Cooperative Election Study, 2016 and 2020: investor and homeowner items and college degree, respondents who voted for one of the two major parties; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: post-election weight (weight_post) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026wagescapitalandthecountyvote ```bibtex @misc{singh2026wagescapitalandthecountyvote, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | vote-weighted mean swing of the decile, shown as a size (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in decile 10 of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain | 2016 to 2020 | 5.4 | 95% CI 4.4 to 6.4 | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | dem_swing_cap_d10 | | vote-weighted mean swing of the decile, shown as a size (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in decile 10 of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit | 2016 to 2020 | 5.2 | 95% CI 3.5 to 6.9 | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | rep_swing_eitc_d10 | | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, with no controls (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | +2.4 | 95% CI 2.0 to 2.9 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | z_cap_raw | | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, net of the college share (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | −1.0 | 95% CI −1.6 to −0.4 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | z_cap_col | | vote-weighted standard deviation of the capital-gains share | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | IRS tax year 2022 | 11.5 | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | sd_cap | | vote-weighted standard deviation of the EITC share | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | IRS tax year 2022 | 8.3 | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | sd_eitc | | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, with no controls (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | −3.5 | 95% CI −4.0 to −3.0 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | z_eitc_raw | | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, net of the poverty rate, college share, Black share and Hispanic share (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | +0.3 | 95% CI −0.8 to 1.4 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | z_eitc_full | | correlation of the capital-gains share with the college share (the ZIP-code college variable, whose definition is unresolved) (vote-weighted; 95% interval from a bootstrap of counties, 2,000 replicates) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | +0.81 | 95% CI 0.79 to 0.82 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | r_cap_col | | count of ZCTAs in the analysis sample | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 and 2020 | 27,144 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | n_zcta | | count of county codes clustered on | counties that contain at least one ZCTA of the analysis sample | 2016 and 2020 | 3,088 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | n_counties | | count of counties in the county sample | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 3,080 | | | none (count) | County election returns | n_cty | ## Findings Between 2016 and 2020, ZIP codes in the highest decile of the share of tax returns that report a capital gain swung 5.4 points toward the Democrats. ZIP codes in the highest decile of the share of returns that claim the earned income tax credit (EITC) swung 5.2 points toward the Republicans. With education held fixed, the capital-gains sign reverses and the EITC link is near zero. The coefficient of the swing on the capital-gains share, in points of margin per standard deviation of the share, is +2.4 (95% CI 2.0 to 2.9) with no controls and −1.0 (95% CI −1.6 to −0.4) with the college share held fixed. To hold the college share fixed is to compare ZIP codes with similar college shares. (Note: A coefficient here is the difference in swing, in points of margin, between ZIP codes one standard deviation apart on the measure. One standard deviation is 11.5 points of share for capital gains and 8.3 for the EITC.) The college share is the college variable of the ZIP-code demographic file, and what that variable counts, degrees only or some college or more, is unresolved, so every adjusted result in this chapter is conditional on that coding. The EITC coefficient goes from −3.5 (95% CI −4.0 to −3.0) with no controls to +0.3 (95% CI −0.8 to 1.4) with poverty, college, Black and Hispanic shares held fixed, a set that leaves out the average tax rate. The capital-gains share correlates +0.81 (95% CI 0.79 to 0.82) with the college share, so these data cannot separate the two. The unit is the ZIP code tabulation area, the census approximation of a ZIP code, and not the county. The IRS shares are tabulated by postal ZIP code, and the votes are precinct returns allocated to the census area, so the two sides of each comparison are different approximations of the same place. The sample is 27,144 ZIP codes in 3,088 counties, and the county analysis uses 3,080 counties; Table 8 in the last section lists the exclusions. The EITC share stands in for low wages, as the next section explains. Counties enter in two ways: as the clusters that set the width of the ZIP-code intervals, and as a second grain in which ZIP-code shares are averaged to counties and compared with certified county returns. Unless the text says otherwise, ZIP-code statistics weight each ZIP code by its 2020 votes and county statistics weight each county by its 2020 two-party votes. ### What the shares and the swing measure The earned income tax credit is a refundable federal credit for households with low earnings from work, so the share of a ZIP code's returns that claim it is higher where more filers have low earnings. It also depends on children in the household and on take-up. A capital gain is the profit from selling an asset such as stock or a home, and returns also report gains that funds distribute, so the share of returns that report one is higher where more households hold assets that produce gains. Both shares come from IRS Statistics of Income data for tax year 2022, and both describe filers; households that do not file a return are absent. The vote-weighted mean is 14.2% of returns for the EITC and 20.1% for capital gains, and across ZIP codes the two shares correlate −0.78 (95% CI −0.79 to −0.77) (−0.68 with each ZIP code counted equally), so a ZIP code with many EITC claims has few capital-gains returns and the reverse. (Note: The IRS shares are for tax year 2022, which follows both elections they are set against. The ZIP-code demographic file that carries the poverty, college and race controls does not record which American Community Survey release it uses, so those controls are undated. The county controls come from a panel with documented anchor years. The last section returns to the timing.) Votes for 2016 and 2020 are precinct returns that Fekrazad allocated to ZIP code tabulation areas in proportion to household population [1], from the Voting and Election Science Team's 2016 precinct returns [2] and the 2020 returns of the MIT Election Data and Science Lab [3]. The outcome is the swing, the 2020 two-party margin minus the 2016 margin, Democratic minus Republican, in points, so a positive swing is toward the Democrats. Across the ZIP codes in this chapter the vote-weighted mean of the swing is 3.0 points toward the Democrats. (Note: The mean weights both years' margins of a ZIP code by its 2020 votes. The aggregate two-party margin of the same ZIP codes weights each year by that year's votes and moved 2.3 points, from +2.3 to +4.6.) ### Swing rose with capital gains and fell with EITC Table 1 ranks the ZIP code tabulation areas by each share and splits them into ten equal groups, or deciles. The mean swing is 7.2 (95% CI 5.6 to 8.8) points toward the Republicans in the lowest capital-gains decile and 5.4 (95% CI 4.4 to 6.4) points toward the Democrats in the highest. It is 6.3 (95% CI 5.5 to 7.2) points toward the Democrats in the lowest EITC decile and 5.2 (95% CI 3.5 to 6.9) points toward the Republicans in the highest. Most deciles of both shares swung toward the Democrats, as the mean of all ZIP codes did, so the ordering is one of how far the deciles moved. Intervals use clustered standard errors at the county, because ZIP codes in one county share local conditions and are not independent draws. Table 1. The swing rose with the capital-gains share and fell with the EITC share Table 2 plots the 2020 margin for the same deciles. It bends into a U for both shares. The margin was most Democratic in the lowest and highest deciles and lowest in the middle of the range. Table 2. The 2020 margin was most Democratic at both ends of each share and lowest in the middle of the range The two ends of each U are different kinds of places (Table 3). The lowest capital-gains decile and the highest EITC decile are poor ZIP codes with large Black and Hispanic populations, and they are the two end deciles that swung toward the Republicans. The other two ends, the highest capital-gains decile and the lowest EITC decile, are college-heavy. A ZIP code can be solidly Democratic in level and still have moved toward the Republicans, so the swing orders the deciles from one end of a share to the other while the level is high at both ends. Table 3. The two end deciles that swung toward the Republicans are the poorest of the four ### Holding college fixed reverses the capital-gains sign In these data a ZIP code's college share is the college variable of the ZIP-code demographic file, and what that variable counts is unresolved. The file describes the variable as the percentage of the population with a college degree or higher and names no table, age group or release. Aggregated to counties it averages 52.7% against 23.6% for the county bachelor's share, with a correlation of +0.86, so its level is far above a bachelor's share. The level and the correlation do not establish whether it counts some college or more or degrees only, so every result below that holds it fixed is conditional on that coding. The county analysis uses the bachelor's share. The college share correlates +0.81 (95% CI 0.79 to 0.82) with the capital-gains share and +0.47 (95% CI 0.43 to 0.51) with the swing (+0.44 with each ZIP code counted equally). A standard deviation of the college share goes with +3.4 (95% CI 3.1 to 3.8) points of swing, against +2.4 (95% CI 2.0 to 2.9) for a standard deviation of the capital-gains share. Table 4 adds controls to each share one set at a time, as separate models on the same 27,144 ZIP codes. With the college share held fixed (third row), the capital-gains coefficient goes from +2.4 (95% CI 2.0 to 2.9) with no controls to −1.0 (95% CI −1.6 to −0.4). Holding the poverty rate fixed instead brings it to +0.3 (95% CI −0.1 to 0.7), so most of the raw capital-gains association is shared with low poverty as well as with college. With intervals clustered on state (49 clusters) instead of county, the capital-gains intervals with the college share held fixed, alone (−1.0 (95% CI −2.1 to 0.0)) or with the average tax rate (+1.4 (95% CI −0.3 to 3.0)), include zero. Every other interval in the ladder keeps its position relative to zero. The same check on the deciles leaves the intervals of the four end deciles away from zero. Table 4. Controls take the EITC coefficient to about zero and change the sign of the capital-gains coefficient The negative sign with the college share held fixed does not show a Republican lean among capital-gains filers. The capital-gains share and the college share correlate +0.81, so the regression has little independent variation in the capital-gains share to work with, and the sign depends on which other controls are present. With the average tax rate and the college share held fixed together the coefficient is +1.4 (95% CI 0.1 to 2.6). Work on Western democracies from 1948 to 2020 found that higher-educated voters had moved toward parties of the left while high-income voters continued to vote for the right [4]. That finding is consistent with an education pattern in the ZIP-code swing, although it describes individual voters and these data describe ZIP codes. ### The EITC link is near zero with poverty, college and race fixed The EITC coefficient in Table 4 is −3.5 (95% CI −4.0 to −3.0) with no controls. It is −1.7 (95% CI −2.7 to −0.6) with the poverty rate held fixed, −2.1 (95% CI −2.9 to −1.3) with the college share held fixed and −2.8 (95% CI −3.6 to −1.9) with the average tax rate and college share held fixed together. With the poverty rate, college share, Black share and Hispanic share all held fixed, a set that does not include the tax rate, it is +0.3 (95% CI −0.8 to 1.4), an interval that includes zero under both clusterings (+0.3 (95% CI −1.2 to 1.9) with clusters on state). A ZIP code with many EITC claims is, on average, poor, has a lower college share and has more Black and Hispanic residents. The EITC share correlates −0.72 (95% CI −0.74 to −0.71) with the college share (−0.56 with each ZIP code counted equally). The link between the EITC share and the swing is therefore partly a link between those characteristics and the swing, and the data do not show a separate association once they are held fixed. Chapter 13.3, Deprivation and mobility (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/deprivation-and-mobility; planned) asks the same question of neighborhood deprivation, with race held fixed. Starr County, Texas, and Holmes County, Mississippi, illustrate that the EITC share alone does not fix the swing. They have nearly the same share of returns claiming the credit, 45.4% and 45.2%. Between 2016 and 2020 Starr swung 56.3 points toward the Republicans, the largest such swing of any county in the county sample, and Holmes 1.7 points toward the Republicans. The Hispanic share of residents is 98.1% in Starr and the Black share is 82.4% in Holmes, and both shares are in the full set of controls. The pair is picked for the contrast, and the ZIP-code regressions do not test whether these shares account for either swing. The average tax rate was included as a rough stand-in for income, and it is a poor control. It correlates +0.90 (95% CI 0.89 to 0.91) with the capital-gains share and −0.67 (95% CI −0.69 to −0.65) with the EITC share, so it is highest in the ZIP codes with many capital-gains returns and lowest where EITC claims are common, and holding it fixed leaves 19% of the variance of the capital-gains share. It may itself respond to either share, since the credit reduces the tax a filer owes and gains are taxed under their own rates. The rows that hold it fixed rest on a near-collinear control and are the least reliable in the ladder. ### Counties show the same raw signs, with wide intervals Table 5 maps both shares and the swing by county. Each county averages the shares of its ZIP codes with weights of 2020 votes and takes the swing from certified county returns. The county correlation of the EITC share with the swing is −0.42 (95% CI −0.58 to −0.23) (−0.44 with each county counted equally) and of the capital-gains share +0.21 (95% CI 0.04 to 0.40) (+0.41), the same signs as in the ZIP codes. This changes the geographic grain and the source of the vote and is not an independent test of the IRS shares, which are the same ZIP-code values averaged. Intervals cluster on state, with 48 clusters (the states and the District of Columbia, without Connecticut), and are wider. Table 5. The EITC share is highest in the Mississippi Delta, Alabama's Black Belt and along the Rio Grande Table 6 repeats the ZIP-code ladder at county grain with the county bachelor's share as the college control; its second view adds the row that holds only the average tax rate fixed. The capital-gains share correlates +0.83 (95% CI 0.77 to 0.87) with the bachelor's share across counties (+0.68 with each county counted equally). The capital-gains coefficient is +1.2 (95% CI 0.0 to 2.4) with no controls, +0.1 (95% CI −1.7 to 2.0) with the bachelor's share held fixed and −2.9 (95% CI −4.4 to −1.5) with the full set held fixed, and the first two intervals include zero. With the average tax rate and the bachelor's share held fixed together it is +2.7 (95% CI 0.4 to 4.9), an interval above zero. The EITC coefficient is −2.4 (95% CI −3.6 to −1.1) with no controls, −2.5 (95% CI −4.2 to −0.8) with the bachelor's share held fixed and 0.0 (95% CI −2.4 to 2.4) with the poverty rate, bachelor's share, Black share and Hispanic share held fixed, an interval that includes zero. The county intervals are wide. The interval for the capital-gains coefficient with the bachelor's share held fixed includes both zero and the ZIP-code estimate with the college share held fixed (−1.0 (95% CI −2.1 to 0.0) with clusters on state). The county data therefore cannot say whether the capital-gains coefficient after education is near zero or negative, and they do not show that the ZIP-code and county results differ. Under the full set the coefficient is negative at both grains. Chapter 12.3, Income and the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/income-and-the-county-vote; planned) takes county income directly. Table 6. At county grain the intervals are wide and the capital-gains coefficient with college held fixed includes zero ### Investors and homeowners lean Republican within education groups The ZIP-code results describe places. The Cooperative Election Study asks respondents whether they have money invested in the stock market and whether they own their home, and it records their vote, so it can compare people with the same education. A college degree here means a four-year degree or more. Table 7 gives the Democratic minus Republican margin among voters for the two major parties in 2020 and in 2016. The investor comparison rests on 43,785 voters in 2020 and 40,803 in 2016 and the homeowner comparison on 42,142 and 39,458. Voters without an answer to the item are set aside, and so, for homeowners, are voters who report a housing status other than owning or renting. Among voters without a college degree, investors were 27.1 (95% CI 23.4 to 30.8) points more Republican than non-investors in 2020 and 18.1 (95% CI 14.2 to 21.9) points more Republican in 2016. Among college graduates the gaps were 10.3 (95% CI 6.5 to 14.2) and 5.9 (95% CI 2.2 to 9.6) points. Homeowners were more Republican than renters at both education levels, by 46.7 (95% CI 42.5 to 50.9) points among non-graduates and 38.0 (95% CI 34.1 to 41.9) points among graduates in 2020, and by 47.4 (95% CI 43.3 to 51.6) and 37.1 (95% CI 33.0 to 41.1) points in 2016. Table 7. Investors voted more Republican than non-investors with the same education in 2016 and 2020 The survey also allows a comparison with the swing, with a caution. The 2016 and 2020 samples are separate cross-sections, and the groups change. The investor share of graduate voters is 63.7% (95% CI 62.8% to 64.6%) in 2016 and 67.9% (95% CI 67.0% to 68.7%) in 2020, and of other voters 33.8% and 35.1%. Between 2016 and 2020 the margin of investors without a degree moved 5.5 (95% CI 1.5 to 9.6) points toward the Republicans, and the margin of non-investors without a degree moved 3.5 (95% CI 0.0 to 7.0) points toward the Democrats (the interval starts at zero). The difference is 9.1 (95% CI 3.7 to 14.4) points. Among graduates, investors moved 4.5 (95% CI 1.4 to 7.5) points toward the Democrats and non-investors 8.9 (95% CI 4.5 to 13.3), a difference of 4.4 (95% CI −1.0 to 9.7) points, an interval that includes zero. The differences are computed from unrounded moves. Investors without a degree therefore moved toward the Republicans while non-investors without a degree moved toward the Democrats, and the data do not show a difference among graduates. Homeowners without a degree moved 0.7 (95% CI −5.2 to 6.6) points more toward the Democrats than renters without a degree, and homeowners with a degree moved 0.9 (95% CI −4.7 to 6.5) points less than renters with a degree. Both homeowner intervals include zero and are wide, so the data do not show whether homeowners and renters moved alike. The individual pattern is consistent with the same composition as the ZIP-code pattern. College graduates are more likely to invest, 67.9% (95% CI 67.0% to 68.7%) of graduate voters in 2020 against 35.1% (95% CI 34.2% to 36.0%) of others, and graduates vote more Democratic than non-graduates within every investor and housing group in the figure. A ZIP code with many college-educated adults has many capital-gains returns and moved toward the Democrats, while an investor with a given degree leans Republican relative to a non-investor with the same degree. The ZIP-code college variable has an unresolved definition and the survey measure is a four-year degree, so the two may not be the same split. Gelman and coauthors found a similar reversal between states and individuals, in which richer states vote more Democratic while richer individuals within them vote more Republican [5]. Chapter 3.3, The income ladder (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-income-ladder) follows the individual vote by family income. ### What these data cannot show The ZIP-code results are associations between places and do not say how a capital-gains filer or an EITC claimant voted. Group and individual correlations can differ [6], and this chapter has one case. The raw ZIP-code coefficient of the swing on the capital-gains share is +2.4, while among voters without a degree investors moved 5.5 points toward the Republicans and non-investors 3.5 points toward the Democrats. With the college share held fixed the ZIP-code coefficient is −1.0, the same sign as the survey difference, though its interval includes zero when clustered on state. The place-level and voter-level results disagree about the raw association and agree in sign once education is held fixed, which is what the composition account above predicts. This is ecological inference, and the ZIP-code filers and voters are overlapping but not identical populations. The timing is a limit. The IRS shares are for tax year 2022 and the swing is for 2016 to 2020, so a ZIP code's income mix is measured after both elections. The release of the American Community Survey behind the ZIP-code controls is not recorded in the demographic file, so the controls cannot be dated against the swing. The IRS shares describe filers, so the poorest households and some retirees are missing, and the EITC share is a share of returns and not of residents. The vote estimates are allocations of precinct returns to ZIP codes, with a source change between 2016 and 2020, and both the allocation error and the source change enter the swing. The IRS file also omits PO-box ZIP codes and ZIP codes below its disclosure thresholds, so some ZIP codes with votes have no share; Table 8 counts what each step of the sample leaves out. Table 8. The ZIP-code sample is 27,144 areas in 3,088 counties and the county sample is 3,080 counties The intervals allow dependence among ZIP codes in the same county (or, in the state check, the same state) and not between neighboring counties in different states or between neighboring states. Regional swings, such as the swing in the Texas border counties, make that dependence likely, and the two capital-gains intervals that change between the county and state clusterings show that it can matter for a conclusion. The shares of the smallest ZIP codes rest on few returns. In the sample, 1,405 ZIP codes report no capital-gains returns and 1,244 report no EITC returns, and the data do not distinguish a true zero from a small count rounded down. They hold 0.3% and 0.2% of the votes in the sample, and leaving them out of the lowest decile moves its mean swing from 7.2 to 7.5 points toward the Republicans for capital gains and from 6.3 to 6.4 points toward the Democrats for the EITC. The capital-gains result cannot be resolved by more controls. The share correlates +0.81 with the college share, the ZIP-code college variable has no resolved definition, and the county results with the bachelor's share carry intervals that include zero, so the data cannot say how much of the capital-gains association is capital gains and how much is education. Every ZIP-code coefficient with the college share held fixed, including the negative capital-gains coefficient and the EITC coefficient near zero, is an adjustment for a variable whose coding is unresolved. If it counts some college or more, the adjustment removes a broader educational gradient than a four-year degree would. The results also depend on the weights. Table 9 gives the partial correlation of the swing with each share under vote weights and with each ZIP code counted equally. The signs of the capital-gains partial correlation with the college share held fixed and of the EITC partial correlation with the full set held fixed differ between the weightings; the capital-gains partial correlation with the full set held fixed is negative under both. Table 9. Two of the partial correlations change sign when every ZIP code counts equally The wealth measures are narrow. The survey has stock ownership and home ownership as yes or no items, so neither measures the size of holdings. The vote in the survey is self-reported, and the intervals treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Chapter 13.1, Measures of hardship compared (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/measures-of-hardship-compared) puts hardship measures on one specification. ## Tables ### Table 1. The swing rose with the capital-gains share and fell with the EITC share Vote-weighted mean change in the two-party margin, 2016 to 2020, by decile of ZIP codes ranked by share of returns; 95% intervals clustered on county; positive is toward the Democrats | Share ranked | Decile | Lowest share in decile (%) | Highest share in decile (%) | Mean swing (points) | Lower bound, county clusters | Upper bound, county clusters | Lower bound, state clusters | Upper bound, state clusters | ZIP codes | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Capital-gains share | 1 | 0.0 | 5.5 | −7.2 | −8.8 | −5.6 | −9.9 | −4.5 | 2,715 | | Capital-gains share | 2 | 5.5 | 8.9 | −1.9 | −3.5 | −0.4 | −4.2 | +0.3 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 3 | 8.9 | 11.3 | +0.9 | −0.1 | +1.8 | −0.8 | +2.6 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 4 | 11.3 | 13.5 | +1.9 | +1.2 | +2.7 | +0.7 | +3.1 | 2,715 | | Capital-gains share | 5 | 13.5 | 15.7 | +3.2 | +2.5 | +4.0 | +1.8 | +4.7 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 6 | 15.7 | 18.1 | +3.9 | +3.1 | +4.6 | +2.4 | +5.3 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 7 | 18.1 | 20.9 | +4.5 | +3.9 | +5.2 | +3.4 | +5.6 | 2,715 | | Capital-gains share | 8 | 20.9 | 24.7 | +5.4 | +4.8 | +6.0 | +4.3 | +6.5 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 9 | 24.7 | 31.0 | +6.1 | +5.4 | +6.8 | +4.6 | +7.6 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 10 | 31.0 | 77.1 | +5.4 | +4.4 | +6.4 | +3.4 | +7.4 | 2,715 | | EITC share | 1 | 0.0 | 5.1 | +6.3 | +5.5 | +7.2 | +4.7 | +8.0 | 2,715 | | EITC share | 2 | 5.1 | 7.7 | +6.2 | +5.5 | +6.8 | +4.6 | +7.8 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 3 | 7.7 | 9.7 | +5.7 | +5.0 | +6.4 | +4.2 | +7.2 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 4 | 9.7 | 11.5 | +4.9 | +4.2 | +5.5 | +3.6 | +6.1 | 2,715 | | EITC share | 5 | 11.5 | 13.4 | +4.3 | +3.6 | +4.9 | +3.0 | +5.5 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 6 | 13.4 | 15.4 | +3.3 | +2.5 | +4.1 | +1.7 | +4.8 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 7 | 15.4 | 18.0 | +2.0 | +0.7 | +3.2 | −0.2 | +4.2 | 2,715 | | EITC share | 8 | 18.0 | 21.3 | +0.8 | −0.4 | +2.0 | −1.2 | +2.8 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 9 | 21.3 | 26.3 | −1.5 | −3.2 | +0.1 | −4.0 | +1.0 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 10 | 26.3 | 72.7 | −5.2 | −6.9 | −3.5 | −8.1 | −2.3 | 2,715 | Note: ZIP code tabulation areas are ranked by the share of their returns that report a net capital gain or claim the earned income tax credit and split into ten groups of equal size. Each point is the mean swing weighted by 2020 votes, and the band is a 95% interval clustered on county. The data table also gives intervals clustered on state, which are wider; the intervals of the four end deciles still exclude zero. ZIP codes with 100 or fewer votes in 2020 are excluded. Source: Precinct votes allocated to ZIP code tabulation areas (Fekrazad 2025), 2016 and 2020; IRS Statistics of Income ZIP-code data, tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates; weighted by 2020 votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/share_deciles.json ### Table 2. The 2020 margin was most Democratic at both ends of each share and lowest in the middle of the range Vote-weighted mean 2020 two-party margin, Democratic minus Republican, by decile of ZIP codes ranked by share of returns; 95% intervals clustered on county | Share ranked | Decile | Mean margin, 2020 (points) | Lower bound | Upper bound | ZIP codes | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Capital-gains share | 1 | +48.4 | +42.5 | +54.3 | 2,715 | | Capital-gains share | 2 | +14.0 | +8.8 | +19.2 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 3 | −4.8 | −9.6 | 0.0 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 4 | −11.6 | −15.7 | −7.6 | 2,715 | | Capital-gains share | 5 | −12.0 | −15.2 | −8.9 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 6 | −6.9 | −10.3 | −3.4 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 7 | −6.9 | −10.2 | −3.6 | 2,715 | | Capital-gains share | 8 | +0.8 | −2.7 | +4.3 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 9 | +5.6 | +2.1 | +9.0 | 2,714 | | Capital-gains share | 10 | +22.6 | +17.3 | +27.9 | 2,715 | | EITC share | 1 | +19.9 | +13.5 | +26.4 | 2,715 | | EITC share | 2 | +9.5 | +5.7 | +13.4 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 3 | +2.5 | −1.2 | +6.2 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 4 | −0.8 | −4.8 | +3.1 | 2,715 | | EITC share | 5 | −6.0 | −9.6 | −2.5 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 6 | −6.3 | −10.5 | −2.0 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 7 | −6.1 | −11.9 | −0.2 | 2,715 | | EITC share | 8 | −3.7 | −9.1 | +1.8 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 9 | +3.4 | −3.0 | +9.9 | 2,714 | | EITC share | 10 | +33.3 | +27.3 | +39.2 | 2,715 | Note: Deciles, weights and intervals are as in the swing figure; the vertical axis is the 2020 margin and not the change. Source: Precinct votes allocated to ZIP code tabulation areas (Fekrazad 2025), 2016 and 2020; IRS Statistics of Income ZIP-code data, tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates; weighted by 2020 votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/decile_levels.json ### Table 3. The two end deciles that swung toward the Republicans are the poorest of the four Vote-weighted mean swing, 2020 margin and demographic profile of the lowest and highest deciles of each share; positive swing and margin are toward the Democrats | ZIP codes in the | Swing (points) | Lower bound | Upper bound | Margin, 2020 (points) | Lower bound | Upper bound | Black and Hispanic share (%) | Lower bound | Upper bound | Poverty rate (%) | Lower bound | Upper bound | ZIP-code college variable (%) | Lower bound | Upper bound | ZIP codes | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Lowest capital-gains decile | −7.2 | −8.8 | −5.6 | +48.4 | +42.5 | +54.3 | 76.5 | 72.8 | 80.2 | 23.4 | 22.4 | 24.4 | 40.6 | 38.9 | 42.3 | 2,715 | | Highest capital-gains decile | +5.4 | +4.4 | +6.4 | +22.6 | +17.3 | +27.9 | 12.8 | 11.7 | 13.8 | 3.8 | 3.6 | 4.0 | 82.1 | 81.3 | 82.8 | 2,715 | | Lowest EITC decile | +6.3 | +5.5 | +7.2 | +19.9 | +13.5 | +26.4 | 8.5 | 7.9 | 9.1 | 2.7 | 2.6 | 2.8 | 82.9 | 81.8 | 83.9 | 2,715 | | Highest EITC decile | −5.2 | −6.9 | −3.5 | +33.3 | +27.3 | +39.2 | 66.8 | 63.2 | 70.5 | 22.9 | 22.2 | 23.7 | 43.9 | 42.9 | 45.0 | 2,715 | Note: The Black and Hispanic shares are added, and a Black Hispanic resident counts in both, so the sum is an upper bound on the share of residents in either group. Means are weighted by 2020 votes; the data table gives 95% intervals clustered on county. Source: Precinct votes allocated to ZIP code tabulation areas (Fekrazad 2025), 2016 and 2020; IRS Statistics of Income ZIP-code data, tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates; weighted by 2020 votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/decile_profiles.json ### Table 4. Controls take the EITC coefficient to about zero and change the sign of the capital-gains coefficient Weighted regression coefficient of the 2016 to 2020 swing on the share of returns, one set of controls per row; 95% intervals clustered on county in the first view and on state in the second | Share | Controls | Coefficient | Lower bound, county clusters | Upper bound, county clusters | Interval, county clusters | Lower bound, state clusters | Upper bound, state clusters | Interval, state clusters | Partial correlation | Lower bound | Upper bound | ZIP codes | County clusters | State clusters | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | EITC share | No controls | −3.48 | −4.01 | −2.96 | Below zero | −4.31 | −2.65 | Below zero | −0.475 | −0.520 | −0.431 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | | EITC share | Poverty rate | −1.69 | −2.73 | −0.65 | Below zero | −3.35 | −0.03 | Below zero | −0.140 | −0.221 | −0.068 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | | EITC share | Average tax rate | −4.12 | −5.00 | −3.23 | Below zero | −5.50 | −2.74 | Below zero | −0.428 | −0.488 | −0.371 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | | EITC share | College share | −2.08 | −2.86 | −1.30 | Below zero | −3.38 | −0.78 | Below zero | −0.222 | −0.289 | −0.158 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | | EITC share | Average tax rate and college share | −2.76 | −3.58 | −1.93 | Below zero | −4.10 | −1.41 | Below zero | −0.290 | −0.356 | −0.229 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | | EITC share | Poverty, college, Black and Hispanic shares | +0.32 | −0.76 | +1.39 | Includes zero | −1.24 | +1.87 | Includes zero | +0.021 | −0.051 | +0.085 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | | Capital-gains share | No controls | +2.42 | +1.98 | +2.86 | Above zero | +1.84 | +3.00 | Above zero | +0.330 | +0.288 | +0.376 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | | Capital-gains share | Poverty rate | +0.31 | −0.09 | +0.71 | Includes zero | −0.23 | +0.85 | Includes zero | +0.038 | −0.006 | +0.087 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | | Capital-gains share | Average tax rate | +4.05 | +2.59 | +5.51 | Above zero | +2.58 | +5.51 | Above zero | +0.249 | +0.181 | +0.314 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | | Capital-gains share | College share | −1.02 | −1.61 | −0.43 | Below zero | −2.08 | +0.03 | Includes zero | −0.093 | −0.145 | −0.038 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | | Capital-gains share | Average tax rate and college share | +1.38 | +0.13 | +2.62 | Above zero | −0.26 | +3.02 | Includes zero | +0.087 | +0.017 | +0.155 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | | Capital-gains share | Poverty, college, Black and Hispanic shares | −2.74 | −3.22 | −2.26 | Below zero | −3.49 | −2.00 | Below zero | −0.258 | −0.296 | −0.214 | 27,144 | 3,088 | 49 | Views: Clusters on county (in_chart = yes); Clusters on state (in_chart = yes). Note: Each row is a separate regression with the controls named on the row, and each uses the same ZIP codes. Race means the Black share and the Hispanic share of residents. The full set is poverty, college, Black and Hispanic shares and does not include the average tax rate, which is the mean effective federal income tax rate in the ZIP code. The ZIP-code college share is the file's college variable, whose definition is unresolved: the file describes it as the share with a college degree or higher, but its level is far above a bachelor's share. Every row that holds it fixed depends on what it counts. The row that holds only the average tax rate fixed is in the data table and not in the chart. Note: Partial correlations for each row are in the data table. Source: Precinct votes allocated to ZIP code tabulation areas (Fekrazad 2025), 2016 and 2020; IRS Statistics of Income ZIP-code data, tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates; weighted by 2020 votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/control_ladder.json ### Table 5. The EITC share is highest in the Mississippi Delta, Alabama's Black Belt and along the Rio Grande Share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit by county, IRS tax year 2022, averaged from ZIP codes within the county No inline rows: the values of Table 5 are in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/county_map.json. Views: EITC share; Capital-gains share; Swing, 2016 to 2020. Note: Counties with no ZIP-code shares or no county demographics draw as no data, as do Alaska and Hawaii, which have no ZIP-code vote estimates. A county with a share of exactly zero in a view also draws as no data in that view, because a zero cannot be told from a small count rounded down. Values are rounded to one decimal place. A county whose shares come from one small ZIP code can show an extreme value. Source: Certified county returns, 2016 and 2020; IRS Statistics of Income ZIP-code shares, tax year 2022, averaged within counties; county demographics centred on 2020; weighted by 2020 two-party votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/county_map.json ### Table 6. At county grain the intervals are wide and the capital-gains coefficient with college held fixed includes zero Weighted regression coefficient of the 2016 to 2020 county swing on the county share of returns, one set of controls per row; 95% intervals clustered on state | Share | Controls | Coefficient | Lower bound | Upper bound | Interval | Counties | State clusters | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | | EITC share | No controls | −2.39 | −3.65 | −1.14 | Below zero | 3,080 | 48 | | EITC share | Poverty rate | −0.90 | −3.56 | +1.76 | Includes zero | 3,080 | 48 | | EITC share | Average tax rate | −3.44 | −5.03 | −1.84 | Below zero | 3,080 | 48 | | EITC share | College share | −2.53 | −4.20 | −0.85 | Below zero | 3,080 | 48 | | EITC share | Average tax rate and college share | −3.00 | −4.52 | −1.49 | Below zero | 3,080 | 48 | | EITC share | Poverty, college, Black and Hispanic shares | +0.01 | −2.40 | +2.43 | Includes zero | 3,080 | 48 | | Capital-gains share | No controls | +1.18 | −0.01 | +2.37 | Includes zero | 3,080 | 48 | | Capital-gains share | Poverty rate | −0.82 | −2.01 | +0.38 | Includes zero | 3,080 | 48 | | Capital-gains share | Average tax rate | +3.67 | +1.54 | +5.81 | Above zero | 3,080 | 48 | | Capital-gains share | College share | +0.14 | −1.72 | +1.99 | Includes zero | 3,080 | 48 | | Capital-gains share | Average tax rate and college share | +2.67 | +0.40 | +4.94 | Above zero | 3,080 | 48 | | Capital-gains share | Poverty, college, Black and Hispanic shares | −2.93 | −4.40 | −1.46 | Below zero | 3,080 | 48 | Views: Main rows (in_chart = yes); All rows. Note: Swing is taken from certified county returns and the shares are averaged from ZIP codes within each county. Each row is a separate regression with the controls named on the row. The full set is poverty, bachelor's share, Black and Hispanic shares and does not include the average tax rate. County shares are the means of the ZIP-code shares in the county, weighted by 2020 votes; the college control is the county bachelor's share, which is not the same variable as the ZIP-code college share (definition unresolved). The second view adds the row that holds only the average tax rate fixed. Source: Certified county returns, 2016 and 2020; IRS Statistics of Income ZIP-code shares, tax year 2022, averaged within counties; county demographics centred on 2020; weighted by 2020 two-party votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/control_ladder_county.json ### Table 7. Investors voted more Republican than non-investors with the same education in 2016 and 2020 Democratic minus Republican margin among voters for the two major parties, by year, education and whether the respondent reports investments; 95% intervals; positive is toward the Democrats | Item | Year and education | Group | Margin (points) | Lower bound | Upper bound | Voters | Comparison group | Margin (points) | Lower bound | Upper bound | Voters | Group minus comparison (points) | Lower bound | Upper bound | Group's change, 2016 to 2020 (points) | Lower bound | Upper bound | Comparison group's change (points) | Lower bound | Upper bound | Group's change minus comparison's (points) | Lower bound | Upper bound | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | investor | 2016, no college degree | Investors | −15.2 | −18.2 | −12.2 | 9,191 | Non-investors | +2.9 | +0.4 | +5.3 | 15,098 | −18.1 | −21.9 | −14.2 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | investor | 2020, no college degree | Investors | −20.7 | −23.5 | −18.0 | 9,501 | Non-investors | +6.4 | +3.8 | +8.9 | 15,452 | −27.1 | −30.8 | −23.4 | −5.5 | −9.6 | −1.5 | +3.5 | 0.0 | +7.0 | −9.1 | −14.4 | −3.7 | | investor | 2016, college degree | Investors | +14.9 | +12.6 | +17.1 | 10,328 | Non-investors | +20.8 | +17.8 | +23.8 | 6,186 | −5.9 | −9.6 | −2.2 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | investor | 2020, college degree | Investors | +19.4 | +17.3 | +21.4 | 12,826 | Non-investors | +29.7 | +26.4 | +32.9 | 6,006 | −10.3 | −14.2 | −6.5 | +4.5 | +1.4 | +7.5 | +8.9 | +4.5 | +13.3 | −4.4 | −9.7 | +1.0 | | homeowner | 2016, no college degree | Homeowners | −20.1 | −22.3 | −17.9 | 16,702 | Renters | +27.3 | +23.8 | +30.8 | 6,697 | −47.4 | −51.6 | −43.3 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | homeowner | 2020, no college degree | Homeowners | −20.6 | −22.8 | −18.4 | 16,241 | Renters | +26.2 | +22.6 | +29.7 | 7,650 | −46.7 | −50.9 | −42.5 | −0.4 | −3.5 | +2.7 | −1.1 | −6.2 | +3.9 | +0.7 | −5.2 | +6.6 | | homeowner | 2016, college degree | Homeowners | +7.9 | +5.8 | +9.9 | 12,186 | Renters | +44.9 | +41.5 | +48.4 | 3,873 | −37.1 | −41.1 | −33.0 | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | n/a | | homeowner | 2020, college degree | Homeowners | +12.7 | +10.6 | +14.7 | 13,685 | Renters | +50.6 | +47.3 | +54.0 | 4,566 | −38.0 | −41.9 | −34.1 | +4.8 | +1.9 | +7.7 | +5.7 | +0.9 | +10.5 | −0.9 | −6.5 | +4.7 | Views: Investors (item = investor); Homeowners (item = homeowner). Note: A college degree means a four-year degree or more; some college and two-year degrees count as no college degree. Intervals are model based: they use the effective sample size implied by the weights and treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Vote choice is self-reported in the post-election wave; the investor and homeownership items come from the respondent's profile. The 2016 and 2020 estimates come from separate samples of voters, and voters who report a housing status other than owning or renting are left out of the homeowner view. The data table gives each group's change in margin from 2016 to 2020 and the difference between the two changes on the 2020 rows. Source: Cooperative Election Study, 2016 and 2020; respondents who voted for one of the two major parties; weighted (post-election weight) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/wealth_and_the_vote.json ### Table 8. The ZIP-code sample is 27,144 areas in 3,088 counties and the county sample is 3,080 counties Counts of ZIP code tabulation areas and counties at each step from the vote file to the two analysis samples | Sample | ZIP code tabulation areas | Counties containing these areas | | --- | ---: | ---: | | ZIP code tabulation areas with vote estimates for 2016 and 2020 | 32,428 | 3,102 | | With more than 100 votes in 2020 | 29,420 | 3,100 | | With both IRS shares and a swing | 27,170 | 3,089 | | With the average tax rate and four ACS controls: the ZIP-code sample | 27,144 | 3,088 | | Counties with a two-party return in 2016 and 2020 | n/a | 3,113 | | With ZIP-code shares | n/a | 3,088 | | With county demographics: the county sample | n/a | 3,080 | Note: For the ZIP-code rows the last column counts the counties that contain the areas. Of the counties with returns that have no ZIP-code shares, the Hawaii counties are not covered by the vote file, Kansas City, Missouri, is coded as a county of its own in the returns file, and small counties and Virginia independent cities lose their ZIP codes at the vote or IRS step. The Connecticut counties have ZIP-code shares and no county demographics in the panel and drop out of the county sample. A retired county code in the vote file (Shannon County, South Dakota, now Oglala Lakota County) is matched to its current code when the county sample is built. Source: Precinct votes allocated to ZIP code tabulation areas (Fekrazad 2025), 2016 and 2020; certified county returns, 2016 and 2020; full counts, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/sample_counts.json ### Table 9. Two of the partial correlations change sign when every ZIP code counts equally Partial correlation of the 2016 to 2020 swing with each share, with vote weights and with every ZIP code counted equally; ZIP-code sample | Share | Controls | Vote weights | Lower bound | Upper bound | Each ZIP code equal | Lower bound | Upper bound | ZIP codes | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Capital-gains share | No controls | +0.330 | +0.288 | +0.376 | +0.345 | +0.318 | +0.374 | 27,144 | | Capital-gains share | College share held fixed | −0.093 | −0.145 | −0.038 | +0.037 | +0.010 | +0.063 | 27,144 | | Capital-gains share | Poverty, college, Black and Hispanic shares held fixed | −0.258 | −0.296 | −0.214 | −0.051 | −0.078 | −0.021 | 27,144 | | EITC share | No controls | −0.475 | −0.520 | −0.431 | −0.381 | −0.410 | −0.353 | 27,144 | | EITC share | College share held fixed | −0.222 | −0.289 | −0.158 | −0.179 | −0.215 | −0.143 | 27,144 | | EITC share | Poverty, college, Black and Hispanic shares held fixed | +0.021 | −0.051 | +0.085 | −0.042 | −0.067 | −0.017 | 27,144 | Note: Each 95% interval is a percentile interval from a seeded bootstrap of counties and is in the data table. Every row uses the same ZIP codes. Source: Precinct votes allocated to ZIP code tabulation areas (Fekrazad 2025), 2016 and 2020; IRS Statistics of Income ZIP-code data, tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates; weighted by 2020 votes and, in the second column, unweighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/weights_check.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (116), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | agg_m16 | +2.3 | points of two-party margin (Democratic minus Republican) | two-party margin of the aggregate votes of the ZIP codes in the analysis sample (each year weighted by that year's votes) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | agg_m20 | +4.6 | points of two-party margin (Democratic minus Republican) | two-party margin of the aggregate votes of the ZIP codes in the analysis sample (each year weighted by that year's votes) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | agg_swing | 2.3 | points of two-party margin (Democratic minus Republican) | change in the aggregate two-party margin of the ZIP codes in the analysis sample, toward the Democrats | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | c_cap_col | +0.1 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, net of the college share (95% interval clustered on state) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI −1.7 to 2.0 | 3,080 | two-party votes cast in the county in 2020 | County election returns | | | c_cap_full | −2.9 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, net of the poverty rate, college share, Black share and Hispanic share (95% interval clustered on state) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI −4.4 to −1.5 | 3,080 | two-party votes cast in the county in 2020 | County election returns | | | c_cap_raw | +1.2 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, with no controls (95% interval clustered on state) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI 0.0 to 2.4 | 3,080 | two-party votes cast in the county in 2020 | County election returns | | | c_cap_taxcol | +2.7 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, net of the average tax rate and the college share (95% interval clustered on state) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI 0.4 to 4.9 | 3,080 | two-party votes cast in the county in 2020 | County election returns | | | c_eitc_col | −2.5 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, net of the college share (95% interval clustered on state) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI −4.2 to −0.8 | 3,080 | two-party votes cast in the county in 2020 | County election returns | | | c_eitc_full | 0.0 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, net of the poverty rate, college share, Black share and Hispanic share (95% interval clustered on state) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI −2.4 to 2.4 | 3,080 | two-party votes cast in the county in 2020 | County election returns | | | c_eitc_raw | −2.4 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, with no controls (95% interval clustered on state) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI −3.6 to −1.1 | 3,080 | two-party votes cast in the county in 2020 | County election returns | | | cap_tax_left | 19% | percent of the variance of the capital-gains share | one minus the squared vote-weighted correlation of the capital-gains share with the average tax rate | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | ces_home_chg_deg | 0.9 | points of two-party margin, how much less the first group moved toward the Democrats than the second | change in the margin from 2016 to 2020 for homeowners and renters, first group minus second, shown as a size below the second group (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; college degree | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −4.7 to 6.5 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_home_chg_nodeg | 0.7 | points of two-party margin, how much more the first group moved toward the Democrats than the second | change in the margin from 2016 to 2020 for homeowners and renters, first group minus second, shown as a size above the second group (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; no college degree | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −5.2 to 6.6 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_home_gap_deg_2016 | 37.1 | points of two-party margin, how much more Republican the first group is | difference in the Democratic minus Republican margin between homeowners and renters, shown as a size (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; college degree | 2016 | 95% CI 33.0 to 41.1 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_home_gap_deg_2020 | 38.0 | points of two-party margin, how much more Republican the first group is | difference in the Democratic minus Republican margin between homeowners and renters, shown as a size (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; college degree | 2020 | 95% CI 34.1 to 41.9 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_home_gap_nodeg_2016 | 47.4 | points of two-party margin, how much more Republican the first group is | difference in the Democratic minus Republican margin between homeowners and renters, shown as a size (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; no college degree | 2016 | 95% CI 43.3 to 51.6 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_home_gap_nodeg_2020 | 46.7 | points of two-party margin, how much more Republican the first group is | difference in the Democratic minus Republican margin between homeowners and renters, shown as a size (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; no college degree | 2020 | 95% CI 42.5 to 50.9 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_chg_deg | 4.4 | points of two-party margin, how much less the first group moved toward the Democrats | change in the margin from 2016 to 2020 for investors and non-investors, first group minus second, sign reversed to a size (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; college degree | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −1.0 to 9.7 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_chg_nodeg | 9.1 | points of two-party margin, how much less the first group moved toward the Democrats | change in the margin from 2016 to 2020 for investors and non-investors, first group minus second, sign reversed to a size (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; no college degree | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 3.7 to 14.4 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_gap_deg_2016 | 5.9 | points of two-party margin, how much more Republican the first group is | difference in the Democratic minus Republican margin between investors and non-investors, shown as a size (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; college degree | 2016 | 95% CI 2.2 to 9.6 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_gap_deg_2020 | 10.3 | points of two-party margin, how much more Republican the first group is | difference in the Democratic minus Republican margin between investors and non-investors, shown as a size (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; college degree | 2020 | 95% CI 6.5 to 14.2 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_gap_nodeg_2016 | 18.1 | points of two-party margin, how much more Republican the first group is | difference in the Democratic minus Republican margin between investors and non-investors, shown as a size (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; no college degree | 2016 | 95% CI 14.2 to 21.9 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_gap_nodeg_2020 | 27.1 | points of two-party margin, how much more Republican the first group is | difference in the Democratic minus Republican margin between investors and non-investors, shown as a size (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; no college degree | 2020 | 95% CI 23.4 to 30.8 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_move_deg | 4.5 | points of two-party margin, how far the group moved toward the Democrats | change in the margin from 2016 to 2020 for investors, shown as a size in the direction of the move (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; college degree; investors | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 1.4 to 7.5 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_move_nodeg | 5.5 | points of two-party margin, how far the group moved toward the Republicans | change in the margin from 2016 to 2020 for investors, shown as a size in the direction of the move (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; no college degree; investors | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 1.5 to 9.6 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_share_deg | 67.9% | percent of voters | weighted share who report investments | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; college degree | 2020 | 95% CI 67.0% to 68.7% | 18,832 | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_share_deg_2016 | 63.7% | percent of voters | weighted share who report investments | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; college degree | 2016 | 95% CI 62.8% to 64.6% | 16,514 | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_share_nodeg | 35.1% | percent of voters | weighted share who report investments | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; no college degree | 2020 | 95% CI 34.2% to 36.0% | 24,953 | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_inv_share_nodeg_2016 | 33.8% | percent of voters | weighted share who report investments | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; no college degree | 2016 | 95% CI 32.9% to 34.7% | 24,289 | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_n_home_2016 | 39,458 | respondents | count of two-party voters with a degree, a weight and an answer to the homeowner item (owning or renting for the homeowner item) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate | 2016 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_n_home_2020 | 42,142 | respondents | count of two-party voters with a degree, a weight and an answer to the homeowner item (owning or renting for the homeowner item) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate | 2020 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_n_inv_2016 | 40,803 | respondents | count of two-party voters with a degree, a weight and an answer to the investor item (owning or renting for the homeowner item) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate | 2016 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_n_inv_2020 | 43,785 | respondents | count of two-party voters with a degree, a weight and an answer to the investor item (owning or renting for the homeowner item) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate | 2020 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_non_move_deg | 8.9 | points of two-party margin, how far the group moved toward the Democrats | change in the margin from 2016 to 2020 for non-investors, shown as a size in the direction of the move (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; college degree; non-investors | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 4.5 to 13.3 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_non_move_nodeg | 3.5 | points of two-party margin, how far the group moved toward the Democrats | change in the margin from 2016 to 2020 for non-investors, shown as a size in the direction of the move (Kish effective-sample interval) | CES respondents who reported voting for the Democratic or the Republican presidential candidate; no college degree; non-investors | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 0.0 to 7.0 | | post-election weight (weight_post) | Cooperative Election Study | | | col_def_ba | 23.6% | percent of adults | mean across counties of the bachelor's share | counties in the county sample | county demographics centred on 2020 | | 3,080 | none (full counts and interpolated estimates) | County demographics panel | | | col_def_r | +0.86 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation across counties of the ZIP-derived college variable with the bachelor's share | counties in the county sample | ACS 5-year estimates | | 3,080 | none (each county counted once) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | col_def_zip | 52.7% | percent (share counted by the ZIP-code college variable, definition unresolved) | mean across counties of the vote-weighted mean of the ZIP-code college variable | counties in the county sample | ACS 5-year estimates, ZIP codes averaged to counties | | 3,080 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | dem_swing_cap_d10 | 5.4 | points of two-party margin swing, toward the Democrats | vote-weighted mean swing of the decile, shown as a size (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in decile 10 of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 4.4 to 6.4 | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | dem_swing_eitc_d1 | 6.3 | points of two-party margin swing, toward the Democrats | vote-weighted mean swing of the decile, shown as a size (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in decile 1 of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 5.5 to 7.2 | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | holmes_blk | 82.4% | percent of residents | Black share of residents | residents of Holmes County, Mississippi | county demographics centred on 2020 | | | none (full counts and interpolated estimates) | County demographics panel | | | holmes_eitc | 45.2% | percent of returns | vote-weighted mean of the ZIP-code EITC share in the county | returns in Holmes County, Mississippi | IRS tax year 2022 | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | holmes_swing | 1.7 | points of two-party margin swing, toward the Republicans | county two-party margin in 2020 minus 2016, sign reversed to a size toward the Republicans | two-party voters in Holmes County, Mississippi | 2016 to 2020 | | | none (full count of votes) | County election returns | | | lvl_cap_d1 | +48.4 | points of two-party margin (Democratic minus Republican) | vote-weighted mean 2020 two-party margin of the decile (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in decile 1 of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain | 2020 | 95% CI 42.5 to 54.3 | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | lvl_cap_d10 | +22.6 | points of two-party margin (Democratic minus Republican) | vote-weighted mean 2020 two-party margin of the decile (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in decile 10 of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain | 2020 | 95% CI 17.3 to 27.9 | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | lvl_cap_min | −12.0 | points of two-party margin (Democratic minus Republican) | lowest vote-weighted mean 2020 two-party margin among the ten deciles (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in the decile of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain with the lowest mean margin | 2020 | 95% CI −15.2 to −8.9 | 2,714 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | lvl_eitc_d1 | +19.9 | points of two-party margin (Democratic minus Republican) | vote-weighted mean 2020 two-party margin of the decile (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in decile 1 of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit | 2020 | 95% CI 13.5 to 26.4 | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | lvl_eitc_d10 | +33.3 | points of two-party margin (Democratic minus Republican) | vote-weighted mean 2020 two-party margin of the decile (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in decile 10 of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit | 2020 | 95% CI 27.3 to 39.2 | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | lvl_eitc_min | −6.3 | points of two-party margin (Democratic minus Republican) | lowest vote-weighted mean 2020 two-party margin among the ten deciles (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in the decile of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit with the lowest mean margin | 2020 | 95% CI −10.5 to −2.0 | 2,714 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | mean_bh | 26.4% | percent of residents | vote-weighted mean of the Black share plus the Hispanic share | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | ACS 5-year estimates | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | mean_cap | 20.1% | percent of returns | vote-weighted mean of the capital-gains share | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | IRS tax year 2022 | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | mean_eitc | 14.2% | percent of returns | vote-weighted mean of the EITC share | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | IRS tax year 2022 | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | mean_pov | 9.2% | percent of residents | vote-weighted mean poverty rate | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | ACS 5-year estimates | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_counties | 3,088 | counties | count of county codes clustered on | counties that contain at least one ZCTA of the analysis sample | 2016 and 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_cty | 3,080 | counties | count of counties in the county sample | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | | | none (count) | County election returns | | | n_cty_returns | 3,113 | counties | count of counties | counties with a two-party return in 2016 and in 2020, Alaska excluded | 2016 and 2020 | | | none (count) | County election returns | | | n_states | 48 | states and the District of Columbia | count of state clusters in the county models | states and the District of Columbia with a county in the county sample | 2016 and 2020 | | | none (count) | County election returns | | | n_states_zip | 49 | states and the District of Columbia | count of state clusters in the state-clustered ZIP-code models | states and the District of Columbia with a ZIP code in the analysis sample | 2016 and 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_zcta | 27,144 | ZIP code tabulation areas | count of ZCTAs in the analysis sample | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 and 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_zcta_file | 32,428 | ZIP code tabulation areas | count of ZCTAs in the vote file | ZCTAs in the contiguous states with vote estimates for 2016 and 2020 | 2016 and 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_zero_cap | 1,405 | ZIP code tabulation areas | count of ZCTAs with exactly 0% of returns reporting a net capital gain | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | IRS tax year 2022 | | | none (count) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | n_zero_eitc | 1,244 | ZIP code tabulation areas | count of ZCTAs with exactly 0% of returns claiming the EITC | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | IRS tax year 2022 | | | none (count) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | natl_swing | 3.0 | points of two-party margin (Democratic minus Republican) | vote-weighted mean of the ZIP-code swing (2020 margin minus 2016 margin) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | p_cap_col | −0.09 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | partial correlation of the swing with the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, net of the college share (95% interval from a bootstrap of counties) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −0.14 to −0.04 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | p_eitc_full | +0.02 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | partial correlation of the swing with the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, net of the poverty rate, college share, Black share and Hispanic share (95% interval from a bootstrap of counties) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −0.05 to 0.08 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | prof_cap_d10_col | 82.1% | percent (share counted by the ZIP-code college variable, definition unresolved) | vote-weighted mean of the ZIP-code college variable (its definition is unresolved) | ZIP codes in the highest decile of the capital-gains share | ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 81.3% to 82.8% | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | prof_cap_d1_bh | 76.5% | percent of residents | vote-weighted mean of the Black share plus the Hispanic share | ZIP codes in the lowest decile of the capital-gains share | ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 72.8% to 80.2% | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | prof_cap_d1_col | 40.6% | percent (share counted by the ZIP-code college variable, definition unresolved) | vote-weighted mean of the ZIP-code college variable (its definition is unresolved) | ZIP codes in the lowest decile of the capital-gains share | ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 38.9% to 42.3% | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | prof_cap_d1_pov | 23.4% | percent of residents | vote-weighted mean poverty rate | ZIP codes in the lowest decile of the capital-gains share | ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 22.4% to 24.4% | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | prof_eitc_d10_bh | 66.8% | percent of residents | vote-weighted mean of the Black share plus the Hispanic share | ZIP codes in the highest decile of the EITC share | ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 63.2% to 70.5% | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | prof_eitc_d10_pov | 22.9% | percent of residents | vote-weighted mean poverty rate | ZIP codes in the highest decile of the EITC share | ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 22.2% to 23.7% | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | prof_eitc_d1_col | 82.9% | percent (share counted by the ZIP-code college variable, definition unresolved) | vote-weighted mean of the ZIP-code college variable (its definition is unresolved) | ZIP codes in the lowest decile of the EITC share | ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 81.8% to 83.9% | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_cap_col | +0.81 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the capital-gains share with the college share (the ZIP-code college variable, whose definition is unresolved) (vote-weighted; 95% interval from a bootstrap of counties, 2,000 replicates) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 0.79 to 0.82 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_cap_eitc | −0.78 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the capital-gains share with the EITC share (vote-weighted; 95% interval from a bootstrap of counties, 2,000 replicates) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −0.79 to −0.77 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_cap_tax | +0.90 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the capital-gains share with the average tax rate (vote-weighted; 95% interval from a bootstrap of counties, 2,000 replicates) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 0.89 to 0.91 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_col_swing | +0.47 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the college share with the 2016 to 2020 swing (vote-weighted; 95% interval from a bootstrap of counties, 2,000 replicates) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 0.43 to 0.51 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_eitc_col | −0.72 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the EITC share with the college share (vote-weighted; 95% interval from a bootstrap of counties, 2,000 replicates) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −0.74 to −0.71 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_eitc_tax | −0.67 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the EITC share with the average tax rate (vote-weighted; 95% interval from a bootstrap of counties, 2,000 replicates) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −0.69 to −0.65 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | rc_cap_col | +0.83 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county capital-gains share with the county bachelor's share (95% interval from a bootstrap of states) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI 0.77 to 0.87 | 3,080 | two-party votes cast in the county in 2020 | County election returns | | | rc_cap_swing | +0.21 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county capital-gains share with the 2016 to 2020 swing (95% interval from a bootstrap of states) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI 0.04 to 0.40 | 3,080 | two-party votes cast in the county in 2020 | County election returns | | | rc_eitc_swing | −0.42 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county EITC share with the 2016 to 2020 swing (95% interval from a bootstrap of states) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI −0.58 to −0.23 | 3,080 | two-party votes cast in the county in 2020 | County election returns | | | rcu_cap_col | +0.68 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county capital-gains share with the county bachelor's share, every county counted equally (95% interval from a bootstrap of states) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI 0.60 to 0.76 | 3,080 | none (every county counted equally) | County election returns | | | rcu_cap_swing | +0.41 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county capital-gains share with the 2016 to 2020 swing, every county counted equally (95% interval from a bootstrap of states) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI 0.33 to 0.49 | 3,080 | none (every county counted equally) | County election returns | | | rcu_eitc_swing | −0.44 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the county EITC share with the 2016 to 2020 swing, every county counted equally (95% interval from a bootstrap of states) | counties in the contiguous states with ZIP-code shares and county demographics | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; county demographics centred on 2020 | 95% CI −0.54 to −0.33 | 3,080 | none (every county counted equally) | County election returns | | | rep_swing_cap_d1 | 7.2 | points of two-party margin swing, toward the Republicans | vote-weighted mean swing of the decile, shown as a size (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in decile 1 of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 5.6 to 8.8 | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | rep_swing_eitc_d10 | 5.2 | points of two-party margin swing, toward the Republicans | vote-weighted mean swing of the decile, shown as a size (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in decile 10 of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 3.5 to 6.9 | 2,715 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | ru_cap_eitc | −0.68 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the capital-gains share with the EITC share, every ZIP code counted equally (95% interval from a bootstrap of counties, 2,000 replicates) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −0.70 to −0.67 | 27,144 | none (every ZIP code counted equally) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | ru_col_swing | +0.44 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the college share with the 2016 to 2020 swing, every ZIP code counted equally (95% interval from a bootstrap of counties, 2,000 replicates) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 0.41 to 0.47 | 27,144 | none (every ZIP code counted equally) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | ru_eitc_col | −0.56 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation of the EITC share with the college share, every ZIP code counted equally (95% interval from a bootstrap of counties, 2,000 replicates) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −0.58 to −0.54 | 27,144 | none (every ZIP code counted equally) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | sd_cap | 11.5 | percentage points of returns | vote-weighted standard deviation of the capital-gains share | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | IRS tax year 2022 | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | sd_eitc | 8.3 | percentage points of returns | vote-weighted standard deviation of the EITC share | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | IRS tax year 2022 | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | starr_eitc | 45.4% | percent of returns | vote-weighted mean of the ZIP-code EITC share in the county | returns in Starr County, Texas | IRS tax year 2022 | | | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | starr_hisp | 98.1% | percent of residents | Hispanic share of residents | residents of Starr County, Texas | county demographics centred on 2020 | | | none (full counts and interpolated estimates) | County demographics panel | | | starr_swing | 56.3 | points of two-party margin swing, toward the Republicans | county two-party margin in 2020 minus 2016, sign reversed to a size toward the Republicans | two-party voters in Starr County, Texas | 2016 to 2020 | | | none (full count of votes) | County election returns | | | u_cap_col | +0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | partial correlation of the swing with the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, net of the college share, every ZIP code counted equally (95% interval from a bootstrap of counties) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.06 | 27,144 | none (every ZIP code counted equally) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | u_eitc_full | −0.04 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | partial correlation of the swing with the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, net of the poverty rate, college share, Black share and Hispanic share, every ZIP code counted equally (95% interval from a bootstrap of counties) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −0.07 to −0.02 | 27,144 | none (every ZIP code counted equally) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | vote_floor | 100 | votes | minimum number of 2020 votes for a ZCTA to enter the sample | ZCTAs kept in the sample | 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | votes_all | 157.4 million | votes | sum of 2020 presidential votes in the vote file | votes allocated to all ZCTAs of the vote file | 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | votes_sample | 156.4 million | votes | sum of 2020 presidential votes in the analysis sample | votes allocated to the ZCTAs of the analysis sample | 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | votes_zero_cap | 0.3% | percent of votes | share of the sample's 2020 votes in ZCTAs with exactly 0% capital-gains returns | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | votes_zero_eitc | 0.2% | percent of votes | share of the sample's 2020 votes in ZCTAs with exactly 0% EITC returns | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | z_cap_col | −1.0 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, net of the college share (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −1.6 to −0.4 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | z_cap_pov | +0.3 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, net of the poverty rate (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −0.1 to 0.7 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | z_cap_raw | +2.4 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, with no controls (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 2.0 to 2.9 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | z_cap_taxcol | +1.4 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, net of the average tax rate and the college share (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 0.1 to 2.6 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | z_col_raw | +3.4 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the college share with no controls (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI 3.1 to 3.8 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | z_eitc_col | −2.1 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, net of the college share (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −2.9 to −1.3 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | z_eitc_full | +0.3 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, net of the poverty rate, college share, Black share and Hispanic share (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −0.8 to 1.4 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | z_eitc_pov | −1.7 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, net of the poverty rate (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −2.7 to −0.6 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | z_eitc_raw | −3.5 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, with no controls (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −4.0 to −3.0 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | z_eitc_taxcol | −2.8 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, net of the average tax rate and the college share (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −3.6 to −1.9 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zero_free_swing_cap_d1 | 7.5 | points of two-party margin swing, toward the Republicans | vote-weighted mean swing of the lowest decile without the ZCTAs at exactly 0%, shown as a size (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in the lowest decile of the capital-gains share, leaving out those with exactly 0% | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 5.8 to 9.1 | 1,310 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zero_free_swing_eitc_d1 | 6.4 | points of two-party margin swing, toward the Democrats | vote-weighted mean swing of the lowest decile without the ZCTAs at exactly 0%, shown as a size (95% interval clustered on county) | ZIP codes in the lowest decile of the EITC share, leaving out those with exactly 0% | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 5.5 to 7.3 | 1,471 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zs_cap_col | −1.0 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, net of the college share (95% interval clustered on state, 49 clusters) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −2.1 to 0.0 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zs_cap_taxcol | +1.4 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns reporting a net capital gain, net of the average tax rate and the college share (95% interval clustered on state, 49 clusters) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −0.3 to 3.0 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zs_eitc_full | +0.3 | points of swing in the two-party margin per standard deviation of the measure (positive is toward the Democrats) | weighted least squares coefficient of the share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit, net of the poverty rate, college share, Black share and Hispanic share (95% interval clustered on state, 49 clusters) | ZIP code tabulation areas in the contiguous states with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete IRS and ACS measures | 2016 to 2020 swing; IRS tax year 2022; ACS 5-year estimates | 95% CI −1.2 to 1.9 | 27,144 | votes cast in the ZIP code in 2020 (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | ## Definitions - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - ZCTA: ZIP Code Tabulation Area: the Census Bureau's area approximation of a ZIP code, built from the census blocks that fall inside it. It is the one neighborhood geography that lines up between the 2016 and 2020 vote estimates. - Swing: The change in a place's two-party margin between two elections. In this book a positive swing is a move toward the Democrats. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. - Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them. ## Methods Sample. ZIP code tabulation areas (ZCTAs) in the contiguous states with vote estimates for 2016 and 2020, kept when they have more than 100 votes in 2020, both IRS shares, a swing, the average tax rate and the four ACS controls; this common sample of 27,144 ZCTAs in 3,088 counties is used for every ZIP-code estimate. County sample: 3,113 counties with returns in 2016 and 2020 (Alaska excluded), of which 3,080 have ZIP-code shares and county demographics. The sample table in the last section gives the counts at each step. Votes and outcome. Precinct returns allocated to ZCTAs by the RLCR method (2016 from VEST, 2020 from MEDSL), fractional counts; the allocation reproduces the national two-party Democratic share of 51.09% in 2016 and 52.24% in 2020. The outcome is the swing, the 2020 two-party margin minus the 2016 margin, Democratic minus Republican, in points, so a positive swing is toward the Democrats. The county swing comes from certified county returns. Measures. The share of returns claiming the earned income tax credit and the share reporting a net capital gain (IRS Statistics of Income ZIP-code data, tax year 2022, a year recorded in the project's build code and not in the data file) and the mean effective tax rate; the poverty rate, Black share, Hispanic share and college share from the ACS 5-year estimates in the project's ZIP-code demographic file, dated March 2025, which records neither the ACS release nor the table behind each variable, so these controls are undated. The county controls are the 2020 row of the county demographics panel. The definition of the ZIP-code college variable is unresolved. The file describes it as the percentage of the population with a college degree or higher and names no table, age group or release, but aggregated to counties it averages 52.7% against 23.6% for the county bachelor's share (correlation +0.86), so its level is far above a bachelor's share. The level and the correlation do not establish what the variable counts, so the chapter calls it the college share and leaves its coding open. Weights. ZIP-code estimates are weighted by 2020 votes in the ZCTA and county estimates by 2020 two-party votes. CES estimates use the post-election weight. Correlations and partial correlations are also computed with every ZIP code (or county) counted equally. Estimator. For each share, a weighted least squares regression of the swing on the share and the named controls, every variable standardized on the sample with the same weights, so the coefficient is points of swing per standard deviation of the share. Each set of controls is a separate model, and the full set (poverty, college, Black and Hispanic shares) does not include the average tax rate. Intervals and clustering. 95% intervals use cluster-robust (CR1) standard errors clustered on county for ZIP-code models and on state for county models (t distribution with the number of clusters minus one degrees of freedom). As a sensitivity check the ZIP-code ladder and the decile means are also computed with clusters on state (49 clusters: the states and the District of Columbia); this moves the two capital-gains intervals that hold the college share fixed, with and without the tax rate, to include zero and leaves the other ladder intervals on the same side of zero. Neither clustering allows for dependence between neighboring states. Correlations use a seeded bootstrap of whole clusters (2,000 replicates, seed 12345); decile means use the clustered ratio estimator; CES margins use the Kish effective sample size and a normal interval, which is model based and treats the weighted sample as a simple random sample. Suppression. ZCTAs with 100 or fewer votes are dropped; no survey cell rests on fewer than 30 respondents. Decile groups hold equal numbers of ZCTAs. The 2016 and 2020 survey samples are separate cross-sections, and voters who report neither owning nor renting are left out of the homeowner comparison. ## What these data cannot show - The ZIP-code results are associations between places and do not say how a capital-gains filer or an EITC claimant voted. - Group and individual correlations can differ [6], and this chapter has one case. - The raw ZIP-code coefficient of the swing on the capital-gains share is +2.4, while among voters without a degree investors moved 5.5 points toward the Republicans and non-investors 3.5 points toward the Democrats. - With the college share held fixed the ZIP-code coefficient is −1.0, the same sign as the survey difference, though its interval includes zero when clustered on state. - The place-level and voter-level results disagree about the raw association and agree in sign once education is held fixed, which is what the composition account above predicts. - This is ecological inference, and the ZIP-code filers and voters are overlapping but not identical populations. - The timing is a limit. - The IRS shares are for tax year 2022 and the swing is for 2016 to 2020, so a ZIP code's income mix is measured after both elections. - The release of the American Community Survey behind the ZIP-code controls is not recorded in the demographic file, so the controls cannot be dated against the swing. - The IRS shares describe filers, so the poorest households and some retirees are missing, and the EITC share is a share of returns and not of residents. - The vote estimates are allocations of precinct returns to ZIP codes, with a source change between 2016 and 2020, and both the allocation error and the source change enter the swing. - The IRS file also omits PO-box ZIP codes and ZIP codes below its disclosure thresholds, so some ZIP codes with votes have no share; Table 8 counts what each step of the sample leaves out. - Table 8. - The ZIP-code sample is 27,144 areas in 3,088 counties and the county sample is 3,080 counties - The intervals allow dependence among ZIP codes in the same county (or, in the state check, the same state) and not between neighboring counties in different states or between neighboring states. - Regional swings, such as the swing in the Texas border counties, make that dependence likely, and the two capital-gains intervals that change between the county and state clusterings show that it can matter for a conclusion. - The shares of the smallest ZIP codes rest on few returns. - In the sample, 1,405 ZIP codes report no capital-gains returns and 1,244 report no EITC returns, and the data do not distinguish a true zero from a small count rounded down. - They hold 0.3% and 0.2% of the votes in the sample, and leaving them out of the lowest decile moves its mean swing from 7.2 to 7.5 points toward the Republicans for capital gains and from 6.3 to 6.4 points toward the Democrats for the EITC. - The capital-gains result cannot be resolved by more controls. - The share correlates +0.81 with the college share, the ZIP-code college variable has no resolved definition, and the county results with the bachelor's share carry intervals that include zero, so the data cannot say how much of the capital-gains association is capital gains and how much is education. - Every ZIP-code coefficient with the college share held fixed, including the negative capital-gains coefficient and the EITC coefficient near zero, is an adjustment for a variable whose coding is unresolved. - If it counts some college or more, the adjustment removes a broader educational gradient than a four-year degree would. - The results also depend on the weights. - Table 9 gives the partial correlation of the swing with each share under vote weights and with each ZIP code counted equally. - The signs of the capital-gains partial correlation with the college share held fixed and of the EITC partial correlation with the full set held fixed differ between the weightings; the capital-gains partial correlation with the full set held fixed is negative under both. - Table 9. - Two of the partial correlations change sign when every ZIP code counts equally - The wealth measures are narrow. - The survey has stock ownership and home ownership as yes or no items, so neither measures the size of holdings. - The vote in the survey is self-reported, and the intervals treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample. - Chapter 13.1, Measures of hardship compared (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/measures-of-hardship-compared) puts hardship measures on one specification. ## References 1. Fekrazad, Amir (2025). A dataset of US precinct votes allocated to Census geographies with precision. Scientific Data 12: 794. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-025-05140-3 2. Voting and Election Science Team (2018). 2016 Precinct-Level Election Results. Harvard Dataverse. https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/NH5S2I 3. Baltz, Samuel; Agadjanian, Alexander; Chin, Declan; Curiel, John; DeLuca, Kevin; Dunham, James; Miranda, Jennifer; Phillips, Connor Halloran; Uhlman, Annabel; Wimpy, Cameron; Zárate, Marcos; Stewart III, Charles (2022). American election results at the precinct level. Scientific Data 9: 651. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-022-01745-0 4. Gethin, Amory; Martínez-Toledano, Clara; Piketty, Thomas (2022). Brahmin Left Versus Merchant Right: Changing Political Cleavages in 21 Western Democracies, 1948-2020. Quarterly Journal of Economics 137(1): 1-48. https://doi.org/10.1093/qje/qjab036 5. Gelman, Andrew; Park, David; Shor, Boris; Bafumi, Joseph; Cortina, Jeronimo (2008). Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do. Princeton University Press. 6. Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. American Sociological Review 15(3): 351-357. ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/build.py (sha256 564f66926cf17974a5fffc4aee9f2b90e928c256dfaf1b4d7af1f2b834db89ab) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/county/pres_county_1868_2024.parquet | 6,295,675 | bec11c7a0cb5d4180bbd6809d048bc892dd00dfcdde527fa4da871b1dd3f835f | b2a4f000f2eea72d09af8939555289e924875cca40cd95ec8869104cd575bed7 | | data/county/pres_county_2000_2024.parquet | 5,622,625 | 89e55d8bb32746282a8a0880a7d0e82892acf449eaea71ac1aa7466cc9b0cc23 | d6c6a14fdff6f54e9ee88e46c71dce64ee40b940e050f92d18540e4889f4a0f3 | | data/precinct/census_estimates/zcta_swing_atlas.parquet | 11,850,164 | ca87f58b5b27fc0ebd644d594a8b93971f85d40f95132ac641ffc84c5021684e | 6db8ad81722c59d7fc7436e5563bfd33b9a60fe03aff344e763af8a25df38651 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | a5fc591847707e9c70e0dff859ec34500193f056a2ffe36cef10aa3f987e37be | | figures/control_ladder.json | a9c1b329b868513d50e084903029d40c1aab749bb785d3ba4984786e57624dcf | | figures/control_ladder_county.json | 26226780539a67f07ce8b0e6cdcc0ad6d38faece9ee0c3aff8829d2a6005340e | | figures/county_map.json | 6cfbd38ad7eb9bf4a2360844a6cc70513ec337df9178d5aac09916a4c6cfcb0c | | figures/decile_levels.json | b6b89687bab4dfad27798f4e7236f97693e7138d378c768f1d532f86088c9be9 | | figures/decile_profiles.json | 5b32e4271752c4d71497bf059ba06355734a205cc424b30b0ad1a37a69fb8647 | | figures/sample_counts.json | 9662140e36b000738cfdfc08d5cb0e657fe72dea0e16a321b251a1eaa17f41b5 | | figures/share_deciles.json | 85fdd5d37df3cd366b88bd35a757fc5fcc149ce002a2b33672a30d27ca95ecf4 | | figures/wealth_and_the_vote.json | 6e7940c15cbb4c0de23ad715ae8344d7b1ea8908faa8668dd4210ae8e7126a43 | | figures/weights_check.json | e7aad52c213967e77b81ecb2a88d3ea897b682f714735ed48b03ca0a564b36f7 | | meta.json | 11b14fe1c79bfd10137918085abdaabfb020d9ce9883ccde3a8ec8f30a165a17 | | public/data/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/county_map.json | 620fb93335403a93299db18eaa618d510c068f8b0ab30e3941274532bbdd43b2 | | refs.json | 866be03d1b003d899186570f0b5eb1cd2d1fecba5c085632fe5b1da5fdc8056a | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/facts.json - Table 1, figure "share_deciles" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/share_deciles.json - Table 2, figure "decile_levels" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/decile_levels.json - Table 3, figure "decile_profiles" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/decile_profiles.json - Table 4, figure "control_ladder" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/control_ladder.json - Table 5, figure "county_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/county_map.json - Table 6, figure "control_ladder_county" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/control_ladder_county.json - Table 7, figure "wealth_and_the_vote" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/wealth_and_the_vote.json - Table 8, figure "sample_counts" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/sample_counts.json - Table 9, figure "weights_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/figures/weights_check.json - Payload of "county_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote/county_map.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Education, ethnicity and the county shift, 2016 to 2024: report Chapter 12.7 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Education, ethnicity and the county shift, 2016 to 2024 - Chapter: 12.7 (Part XII, Demographic axes of the vote; The political map) - Question: Which county characteristics tracked the presidential swing before and after 2016? - Dek: In 2020 to 2024, counties with more Hispanic residents moved further toward the Republicans than other counties did, a vote-weighted correlation of −0.66 with the swing, against +0.45 in 2012 to 2016. - Grain: places - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - County election returns. County presidential returns, 2000-2024: Algara and Amlani (2000-2020) and MIT Election Data and Science Lab (2024), repaired file; years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts of votes); county swings weighted by two-party votes in the later election, or county-equal - County demographics panel. County demographics panel, 2000-2024: education, Hispanic, foreign-born and Black shares, income and rural share at the earlier election of each pair; years: 2000-2024 (election years, interpolated between census and survey anchors); weights: none (census and American Community Survey estimates, interpolated to election years; sampling error not carried) - Precinct votes on census geographies. Precinct votes allocated to ZIP code areas, 2016 and 2020, with the census atlas measures; years: 2016 and 2020 (contiguous United States only); weights: 2020 presidential votes; areas with 100 votes or fewer dropped - Cooperative Election Study. Cooperative Election Study cumulative file, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 waves; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (year-specific); sensitivity: weight_post and vvweight - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026educationethnicityandthecountyshift ```bibtex @misc{singh2026educationethnicityandthecountyshift, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Education, ethnicity and the county shift, 2016 to 2024}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | vote-weighted correlation between the Hispanic share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | −0.66 | 95% CI −0.76 to −0.46 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | r_hispanic_2024_w | | vote-weighted correlation between the Hispanic share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | +0.45 | 95% CI 0.31 to 0.53 | 3,112 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | r_hispanic_1216_w | | vote-weighted correlation between the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | +0.69 | 95% CI 0.62 to 0.78 | 3,112 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | r_college_1216_w | | vote-weighted correlation between the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | +0.02 | 95% CI −0.08 to 0.13 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | r_college_2024_w | | count of counties matched on FIPS | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 3,111 | | 3,111 | none (full counts) | County election returns | n_matched_2024 | | count of counties in the correlations and regressions | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 3,102 | | 3,102 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | n_analysis_2024 | | matched counties with no 2020 county characteristics (the eight Connecticut counties) | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 8 | | 3,111 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | n_no_comp_2024 | ## Findings In 2020 to 2024, counties with more Hispanic residents moved further toward the Republicans than other counties did. The vote-weighted correlation of a county's Hispanic share with its swing in the presidential margin was −0.66, against +0.45 in 2012 to 2016, when counties with a higher Hispanic share had moved further toward the Democrats. The vote-weighted correlation with college share fell from +0.69 in 2012 to 2016 to +0.02 (95% CI −0.08 to 0.13) in 2020 to 2024. The timing of that fall depends on the weighting. Counting each county once instead of by its votes, the college correlation stays near its 2012 to 2016 level through 2016 to 2020 and falls only in 2020 to 2024. A county's swing is the change in its two-party margin from one presidential election to the next, in points, and a positive swing is a move toward the Democrats. The national swing is the change in the summed margin of all counties with returns in both elections, the measure used in Chapter 10.1, Nationalization of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote). A correlation with the swing equals the correlation with the swing minus the national swing, so a positive value means that counties with more of a characteristic moved further toward the Democrats than other counties did, whichever way the nation moved. A vote-weighted correlation counts each county in proportion to its two-party votes in the later election, so the largest counties count most, and a county-equal correlation counts every county once. The chapter holds three kinds of evidence, which answer different questions. The first is county composition, the share of adults with a bachelor's degree or more and the Hispanic, foreign-born and non-Hispanic Black shares of residents, each measured at the start of the pair. The second is the county swing, weighted by votes or counted once. The third, at the end, is the change in the reported vote of survey respondents by race, the only one that describes voters. The 95% confidence interval of an estimate follows it in parentheses, and the note beside Table 1 says how it is computed. Chapter 12.2, The diploma map (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-diploma-map) takes up the level of the vote by education, and Chapter 12.1, Five axes of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/five-axes-of-the-county-vote) ranks the axes together. (Note: The last pair, 2020 to 2024, has 3,111 matched counties, and 3,102 are used here. The 8 Connecticut counties have no county characteristics for 2020, and Jackson County, Missouri is left out because its Kansas City votes are a separate unit in 2024, which gives it a swing that is not its own. Both stay in the national swing so that it matches the other chapter.) ### Vote-weighted Hispanic and foreign-born correlations turned negative after 2016 Table 1 plots the correlation of the swing with each characteristic over six pairs of elections from 2000 to 2024. The vote-weighted Hispanic correlation is positive in 2004 to 2008, 2008 to 2012 and 2012 to 2016 (+0.45 in the last) and negative in 2016 to 2020 (−0.48 (95% CI −0.62 to −0.20)) and 2020 to 2024 (−0.66 (95% CI −0.76 to −0.46)). The foreign-born correlation follows the same path, from +0.58 in 2012 to 2016 to −0.50 and −0.69. The college correlation has a positive point estimate in all six pairs in both weightings and is highest, vote-weighted, in 2012 to 2016. The intervals for 2020 to 2024 (vote-weighted) and 2008 to 2012 (county-equal, +0.09 (95% CI −0.01 to 0.20)) include zero. (Note: The intervals resample whole states, because counties in one state share candidates, campaigns and election law, and a resample of counties would give a narrower interval. The resampling repeats the calculation on many draws of the states with replacement, which is a bootstrap. The returns are full counts, so an interval says how much a correlation depends on which states are in the set and is not sampling error of the vote. The characteristics are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to the election years, so they carry sampling error that no interval includes.) Table 1. Vote-weighted, the college correlation fell after 2016 while the Hispanic and foreign-born correlations turned negative Counting each county once, the Hispanic correlation also changes sign, from +0.33 in 2012 to 2016 to −0.30 (95% CI −0.51 to 0.10) in 2016 to 2020, though the later interval includes zero. The county-equal foreign-born correlation is −0.03 (95% CI −0.20 to 0.22) in 2016 to 2020 and −0.34 (95% CI −0.47 to −0.14) in 2020 to 2024. Black share has a vote-weighted correlation of +0.16 (95% CI 0.03 to 0.31) in 2012 to 2016 and −0.07 (95% CI −0.25 to 0.09) in 2020 to 2024, and counting each county once it is −0.24 (95% CI −0.36 to −0.14) in 2020 to 2024. The spread of county swings was also smaller in 2020 to 2024. The vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings, measured as in Chapter 10.1, Nationalization of the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/nationalization-of-the-county-vote), was 10.8 points in 2012 to 2016 and 4.5 in 2020 to 2024, so the correlations describe how the counties are ordered and not how far they moved. The differences in points are in Table 4, where the 103 counties with a Hispanic share of 50% or more averaged −7.6 (95% CI −12.2 to −5.3) points relative to the national swing, vote-weighted. One account of the 2016 campaign holds that the parties' coalitions were already dividing along racial and ethnic identities and that the Trump campaign stressed race, immigration and religion [1]. A study that combined survey and county data found the educational composition of counties to be among the strongest county-level indicators of shifts in the presidential vote from 2000 to 2020 [2]. The correlations here do not test either account. ### Counties furthest below the national swing had high Hispanic shares Table 2 colors each county by its swing minus the national swing, for 2012 to 2016, 2016 to 2020 and 2020 to 2024. The national swing in 2020 to 2024 was −6.1 points, a move toward the Republicans, and 75.6% of counties were within 5 points of it, against 24.6% in 2012 to 2016. Among the 584 counties with 50,000 or more votes in 2024, the ten furthest below the national swing all have a Hispanic share of 28.0% or more and a foreign-born share of 22.9% or more. They lie along the Rio Grande (Webb, Hidalgo, Cameron and El Paso counties), in the Imperial Valley, in the New York City area (Bronx, Queens, Passaic and Hudson counties) and in Miami-Dade. Without the vote cut, the ten furthest below still all have a Hispanic share of 28.0% or more. Four small Texas counties (Maverick, Starr, Dimmit and Culberson) enter the ten, which brings the lowest foreign-born share among them down to 9.0%. Of the ten furthest above the national swing, 5 are in Georgia, and the swing of Henry County was +15.2 points relative to the nation. This chapter does not explain why the Georgia counties sit at that end. Table 2. In 2020 to 2024, 75.6% of counties were within 5 points of the national swing, and the counties furthest below it were high-Hispanic The 2012 to 2016 frame has different places at its ends. Among the counties with 50,000 or more votes, 8 of the ten furthest below the national swing are in Pennsylvania, Ohio or Michigan, and 7 of the ten furthest above are in Utah or northern Virginia. ### The timing of the college fall depends on the weighting Vote-weighted, the college correlation has already fallen in 2016 to 2020 (+0.25 (95% CI 0.11 to 0.41)). Counting each county once, it is +0.57 in 2012 to 2016 and +0.51 in 2016 to 2020 and falls only in 2020 to 2024, to +0.16 (95% CI 0.07 to 0.24), an interval that excludes zero. Only the vote-weighted series reaches zero. The third view of Table 1 shows the two series together. The county-equal correlation is not a fixed fraction of the vote-weighted one. The two differ by more than 0.2 in 4 of the 24 comparisons of a characteristic and a pair, by as much as 0.47, and they have opposite signs in 2 cells where both are near zero. A vote-weighted correlation counts the largest counties most. In 2020 to 2024 the 134 counties with 250,000 or more votes cast 46.3% of the votes. Table 3 shows that, inside each size group and counting each county once, the 2020 to 2024 college correlation is similar, +0.23 among the large counties and +0.22 among the rest. The groups differ in level. The large counties have a higher mean college share (40.7%, against 22.8%) and a lower mean swing (−5.5 points, against −3.3). The vote-weighted correlation across all counties, +0.02, is lower than either group's. Table 3. The 2020 to 2024 college correlation is similar in large and other counties and is near zero only across all counties weighted by votes A statement that the college correlation is near zero in 2020 to 2024 therefore holds for the vote-weighted correlation across all counties and not for the correlation inside either size group. ### The Hispanic gradient steepens at high shares Table 4 plots each county's 2020 to 2024 swing minus the national swing against its Hispanic share, with the mean of four groups of counties. The vote-weighted mean is +3.3 (95% CI 2.8 to 3.9) points among the 2,285 counties under 10% Hispanic and +1.7 (95% CI 0.3 to 3.4) among the 503 counties from 10% to under 25%. It is −1.9 (95% CI −3.6 to −0.3) among the 211 counties from 25% to under 50% and −7.6 (95% CI −12.2 to −5.3) among the 103 counties at 50% or more. Those last counties moved −13.7 (95% CI −18.3 to −11.4) points in their own margin, against −6.1 nationally. Counting each county once, the four means are +3.1 (95% CI 2.6 to 3.5), +2.9 (95% CI 2.1 to 3.7), +1.0 (95% CI −0.7 to 1.9) and −3.9 (95% CI −7.5 to −2.9), and only the last has an interval below zero. In both weightings the drop from one group to the next gets larger as the Hispanic share rises. A single correlation (−0.66 vote-weighted, −0.39 county-equal) summarizes a relationship that is shallow where Hispanic shares are low and steeper where they are high. Table 4. County swing relative to the nation fell with Hispanic share in 2020 to 2024, and fell faster at higher shares The college-share view of the same figure shows little slope in the vote-weighted means. The vote-weighted mean is +1.4 (95% CI 0.2 to 2.5) points among counties under 20% college, +1.1 (95% CI −0.2 to 2.8) from 20% to under 40% and +1.7 (95% CI 0.4 to 3.3) at 40% or more. Counting each county once, it is +1.9 (95% CI 1.4 to 2.5), +3.3 (95% CI 2.7 to 3.8) and +3.2 (95% CI 2.1 to 4.3), so the county-equal correlation of +0.16 is a difference between the counties with the lowest college shares and the rest. ### Holding other shares fixed, college share re-emerges The four characteristics are correlated across counties, so Table 5 compares each correlation with its standardized coefficient in one regression on all four. Coefficient intervals use standard errors clustered by state. In 2020 to 2024, vote-weighted, college share goes from +0.02 alone to +0.31 (95% CI 0.24 to 0.38) with the others fixed. Among counties with the same Hispanic, foreign-born and Black shares, a county with a college share one standard deviation higher had a swing +0.31 standard deviations further toward the Democrats. The foreign-born coefficient is −0.69 (95% CI −0.93 to −0.44) and the Hispanic coefficient −0.18 (95% CI −0.35 to −0.01). Vote-weighted, the Hispanic coefficient is smaller as characteristics are added, from −0.66 alone to −0.35 (95% CI −0.50 to −0.20) in a regression on Hispanic and foreign-born share only and −0.18 with all four. The R-squared of a regression is the share of the variance of county swings that its fitted values reproduce. Vote-weighted, it is 60.2% for the four characteristics together in 2020 to 2024 and 0.0% for college share alone, and 28.1% and 2.4% counting each county once. In 2012 to 2016 the vote-weighted values were 70.6% and 47.3%, and the county-equal values 58.3% and 32.2%. Table 5. With the other three shares held fixed, college share tracks the 2020 to 2024 swing although its vote-weighted correlation alone is near zero In 2016 to 2020, vote-weighted, college share also goes from +0.25 alone to +0.56 (95% CI 0.46 to 0.65). The foreign-born coefficient is −0.77 (95% CI −0.99 to −0.55) and the Hispanic coefficient is +0.08 (95% CI −0.16 to 0.31), an interval that includes zero. The Hispanic correlation in that pair, −0.48, goes to −0.24 (95% CI −0.42 to −0.07) with foreign-born share added and to +0.08 with all four. Counting each county once in 2016 to 2020, the coefficients are close to the correlations, +0.51 for college share and −0.30 for Hispanic share. Counting each county once in 2020 to 2024, the coefficients are +0.24 for college share, −0.22 for Hispanic share, −0.29 for foreign-born share and −0.24 for Black share. Black share has a coefficient different from zero in that version but not in the vote-weighted one (−0.04 (95% CI −0.16 to 0.07)). ### ZIP code areas reproduce the Hispanic and foreign-born correlations The 2016 to 2020 swing can be measured for 29,323 ZIP code areas, which are far smaller than counties, using precinct votes allocated to each area [3]. The two college measures are not identical. The county panel reports a bachelor's degree share, which averages 21.7% across counties, and the ZIP code atlas reports a college-education share with no documented definition that averages 54.7% across areas, so the college correlations are not like for like. Table 6 compares the vote-weighted correlations at the two grains. The Hispanic correlation is −0.50 (95% CI −0.60 to −0.29) in ZIP code areas and −0.48 (95% CI −0.62 to −0.20) in counties, and the foreign-born correlation is −0.46 (95% CI −0.61 to −0.14) and −0.50 (95% CI −0.67 to −0.10). The Hispanic and foreign-born correlations are reproduced at the finer grain. The college correlation is +0.47 (95% CI 0.42 to 0.55) in ZIP code areas, against +0.25 (95% CI 0.11 to 0.41) in counties. The 14 areas with a missing characteristic are dropped. Table 6. ZIP code areas give Hispanic and foreign-born correlations similar to counties for 2016 to 2020, and a larger college correlation with a different college measure No ZIP code area returns exist for 2024, so the pair in which the vote-weighted college correlation is near zero, 2020 to 2024, cannot be checked below the county. ### High-Hispanic counties swung furthest toward the Republicans Table 7 sorts the 2020 counties by rules, applied in this order, into four groups. High-Hispanic counties are 25% Hispanic or more. Of the rest, high-Black counties are 25% non-Hispanic Black or more, and affluent suburban counties have 35% or more of adults holding a bachelor's degree, a median household income of $75,000 or more and fewer than 25% of residents in rural areas. Every other county is in a fourth group. The figure plots each group's mean swing minus the national swing, minus the mean over all counties in the same weighting. That all-county mean is +1.3 (95% CI 0.2 to 2.8) points vote-weighted and +2.7 (95% CI 2.2 to 3.2) county-equal. It is not zero because the national swing is the change in the summed margin, which large counties dominate, so each group is compared with the all-county mean and not with zero. Table 7. High-Hispanic counties swung 4.2 points further toward the Republicans than the average county, vote-weighted The 314 high-Hispanic counties averaged 4.2 (95% CI 3.0 to 6.2) points further toward the Republicans than the all-county mean vote-weighted, and 3.3 (95% CI 2.4 to 4.7) points further county-equal. The 379 high-Black counties differ from the all-county mean by +0.9 (95% CI −0.8 to 2.1) vote-weighted and −1.8 (95% CI −2.9 to −1.0) county-equal, so their position depends on the weighting. The 152 affluent suburban counties differ by +0.8 (95% CI −0.1 to 1.7) and +0.3 (95% CI −0.7 to 1.3), and both intervals include zero. The county-equal difference for the high-Black counties has the same sign as the county-equal Black-share correlation, −0.24 (95% CI −0.36 to −0.14), and the vote-weighted Black-share correlation is −0.07 (95% CI −0.25 to 0.09). The high-Hispanic difference stays below the all-county mean when the cut is 15%, at −3.1 (95% CI −4.2 to −2.1) vote-weighted and −2.1 (95% CI −2.9 to −1.3) county-equal. The high-Black difference keeps its signs under each of 6 other cuts from 15% to 50%, from +0.8 to +1.9 vote-weighted and from −2.0 to −1.4 county-equal. The affluent suburban difference is at or above zero vote-weighted under 6 other sets of college, income and rural cuts, from 0.0 to +1.0, and changes sign county-equal, from −0.8 to +0.6. Kings County, New York, has a Black share of 28.0% and is in the high-Black group, where it has the most votes. Its swing was −5.2 points relative to the nation, so it moved further toward the Republicans than the nation did and lowers the group's vote-weighted mean. Without it the group's mean swing minus the national swing rises from +2.2 to +2.5. Wayne County, Michigan (−2.5) and Essex County, New Jersey (−4.2) are also below the national swing, and without all three the mean is +2.9. Fulton, Cobb, DeKalb, Gwinnett and Henry counties in the Atlanta area are all above the national swing, the smallest at +3.4 points, and without them the mean is +1.8. Of the ten high-Black counties with the most votes, 2 are below the national swing, Kings and Wayne. The group's vote-weighted mean combines large counties on both sides of the national swing. ### The Democratic margin fell among Hispanic and Black respondents The county correlations do not say which voters moved. The Cooperative Election Study (CES) asks respondents how they voted and how they describe their race, and Table 8 reports the change in the Democratic margin among respondents who reported a major-party vote, using survey weights. Each wave is a separate sample, so the figure compares two groups of respondents and does not follow the same people. (Note: The intervals use the Kish effective sample size [4], treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample, and combine the standard errors of the two waves because they are separate samples of respondents. The CES is an opt-in panel and not a probability sample, so the intervals describe sampling variation among its respondents and leave out how those respondents came to join it. The default weight is the year-specific weight, the only one present in all four waves. It is the weight of the pre-election wave, applied here to a post-election vote question.) Among Hispanic respondents the margin went from +32.5 in 2020 to +9.5 in 2024, a change of −23.0 (95% CI −30.5 to −15.5) points. Among Black respondents it went from +82.9 to +63.8, a change of −19.0 (95% CI −24.1 to −14.0). Among white respondents the change was −7.0 (95% CI −9.1 to −4.8) in 2012 to 2016, +2.2 (95% CI 0.3 to 4.2) in 2016 to 2020 and −1.9 (95% CI −4.0 to 0.2) in 2020 to 2024, and among Black respondents it was −6.5 (95% CI −9.9 to −3.1) in 2012 to 2016. Table 8. The Democratic margin fell among Hispanic and Black respondents in 2020 to 2024 and among white and Black respondents in 2012 to 2016 The size of these changes depends on the weight. With the validated-voter weight, which covers respondents matched to a voter file, the 2020 to 2024 changes are −14.9 (95% CI −24.1 to −5.6) among Hispanic respondents, −13.9 (95% CI −19.5 to −8.3) among Black respondents and −4.1 (95% CI −6.2 to −1.9) among white respondents. With the post-election weight, the 2012 to 2016 changes are −4.4 (95% CI −6.7 to −2.2) among white respondents and −6.8 (95% CI −10.5 to −3.0) among Black respondents. The Hispanic and Black margins fall in 2020 to 2024 under both weights, and the white change in 2020 to 2024 has an interval that includes zero under the year-specific weight and excludes it under the validated-voter weight. The Hispanic result agrees in sign with the county correlation for 2020 to 2024. The Black margin fell by −19.0 points among respondents while county Black share has a vote-weighted correlation of −0.07 with the swing, so a county correlation does not measure how a group voted. Chapter 3.4, Hispanic, Black and Asian voters (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/hispanic-black-and-asian-voters; planned) takes up the votes of each group. ### What these data cannot show Every correlation above is a property of counties, and a pattern across places can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them, a limit known as ecological inference. Robinson [5] showed that a correlation across places can have the opposite sign from the correlation across individuals. The foreign-born population includes residents who are not citizens and cannot vote, so the foreign-born correlation says where the swing was large and not how immigrants voted. The characteristics describe residents, not voters, and a swing combines people who changed their vote with people who began or stopped voting or moved in or out. Chapter 15.5, Composition and behavior in county change (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/composition-and-behavior-in-county-change; planned) separates composition from behavior with other data. The dates are the dates of pairs. A correlation for 2012 to 2016 and one for 2016 to 2020 cannot say when between the two elections a county moved, and a change of sign between two pairs says that the ordering of counties changed, not why. The four characteristics are correlated with each other and with others that are not in the regression, among them income, age and rurality, which Chapter 12.3, Income and the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/income-and-the-county-vote; planned) and Chapter 12.5, Rural counties (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/rural-counties; planned) take up. A coefficient therefore describes one regression and not a separate effect. The characteristics are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated between census and survey years, so they carry sampling error, most in small counties, that no interval here includes. The county set is not harmonized across boundary changes, and the county groups are threshold rules whose group means move with the cut. A swing is not adjusted for the county's earlier margin, and a county that began with an almost one-sided margin had less room to move in one direction than a competitive county did. The intervals describe dependence on which states are in the set, and the returns themselves are counts. The intervals on group means are of the same kind. The ZIP code check covers only 2016 to 2020, and its votes are allocated from precincts. The CES is an opt-in online panel with self-reported vote, so its estimates depend on how well the weights correct for who joins and on which weight is used. The data used here hold no measure of turnout by group, of attitudes or of campaign activity, so they cannot say why the swing lined up with Hispanic and foreign-born share in 2020 to 2024 and with other characteristics in 2012 to 2016. ## Tables ### Table 1. Vote-weighted, the college correlation fell after 2016 while the Hispanic and foreign-born correlations turned negative Correlation between a county characteristic at the start of a pair of presidential elections and the county's swing in the two-party margin, 6 pairs from 2000 to 2004 through 2020 to 2024 | Pair of elections | Characteristic | Weighting | Correlation | Interval low | Interval high | Counties | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2000–04 | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.44 | +0.31 | +0.57 | 3,113 | | 2004–08 | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.25 | +0.11 | +0.38 | 3,113 | | 2008–12 | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.10 | +0.02 | +0.18 | 3,113 | | 2012–16 | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.69 | +0.62 | +0.78 | 3,112 | | 2016–20 | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.25 | +0.11 | +0.41 | 3,113 | | 2020–24 | College share | Vote-weighted | +0.02 | −0.08 | +0.13 | 3,102 | | 2000–04 | Hispanic share | Vote-weighted | −0.03 | −0.15 | +0.09 | 3,113 | | 2004–08 | Hispanic share | Vote-weighted | +0.27 | +0.07 | +0.40 | 3,113 | | 2008–12 | Hispanic share | Vote-weighted | +0.33 | +0.17 | +0.46 | 3,113 | | 2012–16 | Hispanic share | Vote-weighted | +0.45 | +0.31 | +0.53 | 3,112 | | 2016–20 | Hispanic share | Vote-weighted | −0.48 | −0.62 | −0.20 | 3,113 | | 2020–24 | Hispanic share | Vote-weighted | −0.66 | −0.76 | −0.46 | 3,102 | | 2000–04 | Foreign-born share | Vote-weighted | +0.01 | −0.18 | +0.24 | 3,113 | | 2004–08 | Foreign-born share | Vote-weighted | +0.21 | +0.05 | +0.35 | 3,113 | | 2008–12 | Foreign-born share | Vote-weighted | +0.45 | +0.28 | +0.56 | 3,113 | | 2012–16 | Foreign-born share | Vote-weighted | +0.58 | +0.44 | +0.69 | 3,112 | | 2016–20 | Foreign-born share | Vote-weighted | −0.50 | −0.67 | −0.10 | 3,113 | | 2020–24 | Foreign-born share | Vote-weighted | −0.69 | −0.77 | −0.49 | 3,102 | | 2000–04 | Black share | Vote-weighted | +0.05 | −0.06 | +0.15 | 3,113 | | 2004–08 | Black share | Vote-weighted | +0.03 | −0.09 | +0.16 | 3,113 | | 2008–12 | Black share | Vote-weighted | +0.43 | +0.34 | +0.53 | 3,113 | | 2012–16 | Black share | Vote-weighted | +0.16 | +0.03 | +0.31 | 3,112 | | 2016–20 | Black share | Vote-weighted | −0.13 | −0.29 | 0.00 | 3,113 | | 2020–24 | Black share | Vote-weighted | −0.07 | −0.25 | +0.09 | 3,102 | | 2000–04 | College share | County-equal | +0.40 | +0.30 | +0.49 | 3,113 | | 2004–08 | College share | County-equal | +0.34 | +0.26 | +0.41 | 3,113 | | 2008–12 | College share | County-equal | +0.09 | −0.01 | +0.20 | 3,113 | | 2012–16 | College share | County-equal | +0.57 | +0.49 | +0.66 | 3,112 | | 2016–20 | College share | County-equal | +0.51 | +0.45 | +0.60 | 3,113 | | 2020–24 | College share | County-equal | +0.16 | +0.07 | +0.24 | 3,102 | | 2000–04 | Hispanic share | County-equal | −0.09 | −0.21 | +0.07 | 3,113 | | 2004–08 | Hispanic share | County-equal | +0.19 | +0.11 | +0.29 | 3,113 | | 2008–12 | Hispanic share | County-equal | +0.20 | +0.11 | +0.30 | 3,113 | | 2012–16 | Hispanic share | County-equal | +0.33 | +0.25 | +0.42 | 3,112 | | 2016–20 | Hispanic share | County-equal | −0.30 | −0.51 | +0.10 | 3,113 | | 2020–24 | Hispanic share | County-equal | −0.39 | −0.51 | −0.16 | 3,102 | | 2000–04 | Foreign-born share | County-equal | +0.05 | −0.05 | +0.16 | 3,113 | | 2004–08 | Foreign-born share | County-equal | +0.24 | +0.15 | +0.33 | 3,113 | | 2008–12 | Foreign-born share | County-equal | +0.26 | +0.17 | +0.35 | 3,113 | | 2012–16 | Foreign-born share | County-equal | +0.51 | +0.44 | +0.58 | 3,112 | | 2016–20 | Foreign-born share | County-equal | −0.03 | −0.20 | +0.22 | 3,113 | | 2020–24 | Foreign-born share | County-equal | −0.34 | −0.47 | −0.14 | 3,102 | | 2000–04 | Black share | County-equal | −0.08 | −0.21 | +0.04 | 3,113 | | 2004–08 | Black share | County-equal | −0.04 | −0.17 | +0.09 | 3,113 | | 2008–12 | Black share | County-equal | +0.49 | +0.36 | +0.59 | 3,113 | | 2012–16 | Black share | County-equal | +0.29 | +0.20 | +0.38 | 3,112 | | 2016–20 | Black share | County-equal | −0.12 | −0.26 | −0.02 | 3,113 | | 2020–24 | Black share | County-equal | −0.24 | −0.36 | −0.14 | 3,102 | Views: Vote-weighted (weighting = Vote-weighted); County-equal (weighting = County-equal); College share, both weightings (characteristic = College share). Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so they carry no sampling error. The 95% intervals come from a bootstrap that resamples whole states, so they show how much a number depends on which states are in the set. They do not include the sampling error of the county characteristics, which are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated between years. Note: The pair 2020 to 2024 leaves out the eight Connecticut counties, which have no county characteristics for 2020, and Jackson County, Missouri, whose swing is not its own. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the later election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/correlation_by_pair.json ### Table 2. In 2020 to 2024, 75.6% of counties were within 5 points of the national swing, and the counties furthest below it were high-Hispanic County swing in the Democratic minus Republican margin, minus the national swing, in percentage points, for the pairs 2012 to 2016, 2016 to 2020 and 2020 to 2024 | Pair of elections | Position | County | Swing minus national swing (points) | Swing (points) | Hispanic share (%) | Foreign-born share (%) | College share (%) | Two-party votes, later election | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Schuylkill, PA | −29.3 | −31.2 | 3.2 | 1.8 | 14.6 | 60,771 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Trumbull, OH | −28.0 | −29.9 | 1.5 | 1.5 | 17.2 | 92,038 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest below the national swing | St. Clair, MI | −24.1 | −26.1 | 3.0 | 2.7 | 16.6 | 73,604 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Mahoning, OH | −23.4 | −25.4 | 5.0 | 3.0 | 21.9 | 110,997 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Luzerne, PA | −23.0 | −25.0 | 8.1 | 5.2 | 21.3 | 130,395 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Monroe, MI | −22.4 | −24.4 | 3.2 | 2.1 | 18.2 | 70,124 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Jefferson, MO | −22.3 | −24.2 | 1.7 | 1.7 | 17.7 | 100,519 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Lackawanna, PA | −22.1 | −24.0 | 5.6 | 4.9 | 25.6 | 100,367 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Androscoggin, ME | −21.4 | −23.3 | 1.7 | 3.0 | 19.6 | 51,164 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Fayette, PA | −21.3 | −23.2 | 0.9 | 0.9 | 14.4 | 52,536 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Salt Lake, UT | +35.0 | +33.0 | 17.4 | 12.3 | 31.8 | 313,906 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Davis, UT | +28.3 | +26.4 | 8.7 | 4.8 | 34.7 | 90,995 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Utah, UT | +25.7 | +23.8 | 10.9 | 7.1 | 36.9 | 130,704 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Arlington, VA | +25.5 | +23.6 | 15.2 | 23.0 | 72.5 | 112,202 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Weber, UT | +21.4 | +19.4 | 17.2 | 7.3 | 22.7 | 63,366 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Alexandria, VA | +20.2 | +18.2 | 16.4 | 26.4 | 61.3 | 70,527 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Fairfax, VA | +19.6 | +17.7 | 15.8 | 29.8 | 59.2 | 512,843 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Travis, TX | +18.7 | +16.7 | 33.6 | 17.7 | 45.3 | 435,469 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Orange, CA | +17.5 | +15.5 | 33.9 | 30.4 | 37.5 | 1,106,504 | | 2012–16 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Gwinnett, GA | +17.4 | +15.5 | 20.3 | 25.1 | 34.7 | 313,142 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Webb, TX | −32.2 | −29.6 | 95.5 | 26.0 | 18.1 | 67,718 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Hidalgo, TX | −27.2 | −24.7 | 91.9 | 27.1 | 18.4 | 218,726 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Miami-Dade, FL | −25.4 | −22.9 | 67.3 | 53.1 | 29.0 | 1,150,697 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Cameron, TX | −22.9 | −20.4 | 89.4 | 23.3 | 17.5 | 113,095 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Imperial, CA | −21.8 | −19.2 | 83.7 | 31.0 | 14.7 | 55,525 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Bronx, NY | −15.0 | −12.5 | 55.7 | 34.8 | 19.7 | 423,114 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Osceola, FL | −14.5 | −12.0 | 52.5 | 20.0 | 20.9 | 170,777 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest below the national swing | El Paso, TX | −12.2 | −9.7 | 82.2 | 24.6 | 22.9 | 262,457 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Queens, NY | −11.7 | −9.1 | 27.9 | 47.2 | 32.0 | 781,703 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Kings, NY | −10.6 | −8.1 | 19.1 | 36.4 | 36.5 | 906,082 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Henry, GA | +13.6 | +16.2 | 6.7 | 7.4 | 27.8 | 121,702 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Forsyth, GA | +13.5 | +16.0 | 9.4 | 16.5 | 51.6 | 127,331 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Douglas, GA | +11.8 | +14.3 | 9.4 | 8.7 | 27.1 | 68,268 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Kaufman, TX | +11.6 | +14.1 | 20.8 | 7.7 | 19.8 | 56,029 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Hamilton, IN | +11.3 | +13.9 | 3.9 | 8.1 | 57.8 | 189,977 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest above the national swing | El Paso, CO | +11.0 | +13.6 | 16.8 | 7.0 | 37.6 | 364,769 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Fayette, GA | +10.7 | +13.3 | 7.2 | 9.7 | 46.3 | 71,018 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Collin, TX | +10.7 | +13.3 | 15.2 | 20.2 | 51.7 | 483,263 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Paulding, GA | +10.5 | +13.0 | 6.1 | 5.8 | 24.3 | 84,212 | | 2016–20 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Stafford, VA | +10.5 | +13.0 | 12.3 | 9.8 | 39.3 | 77,881 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Imperial, CA | −19.7 | −25.8 | 85.3 | 30.9 | 15.7 | 52,629 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Webb, TX | −19.6 | −25.7 | 95.3 | 25.4 | 20.1 | 65,336 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Bronx, NY | −16.4 | −22.5 | 55.6 | 34.6 | 21.3 | 359,844 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Queens, NY | −14.9 | −21.0 | 28.0 | 47.2 | 34.8 | 701,910 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest below the national swing | El Paso, TX | −14.3 | −20.4 | 82.7 | 23.5 | 25.0 | 248,280 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Hidalgo, TX | −14.0 | −20.1 | 92.1 | 26.2 | 20.0 | 215,277 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Passaic, NJ | −13.6 | −19.7 | 43.1 | 32.6 | 30.2 | 196,110 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Cameron, TX | −13.0 | −19.1 | 89.6 | 22.9 | 20.1 | 115,249 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Miami-Dade, FL | −12.8 | −18.9 | 68.7 | 54.3 | 32.5 | 1,085,945 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest below the national swing | Hudson, NJ | −11.9 | −18.0 | 41.7 | 43.2 | 46.4 | 224,678 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Henry, GA | +15.2 | +9.2 | 7.7 | 8.3 | 28.8 | 128,235 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Douglas, GA | +12.3 | +6.2 | 11.1 | 9.3 | 29.5 | 70,236 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Kaufman, TX | +12.3 | +6.2 | 24.9 | 9.5 | 23.3 | 68,789 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Paulding, GA | +11.3 | +5.2 | 7.7 | 7.1 | 26.7 | 94,571 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Island, WA | +10.7 | +4.6 | 8.4 | 7.7 | 35.4 | 50,562 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Henderson, NC | +10.4 | +4.3 | 11.6 | 7.5 | 34.0 | 68,858 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Newton, GA | +10.3 | +4.2 | 6.5 | 6.8 | 22.9 | 58,732 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Mesa, CO | +9.9 | +3.8 | 15.1 | 4.1 | 29.9 | 89,412 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Fayette, GA | +9.8 | +3.7 | 8.0 | 10.6 | 48.3 | 73,999 | | 2020–24 | Ten furthest above the national swing | Buncombe, NC | +9.8 | +3.7 | 7.6 | 6.4 | 43.6 | 157,678 | The map draws every unit from https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/swing_map.json; the rows above are the subset the figure file carries. Note: Election returns are full counts of votes, so the map draws no intervals. Counties are drawn on 2020 boundaries and matched across elections on FIPS code; a county with no return in one of the two elections draws as no data. Jackson County, Missouri is left blank in 2020 to 2024 because Kansas City's votes are a separate unit in 2024. The data table lists the ten counties at each end for each pair, not the whole map. Source: County presidential returns, 2012-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, not weighted; tooltip characteristics from the county demographics panel (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/swing_map.json ### Table 3. The 2020 to 2024 college correlation is similar in large and other counties and is near zero only across all counties weighted by votes Correlation of the college share and the foreign-born share with the county swing, with the mean college share and mean swing of each group of counties, for 2016 to 2020 and 2020 to 2024 | Counties and weighting | Pair of elections | Counties | Share of two-party votes (%) | College correlation | College, low | College, high | Foreign-born correlation | Foreign-born, low | Foreign-born, high | Mean college share, start of pair (%) | Mean swing (points) | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | All counties, vote-weighted | 2016–20 | 3,113 | 100.0 | +0.25 | +0.11 | +0.41 | −0.50 | −0.67 | −0.10 | 32.2 | +2.5 | | All counties, county-equal | 2016–20 | 3,113 | 100.0 | +0.51 | +0.45 | +0.60 | −0.03 | −0.20 | +0.22 | 21.7 | +1.1 | | Large counties, county-equal | 2016–20 | 142 | 48.8 | +0.21 | +0.02 | +0.38 | −0.65 | −0.78 | −0.37 | 37.6 | +3.2 | | Other counties, county-equal | 2016–20 | 2,971 | 51.2 | +0.53 | +0.48 | +0.63 | −0.03 | −0.24 | +0.26 | 20.9 | +1.0 | | All counties, vote-weighted | 2020–24 | 3,102 | 100.0 | +0.02 | −0.08 | +0.13 | −0.69 | −0.77 | −0.49 | 34.6 | −4.8 | | All counties, county-equal | 2020–24 | 3,102 | 100.0 | +0.16 | +0.07 | +0.24 | −0.34 | −0.47 | −0.14 | 23.6 | −3.4 | | Large counties, county-equal | 2020–24 | 134 | 46.3 | +0.23 | 0.00 | +0.40 | −0.70 | −0.80 | −0.54 | 40.7 | −5.5 | | Other counties, county-equal | 2020–24 | 2,968 | 53.7 | +0.22 | +0.15 | +0.29 | −0.28 | −0.40 | −0.07 | 22.8 | −3.3 | Note: Intervals resample whole states; see Methods. Intervals within a size group resample states from the counties of that group. Note: Counties are those in the correlations for the pair; the eight Connecticut counties and, in 2020 to 2024, Jackson County, Missouri are left out. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the later election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/size_classes.json ### Table 4. County swing relative to the nation fell with Hispanic share in 2020 to 2024, and fell faster at higher shares Each dot is a county with characteristics for 2020; the vertical axis is its swing in the Democratic minus Republican margin between 2020 and 2024, minus the national swing, in percentage points | County | Hispanic share, 2020 (%) | College share, 2020 (%) | Swing minus national swing (points) | Two-party votes, 2024 | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Autauga, AL | 3.3 | 28.7 | +4.5 | 27,923 | | Baldwin, AL | 5.2 | 32.8 | +1.9 | 120,732 | | Barbour, AL | 5.3 | 11.1 | −1.0 | 9,764 | | Bibb, AL | 3.1 | 11.5 | −0.4 | 9,191 | | Blount, AL | 9.8 | 14.5 | +5.2 | 27,930 | | Bullock, AL | 7.0 | 9.2 | +2.1 | 4,084 | | Butler, AL | 1.6 | 14.7 | −0.9 | 8,423 | | Calhoun, AL | 4.2 | 19.8 | +0.5 | 48,106 | | Chambers, AL | 3.3 | 14.7 | −1.5 | 14,116 | | Cherokee, AL | 1.8 | 14.7 | +3.5 | 12,911 | | Chilton, AL | 9.0 | 15.0 | +1.5 | 19,618 | | Choctaw, AL | 0.9 | 14.6 | −2.2 | 6,618 | | Clarke, AL | 0.9 | 14.4 | +1.0 | 11,892 | | Clay, AL | 3.2 | 13.2 | −1.3 | 6,727 | | Cleburne, AL | 2.3 | 16.5 | +3.2 | 7,593 | | Coffee, AL | 8.8 | 22.1 | +1.5 | 22,096 | | Colbert, AL | 3.2 | 19.5 | −1.3 | 26,851 | | Conecuh, AL | 0.8 | 13.6 | −0.5 | 6,003 | | Coosa, AL | 1.9 | 12.7 | −3.6 | 5,236 | | Covington, AL | 1.9 | 16.4 | +1.9 | 16,991 | | Crenshaw, AL | 2.2 | 18.6 | −0.6 | 6,457 | | Cullman, AL | 4.7 | 17.6 | +3.3 | 42,743 | | Dale, AL | 6.9 | 19.3 | +0.3 | 18,960 | | Dallas, AL | 0.6 | 17.1 | +1.0 | 15,426 | | DeKalb, AL | 15.9 | 14.0 | +2.2 | 29,391 | | Elmore, AL | 3.2 | 25.6 | +2.4 | 41,148 | | Escambia, AL | 2.4 | 13.0 | −2.8 | 14,848 | | Etowah, AL | 4.7 | 17.9 | +0.9 | 45,680 | | Fayette, AL | 0.7 | 13.6 | +1.5 | 8,300 | | Franklin, AL | 19.1 | 15.4 | −1.2 | 11,985 | | Geneva, AL | 4.7 | 13.2 | +3.0 | 12,320 | | Greene, AL | 1.4 | 12.6 | −1.2 | 4,018 | | Hale, AL | 0.7 | 16.6 | −6.0 | 7,237 | | Henry, AL | 2.4 | 20.4 | −1.6 | 9,252 | | Houston, AL | 4.0 | 22.6 | +1.2 | 43,821 | | Jackson, AL | 3.3 | 16.1 | +2.4 | 23,349 | | Jefferson, AL | 4.7 | 35.1 | +3.3 | 293,235 | | Lamar, AL | 1.8 | 11.7 | +2.3 | 6,839 | | Lauderdale, AL | 3.1 | 27.4 | −0.5 | 43,034 | | Lawrence, AL | 2.7 | 15.5 | −1.5 | 16,007 | | Lee, AL | 4.6 | 39.4 | −1.6 | 71,818 | | Limestone, AL | 6.7 | 27.6 | +5.1 | 52,468 | | Lowndes, AL | 0.3 | 14.5 | −2.5 | 5,625 | | Macon, AL | 1.3 | 20.8 | −1.6 | 7,766 | | Madison, AL | 5.9 | 45.1 | +5.1 | 193,254 | | Marengo, AL | 2.6 | 18.3 | +1.0 | 9,626 | | Marion, AL | 2.9 | 13.3 | +2.5 | 13,442 | | Marshall, AL | 15.7 | 21.1 | +3.5 | 39,987 | | Mobile, AL | 3.2 | 25.2 | +1.5 | 172,814 | | Monroe, AL | 0.3 | 12.6 | −1.2 | 9,747 | | Montgomery, AL | 4.2 | 34.1 | +5.3 | 88,423 | | Morgan, AL | 9.5 | 22.3 | +3.0 | 52,841 | | Perry, AL | 1.1 | 16.8 | +0.5 | 4,443 | | Pickens, AL | 4.2 | 13.8 | −1.0 | 8,853 | | Pike, AL | 2.5 | 28.8 | −1.7 | 13,123 | | Randolph, AL | 2.9 | 17.7 | 0.0 | 11,022 | | Russell, AL | 5.8 | 17.8 | +1.3 | 20,500 | | St. Clair, AL | 2.7 | 19.7 | +6.2 | 43,141 | | Shelby, AL | 6.6 | 45.5 | +5.9 | 112,753 | | Sumter, AL | 0.9 | 18.7 | −1.3 | 5,267 | | Talladega, AL | 2.4 | 15.9 | −2.1 | 32,998 | | Tallapoosa, AL | 2.7 | 19.6 | −0.1 | 19,859 | | Tuscaloosa, AL | 4.7 | 31.6 | +0.5 | 84,123 | | Walker, AL | 3.2 | 15.0 | +2.5 | 29,566 | | Washington, AL | 1.0 | 15.7 | −0.7 | 8,397 | | Wilcox, AL | 0.2 | 12.3 | 0.0 | 5,242 | | Winston, AL | 3.4 | 13.8 | +4.6 | 11,075 | | Apache, AZ | 6.5 | 14.5 | −8.8 | 31,667 | | Cochise, AZ | 35.1 | 26.8 | +2.6 | 58,232 | | Coconino, AZ | 14.9 | 39.0 | +1.7 | 69,080 | | Gila, AZ | 18.5 | 19.0 | +2.7 | 27,405 | | Graham, AZ | 31.9 | 14.7 | +2.9 | 15,044 | | Greenlee, AZ | 47.0 | 18.8 | −0.8 | 3,262 | | La Paz, AZ | 26.6 | 12.6 | +0.9 | 7,571 | | Maricopa, AZ | 31.2 | 35.0 | +0.4 | 2,031,547 | | Mohave, AZ | 16.9 | 14.3 | +1.9 | 109,764 | | Navajo, AZ | 11.3 | 17.6 | −2.9 | 50,234 | | Pima, AZ | 37.0 | 35.2 | +2.5 | 507,119 | | Pinal, AZ | 30.1 | 21.7 | +1.4 | 207,582 | | Santa Cruz, AZ | 82.9 | 22.0 | −11.0 | 18,964 | | Yavapai, AZ | 15.0 | 28.3 | +1.6 | 148,063 | | Yuma, AZ | 64.5 | 16.1 | −8.2 | 67,568 | | Arkansas, AR | 3.7 | 15.0 | +1.8 | 5,454 | | Ashley, AR | 6.0 | 12.5 | +2.0 | 6,919 | | Baxter, AR | 2.7 | 18.6 | +3.0 | 20,594 | | Benton, AR | 17.6 | 36.2 | +5.7 | 125,138 | | Boone, AR | 2.9 | 17.5 | +3.4 | 16,822 | | Bradley, AR | 15.7 | 14.6 | −1.8 | 3,174 | | Calhoun, AR | 3.6 | 15.3 | −2.3 | 2,053 | | Carroll, AR | 15.4 | 20.6 | +3.4 | 11,282 | | Chicot, AR | 6.1 | 16.3 | −2.6 | 3,454 | | Clark, AR | 5.2 | 25.7 | −0.2 | 7,485 | | Clay, AR | 1.7 | 14.5 | +5.2 | 4,875 | | Cleburne, AR | 2.7 | 17.6 | +4.8 | 12,536 | | Cleveland, AR | 0.7 | 17.8 | +0.6 | 3,328 | | Columbia, AR | 3.1 | 21.2 | +1.4 | 7,833 | | Conway, AR | 4.4 | 18.8 | +1.9 | 8,342 | | Craighead, AR | 5.7 | 28.4 | +4.1 | 36,362 | | Crawford, AR | 8.3 | 19.1 | +4.7 | 23,368 | | Crittenden, AR | 3.0 | 17.2 | +1.0 | 14,390 | | Cross, AR | 2.2 | 16.5 | +4.7 | 6,395 | | Dallas, AR | 1.4 | 11.2 | +0.2 | 2,280 | | Desha, AR | 6.8 | 13.3 | −1.2 | 3,443 | | Drew, AR | 4.0 | 24.1 | 0.0 | 6,253 | | Faulkner, AR | 4.9 | 33.5 | +3.4 | 53,109 | | Franklin, AR | 3.3 | 12.9 | +5.0 | 6,814 | | Fulton, AR | 1.3 | 14.6 | +1.3 | 4,946 | | Garland, AR | 6.6 | 24.1 | +3.9 | 41,374 | | Grant, AR | 2.9 | 20.9 | +4.6 | 7,947 | | Greene, AR | 3.3 | 17.1 | +5.0 | 15,552 | | Hempstead, AR | 14.1 | 16.2 | +0.9 | 5,969 | | Hot Spring, AR | 3.8 | 16.4 | +2.7 | 12,044 | | Howard, AR | 12.6 | 15.0 | +1.7 | 4,404 | | Independence, AR | 7.7 | 18.3 | +5.4 | 13,712 | | Izard, AR | 2.7 | 17.1 | +2.7 | 5,803 | | Jackson, AR | 3.1 | 13.2 | +1.5 | 4,692 | | Jefferson, AR | 2.4 | 19.0 | +4.2 | 21,270 | | Johnson, AR | 13.9 | 17.2 | +4.1 | 8,873 | | Lafayette, AR | 1.8 | 11.5 | +2.5 | 2,287 | | Lawrence, AR | 1.9 | 14.5 | +2.5 | 5,573 | | Lee, AR | 2.9 | 8.0 | +4.7 | 2,451 | | Lincoln, AR | 4.6 | 10.2 | +0.3 | 3,315 | | Little River, AR | 3.8 | 15.7 | +1.4 | 4,828 | | Logan, AR | 3.3 | 14.5 | +3.9 | 8,031 | | Lonoke, AR | 5.0 | 21.3 | +6.1 | 30,015 | | Madison, AR | 6.2 | 12.5 | +3.2 | 7,376 | | Marion, AR | 2.5 | 15.5 | +3.1 | 7,731 | | Miller, AR | 3.8 | 16.5 | +1.9 | 15,611 | | Mississippi, AR | 4.6 | 14.6 | −3.0 | 10,537 | | Monroe, AR | 2.0 | 12.7 | +4.8 | 2,387 | | Montgomery, AR | 4.6 | 15.9 | +2.9 | 3,632 | | Nevada, AR | 2.4 | 12.9 | −1.4 | 2,851 | | Newton, AR | 1.3 | 15.8 | +4.5 | 3,707 | | Ouachita, AR | 2.5 | 14.9 | +0.7 | 8,468 | | Perry, AR | 3.3 | 17.1 | +2.2 | 4,482 | | Phillips, AR | 2.0 | 15.2 | −0.3 | 4,852 | | Pike, AR | 7.3 | 18.7 | +1.2 | 4,306 | | Poinsett, AR | 3.5 | 11.4 | +2.8 | 6,966 | | Polk, AR | 6.8 | 16.5 | +4.2 | 8,132 | | Pope, AR | 10.1 | 24.6 | +4.2 | 23,605 | | Prairie, AR | 2.1 | 16.7 | +1.3 | 3,152 | | Pulaski, AR | 7.3 | 36.6 | +5.7 | 150,015 | | Randolph, AR | 2.4 | 12.9 | +4.1 | 6,505 | | St Francis, AR | 4.5 | 12.6 | +1.6 | 5,862 | | Saline, AR | 6.1 | 28.5 | +7.3 | 56,345 | | Scott, AR | 7.9 | 12.6 | +3.5 | 3,338 | | Searcy, AR | 2.4 | 13.0 | +3.1 | 3,816 | | Sebastian, AR | 15.2 | 23.3 | +4.2 | 44,371 | | Sevier, AR | 34.5 | 11.4 | −1.3 | 4,634 | | Sharp, AR | 2.4 | 12.2 | +4.1 | 7,294 | | Stone, AR | 2.1 | 14.2 | +2.3 | 5,897 | | Union, AR | 4.4 | 20.1 | +2.5 | 15,215 | | Van Buren, AR | 3.3 | 15.4 | +2.8 | 7,460 | | Washington, AR | 17.8 | 34.2 | +3.3 | 94,022 | | White, AR | 4.7 | 20.6 | +3.9 | 30,155 | | Woodruff, AR | 0.8 | 15.6 | +1.6 | 2,273 | | Yell, AR | 20.9 | 14.1 | +4.8 | 6,360 | | Alameda, CA | 22.8 | 50.5 | −1.7 | 640,340 | | Alpine, CA | 14.6 | 39.7 | +6.6 | 722 | | Amador, CA | 15.2 | 20.3 | +2.5 | 21,801 | | Butte, CA | 18.4 | 30.1 | +1.2 | 91,407 | | Calaveras, CA | 13.5 | 21.8 | +1.6 | 25,806 | | Colusa, CA | 61.3 | 15.6 | −5.9 | 6,845 | | Contra Costa, CA | 26.7 | 44.3 | −0.9 | 511,316 | | Del Norte, CA | 20.0 | 18.4 | +5.2 | 10,265 | | El Dorado, CA | 13.7 | 37.6 | +2.8 | 108,812 | | Fresno, CA | 53.9 | 23.2 | −6.4 | 317,552 | | Glenn, CA | 43.6 | 14.8 | −2.0 | 10,164 | | Humboldt, CA | 13.0 | 32.0 | +1.3 | 61,359 | | Imperial, CA | 85.3 | 15.7 | −19.7 | 52,629 | | Inyo, CA | 23.6 | 28.9 | +2.9 | 8,669 | | Kern, CA | 55.2 | 17.9 | −5.1 | 276,120 | | Kings, CA | 56.6 | 14.3 | −4.9 | 40,593 | | Lake, CA | 23.0 | 17.3 | −1.8 | 25,955 | | Lassen, CA | 20.9 | 12.9 | +3.2 | 11,097 | | Los Angeles, CA | 48.4 | 34.8 | −5.0 | 3,606,971 | | Madera, CA | 59.6 | 16.6 | −3.4 | 53,325 | | Marin, CA | 17.8 | 60.6 | +4.0 | 140,206 | | Mariposa, CA | 13.2 | 29.4 | +3.0 | 9,247 | | Mendocino, CA | 26.6 | 24.6 | −2.8 | 37,577 | | Merced, CA | 61.8 | 14.7 | −9.2 | 84,145 | | Modoc, CA | 15.3 | 21.5 | +3.9 | 3,892 | | Mono, CA | 27.1 | 32.1 | +4.2 | 5,816 | | Monterey, CA | 60.3 | 27.2 | −5.3 | 142,286 | | Napa, CA | 35.2 | 38.5 | +0.7 | 63,569 | | Nevada, CA | 10.1 | 39.6 | +3.6 | 59,961 | | Orange, CA | 34.0 | 42.7 | −0.4 | 1,346,546 | | Placer, CA | 15.0 | 42.0 | +4.1 | 227,899 | | Plumas, CA | 9.8 | 23.5 | +5.7 | 9,745 | | Riverside, CA | 50.3 | 24.4 | −3.3 | 915,459 | | Sacramento, CA | 23.8 | 32.8 | +0.6 | 633,704 | | San Benito, CA | 61.2 | 22.1 | −5.9 | 26,881 | | San Bernardino, CA | 54.5 | 22.3 | −7.0 | 740,530 | | San Diego, CA | 34.3 | 41.3 | +0.1 | 1,434,642 | | San Francisco, CA | 15.7 | 59.6 | −0.3 | 386,313 | | San Joaquin, CA | 42.1 | 21.0 | −9.0 | 255,643 | | San Luis Obispo, CA | 23.9 | 38.0 | +3.9 | 146,246 | | San Mateo, CA | 24.5 | 52.9 | −0.7 | 319,573 | | Santa Barbara, CA | 47.0 | 35.9 | +0.8 | 179,019 | | Santa Clara, CA | 25.0 | 55.0 | −0.8 | 721,668 | | Santa Cruz, CA | 34.4 | 42.9 | +0.9 | 128,976 | | Shasta, CA | 11.1 | 22.9 | +2.6 | 86,669 | | Sierra, CA | 10.5 | 22.6 | +3.2 | 1,707 | | Siskiyou, CA | 13.2 | 22.7 | +2.4 | 20,790 | | Solano, CA | 28.2 | 27.9 | −1.2 | 184,342 | | Sonoma, CA | 28.5 | 37.5 | +1.1 | 243,026 | | Stanislaus, CA | 48.5 | 18.7 | −6.0 | 192,333 | | Sutter, CA | 32.1 | 20.5 | −9.3 | 38,388 | | Tehama, CA | 27.3 | 18.4 | −0.2 | 25,918 | | Trinity, CA | 6.8 | 20.8 | +1.9 | 5,428 | | Tulare, CA | 65.9 | 15.6 | −7.1 | 135,075 | | Tuolumne, CA | 13.1 | 23.5 | +2.9 | 28,119 | | Ventura, CA | 43.6 | 35.0 | +0.1 | 376,325 | | Yolo, CA | 32.5 | 43.7 | +1.2 | 89,249 | | Yuba, CA | 29.8 | 17.9 | +1.8 | 29,216 | | Adams, CO | 41.6 | 27.1 | −1.4 | 227,080 | | Alamosa, CO | 47.6 | 28.5 | −4.3 | 7,301 | | Arapahoe, CO | 20.6 | 45.0 | +1.5 | 316,036 | | Archuleta, CO | 17.5 | 40.3 | +7.9 | 9,122 | | Baca, CO | 11.1 | 23.3 | +5.1 | 1,961 | | Bent, CO | 32.4 | 15.4 | +0.8 | 2,141 | | Boulder, CO | 14.3 | 63.6 | +5.6 | 190,907 | | Broomfield, CO | 13.4 | 58.2 | +7.3 | 45,497 | | Chaffee, CO | 9.9 | 41.3 | +13.0 | 14,026 | | Cheyenne, CO | 10.6 | 24.8 | +3.6 | 1,038 | | Clear Creek, CO | 7.5 | 54.2 | +9.8 | 5,916 | | Conejos, CO | 51.0 | 25.6 | −4.5 | 3,985 | | Costilla, CO | 58.0 | 24.4 | −6.5 | 2,005 | | Crowley, CO | 30.5 | 10.6 | +6.0 | 1,653 | | Custer, CO | 7.9 | 38.9 | +7.1 | 3,771 | | Delta, CO | 14.8 | 24.2 | +7.6 | 18,978 | | Denver, CO | 28.8 | 53.4 | +1.0 | 353,399 | | Dolores, CO | 12.0 | 27.1 | +4.8 | 1,401 | | Douglas, CO | 9.6 | 60.3 | +6.3 | 237,859 | | Eagle, CO | 29.8 | 50.7 | +0.6 | 27,091 | | Elbert, CO | 8.3 | 35.1 | +5.3 | 19,977 | | El Paso, CO | 18.1 | 40.3 | +7.2 | 370,530 | | Fremont, CO | 13.3 | 20.2 | +7.5 | 24,839 | | Garfield, CO | 30.6 | 32.8 | +5.9 | 29,621 | | Gilpin, CO | 8.0 | 48.6 | +9.7 | 3,983 | | Grand, CO | 9.7 | 41.4 | +7.1 | 9,565 | | Gunnison, CO | 9.8 | 61.1 | +5.1 | 10,576 | | Hinsdale, CO | 5.7 | 45.7 | +9.5 | 589 | | Huerfano, CO | 32.2 | 25.0 | +0.2 | 4,311 | | Jackson, CO | 10.8 | 31.3 | +8.1 | 807 | | Jefferson, CO | 15.8 | 49.2 | +7.0 | 351,380 | | Kiowa, CO | 8.7 | 20.6 | +8.3 | 846 | | Kit Carson, CO | 19.5 | 19.0 | +1.9 | 3,639 | | Lake, CO | 29.4 | 44.9 | +2.0 | 3,756 | | La Plata, CO | 12.9 | 46.7 | +7.1 | 34,701 | | Larimer, CO | 12.3 | 50.3 | +8.3 | 219,056 | | Las Animas, CO | 39.9 | 19.6 | +2.4 | 7,604 | | Lincoln, CO | 18.6 | 19.4 | +4.3 | 2,522 | | Logan, CO | 17.1 | 20.4 | +5.2 | 9,953 | | Mesa, CO | 15.1 | 29.9 | +9.9 | 89,412 | | Mineral, CO | 5.1 | 52.9 | +7.3 | 734 | | Moffat, CO | 16.4 | 20.4 | +6.9 | 6,525 | | Montezuma, CO | 12.6 | 30.2 | +7.5 | 14,765 | | Montrose, CO | 21.1 | 26.6 | +9.9 | 25,058 | | Morgan, CO | 37.3 | 17.5 | −1.3 | 13,121 | | Otero, CO | 42.1 | 19.4 | +1.9 | 8,684 | | Ouray, CO | 4.4 | 52.8 | +7.8 | 4,015 | | Park, CO | 7.0 | 37.1 | +6.6 | 11,669 | | Phillips, CO | 29.7 | 28.5 | +2.2 | 2,300 | | Pitkin, CO | 10.8 | 62.0 | −1.4 | 10,924 | | Prowers, CO | 39.5 | 18.9 | +1.2 | 5,060 | | Pueblo, CO | 42.7 | 24.3 | −0.9 | 83,016 | | Rio Blanco, CO | 10.6 | 24.7 | +10.3 | 3,625 | | Rio Grande, CO | 42.5 | 30.2 | +1.3 | 6,049 | | Routt, CO | 8.0 | 51.8 | +6.4 | 15,884 | | Saguache, CO | 36.4 | 26.9 | −4.3 | 3,281 | | San Juan, CO | 21.1 | 42.8 | +13.7 | 564 | | San Miguel, CO | 11.3 | 60.7 | +1.7 | 4,683 | | Sedgwick, CO | 19.2 | 23.9 | +6.3 | 1,331 | | Summit, CO | 15.8 | 54.3 | +3.7 | 17,006 | | Teller, CO | 7.4 | 36.7 | +5.8 | 15,921 | | Washington, CO | 11.1 | 22.9 | +5.0 | 2,765 | | Weld, CO | 30.3 | 30.4 | +3.1 | 175,221 | | Yuma, CO | 27.1 | 23.0 | +7.2 | 4,565 | | Kent, DE | 7.7 | 26.0 | +4.0 | 86,680 | | New Castle, DE | 11.0 | 38.2 | +1.5 | 271,568 | | Sussex, DE | 10.4 | 31.2 | +6.4 | 145,861 | | District Of Columbia, DC | 11.5 | 62.0 | +3.8 | 315,261 | | Alachua, FL | 11.4 | 46.4 | −0.1 | 134,517 | | Baker, FL | 3.4 | 16.1 | +3.5 | 14,908 | | Bay, FL | 7.9 | 27.1 | +2.4 | 96,698 | | Bradford, FL | 4.7 | 12.7 | +1.8 | 13,866 | | Brevard, FL | 11.4 | 32.6 | +1.7 | 357,766 | | Broward, FL | 31.5 | 34.9 | −6.7 | 866,280 | | Calhoun, FL | 5.6 | 11.3 | +0.8 | 6,388 | | Charlotte, FL | 7.9 | 25.4 | −1.3 | 122,930 | | Citrus, FL | 6.4 | 19.8 | +1.3 | 97,632 | | Clay, FL | 10.8 | 27.2 | +4.1 | 125,637 | | Collier, FL | 28.1 | 38.1 | −2.3 | 214,987 | | Columbia, FL | 7.2 | 15.9 | +1.1 | 33,358 | | DeSoto, FL | 30.8 | 11.5 | −4.9 | 12,413 | | Dixie, FL | 4.4 | 10.1 | +1.7 | 8,103 | | Duval, FL | 11.3 | 32.6 | +0.7 | 465,650 | | Escambia, FL | 6.4 | 28.4 | +1.7 | 161,008 | | Flagler, FL | 11.1 | 28.5 | −1.4 | 79,445 | | Franklin, FL | 5.6 | 24.2 | −0.5 | 6,701 | | Gadsden, FL | 11.4 | 19.8 | +0.2 | 21,698 | | Gilchrist, FL | 7.0 | 13.8 | +2.0 | 10,593 | | Glades, FL | 23.4 | 12.5 | −1.0 | 5,256 | | Gulf, FL | 4.7 | 23.4 | +2.6 | 8,654 | | Hamilton, FL | 10.6 | 9.6 | −1.2 | 5,691 | | Hardee, FL | 43.1 | 10.6 | −5.2 | 8,087 | | Hendry, FL | 56.0 | 10.2 | −9.3 | 13,349 | | Hernando, FL | 15.5 | 20.1 | −0.8 | 109,877 | | Highlands, FL | 21.3 | 19.0 | −0.3 | 51,609 | | Hillsborough, FL | 29.7 | 36.3 | −4.0 | 663,472 | | Holmes, FL | 3.3 | 11.2 | +5.0 | 9,075 | | Indian River, FL | 13.2 | 32.2 | +0.3 | 98,391 | | Jackson, FL | 5.2 | 14.0 | −1.1 | 21,966 | | Jefferson, FL | 4.6 | 21.2 | −5.7 | 8,440 | | Lafayette, FL | 14.5 | 9.6 | +1.7 | 3,737 | | Lake, FL | 17.4 | 26.1 | +1.5 | 225,046 | | Lee, FL | 23.3 | 29.8 | −3.2 | 389,901 | | Leon, FL | 7.4 | 47.8 | −0.5 | 154,917 | | Levy, FL | 9.5 | 15.3 | +1.5 | 24,239 | | Liberty, FL | 5.5 | 15.0 | −0.4 | 3,464 | | Madison, FL | 5.9 | 13.9 | −3.3 | 9,105 | | Manatee, FL | 17.4 | 32.8 | −1.4 | 227,160 | | Marion, FL | 15.4 | 22.0 | +0.4 | 212,609 | | Martin, FL | 14.8 | 35.3 | −0.5 | 97,660 | | Miami-Dade, FL | 68.7 | 32.5 | −12.8 | 1,085,945 | | Monroe, FL | 24.6 | 36.9 | −4.4 | 43,997 | | Nassau, FL | 5.1 | 33.0 | +5.2 | 65,088 | | Okaloosa, FL | 10.4 | 33.5 | +3.1 | 112,383 | | Okeechobee, FL | 26.0 | 15.1 | −3.3 | 15,986 | | Orange, FL | 33.0 | 37.4 | −3.5 | 599,086 | | Osceola, FL | 55.3 | 26.5 | −9.3 | 170,918 | | Palm Beach, FL | 23.5 | 38.8 | −6.0 | 739,348 | | Pasco, FL | 17.2 | 26.9 | +0.9 | 315,229 | | Pinellas, FL | 10.6 | 34.6 | +0.6 | 511,924 | | Polk, FL | 26.4 | 22.0 | −0.2 | 345,923 | | Putnam, FL | 10.7 | 14.0 | −0.4 | 36,054 | | St. Johns, FL | 8.2 | 47.7 | +1.4 | 195,621 | | St. Lucie, FL | 20.6 | 24.6 | −1.5 | 183,810 | | Santa Rosa, FL | 6.3 | 29.6 | +2.1 | 111,349 | | Sarasota, FL | 10.0 | 38.6 | −1.7 | 275,887 | | Seminole, FL | 22.9 | 41.9 | −0.3 | 250,452 | | Sumter, FL | 6.1 | 33.7 | +4.6 | 104,685 | | Suwannee, FL | 10.7 | 16.2 | +1.9 | 21,778 | | Taylor, FL | 4.3 | 13.7 | +0.4 | 9,945 | | Union, FL | 5.6 | 10.8 | +3.4 | 6,195 | | Volusia, FL | 15.4 | 26.4 | −1.6 | 307,823 | | Wakulla, FL | 4.4 | 20.9 | +2.7 | 19,687 | | Walton, FL | 7.5 | 32.5 | +0.1 | 49,257 | | Washington, FL | 3.9 | 11.8 | +1.9 | 12,510 | | Appling, GA | 10.4 | 10.4 | +0.9 | 8,321 | | Atkinson, GA | 26.7 | 10.6 | −0.8 | 3,050 | | Bacon, GA | 8.4 | 9.8 | +5.9 | 4,831 | | Baker, GA | 4.4 | 19.0 | +2.0 | 1,473 | | Baldwin, GA | 2.6 | 24.3 | +2.6 | 18,733 | | Banks, GA | 7.2 | 17.2 | +6.4 | 10,494 | | Barrow, GA | 13.4 | 20.7 | +9.3 | 43,679 | | Bartow, GA | 9.8 | 22.0 | +6.2 | 57,213 | | Ben Hill, GA | 6.5 | 12.0 | +0.4 | 6,480 | | Berrien, GA | 5.7 | 14.5 | +3.1 | 8,050 | | Bibb, GA | 4.1 | 25.8 | +4.6 | 68,830 | | Bleckley, GA | 3.5 | 18.9 | +4.0 | 6,024 | | Brantley, GA | 2.7 | 10.7 | +5.3 | 8,480 | | Brooks, GA | 6.4 | 16.1 | +0.1 | 7,189 | | Bryan, GA | 7.9 | 34.5 | +5.3 | 24,517 | | Bulloch, GA | 4.7 | 30.0 | +1.0 | 32,499 | | Burke, GA | 3.4 | 15.0 | −1.5 | 11,021 | | Butts, GA | 3.6 | 12.7 | +4.7 | 12,968 | | Calhoun, GA | 5.2 | 12.4 | +2.9 | 2,053 | | Camden, GA | 7.3 | 23.5 | +1.6 | 26,224 | | Candler, GA | 12.3 | 13.7 | +0.9 | 4,562 | | Carroll, GA | 7.8 | 22.9 | +4.3 | 60,170 | | Catoosa, GA | 3.5 | 23.6 | +7.1 | 34,854 | | Charlton, GA | 11.3 | 12.6 | +0.9 | 4,614 | | Chatham, GA | 7.4 | 36.0 | +5.2 | 140,094 | | Chattahoochee, GA | 17.1 | 28.3 | +3.3 | 1,685 | | Chattooga, GA | 5.5 | 10.8 | +4.3 | 10,665 | | Cherokee, GA | 11.5 | 39.0 | +6.7 | 160,980 | | Clarke, GA | 11.3 | 46.4 | +2.0 | 52,346 | | Clay, GA | 0.2 | 20.2 | +2.8 | 1,434 | | Clayton, GA | 13.8 | 20.8 | +4.1 | 111,080 | | Clinch, GA | 6.3 | 9.9 | +2.2 | 2,903 | | Cobb, GA | 14.1 | 49.6 | +6.6 | 397,083 | | Coffee, GA | 12.6 | 13.0 | +1.1 | 15,683 | | Colquitt, GA | 20.1 | 14.6 | +3.3 | 16,565 | | Columbia, GA | 7.4 | 37.5 | +6.5 | 85,281 | | Cook, GA | 6.7 | 16.8 | +0.3 | 7,330 | | Coweta, GA | 7.6 | 34.7 | +8.0 | 85,315 | | Crawford, GA | 3.7 | 12.6 | +2.7 | 6,324 | | Crisp, GA | 3.6 | 14.5 | +5.2 | 8,092 | | Dade, GA | 2.6 | 17.1 | +4.6 | 8,147 | | Dawson, GA | 6.1 | 35.0 | +9.2 | 19,465 | | Decatur, GA | 6.6 | 14.6 | −0.8 | 11,512 | | DeKalb, GA | 9.5 | 46.5 | +3.4 | 362,252 | | Dodge, GA | 3.7 | 16.2 | +1.9 | 8,330 | | Dooly, GA | 7.7 | 13.9 | +4.5 | 4,164 | | Dougherty, GA | 3.1 | 22.5 | +7.0 | 33,735 | | Douglas, GA | 11.1 | 29.5 | +12.3 | 70,236 | | Early, GA | 1.5 | 14.2 | −0.3 | 4,876 | | Echols, GA | 24.6 | 11.8 | +0.3 | 1,434 | | Effingham, GA | 5.7 | 25.5 | +7.1 | 36,087 | | Elbert, GA | 5.9 | 14.0 | −0.7 | 9,560 | | Emanuel, GA | 4.7 | 12.4 | +0.7 | 9,592 | | Evans, GA | 12.1 | 15.3 | +0.7 | 4,225 | | Fannin, GA | 2.9 | 23.1 | +6.2 | 16,039 | | Fayette, GA | 8.0 | 48.3 | +9.8 | 73,999 | | Floyd, GA | 11.9 | 23.6 | +5.5 | 44,493 | | Forsyth, GA | 9.8 | 56.0 | +6.3 | 136,790 | | Franklin, GA | 5.2 | 17.4 | +3.4 | 12,106 | | Fulton, GA | 7.7 | 56.5 | +4.5 | 529,407 | | Gilmer, GA | 12.0 | 23.1 | +7.4 | 18,389 | | Glascock, GA | 2.4 | 13.7 | +2.1 | 1,667 | | Glynn, GA | 7.2 | 31.1 | +3.4 | 43,702 | | Gordon, GA | 16.2 | 17.4 | +5.5 | 27,477 | | Grady, GA | 12.4 | 15.9 | −0.2 | 10,675 | | Greene, GA | 6.6 | 34.2 | +3.7 | 12,729 | | Gwinnett, GA | 22.5 | 38.2 | +4.3 | 415,548 | | Habersham, GA | 15.8 | 22.9 | +5.7 | 23,178 | | Hall, GA | 28.8 | 25.6 | +5.9 | 101,338 | | Hancock, GA | 1.1 | 9.8 | −2.5 | 4,228 | | Haralson, GA | 2.0 | 17.1 | +6.1 | 16,304 | | Harris, GA | 4.4 | 35.2 | +4.6 | 22,259 | | Hart, GA | 4.0 | 19.0 | +1.0 | 14,274 | | Heard, GA | 2.8 | 11.0 | +3.0 | 6,194 | | Henry, GA | 7.7 | 28.8 | +15.2 | 128,235 | | Houston, GA | 7.1 | 31.7 | +7.4 | 80,997 | | Irwin, GA | 5.7 | 16.2 | +3.0 | 4,326 | | Jackson, GA | 9.5 | 25.6 | +9.5 | 46,969 | | Jasper, GA | 4.5 | 17.1 | +1.1 | 9,084 | | Jeff Davis, GA | 13.2 | 12.1 | +1.7 | 5,859 | | Jefferson, GA | 3.7 | 12.1 | −2.0 | 7,439 | | Jenkins, GA | 7.8 | 7.7 | +1.6 | 3,396 | | Johnson, GA | 2.2 | 7.7 | −0.3 | 3,979 | | Jones, GA | 2.0 | 20.4 | +2.1 | 16,038 | | Lamar, GA | 3.0 | 16.6 | +1.5 | 10,370 | | Lanier, GA | 6.9 | 19.5 | +1.8 | 3,721 | | Laurens, GA | 3.0 | 18.1 | +1.7 | 23,280 | | Lee, GA | 3.2 | 30.6 | +7.4 | 17,612 | | Liberty, GA | 12.7 | 19.9 | −0.8 | 22,900 | | Lincoln, GA | 1.7 | 14.7 | −1.1 | 4,910 | | Long, GA | 12.2 | 14.0 | +3.3 | 7,033 | | Lowndes, GA | 6.5 | 27.1 | +0.2 | 47,568 | | Lumpkin, GA | 5.4 | 31.5 | +3.1 | 17,695 | | McDuffie, GA | 3.4 | 16.4 | +0.5 | 10,499 | | McIntosh, GA | 1.5 | 18.7 | −1.5 | 7,375 | | Macon, GA | 4.5 | 10.5 | +0.9 | 4,671 | | Madison, GA | 6.6 | 20.1 | +4.7 | 16,704 | | Marion, GA | 7.9 | 15.6 | +2.5 | 3,601 | | Meriwether, GA | 1.6 | 12.6 | +1.2 | 11,748 | | Miller, GA | 1.9 | 20.0 | +2.3 | 2,715 | | Mitchell, GA | 4.9 | 13.0 | +0.3 | 8,851 | | Monroe, GA | 2.6 | 26.8 | +2.5 | 17,643 | | Montgomery, GA | 7.2 | 18.2 | +3.2 | 3,960 | | Morgan, GA | 3.5 | 26.9 | +2.1 | 13,122 | | Murray, GA | 15.6 | 12.8 | +4.1 | 17,424 | | Muscogee, GA | 8.1 | 29.0 | +5.3 | 80,029 | | Newton, GA | 6.5 | 22.9 | +10.3 | 58,732 | | Oconee, GA | 5.6 | 53.2 | +3.9 | 27,044 | | Oglethorpe, GA | 5.8 | 22.5 | +2.7 | 8,770 | | Paulding, GA | 7.7 | 26.7 | +11.3 | 94,571 | | Peach, GA | 8.6 | 22.4 | +4.7 | 13,397 | | Pickens, GA | 3.6 | 24.7 | +6.6 | 20,803 | | Pierce, GA | 5.1 | 16.8 | +4.0 | 9,744 | | Pike, GA | 2.0 | 20.5 | +4.1 | 12,512 | | Polk, GA | 13.6 | 14.1 | +2.9 | 19,101 | | Pulaski, GA | 4.3 | 13.8 | +4.6 | 4,317 | | Putnam, GA | 6.7 | 27.3 | +5.0 | 12,832 | | Quitman, GA | 1.1 | 11.9 | +0.3 | 1,136 | | Rabun, GA | 8.4 | 29.8 | +7.0 | 10,373 | | Randolph, GA | 3.8 | 14.3 | +4.6 | 2,974 | | Richmond, GA | 5.4 | 23.5 | +4.8 | 83,129 | | Rockdale, GA | 10.5 | 29.8 | +12.7 | 44,876 | | Schley, GA | 3.9 | 17.1 | +2.6 | 2,423 | | Screven, GA | 2.5 | 14.7 | −0.1 | 6,906 | | Seminole, GA | 2.2 | 14.4 | +0.7 | 4,002 | | Spalding, GA | 5.4 | 18.3 | +10.3 | 32,863 | | Stephens, GA | 3.8 | 16.6 | +2.4 | 13,036 | | Stewart, GA | 10.0 | 13.2 | +3.2 | 2,024 | | Sumter, GA | 6.0 | 20.7 | +3.5 | 12,005 | | Talbot, GA | 0.7 | 12.3 | −2.5 | 3,371 | | Taliaferro, GA | 4.4 | 8.9 | −0.8 | 882 | | Tattnall, GA | 11.3 | 14.7 | +1.7 | 8,482 | | Taylor, GA | 0.9 | 15.0 | +2.1 | 3,966 | | Telfair, GA | 13.2 | 8.5 | −2.3 | 4,204 | | Terrell, GA | 2.8 | 11.6 | +1.7 | 4,328 | | Thomas, GA | 3.8 | 23.4 | +1.6 | 22,017 | | Tift, GA | 12.6 | 19.1 | +4.3 | 16,934 | | Toombs, GA | 11.8 | 17.5 | +0.9 | 10,882 | | Towns, GA | 3.1 | 31.8 | +4.5 | 8,804 | | Treutlen, GA | 1.7 | 14.1 | −0.8 | 3,114 | | Troup, GA | 4.2 | 21.9 | +3.7 | 31,149 | | Turner, GA | 4.8 | 10.3 | +2.5 | 3,822 | | Twiggs, GA | 1.3 | 10.4 | −1.2 | 4,444 | | Union, GA | 3.6 | 24.8 | +7.1 | 17,786 | | Upson, GA | 2.5 | 14.5 | +0.6 | 13,626 | | Walker, GA | 2.6 | 20.2 | +6.6 | 31,898 | | Walton, GA | 5.6 | 23.5 | +9.7 | 58,012 | | Ware, GA | 4.6 | 14.8 | +3.6 | 14,347 | | Warren, GA | 0.6 | 11.4 | −0.7 | 2,586 | | Washington, GA | 2.4 | 16.0 | +3.4 | 9,467 | The first 500 of 3102 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/swing_by_share.json. Views: Hispanic share; College share. Note: Intervals resample whole states; see Methods. The number of counties in each group is in the tooltip. Note: Counties without 2020 characteristics (the eight Connecticut counties) and Jackson County, Missouri are left out. Points are shown for all remaining counties. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the later election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/swing_by_share.json ### Table 5. With the other three shares held fixed, college share tracks the 2020 to 2024 swing although its vote-weighted correlation alone is near zero Correlation of each characteristic with the county swing, alone and as a standardized coefficient in one regression on the four characteristics; two pairs of elections and two weightings | Characteristic | Pair | Weighting | Correlation alone | Alone, low | Alone, high | Coefficient, all four | Together, low | Together, high | Counties | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | College share | 2016–20 | County-equal | +0.51 | +0.45 | +0.60 | +0.51 | +0.43 | +0.59 | 3,113 | | Hispanic share | 2016–20 | County-equal | −0.30 | −0.51 | +0.10 | −0.30 | −0.60 | +0.01 | 3,113 | | Foreign-born share | 2016–20 | County-equal | −0.03 | −0.20 | +0.22 | −0.02 | −0.19 | +0.15 | 3,113 | | Black share | 2016–20 | County-equal | −0.12 | −0.26 | −0.02 | −0.10 | −0.17 | −0.04 | 3,113 | | College share | 2020–24 | County-equal | +0.16 | +0.07 | +0.24 | +0.24 | +0.15 | +0.34 | 3,102 | | Hispanic share | 2020–24 | County-equal | −0.39 | −0.51 | −0.16 | −0.22 | −0.36 | −0.08 | 3,102 | | Foreign-born share | 2020–24 | County-equal | −0.34 | −0.47 | −0.14 | −0.29 | −0.48 | −0.10 | 3,102 | | Black share | 2020–24 | County-equal | −0.24 | −0.36 | −0.14 | −0.24 | −0.35 | −0.13 | 3,102 | | College share | 2016–20 | Vote-weighted | +0.25 | +0.11 | +0.41 | +0.56 | +0.46 | +0.65 | 3,113 | | Hispanic share | 2016–20 | Vote-weighted | −0.48 | −0.62 | −0.20 | +0.08 | −0.16 | +0.31 | 3,113 | | Foreign-born share | 2016–20 | Vote-weighted | −0.50 | −0.67 | −0.10 | −0.77 | −0.99 | −0.55 | 3,113 | | Black share | 2016–20 | Vote-weighted | −0.13 | −0.29 | 0.00 | −0.09 | −0.16 | −0.01 | 3,113 | | College share | 2020–24 | Vote-weighted | +0.02 | −0.08 | +0.13 | +0.31 | +0.24 | +0.38 | 3,102 | | Hispanic share | 2020–24 | Vote-weighted | −0.66 | −0.76 | −0.46 | −0.18 | −0.35 | −0.01 | 3,102 | | Foreign-born share | 2020–24 | Vote-weighted | −0.69 | −0.77 | −0.49 | −0.69 | −0.93 | −0.44 | 3,102 | | Black share | 2020–24 | Vote-weighted | −0.07 | −0.25 | +0.09 | −0.04 | −0.16 | +0.07 | 3,102 | Views: 2020–24, vote-weighted (pair = 2020–24, weighting = Vote-weighted); 2020–24, county-equal (pair = 2020–24, weighting = County-equal); 2016–20, vote-weighted (pair = 2016–20, weighting = Vote-weighted); 2016–20, county-equal (pair = 2016–20, weighting = County-equal). Note: Intervals resample whole states; see Methods. Note: Each characteristic is standardized with the weighted mean and standard deviation of the weighting shown, so a coefficient from a regression on one characteristic equals its correlation. The four characteristics are correlated across counties, so a coefficient depends on which others are in the regression. Non-Hispanic white share is not in the regression. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the later election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/correlation_and_model.json ### Table 6. ZIP code areas give Hispanic and foreign-born correlations similar to counties for 2016 to 2020, and a larger college correlation with a different college measure Vote-weighted correlation of four characteristics with the swing in the Democratic minus Republican margin between 2016 and 2020, at county and ZIP code area grain | Characteristic | County | County, low | County, high | Counties | ZIP code area | ZIP, low | ZIP, high | ZIP code areas | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | College share | +0.25 | +0.11 | +0.41 | 3,113 | +0.47 | +0.42 | +0.55 | 29,323 | | Hispanic share | −0.48 | −0.62 | −0.20 | 3,113 | −0.50 | −0.60 | −0.29 | 29,323 | | Foreign-born share | −0.50 | −0.67 | −0.10 | 3,113 | −0.46 | −0.61 | −0.14 | 29,323 | | Black share | −0.13 | −0.29 | 0.00 | 3,113 | −0.18 | −0.29 | −0.11 | 29,323 | Note: Intervals resample whole states; see Methods. Note: ZIP code area votes are estimates allocated from precinct returns, so they carry allocation error. There is no ZIP code area release for 2024, so the 2020 to 2024 pair cannot be checked below the county. The 14 areas for which the atlas codes one of the four characteristics as missing, with a negative value, are dropped. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the later election or county-equal, as stated; ZIP code areas from precinct votes allocated to census geographies (Fekrazad 2025), 2016 and 2020, weighted by 2020 presidential votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/zip_code_check.json ### Table 7. High-Hispanic counties swung 4.2 points further toward the Republicans than the average county, vote-weighted Mean county swing in the Democratic minus Republican margin minus the national swing, minus the mean over all counties of the same weighting, in percentage points, by county type, weighted by votes and counting each county once | County type | Weighting | Minus all-county mean (points) | Difference, low | Difference, high | Mean swing minus national swing (points) | Interval low | Interval high | All-county mean, same weighting (points) | Counties | Two-party votes, 2024 (millions) | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | High-Hispanic | Vote-weighted | −4.2 | −6.2 | −3.0 | −2.9 | −4.8 | −1.2 | +1.3 | 314 | 36.6 | | High-Hispanic | County-equal | −3.3 | −4.7 | −2.4 | −0.6 | −2.0 | +0.4 | +2.7 | 314 | 36.6 | | High-Black | Vote-weighted | +0.9 | −0.8 | +2.1 | +2.2 | +0.6 | +3.4 | +1.3 | 379 | 17.5 | | High-Black | County-equal | −1.8 | −2.9 | −1.0 | +0.9 | −0.2 | +1.7 | +2.7 | 379 | 17.5 | | Affluent suburban | Vote-weighted | +0.8 | −0.1 | +1.7 | +2.1 | +0.7 | +3.7 | +1.3 | 152 | 36.2 | | Affluent suburban | County-equal | +0.3 | −0.7 | +1.3 | +3.0 | +1.9 | +4.3 | +2.7 | 152 | 36.2 | | All other | Vote-weighted | +1.9 | +0.8 | +2.7 | +3.2 | +2.6 | +3.8 | +1.3 | 2,257 | 59.7 | | All other | County-equal | +0.7 | +0.4 | +1.1 | +3.4 | +3.0 | +3.9 | +2.7 | 2,257 | 59.7 | Note: Intervals resample whole states; see Methods. The groups are rules applied in the order given in the text, and each county is in one group; the thresholds are not fitted to the swing. Note: Counties are assigned by their 2020 characteristics. Jackson County, Missouri and the eight Connecticut counties are left out. The data table also gives each group's mean minus the national swing, with its interval, and the all-county mean. Source: County presidential returns, 2000-2024 (Algara and Amlani; MIT Election Data and Science Lab), full counts of votes, and county demographics (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated to election years); weighted by two-party votes in the later election or county-equal, as stated Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/county_types.json ### Table 8. The Democratic margin fell among Hispanic and Black respondents in 2020 to 2024 and among white and Black respondents in 2012 to 2016 Change in the Democratic minus Republican margin among White, Black and Hispanic respondents who reported a major-party presidential vote, in percentage points, with one panel for each pair of elections | Race | Pair of elections | Weight | Change in margin (points) | Interval low | Interval high | Respondents, both waves combined | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | White | 2012–16 | Year-specific weight | −7.0 | −9.1 | −4.8 | 61,083 | | Black | 2012–16 | Year-specific weight | −6.5 | −9.9 | −3.1 | 6,938 | | Hispanic | 2012–16 | Year-specific weight | +4.3 | −3.6 | +12.3 | 6,340 | | Asian | 2012–16 | Year-specific weight | +11.0 | −3.0 | +25.0 | 1,502 | | Other | 2012–16 | Year-specific weight | −7.1 | −17.9 | +3.7 | 2,817 | | White | 2016–20 | Year-specific weight | +2.2 | +0.3 | +4.2 | 63,584 | | Black | 2016–20 | Year-specific weight | −2.4 | −6.1 | +1.4 | 7,967 | | Hispanic | 2016–20 | Year-specific weight | −5.7 | −12.9 | +1.5 | 7,866 | | Asian | 2016–20 | Year-specific weight | −12.5 | −22.0 | −3.1 | 2,208 | | Other | 2016–20 | Year-specific weight | −2.5 | −12.3 | +7.3 | 3,138 | | White | 2020–24 | Year-specific weight | −1.9 | −4.0 | +0.2 | 64,714 | | Black | 2020–24 | Year-specific weight | −19.0 | −24.1 | −14.0 | 7,822 | | Hispanic | 2020–24 | Year-specific weight | −23.0 | −30.5 | −15.5 | 7,642 | | Asian | 2020–24 | Year-specific weight | −9.8 | −21.1 | +1.4 | 2,210 | | Other | 2020–24 | Year-specific weight | −6.7 | −17.2 | +3.9 | 3,492 | | White | 2012–16 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | −4.4 | −6.7 | −2.2 | 61,083 | | Black | 2012–16 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | −6.8 | −10.5 | −3.0 | 6,938 | | Hispanic | 2012–16 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | +10.1 | +1.9 | +18.3 | 6,340 | | Asian | 2012–16 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | +11.0 | −3.3 | +25.4 | 1,502 | | Other | 2012–16 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | −2.6 | −13.7 | +8.4 | 2,817 | | White | 2016–20 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | +3.6 | +1.5 | +5.7 | 63,583 | | Black | 2016–20 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | −4.3 | −8.6 | +0.1 | 7,967 | | Hispanic | 2016–20 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | −4.7 | −12.3 | +3.0 | 7,866 | | Asian | 2016–20 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | −11.5 | −22.0 | −1.0 | 2,208 | | Other | 2016–20 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | +4.7 | −6.5 | +15.8 | 3,138 | | White | 2020–24 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | −4.1 | −6.2 | −1.9 | 53,387 | | Black | 2020–24 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | −13.9 | −19.5 | −8.3 | 5,828 | | Hispanic | 2020–24 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | −14.9 | −24.1 | −5.6 | 5,294 | | Asian | 2020–24 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | −3.1 | −15.6 | +9.4 | 1,408 | | Other | 2020–24 | Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 | +8.1 | −4.0 | +20.2 | 2,777 | Views: Default weight (plotted = true, weights = Year-specific weight); Other weights (plotted = true, weights = Post-election weight, validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024). Note: The Cooperative Election Study is an opt-in online panel with post-stratification weights, so the intervals use the Kish effective sample size and assume a weighted simple random sample. They describe sampling variation among its respondents and leave out how those respondents came to join the panel. The year-specific weight is the pre-election weight, applied here to a post-election vote question, and it is the only weight present in all four waves. Note: Respondents are those who reported voting for the Democratic or Republican presidential candidate, so people who did not vote and people who voted for others are left out. Race is self-reported. A dot compares two separate samples of respondents, so it does not follow the same people over time. Source: Cooperative Election Study, 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 waves; weighted by the year-specific weight, and in the second view by the post-election weight (2012 to 2016 and 2016 to 2020) or the validated-voter weight (2020 to 2024) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/ces_by_race.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (169), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | aff_ba_cut | 35% | percent of adults 25 and older | definition of an affluent suburban county | threshold for affluent suburban counties | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | aff_inc_cut | 75,000 | dollars of median household income, 2024 prices | definition of an affluent suburban county | threshold for affluent suburban counties | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | aff_rural_cut | 25% | percent of residents in rural areas | definition of an affluent suburban county | threshold for affluent suburban counties | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | atlanta_min_rel | +3.4 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | smallest county swing minus national swing among the five counties | Fulton, Cobb, DeKalb, Gwinnett and Henry counties, Georgia | 2020 to 2024 | | 5 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | b2_hispanic_1620_w | −0.24 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on Hispanic share in a vote-weighted regression of the county swing on Hispanic share and foreign-born share only | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.42 to −0.07 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b2_hispanic_2024_w | −0.35 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on Hispanic share in a vote-weighted regression of the county swing on Hispanic share and foreign-born share only | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.50 to −0.20 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_black_2024_u | −0.24 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on Black share in a county-equal regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.35 to −0.13 | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_black_2024_w | −0.04 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on Black share in a vote-weighted regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.16 to 0.07 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_college_1620_u | +0.51 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on college share in a county-equal regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 0.43 to 0.59 | 3,113 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_college_1620_w | +0.56 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on college share in a vote-weighted regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 0.46 to 0.65 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_college_2024_u | +0.24 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on college share in a county-equal regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.34 | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_college_2024_w | +0.31 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on college share in a vote-weighted regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.24 to 0.38 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_foreign_1620_w | −0.77 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on foreign-born share in a vote-weighted regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.99 to −0.55 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_foreign_2024_u | −0.29 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on foreign-born share in a county-equal regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.48 to −0.10 | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_foreign_2024_w | −0.69 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on foreign-born share in a vote-weighted regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.93 to −0.44 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_hispanic_1620_u | −0.30 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on Hispanic share in a county-equal regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.60 to 0.01 | 3,113 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_hispanic_1620_w | +0.08 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on Hispanic share in a vote-weighted regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.16 to 0.31 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_hispanic_2024_u | −0.22 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on Hispanic share in a county-equal regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.36 to −0.08 | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | b_hispanic_2024_w | −0.18 | standardized regression coefficient, standard deviations of swing per standard deviation of the characteristic | coefficient on Hispanic share in a vote-weighted regression of the county swing on the four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.35 to −0.01 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% normal interval with errors clustered by state. | | band | 5 | percentage points of the two-party margin | definition of near the national swing | half-width of the band around the national swing | 2012 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | big_cut | 250,000 | two-party votes in the later election | definition of a large county | threshold for a large county | 2016 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | big_n_2024 | 134 | counties | count of large counties | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | big_share_2024 | 46.3% | percent of two-party votes | share of the later election's two-party votes cast in large counties | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | 134 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | black_cut | 25% | percent of residents | definition of a high-Black county | threshold for high-Black counties | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | black_ex_atlanta | +1.8 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | high-Black counties without Fulton, Cobb, DeKalb, Gwinnett and Henry counties | 2020 to 2024 | | 374 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | black_ex_kings | +2.5 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | high-Black counties without Kings County | 2020 to 2024 | | 378 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | black_ex_three | +2.9 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | high-Black counties without Kings, Wayne and Essex counties | 2020 to 2024 | | 376 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | black_top10_neg | 2 | counties | count with a swing below the national swing | the ten high-Black counties with the most votes | 2020 to 2024 | | 10 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | ces_black_1216 | −6.5 | change in the two-party Democratic margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | difference between two waves in the weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | black respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI −9.9 to −3.1 | 6,938 | CES year-specific weight | Cooperative Election Study | Interval: 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, model-based. | | ces_black_2024 | −19.0 | change in the two-party Democratic margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | difference between two waves in the weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | black respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −24.1 to −14.0 | 7,822 | CES year-specific weight | Cooperative Election Study | Interval: 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, model-based. | | ces_black_m2020 | +82.9 | Democratic minus Republican margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | black respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2020 | | 3,898 | CES year-specific weight | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_black_m2024 | +63.8 | Democratic minus Republican margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | black respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2024 | | 4,069 | CES year-specific weight | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_hispanic_2024 | −23.0 | change in the two-party Democratic margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | difference between two waves in the weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | hispanic respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −30.5 to −15.5 | 7,642 | CES year-specific weight | Cooperative Election Study | Interval: 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, model-based. | | ces_hispanic_m2020 | +32.5 | Democratic minus Republican margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | hispanic respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2020 | | 3,788 | CES year-specific weight | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_hispanic_m2024 | +9.5 | Democratic minus Republican margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | hispanic respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2024 | | 4,078 | CES year-specific weight | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_white_1216 | −7.0 | change in the two-party Democratic margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | difference between two waves in the weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | white respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI −9.1 to −4.8 | 61,083 | CES year-specific weight | Cooperative Election Study | Interval: 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, model-based. | | ces_white_1620 | +2.2 | change in the two-party Democratic margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | difference between two waves in the weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | white respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 0.3 to 4.2 | 63,584 | CES year-specific weight | Cooperative Election Study | Interval: 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, model-based. | | ces_white_2024 | −1.9 | change in the two-party Democratic margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | difference between two waves in the weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | white respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.0 to 0.2 | 64,714 | CES year-specific weight | Cooperative Election Study | Interval: 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, model-based. | | cesv_black_1216 | −6.8 | change in the two-party Democratic margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | difference between two waves in the weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | black respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI −10.5 to −3.0 | 6,938 | CES post-election weight | Cooperative Election Study | Sensitivity to the weight. Interval: 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, model-based. | | cesv_black_2024 | −13.9 | change in the two-party Democratic margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | difference between two waves in the weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | black respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −19.5 to −8.3 | 5,828 | CES validated-voter weight | Cooperative Election Study | Sensitivity to the weight. Interval: 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, model-based. | | cesv_hispanic_2024 | −14.9 | change in the two-party Democratic margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | difference between two waves in the weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | hispanic respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −24.1 to −5.6 | 5,294 | CES validated-voter weight | Cooperative Election Study | Sensitivity to the weight. Interval: 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, model-based. | | cesv_white_1216 | −4.4 | change in the two-party Democratic margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | difference between two waves in the weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | white respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI −6.7 to −2.2 | 61,083 | CES post-election weight | Cooperative Election Study | Sensitivity to the weight. Interval: 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, model-based. | | cesv_white_2024 | −4.1 | change in the two-party Democratic margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | difference between two waves in the weighted Democratic minus Republican margin among presidential voters | white respondents who reported voting for a Democratic or Republican presidential candidate | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −6.2 to −1.9 | 53,387 | CES validated-voter weight | Cooperative Election Study | Sensitivity to the weight. Interval: 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, model-based. | | county_ba_mean | 21.7% | percent of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more | mean across counties of the bachelor's degree share in 2016 | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | | 3,113 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | diff_cut | 0.2 | difference between two correlations | definition of a large difference | cut-off for a large difference between weightings | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | essex_rel | −4.2 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county swing minus national swing | Essex County, New Jersey | 2020 to 2024 | | 1 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | ext_all_fb_min_2024 | 9.0% | percent of residents | smallest foreign-born share among the ten counties | the ten counties furthest below the national swing, with no minimum on votes | 2020 to 2024 | | 10 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | ext_all_hisp_min_2024 | 28.0% | percent of residents | smallest Hispanic share among the ten counties | the ten counties furthest below the national swing, with no minimum on votes | 2020 to 2024 | | 10 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | ext_high_georgia_2024 | 5 | counties | count in Georgia | the ten counties with 50,000 or more votes furthest above the national swing | 2020 to 2024 | | 10 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | ext_high_utva_2016 | 7 | counties | count in Utah or Virginia | the ten counties with 50,000 or more votes furthest above the national swing | 2012 to 2016 | | 10 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | ext_low_fb_min_2024 | 22.9% | percent of residents | smallest foreign-born share among the ten counties | the ten counties with 50,000 or more votes furthest below the national swing | 2020 to 2024 | | 10 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | ext_low_hisp_min_2024 | 28.0% | percent of residents | smallest Hispanic share among the ten counties | the ten counties with 50,000 or more votes furthest below the national swing | 2020 to 2024 | | 10 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | ext_low_rust_2016 | 8 | counties | count in Pennsylvania, Ohio or Michigan | the ten counties with 50,000 or more votes furthest below the national swing | 2012 to 2016 | | 10 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | ext_min_votes | 50,000 | two-party votes in the later election | minimum size of a county in the ranking | counties named among the furthest above or below the national swing | 2012 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | ext_n_2024 | 584 | counties | count of counties | counties with 50,000 or more two-party votes in the later election | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | g_ba_20_40_rel_u | +3.3 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing | counties 20 to under 40 percent college in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.7 to 3.8 | 1,528 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_ba_20_40_rel_w | +1.1 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | counties 20 to under 40 percent college in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.2 to 2.8 | 1,528 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_ba_40p_rel_u | +3.2 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing | counties 40 percent or more college in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.1 to 4.3 | 228 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_ba_40p_rel_w | +1.7 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | counties 40 percent or more college in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.4 to 3.3 | 228 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_ba_lt20_rel_u | +1.9 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing | counties under 20 percent college in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 1.4 to 2.5 | 1,346 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_ba_lt20_rel_w | +1.4 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | counties under 20 percent college in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.2 to 2.5 | 1,346 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_cut10 | 10% | percent of residents | definition of a county group | Hispanic share cut-off for the county groups | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | g_cut15 | 15% | percent of residents | definition of an alternative high-Hispanic county | alternative Hispanic share cut-off for high-Hispanic counties | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | g_cut20ba | 20% | percent of adults with a bachelor's degree or more | definition of a county group | college share cut-off for the county groups | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | g_cut40ba | 40% | percent of adults with a bachelor's degree or more | definition of a county group | college share cut-off for the county groups | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | g_cut50 | 50% | percent of residents | definition of a county group | Hispanic share cut-off for the county groups | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | g_hisp_10_25_n | 503 | counties | count of counties | counties 10 to under 25 percent Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | g_hisp_10_25_rel_u | +2.9 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing | counties 10 to under 25 percent Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.1 to 3.7 | 503 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_hisp_10_25_rel_w | +1.7 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | counties 10 to under 25 percent Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.3 to 3.4 | 503 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_hisp_25_50_n | 211 | counties | count of counties | counties 25 to under 50 percent Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | g_hisp_25_50_rel_u | +1.0 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing | counties 25 to under 50 percent Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.7 to 1.9 | 211 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_hisp_25_50_rel_w | −1.9 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | counties 25 to under 50 percent Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −3.6 to −0.3 | 211 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_hisp_50p_n | 103 | counties | count of counties | counties 50 percent or more Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | g_hisp_50p_rel_u | −3.9 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing | counties 50 percent or more Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −7.5 to −2.9 | 103 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_hisp_50p_rel_w | −7.6 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | counties 50 percent or more Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −12.2 to −5.3 | 103 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_hisp_50p_swing_w | −13.7 | change in the two-party margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of the county swing | counties 50 percent or more Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −18.3 to −11.4 | 103 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_hisp_lt10_n | 2,285 | counties | count of counties | counties under 10 percent Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | g_hisp_lt10_rel_u | +3.1 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing | counties under 10 percent Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.6 to 3.5 | 2,285 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | g_hisp_lt10_rel_w | +3.3 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | counties under 10 percent Hispanic in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.8 to 3.9 | 2,285 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | henry_rel | +15.2 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county swing minus national swing | Henry County, Georgia | 2020 to 2024 | | 1 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | hisp_cut | 25% | percent of residents | definition of a high-Hispanic county | threshold for high-Hispanic counties | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | kings_black | 28.0% | percent of residents | non-Hispanic Black share of residents | Kings County, New York | 2020 | | 1 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | kings_rel | −5.2 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county swing minus national swing | Kings County, New York | 2020 to 2024 | | 1 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | map_within_1216 | 24.6% | percent of counties shown | share of counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | | 3,112 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | map_within_2024 | 75.6% | percent of counties shown | share of counties whose swing is within the band of the national swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | 3,110 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | max_diff | 0.47 | difference between two correlations | largest absolute difference between the vote-weighted and county-equal correlation | four characteristics in six pairs | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | n_aff_alts | 6 | sets of cut-offs | count of alternative sets | alternative college, income and rural cut-offs for affluent suburban counties | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | n_analysis_2024 | 3,102 | counties | count of counties in the correlations and regressions | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | 3,102 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | n_black_alts | 6 | cut-offs | count of alternative cut-offs | alternative non-Hispanic Black share cut-offs from 15 to 50 percent | 2020 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | n_cells | 24 | correlations | count of pairs of vote-weighted and county-equal correlations | four characteristics in six pairs | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | n_diff_02 | 4 | correlations | count of characteristic-pair cells where the two weightings differ by more than 0.2 | four characteristics in six pairs | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | n_matched_2024 | 3,111 | counties | count of counties matched on FIPS | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | 3,111 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | n_no_comp_2024 | 8 | counties | matched counties with no 2020 county characteristics (the eight Connecticut counties) | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | 3,111 | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | n_opposite | 2 | correlations | count of cells where the two weightings have opposite signs | four characteristics in six pairs | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | n_pairs | 6 | pairs of consecutive presidential elections | count of pairs | elections from 2000 to 2024 | 2000 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | nat_swing_2024 | −6.1 | change in the two-party margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | change in the summed two-party margin of the matched counties | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | 3,111 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | r2_all_1216_u | 58.3% | share of the variance of county swings | county-equal R-squared of the regression of the county swing on all four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | | 3,112 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | r2_all_1216_w | 70.6% | share of the variance of county swings | vote-weighted R-squared of the regression of the county swing on all four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | | 3,112 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | | | r2_all_2024_u | 28.1% | share of the variance of county swings | county-equal R-squared of the regression of the county swing on all four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | r2_all_2024_w | 60.2% | share of the variance of county swings | vote-weighted R-squared of the regression of the county swing on all four characteristics | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | | | r2_college_1216_u | 32.2% | share of the variance of county swings | county-equal R-squared of the regression of the county swing on college share alone | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | | 3,112 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | r2_college_1216_w | 47.3% | share of the variance of county swings | vote-weighted R-squared of the regression of the county swing on college share alone | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | | 3,112 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | | | r2_college_2024_u | 2.4% | share of the variance of county swings | county-equal R-squared of the regression of the county swing on college share alone | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | r2_college_2024_w | 0.0% | share of the variance of county swings | vote-weighted R-squared of the regression of the county swing on college share alone | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | | | r_black_0812_w | +0.43 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the non-Hispanic Black share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI 0.34 to 0.53 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_black_1216_w | +0.16 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the non-Hispanic Black share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 0.03 to 0.31 | 3,112 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_black_1620_w | −0.13 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the non-Hispanic Black share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.29 to 0.00 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_black_2024_u | −0.24 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the non-Hispanic Black share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.36 to −0.14 | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_black_2024_w | −0.07 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the non-Hispanic Black share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.25 to 0.09 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_college_0812_u | +0.09 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2008 to 2012 | 95% CI −0.01 to 0.20 | 3,113 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_college_1216_u | +0.57 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 0.49 to 0.66 | 3,112 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_college_1216_w | +0.69 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 0.62 to 0.78 | 3,112 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_college_1620_u | +0.51 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 0.45 to 0.60 | 3,113 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_college_1620_w | +0.25 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 0.11 to 0.41 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_college_2024_u | +0.16 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.24 | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_college_2024_w | +0.02 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.08 to 0.13 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_foreign_1216_w | +0.58 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the foreign-born share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 0.44 to 0.69 | 3,112 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_foreign_1620_u | −0.03 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the foreign-born share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.20 to 0.22 | 3,113 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_foreign_1620_w | −0.50 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the foreign-born share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.67 to −0.10 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_foreign_2024_u | −0.34 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the foreign-born share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.47 to −0.14 | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_foreign_2024_w | −0.69 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the foreign-born share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.77 to −0.49 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_hispanic_1216_u | +0.33 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the Hispanic share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.42 | 3,112 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_hispanic_1216_w | +0.45 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the Hispanic share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI 0.31 to 0.53 | 3,112 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_hispanic_1620_u | −0.30 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the Hispanic share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.51 to 0.10 | 3,113 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_hispanic_1620_w | −0.48 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the Hispanic share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.62 to −0.20 | 3,113 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_hispanic_2024_u | −0.39 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the Hispanic share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.51 to −0.16 | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | r_hispanic_2024_w | −0.66 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the Hispanic share of residents at the start of the pair and the county swing | counties with returns in both elections of the pair and county characteristics, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.76 to −0.46 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sd_w_1216 | 10.8 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings about their weighted mean | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2012 to 2016 | | 3,112 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sd_w_2024 | 4.5 | standard deviation, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted standard deviation of county swings about their weighted mean | counties with returns in both elections of the pair, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | | 3,111 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sens_aff_max_du | +0.6 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | highest of the county-equal differences between the group mean of county swing minus national swing and the all-county mean, across the alternative cut-offs | affluent suburban counties under the alternative college, income and rural cut-offs | 2020 to 2024 | | | none; each county counted once | County election returns | | | sens_aff_max_dw | +1.0 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | highest of the vote-weighted differences between the group mean of county swing minus national swing and the all-county mean, across the alternative cut-offs | affluent suburban counties under the alternative college, income and rural cut-offs | 2020 to 2024 | | | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sens_aff_min_du | −0.8 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | lowest of the county-equal differences between the group mean of county swing minus national swing and the all-county mean, across the alternative cut-offs | affluent suburban counties under the alternative college, income and rural cut-offs | 2020 to 2024 | | | none; each county counted once | County election returns | | | sens_aff_min_dw | 0.0 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | lowest of the vote-weighted differences between the group mean of county swing minus national swing and the all-county mean, across the alternative cut-offs | affluent suburban counties under the alternative college, income and rural cut-offs | 2020 to 2024 | | | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sens_black_max_du | −1.4 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | highest of the county-equal differences between the group mean of county swing minus national swing and the all-county mean, across the alternative cut-offs | high-Black counties under the alternative non-Hispanic Black share cut-offs | 2020 to 2024 | | | none; each county counted once | County election returns | | | sens_black_max_dw | +1.9 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | highest of the vote-weighted differences between the group mean of county swing minus national swing and the all-county mean, across the alternative cut-offs | high-Black counties under the alternative non-Hispanic Black share cut-offs | 2020 to 2024 | | | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sens_black_min_du | −2.0 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | lowest of the county-equal differences between the group mean of county swing minus national swing and the all-county mean, across the alternative cut-offs | high-Black counties under the alternative non-Hispanic Black share cut-offs | 2020 to 2024 | | | none; each county counted once | County election returns | | | sens_black_min_dw | +0.8 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | lowest of the vote-weighted differences between the group mean of county swing minus national swing and the all-county mean, across the alternative cut-offs | high-Black counties under the alternative non-Hispanic Black share cut-offs | 2020 to 2024 | | | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | | | sens_hisp15_du | −2.1 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | counties 15 percent Hispanic or more in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −2.9 to −1.3 | 555 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sens_hisp15_dw | −3.1 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | counties 15 percent Hispanic or more in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.2 to −2.1 | 555 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | sz_college_2024_big | +0.23 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more and the county swing within the group | counties with 250,000 or more two-party votes in the later election, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.00 to 0.40 | 134 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states. | | sz_college_2024_small | +0.22 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | county-equal correlation between the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more and the county swing within the group | counties with fewer two-party votes than that in the later election, Alaska excluded | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.15 to 0.29 | 2,968 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states. | | sz_mean_college_2024_big | 40.7% | percent of adults with a bachelor's degree or more | county-equal mean college share | big counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | | 134 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | sz_mean_college_2024_small | 22.8% | percent of adults with a bachelor's degree or more | county-equal mean college share | small counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | | 2,968 | none; each county counted once | County demographics panel | | | sz_mean_swing_2024_big | −5.5 | change in the two-party margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean county swing | big counties | 2020 to 2024 | | 134 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | | | sz_mean_swing_2024_small | −3.3 | change in the two-party margin, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean county swing | small counties | 2020 to 2024 | | 2,968 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | | | t_aff_n | 152 | counties | count of counties in the group | affluent suburban counties | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | t_all_u | +2.7 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing | counties in the analysis | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.2 to 3.2 | 3,102 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | t_all_w | +1.3 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | counties in the analysis | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.2 to 2.8 | 3,102 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | t_black_n | 379 | counties | count of counties in the group | high-black counties | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | t_black_w | +2.2 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing | high-black counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.6 to 3.4 | 379 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | t_hisp_n | 314 | counties | count of counties in the group | high-hispanic counties | 2020 to 2024 | | | none (full counts) | County demographics panel | | | td_aff_u | +0.3 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | affluent suburban counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.7 to 1.3 | 152 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | td_aff_w | +0.8 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | affluent suburban counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.1 to 1.7 | 152 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | td_black_u | −1.8 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | high-black counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −2.9 to −1.0 | 379 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | td_black_w | +0.9 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | high-black counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −0.8 to 2.1 | 379 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | td_hisp_u | −3.3 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | high-hispanic counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.7 to −2.4 | 314 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | td_hisp_u_abs | 3.3 | points of the two-party margin below the all-county mean | absolute value of the county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | high-Hispanic counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 2.4 to 4.7 | 314 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | td_hisp_w | −4.2 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | high-hispanic counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI −6.2 to −3.0 | 314 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | td_hisp_w_abs | 4.2 | points of the two-party margin below the all-county mean | absolute value of the vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | high-Hispanic counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 3.0 to 6.2 | 314 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | td_other_u | +0.7 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | county-equal mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | all other counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.4 to 1.1 | 2,257 | none; each county counted once | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | td_other_w | +1.9 | difference between the group mean and the all-county mean, percentage points of the two-party margin | vote-weighted mean of county swing minus national swing in the group, minus the same mean over all counties in the analysis | all other counties in 2020 | 2020 to 2024 | 95% CI 0.8 to 2.7 | 2,257 | two-party votes in the later election | County election returns | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states, 2,000 replicates. | | wayne_rel | −2.5 | county swing minus national swing, percentage points of the two-party margin | county swing minus national swing | Wayne County, Michigan | 2020 to 2024 | | 1 | none (full counts) | County election returns | | | z_black | −0.18 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the Black share and the ZIP code area swing | ZIP code areas with more than 100 presidential votes in 2020, contiguous United States | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.29 to −0.11 | 29,323 | presidential votes in 2020 | Precinct votes on census geographies | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states. | | z_college | +0.47 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the college share (ZCTA atlas measure) and the ZIP code area swing | ZIP code areas with more than 100 presidential votes in 2020, contiguous United States | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI 0.42 to 0.55 | 29,323 | presidential votes in 2020 | Precinct votes on census geographies | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states. | | z_foreign | −0.46 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the foreign-born share and the ZIP code area swing | ZIP code areas with more than 100 presidential votes in 2020, contiguous United States | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.61 to −0.14 | 29,323 | presidential votes in 2020 | Precinct votes on census geographies | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states. | | z_hispanic | −0.50 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation between the Hispanic share and the ZIP code area swing | ZIP code areas with more than 100 presidential votes in 2020, contiguous United States | 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −0.60 to −0.29 | 29,323 | presidential votes in 2020 | Precinct votes on census geographies | Interval: 95% percentile interval from a bootstrap over states. | | zcta_college_mean | 54.7% | percent, atlas college measure | mean across areas of the atlas college-education share | ZIP code areas in the check | 2016 to 2020 | | 29,323 | none; each area counted once | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zcta_n | 29,323 | ZIP code areas | count of areas | ZIP code areas with more than 100 presidential votes in 2020 and all four characteristics | 2016 to 2020 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zcta_n_dropped | 14 | ZIP code areas | count of areas dropped because the atlas codes a characteristic as missing (-1) | ZIP code areas with more than 100 presidential votes in 2020 | 2016 to 2020 | | | none (full counts) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | ## Definitions - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Swing: The change in a place's two-party margin between two elections. In this book a positive swing is a move toward the Democrats. - County two-party margin: The Democratic vote minus the Republican vote, divided by the sum of the two, so a positive value is a Democratic lead. Votes for other candidates are left out. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - National swing: The change between two elections in the Democratic minus Republican margin for the country as a whole. A county's own swing is compared with it to show whether the county moved with the nation or against it. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Matched counties: The counties that report a vote in both elections being compared. Changes are computed on them so that a county created, merged or renamed between the two elections does not distort the comparison. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Standardized coefficient: A regression coefficient measured in standard deviations of the variables involved. It lets effects on differently scaled variables be compared. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. - ZCTA: ZIP Code Tabulation Area: the Census Bureau's area approximation of a ZIP code, built from the census blocks that fall inside it. It is the one neighborhood geography that lines up between the 2016 and 2020 vote estimates. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. - Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them. ## Methods Sample: presidential returns for the 7 elections from 2000 to 2024 (Algara and Amlani for 2000 to 2020, MIT Election Data and Science Lab for 2024), from the repaired county file whose 2024 totals are corrected for 173 counties in South Carolina, Wisconsin and West Virginia. The 41 Alaska rows (election districts) are dropped before any calculation; in these years no other row lacks a FIPS code, a vote count or two-party votes. A pair of consecutive elections uses the counties present in both, matched on FIPS code, which gives 3,111 to 3,114 counties; county boundaries are not harmonized. County characteristics come from the county demographics panel (decennial census and American Community Survey estimates, interpolated to election years, so they carry sampling error that no interval here includes) at the earlier election of the pair: the share of adults 25 and older with a bachelor's degree or more, the Hispanic share of residents (any race), the foreign-born share of residents and the non-Hispanic Black share of residents; the county groups also use median household income in 2024 dollars and the rural share of residents. Eight Connecticut counties have no characteristics for 2020, and Jackson County, Missouri loses its Kansas City votes to a separate unit in 2024; both are left out of the 2020 to 2024 correlations, regressions, groups and scatter and stay in the national swing, so that the swing matches chapter 10.1; Alaska is not in any county statistic. Estimand: the margin is 100 times the Democratic minus the Republican votes over their sum; a county's swing is its margin in the later election minus its margin in the earlier one; the national swing is the same change in the summed margin of the matched counties; the relative swing is the county swing minus the national swing. A correlation with the swing equals the correlation with the relative swing. Weights: two-party votes in the later election (vote-weighted) or one per county (county-equal). Correlations are Pearson correlations across counties. Regressions are weighted least squares of the swing on the four characteristics, each variable standardized with the weighted mean and standard deviation of the weighting used; non-Hispanic white share is not a regressor. A second regression uses Hispanic and foreign-born share only. R-squared is the share of the variance of the standardized swing that the fitted values reproduce, from the weighted fit. Intervals: 95% percentile intervals from a bootstrap over whole states for correlations, for the mean swing of county groups and for the difference between a group mean and the all-county mean (2,000 replicates, seed 12345, 48 states and the District of Columbia in the 2020 to 2024 pair; for a group mean the states are resampled from all states in the analysis, so a group can gain or lose states), and normal intervals with errors clustered by state for regression coefficients. The returns are full counts, so these intervals show how much a number depends on which states are in the set; they are not sampling error of the vote and they do not include the sampling error of the county characteristics. County groups: high-Hispanic (25% or more Hispanic in 2020), high-Black (25% or more non-Hispanic Black and not high-Hispanic), affluent suburban (35% or more of adults with a bachelor's degree, median household income of $75,000 or more, rural share below 25%, and neither of the first two) and all other counties. The county-type figure plots each group's mean relative swing minus the mean over all counties in the analysis, in the same weighting, because the all-county mean is not zero (the national swing is the change in the summed margin, which large counties dominate). Threshold check: the difference from the all-county mean is recomputed for the high-Hispanic group with a 15% cut, for the high-Black group with six other cuts (15, 20, 30, 35, 40 and 50%), and for the affluent suburban group with six other sets of cuts that move the college cut (to 30 or 40%), the income cut (to $60,000 or $90,000) or the rural cut (to 10 or 50%) one at a time from the baseline. Group means of the swing by Hispanic share (under 10, 10 to under 25, 25 to under 50 and 50% or more) and by college share (under 20, 20 to under 40 and 40% or more) are drawn at the group's median share, the same for both weightings. Large counties: 250,000 or more two-party votes in the later election; correlations inside a size class count each county once, and the table of size classes also gives the mean college share and mean swing of each class, and for all counties in each weighting. ZIP code areas: the 2016 to 2020 swing surface from precinct votes allocated to ZIP code areas (Fekrazad 2025; the swing is the 2020 margin minus the 2016 margin, in points), areas with more than 100 presidential votes in 2020 (29,323 areas), weighted by 2020 presidential votes; its college measure is the atlas's college-education share, which the atlas file does not define and is not the county bachelor's degree share; areas with a negative sentinel in any of the four measures are dropped. Survey check: Cooperative Election Study respondents who reported a Democratic or Republican presidential vote in 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024, the year-specific weight (the pre-election weight, the only weight present in all four waves, applied to a post-election vote item), the change in the weighted margin between two waves by self-reported race (the waves are separate samples of respondents; the chart shows White, Black and Hispanic respondents and the data table also has Asian and other respondents), with intervals from the Kish effective sample size (two independent waves, standard errors combined in quadrature). Sensitivity to the weight: the post-election weight for 2012 to 2016 and 2016 to 2020 (not in the file for 2024) and the validated-voter weight for 2020 to 2024 (respondents matched to a voter file). Suppression: none for county or ZIP code area figures; a survey cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of at least 100, and every race-by-wave cell meets both. ## What these data cannot show - Every correlation above is a property of counties, and a pattern across places can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them, a limit known as ecological inference. - Robinson [5] showed that a correlation across places can have the opposite sign from the correlation across individuals. - The foreign-born population includes residents who are not citizens and cannot vote, so the foreign-born correlation says where the swing was large and not how immigrants voted. - The characteristics describe residents, not voters, and a swing combines people who changed their vote with people who began or stopped voting or moved in or out. - Chapter 15.5, Composition and behavior in county change (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/composition-and-behavior-in-county-change; planned) separates composition from behavior with other data. - The dates are the dates of pairs. - A correlation for 2012 to 2016 and one for 2016 to 2020 cannot say when between the two elections a county moved, and a change of sign between two pairs says that the ordering of counties changed, not why. - The four characteristics are correlated with each other and with others that are not in the regression, among them income, age and rurality, which Chapter 12.3, Income and the county vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/income-and-the-county-vote; planned) and Chapter 12.5, Rural counties (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/rural-counties; planned) take up. - A coefficient therefore describes one regression and not a separate effect. - The characteristics are census and American Community Survey estimates interpolated between census and survey years, so they carry sampling error, most in small counties, that no interval here includes. - The county set is not harmonized across boundary changes, and the county groups are threshold rules whose group means move with the cut. - A swing is not adjusted for the county's earlier margin, and a county that began with an almost one-sided margin had less room to move in one direction than a competitive county did. - The intervals describe dependence on which states are in the set, and the returns themselves are counts. - The intervals on group means are of the same kind. - The ZIP code check covers only 2016 to 2020, and its votes are allocated from precincts. - The CES is an opt-in online panel with self-reported vote, so its estimates depend on how well the weights correct for who joins and on which weight is used. - The data used here hold no measure of turnout by group, of attitudes or of campaign activity, so they cannot say why the swing lined up with Hispanic and foreign-born share in 2020 to 2024 and with other characteristics in 2012 to 2016. ## References 1. Sides, John; Tesler, Michael; Vavreck, Lynn (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America. Princeton University Press. https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691174198/identity-crisis 2. Zingher, Joshua N. (2022). Diploma Divide: Educational Attainment and the Realignment of the American Electorate. Political Research Quarterly 75(2): 263-277. https://doi.org/10.1177/10659129221079862 3. Fekrazad, Amir (2025). A dataset of US precinct votes allocated to Census geographies with precision. Scientific Data 12: 794. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-025-05140-3 4. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. 5. Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. American Sociological Review 15(3): 351-357. ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/build.py (sha256 f5f2e746959f3a841962ddacad9e93d8c3e96e4b09d54bc29efb65bdb0db0388) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/county/county_demographics_2000_2024.parquet | 4,334,220 | 45cdaf63128da1aa0c12e1196d7e60835697d7432ab9bff1acd2f5559fdb5130 | 90293a64867bf37645b53eaf5ab343f3b284c0d2c3fc3b8e0f38d32f1649fee4 | | data/county/pres_county_1868_2024.parquet | 6,295,675 | bec11c7a0cb5d4180bbd6809d048bc892dd00dfcdde527fa4da871b1dd3f835f | b2a4f000f2eea72d09af8939555289e924875cca40cd95ec8869104cd575bed7 | | data/precinct/census_estimates/zcta_swing_atlas.parquet | 11,850,164 | ca87f58b5b27fc0ebd644d594a8b93971f85d40f95132ac641ffc84c5021684e | 6db8ad81722c59d7fc7436e5563bfd33b9a60fe03aff344e763af8a25df38651 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 7464f5e3872aba0a22081c0d29fb15a918851de8df78ff45d13c776e5e5043dd | | figures/ces_by_race.json | c6a252485706a8746b15c92d54aea7daa700584da2f8ce9852e8a7d2aa05e539 | | figures/correlation_and_model.json | 6a5e17b116f8bb2669531108516970013f5ed8a0a444b533cb8b5b8a76f2e494 | | figures/correlation_by_pair.json | bbef30d1d9a8bef56396b87678ba67a66bd63d153ac1045cad280913885e87b2 | | figures/county_types.json | 1a9ecfe991a3f7d3c092b1a25e3348ecada6ca26e6c27acc55e416483ef9372f | | figures/size_classes.json | 3c58f16849b38b5544184571334cdd6ec878c4e7d93091a96e7686388e951ea6 | | figures/swing_by_share.json | 24ec23e62848bdc8db2946e19f2879cd82f35d5262a661e3796b9702011cba51 | | figures/swing_map.json | 4bf2f17dfc1f486b70e949ac9c05fd009403c4be378e90f35093908c37c70bf6 | | figures/zip_code_check.json | 7a1b7792c746cac843cba3a651416cf81f3c8f49fb1d0000a14cad546b048e25 | | meta.json | b0fca8d301e58168ec3d3c931c99f07dd0274ab1df23a4eca870c35c56d8c0d5 | | public/data/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/swing_map.json | 463109502e6e43b2430741cf9880dfb154f576691591cbe85e5d24769376eec1 | | refs.json | bdb9a736095e79a8f41f0f4161b0472c8804962220f14e7b8d6b27114063b76d | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/facts.json - Table 1, figure "correlation_by_pair" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/correlation_by_pair.json - Table 2, figure "swing_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/swing_map.json - Table 3, figure "size_classes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/size_classes.json - Table 4, figure "swing_by_share" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/swing_by_share.json - Table 5, figure "correlation_and_model" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/correlation_and_model.json - Table 6, figure "zip_code_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/zip_code_check.json - Table 7, figure "county_types" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/county_types.json - Table 8, figure "ces_by_race" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/figures/ces_by_race.json - Payload of "swing_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/education-ethnicity-and-the-county-shift/swing_map.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Measures of hardship compared: report Chapter 13.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/measures-of-hardship-compared. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Measures of hardship compared - Chapter: 13.1 (Part XIII, Hardship, health and the vote; The political map) - Question: On one common specification, which kinds of hardship track the vote and which are demographic proxies? - Dek: Across 80,873 census tracts, the median absolute coefficient of a hardship measure on the 2020 Democratic vote falls from 4.7 points per standard deviation to 2.2 once race and ethnicity, education, density and state are held fixed. - Grain: places - Status: draft - Published: 2026-10-03 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - Precinct votes on census geographies. Precinct votes allocated to 2020 census tracts and ZIP code tabulation areas (Fekrazad 2025), contiguous states and the District of Columbia, with the American Community Survey controls of the project atlases (2019 to 2023 five-year for tracts; ZIP code vintage not confirmed); years: 2016 and 2020 (contiguous United States only); weights: votes cast in the unit (pres_tot, pres_tot_2020); units with 100 or fewer votes dropped - Area Deprivation Index. Area Deprivation Index national rank, Neighborhood Atlas version 4.0.1 (2023); tract values are unweighted means of block-group ranks and ZIP code values are area aggregations; license not confirmed; years: Vintage as distributed with the tract and ZCTA atlas files.; weights: none (area values) - Opportunity Atlas. Opportunity Atlas tract estimates for children born 1978 to 1983 with low-income parents, area-interpolated to 2020 tracts (household and individual income rank, incarceration, teen birth); years: Birth cohorts and outcome years as defined by Chetty and others (2018).; weights: none (area values) - EJScreen. EJScreen 2024 tract values (version 2.32 in the atlas build code), from a community mirror of the archived tool; years: Version as distributed with the tract atlas file.; weights: none (area values) - CDC PLACES. PLACES crude prevalence of nine adult health measures, model-based; 2024 release for tracts and 2025 release for ZIP code areas; years: Release as distributed with the tract and ZCTA atlas files.; weights: none (area values) - Social Capital Atlas. Social Capital Atlas ZIP code values (2022 release, Facebook users), six measures; years: Built from Facebook friendship data; see the provider for the measurement window.; weights: none (area values) - IRS SOI ZIP code data. IRS Statistics of Income ZIP code data, tax year 2022: shares of returns with the earned income credit and with unemployment compensation, and mean adjusted gross income per return; years: Tax year as distributed with the ZCTA atlas file.; weights: none (area values) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/measures-of-hardship-compared - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/measures-of-hardship-compared/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/measures-of-hardship-compared/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026measuresofhardshipcompared ```bibtex @misc{singh2026measuresofhardshipcompared, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Measures of hardship compared}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/measures-of-hardship-compared}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | count of tracts in the common sample | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 80,873 | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | n_tracts | | median across measures of the absolute raw coefficient | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 4.7 | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | med_abs_raw | | median across measures of the absolute common-specification coefficient | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 2.2 | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | med_abs_adj | | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: ozone | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | −3.2 | 95% CI −4.3 to −2.1 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | t_ozone_adj | | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: no health insurance | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 7.6 | 95% CI 6.2 to 9.0 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | t_access2_adj | | count of measures whose raw 95% interval excludes zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 20 | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | n_raw_nonzero | | count of measures that keep their sign and at least half of the raw coefficient | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 3 | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | n_keeps | | share of the raw coefficient that a measure must keep to count as keeping its association | measures with a raw interval that excludes zero | 2020 presidential election | 50% | | | none (rule) | Precinct votes on census geographies | keep_threshold | | count of measures that keep less than half of the raw coefficient or whose adjusted interval includes zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 9 | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | n_lose | | count of measures whose adjusted interval lies on the other side of zero from the raw coefficient | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 8 | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | n_reverses | ## Findings Once race and ethnicity, education, population density and state are held fixed, the median absolute coefficient of a tract measure of hardship on the 2020 Democratic vote is 2.2 points, against 4.7 points before any controls. The unit is points of Democratic share of the two-party vote per standard deviation of the measure, and the sample is the 80,873 census tracts that have every measure and control, described below. The adjusted coefficients run from −3.2 for ozone, an EJScreen model estimate, to 7.6 for lack of health insurance, a PLACES model estimate. Of the 20 measures that go with the vote before any controls, 3 keep at least 50% of that association once the controls are in, 9 lose more than 50% of it and 8 reverse sign. The rule that sorts the measures into these groups was set after a first run of the estimates, and the last section shows that two measures sit close to its line. Each measure is signed so that a higher value means more hardship, so a positive coefficient means a more Democratic vote where hardship is higher (social capital, taken up below, is the exception). The estimates are descriptive regressions that compare places. The votes are precinct returns that a land-cover model allocated to census geographies [1], so each area's Democratic share is a modeled estimate and not a count, and a pattern across areas can differ from the pattern among the people in them [2] (ecological inference). Several of the measures are model estimates as well, the PLACES health values among them, and the next section says which. Chapter 13.6, Air pollution and the vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote) covers air pollution in detail, and chapters are planned on deprivation and childhood outcomes (Chapter 13.3, Deprivation and mobility (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/deprivation-and-mobility; planned)), health (Chapter 13.4, Health outcomes and the vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/health-outcomes-and-the-vote; planned)) and social ties (Chapter 13.5, Social capital (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/social-capital; planned)). This chapter puts the measures on one footing and does not rebuild those results. Table 1. Raw associations with the Democratic vote split in sign across 24 hardship measures, and adjusted ones are smaller and mostly positive ### One footing for every measure The comparison fixes the sample, the outcome, the weights, the controls and the interval method, and it gives each measure the same sign and scale. The 2020 vote layer covers the contiguous states and the District of Columbia and holds 83,648 census tracts. The tract atlas has a row for 82,765 of them. The 883 without a row are the tracts of Connecticut, which the atlas codes by planning region and the vote layer by county; they carry 1.8 million votes and voted 60% Democratic. Of the atlas tracts, 81,617 have more than 100 estimated votes, and the common sample keeps those of them that have every measure and control. They lie in 3,081 counties in 47 states and carry 154.8 million votes. The 744 tracts that drop out at this point voted 74.3% Democratic, against 52.0% in the sample. The race and college controls are missing for 218 of them, 203 in the District of Columbia, and those tracts voted 93% Democratic. The other 526 lack an Area Deprivation Index, Opportunity Atlas or EJScreen value and voted 59% Democratic (Table 2). Table 2. The Social Capital Atlas drops ZIP code areas that voted 40% Democratic against 53% for those kept, and missing controls drop tracts in the District of Columbia The outcome is the Democratic share of the 2020 two-party presidential vote, in points of share. The Chapter 13.6, Air pollution and the vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote) chapter reports the margin, the Democratic share minus the Republican share, and a coefficient of the margin is 2 times the coefficient of the share on the same data. Each area counts in proportion to its estimated votes. A measure is cut at its 1st and 99th percentiles across areas, so that a few extreme values do not set the scale, and then standardized with the vote-weighted mean and standard deviation. A coefficient is the difference in Democratic share, in points, between two areas one standard deviation apart on the measure, and with controls the two areas also match on the controls. The vote-weighted standard deviation of the Democratic share across tracts is 20.9 points. The controls are the shares of residents who are white, Black, Asian and Hispanic, the college share, the log of population density and a fixed effect for each state, which compares areas inside one state. Race and ethnicity, education and density explain 72% of the variation in the vote within states, so an adjusted comparison is among tracts that resemble each other on traits that predict the vote closely. The controls leave out income, which is itself a measure of hardship, and age; the last section adds both as a variation. Intervals are 95% intervals from standard errors clustered by state, with the critical value of a t distribution that has one fewer degree of freedom than there are clusters, since the number of clusters is small [3]. The measures come from six sources in the project atlas, and the atlas build documentation, not the data files, dates them. The Area Deprivation Index ranks neighborhoods from least to most deprived [4]. The atlas holds the 2023 release of the Neighborhood Atlas, with tract values that are unweighted means of block-group ranks and ZIP code values that aggregate them by area, an approximation. The terms of use may restrict redistribution and are unconfirmed, so this chapter publishes coefficients and no area values. The Opportunity Atlas gives model-based estimates of outcomes in adulthood for children who grew up in a tract [5], here children born between 1978 and 1983 whose parents had low incomes, interpolated from 2010 tracts to 2020 tracts. They do not describe the tract's current residents. EJScreen is the Environmental Protection Agency's screening tool, here the 2024 release as kept in a community mirror after the agency withdrew it. (Note: The atlas build code and Chapter 13.6, Air pollution and the vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote) name different versions of the 2024 release, and the two have not been reconciled; the methods note gives both.) The PLACES estimates of adult health are crude prevalence from a model, the 2024 release for tracts and the 2025 release for ZIP code areas, taken up below [6]. The tract controls from the American Community Survey cover 2019 to 2023, so the vote of November 2020 is set against measures dated 2019 to 2024. Two sources exist for ZIP code areas only. The Social Capital Atlas is a 2022 snapshot built from Facebook friendships, with noise added to protect privacy [7]; the 6 columns used here match the 2022 release value for value. The IRS ZIP code data are for tax year 2022 and describe households that file a tax return. The ZIP code sample has its own counts and is described in its section. Social capital keeps its published direction, so a higher value means more connection, and the other measures are signed toward more hardship. ### Before controls, the measures disagree in sign Table 1 plots the raw and adjusted coefficient of each of the 24 tract measures. The raw coefficients run from −10.4 for arthritis, a modeled PLACES estimate, to 13.1 for proximity to hazardous waste facilities, an EJScreen indicator. Before controls, 12 measures have a coefficient with an interval above zero, 8 have one with an interval below zero and 4 have an interval that includes zero. The positive ones are mainly environmental: 13.1 (95% CI 11.9 to 14.4) for hazardous waste proximity, 11.9 (95% CI 8.1 to 15.6) for traffic proximity, 11.4 (95% CI 10.1 to 12.7) for nitrogen dioxide and 11.6 (95% CI 8.6 to 14.6) for diesel particulate matter. The negative ones are mainly deprivation and illness: −10.4 (95% CI −11.8 to −8.9) for arthritis, −6.3 (95% CI −8.5 to −4.2) for depression and −5.9 (95% CI −8.2 to −3.5) for the Area Deprivation Index, so more deprived tracts voted less Democratic. Two Opportunity Atlas measures of income in adulthood disagree. Low household income rank has a raw coefficient of 3.0 (95% CI 1.3 to 4.8) and low individual income rank has −2.4 (95% CI −4.0 to −0.7), and the data here cannot say why the signs differ. Before controls, the answer to which kinds of hardship go with the vote depends on the measure: environmental burdens and some childhood outcomes go with a more Democratic vote, and deprivation and illness go with a more Republican one. ### With controls, most coefficients are positive and smaller With race and ethnicity, education, density and state held fixed, 16 measures have an interval above zero, 2 have one below zero and 6 include zero. The two negative ones are ozone, −3.2 (95% CI −4.3 to −2.1), and fine particles, −2.0 (95% CI −3.8 to −0.1). The largest coefficient belongs to lack of health insurance, 7.6 (95% CI 6.2 to 9.0). The next four are fair or poor health, 4.5, the Area Deprivation Index, 3.9, low household income rank, 3.6 and housing built before 1960, 3.6, and their intervals overlap one another, so the data do not rank them. Among alike tracts in one state, the ones with more hardship voted more Democratic on those 16 measures. Adjusted coefficients are closer to zero than raw ones for 17 of the 24 measures. The measures sort into groups by what the controls do. The group of 3 that keep at least 50% of the raw coefficient is low household income rank, whose adjusted coefficient is 3.6 (95% CI 2.9 to 4.3), housing built before 1960, 3.6 (95% CI 2.9 to 4.3), and lack of health insurance, whose adjusted coefficient is larger than its raw one. The group of 9 that lose more than 50% of it, or whose adjusted interval includes zero, is made up of 6 environmental indicators, incarceration, obesity and arthritis. The group of 8 that reverse sign, with an adjusted interval on the other side of zero, is the Area Deprivation Index, low individual income rank, ozone, fine particles, depression, diabetes, current smoking and no leisure-time physical activity. The remaining 4 have a raw interval that includes zero, and teen birth, fair or poor health and poor mental health are above zero once the controls are in. Both the 50% line and the choice of the 9 PLACES measures, made after a first look at 19 of the 40, followed a first run of the estimates. The last section shows how firm the groups are. ### Race and education move the coefficients most Table 3 adds the controls one block at a time. Across measures the median absolute change in the coefficient is 3.5 points when race and ethnicity enter, 3.8 when education enters, 1.0 when density enters and 1.6 when state fixed effects enter. The size of a step depends on the order, so the steps do not add up to a share of the change. Leaving out one block from the common specification gives a median change of 3.2 points for race and ethnicity, 3.0 for education and 0.9 for density. Table 3. Race and education move the coefficients most, and density and state fixed effects move them less The Area Deprivation Index shows how a control can matter by construction. It is built from income, education, employment and housing measures [4], so holding education fixed removes part of what it measures. Its coefficient is −5.9 (95% CI −8.2 to −3.5) before controls and −7.2 (95% CI −8.9 to −5.6) with race and ethnicity held fixed. With race, education and density held fixed but no state effects it is 0.0 (95% CI −2.3 to 2.3), and with state effects it is 3.9 (95% CI 2.6 to 5.2). In the common specification without the college share it is −3.6 (95% CI −5.2 to −2.1). ### Environmental burdens lose most of their association Among the 10 environmental indicators, all have a raw coefficient above zero and 9 have an interval above zero. 6 of them keep at most 23% of the raw coefficient after the controls. Diesel particulate matter goes from 11.6 (95% CI 8.6 to 14.6) to 1.1 (95% CI −0.8 to 2.9), traffic proximity from 11.9 (95% CI 8.1 to 15.6) to 2.4 (95% CI 1.2 to 3.5) and nitrogen dioxide from 11.4 (95% CI 10.1 to 12.7) to 2.0 (95% CI 0.8 to 3.1). The proximity indicators for hazardous waste facilities, Superfund sites and risk management facilities go from 13.1 (95% CI 11.9 to 14.4), 6.9 (95% CI 5.7 to 8.0) and 5.0 (95% CI 3.2 to 6.7) to 3.0 (95% CI 2.2 to 3.9), 0.6 (95% CI 0.0 to 1.1) and 0.5 (95% CI −0.3 to 1.3). A state bootstrap puts the share of the raw coefficient that remains at 9% (95% CI −1% to 28%) for diesel, 20% (95% CI 14% to 28%) for traffic, 17% (95% CI 7% to 27%) for nitrogen dioxide and 23% (95% CI 17% to 28%) for hazardous waste proximity, and the 6 indicators keep between 8% and 23% of their raw coefficients. Race, education and density explain 47% of the within-state variation in diesel exposure, 59% in nitrogen dioxide and 51% in hazardous waste proximity, so much of the within-state difference in these exposures follows demographics. The other environmental indicators behave differently. Housing built before 1960 keeps 54% (95% CI 42% to 71%) of its raw coefficient and only 9% of its variation is explained by the controls. Ozone and fine particles reverse sign, and toxic releases to air have a raw interval that includes zero. Chapter 13.6, Air pollution and the vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote) takes up four of these exposures in detail. These results depend on the level of the fixed effects. With county fixed effects in place of state fixed effects, which compares tracts inside one county, diesel is 4.1 (95% CI 2.7 to 5.6), which is 36% of its raw coefficient against 9% with state effects. Obesity goes from 0.0 (95% CI −1.5 to 1.6) to 6.7 (95% CI 5.7 to 7.7), fine particles from −2.0 (95% CI −3.8 to −0.1) to 0.2 (95% CI −1.5 to 1.9) and ozone from −3.2 (95% CI −4.3 to −2.1) to −1.1 (95% CI −2.1 to −0.2). Whether a measure behaves as a demographic proxy depends on how local the comparison is. ### The PLACES health measures share most of their variance with demographics The CDC's PLACES estimates are the output of a multilevel model fitted to survey answers. Its inputs are the respondent's age, sex, race and ethnicity and education, the county poverty rate and state and county effects. The fitted model is then applied to each area's population by age, race and ethnicity and sex. Because counts by education are not available for small areas, a bootstrap assigns education to each group [6]. A tract's own college share is therefore not an input, and a tract's estimate differs from another's through its age, sex and racial mix and its county. The atlas holds crude prevalence and not age-adjusted prevalence, so a tract with older residents has higher prevalence of an age-related condition: arthritis correlates +0.62 with the share of older residents. Across tracts, race and ethnicity shares, the shares of older residents and of children, and county effects share between 66% and 89% of the variance of the 9 PLACES measures here. County effects alone share between 33% and 78%, and race and age alone between 25% and 63%. Race, education and density with state effects share between 40% and 80% of their within-state variance (Table 4). Table 4. Race, education and density share 40% to 80% of the within-state variance of the PLACES health measures and 2% of the variance of toxic releases Before controls the PLACES coefficients are near zero or negative with one exception: 0.2 (95% CI −1.2 to 1.6) for fair or poor health, −0.1 (95% CI −1.5 to 1.3) for poor mental health and −6.3 (95% CI −8.5 to −4.2) for depression, against 1.8 (95% CI 0.4 to 3.1) for lack of health insurance. With the controls in, 7 of the 9 are above zero, from 1.9 (95% CI 1.2 to 2.7) for diabetes to 7.6 (95% CI 6.2 to 9.0) for lack of health insurance. What is left after the controls includes the age and sex structure, which the controls omit, and each county's own level, which are the other inputs of the model. The coefficients are not evidence that illness goes with the vote apart from who lives in a tract. Chapter 13.4, Health outcomes and the vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/health-outcomes-and-the-vote; planned) is planned to cover the full set of PLACES outcomes. ### Deprivation reverses sign and low income rank holds The Area Deprivation Index changes from −5.9 (95% CI −8.2 to −3.5) to 3.9 (95% CI 2.6 to 5.2), and the share of its variation within states that the controls explain is 59%. Among the Opportunity Atlas measures, low household income rank keeps 119% (95% CI 70% to 234%) of its raw coefficient. Incarceration goes from 2.5 (95% CI 0.8 to 4.1) to 1.0 (95% CI 0.8 to 1.3), a share of 41% (95% CI 21% to 98%), and race, education and density explain only 13% of its variation. Low individual income rank goes from −2.4 (95% CI −4.0 to −0.7) to 2.0 (95% CI 1.3 to 2.7), and teen birth from 0.4 (95% CI −1.4 to 2.3) to 1.9 (95% CI 1.1 to 2.6). These estimates describe children born between 1978 and 1983 who grew up in a tract. Chapter 13.3, Deprivation and mobility (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/deprivation-and-mobility; planned) is planned to ask how deprivation and mobility relate to the vote with race held constant. ### ZIP code areas add social capital and tax returns Social capital and tax returns exist for ZIP code areas only. The ZIP-only sample is 18,039 ZIP code tabulation areas carrying 149.4 million of the 157.2 million votes in ZIP code areas with more than 100 votes. The Social Capital Atlas lacks values for 11,138 areas that otherwise qualify, which carry 7.7 million votes and voted 40% Democratic, against 53% in the sample, so the ZIP-only estimates describe the areas where the atlas has values. Table 5. Friend clustering, volunteering and the unemployment compensation share change sign once the controls enter, while the earned income credit share keeps its raw sign Economic connectedness, which Chetty and coauthors define as the share of friends with high socioeconomic status among people with low status [7], has a raw coefficient of 0.4 (95% CI −1.5 to 2.3) and an adjusted one of −0.9 (95% CI −3.1 to 1.3), both with intervals that include zero. The two cohesiveness measures (Table 5) are strongly negative before controls, −9.1 (95% CI −11.2 to −7.1) for friend clustering and −9.7 (95% CI −11.7 to −7.8) for the friend support ratio. With controls, clustering is 1.2 (95% CI 0.3 to 2.1) and the support ratio −2.0 (95% CI −3.0 to −1.1). The volunteering rate goes from −3.1 (95% CI −4.6 to −1.5) to 3.7 (95% CI 2.9 to 4.6). Chapter 13.5, Social capital (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/social-capital; planned) is planned to take up these measures and the 2016 to 2020 swing. The earned income credit share of tax returns keeps its sign, 2.0 (95% CI 0.2 to 3.8) before controls and 1.6 (95% CI 0.1 to 3.0) after. Low mean income per return has the other sign, −2.7 (95% CI −4.3 to −1.1) before controls and −1.7 (95% CI −3.0 to −0.4) after, so ZIP code areas with higher mean income and ZIP code areas with more credit claims both voted more Democratic. Chapter 12.4, Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote) documents a U-shaped relation between tax-return shares and the 2020 margin. The share of returns with unemployment compensation goes from 4.8 (95% CI 3.2 to 6.4) to −1.2 (95% CI −2.3 to −0.2). ### The adjusted coefficient differs by surface Two sets of measures exist on both surfaces, the Area Deprivation Index and the PLACES measures. Table 6 compares their coefficients on tracts and on ZIP code areas. Without controls the two surfaces differ by at most 1.5 points, with a median of 0.6. With the common specification they differ by up to 3.4 points, with a median of 2.0. No leisure-time physical activity has 3.3 (95% CI 2.4 to 4.1) on tracts and −0.2 (95% CI −1.2 to 0.9) on ZIP code areas. The sign of the adjusted coefficient agrees on 7 of the 10 measures. Table 6. The same measure gives raw coefficients within 1.5 points on tracts and ZIP code areas but adjusted ones up to 3.4 points apart, and up to 2.8 points apart without the college share The surfaces differ in more than the unit, and the college variable is one reason. The college variable of the ZIP code atlas has a vote-weighted mean of 63% against 37% for the tract college share, and its definition is unresolved: the atlas metadata call it college degree or higher, and Chapter 12.4, Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote) finds that its county average is too high for a bachelor's share. Leaving the college share out on both surfaces brings the coefficients together. The sign agrees on 10 of the 10 measures, the median difference is 1.3 points and the largest is 2.8, and every coefficient is negative on both surfaces. The Area Deprivation Index is aggregated differently, an unweighted mean of block-group ranks for tracts and an area aggregation for ZIP code areas, and the PLACES values of ZIP code areas are the 2025 ZIP code estimates for 78% of the areas and a mix with tract aggregates for the rest, against the 2024 tract release. The ZIP code areas in this comparison are the 29,276 that have an Area Deprivation Index and PLACES values, a set larger than the ZIP-only sample that includes more sparsely populated places than the tracts do. Estimates on the smaller ZIP-only sample differ from these by at most 0.7 points. Lack of health insurance has the largest adjusted coefficient on both surfaces. The unit, the sample and the aggregation of the measures cannot be separated from the college variable with these data. ### Other chapters use a different footing Table 7 sets the specifications side by side. Chapter 13.6, Air pollution and the vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote) reports a margin, controls for median household income, standardizes exposures with an unweighted standard deviation and clusters by county. Its diesel coefficient with race, college share and income held fixed, converted to points of share, is 5.2 (95% CI 4.1 to 6.3) on 81,134 tracts, and 2.5 (95% CI 1.3 to 3.6) with density added. On the footing of this chapter, with state fixed effects and without income, it is 1.1 (95% CI −0.8 to 2.9). Without state effects but with race, education and density it is 2.5 (95% CI 0.2 to 4.8), close to the air chapter's value with density added, so the difference between the two chapters lies mainly in the state effects. The air chapter's within-county estimate, converted to points of share, is 3.5 (95% CI 2.6 to 4.4), and the county-effects estimate on this chapter's footing is 4.1 (95% CI 2.7 to 5.6). Their intervals overlap, and both are larger than the estimate with state effects, so the diesel result depends on the level of the fixed effects. Table 7. Two existing chapters use a different outcome, sample, weights or controls, so their coefficients cannot be set beside the ones here Chapter 12.4, Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote) uses the change in the margin between 2016 and 2020 as its outcome, on 27,144 ZIP code areas, with poverty, college, Black and Hispanic shares as controls. A coefficient there is a change in the margin and a coefficient here is a level of the share, so the two do not compare, even for the earned income credit share that appears in both. ### The signs hold under the variations tried Table 8 repeats the tract analysis under 9 variations. They are normal critical values, county clusters, the standard deviation without cutting the tails, percentile ranks in place of standard deviations, every tract counting once, the rural-urban commuting code in place of density, county fixed effects in place of state fixed effects, a higher vote floor, and median household income and the share of older residents added to the controls. The sign of the adjusted estimate agrees with the common specification for at least 21 of the 24 measures in each variation. The groups are less firm than the signs: the pattern agrees for at least 16 of the 24, and it changes most when every tract counts once and when ranks replace standard deviations. Two measures sit close to the line between keeping and losing. Housing built before 1960 keeps 54% (95% CI 42% to 71%) of its raw coefficient and is at or above 50% in 75% of the bootstrap replicates, and incarceration keeps 41% (95% CI 21% to 98%) and is at or above it in 26%. Table 8. Under each of 9 changes to the specification the adjusted sign agrees with the common specification for at least 21 of the 24 measures ### What these data cannot show The estimates describe areas in one election. They do not say how any resident of a tract voted. The vote in each area is an allocation of precinct returns by a land-cover model, and several of the measures are modeled as well, so the estimates carry errors that the intervals leave out. The measures are not independent of the controls. The Area Deprivation Index contains education, the PLACES values are built from age, sex, race and ethnicity, education and county, and the Opportunity Atlas and EJScreen values are model estimates whose inputs the atlas does not list, so some overlap with the controls is possible. An adjusted coefficient therefore compares areas on the part of a measure that the controls do not explain, and that part can be small. The data cannot say what the remainder is. The specification is one choice among several. The controls leave out income and age, which the last table adds. The order in which controls enter changes the size of each step, and the level of the fixed effects changes some coefficients. The coefficients are per standard deviation after the tails are cut, and other scalings change the size of some of them. The 24 tract measures overlap and are not entered together, so the coefficients cannot say which of two related measures carries a pattern. Each interval is for one estimate, and there is no adjustment for the many estimates in the chapter. The sources differ in vintage and in what they describe. The measures are dated 2019 to 2024 and the vote is from November 2020, so most of the releases came after the election, and the atlas files do not record their dates. The atlas also holds firearm, suicide and overdose rates, which this chapter leaves out because the file does not document their source. Social capital and tax returns exist only for ZIP code areas, and the Social Capital Atlas describes Facebook users. The comparison across measures is therefore made on two surfaces with two samples, and Table 6 shows that the adjusted coefficient differs by surface. Alaska and Hawaii are not in the vote layer, Connecticut's tracts do not join the atlas, and the District of Columbia drops out of the tract sample. The vote is the 2020 presidential two-party share. The data say nothing about turnout, other offices, other elections or the swing between elections, which Chapter 12.4, Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote) takes up for ZIP code areas and Chapter 13.5, Social capital (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/social-capital; planned) is planned to take up. ## Tables ### Table 1. Raw associations with the Democratic vote split in sign across 24 hardship measures, and adjusted ones are smaller and mostly positive Democratic share of the 2020 two-party presidential vote, points per standard deviation of each measure, tracts, raw and with race and ethnicity, education, density and state held fixed | adj_hi | adj_lo | adjusted | group | label | n | pattern | raw | raw_hi | raw_lo | view | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | 5.22 | 2.58 | 3.90 | Deprivation: Area Deprivation Index | Area Deprivation Index rank | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −5.86 | −3.51 | −8.22 | source | | 4.34 | 2.88 | 3.61 | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | Low household income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Keeps 50 percent or more of the raw coefficient | 3.04 | 4.81 | 1.27 | source | | 2.70 | 1.26 | 1.98 | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | Low individual income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −2.37 | −0.695 | −4.04 | source | | 1.28 | 0.756 | 1.02 | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | Incarceration | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 2.46 | 4.12 | 0.798 | source | | 2.59 | 1.13 | 1.86 | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | Teen birth among women | 80,873 | Raw interval includes zero | 0.429 | 2.29 | −1.43 | source | | 2.93 | −0.774 | 1.08 | Environment: EJScreen | Diesel particulate matter | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 11.63 | 14.63 | 8.63 | source | | 3.55 | 1.17 | 2.36 | Environment: EJScreen | Traffic proximity | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 11.86 | 15.60 | 8.12 | source | | 3.14 | 0.801 | 1.97 | Environment: EJScreen | Nitrogen dioxide | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 11.40 | 12.69 | 10.12 | source | | −0.087 | −3.84 | −1.96 | Environment: EJScreen | Fine particles (PM2.5) | 80,873 | Reverses sign | 4.63 | 6.19 | 3.07 | source | | −2.09 | −4.28 | −3.18 | Environment: EJScreen | Ozone | 80,873 | Reverses sign | 3.83 | 6.30 | 1.36 | source | | 0.635 | −0.145 | 0.245 | Environment: EJScreen | Toxic releases to air (RSEI) | 80,873 | Raw interval includes zero | 0.532 | 1.75 | −0.691 | source | | 4.33 | 2.86 | 3.60 | Environment: EJScreen | Housing built before 1960 | 80,873 | Keeps 50 percent or more of the raw coefficient | 6.67 | 7.81 | 5.54 | source | | 1.13 | −0.005 | 0.564 | Environment: EJScreen | Proximity to Superfund sites | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 6.88 | 8.01 | 5.75 | source | | 1.31 | −0.327 | 0.492 | Environment: EJScreen | Proximity to risk management facilities | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 4.95 | 6.71 | 3.20 | source | | 3.86 | 2.20 | 3.03 | Environment: EJScreen | Proximity to hazardous waste facilities | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 13.14 | 14.40 | 11.88 | source | | 5.27 | 3.71 | 4.49 | Health: CDC PLACES | Fair or poor health | 80,873 | Raw interval includes zero | 0.221 | 1.60 | −1.16 | source | | 3.57 | 2.59 | 3.08 | Health: CDC PLACES | Poor mental health | 80,873 | Raw interval includes zero | −0.113 | 1.29 | −1.52 | source | | 4.14 | 1.98 | 3.06 | Health: CDC PLACES | Depression | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −6.33 | −4.16 | −8.49 | source | | 2.68 | 1.22 | 1.95 | Health: CDC PLACES | Diabetes | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −1.67 | −0.121 | −3.22 | source | | 1.58 | −1.50 | 0.036 | Health: CDC PLACES | Obesity | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | −4.80 | −2.59 | −7.02 | source | | 4.12 | 2.56 | 3.34 | Health: CDC PLACES | Current smoking | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −4.70 | −2.81 | −6.58 | source | | 4.13 | 2.44 | 3.29 | Health: CDC PLACES | No leisure-time physical activity | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −1.88 | −0.282 | −3.49 | source | | 8.97 | 6.21 | 7.59 | Health: CDC PLACES | No health insurance | 80,873 | Keeps 50 percent or more of the raw coefficient | 1.77 | 3.13 | 0.411 | source | | 0.385 | −0.636 | −0.125 | Health: CDC PLACES | Arthritis | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | −10.37 | −8.95 | −11.80 | source | | 4.33 | 2.86 | 3.60 | Keeps 50 percent or more of the raw coefficient | Housing built before 1960 | 80,873 | Keeps 50 percent or more of the raw coefficient | 6.67 | 7.81 | 5.54 | pattern | | 4.34 | 2.88 | 3.61 | Keeps 50 percent or more of the raw coefficient | Low household income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Keeps 50 percent or more of the raw coefficient | 3.04 | 4.81 | 1.27 | pattern | | 8.97 | 6.21 | 7.59 | Keeps 50 percent or more of the raw coefficient | No health insurance | 80,873 | Keeps 50 percent or more of the raw coefficient | 1.77 | 3.13 | 0.411 | pattern | | 3.86 | 2.20 | 3.03 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | Proximity to hazardous waste facilities | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 13.14 | 14.40 | 11.88 | pattern | | 3.55 | 1.17 | 2.36 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | Traffic proximity | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 11.86 | 15.60 | 8.12 | pattern | | 2.93 | −0.774 | 1.08 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | Diesel particulate matter | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 11.63 | 14.63 | 8.63 | pattern | | 3.14 | 0.801 | 1.97 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | Nitrogen dioxide | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 11.40 | 12.69 | 10.12 | pattern | | 1.13 | −0.005 | 0.564 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | Proximity to Superfund sites | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 6.88 | 8.01 | 5.75 | pattern | | 1.31 | −0.327 | 0.492 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | Proximity to risk management facilities | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 4.95 | 6.71 | 3.20 | pattern | | 1.28 | 0.756 | 1.02 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | Incarceration | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | 2.46 | 4.12 | 0.798 | pattern | | 1.58 | −1.50 | 0.036 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | Obesity | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | −4.80 | −2.59 | −7.02 | pattern | | 0.385 | −0.636 | −0.125 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | Arthritis | 80,873 | Loses more than 50 percent of the raw coefficient | −10.37 | −8.95 | −11.80 | pattern | | −0.087 | −3.84 | −1.96 | Reverses sign | Fine particles (PM2.5) | 80,873 | Reverses sign | 4.63 | 6.19 | 3.07 | pattern | | −2.09 | −4.28 | −3.18 | Reverses sign | Ozone | 80,873 | Reverses sign | 3.83 | 6.30 | 1.36 | pattern | | 2.68 | 1.22 | 1.95 | Reverses sign | Diabetes | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −1.67 | −0.121 | −3.22 | pattern | | 4.13 | 2.44 | 3.29 | Reverses sign | No leisure-time physical activity | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −1.88 | −0.282 | −3.49 | pattern | | 2.70 | 1.26 | 1.98 | Reverses sign | Low individual income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −2.37 | −0.695 | −4.04 | pattern | | 4.12 | 2.56 | 3.34 | Reverses sign | Current smoking | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −4.70 | −2.81 | −6.58 | pattern | | 5.22 | 2.58 | 3.90 | Reverses sign | Area Deprivation Index rank | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −5.86 | −3.51 | −8.22 | pattern | | 4.14 | 1.98 | 3.06 | Reverses sign | Depression | 80,873 | Reverses sign | −6.33 | −4.16 | −8.49 | pattern | | 0.635 | −0.145 | 0.245 | Raw interval includes zero | Toxic releases to air (RSEI) | 80,873 | Raw interval includes zero | 0.532 | 1.75 | −0.691 | pattern | | 2.59 | 1.13 | 1.86 | Raw interval includes zero | Teen birth among women | 80,873 | Raw interval includes zero | 0.429 | 2.29 | −1.43 | pattern | | 5.27 | 3.71 | 4.49 | Raw interval includes zero | Fair or poor health | 80,873 | Raw interval includes zero | 0.221 | 1.60 | −1.16 | pattern | | 3.57 | 2.59 | 3.08 | Raw interval includes zero | Poor mental health | 80,873 | Raw interval includes zero | −0.113 | 1.29 | −1.52 | pattern | Views: By data source (view = source); By what the controls do (view = pattern). Note: Low household income rank and low individual income rank in adulthood are the Opportunity Atlas ranks with the sign reversed, so that a higher value means worse outcomes. Note: Each measure is cut at its 1st and 99th percentiles across tracts before it is standardized with the vote-weighted mean and standard deviation. Note: The grouping rule was set after a first run of the estimates, and the methods note gives it. Note: Votes are estimates allocated from precincts to tracts, not reported counts. Source: Precinct returns allocated to 2020 census tracts (Fekrazad 2025) with the ADI, Opportunity Atlas, EJScreen, PLACES and ACS values of the project tract atlas; 2020 presidential vote; weighted by tract votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/raw_vs_adjusted.json ### Table 2. The Social Capital Atlas drops ZIP code areas that voted 40% Democratic against 53% for those kept, and missing controls drop tracts in the District of Columbia Units dropped at each step of the tract sample and the ZIP code area sample, with the votes they carry and their Democratic share of the two-party vote, 2020 | Sample | Step | Units dropped | Units left | Votes dropped (millions) | Democratic share of dropped votes (%) | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Tracts | In the 2020 vote layer | n/a | 83,648 | n/a | n/a | | Tracts | No row in the atlas | 883 | 82,765 | 1.82 | 60 | | Tracts | 100 or fewer estimated votes | 1,148 | 81,617 | 0.01 | 60 | | Tracts | Missing a race share, the college share or population density | 218 | 81,399 | 0.36 | 93 | | Tracts | Missing the Area Deprivation Index | 321 | 81,078 | 0.18 | 61 | | Tracts | Missing an Opportunity Atlas estimate | 200 | 80,878 | 0.28 | 59 | | Tracts | Missing an EJScreen indicator | 5 | 80,873 | 0.01 | 48 | | ZIP code areas | In the 2020 vote layer | n/a | 32,462 | n/a | n/a | | ZIP code areas | No row in the atlas | 34 | 32,428 | 0.00 | 22 | | ZIP code areas | 100 or fewer estimated votes | 3,008 | 29,420 | 0.14 | 30 | | ZIP code areas | Missing a race share, the college share or population density | 96 | 29,324 | 0.03 | 55 | | ZIP code areas | Missing the Area Deprivation Index | 48 | 29,276 | 0.02 | 41 | | ZIP code areas | Bridge sample: Area Deprivation Index and PLACES present | n/a | 29,276 | n/a | n/a | | ZIP code areas | Missing a Social Capital Atlas value | 11,138 | 18,138 | 7.66 | 40 | | ZIP code areas | Missing an IRS value | 99 | 18,039 | 0.14 | 54 | Note: Steps that drop no unit are left out: no tract and no ZIP code area lacks a PLACES value. Note: Alaska and Hawaii are not in the vote layer. The tracts with no atlas row are all in Connecticut, which has votes in the vote layer but is coded by planning region in the atlas. Note: The ZIP code atlas has Connecticut ZIP code areas, so the ZIP sample covers Connecticut. Source: Precinct returns allocated to 2020 tracts and ZIP code tabulation areas (Fekrazad 2025) with the project atlases; 2020 presidential vote; counts of units and votes, unweighted sums Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/sample_counts.json ### Table 3. Race and education move the coefficients most, and density and state fixed effects move them less Coefficient of the tract Democratic two-party share on each standardized measure, points per standard deviation, as controls are added from left to right | family | hi | lo | measure | n | specification | value | | --- | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | | Deprivation: Area Deprivation Index | −3.51 | −8.22 | Area Deprivation Index rank | 80,873 | No controls | −5.86 | | Deprivation: Area Deprivation Index | −5.58 | −8.87 | Area Deprivation Index rank | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −7.22 | | Deprivation: Area Deprivation Index | 1.91 | −3.33 | Area Deprivation Index rank | 80,873 | Plus education | −0.712 | | Deprivation: Area Deprivation Index | 2.34 | −2.27 | Area Deprivation Index rank | 80,873 | Plus density | 0.037 | | Deprivation: Area Deprivation Index | 5.22 | 2.58 | Area Deprivation Index rank | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 3.90 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 4.81 | 1.27 | Low household income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | No controls | 3.04 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 0.415 | −2.91 | Low household income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −1.25 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 3.98 | 0.906 | Low household income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Plus education | 2.45 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 3.52 | 0.596 | Low household income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Plus density | 2.06 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 4.34 | 2.88 | Low household income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 3.61 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | −0.695 | −4.04 | Low individual income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | No controls | −2.37 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | −2.29 | −5.08 | Low individual income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −3.68 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 1.51 | −0.940 | Low individual income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Plus education | 0.286 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 1.53 | −0.850 | Low individual income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Plus density | 0.340 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 2.70 | 1.26 | Low individual income rank in adulthood | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 1.98 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 4.12 | 0.798 | Incarceration | 80,873 | No controls | 2.46 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 0.212 | −1.43 | Incarceration | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −0.610 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 1.03 | −0.316 | Incarceration | 80,873 | Plus education | 0.355 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 0.744 | −0.326 | Incarceration | 80,873 | Plus density | 0.209 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 1.28 | 0.756 | Incarceration | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 1.02 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 2.29 | −1.43 | Teen birth among women | 80,873 | No controls | 0.429 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | −3.78 | −6.98 | Teen birth among women | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −5.38 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 0.326 | −2.69 | Teen birth among women | 80,873 | Plus education | −1.18 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 0.688 | −1.96 | Teen birth among women | 80,873 | Plus density | −0.636 | | Childhood outcomes: Opportunity Atlas | 2.59 | 1.13 | Teen birth among women | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 1.86 | | Environment: EJScreen | 14.63 | 8.63 | Diesel particulate matter | 80,873 | No controls | 11.63 | | Environment: EJScreen | 10.40 | 5.16 | Diesel particulate matter | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | 7.78 | | Environment: EJScreen | 7.82 | 2.73 | Diesel particulate matter | 80,873 | Plus education | 5.27 | | Environment: EJScreen | 4.79 | 0.207 | Diesel particulate matter | 80,873 | Plus density | 2.50 | | Environment: EJScreen | 2.93 | −0.774 | Diesel particulate matter | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 1.08 | | Environment: EJScreen | 15.60 | 8.12 | Traffic proximity | 80,873 | No controls | 11.86 | | Environment: EJScreen | 11.35 | 5.93 | Traffic proximity | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | 8.64 | | Environment: EJScreen | 8.99 | 4.06 | Traffic proximity | 80,873 | Plus education | 6.52 | | Environment: EJScreen | 6.63 | 2.79 | Traffic proximity | 80,873 | Plus density | 4.71 | | Environment: EJScreen | 3.55 | 1.17 | Traffic proximity | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 2.36 | | Environment: EJScreen | 12.69 | 10.12 | Nitrogen dioxide | 80,873 | No controls | 11.40 | | Environment: EJScreen | 8.87 | 6.43 | Nitrogen dioxide | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | 7.65 | | Environment: EJScreen | 6.67 | 3.94 | Nitrogen dioxide | 80,873 | Plus education | 5.31 | | Environment: EJScreen | 4.34 | 0.115 | Nitrogen dioxide | 80,873 | Plus density | 2.23 | | Environment: EJScreen | 3.14 | 0.801 | Nitrogen dioxide | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 1.97 | | Environment: EJScreen | 6.19 | 3.07 | Fine particles (PM2.5) | 80,873 | No controls | 4.63 | | Environment: EJScreen | 2.47 | −1.15 | Fine particles (PM2.5) | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | 0.662 | | Environment: EJScreen | 2.18 | −1.45 | Fine particles (PM2.5) | 80,873 | Plus education | 0.366 | | Environment: EJScreen | 1.36 | −2.20 | Fine particles (PM2.5) | 80,873 | Plus density | −0.419 | | Environment: EJScreen | −0.087 | −3.84 | Fine particles (PM2.5) | 80,873 | Plus state effects | −1.96 | | Environment: EJScreen | 6.30 | 1.36 | Ozone | 80,873 | No controls | 3.83 | | Environment: EJScreen | 4.61 | −1.76 | Ozone | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | 1.43 | | Environment: EJScreen | 3.20 | −2.19 | Ozone | 80,873 | Plus education | 0.502 | | Environment: EJScreen | 1.52 | −2.67 | Ozone | 80,873 | Plus density | −0.577 | | Environment: EJScreen | −2.09 | −4.28 | Ozone | 80,873 | Plus state effects | −3.18 | | Environment: EJScreen | 1.75 | −0.691 | Toxic releases to air (RSEI) | 80,873 | No controls | 0.532 | | Environment: EJScreen | 0.834 | −1.21 | Toxic releases to air (RSEI) | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −0.188 | | Environment: EJScreen | 0.752 | −1.22 | Toxic releases to air (RSEI) | 80,873 | Plus education | −0.235 | | Environment: EJScreen | 0.163 | −1.38 | Toxic releases to air (RSEI) | 80,873 | Plus density | −0.610 | | Environment: EJScreen | 0.635 | −0.145 | Toxic releases to air (RSEI) | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 0.245 | | Environment: EJScreen | 7.81 | 5.54 | Housing built before 1960 | 80,873 | No controls | 6.67 | | Environment: EJScreen | 6.98 | 4.95 | Housing built before 1960 | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | 5.96 | | Environment: EJScreen | 7.40 | 5.21 | Housing built before 1960 | 80,873 | Plus education | 6.31 | | Environment: EJScreen | 6.32 | 4.14 | Housing built before 1960 | 80,873 | Plus density | 5.23 | | Environment: EJScreen | 4.33 | 2.86 | Housing built before 1960 | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 3.60 | | Environment: EJScreen | 8.01 | 5.75 | Proximity to Superfund sites | 80,873 | No controls | 6.88 | | Environment: EJScreen | 5.60 | 3.34 | Proximity to Superfund sites | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | 4.47 | | Environment: EJScreen | 4.51 | 2.22 | Proximity to Superfund sites | 80,873 | Plus education | 3.36 | | Environment: EJScreen | 3.08 | 1.18 | Proximity to Superfund sites | 80,873 | Plus density | 2.13 | | Environment: EJScreen | 1.13 | −0.005 | Proximity to Superfund sites | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 0.564 | | Environment: EJScreen | 6.71 | 3.20 | Proximity to risk management facilities | 80,873 | No controls | 4.95 | | Environment: EJScreen | 3.38 | 0.564 | Proximity to risk management facilities | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | 1.97 | | Environment: EJScreen | 2.88 | 0.640 | Proximity to risk management facilities | 80,873 | Plus education | 1.76 | | Environment: EJScreen | 1.66 | −0.431 | Proximity to risk management facilities | 80,873 | Plus density | 0.617 | | Environment: EJScreen | 1.31 | −0.327 | Proximity to risk management facilities | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 0.492 | | Environment: EJScreen | 14.40 | 11.88 | Proximity to hazardous waste facilities | 80,873 | No controls | 13.14 | | Environment: EJScreen | 11.06 | 8.94 | Proximity to hazardous waste facilities | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | 10.00 | | Environment: EJScreen | 8.90 | 6.43 | Proximity to hazardous waste facilities | 80,873 | Plus education | 7.67 | | Environment: EJScreen | 7.10 | 4.56 | Proximity to hazardous waste facilities | 80,873 | Plus density | 5.83 | | Environment: EJScreen | 3.86 | 2.20 | Proximity to hazardous waste facilities | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 3.03 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 1.60 | −1.16 | Fair or poor health | 80,873 | No controls | 0.221 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −5.58 | −8.68 | Fair or poor health | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −7.13 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 3.23 | 0.169 | Fair or poor health | 80,873 | Plus education | 1.70 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 3.63 | 1.01 | Fair or poor health | 80,873 | Plus density | 2.32 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 5.27 | 3.71 | Fair or poor health | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 4.49 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 1.29 | −1.52 | Poor mental health | 80,873 | No controls | −0.113 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −2.86 | −5.70 | Poor mental health | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −4.28 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 4.70 | 1.53 | Poor mental health | 80,873 | Plus education | 3.12 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 3.15 | 0.123 | Poor mental health | 80,873 | Plus density | 1.64 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 3.57 | 2.59 | Poor mental health | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 3.08 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −4.16 | −8.49 | Depression | 80,873 | No controls | −6.33 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 0.363 | −3.76 | Depression | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −1.70 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 4.53 | −0.085 | Depression | 80,873 | Plus education | 2.22 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 3.63 | −0.600 | Depression | 80,873 | Plus density | 1.51 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 4.14 | 1.98 | Depression | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 3.06 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −0.121 | −3.22 | Diabetes | 80,873 | No controls | −1.67 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −6.62 | −9.63 | Diabetes | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −8.13 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −1.84 | −4.23 | Diabetes | 80,873 | Plus education | −3.04 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 0.097 | −2.35 | Diabetes | 80,873 | Plus density | −1.13 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 2.68 | 1.22 | Diabetes | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 1.95 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −2.59 | −7.02 | Obesity | 80,873 | No controls | −4.80 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −7.44 | −11.41 | Obesity | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −9.43 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −0.618 | −6.02 | Obesity | 80,873 | Plus education | −3.32 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 0.588 | −4.34 | Obesity | 80,873 | Plus density | −1.88 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 1.58 | −1.50 | Obesity | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 0.036 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −2.81 | −6.58 | Current smoking | 80,873 | No controls | −4.70 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −5.84 | −8.87 | Current smoking | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −7.35 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 2.74 | −0.592 | Current smoking | 80,873 | Plus education | 1.07 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 2.74 | −0.049 | Current smoking | 80,873 | Plus density | 1.35 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 4.12 | 2.56 | Current smoking | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 3.34 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −0.282 | −3.49 | No leisure-time physical activity | 80,873 | No controls | −1.88 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −7.07 | −9.72 | No leisure-time physical activity | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −8.40 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 0.640 | −3.25 | No leisure-time physical activity | 80,873 | Plus education | −1.30 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 0.744 | −2.34 | No leisure-time physical activity | 80,873 | Plus density | −0.799 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 4.13 | 2.44 | No leisure-time physical activity | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 3.29 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 3.13 | 0.411 | No health insurance | 80,873 | No controls | 1.77 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −7.70 | −12.78 | No health insurance | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −10.24 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −2.84 | −6.99 | No health insurance | 80,873 | Plus education | −4.91 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −2.42 | −5.51 | No health insurance | 80,873 | Plus density | −3.96 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 8.97 | 6.21 | No health insurance | 80,873 | Plus state effects | 7.59 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −8.95 | −11.80 | Arthritis | 80,873 | No controls | −10.37 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −6.06 | −9.56 | Arthritis | 80,873 | Race and ethnicity | −7.81 | | Health: CDC PLACES | −1.48 | −3.91 | Arthritis | 80,873 | Plus education | −2.69 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 0.759 | −2.40 | Arthritis | 80,873 | Plus density | −0.818 | | Health: CDC PLACES | 0.385 | −0.636 | Arthritis | 80,873 | Plus state effects | −0.125 | Note: The order of the columns is one of several; the size of each step depends on the order, so the steps are not shares of a total. Note: A coefficient of zero is white, and values beyond the ends of the color scale take the color of the end. Source: Precinct returns allocated to 2020 census tracts (Fekrazad 2025) with the ADI, Opportunity Atlas, EJScreen, PLACES and ACS values of the project tract atlas; 2020 presidential vote; weighted by tract votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/control_ladder.json ### Table 4. Race, education and density share 40% to 80% of the within-state variance of the PLACES health measures and 2% of the variance of toxic releases Share of the vote-weighted variance of each measure shared with the controls, in percent: within states for race and ethnicity shares, the college share and density; across all tracts for race, age and county effects in the second view | family | label | value | view | | --- | --- | ---: | --- | | Deprivation | Area Deprivation Index rank | 59.24 | common | | Childhood outcomes | Low household income rank in adulthood | 38.80 | common | | Childhood outcomes | Low individual income rank in adulthood | 30.35 | common | | Childhood outcomes | Incarceration | 13.36 | common | | Childhood outcomes | Teen birth among women | 41.91 | common | | Environment | Diesel particulate matter | 46.88 | common | | Environment | Traffic proximity | 36.42 | common | | Environment | Nitrogen dioxide | 58.75 | common | | Environment | Fine particles (PM2.5) | 12.93 | common | | Environment | Ozone | 9.23 | common | | Environment | Toxic releases to air (RSEI) | 2.09 | common | | Environment | Housing built before 1960 | 9.11 | common | | Environment | Proximity to Superfund sites | 10.08 | common | | Environment | Proximity to risk management facilities | 15.12 | common | | Environment | Proximity to hazardous waste facilities | 50.74 | common | | Health | Fair or poor health | 70.55 | common | | Health | Poor mental health | 59.95 | common | | Health | Depression | 40.34 | common | | Health | Diabetes | 56.23 | common | | Health | Obesity | 71.20 | common | | Health | Current smoking | 71.35 | common | | Health | No leisure-time physical activity | 73.11 | common | | Health | No health insurance | 80.22 | common | | Health | Arthritis | 50.24 | common | | Social capital | Economic connectedness (ZIP code areas) | 71.28 | common | | Social capital | Economic connectedness among group members (ZIP code areas) | 68.35 | common | | Social capital | Friend clustering (ZIP code areas) | 50.74 | common | | Social capital | Friend support ratio (ZIP code areas) | 42.22 | common | | Social capital | Volunteering rate (ZIP code areas) | 35.73 | common | | Social capital | Civic organizations per capita (ZIP code areas) | 9.28 | common | | Tax returns | Earned income credit share of returns (ZIP code areas) | 79.93 | common | | Tax returns | Unemployment compensation share of returns (ZIP code areas) | 23.71 | common | | Tax returns | Low mean adjusted gross income per return (ZIP code areas) | 53.73 | common | | Health | Fair or poor health | 69.26 | places | | Health | Poor mental health | 67.18 | places | | Health | Depression | 87.07 | places | | Health | Diabetes | 76.39 | places | | Health | Obesity | 89.39 | places | | Health | Current smoking | 66.46 | places | | Health | No leisure-time physical activity | 72.75 | places | | Health | No health insurance | 84.86 | places | | Health | Arthritis | 85.16 | places | Views: Race, education and density, within states (view = common); PLACES measures: race, age and county, all tracts (view = places). Note: R-squared values describe the full sample and carry no interval. Note: ZIP code rows use the ZIP code sample that has every Social Capital Atlas and IRS value. Note: Each measure is cut at its 1st and 99th percentiles before the variance is taken, as in the coefficient figures. Source: Precinct returns allocated to 2020 census tracts and ZIP code tabulation areas (Fekrazad 2025) with the project atlases; 2020 presidential vote; weighted by votes in each unit Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/demographic_content.json ### Table 5. Friend clustering, volunteering and the unemployment compensation share change sign once the controls enter, while the earned income credit share keeps its raw sign Democratic share of the 2020 two-party presidential vote, points per standard deviation of each measure, ZIP code areas, raw and with race and ethnicity, education, density and state held fixed | adj_hi | adj_lo | adjusted | group | label | n | raw | raw_hi | raw_lo | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1.26 | −3.09 | −0.914 | Social capital: Social Capital Atlas (higher means more connection) | Economic connectedness | 18,039 | 0.394 | 2.28 | −1.49 | | −0.018 | −3.67 | −1.84 | Social capital: Social Capital Atlas (higher means more connection) | Economic connectedness among group members | 18,039 | 1.33 | 3.03 | −0.368 | | 2.11 | 0.322 | 1.22 | Social capital: Social Capital Atlas (higher means more connection) | Friend clustering | 18,039 | −9.13 | −7.06 | −11.21 | | −1.06 | −2.97 | −2.01 | Social capital: Social Capital Atlas (higher means more connection) | Friend support ratio | 18,039 | −9.74 | −7.81 | −11.67 | | 4.59 | 2.86 | 3.72 | Social capital: Social Capital Atlas (higher means more connection) | Volunteering rate | 18,039 | −3.05 | −1.49 | −4.62 | | 2.72 | 1.79 | 2.26 | Social capital: Social Capital Atlas (higher means more connection) | Civic organizations per capita | 18,039 | −0.433 | 0.445 | −1.31 | | 3.03 | 0.129 | 1.58 | Tax returns: IRS ZIP code data | Earned income credit share of returns | 18,039 | 2.03 | 3.83 | 0.227 | | −0.187 | −2.28 | −1.23 | Tax returns: IRS ZIP code data | Unemployment compensation share of returns | 18,039 | 4.80 | 6.37 | 3.23 | | −0.350 | −2.96 | −1.65 | Tax returns: IRS ZIP code data | Low mean adjusted gross income per return | 18,039 | −2.67 | −1.10 | −4.25 | Note: Low mean adjusted gross income per return is the mean with its sign reversed, so that a higher value means lower income. Note: Each measure is cut at its 1st and 99th percentiles across ZIP code areas before it is standardized. Note: Votes are estimates allocated from precincts to ZIP code tabulation areas, not reported counts. Source: Precinct returns allocated to ZIP code tabulation areas (Fekrazad 2025) with the ADI, PLACES, Social Capital Atlas, IRS and ACS values of the project ZIP code atlas; 2020 presidential vote; weighted by ZIP code area votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/zip_measures.json ### Table 6. The same measure gives raw coefficients within 1.5 points on tracts and ZIP code areas but adjusted ones up to 3.4 points apart, and up to 2.8 points apart without the college share Democratic share of the 2020 two-party presidential vote, points per standard deviation, Area Deprivation Index and nine PLACES measures, tracts and ZIP code areas | estimate | hi | lo | measure | n | specification | surface | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | −5.86 | −3.51 | −8.22 | Area Deprivation Index rank | 80,873 | No controls | Tracts | | 3.90 | 5.22 | 2.58 | Area Deprivation Index rank | 80,873 | Common specification | Tracts | | −3.63 | −2.07 | −5.19 | Area Deprivation Index rank | 80,873 | Without the college share | Tracts | | −7.15 | −5.16 | −9.14 | Area Deprivation Index rank | 29,276 | No controls | ZIP code areas | | 1.75 | 4.00 | −0.505 | Area Deprivation Index rank | 29,276 | Common specification | ZIP code areas | | −3.78 | −1.71 | −5.85 | Area Deprivation Index rank | 29,276 | Without the college share | ZIP code areas | | 0.221 | 1.60 | −1.16 | Fair or poor health | 80,873 | No controls | Tracts | | 4.49 | 5.27 | 3.71 | Fair or poor health | 80,873 | Common specification | Tracts | | −3.32 | −2.34 | −4.30 | Fair or poor health | 80,873 | Without the college share | Tracts | | −0.317 | 1.41 | −2.05 | Fair or poor health | 29,276 | No controls | ZIP code areas | | 2.65 | 3.67 | 1.63 | Fair or poor health | 29,276 | Common specification | ZIP code areas | | −5.22 | −4.07 | −6.37 | Fair or poor health | 29,276 | Without the college share | ZIP code areas | | −0.113 | 1.29 | −1.52 | Poor mental health | 80,873 | No controls | Tracts | | 3.08 | 3.57 | 2.59 | Poor mental health | 80,873 | Common specification | Tracts | | −3.13 | −2.38 | −3.88 | Poor mental health | 80,873 | Without the college share | Tracts | | −1.49 | 0.106 | −3.09 | Poor mental health | 29,276 | No controls | ZIP code areas | | 1.35 | 2.54 | 0.159 | Poor mental health | 29,276 | Common specification | ZIP code areas | | −3.18 | −2.31 | −4.06 | Poor mental health | 29,276 | Without the college share | ZIP code areas | | −6.33 | −4.16 | −8.49 | Depression | 80,873 | No controls | Tracts | | 3.06 | 4.14 | 1.98 | Depression | 80,873 | Common specification | Tracts | | −2.24 | −1.12 | −3.37 | Depression | 80,873 | Without the college share | Tracts | | −5.98 | −3.10 | −8.86 | Depression | 29,276 | No controls | ZIP code areas | | 3.83 | 5.57 | 2.09 | Depression | 29,276 | Common specification | ZIP code areas | | −0.727 | 1.07 | −2.53 | Depression | 29,276 | Without the college share | ZIP code areas | | −1.67 | −0.121 | −3.22 | Diabetes | 80,873 | No controls | Tracts | | 1.95 | 2.68 | 1.22 | Diabetes | 80,873 | Common specification | Tracts | | −3.07 | −1.90 | −4.23 | Diabetes | 80,873 | Without the college share | Tracts | | −2.36 | −0.770 | −3.95 | Diabetes | 29,276 | No controls | ZIP code areas | | −0.206 | 0.716 | −1.13 | Diabetes | 29,276 | Common specification | ZIP code areas | | −4.81 | −3.45 | −6.17 | Diabetes | 29,276 | Without the college share | ZIP code areas | | −4.80 | −2.59 | −7.02 | Obesity | 80,873 | No controls | Tracts | | 0.036 | 1.58 | −1.50 | Obesity | 80,873 | Common specification | Tracts | | −6.59 | −5.20 | −7.99 | Obesity | 80,873 | Without the college share | Tracts | | −6.04 | −3.97 | −8.12 | Obesity | 29,276 | No controls | ZIP code areas | | −2.63 | −0.550 | −4.72 | Obesity | 29,276 | Common specification | ZIP code areas | | −6.77 | −5.14 | −8.41 | Obesity | 29,276 | Without the college share | ZIP code areas | | −4.70 | −2.81 | −6.58 | Current smoking | 80,873 | No controls | Tracts | | 3.34 | 4.12 | 2.56 | Current smoking | 80,873 | Common specification | Tracts | | −4.83 | −3.99 | −5.66 | Current smoking | 80,873 | Without the college share | Tracts | | −6.19 | −4.37 | −8.00 | Current smoking | 29,276 | No controls | ZIP code areas | | 0.890 | 2.38 | −0.598 | Current smoking | 29,276 | Common specification | ZIP code areas | | −5.87 | −5.05 | −6.68 | Current smoking | 29,276 | Without the college share | ZIP code areas | | −1.88 | −0.282 | −3.49 | No leisure-time physical activity | 80,873 | No controls | Tracts | | 3.29 | 4.13 | 2.44 | No leisure-time physical activity | 80,873 | Common specification | Tracts | | −4.74 | −3.78 | −5.69 | No leisure-time physical activity | 80,873 | Without the college share | Tracts | | −2.14 | −0.438 | −3.83 | No leisure-time physical activity | 29,276 | No controls | ZIP code areas | | −0.158 | 0.920 | −1.24 | No leisure-time physical activity | 29,276 | Common specification | ZIP code areas | | −6.35 | −5.27 | −7.42 | No leisure-time physical activity | 29,276 | Without the college share | ZIP code areas | | 1.77 | 3.13 | 0.411 | No health insurance | 80,873 | No controls | Tracts | | 7.59 | 8.97 | 6.21 | No health insurance | 80,873 | Common specification | Tracts | | −2.86 | −0.641 | −5.08 | No health insurance | 80,873 | Without the college share | Tracts | | 1.66 | 2.98 | 0.333 | No health insurance | 29,276 | No controls | ZIP code areas | | 6.04 | 8.54 | 3.54 | No health insurance | 29,276 | Common specification | ZIP code areas | | −5.69 | −3.78 | −7.59 | No health insurance | 29,276 | Without the college share | ZIP code areas | | −10.37 | −8.95 | −11.80 | Arthritis | 80,873 | No controls | Tracts | | −0.125 | 0.385 | −0.636 | Arthritis | 80,873 | Common specification | Tracts | | −3.96 | −2.86 | −5.06 | Arthritis | 80,873 | Without the college share | Tracts | | −10.79 | −9.16 | −12.42 | Arthritis | 29,276 | No controls | ZIP code areas | | −1.53 | −0.643 | −2.42 | Arthritis | 29,276 | Common specification | ZIP code areas | | −4.86 | −3.48 | −6.23 | Arthritis | 29,276 | Without the college share | ZIP code areas | Note: Tract and ZIP code area samples differ: ZIP code areas are fewer and include more sparsely populated places, so the comparison mixes the unit and the sample. Note: The surfaces also differ in how the Area Deprivation Index is aggregated and in the PLACES release, so the unit is not the only difference. Note: Estimates for the ZIP-only sample that also requires every Social Capital Atlas and IRS value differ from these by less than the surface difference. Source: Precinct returns allocated to 2020 census tracts and ZIP code tabulation areas (Fekrazad 2025) with the ADI and PLACES values of the project atlases; 2020 presidential vote; weighted by votes in each unit Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/surface_check.json ### Table 7. Two existing chapters use a different outcome, sample, weights or controls, so their coefficients cannot be set beside the ones here Outcome, unit, weights, controls and interval method of this chapter and of the two chapters that use the same atlas files | Chapter | Outcome | Unit and sample | Weights | Controls | Intervals | | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | | This chapter, tracts | Democratic share of the two-party vote, 2020, in points | 80,873 tracts, 3,081 counties | Votes in the tract | White, Black, Asian and Hispanic shares, college share, log density, state effects | State clusters, t distribution | | This chapter, ZIP code areas | Democratic share of the two-party vote, 2020, in points | 18,039 ZIP code areas (Social Capital Atlas and IRS sample) | Votes in the ZIP code area | Same, with the college variable of the ZIP code atlas | State clusters, t distribution | | Air pollution and the vote | Democratic two-party margin, 2020, in points (a linear function of the share) | 81,134 tracts, 3,096 counties | Votes in the tract | White, Black and Hispanic shares, college share, median household income; density in one row, county effects in another | County clusters, normal; exposures standardized with the unweighted standard deviation | | Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote | Swing: 2020 margin minus 2016 margin, in points | 27,144 ZIP code areas, 3,088 counties | 2020 votes in the ZIP code area | Poverty, college, Black and Hispanic shares; the average tax rate in some rows | County clusters, t distribution; state clusters as a check | Source: Chapter data of this book: tract and ZIP code atlas files (Fekrazad 2025) with 2016 and 2020 presidential votes; descriptions of specifications, with unit counts recomputed from the files; counts are unweighted Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/chapter_specs.json ### Table 8. Under each of 9 changes to the specification the adjusted sign agrees with the common specification for at least 21 of the 24 measures Tract measures, number of measures whose adjusted interval lies above zero, below zero or includes zero, and agreement with the common specification | Variation | Tracts | Above zero | Below zero | Includes zero | Same sign | Same pattern | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Common specification | 80,873 | 16 | 2 | 6 | 24 | 24 | | Normal instead of t critical value | 80,873 | 17 | 2 | 5 | 24 | 24 | | Intervals clustered by county | 80,873 | 19 | 2 | 3 | 24 | 24 | | Standard deviation without cutting the tails | 80,873 | 16 | 2 | 6 | 24 | 24 | | Vote-weighted percentile rank in place of the standard deviation | 80,873 | 17 | 1 | 6 | 21 | 19 | | Every tract counts once | 80,873 | 18 | 1 | 5 | 24 | 16 | | Rural-urban commuting area code in place of density | 80,873 | 19 | 2 | 3 | 23 | 23 | | County fixed effects in place of state fixed effects | 80,873 | 21 | 1 | 2 | 23 | 22 | | Tracts with more than 500 votes | 78,837 | 16 | 2 | 6 | 23 | 24 | | Median household income and the share of older residents added | 80,653 | 17 | 2 | 5 | 23 | 22 | Note: The pattern is the grouping of the first figure; the group labels there state the rule. Note: The income and age row drops the tracts without a median household income. Source: Precinct returns allocated to 2020 census tracts (Fekrazad 2025) with the project tract atlas; 2020 presidential vote; weighted by tract votes except where the row says every tract counts once Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/robustness.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (173), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | adi_no_edu | −3.6 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Area Deprivation Index with the college share left out | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −5.2 to −2.1 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Area Deprivation Index | | | adi_no_fe | 0.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | coefficient of the Area Deprivation Index with race, education and density but no state fixed effects | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −2.3 to 2.3 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Area Deprivation Index | | | adi_race_only | −7.2 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | coefficient of the Area Deprivation Index with race and ethnicity shares held fixed | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −8.9 to −5.6 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Area Deprivation Index | | | air_diesel_ctrl | 5.2 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of diesel exposure | coefficient of the Democratic share on diesel exposure standardized with the unweighted standard deviation, race, college share and median income held fixed | tracts of the air pollution chapter sample | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 4.1 to 6.3 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | air_diesel_dens | 2.5 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of diesel exposure | coefficient of the Democratic share on diesel exposure standardized with the unweighted standard deviation, race, college share, median income and density held fixed | tracts of the air pollution chapter sample | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 1.3 to 3.6 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | air_diesel_fe | 3.5 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of diesel exposure | within-county coefficient of the Democratic share on diesel exposure with race, college share, median income and density held fixed | tracts of the air pollution chapter sample | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 2.6 to 4.4 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | air_n | 81,134 | tracts | count of tracts | tracts of the air pollution chapter sample | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | coll_mean_tract | 37% | percent of residents | vote-weighted mean of the tract college share (pct_college_plus) | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | coll_mean_zip | 63% | percent of residents | vote-weighted mean of the ZIP code area college variable (per_college_above) | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes, the Area Deprivation Index and every PLACES measure | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | dem_not_in_atlas | 60% | percent of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote | tracts of the vote layer with no row in the tract atlas | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast (sums of tract votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | diesel_cfe | 4.1 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | coefficient with race, education and density and county fixed effects instead of state fixed effects: diesel particulate matter | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 2.7 to 5.6 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | diesel_no_fe | 2.5 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | coefficient with race, education and density but no state fixed effects: diesel particulate matter | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 0.2 to 4.8 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | drop_controls | 218 | tracts | count of tracts dropped at this step of the sample | tracts with more than 100 votes | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | drop_controls_dc | 203 | tracts | count of such tracts in the District of Columbia | tracts with more than 100 votes and no race share or college share | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | drop_controls_dem | 93% | percent of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote | tracts dropped for a missing control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast (sums of tract votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | drop_dens | 0.9 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median across measures of the absolute change in the common-specification coefficient when density is left out | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | drop_edu | 3.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median across measures of the absolute change in the common-specification coefficient when education is left out | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | drop_race | 3.2 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median across measures of the absolute change in the common-specification coefficient when race and ethnicity is left out | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | dropped_dem | 74.3% | percent of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in the dropped tracts | dropped tracts with more than 100 votes | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast (sums of tract votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | dropped_n | 744 | tracts | count of tracts dropped | tracts with more than 100 votes that lack a measure or control | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | dropped_other_dem | 59% | percent of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote | tracts dropped for a missing Area Deprivation Index, Opportunity Atlas or EJScreen value | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast (sums of tract votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | dropped_other_n | 526 | tracts | count of tracts dropped | tracts with more than 100 votes and the controls but no value for the Area Deprivation Index, the Opportunity Atlas or EJScreen | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | jail_p50 | 26% | percent of bootstrap replicates | share of 2,000 state bootstrap replicates in which the retained share is at least 50 percent: incarceration | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | keep_threshold | 50% | percent of the raw coefficient | share of the raw coefficient that a measure must keep to count as keeping its association | measures with a raw interval that excludes zero | 2020 presidential election | | | none (rule) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | kept_diesel | 9% | percent of the raw coefficient | common-specification coefficient divided by the raw coefficient, diesel particulate matter | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −1% to 28% | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | kept_diesel_cfe | 36% | percent of the raw coefficient | county-fixed-effects coefficient divided by the raw coefficient, diesel particulate matter (a ratio of point estimates) | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | kept_env_max | 23% | percent of the raw coefficient | largest share of the raw coefficient kept among the six indicators | six environmental indicators | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | kept_env_min | 8% | percent of the raw coefficient | smallest share of the raw coefficient kept among the six indicators | six environmental indicators | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | kept_haz | 23% | percent of the raw coefficient | common-specification coefficient divided by the raw coefficient, proximity to hazardous waste facilities | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 17% to 28% | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | kept_jail | 41% | percent of the raw coefficient | common-specification coefficient divided by the raw coefficient, incarceration | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 21% to 98% | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | kept_kfr | 119% | percent of the raw coefficient | common-specification coefficient divided by the raw coefficient, low household income rank in adulthood | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 70% to 234% | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | kept_lead | 54% | percent of the raw coefficient | common-specification coefficient divided by the raw coefficient, housing built before 1960 | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 42% to 71% | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | kept_no2 | 17% | percent of the raw coefficient | common-specification coefficient divided by the raw coefficient, nitrogen dioxide | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 7% to 27% | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | kept_traffic | 20% | percent of the raw coefficient | common-specification coefficient divided by the raw coefficient, traffic proximity | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 14% to 28% | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | lead_p50 | 75% | percent of bootstrap replicates | share of 2,000 state bootstrap replicates in which the retained share is at least 50 percent: housing built before 1960 | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | margin_factor | 2 | multiple | factor between the two-party margin in points and the Democratic share minus 50 | tracts | 2020 presidential election | | | none (definition) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | med_abs_adj | 2.2 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median across measures of the absolute common-specification coefficient | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | med_abs_raw | 4.7 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median across measures of the absolute raw coefficient | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_adj_neg | 2 | measures | count of measures whose adjusted 95% interval lies below zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_adj_pos | 16 | measures | count of measures whose adjusted 95% interval lies above zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_adj_zero | 6 | measures | count of measures whose adjusted 95% interval includes zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_atlas_tracts | 82,765 | tracts | count of tracts | 2020 census tracts in the tract atlas | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_closer | 17 | measures | count of measures whose adjusted coefficient is closer to zero than the raw coefficient | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_counties | 3,081 | counties | count of counties containing a tract of the sample | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_env | 10 | indicators | count of environmental indicators | EJScreen indicators in the chapter | 2020 presidential election | | | none (count) | EJScreen | | | n_env_lose | 6 | indicators | count of environmental indicators that keep less than half of the raw coefficient or whose adjusted interval includes zero | EJScreen indicators in the chapter | 2020 presidential election | | | none (count) | EJScreen | | | n_env_pos_int | 9 | indicators | count of environmental indicators whose raw 95% interval lies above zero | EJScreen indicators in the chapter | 2020 presidential election | | | none (count) | EJScreen | | | n_health | 9 | measures | count of PLACES measures | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_health_pos | 7 | measures | count of PLACES measures whose adjusted 95% interval lies above zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_keeps | 3 | measures | count of measures that keep their sign and at least half of the raw coefficient | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_layer_tracts | 83,648 | tracts | count of tracts | 2020 census tracts in the vote layer | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_lose | 9 | measures | count of measures that keep less than half of the raw coefficient or whose adjusted interval includes zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_meas | 24 | measures | count of measures | tract measures of hardship in the chapter | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_not_in_atlas | 883 | tracts | count of tracts | tracts of the vote layer with no row in the tract atlas | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_over100 | 81,617 | tracts | count of tracts | tracts in the atlas with more than 100 estimated presidential votes | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_raw_neg | 8 | measures | count of measures whose raw 95% interval lies below zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_raw_nonzero | 20 | measures | count of measures whose raw 95% interval excludes zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_raw_pos | 12 | measures | count of measures whose raw 95% interval lies above zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_raw_zero | 4 | measures | count of measures whose raw 95% interval includes zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_reverses | 8 | measures | count of measures whose adjusted interval lies on the other side of zero from the raw coefficient | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_sc_meas | 6 | measures | count of measures | Social Capital Atlas measures | 2020 presidential election | | | none (count) | Social Capital Atlas | | | n_startzero | 4 | measures | count of measures whose raw interval includes zero | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_states | 47 | states | count of states containing a tract of the sample | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_surf | 10 | measures | count of measures on both surfaces | ADI and PLACES measures | 2020 presidential election | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_tracts | 80,873 | tracts | count of tracts in the common sample | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_variants | 9 | measures | count of variations of the specification | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_zip | 18,039 | ZIP code areas | count of ZIP code areas in the ZIP-only sample | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_zip_br | 29,276 | ZIP code areas | count of ZIP code areas in the bridge sample | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes, the Area Deprivation Index and every PLACES measure | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_zip_meas | 9 | measures | count of Social Capital Atlas and IRS measures | ZIP-only measures | 2020 presidential election | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | obesity_cfe | 6.7 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | coefficient with race, education and density and county fixed effects instead of state fixed effects: obesity | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 5.7 to 7.7 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | ozone_cfe | −1.1 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | coefficient with race, education and density and county fixed effects instead of state fixed effects: ozone | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −2.1 to −0.2 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | places_comp_max | 89% | percent of variance | largest share of the variance of a PLACES measure explained by race and ethnicity, age and county effects | tracts with more than 100 votes, race and age shares present | 2020 presidential election | | 81,400 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | places_comp_min | 66% | percent of variance | smallest share of the variance of a PLACES measure explained by race and ethnicity, age and county effects | tracts with more than 100 votes, race and age shares present | 2020 presidential election | | 81,400 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | places_county_max | 78% | percent of variance | largest share of the variance of a PLACES measure shared with county fixed effects alone | tracts with more than 100 votes, race and age shares present | 2020 presidential election | | 81,400 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | places_county_min | 33% | percent of variance | smallest share of the variance of a PLACES measure shared with county fixed effects alone | tracts with more than 100 votes, race and age shares present | 2020 presidential election | | 81,400 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | places_looked | 19 | measures | count of PLACES measures examined in an exploratory run before the nine of the chapter were chosen | PLACES measures in the tract atlas | 2020 presidential election | | | none (count) | CDC PLACES | | | places_raceage_max | 63% | percent of variance | largest share of the variance of a PLACES measure shared with race and ethnicity and age shares alone | tracts with more than 100 votes, race and age shares present | 2020 presidential election | | 81,400 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | places_raceage_min | 25% | percent of variance | smallest share of the variance of a PLACES measure shared with race and ethnicity and age shares alone | tracts with more than 100 votes, race and age shares present | 2020 presidential election | | 81,400 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | places_total | 40 | measures | count of PLACES measures in the tract atlas | PLACES measures in the tract atlas | 2020 presidential election | | | none (count) | CDC PLACES | | | pm25_cfe | 0.2 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | coefficient with race, education and density and county fixed effects instead of state fixed effects: fine particles (pm2.5) | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −1.5 to 1.9 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | r2_adi | 59% | percent of within-state variance | share of the within-state variance of the Area Deprivation Index explained by race and ethnicity, college share and density | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Area Deprivation Index | | | r2_diesel | 47% | percent of within-state variance | share of the within-state variance of diesel exposure explained by race and ethnicity, college share and density | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | r2_haz | 51% | percent of within-state variance | share of the within-state variance of hazardous waste proximity explained by race and ethnicity, college share and density | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | r2_health_max | 80% | percent of within-state variance | largest share of the within-state variance of a PLACES measure explained by race and ethnicity, college share and density | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | r2_health_min | 40% | percent of within-state variance | smallest share of the within-state variance of a PLACES measure explained by race and ethnicity, college share and density | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | r2_jail | 13% | percent of within-state variance | share of the within-state variance of childhood incarceration explained by race and ethnicity, college share and density | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | r2_lead | 9% | percent of within-state variance | share of the within-state variance of older housing explained by race and ethnicity, college share and density | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | r2_no2 | 59% | percent of within-state variance | share of the within-state variance of nitrogen dioxide explained by race and ethnicity, college share and density | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | r2_toxics | 2% | percent of within-state variance | share of the within-state variance of toxic releases explained by race and ethnicity, college share and density | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | r2_y_within | 72% | percent of within-state variance | share of the vote-weighted within-state variance of the Democratic share explained by race and ethnicity, college share and log density | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_age_arthritis | +0.62 | correlation | vote-weighted correlation of arthritis prevalence with the share of residents aged 65 and older | tracts with more than 100 votes, race and age shares present | 2020 presidential election | | 81,400 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | rob_pattern_min | 16 | measures | smallest count of measures whose pattern matches the common specification across the variations | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | rob_pos_max | 21 | measures | largest count of measures with an adjusted interval above zero across the common specification and its variations | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | rob_pos_min | 16 | measures | smallest count of measures with an adjusted interval above zero across the common specification and its variations | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | rob_sign_min | 21 | measures | smallest count of measures whose adjusted sign matches the common specification across the variations | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | sample_dem | 52.0% | percent of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in the sample | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast (sums of tract votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | sd_y | 20.9 | points of Democratic two-party share | vote-weighted standard deviation of the tract Democratic two-party share | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | step_dens | 1.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median across measures of the absolute change in the coefficient when density enters | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | step_edu | 3.8 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median across measures of the absolute change in the coefficient when education enters | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | step_fe | 1.6 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median across measures of the absolute change in the coefficient when state fixed effects enters | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | step_race | 3.5 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median across measures of the absolute change in the coefficient when race and ethnicity enters | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | surf_adj_max | 3.4 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | largest absolute difference between the tract and ZIP code area common-specification coefficients across ten measures | ADI and PLACES measures on tracts and on ZIP code areas | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the unit | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | surf_adj_median | 2.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median absolute difference between the tract and ZIP code area common-specification coefficients across ten measures | ADI and PLACES measures on tracts and on ZIP code areas | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the unit | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | surf_nc_max | 2.8 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | largest absolute difference between the tract and ZIP code area coefficients with race, density and state held fixed and the college share left out | ADI and PLACES measures on tracts and on ZIP code areas | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the unit | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | surf_nc_median | 1.3 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median absolute difference between the tract and ZIP code area coefficients with the college share left out | ADI and PLACES measures on tracts and on ZIP code areas | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the unit | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | surf_nc_same | 10 | measures | count of the ten measures with the same sign of the coefficient on tracts and on ZIP code areas with the college share left out | ADI and PLACES measures | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the unit | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | surf_raw_max | 1.5 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | largest absolute difference between the tract and ZIP code area raw coefficients across ten measures | ADI and PLACES measures on tracts and on ZIP code areas | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the unit | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | surf_raw_median | 0.6 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | median absolute difference between the tract and ZIP code area raw coefficients across ten measures | ADI and PLACES measures on tracts and on ZIP code areas | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the unit | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | surf_same_sign | 7 | measures | count of the ten measures with the same sign of the common-specification coefficient on tracts and on ZIP code areas | ADI and PLACES measures | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the unit | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | surf_sc_diff | 0.7 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | largest absolute difference between common-specification coefficients on the bridge sample and the ZIP-only sample across ten measures | ADI and PLACES measures on tracts and on ZIP code areas | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast in the unit | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | t_access2_adj | 7.6 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: no health insurance | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 6.2 to 9.0 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | t_access2_raw | 1.8 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: no health insurance | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 0.4 to 3.1 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | t_adi_adj | 3.9 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: area deprivation index rank | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 2.6 to 5.2 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Area Deprivation Index | | | t_adi_raw | −5.9 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: area deprivation index rank | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −8.2 to −3.5 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Area Deprivation Index | | | t_arthritis_raw | −10.4 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: arthritis | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −11.8 to −8.9 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | t_depression_raw | −6.3 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: depression | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −8.5 to −4.2 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | t_diabetes_adj | 1.9 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: diabetes | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 1.2 to 2.7 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | t_diesel_adj | 1.1 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: diesel particulate matter | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −0.8 to 2.9 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_diesel_raw | 11.6 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: diesel particulate matter | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 8.6 to 14.6 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_ghlth_adj | 4.5 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: fair or poor health | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 3.7 to 5.3 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | t_ghlth_raw | 0.2 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: fair or poor health | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −1.2 to 1.6 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | t_haz_adj | 3.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: proximity to hazardous waste facilities | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 2.2 to 3.9 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_haz_raw | 13.1 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: proximity to hazardous waste facilities | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 11.9 to 14.4 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_jail_adj | 1.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: incarceration | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 0.8 to 1.3 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | t_jail_raw | 2.5 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: incarceration | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 0.8 to 4.1 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | t_kfr_adj | 3.6 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: low household income rank in adulthood | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 2.9 to 4.3 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | t_kfr_raw | 3.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: low household income rank in adulthood | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 1.3 to 4.8 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | t_kir_adj | 2.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: low individual income rank in adulthood | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 1.3 to 2.7 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | t_kir_raw | −2.4 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: low individual income rank in adulthood | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −4.0 to −0.7 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | t_lead_adj | 3.6 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: housing built before 1960 | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 2.9 to 4.3 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_lpa_adj | 3.3 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: no leisure-time physical activity | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 2.4 to 4.1 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | t_mhlth_raw | −0.1 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: poor mental health | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −1.5 to 1.3 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | t_no2_adj | 2.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: nitrogen dioxide | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 0.8 to 3.1 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_no2_raw | 11.4 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: nitrogen dioxide | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 10.1 to 12.7 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_obesity_adj | 0.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: obesity | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −1.5 to 1.6 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | t_ozone_adj | −3.2 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: ozone | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −4.3 to −2.1 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_pm25_adj | −2.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: fine particles (pm2.5) | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −3.8 to −0.1 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_rmp_adj | 0.5 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: proximity to risk management facilities | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −0.3 to 1.3 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_rmp_raw | 5.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: proximity to risk management facilities | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 3.2 to 6.7 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_superfund_adj | 0.6 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: proximity to superfund sites | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 0.0 to 1.1 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_superfund_raw | 6.9 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: proximity to superfund sites | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 5.7 to 8.0 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_teen_adj | 1.9 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: teen birth among women | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 1.1 to 2.6 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | t_teen_raw | 0.4 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: teen birth among women | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −1.4 to 2.3 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | Opportunity Atlas | | | t_traffic_adj | 2.4 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: traffic proximity | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 1.2 to 3.5 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | t_traffic_raw | 11.9 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: traffic proximity | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 8.1 to 15.6 | 80,873 | votes cast in the tract (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | vote_floor | 100 | estimated votes | minimum votes for a unit to enter the sample | tracts and ZIP code areas | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | votes_m | 154.8 million | votes | sum of estimated presidential votes | tracts in the 2020 atlas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | votes_not_in_atlas_m | 1.8 million | votes | sum of estimated presidential votes | tracts of the vote layer with no row in the tract atlas | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | wages_n | 27,144 | ZIP code areas | count of ZIP code areas | ZIP code areas of the wages chapter sample | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | z_agi_adj | −1.7 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: low mean adjusted gross income per return | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −3.0 to −0.4 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | z_agi_raw | −2.7 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: low mean adjusted gross income per return | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −4.3 to −1.1 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | z_eitc_adj | 1.6 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: earned income credit share of returns | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 0.1 to 3.0 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | z_eitc_raw | 2.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: earned income credit share of returns | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 0.2 to 3.8 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | z_sc_clu_adj | 1.2 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: friend clustering | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 0.3 to 2.1 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | Social Capital Atlas | | | z_sc_clu_raw | −9.1 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: friend clustering | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −11.2 to −7.1 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | Social Capital Atlas | | | z_sc_ec_adj | −0.9 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: economic connectedness | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −3.1 to 1.3 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | Social Capital Atlas | | | z_sc_ec_raw | 0.4 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: economic connectedness | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −1.5 to 2.3 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | Social Capital Atlas | | | z_sc_sup_adj | −2.0 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: friend support ratio | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −3.0 to −1.1 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | Social Capital Atlas | | | z_sc_sup_raw | −9.7 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: friend support ratio | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −11.7 to −7.8 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | Social Capital Atlas | | | z_sc_vol_adj | 3.7 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: volunteering rate | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 2.9 to 4.6 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | Social Capital Atlas | | | z_sc_vol_raw | −3.1 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: volunteering rate | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −4.6 to −1.5 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | Social Capital Atlas | | | z_unemp_adj | −1.2 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: unemployment compensation share of returns | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −2.3 to −0.2 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | z_unemp_raw | 4.8 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | raw coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: unemployment compensation share of returns | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI 3.2 to 6.4 | 18,039 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | IRS SOI ZIP code data | | | zb_lpa_adj | −0.2 | points of Democratic two-party vote share per standard deviation of the measure | common-specification coefficient of the Democratic two-party share on the standardized measure: no leisure-time physical activity | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes, the Area Deprivation Index and every PLACES measure | 2020 presidential election | 95% CI −1.2 to 0.9 | 29,276 | votes cast in the ZIP code area (pres_tot_2020) | CDC PLACES | | | zip_adj_neg | 4 | measures | count of ZIP-only measures whose adjusted 95% interval lies below zero | ZIP-only measures | 2020 presidential election | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zip_adj_pos | 4 | measures | count of ZIP-only measures whose adjusted 95% interval lies above zero | ZIP-only measures | 2020 presidential election | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zip_health_native | 78% | percent of ZIP code areas | share of ZIP code areas whose PLACES values are native ZIP code tabulation area estimates | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes, the Area Deprivation Index and every PLACES measure | 2020 presidential election | | | none (share of areas) | CDC PLACES | | | zip_sample_dem | 53% | percent of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote in the sample | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast (sums of ZIP code area votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zip_sc_dropped_dem | 40% | percent of the two-party vote | Democratic share of the two-party vote | ZIP code areas dropped for a missing Social Capital Atlas value | 2020 presidential election | | | votes cast (sums of ZIP code area votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zip_sc_dropped_n | 11,138 | ZIP code areas | count of ZIP code areas with no Social Capital Atlas value for at least one of six measures | ZIP code areas with more than 100 votes, controls and ADI | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zip_sc_dropped_votes_m | 7.7 million | votes | sum of estimated presidential votes | ZIP code areas dropped for a missing Social Capital Atlas value | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zip_votes_m | 149.4 million | votes | sum of estimated presidential votes | ZIP code areas with more than 100 estimated votes and every measure and control, including the Social Capital Atlas and IRS values | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | zip_votes_over100_m | 157.2 million | votes | sum of estimated presidential votes | ZIP code areas with more than 100 votes | 2020 presidential election | | | none (counts of units and votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | ## Definitions - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Census tract: A Census Bureau neighborhood area, usually home to between 1,200 and 8,000 people. Tract boundaries were redrawn after the 2010 census and again after 2020. - Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Fixed effects: Regression terms that give each group, such as each country or each year, its own baseline. The other coefficients then compare respondents within the same group. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. - Area Deprivation Index: A ranking of neighborhoods built from income, education, employment and housing measures in the American Community Survey. Higher ranks mean more deprived neighborhoods. - ZCTA: ZIP Code Tabulation Area: the Census Bureau's area approximation of a ZIP code, built from the census blocks that fall inside it. It is the one neighborhood geography that lines up between the 2016 and 2020 vote estimates. ## Methods Sample. Tracts: the 2020 vote layer covers the contiguous states and the District of Columbia (Alaska and Hawaii are not in it) and holds 83,648 tracts. The tract atlas holds 82,765 of them, in 47 states and the District of Columbia; the 883 tracts with no row in the atlas are all in Connecticut, which the atlas codes by planning region and the vote layer by county. 81,617 atlas tracts have more than 100 estimated presidential votes; the common sample keeps the 80,873 that also have every one of the 24 tract measures, the white, Black, Asian and Hispanic shares of residents, the college share and population density, in 3,081 counties and 47 states, carrying 154.8 million votes. The District of Columbia drops out because the atlas has no white or Asian share for its tracts (203 tracts); 15 tracts in other states lack a race share or the college share, and 526 tracts, carrying 0.47 million votes that went 59 percent Democratic, lack an Area Deprivation Index, Opportunity Atlas or EJScreen value. ZIP code areas: the ZIP code atlas holds 32,428 ZIP code tabulation areas, of the 32,462 in the vote layer; 29,420 have more than 100 estimated votes. The bridge sample keeps the 29,276 that also have the Area Deprivation Index, every PLACES measure and the controls, and the ZIP-only sample keeps the 18,039 that also have all six Social Capital Atlas values and the three IRS values, in 2,892 counties and 48 states and the District of Columbia, carrying 149.4 million votes. The atlas codes a missing American Community Survey value as -1 for some ZIP code controls, which are set to missing. The sample table lists the units dropped at each step in the order given. Votes and outcome. Precinct returns allocated to census geographies by Regionalized Land Cover Regression (Fekrazad 2025): the 2020 returns of the MIT Election Data and Science Lab, allocated in proportion to household population, as fractional counts. The vote layer reproduces the national two-party Democratic share of the contiguous states (52.24 percent in 2020, for tracts and for ZIP code areas); the tract atlas file lacks the 883 Connecticut tracts of the layer, which carry 1.8 million votes and voted 60.2 percent Democratic, and gives 52.15 percent. The outcome is 100 times the Democratic votes over the sum of the Democratic and Republican votes (pres_dem_2pty; pres_dem2pty_2020 for ZIP code areas). The two-party margin used by some chapters is twice this share minus 50. Weights: total presidential votes of the unit (pres_tot; pres_tot_2020), in the regression, in every vote-weighted mean and standard deviation and in the R-squared values. Units with 100 or fewer votes are dropped. Measures and signs. Tracts: Area Deprivation Index national rank (adi_national_rank; higher is more deprived); Opportunity Atlas outcomes of children with low-income parents, kfr_pooled_pooled_p25 (household income rank in adulthood) and kir_pooled_pooled_p25 (individual income rank in adulthood), both with the sign reversed so that higher means a lower rank, jail_pooled_pooled_p25 (incarceration) and teenbrth_pooled_female_p25 (teen birth among women); EJScreen tract values in the atlas (ej_diesel_pm_ug_m3, ej_traffic_proximity, ej_no2_ppb, ej_pm25_ug_m3, ej_ozone_ppb, ej_air_toxics_rsei, ej_pct_pre1960_housing, ej_superfund_pctile, ej_rmp_facility_pctile, ej_haz_waste_pctile, the last three being national percentile values); PLACES health_ghlth, health_mhlth, health_depression, health_diabetes, health_obesity, health_csmoking, health_lpa, health_access2 and health_arthritis, chosen to span current illness, risk and access, plus one condition that rises with age, after an exploratory run that looked at 19 of the 40 PLACES measures; the other PLACES measures are left to the health chapter, and seven of them are missing for every tract in ten states. ZIP code areas: the Area Deprivation Index and the same PLACES measures; the Social Capital Atlas columns sc_econ_connectedness, sc_civic_membership_ec, sc_friend_clustering, sc_support_ratio, sc_volunteering_rate and sc_civic_orgs_per_cap, which match the columns ec_zip, ec_grp_mem_zip, clustering_zip, support_ratio_zip, volunteering_rate_zip and civic_organizations_zip of the 2022 release value for value (sc_civic_membership_ec is economic connectedness measured over group and club memberships, according to the atlas build documentation); IRS irs_pct_eitc_returns, irs_pct_unemp_comp_returns and irs_mean_agi_per_return (sign reversed). The Social Capital Atlas keeps its published direction, and every other measure is signed so that a higher value means more hardship. The firearm, suicide and overdose columns of the tract atlas are not used because their source is undocumented. Vintages. The atlas files record none of the following; it comes from the build code and documentation of the atlas in the birth_death project (the tract atlas file here equals that project's analytic atlas on the five columns compared): American Community Survey 2019 to 2023 five-year estimates for the tract controls (the vintage of the ZIP code controls, which come from a file named Zip_All, is not confirmed); Neighborhood Atlas Area Deprivation Index version 4.0.1 (2023), with tract values the unweighted mean of block-group ranks and ZIP code values an area aggregation of them, an approximation; Opportunity Atlas estimates for children born 1978 to 1983, area-interpolated from 2010 to 2020 tracts; EJScreen 2024, version 2.32 in the build code (the air pollution chapter identifies version 2.3 from the values), a community mirror (DOI 10.5281/zenodo.14767363) because EPA removed the tool in 2025; PLACES crude prevalence, the 2024 release for tracts and the 2025 release for ZIP code areas, with native ZIP code area values for 78 percent of the ZIP code areas of the bridge sample and a mix of native and tract-aggregated values for the rest; IRS Statistics of Income tax year 2022; Social Capital Atlas 2022. The measures are dated 2019 to 2024 and the vote is November 2020. Not confirmed: the license terms of the Area Deprivation Index and the definition of per_college_above. Controls. Tracts: pct_white_alone, pct_black_alone, pct_asian_alone and pct_hispanic, pct_college_plus, and the log of total_population over land area in square kilometers. ZIP code areas: per_white, per_black, per_asian, per_hispanic, per_college_above (labelled college degree or higher in the atlas metadata, but the wages chapter finds a county average of 52.7 percent against 23.6 percent for the county bachelor's share, so its definition is unresolved; its vote-weighted mean is 63 percent in the bridge sample against 37 percent for the tract college share) and the log of population over land area in square miles. State fixed effects: the state of the tract, the state of the county code for ZIP code areas. Median household income and age are not controls in the common specification. Estimator. Each measure is cut at its 1st and 99th percentile across the units of its sample (unweighted percentiles) and standardized with the vote-weighted mean and standard deviation, so a coefficient is points of Democratic share per standard deviation. Weighted least squares of the Democratic share on the measure, with the controls added cumulatively (race and ethnicity, then education, then density, then state fixed effects); the fixed effects are removed by weighted within-state demeaning, which gives the same coefficients as state indicators. The common specification is the last column. Intervals: 95%, standard errors clustered by state (CR1, the statsmodels default), with the critical value of the t distribution with the number of states minus one degrees of freedom (2.01 for 47 tract states, 2.01 for 49 ZIP code states; the normal value is 1.96) (Cameron and Miller 2015). The code reproduces b3.stats.wls to six decimals for the coefficients and standard errors of two measures in three specifications, and pyfixest with state fixed effects reproduces the estimate and standard error of 28 coefficients. Pattern rule, set after a first run of the estimates and not before: a measure keeps if its raw interval excludes zero and the adjusted coefficient has the raw sign, an interval that excludes zero and at least half of the raw size; it loses if the adjusted interval includes zero or if it has the raw sign and less than half of the raw size; it reverses if the adjusted interval excludes zero on the other side from the raw coefficient; the rest have a raw interval that includes zero. Retained share: the common-specification coefficient divided by the raw one, with a percentile interval from 2,000 state bootstrap replicates (seed 12345, whole states resampled, a state drawn twice keeps its own fixed effect); the share of replicates at or above 50 percent measures how close a measure sits to the line between keeping and losing. Variance explained: the weighted R-squared of a regression of the standardized measure on the controls with state fixed effects, as a share of the within-state variance; for PLACES measures also, over all tracts, on race and ethnicity shares, the 65-and-older and under-18 shares and county fixed effects, on county fixed effects alone and on race and age alone, as shares of the total variance of the measure cut at its 1st and 99th percentiles. Variations: normal critical values; county clusters; no cutting of the tails; vote-weighted percentile rank in place of the standard deviation; every tract counting once; the USDA rural-urban commuting area code in place of density; county fixed effects in place of state fixed effects (clusters still by state); tracts with more than 500 votes; median household income and the 65-and-older share added (tracts with an income only). Intervals are model based: they do not include error in the vote allocation or in the modeled measures, and they are not adjusted for the number of estimates. Replications: the air pollution chapter's diesel rows, including its within-county row, computed here on its own sample of 81,134 tracts, and the wages chapter's sample of 27,144 ZIP code areas, all match those chapters as published. ## What these data cannot show - The estimates describe areas in one election. - They do not say how any resident of a tract voted. - The vote in each area is an allocation of precinct returns by a land-cover model, and several of the measures are modeled as well, so the estimates carry errors that the intervals leave out. - The measures are not independent of the controls. - The Area Deprivation Index contains education, the PLACES values are built from age, sex, race and ethnicity, education and county, and the Opportunity Atlas and EJScreen values are model estimates whose inputs the atlas does not list, so some overlap with the controls is possible. - An adjusted coefficient therefore compares areas on the part of a measure that the controls do not explain, and that part can be small. - The data cannot say what the remainder is. - The specification is one choice among several. - The controls leave out income and age, which the last table adds. - The order in which controls enter changes the size of each step, and the level of the fixed effects changes some coefficients. - The coefficients are per standard deviation after the tails are cut, and other scalings change the size of some of them. - The 24 tract measures overlap and are not entered together, so the coefficients cannot say which of two related measures carries a pattern. - Each interval is for one estimate, and there is no adjustment for the many estimates in the chapter. - The sources differ in vintage and in what they describe. - The measures are dated 2019 to 2024 and the vote is from November 2020, so most of the releases came after the election, and the atlas files do not record their dates. - The atlas also holds firearm, suicide and overdose rates, which this chapter leaves out because the file does not document their source. - Social capital and tax returns exist only for ZIP code areas, and the Social Capital Atlas describes Facebook users. - The comparison across measures is therefore made on two surfaces with two samples, and Table 6 shows that the adjusted coefficient differs by surface. - Alaska and Hawaii are not in the vote layer, Connecticut's tracts do not join the atlas, and the District of Columbia drops out of the tract sample. - The vote is the 2020 presidential two-party share. - The data say nothing about turnout, other offices, other elections or the swing between elections, which Chapter 12.4, Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/wages-capital-and-the-county-vote) takes up for ZIP code areas and Chapter 13.5, Social capital (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/social-capital; planned) is planned to take up. ## References 1. Fekrazad, Amir (2025). A dataset of US precinct votes allocated to Census geographies with precision. Scientific Data 12: 794. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-025-05140-3 2. Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. American Sociological Review 15(3): 351-357. https://doi.org/10.2307/2087176 3. Cameron, A. Colin; Miller, Douglas L. (2015). A Practitioner's Guide to Cluster-Robust Inference. Journal of Human Resources 50(2): 317-372. https://doi.org/10.3368/jhr.50.2.317 4. Kind, Amy J. H.; Buckingham, William R. (2018). Making Neighborhood-Disadvantage Metrics Accessible: The Neighborhood Atlas. New England Journal of Medicine 378: 2456-2458. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1802313 5. Chetty, Raj; Friedman, John N.; Hendren, Nathaniel; Jones, Maggie R.; Porter, Sonya R. (2018). The Opportunity Atlas: Mapping the Childhood Roots of Social Mobility. NBER Working Paper 25147. https://doi.org/10.3386/w25147 6. Greenlund, Kurt J.; Lu, Hua; Wang, Yan; Matthews, Kevin A.; LeClercq, Jennifer M.; Lee, Benjamin; Carlson, Susan A. (2022). PLACES: Local Data for Better Health. Preventing Chronic Disease 19: 210459. https://doi.org/10.5888/pcd19.210459 7. Chetty, Raj; Jackson, Matthew O.; Kuchler, Theresa; Stroebel, Johannes; and others (2022). Social capital I: measurement and associations with economic mobility. Nature 608: 108-121. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-022-04996-4 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/measures-of-hardship-compared/build.py (sha256 04cd3be028518dd5e3ebf3ea630c48d819a3f927e14dc1db4809f76dd1c22ab4) - Built on: 2026-10-03 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/precinct/census_estimates/tract_2020.parquet | 11,111,139 | 716f8b605b007e0230d64f3539a5c432d459664e798d03ba96798ef62c63fa25 | e89c06fe8f7d7132a306d72701352907e7d8eaee3c3b34fdf6c3a770953c254b | | data/precinct/census_estimates/tract_2020_atlas.parquet | 41,025,289 | 8cd40801ba81ac3d5870313f9e8772790afe7917f983dd24c15efc8719651ab8 | 01b796cc4b00f21457d93c96df76db6edfde80c66e1844919fb7510aecd5efe9 | | data/precinct/census_estimates/zcta_2020.parquet | 4,608,929 | 560cabe4b643241fab4572f4e46599d64297eaa67f987c32ad235c55c045612b | f5f882de2008137295d09c69667751bddd476b861a49292ee4a4a3a3f22b0236 | | data/precinct/census_estimates/zcta_swing_atlas.parquet | 11,850,164 | ca87f58b5b27fc0ebd644d594a8b93971f85d40f95132ac641ffc84c5021684e | 6db8ad81722c59d7fc7436e5563bfd33b9a60fe03aff344e763af8a25df38651 | | C:/Users/Vishal Singh/Box/birth_death/data/raw/social_capital_atlas/2022/social_capital_zip.csv | 4,052,257 | 6e4fe2e4b37b666313dd90e8897df45fdc96285fb59c3aa425edcb0fac460c8e | 8ad382b00cc90db64f8592e59177d6eb9e4e9c13476f888d024c7b3f95903510 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | cc3ff1cdc26f7eaed437edc430e49dcdd3104efee123fc8ead75fcd8f4d8b4d2 | | figures/chapter_specs.json | 65f82478417b1a7c7bce01405134991af5c874a98624516ae0367f8e6f8a67ed | | figures/control_ladder.json | dc656b3020df8a18933545ab0c994b7020fb98d1a395fdd7902f56bdf7957693 | | figures/demographic_content.json | 3e1c8fe4a313dde678cd45d97b4e40d018cd2e10a200428f501830ecb2d44c94 | | figures/raw_vs_adjusted.json | accea50a6880784d4aa162900c15a078994e9b1e00f78222ce8a3f7e221e14f2 | | figures/robustness.json | b3719e979fbe5434b8d8e37347eb69ba8eec741a05bd221eb5d5adce68855f6c | | figures/sample_counts.json | 2e461986729f9afbb7d06f071e12516f35a44b539c841e30c515bfff6ed84ec3 | | figures/surface_check.json | 79c77c6e74852ed6dd16d3692d5d97d40d272168d18ab3c2a975bde6bac5c122 | | figures/zip_measures.json | 3d260e4405fb5e8af5a571b586130afe1f2af0ea64abac2d53680443f0f88d64 | | meta.json | dcfe47a5ec29e99fcba5035681996eac59cd6c84cf97d9c7591bc5055f0a20ec | | refs.json | c522d0bd024ac5359e632dcba47b5b89186d6294efb6cfd2f3bb343e28b4d9af | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/measures-of-hardship-compared/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/measures-of-hardship-compared/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/facts.json - Table 1, figure "raw_vs_adjusted" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/raw_vs_adjusted.json - Table 2, figure "sample_counts" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/sample_counts.json - Table 3, figure "control_ladder" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/control_ladder.json - Table 4, figure "demographic_content" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/demographic_content.json - Table 5, figure "zip_measures" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/zip_measures.json - Table 6, figure "surface_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/surface_check.json - Table 7, figure "chapter_specs" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/chapter_specs.json - Table 8, figure "robustness" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/measures-of-hardship-compared/figures/robustness.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Air pollution and the vote: report Chapter 13.6 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Air pollution and the vote - Chapter: 13.6 (Part XIII, Hardship, health and the vote; The political map) - Question: Do neighborhoods with more diesel and traffic pollution vote differently once race, income and education are held fixed? - Dek: Tracts with more diesel exposure voted more Democratic in 2020, by 24.8 points per standard deviation of exposure, but only 4.9 points once race, income, education and density are held fixed. - Grain: places - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - Precinct votes on census geographies. Precinct votes allocated to 2020 census tracts (Fekrazad 2025) with the ACS demographics of the tract atlas (ACS years not recorded), 2020 presidential election; years: 2016 and 2020 (contiguous United States only); weights: votes cast in the tract (pres_tot); full counts of tracts, no sampling weights - EJScreen. EPA EJScreen version 2.3 (July 2024; modeled air data for 2020), tract values in the atlas; EPA removed the tool in February 2025 and the archived copy is not recorded; years: Version as distributed with the tract atlas file.; weights: none (tract values) - Area Deprivation Index. Area Deprivation Index national rank, tract values in the atlas; release year not recorded; years: Vintage as distributed with the tract and ZCTA atlas files.; weights: none (tract values) - CDC PLACES. Current asthma among adults, model-based tract estimates in the atlas; release year not recorded; years: Release as distributed with the tract and ZCTA atlas files.; weights: none (tract values) - Cooperative Election Study. Cooperative Election Study 2020 wave; support for strengthening EPA enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs U.S. jobs; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (single wave) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026airpollutionandthevote ```bibtex @misc{singh2026airpollutionandthevote, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Air pollution and the vote}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized diesel particulate matter exposure, with no controls; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 24.8 | 95% CI 21.5 to 28.0 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | diesel_raw | | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized diesel particulate matter exposure, with race, income, education and density held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 4.9 | 95% CI 2.6 to 7.2 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | diesel_dens | | vote-weighted mean tract margin; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts in decile 10 of diesel exposure | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | +49.1 | 95% CI 42.4 to 55.8 | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | margin_d10 | | vote-weighted mean tract margin; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts in decile 1 of diesel exposure | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | −29.8 | 95% CI −32.2 to −27.4 | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | margin_d1 | | difference in vote-weighted mean margin, top decile minus bottom decile; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts in the top and bottom decile of diesel exposure | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 78.9 | 95% CI 71.8 to 86.1 | 16,228 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | margin_gap | | ratio of the diesel coefficient with race, income and education held fixed to the diesel coefficient with no controls (ratio of point estimates); 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 42% | 95% CI 36% to 48% | 81,134 | none (ratio of estimates) | Precinct votes on census geographies | diesel_ctrl_kept | | ratio of the diesel coefficient with race, income, education and density held fixed to the diesel coefficient with no controls (ratio of point estimates); 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 20% | 95% CI 12% to 27% | 81,134 | none (ratio of estimates) | Precinct votes on census geographies | diesel_dens_kept | | version of the tool, identified from the indicators and values in the atlas | the EPA EJScreen release identified in the tract atlas | released July 2024 | 2.3 | | | none (identifier) | EJScreen | ejscreen_version | | count of tracts | tracts in the 2020 tract atlas | 2020 presidential election | 82,765 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | n_atlas_tracts | | count of tracts | tracts in the atlas with more than 100 estimated votes | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 81,617 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | n_over100 | | a tract is kept when its estimated presidential votes exceed this number | census tracts | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 100 | | | none (constant) | Precinct votes on census geographies | vote_floor | | count of tracts | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 81,134 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | n_tracts | | count of states | states with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 47 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | n_states | | sum of tract presidential votes in the sample | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 155.1 million | | | none (sum of votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | votes_m | ## Findings The tenth of census tracts with the most diesel exhaust in the air had a Democratic two-party margin of +49.1 (95% CI 42.4 to 55.8) points in the 2020 presidential election, against −29.8 (95% CI −32.2 to −27.4) points in the tenth with the least, a gap of 78.9 points. The margin difference per standard deviation of diesel exposure shrinks when tracts are compared on who lives in them: 42% (95% CI 36% to 48%) of the no-controls coefficient remains with race, income and education held fixed, and 20% (95% CI 12% to 27%) once population density is added. The four air measures in the chapter move together, so the data cannot say which one carries the difference that remains. The chapter also compares neighborhood deprivation, modeled asthma prevalence and survey support for EPA enforcement. The asthma figures are modeled estimates and not measured health outcomes, a distinction that the section on asthma explains. The margin is the Democratic vote minus the Republican vote as a share of the two, so a positive value is a Democratic lead. The votes come from precinct returns that a land-cover model allocated to 2020 census tracts [1], so each tract's margin is an estimate and not a count. Pollution comes from EJSCREEN. Diesel exposure is its modeled annual average concentration of diesel particulate matter in the tract's air, in micrograms per cubic meter, and the other measures are modeled annual averages of fine particles and nitrogen dioxide and a traffic proximity score (vehicles per day on nearby major roads, weighted by distance). (Note: The EPA removed EJSCREEN from its website in February 2025. [Public Environmental Data Partners](https://screening-tools.com/epa-ejscreen) hosts a reconstruction of version 2.3, released in July 2024 with air data modeled for 2020 [2].) Of the 82,765 tracts in the atlas, 81,617 have more than 100 estimated votes, and 81,134 of those have every pollution measure, control and land area that the models need. They lie in 47 states and carry 155.1 million votes, and each tract counts in proportion to its votes. The unit is a neighborhood, and the last section returns to what that allows. ### The margin rises with diesel exposure Table 1 sorts the tracts into ten equal groups by diesel exposure and shows the margin in each, with each row labeled by its decile and median exposure. The point estimates rise with each step. The deciles below the fifth lean Republican and the deciles above it lean Democratic. The fifth decile, with a median exposure of 0.14 micrograms per cubic meter of diesel particulate matter, is an even split within its interval (+1.4 (95% CI −1.8 to 4.7) points). The intervals are widest in the top two deciles. The tenth-decile tracts sit in 112 counties, against 1,824 counties for the first decile, and the intervals allow for tracts in one county resembling each other. Table 1. The Democratic margin rises from −29.8 points in the tenth of tracts with the least diesel exposure to +49.1 points in the tenth with the most The tenth decile differs from the first in more than the air (Table 2). The white-alone share of residents is 36% in the tenth decile against 79% in the first, the Hispanic share is 33% against 9%, and the median tract holds 5,167 people per square kilometer against 14. Income peaks in decile 6 and the college share is nearly flat from there. Diesel exposure moves with density, and across tracts the correlation of exposure with the log of density is +0.68 (95% CI 0.66 to 0.71). Holding these traits fixed means comparing tracts that resemble each other on them. The Area Deprivation Index ranks neighborhoods from the least to the most deprived [3], and its mean national rank falls from 62.5 (95% CI 60.9 to 64.2) in the first decile of diesel exposure to 22.2 (95% CI 16.2 to 28.2) in the tenth, against 44.8 (95% CI 42.2 to 47.4) for all tracts weighted by votes. The index is built from income, education, employment and housing measures, so it overlaps with the controls in the vote models. Chapter 13.3, Deprivation and mobility (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/deprivation-and-mobility; planned) asks how deprivation itself relates to the vote, and Chapter 13.1, Measures of hardship compared (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/measures-of-hardship-compared) sets several hardship measures side by side. Table 2. Higher-diesel tracts are denser, less white and more Hispanic, and income peaks at decile 6 while college share stays nearly flat after it ### Controls shrink every gap, and fine particles end near zero Table 3 regresses the tract margin on each exposure. Each exposure is standardized, so a coefficient is the difference in the margin, in points, between tracts one standard deviation apart in exposure. One standard deviation of diesel exposure is 0.14 micrograms per cubic meter. For the other exposures it is 3.5 parts per billion of nitrogen dioxide, 2.1 micrograms per cubic meter of fine particles and 2.4 million on the traffic proximity score. Tracts count in proportion to their votes, and the intervals are clustered by county, so they allow tracts in one county to resemble each other. Chapter 13.1, Measures of hardship compared (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/measures-of-hardship-compared) sets this specification beside a common one for every hardship measure, which reports the Democratic share in place of the margin, leaves out income, standardizes with a vote-weighted standard deviation and adds state fixed effects, and it traces the difference between the two diesel estimates mainly to the state effects. The diesel coefficient is 24.8 (95% CI 21.5 to 28.0) points with no controls and 10.3 (95% CI 8.1 to 12.6) points with the white, Black and Hispanic shares of residents, the college share and median household income held fixed. Adding the log of population density lowers it further, to 4.9 (95% CI 2.6 to 7.2) points. Traffic proximity goes from 24.7 (95% CI 19.2 to 30.2) points to 12.2 (95% CI 9.0 to 15.3) with the demographic controls and 8.7 (95% CI 6.1 to 11.3) with density added. Nitrogen dioxide goes from 24.3 (95% CI 22.3 to 26.3) points to 10.1 (95% CI 8.3 to 11.9) and then 3.6 (95% CI 1.5 to 5.8). Fine particles are the exception, with a coefficient of 8.8 (95% CI 5.3 to 12.2) points with no controls, 0.9 (95% CI −1.4 to 3.1) with the demographic controls and −0.7 (95% CI −2.8 to 1.4) with density. Once tracts are compared on who lives in them, the fine-particle interval includes zero. The four exposures are correlated, so the first four rows of each panel do not say which one matters. Diesel exposure moves with traffic proximity and nitrogen dioxide (correlations of +0.68 and +0.72 across tracts). In the joint row, where all four enter one model with the controls and density, only traffic proximity has an interval above zero: it keeps 8.7 (95% CI 5.6 to 11.7) points while diesel falls to 1.3, an interval that includes zero, so the data cannot say which exposure carries the difference. Table 3. Controls shrink the Democratic gap for every pollutant, and with all four exposures in one model traffic proximity keeps 8.7 points while diesel falls to 1.3 Population density is closely tied to the Democratic vote across American places [4]. Entering density as 20 equal-size bins in place of the log term gives a diesel coefficient of 3.4 (95% CI 1.1 to 5.8) points. Clustering the intervals by state in place of county gives 4.9 (95% CI 0.2 to 9.6) points for the diesel coefficient with density, and the lower bound is near zero. Comparing tracts inside the same county, with a fixed effect for each county and the same controls and density, gives 7.1 (95% CI 5.3 to 8.9) points for diesel, 6.5 (95% CI 5.2 to 7.8) points for nitrogen dioxide and 6.6 (95% CI 4.6 to 8.6) points for traffic. The point estimates for diesel and nitrogen dioxide are larger than the pooled ones with density, and the point estimate for traffic is smaller. (Note: The within-county coefficient minus the pooled coefficient with density is +2.2 (95% CI −0.4 to 5.3) points for diesel, an interval that includes zero, +2.8 (95% CI 0.5 to 5.3) points for nitrogen dioxide and −2.1 (95% CI −4.4 to −0.1) points for traffic.) A within-county comparison removes every difference between counties, including the urban-rural contrast, but it is not a comparison of neighbors. Tracts in one county range from dense cores to suburbs, which is why density stays in the model. Chapter 12.6, Suburbs and density (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/suburbs-and-density; planned) takes up the density gradient in the vote directly. ### In counties, the link depends on weighting Table 4 moves the question to counties. A tract model of the margin on race, income and education, with no pollution term, predicts each tract's margin, and the residual margin is the actual margin minus that prediction. The map averages the residual over each county's tracts by votes, which smooths the noise in single tract estimates and lets the map use county shapes. Diesel exposure for a county is the same vote-weighted average of its tract values. Table 4. The residual margin after race, income and education averages −15.9 points in southern counties and +14.5 points in northeastern counties, weighted by votes The residual margin has a strong regional component. Counties in the South average −15.9 points and counties in the Northeast +14.5 points, and 61% of the variance of the residual, weighted by county votes, lies between states. Table 5 plots each county's diesel exposure against its residual margin. Across counties weighted by their votes, the residual correlates with county diesel exposure at +0.26 (95% CI 0.17 to 0.34), so counties with more exposure vote more Democratic than the demographic model predicts. Counting each county once, the correlation is +0.27 (95% CI 0.25 to 0.30). When density also enters the model that produces the residual, the vote-weighted correlation is +0.08 (95% CI −0.02 to 0.17), which includes zero, and the unweighted correlation is −0.06 (95% CI −0.09 to −0.03), which does not. The sign of the density-adjusted correlation therefore depends on whether large counties count more. Within states, the vote-weighted correlation is +0.18 (95% CI 0.01 to 0.41) net of race, income and education and −0.07 (95% CI −0.21 to 0.16) with density added, with intervals that resample the states. Table 5. County diesel exposure correlates at +0.26 with the residual margin after race, income and education, and at +0.08 (interval includes zero) with density added ### Modeled asthma cannot register local air A modeled health estimate is computed from other data by a formula. A measured health outcome is a count or an answer recorded for the people who live in the place. The asthma figures in this chapter are of the first kind: the CDC's PLACES estimates of current asthma among adults [5] are modeled and not measured, so they cannot show an effect of local air. PLACES fits a multilevel model to survey answers, with the age, sex, race and education of respondents and the poverty rate of the county as inputs, and applies it to each tract's population [5]. One tract's estimate differs from another's through its demographic mix and its county, and not through its local air. Modeled prevalence is 11.0% (95% CI 11.0% to 11.1%) in the first decile of diesel exposure and 9.9% (95% CI 9.6% to 10.3%) in the tenth. Per standard deviation of diesel exposure, prevalence differs by −0.25 (95% CI −0.35 to −0.14) points with no controls, by 0.04 (95% CI −0.04 to 0.12) points with race, income and education held fixed and by −0.02 (95% CI −0.11 to 0.07) points with density added. The difference is negative with no controls and its interval includes zero once race, income and education are held fixed, as expected when the model is built from demographic inputs. The pattern describes how the modeled values line up with diesel exposure and does not test whether exposure affects asthma. Chapter 13.4, Health outcomes and the vote (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/health-outcomes-and-the-vote; planned) looks at small-area health outcomes and the vote more broadly. ### The support gap shrinks within party The Cooperative Election Study asked respondents in 2020 whether they support strengthening the Environmental Protection Agency's enforcement of the Clean Air Act and the Clean Water Act even if it costs U.S. jobs. The item names two statutes and a cost in jobs, so it measures more than support for the agency, and it does not ask about local pollution or health. Among the 57,411 respondents in 2,630 counties who gave an answer and a party ID and live in a county with tracts in the sample, weighted support is 59.7% (95% CI 58.5% to 60.8%). Respondents in the fifth whose counties have the most diesel exposure are more supportive, 69.5% (95% CI 67.2% to 71.8%) against 51.2% (95% CI 49.8% to 52.7%) in the fifth whose counties have the least. They are also more often Democrats, 59.0% (95% CI 56.0% to 62.0%) against 32.3% (95% CI 30.9% to 33.7%). Support is 86.1% (95% CI 85.3% to 86.9%) among Democrats, 59.7% (95% CI 58.0% to 61.4%) among independents and 30.6% (95% CI 29.5% to 31.7%) among Republicans, with leaners counted in their party. Table 6 fits a linear probability model of support on standardized county diesel exposure, with survey weights and errors clustered by county. For all respondents the coefficient is 6.4 (95% CI 5.3 to 7.6) points per standard deviation with no controls, 1.3 (95% CI 0.9 to 1.7) points with party ID and demographics held fixed and −0.4 (95% CI −1.1 to 0.4) with the density of the county added. Among Democrats it is 0.0 (95% CI −0.8 to 0.8) with no controls and 0.2 (95% CI −0.6 to 1.0) with controls. Among Republicans it is 4.3 (95% CI 2.4 to 6.2) with no controls, 3.0 (95% CI 1.2 to 4.8) with controls and 1.0 (95% CI −1.4 to 3.4) once county density is added. With county density added every group's interval includes zero. The fifth of respondents in the most exposed counties live in only 54 counties, so large urban counties make up that end of the exposure range. Table 6. Support for EPA enforcement rises with county diesel exposure, but the rise shrinks within party and its interval includes zero with county density held fixed ### What these data cannot show The estimates describe places in one election. They do not say how the residents of a tract voted, because a pattern across areas can differ from the pattern among the people in them [6] (ecological inference). The vote in each tract is an allocation of precinct returns by a land-cover model and each pollution value is modeled, so the estimates carry errors that the intervals leave out. The exposures and the vote are both from 2020, so the data cannot say whether pollution changes how people vote, whether people who vote a certain way settle near sources, or whether the siting of sources follows political power, a claim the environmental justice literature makes [7]. Holding traits fixed is partial. The controls come from the American Community Survey and carry sampling error, and density enters as one summary of urban form. The four exposures move together, so the data cannot say which one the coefficients reflect, and the county residual varies strongly between states, so a correlation across counties can reflect regional differences that the data cannot separate from exposure. Coverage is 47 states, because Alaska, Hawaii and Connecticut have no tract vote estimates and the District of Columbia lacks the white share that the controls need. The survey comparison assigns a county exposure to each respondent and cannot see how much air pollution a respondent breathes. The vote is the presidential margin in one election, so the data say nothing about turnout, down-ballot races or votes on local environmental measures. They hold no local political context, so they cannot say why tracts with more exposure vote as they do. ## Tables ### Table 1. The Democratic margin rises from −29.8 points in the tenth of tracts with the least diesel exposure to +49.1 points in the tenth with the most Democratic minus Republican share of the two-party 2020 presidential vote, percentage points; vote-weighted mean by decile of tract diesel particulate exposure, each row labeled with the decile and its median exposure in micrograms per cubic meter; 95% intervals clustered by county | conf_high | conf_low | decile | decile_label | diesel_median | margin | n | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | −27.42 | −32.23 | 1 | 1 (0.04 µg/m³) | 0.042 | −29.82 | 8,114 | | −26.24 | −31.31 | 2 | 2 (0.07) | 0.068 | −28.78 | 8,113 | | −19.39 | −24.18 | 3 | 3 (0.09) | 0.092 | −21.78 | 8,113 | | −7.48 | −13.25 | 4 | 4 (0.12) | 0.118 | −10.36 | 8,114 | | 4.68 | −1.83 | 5 | 5 (0.14) | 0.144 | 1.42 | 8,113 | | 12.45 | 6.15 | 6 | 6 (0.17) | 0.171 | 9.30 | 8,113 | | 21.73 | 14.99 | 7 | 7 (0.20) | 0.203 | 18.36 | 8,114 | | 30.07 | 22.62 | 8 | 8 (0.24) | 0.244 | 26.34 | 8,113 | | 40.11 | 28.24 | 9 | 9 (0.31) | 0.311 | 34.18 | 8,113 | | 55.84 | 42.39 | 10 | 10 (0.48) | 0.477 | 49.12 | 8,114 | Note: Deciles of diesel exposure hold equal numbers of tracts; ties are broken by census tract code. Note: Tracts with 100 or fewer votes are left out. Intervals treat counties as the units that vary. They do not include error in the allocation of precinct votes to tracts or in the modeled pollution values. Source: Precinct votes allocated to census tracts (Fekrazad 2025), 2020 presidential election; EPA EJScreen version 2.3 (2024 release, 2020 air data); American Community Survey tract data (vintage not recorded in the atlas); vote-weighted, full counts of tracts, no sampling weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/margin_by_diesel_decile.json ### Table 2. Higher-diesel tracts are denser, less white and more Hispanic, and income peaks at decile 6 while college share stays nearly flat after it Characteristics of the tracts in each decile of diesel particulate exposure (8,113 or 8,114 tracts per decile): shares of residents (percent), income (dollars) and deprivation rank averaged by votes, density and exposure as medians | Decile of diesel exposure | Diesel PM, median (µg/m³) | Democratic margin (points) | White alone (%) | Black alone (%) | Hispanic (%) | College degree (%) | Median household income | Deprivation rank (100 = most) | People per km², median | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1 (least) | 0.04 | −29.8 | 79 | 5 | 9 | 25 | $70k | 62.5 | 14 | | 2 | 0.07 | −28.8 | 78 | 7 | 9 | 28 | $78k | 59.1 | 44 | | 3 | 0.09 | −21.8 | 77 | 7 | 10 | 32 | $87k | 52.2 | 152 | | 4 | 0.12 | −10.4 | 72 | 8 | 11 | 36 | $95k | 47.1 | 427 | | 5 | 0.14 | +1.4 | 67 | 11 | 13 | 40 | $98k | 45.0 | 821 | | 6 | 0.17 | +9.3 | 62 | 13 | 15 | 41 | $102k | 42.7 | 1,080 | | 7 | 0.20 | +18.4 | 57 | 14 | 17 | 42 | $101k | 41.4 | 1,394 | | 8 | 0.24 | +26.3 | 53 | 15 | 19 | 42 | $100k | 39.4 | 1,669 | | 9 | 0.31 | +34.2 | 47 | 14 | 25 | 42 | $98k | 34.4 | 2,354 | | 10 (most) | 0.48 | +49.1 | 36 | 13 | 33 | 42 | $97k | 22.2 | 5,167 | Note: Deciles of diesel exposure hold equal numbers of tracts; ties are broken by census tract code. Note: Shares, incomes and ranks are means of tract values weighted by votes. They describe the tracts in each decile, so the table shows no interval. Note: The atlas labels the white share as white alone. Together the white, Black and Hispanic shares never exceed a tract's whole population, so the white share appears to leave out Hispanic residents, but the atlas file does not say so. Note: The Area Deprivation Index has no rank for a small number of tracts, which are left out of that column. Source: Precinct votes allocated to census tracts (Fekrazad 2025), 2020 presidential election; EPA EJScreen version 2.3 (2024 release, 2020 air data); American Community Survey tract data (vintage not recorded in the atlas); vote-weighted, full counts of tracts, no sampling weights; Area Deprivation Index national rank (Neighborhood Atlas; release year not recorded in the atlas file) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/tract_profile.json ### Table 3. Controls shrink the Democratic gap for every pollutant, and with all four exposures in one model traffic proximity keeps 8.7 points while diesel falls to 1.3 Difference in the Democratic two-party margin (percentage points) per standard deviation of tract exposure, by pollutant and set of controls; 81,134 tracts; 95% intervals clustered by county | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | n | pollutant | specification | | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | --- | | 27.99 | 21.52 | 24.75 | 81,134 | Diesel particulate matter | No controls | | 12.56 | 8.11 | 10.34 | 81,134 | Diesel particulate matter | Race, income, education | | 7.21 | 2.60 | 4.90 | 81,134 | Diesel particulate matter | Plus density | | 4.64 | −2.05 | 1.29 | 81,134 | Diesel particulate matter | All four together | | 8.89 | 5.26 | 7.07 | 81,134 | Diesel particulate matter | County fixed effects | | 30.22 | 19.19 | 24.70 | 81,134 | Traffic proximity | No controls | | 15.35 | 9.04 | 12.20 | 81,134 | Traffic proximity | Race, income, education | | 11.29 | 6.08 | 8.69 | 81,134 | Traffic proximity | Plus density | | 11.72 | 5.59 | 8.65 | 81,134 | Traffic proximity | All four together | | 8.56 | 4.64 | 6.60 | 81,134 | Traffic proximity | County fixed effects | | 26.28 | 22.35 | 24.31 | 81,134 | Nitrogen dioxide | No controls | | 11.86 | 8.29 | 10.07 | 81,134 | Nitrogen dioxide | Race, income, education | | 5.80 | 1.46 | 3.63 | 81,134 | Nitrogen dioxide | Plus density | | 1.85 | −3.40 | −0.777 | 81,134 | Nitrogen dioxide | All four together | | 7.80 | 5.16 | 6.48 | 81,134 | Nitrogen dioxide | County fixed effects | | 12.24 | 5.26 | 8.75 | 81,134 | Fine particles (PM2.5) | No controls | | 3.09 | −1.37 | 0.859 | 81,134 | Fine particles (PM2.5) | Race, income, education | | 1.36 | −2.80 | −0.721 | 81,134 | Fine particles (PM2.5) | Plus density | | 0.309 | −3.76 | −1.72 | 81,134 | Fine particles (PM2.5) | All four together | | 2.53 | −2.43 | 0.050 | 81,134 | Fine particles (PM2.5) | County fixed effects | Note: Controls are the white, Black and Hispanic shares of residents, the college share and median household income; density is the log of people per square kilometer. The joint row enters all four exposures in one model with the controls and density. Note: The county fixed effects row is a different comparison and not a further control: it uses the same controls and density and compares tracts only within their own county. Note: Intervals treat counties as the units that vary. They do not include error in the allocation of precinct votes to tracts or in the modeled pollution values. Source: Precinct votes allocated to census tracts (Fekrazad 2025), 2020 presidential election; EPA EJScreen version 2.3 (2024 release, 2020 air data); American Community Survey tract data (vintage not recorded in the atlas); vote-weighted, full counts of tracts, no sampling weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/pollutant_ladder.json ### Table 4. The residual margin after race, income and education averages −15.9 points in southern counties and +14.5 points in northeastern counties, weighted by votes Residual margin: tract Democratic two-party margin minus the margin predicted from tract race, income and education, averaged over each county's tracts by votes, percentage points; county diesel exposure in micrograms per cubic meter No inline rows: the values of Table 4 are in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/air-pollution-and-the-vote/county_lean.json. Views: Residual margin; Residual, density held fixed; Diesel exposure. Note: Hawaii, Connecticut and the District of Columbia draw as no data (Hawaii has no tract vote estimates, the tract atlas has no rows for Connecticut, and it has no white share for DC tracts), and so does any county without a tract of more than 100 votes. Note: County values are averages of modeled tract values, so they carry the errors of both models. No interval is shown on the map. Source: Precinct votes allocated to census tracts (Fekrazad 2025), 2020 presidential election; EPA EJScreen version 2.3 (2024 release, 2020 air data); American Community Survey tract data (vintage not recorded in the atlas); vote-weighted county means of tract values, full counts, no sampling weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/county_lean_map.json ### Table 5. County diesel exposure correlates at +0.26 with the residual margin after race, income and education, and at +0.08 (interval includes zero) with density added Each dot is a county: its mean diesel exposure (averaged over tracts by 2020 votes) against its residual margin, the Democratic two-party margin minus the margin predicted from race, income and education, in percentage points; correlations across 3,096 counties weighted by county votes | County | Diesel exposure (µg/m³) | Residual margin (points) | Residual margin, density held fixed (points) | Votes for president, 2020 | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Autauga, AL | 0.099 | −37.1 | −34.3 | 27,770 | | Baldwin, AL | 0.079 | −39.1 | −36.2 | 109,679 | | Barbour, AL | 0.048 | −21.7 | −4.6 | 10,518 | | Bibb, AL | 0.061 | −31.6 | −21.9 | 9,595 | | Blount, AL | 0.078 | −38.5 | −33.6 | 27,588 | | Bullock, AL | 0.040 | +10.2 | +37.9 | 4,613 | | Butler, AL | 0.059 | −25.1 | −7.6 | 9,488 | | Calhoun, AL | 0.091 | −25.8 | −24.3 | 50,980 | | Chambers, AL | 0.080 | −22.0 | −11.1 | 15,284 | | Cherokee, AL | 0.073 | −29.5 | −22.0 | 12,301 | | Chilton, AL | 0.075 | −36.1 | −29.0 | 19,310 | | Choctaw, AL | 0.034 | −15.7 | +7.6 | 7,464 | | Clarke, AL | 0.041 | −22.4 | −1.5 | 13,135 | | Clay, AL | 0.052 | −32.7 | −17.4 | 6,930 | | Cleburne, AL | 0.077 | −38.4 | −26.5 | 7,227 | | Coffee, AL | 0.048 | −37.5 | −31.8 | 22,275 | | Colbert, AL | 0.107 | −17.4 | −17.3 | 27,886 | | Conecuh, AL | 0.047 | −16.9 | +7.3 | 6,441 | | Coosa, AL | 0.048 | −21.2 | −1.1 | 5,479 | | Covington, AL | 0.039 | −36.8 | −27.5 | 17,430 | | Crenshaw, AL | 0.035 | −33.3 | −14.9 | 6,617 | | Cullman, AL | 0.090 | −36.4 | −34.6 | 41,851 | | Dale, AL | 0.044 | −33.3 | −25.6 | 19,738 | | Dallas, AL | 0.067 | −10.5 | +4.6 | 17,864 | | DeKalb, AL | 0.073 | −34.6 | −27.6 | 29,356 | | Elmore, AL | 0.072 | −34.4 | −29.9 | 41,030 | | Escambia, AL | 0.054 | −29.5 | −16.8 | 15,910 | | Etowah, AL | 0.097 | −24.6 | −25.1 | 47,728 | | Fayette, AL | 0.051 | −34.1 | −20.8 | 8,766 | | Franklin, AL | 0.057 | −36.0 | −25.9 | 12,578 | | Geneva, AL | 0.043 | −39.6 | −29.5 | 12,545 | | Greene, AL | 0.059 | +5.7 | +37.6 | 4,775 | | Hale, AL | 0.051 | −19.7 | +3.5 | 6,772 | | Henry, AL | 0.040 | −34.9 | −19.5 | 9,298 | | Houston, AL | 0.070 | −38.1 | −36.1 | 46,173 | | Jackson, AL | 0.073 | −25.9 | −19.6 | 23,636 | | Jefferson, AL | 0.194 | −18.3 | −15.8 | 325,762 | | Lamar, AL | 0.047 | −31.6 | −18.7 | 7,193 | | Lauderdale, AL | 0.085 | −22.8 | −21.7 | 44,339 | | Lawrence, AL | 0.073 | −27.2 | −17.2 | 16,031 | | Lee, AL | 0.087 | −37.8 | −31.5 | 71,065 | | Limestone, AL | 0.112 | −29.6 | −25.6 | 49,235 | | Lowndes, AL | 0.057 | −2.4 | +27.9 | 6,835 | | Macon, AL | 0.064 | +0.7 | +25.9 | 8,723 | | Madison, AL | 0.118 | −26.4 | −23.0 | 194,767 | | Marengo, AL | 0.048 | −24.2 | −0.6 | 10,900 | | Marion, AL | 0.061 | −31.4 | −23.7 | 13,807 | | Marshall, AL | 0.076 | −41.1 | −37.6 | 39,655 | | Mobile, AL | 0.150 | −24.0 | −24.2 | 181,166 | | Monroe, AL | 0.040 | −17.7 | −0.4 | 10,668 | | Montgomery, AL | 0.145 | −24.7 | −18.6 | 98,448 | | Morgan, AL | 0.124 | −31.2 | −30.8 | 53,722 | | Perry, AL | 0.043 | +0.8 | +31.8 | 5,230 | | Pickens, AL | 0.046 | −21.4 | −0.2 | 9,668 | | Pike, AL | 0.047 | −36.5 | −20.2 | 13,841 | | Randolph, AL | 0.059 | −42.5 | −27.8 | 10,837 | | Russell, AL | 0.090 | −10.3 | −3.5 | 21,329 | | St. Clair, AL | 0.109 | −30.2 | −29.8 | 44,441 | | Shelby, AL | 0.128 | −46.2 | −42.5 | 114,950 | | Sumter, AL | 0.058 | −3.8 | +28.8 | 6,291 | | Talladega, AL | 0.080 | −19.6 | −13.1 | 35,663 | | Tallapoosa, AL | 0.054 | −31.2 | −19.7 | 20,991 | | Tuscaloosa, AL | 0.118 | −25.9 | −22.1 | 89,347 | | Walker, AL | 0.087 | −28.7 | −25.0 | 31,170 | | Washington, AL | 0.038 | −34.1 | −13.0 | 8,876 | | Wilcox, AL | 0.039 | −2.4 | +26.4 | 5,903 | | Winston, AL | 0.056 | −34.7 | −26.9 | 11,284 | | Apache, AZ | 0.016 | +16.7 | +54.6 | 35,171 | | Cochise, AZ | 0.049 | −19.7 | −5.7 | 60,391 | | Coconino, AZ | 0.072 | +9.6 | +27.7 | 73,274 | | Gila, AZ | 0.038 | −11.5 | +4.0 | 27,663 | | Graham, AZ | 0.039 | −28.7 | −12.5 | 14,995 | | Greenlee, AZ | 0.019 | −35.2 | +1.5 | 3,685 | | La Paz, AZ | 0.071 | −17.9 | +5.1 | 6,546 | | Maricopa, AZ | 0.256 | −3.0 | −7.5 | 2,067,902 | | Mohave, AZ | 0.074 | −18.1 | −20.4 | 104,667 | | Navajo, AZ | 0.040 | −6.5 | +17.2 | 51,767 | | Pima, AZ | 0.159 | +7.1 | +10.1 | 519,220 | | Pinal, AZ | 0.131 | −7.2 | −6.6 | 184,398 | | Santa Cruz, AZ | 0.048 | +4.7 | +30.6 | 19,556 | | Yavapai, AZ | 0.073 | −10.5 | −6.0 | 143,219 | | Yuma, AZ | 0.162 | −14.3 | −10.5 | 69,651 | | Arkansas, AR | 0.074 | −21.5 | −10.7 | 6,292 | | Ashley, AR | 0.050 | −29.0 | −16.4 | 7,926 | | Baxter, AR | 0.061 | −14.0 | −11.2 | 21,007 | | Benton, AR | 0.090 | −25.8 | −22.0 | 119,903 | | Boone, AR | 0.051 | −16.3 | −13.4 | 17,114 | | Bradley, AR | 0.043 | −31.9 | −9.7 | 3,654 | | Calhoun, AR | 0.040 | −32.4 | −6.3 | 2,182 | | Carroll, AR | 0.042 | −5.9 | +7.9 | 11,797 | | Chicot, AR | 0.062 | −22.2 | −0.3 | 4,103 | | Clark, AR | 0.086 | −14.0 | +0.5 | 8,395 | | Clay, AR | 0.091 | −14.6 | −8.8 | 5,183 | | Cleburne, AR | 0.052 | −24.0 | −17.7 | 12,680 | | Cleveland, AR | 0.045 | −31.3 | −12.4 | 3,600 | | Columbia, AR | 0.056 | −36.9 | −22.8 | 8,616 | | Conway, AR | 0.100 | −10.1 | +2.0 | 8,685 | | Craighead, AR | 0.125 | −26.5 | −24.9 | 38,511 | | Crawford, AR | 0.117 | −25.3 | −22.8 | 24,093 | | Crittenden, AR | 0.180 | −13.8 | −8.3 | 16,367 | | Cross, AR | 0.106 | −24.5 | −16.8 | 6,942 | | Dallas, AR | 0.051 | −23.5 | −4.5 | 2,649 | | Desha, AR | 0.070 | −19.0 | +4.3 | 4,164 | | Drew, AR | 0.055 | −30.4 | −12.4 | 6,908 | | Faulkner, AR | 0.106 | −21.5 | −19.0 | 54,428 | | Franklin, AR | 0.073 | −20.0 | −9.8 | 7,129 | | Fulton, AR | 0.053 | −14.3 | +0.2 | 5,119 | | Garland, AR | 0.062 | −13.9 | −11.6 | 44,199 | | Grant, AR | 0.054 | −26.7 | −18.2 | 8,191 | | Greene, AR | 0.103 | −17.5 | −19.6 | 16,100 | | Hempstead, AR | 0.078 | −32.9 | −16.5 | 6,845 | | Hot Spring, AR | 0.090 | −16.7 | −9.9 | 12,557 | | Howard, AR | 0.059 | −34.2 | −17.6 | 4,837 | | Independence, AR | 0.072 | −22.4 | −14.5 | 14,512 | | Izard, AR | 0.042 | −27.7 | −12.4 | 5,810 | | Jackson, AR | 0.100 | −18.4 | −7.5 | 5,091 | | Jefferson, AR | 0.093 | −10.8 | −1.1 | 24,796 | | Johnson, AR | 0.084 | −20.2 | −9.5 | 9,541 | | Lafayette, AR | 0.047 | −31.1 | −10.8 | 2,679 | | Lawrence, AR | 0.101 | −14.6 | −8.4 | 5,857 | | Lee, AR | 0.076 | −17.7 | +1.1 | 2,848 | | Lincoln, AR | 0.054 | −21.9 | −6.7 | 3,875 | | Little River, AR | 0.066 | −35.4 | −18.2 | 5,177 | | Logan, AR | 0.048 | −17.5 | −9.5 | 8,182 | | Lonoke, AR | 0.098 | −22.0 | −21.4 | 30,699 | | Madison, AR | 0.037 | −22.6 | −5.7 | 7,351 | | Marion, AR | 0.041 | −12.4 | −2.0 | 7,503 | | Miller, AR | 0.118 | −30.3 | −28.4 | 16,527 | | Mississippi, AR | 0.102 | −19.7 | −10.7 | 12,342 | | Monroe, AR | 0.091 | −23.3 | +1.7 | 2,816 | | Montgomery, AR | 0.035 | −19.8 | −0.8 | 3,873 | | Nevada, AR | 0.065 | −24.2 | −3.2 | 3,358 | | Newton, AR | 0.030 | −15.7 | +2.9 | 3,998 | | Ouachita, AR | 0.109 | −19.0 | −5.1 | 9,629 | | Perry, AR | 0.054 | −11.5 | +1.7 | 4,627 | | Phillips, AR | 0.076 | −12.0 | +6.2 | 6,242 | | Pike, AR | 0.046 | −36.5 | −18.0 | 4,246 | | Poinsett, AR | 0.101 | −20.0 | −15.3 | 7,521 | | Polk, AR | 0.039 | −29.8 | −17.6 | 8,490 | | Pope, AR | 0.100 | −25.2 | −21.2 | 24,432 | | Prairie, AR | 0.085 | −28.7 | −9.5 | 3,495 | | Pulaski, AR | 0.154 | −6.9 | −4.6 | 169,926 | | Randolph, AR | 0.076 | −17.9 | −10.8 | 6,812 | | St. Francis, AR | 0.123 | −14.4 | −0.3 | 7,108 | | Saline, AR | 0.100 | −21.7 | −21.5 | 56,960 | | Scott, AR | 0.036 | −28.1 | −13.0 | 3,551 | | Searcy, AR | 0.036 | −27.0 | −9.3 | 4,019 | | Sebastian, AR | 0.092 | −20.8 | −20.8 | 47,138 | | Sevier, AR | 0.058 | −35.9 | −19.2 | 5,202 | | Sharp, AR | 0.059 | −13.6 | −5.3 | 7,566 | | Stone, AR | 0.039 | −17.1 | −3.5 | 5,938 | | Union, AR | 0.057 | −29.6 | −18.1 | 16,607 | | Van Buren, AR | 0.042 | −14.1 | −1.9 | 7,807 | | Washington, AR | 0.092 | −3.1 | +0.5 | 94,275 | | White, AR | 0.083 | −26.5 | −22.1 | 30,885 | | Woodruff, AR | 0.086 | −16.2 | +7.1 | 2,476 | | Yell, AR | 0.056 | −27.7 | −13.0 | 6,741 | | Alameda, CA | 0.250 | +21.4 | +21.4 | 767,729 | | Alpine, CA | 0.012 | +26.8 | +71.0 | 741 | | Amador, CA | 0.052 | +2.6 | +11.5 | 22,308 | | Butte, CA | 0.133 | +8.5 | +10.7 | 102,023 | | Calaveras, CA | 0.049 | +4.6 | +16.4 | 27,159 | | Colusa, CA | 0.078 | −20.1 | +8.3 | 7,962 | | Contra Costa, CA | 0.161 | +22.9 | +23.3 | 581,271 | | Del Norte, CA | 0.024 | −0.7 | +7.4 | 11,452 | | El Dorado, CA | 0.067 | +3.4 | +6.8 | 115,597 | | Fresno, CA | 0.369 | −9.6 | −6.9 | 364,089 | | Glenn, CA | 0.100 | −16.9 | −7.7 | 11,296 | | Humboldt, CA | 0.054 | +42.2 | +48.7 | 68,824 | | Imperial, CA | 0.180 | −4.7 | +7.2 | 55,690 | | Inyo, CA | 0.021 | +0.6 | +25.6 | 9,480 | | Kern, CA | 0.318 | −17.1 | −15.6 | 305,129 | | Kings, CA | 0.268 | −19.2 | −16.6 | 43,863 | | Lake, CA | 0.031 | +28.5 | +35.5 | 28,808 | | Lassen, CA | 0.020 | −25.9 | −9.4 | 11,980 | | Los Angeles, CA | 0.401 | +12.5 | +10.1 | 4,256,459 | | Madera, CA | 0.225 | −13.6 | −1.8 | 53,736 | | Marin, CA | 0.077 | +54.1 | +54.9 | 155,764 | | Mariposa, CA | 0.030 | −0.5 | +24.0 | 10,277 | | Mendocino, CA | 0.031 | +47.4 | +61.9 | 43,333 | | Merced, CA | 0.302 | −0.9 | +5.1 | 90,569 | | Modoc, CA | 0.015 | −23.4 | +2.3 | 4,338 | | Mono, CA | 0.014 | +27.3 | +57.3 | 6,737 | | Monterey, CA | 0.093 | +25.7 | +30.6 | 163,789 | | Napa, CA | 0.101 | +32.4 | +34.7 | 72,042 | | Nevada, CA | 0.058 | +28.7 | +34.7 | 64,806 | | Orange, CA | 0.316 | −13.3 | −16.2 | 1,521,670 | | Placer, CA | 0.211 | −3.9 | −5.4 | 234,940 | | Plumas, CA | 0.022 | +17.6 | +37.8 | 11,256 | | Riverside, CA | 0.271 | −4.1 | −3.9 | 997,214 | | Sacramento, CA | 0.234 | +10.4 | +6.0 | 716,929 | | San Benito, CA | 0.100 | +19.1 | +25.4 | 28,876 | | San Bernardino, CA | 0.353 | −7.1 | −5.6 | 840,486 | | San Diego, CA | 0.234 | +2.9 | +1.3 | 1,601,471 | | San Francisco, CA | 0.307 | +33.3 | +25.2 | 439,813 | | San Joaquin, CA | 0.265 | +3.3 | +1.6 | 288,024 | | San Luis Obispo, CA | 0.070 | +13.8 | +17.3 | 159,755 | | San Mateo, CA | 0.125 | +30.3 | +29.4 | 373,511 | | Santa Barbara, CA | 0.116 | +20.0 | +20.6 | 200,147 | | Santa Clara, CA | 0.202 | +10.1 | +11.3 | 849,568 | | Santa Cruz, CA | 0.078 | +54.1 | +54.6 | 143,698 | | Shasta, CA | 0.090 | −7.5 | −8.4 | 92,846 | | Sierra, CA | 0.020 | +11.3 | +42.4 | 1,930 | | Siskiyou, CA | 0.029 | +5.2 | +25.2 | 23,439 | | Solano, CA | 0.151 | +15.3 | +15.2 | 205,888 | | Sonoma, CA | 0.095 | +52.5 | +53.1 | 268,261 | | Stanislaus, CA | 0.269 | −0.2 | −2.9 | 214,859 | | Sutter, CA | 0.151 | −15.4 | −13.3 | 42,604 | | Tehama, CA | 0.098 | −16.0 | −4.3 | 28,787 | | Trinity, CA | 0.010 | +26.5 | +52.9 | 6,262 | | Tulare, CA | 0.312 | −16.4 | −11.5 | 146,843 | | Tuolumne, CA | 0.040 | +8.3 | +15.4 | 30,395 | | Ventura, CA | 0.165 | +11.7 | +10.8 | 422,731 | | Yolo, CA | 0.190 | +12.7 | +18.2 | 96,830 | | Yuba, CA | 0.143 | −9.6 | −5.7 | 29,816 | | Adams, CO | 0.312 | +15.0 | +11.1 | 236,740 | | Alamosa, CO | 0.050 | −13.7 | +6.6 | 7,808 | | Arapahoe, CO | 0.268 | +9.9 | +5.7 | 350,172 | | Archuleta, CO | 0.015 | −10.8 | +12.4 | 9,144 | | Baca, CO | 0.022 | −45.1 | −8.9 | 2,225 | | Bent, CO | 0.036 | −21.5 | +13.9 | 2,274 | | Boulder, CO | 0.122 | +38.6 | +41.4 | 206,111 | | Broomfield, CO | 0.238 | +18.7 | +15.8 | 46,632 | | Chaffee, CO | 0.016 | +10.8 | +29.8 | 13,718 | | Cheyenne, CO | 0.020 | −51.0 | −10.4 | 1,136 | | Clear Creek, CO | 0.025 | +13.0 | +37.8 | 6,548 | | Conejos, CO | 0.014 | −14.2 | +24.9 | 4,333 | | Costilla, CO | 0.010 | +5.3 | +54.4 | 2,094 | | Crowley, CO | 0.030 | −34.5 | −8.2 | 1,750 | | Custer, CO | 0.009 | −14.1 | +13.6 | 3,635 | | Delta, CO | 0.029 | −13.8 | +2.5 | 19,370 | | Denver, CO | 0.462 | +32.4 | +28.7 | 393,776 | | Dolores, CO | 0.011 | −26.3 | +8.8 | 1,449 | | Douglas, CO | 0.166 | −12.9 | −13.0 | 231,605 | | Eagle, CO | 0.029 | +14.9 | +38.6 | 26,745 | | Elbert, CO | 0.048 | −22.8 | −9.3 | 18,983 | | El Paso, CO | 0.117 | −13.2 | −15.9 | 378,813 | | Fremont, CO | 0.026 | −11.6 | −5.1 | 25,557 | | Garfield, CO | 0.041 | +5.8 | +24.5 | 30,904 | | Gilpin, CO | 0.021 | +15.1 | +36.1 | 4,186 | | Grand, CO | 0.017 | +7.0 | +33.4 | 9,870 | | Gunnison, CO | 0.018 | +20.3 | +46.2 | 11,190 | | Hinsdale, CO | 0.005 | −13.8 | +33.5 | 632 | | Huerfano, CO | 0.022 | +5.5 | +35.4 | 4,406 | | Jackson, CO | 0.013 | −37.8 | +4.6 | 876 | | Jefferson, CO | 0.185 | +18.0 | +14.2 | 376,131 | | Kiowa, CO | 0.022 | −41.1 | −2.2 | 903 | | Kit Carson, CO | 0.026 | −35.8 | −4.6 | 3,871 | | Lake, CO | 0.015 | +5.3 | +25.4 | 3,961 | | La Plata, CO | 0.030 | +15.7 | +32.3 | 35,667 | | Larimer, CO | 0.146 | +13.7 | +14.1 | 224,264 | | Las Animas, CO | 0.028 | −0.8 | +26.4 | 7,961 | | Lincoln, CO | 0.028 | −46.7 | −12.3 | 2,651 | | Logan, CO | 0.070 | −27.8 | −17.5 | 10,532 | | Mesa, CO | 0.093 | −8.8 | −11.9 | 90,623 | | Mineral, CO | 0.006 | −19.7 | +29.4 | 756 | | Moffat, CO | 0.034 | −35.2 | −30.9 | 7,026 | | Montezuma, CO | 0.021 | −9.2 | +9.4 | 15,500 | | Montrose, CO | 0.043 | −20.2 | −10.1 | 24,922 | | Morgan, CO | 0.109 | −26.5 | −14.0 | 13,744 | | Otero, CO | 0.049 | −15.0 | +0.7 | 9,576 | | Ouray, CO | 0.009 | +20.3 | +52.5 | 4,020 | | Park, CO | 0.013 | +3.1 | +24.7 | 12,285 | | Phillips, CO | 0.033 | −43.4 | −12.1 | 2,485 | | Pitkin, CO | 0.014 | +34.5 | +60.7 | 11,957 | | Prowers, CO | 0.044 | −35.8 | −19.4 | 5,561 | | Pueblo, CO | 0.101 | +2.0 | +5.1 | 88,239 | | Rio Blanco, CO | 0.015 | −42.7 | −7.1 | 3,691 | | Rio Grande, CO | 0.022 | −22.1 | +1.3 | 6,305 | | Routt, CO | 0.028 | +28.3 | +47.8 | 16,876 | | Saguache, CO | 0.011 | +18.8 | +61.5 | 3,389 | | San Juan, CO | 0.007 | +23.9 | +68.5 | 562 | | San Miguel, CO | 0.008 | +36.5 | +69.2 | 5,147 | | Sedgwick, CO | 0.058 | −41.9 | −8.0 | 1,446 | | Summit, CO | 0.026 | +36.8 | +52.4 | 18,479 | | Teller, CO | 0.016 | −20.1 | −8.9 | 16,962 | | Washington, CO | 0.031 | −45.5 | −11.7 | 3,008 | | Weld, CO | 0.190 | −9.6 | −7.3 | 166,255 | | Yuma, CO | 0.033 | −54.2 | −18.9 | 4,981 | | Kent, DE | 0.108 | −0.5 | +1.0 | 87,021 | | New Castle, DE | 0.183 | +18.2 | +16.2 | 287,633 | | Sussex, DE | 0.079 | −0.8 | +2.3 | 129,356 | | Alachua, FL | 0.146 | −1.4 | +5.7 | 142,988 | | Baker, FL | 0.080 | −37.4 | −31.1 | 14,082 | | Bay, FL | 0.092 | −30.7 | −33.8 | 93,213 | | Bradford, FL | 0.073 | −29.0 | −22.6 | 13,704 | | Brevard, FL | 0.120 | −9.8 | −15.5 | 360,580 | | Broward, FL | 0.285 | −7.9 | −9.9 | 959,445 | | Calhoun, FL | 0.036 | −29.1 | −14.4 | 6,537 | | Charlotte, FL | 0.092 | +0.2 | −6.7 | 116,560 | | Citrus, FL | 0.080 | −7.0 | −10.1 | 93,403 | | Clay, FL | 0.124 | −26.3 | −29.9 | 124,589 | | Collier, FL | 0.115 | −26.4 | −26.5 | 208,285 | | Columbia, FL | 0.086 | −24.8 | −19.8 | 33,092 | | DeSoto, FL | 0.076 | −18.1 | −7.4 | 12,676 | | Dixie, FL | 0.043 | −17.7 | −8.7 | 8,173 | | Duval, FL | 0.201 | −16.9 | −19.5 | 494,212 | | Escambia, FL | 0.120 | −17.9 | −20.5 | 170,856 | | Flagler, FL | 0.093 | −9.6 | −12.1 | 71,871 | | Franklin, FL | 0.036 | −16.3 | +0.5 | 6,874 | | Gadsden, FL | 0.058 | −2.6 | +16.2 | 23,763 | | Gilchrist, FL | 0.051 | −21.7 | −13.3 | 9,702 | | Glades, FL | 0.056 | −34.8 | −10.9 | 5,212 | | Gulf, FL | 0.036 | −32.4 | −17.0 | 8,172 | | Hamilton, FL | 0.065 | −25.6 | −5.7 | 5,567 | | Hardee, FL | 0.070 | −38.5 | −21.2 | 8,500 | | Hendry, FL | 0.069 | −31.6 | −14.0 | 12,943 | | Hernando, FL | 0.105 | −5.6 | −10.9 | 109,147 | | Highlands, FL | 0.072 | −20.7 | −17.3 | 52,232 | | Hillsborough, FL | 0.216 | −15.2 | −15.4 | 713,279 | | Holmes, FL | 0.044 | −35.5 | −26.1 | 9,078 | | Indian River, FL | 0.098 | −11.8 | −15.0 | 97,740 | | Jackson, FL | 0.051 | −27.7 | −15.3 | 22,456 | | Jefferson, FL | 0.049 | −2.2 | +15.9 | 8,468 | | Lafayette, FL | 0.039 | −45.1 | −26.9 | 3,661 | | Lake, FL | 0.133 | −11.1 | −11.9 | 211,284 | | Lee, FL | 0.127 | −11.7 | −16.1 | 393,618 | | Leon, FL | 0.120 | −6.5 | −1.2 | 161,120 | | Levy, FL | 0.057 | −16.7 | −5.8 | 23,196 | | Liberty, FL | 0.033 | −26.1 | −3.4 | 3,566 | | Madison, FL | 0.052 | −19.5 | −2.6 | 9,393 | | Manatee, FL | 0.147 | −10.5 | −15.1 | 217,471 | | Marion, FL | 0.119 | −12.3 | −12.6 | 204,736 | | Martin, FL | 0.129 | −13.7 | −16.6 | 98,969 | | Miami-Dade, FL | 0.286 | −42.6 | −39.1 | 1,154,200 | | Monroe, FL | 0.059 | −9.7 | −8.9 | 48,122 | | Nassau, FL | 0.101 | −27.0 | −24.8 | 58,920 | | Okaloosa, FL | 0.082 | −34.2 | −37.1 | 116,748 | | Okeechobee, FL | 0.075 | −26.7 | −20.2 | 15,984 | | Orange, FL | 0.255 | −9.1 | −6.7 | 649,086 | | Osceola, FL | 0.167 | −12.8 | −5.7 | 172,793 | | Palm Beach, FL | 0.192 | −4.5 | −7.5 | 774,179 | | Pasco, FL | 0.137 | −8.6 | −13.4 | 302,673 | | Pinellas, FL | 0.184 | +3.9 | −5.9 | 556,668 | | Polk, FL | 0.146 | −15.3 | −15.7 | 344,106 | | Putnam, FL | 0.069 | −19.8 | −13.8 | 36,403 | | St. Johns, FL | 0.126 | −25.3 | −24.5 | 177,026 | | St. Lucie, FL | 0.136 | −5.5 | −8.9 | 172,340 | | Santa Rosa, FL | 0.078 | −28.1 | −30.3 | 107,193 | | Sarasota, FL | 0.132 | +0.2 | −5.6 | 271,167 | | Seminole, FL | 0.212 | −14.4 | −14.6 | 261,618 | | Sumter, FL | 0.170 | −17.7 | −22.0 | 92,538 | | Suwannee, FL | 0.059 | −31.6 | −20.7 | 21,057 | | Taylor, FL | 0.050 | −33.6 | −20.8 | 10,135 | | Union, FL | 0.062 | −32.5 | −24.7 | 6,251 | | Volusia, FL | 0.135 | −2.7 | −7.3 | 308,100 | | Wakulla, FL | 0.048 | −15.6 | −7.8 | 18,133 | | Walton, FL | 0.062 | −34.3 | −28.0 | 43,795 | | Washington, FL | 0.046 | −29.4 | −19.3 | 12,335 | | Appling, GA | 0.049 | −33.5 | −21.6 | 8,341 | | Atkinson, GA | 0.042 | −36.7 | −15.0 | 3,155 | | Bacon, GA | 0.052 | −44.8 | −32.8 | 4,668 | | Baker, GA | 0.036 | −28.7 | +1.2 | 1,555 | | Baldwin, GA | 0.072 | −18.7 | −10.4 | 18,283 | | Banks, GA | 0.097 | −37.1 | −30.9 | 8,784 | | Barrow, GA | 0.175 | −29.0 | −29.6 | 37,921 | | Bartow, GA | 0.179 | −28.0 | −27.9 | 50,434 | | Ben Hill, GA | 0.073 | −27.3 | −21.2 | 6,560 | | Berrien, GA | 0.048 | −33.0 | −22.2 | 7,743 | | Bibb, GA | 0.170 | −14.0 | −10.3 | 69,327 | | Bleckley, GA | 0.063 | −40.5 | −30.7 | 5,706 | | Brantley, GA | 0.046 | −32.1 | −24.2 | 7,746 | | Brooks, GA | 0.051 | −20.3 | −3.6 | 7,100 | | Bryan, GA | 0.099 | −29.6 | −23.4 | 21,340 | | Bulloch, GA | 0.068 | −31.9 | −22.1 | 30,084 | | Burke, GA | 0.053 | −13.7 | +6.0 | 10,684 | | Butts, GA | 0.130 | −28.3 | −23.6 | 11,771 | | Calhoun, GA | 0.038 | −16.0 | +9.1 | 2,194 | | Camden, GA | 0.099 | −18.3 | −13.8 | 23,688 | | Candler, GA | 0.051 | −31.7 | −16.0 | 4,431 | | Carroll, GA | 0.104 | −27.0 | −25.1 | 54,450 | | Catoosa, GA | 0.165 | −21.8 | −27.3 | 32,593 | | Charlton, GA | 0.055 | −45.2 | −26.7 | 4,566 | | Chatham, GA | 0.140 | −12.2 | −9.9 | 133,420 | | Chattahoochee, GA | 0.051 | −21.1 | −5.2 | 1,582 | | Chattooga, GA | 0.089 | −23.1 | −19.8 | 10,050 | | Cherokee, GA | 0.156 | −30.7 | −33.2 | 144,830 | | Clarke, GA | 0.168 | +2.0 | +8.1 | 51,333 | | Clay, GA | 0.035 | −26.5 | +3.0 | 1,434 | | Clayton, GA | 0.184 | +5.2 | +7.8 | 111,190 | | Clinch, GA | 0.043 | −34.1 | −11.5 | 2,864 | | Cobb, GA | 0.230 | −20.7 | −18.8 | 393,747 | | Coffee, GA | 0.064 | −34.4 | −23.5 | 15,214 | | Colquitt, GA | 0.062 | −44.3 | −33.8 | 16,083 | | Columbia, GA | 0.127 | −30.9 | −30.7 | 80,581 | | Cook, GA | 0.081 | −36.0 | −24.1 | 7,035 | | Coweta, GA | 0.117 | −33.1 | −30.9 | 76,798 | | Crawford, GA | 0.067 | −23.1 | −10.9 | 6,102 | | Crisp, GA | 0.108 | −40.8 | −28.2 | 8,039 | | Dade, GA | 0.096 | −23.4 | −18.7 | 7,434 | | Dawson, GA | 0.091 | −44.4 | −38.5 | 16,081 | | Decatur, GA | 0.050 | −25.9 | −14.0 | 11,627 | | DeKalb, GA | 0.255 | +3.2 | +7.0 | 370,006 | | Dodge, GA | 0.053 | −38.7 | −25.2 | 8,070 | | Dooly, GA | 0.080 | −26.3 | −3.6 | 4,105 | | Dougherty, GA | 0.090 | −17.1 | −9.9 | 35,296 | | Douglas, GA | 0.159 | −13.8 | −8.3 | 69,121 | | Early, GA | 0.039 | −29.6 | −5.8 | 5,187 | | Echols, GA | 0.045 | −59.6 | −33.6 | 1,441 | | Effingham, GA | 0.092 | −34.0 | −29.9 | 31,570 | | Elbert, GA | 0.073 | −26.4 | −15.2 | 9,171 | | Emanuel, GA | 0.048 | −33.0 | −16.9 | 9,501 | | Evans, GA | 0.052 | −35.6 | −20.7 | 4,247 | | Fannin, GA | 0.049 | −27.5 | −20.8 | 14,865 | | Fayette, GA | 0.121 | −33.3 | −26.7 | 71,994 | | Floyd, GA | 0.134 | −27.8 | −25.4 | 41,648 | | Forsyth, GA | 0.163 | −48.4 | −45.0 | 129,176 | | Franklin, GA | 0.108 | −38.2 | −32.2 | 10,765 | | Fulton, GA | 0.273 | −14.0 | −9.0 | 518,228 | | Gilmer, GA | 0.054 | −31.4 | −23.6 | 16,510 | | Glascock, GA | 0.048 | −42.4 | −28.0 | 1,566 | | Glynn, GA | 0.089 | −23.0 | −19.3 | 41,984 | | Gordon, GA | 0.156 | −31.5 | −29.4 | 24,066 | | Grady, GA | 0.051 | −29.3 | −16.4 | 10,707 | | Greene, GA | 0.074 | −38.0 | −20.8 | 11,247 | | Gwinnett, GA | 0.231 | −21.8 | −18.5 | 413,865 | | Habersham, GA | 0.069 | −42.1 | −37.1 | 20,453 | | Hall, GA | 0.157 | −34.9 | −33.5 | 90,517 | | Hancock, GA | 0.049 | +5.5 | +32.1 | 4,133 | | Haralson, GA | 0.097 | −31.9 | −30.3 | 14,248 | | Harris, GA | 0.068 | −37.5 | −24.8 | 19,991 | | Hart, GA | 0.087 | −27.5 | −22.2 | 12,727 | | Heard, GA | 0.059 | −25.0 | −16.1 | 5,391 | | Henry, GA | 0.179 | −14.8 | −10.8 | 122,762 | | Houston, GA | 0.117 | −29.7 | −29.4 | 74,819 | | Irwin, GA | 0.054 | −42.7 | −24.0 | 4,168 | | Jackson, GA | 0.172 | −37.7 | −34.8 | 37,673 | | Jasper, GA | 0.081 | −36.5 | −23.5 | 7,644 | | Jeff Davis, GA | 0.051 | −40.8 | −28.8 | 5,771 | | Jefferson, GA | 0.057 | −11.4 | +9.4 | 7,642 | | Jenkins, GA | 0.048 | −21.4 | −3.7 | 3,455 | | Johnson, GA | 0.046 | −25.0 | −11.4 | 4,100 | | Jones, GA | 0.083 | −17.6 | −11.2 | 14,966 | | Lamar, GA | 0.088 | −31.0 | −23.3 | 9,039 | | Lanier, GA | 0.048 | −40.8 | −27.4 | 2,844 | | Laurens, GA | 0.064 | −32.0 | −22.5 | 22,729 | | Lee, GA | 0.062 | −46.9 | −38.6 | 16,729 | | Liberty, GA | 0.083 | −0.9 | +5.4 | 21,257 | | Lincoln, GA | 0.054 | −25.7 | −10.6 | 4,650 | | Long, GA | 0.059 | −20.6 | −5.6 | 5,656 | | Lowndes, GA | 0.104 | −30.0 | −25.2 | 46,355 | | Lumpkin, GA | 0.064 | −32.1 | −26.0 | 15,531 | | McDuffie, GA | 0.085 | −27.4 | −15.9 | 10,455 | | McIntosh, GA | 0.077 | −18.0 | 0.0 | 6,696 | | Macon, GA | 0.069 | −8.2 | +14.8 | 4,662 | | Madison, GA | 0.090 | −27.9 | −21.3 | 14,936 | | Marion, GA | 0.045 | −22.1 | −0.9 | 3,624 | | Meriwether, GA | 0.065 | −19.9 | −5.3 | 10,878 | | Miller, GA | 0.038 | −45.3 | −24.0 | 2,835 | | Mitchell, GA | 0.045 | −22.4 | −5.7 | 8,963 | | Monroe, GA | 0.126 | −34.4 | −22.9 | 15,492 | | Montgomery, GA | 0.042 | −38.8 | −21.9 | 3,966 | | Morgan, GA | 0.101 | −34.0 | −20.3 | 11,707 | | Murray, GA | 0.073 | −29.7 | −27.5 | 15,389 | | Muscogee, GA | 0.133 | −14.7 | −13.9 | 80,509 | | Newton, GA | 0.158 | −13.8 | −9.7 | 54,239 | | Oconee, GA | 0.125 | −34.4 | −25.7 | 25,168 | | Oglethorpe, GA | 0.071 | −25.2 | −11.2 | 8,131 | | Paulding, GA | 0.144 | −24.2 | −26.1 | 85,385 | | Peach, GA | 0.117 | −25.3 | −15.2 | 12,549 | | Pickens, GA | 0.071 | −28.9 | −26.7 | 17,116 | | Pierce, GA | 0.058 | −44.8 | −36.9 | 9,048 | | Pike, GA | 0.071 | −35.2 | −29.8 | 10,720 | | Polk, GA | 0.101 | −30.8 | −26.0 | 17,399 | | Pulaski, GA | 0.060 | −38.0 | −30.7 | 4,059 | | Putnam, GA | 0.070 | −41.2 | −27.0 | 11,855 | | Quitman, GA | 0.033 | −20.2 | +3.9 | 1,106 | | Rabun, GA | 0.036 | −33.0 | −18.8 | 9,568 | | Randolph, GA | 0.038 | −36.4 | −5.9 | 3,074 | | Richmond, GA | 0.150 | −3.5 | −1.9 | 87,014 | | Rockdale, GA | 0.179 | −9.5 | −3.0 | 44,686 | | Schley, GA | 0.045 | −35.2 | −19.7 | 2,275 | | Screven, GA | 0.050 | −22.0 | −2.2 | 6,628 | | Seminole, GA | 0.041 | −30.7 | −16.6 | 3,884 | | Spalding, GA | 0.123 | −21.5 | −20.1 | 30,116 | | Stephens, GA | 0.088 | −25.6 | −24.6 | 11,884 | | Stewart, GA | 0.035 | −21.3 | +11.4 | 1,990 | | Sumter, GA | 0.072 | −27.2 | −10.9 | 12,150 | | Talbot, GA | 0.057 | −4.3 | +22.5 | 3,522 | | Taliaferro, GA | 0.059 | +8.0 | +37.2 | 928 | | Tattnall, GA | 0.048 | −45.2 | −30.7 | 8,183 | | Taylor, GA | 0.061 | −32.1 | −11.3 | 3,839 | | Telfair, GA | 0.046 | −30.8 | −11.6 | 4,333 | | Terrell, GA | 0.056 | −13.0 | +6.9 | 4,416 | | Thomas, GA | 0.061 | −29.5 | −19.7 | 21,853 | | Tift, GA | 0.106 | −37.4 | −31.2 | 16,283 | | Toombs, GA | 0.057 | −44.2 | −33.7 | 10,914 | | Towns, GA | 0.039 | −35.0 | −25.1 | 7,983 | | Treutlen, GA | 0.048 | −26.5 | −11.4 | 3,077 | | Troup, GA | 0.106 | −28.8 | −21.9 | 30,049 | | Turner, GA | 0.074 | −29.7 | −11.4 | 3,792 | | Twiggs, GA | 0.067 | −15.5 | +5.5 | 4,444 | | Union, GA | 0.044 | −27.6 | −21.0 | 15,556 | | Upson, GA | 0.069 | −18.8 | −14.6 | 12,905 | | Walker, GA | 0.112 | −23.3 | −25.0 | 29,354 | | Walton, GA | 0.153 | −36.3 | −35.4 | 51,095 | | Ware, GA | 0.096 | −32.2 | −27.2 | 14,192 | | Warren, GA | 0.062 | −13.8 | +10.8 | 2,651 | | Washington, GA | 0.061 | −25.9 | −4.7 | 9,459 | | Wayne, GA | 0.064 | −36.3 | −29.0 | 12,778 | The first 500 of 3096 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/county_diesel_scatter.json. Views: Residual margin; Density held fixed. Note: Binned means group counties into tenths by diesel exposure. The number of counties in each bin is in the tooltip. Note: Hawaii, Connecticut and the District of Columbia, and counties without a tract of more than 100 votes, are left out. County values are averages of modeled tract values, so they carry the errors of both models. Note: Intervals on the binned means resample the states. They do not include error in the allocation of precinct votes to tracts or in the modeled pollution values. Source: Precinct votes allocated to census tracts (Fekrazad 2025), 2020 presidential election; EPA EJScreen version 2.3 (2024 release, 2020 air data); American Community Survey tract data (vintage not recorded in the atlas); vote-weighted county means of tract values, full counts, no sampling weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/county_diesel_scatter.json ### Table 6. Support for EPA enforcement rises with county diesel exposure, but the rise shrinks within party and its interval includes zero with county density held fixed Percentage-point difference in support for strengthening EPA enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs U.S. jobs, per standard deviation of county diesel exposure; 57,411 respondents in 2,630 counties, 2020; 95% intervals clustered by county | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | group | n | specification | | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | | 7.57 | 5.30 | 6.43 | All respondents | 57,411 | No controls | | 1.74 | 0.861 | 1.30 | All respondents | 57,411 | Party ID and demographics | | 0.369 | −1.12 | −0.377 | All respondents | 57,411 | Plus county density | | 0.829 | −0.773 | 0.028 | Democrats | 28,671 | No controls | | 0.955 | −0.620 | 0.168 | Democrats | 28,671 | Party ID and demographics | | 0.568 | −1.77 | −0.603 | Democrats | 28,671 | Plus county density | | 4.81 | 1.34 | 3.08 | Independents | 8,643 | No controls | | 3.51 | −0.177 | 1.66 | Independents | 8,643 | Party ID and demographics | | 1.18 | −4.11 | −1.47 | Independents | 8,643 | Plus county density | | 6.16 | 2.39 | 4.27 | Republicans | 20,097 | No controls | | 4.78 | 1.18 | 2.98 | Republicans | 20,097 | Party ID and demographics | | 3.40 | −1.42 | 0.991 | Republicans | 20,097 | Plus county density | Note: The CES is an opt-in panel, so its intervals are model based. County exposure is a county value assigned to each respondent, not an exposure the respondent was measured to have. Note: It is a different CES item from the one on giving the EPA power to regulate carbon dioxide. Source: Cooperative Election Study 2020 wave, item on strengthening EPA enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, weighted with the CES survey weight; county diesel exposure from EPA EJScreen version 2.3 averaged over tracts by 2020 votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/ces_within_party.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (103), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | adi_d1 | 62.5 | Area Deprivation Index national rank (1 = least deprived, 100 = most deprived) | vote-weighted mean rank; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts in decile 1 of diesel exposure with an ADI rank | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 60.9 to 64.2 | 8,076 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Area Deprivation Index | | | adi_d10 | 22.2 | Area Deprivation Index national rank (1 = least deprived, 100 = most deprived) | vote-weighted mean rank; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts in decile 10 of diesel exposure with an ADI rank | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 16.2 to 28.2 | 8,073 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Area Deprivation Index | | | adi_national | 44.8 | Area Deprivation Index national rank (1 = least deprived, 100 = most deprived) | vote-weighted mean rank; 95% interval clustered by county | all sample tracts with an ADI rank | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 42.2 to 47.4 | 80,849 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Area Deprivation Index | | | asthma_ctrl | 0.04 | percentage points of adults with current asthma per standard deviation of diesel exposure | weighted least squares coefficient of the tract asthma estimate on standardized diesel exposure, with race, income and education held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | PLACES release not recorded in the atlas file | 95% CI −0.04 to 0.12 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | asthma_d1 | 11.0% | percent of adults with current asthma (model-based tract estimate) | vote-weighted mean of the tract estimate; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts in decile 1 of diesel exposure | PLACES release not recorded in the atlas file | 95% CI 11.0% to 11.1% | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | asthma_d10 | 9.9% | percent of adults with current asthma (model-based tract estimate) | vote-weighted mean of the tract estimate; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts in decile 10 of diesel exposure | PLACES release not recorded in the atlas file | 95% CI 9.6% to 10.3% | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | asthma_dens | −0.02 | percentage points of adults with current asthma per standard deviation of diesel exposure | weighted least squares coefficient of the tract asthma estimate on standardized diesel exposure, with race, income, education and density held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | PLACES release not recorded in the atlas file | 95% CI −0.11 to 0.07 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | asthma_raw | −0.25 | percentage points of adults with current asthma per standard deviation of diesel exposure | weighted least squares coefficient of the tract asthma estimate on standardized diesel exposure, with no controls; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | PLACES release not recorded in the atlas file | 95% CI −0.35 to −0.14 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | CDC PLACES | | | ces_all_ctrl | 1.3 | percentage points of support per standard deviation of county diesel exposure | weighted linear probability model coefficient on standardized county diesel exposure, specification: party id and demographics; 95% interval clustered by county | all respondents in the CES 2020 sample | 2020 | 95% CI 0.9 to 1.7 | 57,411 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_all_dens | −0.4 | percentage points of support per standard deviation of county diesel exposure | weighted linear probability model coefficient on standardized county diesel exposure, specification: plus county density; 95% interval clustered by county | all respondents in the CES 2020 sample | 2020 | 95% CI −1.1 to 0.4 | 57,411 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_all_raw | 6.4 | percentage points of support per standard deviation of county diesel exposure | weighted linear probability model coefficient on standardized county diesel exposure, specification: no controls; 95% interval clustered by county | all respondents in the CES 2020 sample | 2020 | 95% CI 5.3 to 7.6 | 57,411 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_counties | 2,630 | counties | count of counties with a respondent | CES 2020 respondents with an answer on the EPA enforcement item, a seven-point party ID and a county in the tract sample | 2020 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_dem_ctrl | 0.2 | percentage points of support per standard deviation of county diesel exposure | weighted linear probability model coefficient on standardized county diesel exposure, specification: party id and demographics; 95% interval clustered by county | democrats in the CES 2020 sample | 2020 | 95% CI −0.6 to 1.0 | 28,671 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_dem_raw | 0.0 | percentage points of support per standard deviation of county diesel exposure | weighted linear probability model coefficient on standardized county diesel exposure, specification: no controls; 95% interval clustered by county | democrats in the CES 2020 sample | 2020 | 95% CI −0.8 to 0.8 | 28,671 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_diesel_sd | 0.12 | micrograms per cubic meter of diesel particulate matter | survey-weighted standard deviation of county diesel exposure across respondents | CES 2020 respondents with an answer on the EPA enforcement item, a seven-point party ID and a county in the tract sample | 2020 | | | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_n | 57,411 | respondents | count of respondents | CES 2020 respondents with an answer on the EPA enforcement item, a seven-point party ID and a county in the tract sample | 2020 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_q1_dem | 32.3% | percent Democratic (party ID 1 to 3) | weighted share; 95% interval clustered by county | CES respondents in the lowest fifth of county diesel exposure | 2020 | 95% CI 30.9% to 33.7% | 11,483 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_q1_support | 51.2% | percent supporting stronger EPA enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, even if it costs U.S. jobs | weighted share; 95% interval clustered by county | CES respondents in the lowest fifth of county diesel exposure | 2020 | 95% CI 49.8% to 52.7% | 11,483 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_q5_counties | 54 | counties | count of counties with a respondent in the group | CES respondents in the highest fifth of county diesel exposure | 2020 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_q5_dem | 59.0% | percent Democratic (party ID 1 to 3) | weighted share; 95% interval clustered by county | CES respondents in the highest fifth of county diesel exposure | 2020 | 95% CI 56.0% to 62.0% | 11,482 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_q5_support | 69.5% | percent supporting stronger EPA enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, even if it costs U.S. jobs | weighted share; 95% interval clustered by county | CES respondents in the highest fifth of county diesel exposure | 2020 | 95% CI 67.2% to 71.8% | 11,482 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_rep_ctrl | 3.0 | percentage points of support per standard deviation of county diesel exposure | weighted linear probability model coefficient on standardized county diesel exposure, specification: party id and demographics; 95% interval clustered by county | republicans in the CES 2020 sample | 2020 | 95% CI 1.2 to 4.8 | 20,097 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_rep_dens | 1.0 | percentage points of support per standard deviation of county diesel exposure | weighted linear probability model coefficient on standardized county diesel exposure, specification: plus county density; 95% interval clustered by county | republicans in the CES 2020 sample | 2020 | 95% CI −1.4 to 3.4 | 20,097 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_rep_raw | 4.3 | percentage points of support per standard deviation of county diesel exposure | weighted linear probability model coefficient on standardized county diesel exposure, specification: no controls; 95% interval clustered by county | republicans in the CES 2020 sample | 2020 | 95% CI 2.4 to 6.2 | 20,097 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_support | 59.7% | percent supporting stronger EPA enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, even if it costs U.S. jobs | weighted share; 95% interval clustered by county | CES 2020 respondents with an answer on the EPA enforcement item, a seven-point party ID and a county in the tract sample | 2020 | 95% CI 58.5% to 60.8% | 57,411 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_support_dem | 86.1% | percent supporting stronger EPA enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, even if it costs U.S. jobs | weighted share; 95% interval clustered by county | Democratic respondents (seven-point party ID, leaners included) | 2020 | 95% CI 85.3% to 86.9% | 28,671 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_support_ind | 59.7% | percent supporting stronger EPA enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, even if it costs U.S. jobs | weighted share; 95% interval clustered by county | Independent respondents (seven-point party ID, leaners included) | 2020 | 95% CI 58.0% to 61.4% | 8,643 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_support_rep | 30.6% | percent supporting stronger EPA enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act, even if it costs U.S. jobs | weighted share; 95% interval clustered by county | Republican respondents (seven-point party ID, leaners included) | 2020 | 95% CI 29.5% to 31.7% | 20,097 | CES 2020 weight (weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | college_at_peak | 41% | percent (share of adults with a college degree) | vote-weighted mean of the tract share of adults with a college degree, in the decile where mean income peaks | census tracts in decile 6 of diesel exposure | 2020 votes; ACS tract shares | | 8,113 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | college_d10 | 42% | percent (share of adults with a college degree) | vote-weighted mean of the tract share of adults with a college degree | census tracts in decile 10 of diesel exposure | 2020 votes; ACS tract shares | | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | density_d1 | 14 | people per square kilometer | median across tracts in the decile | census tracts in decile 1 of diesel exposure | 2020 votes; ACS tract population and land area | | 8,114 | none (each tract counts once) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | density_d10 | 5,167 | people per square kilometer | median across tracts in the decile | census tracts in decile 10 of diesel exposure | 2020 votes; ACS tract population and land area | | 8,114 | none (each tract counts once) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | diesel_cap | 0.6 | micrograms per cubic meter of diesel particulate matter | the diesel view of the county map stops its color scale at this value | counties on the map | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (constant) | EJScreen | | | diesel_ctrl | 10.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized diesel particulate matter exposure, with race, income and education held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 8.1 to 12.6 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | diesel_ctrl_kept | 42% | percent of the no-controls diesel coefficient | ratio of the diesel coefficient with race, income and education held fixed to the diesel coefficient with no controls (ratio of point estimates); 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 36% to 48% | 81,134 | none (ratio of estimates) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | diesel_dens | 4.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized diesel particulate matter exposure, with race, income, education and density held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 2.6 to 7.2 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | diesel_dens20 | 3.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | diesel coefficient with race, income and education held fixed and density entered as 20 equal-size bins instead of a log term; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 1.1 to 5.8 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | diesel_dens_kept | 20% | percent of the no-controls diesel coefficient | ratio of the diesel coefficient with race, income, education and density held fixed to the diesel coefficient with no controls (ratio of point estimates); 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 12% to 27% | 81,134 | none (ratio of estimates) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | diesel_dens_state | 4.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | same coefficient as diesel with race, income, education and density held fixed, with the interval clustered by state (47 clusters) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 0.2 to 9.6 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | diesel_fe | 7.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized diesel particulate matter exposure, within county, with race, income, education and density held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 5.3 to 8.9 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | diesel_med_d5 | 0.14 | micrograms per cubic meter of diesel particulate matter | median across tracts in the decile | census tracts in decile 5 of diesel exposure | EJScreen 2.3, 2020 modeled air data | | 8,113 | none (each tract counts once) | EJScreen | | | diesel_raw | 24.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized diesel particulate matter exposure, with no controls; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 21.5 to 28.0 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | diesel_sd | 0.14 | micrograms per cubic meter of diesel particulate matter | standard deviation across tracts (unweighted) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | EJScreen 2.3, 2020 modeled air data | | | none (each tract counts once) | EJScreen | | | diesel_top5_hi | 0.75 | micrograms per cubic meter of diesel particulate matter | highest county mean of tract diesel exposure (vote-weighted) | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | votes cast in the county, 2020 presidential election | EJScreen | | | diesel_top5_lo | 0.56 | micrograms per cubic meter of diesel particulate matter | fifth-highest county mean of tract diesel exposure (vote-weighted) | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | votes cast in the county, 2020 presidential election | EJScreen | | | ejscreen_version | 2.3 | EJScreen version number | version of the tool, identified from the indicators and values in the atlas | the EPA EJScreen release identified in the tract atlas | released July 2024 | | | none (identifier) | EJScreen | | | fe_diff_diesel | +2.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | within-county coefficient on the standardized diesel exposure minus the pooled coefficient with race, income, education and density; 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI −0.4 to 5.3 | 81,134 | none (difference of two weighted least squares coefficients) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | fe_diff_no2 | +2.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | within-county coefficient on the standardized nitrogen dioxide exposure minus the pooled coefficient with race, income, education and density; 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 0.5 to 5.3 | 81,134 | none (difference of two weighted least squares coefficients) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | fe_diff_traffic | −2.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | within-county coefficient on the standardized traffic proximity exposure minus the pooled coefficient with race, income, education and density; 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI −4.4 to −0.1 | 81,134 | none (difference of two weighted least squares coefficients) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | hispanic_d1 | 9% | percent (share of residents who are Hispanic) | vote-weighted mean of the tract share of residents who are Hispanic | census tracts in decile 1 of diesel exposure | 2020 votes; ACS tract shares | | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | hispanic_d10 | 33% | percent (share of residents who are Hispanic) | vote-weighted mean of the tract share of residents who are Hispanic | census tracts in decile 10 of diesel exposure | 2020 votes; ACS tract shares | | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | income_d1 | $70,000 | dollars (median household income of the tract, rounded to the nearest thousand) | vote-weighted mean of tract median household income | census tracts in decile 1 of diesel exposure | 2020 votes; ACS tract incomes | | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | The display is rounded to the nearest thousand dollars; the stored value is exact. | | income_d10 | $97,000 | dollars (median household income of the tract, rounded to the nearest thousand) | vote-weighted mean of tract median household income | census tracts in decile 10 of diesel exposure | 2020 votes; ACS tract incomes | | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | The display is rounded to the nearest thousand dollars; the stored value is exact. | | income_peak | $102,000 | dollars (median household income of the tract, rounded to the nearest thousand) | highest decile mean of tract median household income (vote-weighted) | census tracts in decile 6 of diesel exposure | 2020 votes; ACS tract incomes | | 8,113 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | The display is rounded to the nearest thousand dollars; the stored value is exact. | | income_peak_decile | 6 | decile of diesel exposure | decile with the highest vote-weighted mean tract income | census tracts | 2020 votes; ACS tract incomes | | | none (identifier) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | joint_diesel | 1.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | coefficient on standardized diesel in one model with diesel, traffic, nitrogen dioxide and fine particles together, plus race, income, education and density; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI −2.1 to 4.6 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | joint_traffic | 8.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | coefficient on standardized traffic in one model with diesel, traffic, nitrogen dioxide and fine particles together, plus race, income, education and density; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 5.6 to 11.7 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | map_cap | 40 | percentage points | the county map colors stop at this distance from zero | counties on the map | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (constant) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | map_northeast | +14.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin | mean over counties, weighted by county votes, of the residual margin net of race, income and education (a positive value is more Democratic than the model predicts) | counties of the Northeast census region in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | 209 | votes cast in the county, 2020 presidential election | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | map_south | −15.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin | mean over counties, weighted by county votes, of the residual margin net of race, income and education (a positive value is more Democratic than the model predicts) | counties of the South census region in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | 1,419 | votes cast in the county, 2020 presidential election | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | margin_d1 | −29.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin | vote-weighted mean tract margin; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts in decile 1 of diesel exposure | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI −32.2 to −27.4 | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | margin_d10 | +49.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin | vote-weighted mean tract margin; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts in decile 10 of diesel exposure | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 42.4 to 55.8 | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | margin_d5 | +1.4 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin | vote-weighted mean tract margin; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts in decile 5 of diesel exposure | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI −1.8 to 4.7 | 8,113 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | margin_gap | 78.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin | difference in vote-weighted mean margin, top decile minus bottom decile; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts in the top and bottom decile of diesel exposure | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 71.8 to 86.1 | 16,228 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_atlas_tracts | 82,765 | census tracts | count of tracts | tracts in the 2020 tract atlas | 2020 presidential election | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_counties_d1 | 1,824 | counties | count of counties with at least one tract in the decile | census tracts in decile 1 of diesel exposure | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_counties_d10 | 112 | counties | count of counties with at least one tract in the decile | census tracts in decile 10 of diesel exposure | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_counties_sample | 3,096 | counties | count of counties | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_density_bins | 20 | bins | number of equal-size bins of log density that replace the log term in the robustness model | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (constant) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_over100 | 81,617 | census tracts | count of tracts | tracts in the atlas with more than 100 estimated votes | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_over_clamp | 343 | counties | count of counties whose residual margin net of race, income and education is more than 40 points from zero | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_over_diesel_cap | 3 | counties | count of counties whose vote-weighted mean tract diesel exposure is above the map cap | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (count) | EJScreen | | | n_per_decile | 8,113 or 8,114 | census tracts per decile of diesel exposure | count of tracts in each decile (deciles are cut on the rank of exposure, so the counts differ by at most one) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_states | 47 | states | count of states | states with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | n_tracts | 81,134 | census tracts | count of tracts | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (count) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | no2_ctrl | 10.1 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized nitrogen dioxide exposure, with race, income and education held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 8.3 to 11.9 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | no2_dens | 3.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized nitrogen dioxide exposure, with race, income, education and density held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 1.5 to 5.8 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | no2_fe | 6.5 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized nitrogen dioxide exposure, within county, with race, income, education and density held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 5.2 to 7.8 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | no2_raw | 24.3 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized nitrogen dioxide exposure, with no controls; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 22.3 to 26.3 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | no2_sd | 3.5 | parts per billion of nitrogen dioxide | standard deviation across tracts (unweighted) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | EJScreen 2.3, 2020 modeled air data | | | none (each tract counts once) | EJScreen | | | pm25_ctrl | 0.9 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized fine particles (pm2.5) exposure, with race, income and education held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI −1.4 to 3.1 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | pm25_dens | −0.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized fine particles (pm2.5) exposure, with race, income, education and density held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI −2.8 to 1.4 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | pm25_raw | 8.8 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized fine particles (pm2.5) exposure, with no controls; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 5.3 to 12.2 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | pm25_sd | 2.1 | micrograms per cubic meter of fine particles | standard deviation across tracts (unweighted) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | EJScreen 2.3, 2020 modeled air data | | | none (each tract counts once) | EJScreen | | | r_county_lean_demog | +0.26 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation across counties, weighted by county votes, of county diesel exposure with the county mean residual margin after a tract model of race, income and education; 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 0.17 to 0.34 | 3,096 | votes cast in the county, 2020 presidential election | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_county_lean_demog_state | +0.18 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation across counties, weighted by county votes, of county diesel exposure with the county mean residual margin after a tract model of race, income and education, both measured from their vote-weighted state means (within-state); 95% interval from resampling the 47 states (2,000 replicates) | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 0.01 to 0.41 | 3,096 | votes cast in the county, 2020 presidential election | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_county_lean_demog_unw | +0.27 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | unweighted correlation across counties (each county counts once) of county diesel exposure with the county mean residual margin after a tract model of race, income and education; 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 0.25 to 0.30 | 3,096 | none (each county counts once) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_county_lean_dens | +0.08 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation across counties, weighted by county votes, of county diesel exposure with the county mean residual margin after a tract model of race, income, education and density; 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI −0.02 to 0.17 | 3,096 | votes cast in the county, 2020 presidential election | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_county_lean_dens_state | −0.07 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | correlation across counties, weighted by county votes, of county diesel exposure with the county mean residual margin after a tract model of race, income, education and density, both measured from their vote-weighted state means (within-state); 95% interval from resampling the 47 states (2,000 replicates) | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI −0.21 to 0.16 | 3,096 | votes cast in the county, 2020 presidential election | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_county_lean_dens_unw | −0.06 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | unweighted correlation across counties (each county counts once) of county diesel exposure with the county mean residual margin after a tract model of race, income, education and density; 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI −0.09 to −0.03 | 3,096 | none (each county counts once) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | r_diesel_density | +0.68 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation across tracts of diesel exposure with log population density; 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | EJScreen 2.3, 2020 modeled air data; ACS population | 95% CI 0.66 to 0.71 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | r_diesel_no2 | +0.72 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation across tracts of diesel exposure with nitrogen dioxide; 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | EJScreen 2.3, 2020 modeled air data | 95% CI 0.66 to 0.76 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | r_diesel_traffic | +0.68 | correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1 | vote-weighted correlation across tracts of diesel exposure with traffic proximity; 95% interval from a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | EJScreen 2.3, 2020 modeled air data | 95% CI 0.58 to 0.77 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | EJScreen | | | resid_between_state | 61% | percent of the vote-weighted variance of the county residual margin | share of the vote-weighted variance of the county residual margin (net of race, income and education) that lies between states: one minus the ratio of the within-state variance to the total variance | counties with at least one tract in the sample | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | 3,096 | votes cast in the county, 2020 presidential election | Precinct votes on census geographies | A descriptive ratio of variances with no interval. | | traffic_ctrl | 12.2 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized traffic proximity exposure, with race, income and education held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 9.0 to 15.3 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | traffic_dens | 8.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized traffic proximity exposure, with race, income, education and density held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 6.1 to 11.3 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | traffic_fe | 6.6 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized traffic proximity exposure, within county, with race, income, education and density held fixed; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 4.6 to 8.6 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | traffic_raw | 24.7 | percentage points of Democratic two-party margin per standard deviation of the exposure | weighted least squares coefficient on the standardized traffic proximity exposure, with no controls; 95% interval clustered by county | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | 95% CI 19.2 to 30.2 | 81,134 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | traffic_sd | 2.4 million | traffic proximity score (annual average daily traffic on major roads divided by distance) | standard deviation across tracts (unweighted) | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | EJScreen 2.3, 2020 highway counts | | | none (each tract counts once) | EJScreen | | | vote_floor | 100 | votes | a tract is kept when its estimated presidential votes exceed this number | census tracts | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (constant) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | votes_m | 155.1 million | votes | sum of tract presidential votes in the sample | census tracts with more than 100 votes in 2020 and complete pollution, control and land-area data | 2020 presidential election; EJScreen 2.3 air data for 2020 | | | none (sum of votes) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | white_d1 | 79% | percent (share of residents who are white alone) | vote-weighted mean of the tract share of residents who are white alone | census tracts in decile 1 of diesel exposure | 2020 votes; ACS tract shares | | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | | white_d10 | 36% | percent (share of residents who are white alone) | vote-weighted mean of the tract share of residents who are white alone | census tracts in decile 10 of diesel exposure | 2020 votes; ACS tract shares | | 8,114 | votes cast in the tract, 2020 presidential election (pres_tot) | Precinct votes on census geographies | | ## Definitions - Census tract: A Census Bureau neighborhood area, usually home to between 1,200 and 8,000 people. Tract boundaries were redrawn after the 2010 census and again after 2020. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - EJSCREEN: The Environmental Protection Agency's environmental justice screening tool. It combines pollution and hazard measures, such as fine particles and diesel exhaust, with the demographics of each neighborhood. - Area Deprivation Index: A ranking of neighborhoods built from income, education, employment and housing measures in the American Community Survey. Higher ranks mean more deprived neighborhoods. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Fixed effects: Regression terms that give each group, such as each country or each year, its own baseline. The other coefficients then compare respondents within the same group. - Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them. ## Methods Sample: census tracts in the tract atlas (82,765 tracts in 47 states and the District of Columbia; Alaska and Hawaii have no tract vote estimates, and the tract atlas has no rows for Connecticut) with more than 100 estimated presidential votes in 2020, a two-party margin, all four pollution measures, the five controls and a land area above zero: 81,134 tracts in 47 states and 3,096 counties, carrying 155.1 million votes. The District of Columbia drops out because the atlas has no white share for its tracts. Vote: precinct returns allocated to 2020 tracts by Regionalized Land Cover Regression (Fekrazad 2025), fractional votes; margin = 100 (D minus R) over (D plus R). Pollution: tract values of EPA EJScreen version 2.3 (July 2024) in the atlas: diesel particulate matter (micrograms per cubic meter; 2020 AirToxScreen), traffic proximity (annual average daily traffic on major roads within 10 kilometers divided by distance; 2020 highway counts), nitrogen dioxide (parts per billion; NASA satellite model, 2020) and fine particles (micrograms per cubic meter; 2020). EPA removed EJScreen from its website on 5 February 2025. The atlas does not record the version or the archived copy; version 2.3 is identified from the values (the fine-particle range and the nitrogen dioxide maximum match the 2.3 documentation, and the median diesel value is close to the documented median, which is a block-group value while the atlas holds tract values, so the atlas diesel range is narrower than the documented one). Controls: white, Black and Hispanic shares of residents, college share and median household income are American Community Survey tract values; the atlas does not record the survey years. Estimands: the vote-weighted mean margin by decile of diesel exposure (equal numbers of tracts); the coefficient of the margin on each exposure standardized with the unweighted standard deviation across tracts; the share of the raw diesel coefficient that remains after controls (a ratio of point estimates); the within-county coefficient minus the pooled coefficient with density; and, across counties, the correlation of county diesel exposure with the county residual margin (the tract margin minus the margin predicted by a weighted least squares model with no pollution term, on the demographic controls alone or with log density added, averaged over the county's tracts by votes). Weights: tract presidential votes. Estimator: weighted least squares; controls are the shares of white, Black and Hispanic residents, the college share and median household income; density is the log of people per square kilometer; the within-county estimate removes the vote-weighted county mean from every variable before fitting. Interval method: 95%, clustered by county (3,096 clusters); the retained shares and the within-county differences use a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345, the same resampled counties for every model); correlations across tracts and counties use a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345); county correlations are reported weighted by county votes and unweighted, because the weighting decides the sign of the density-adjusted one; within-state correlations (county diesel exposure and the county residual margin each measured from its vote-weighted state mean, correlated with county votes as weights) and the binned means of the county residual margin over tenths of counties ordered by diesel exposure (weighted by county votes, or counting each county once) resample the 47 states (2,000 replicates, seed 12345); the share of the variance of the county residual margin that lies between states is one minus the ratio of the vote-weighted within-state variance to the total variance and has no interval; the state-clustered interval on the diesel coefficient uses 47 clusters. Intervals are model based and do not include error in the vote allocation or in the modeled pollution. The atlas does not record how EJScreen block-group values were turned into tract values (diesel and fine particles are tract values in the source). Deprivation: Area Deprivation Index national rank. Asthma: CDC PLACES current asthma among adults, a model-based estimate that cannot vary with local air (its inputs are demographic and geographic). The release years of the ADI and PLACES values are not recorded in the atlas. CES: 2020 wave, respondents with an answer on the item on strengthening EPA enforcement of the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act even if it costs U.S. jobs (support_epa_airwater, from the source item enviro_airwateracts, coded 1 for support), a seven-point party ID and a county in the tract sample (57,411 respondents in 2,630 counties); weighted least squares on a 0 or 100 outcome with the survey weight; county exposure is the vote-weighted county mean of tract diesel exposure. Suppression: tracts with 100 or fewer votes are dropped; no survey cell rests on fewer than 30 respondents; tract deciles and county values are full counts of tracts and counties. ## What these data cannot show - The estimates describe places in one election. - They do not say how the residents of a tract voted, because a pattern across areas can differ from the pattern among the people in them [6] (ecological inference). - The vote in each tract is an allocation of precinct returns by a land-cover model and each pollution value is modeled, so the estimates carry errors that the intervals leave out. - The exposures and the vote are both from 2020, so the data cannot say whether pollution changes how people vote, whether people who vote a certain way settle near sources, or whether the siting of sources follows political power, a claim the environmental justice literature makes [7]. - Holding traits fixed is partial. - The controls come from the American Community Survey and carry sampling error, and density enters as one summary of urban form. - The four exposures move together, so the data cannot say which one the coefficients reflect, and the county residual varies strongly between states, so a correlation across counties can reflect regional differences that the data cannot separate from exposure. - Coverage is 47 states, because Alaska, Hawaii and Connecticut have no tract vote estimates and the District of Columbia lacks the white share that the controls need. - The survey comparison assigns a county exposure to each respondent and cannot see how much air pollution a respondent breathes. - The vote is the presidential margin in one election, so the data say nothing about turnout, down-ballot races or votes on local environmental measures. - They hold no local political context, so they cannot say why tracts with more exposure vote as they do. ## References 1. Fekrazad, Amir (2025). A dataset of US precinct votes allocated to Census geographies with precision. Scientific Data 12: 794. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-025-05140-3 2. US Environmental Protection Agency (2024). EJScreen Technical Documentation for Version 2.3 (revised July 31, 2024). Office of Environmental Justice and External Civil Rights, Washington, DC. https://epa.gov/system/files/documents/2024-07/ejscreen-tech-doc-version-2-3.pdf 3. Kind, Amy J. H.; Buckingham, William R. (2018). Making Neighborhood-Disadvantage Metrics Accessible: The Neighborhood Atlas. New England Journal of Medicine 378: 2456-2458. https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJMp1802313 4. Rodden, Jonathan A. (2019). Why Cities Lose: The Deep Roots of the Urban-Rural Political Divide. Basic Books, New York. 5. Greenlund, Kurt J.; Lu, Hua; Wang, Yan; Matthews, Kevin A.; LeClercq, Jennifer M.; Lee, Benjamin; Carlson, Susan A. (2022). PLACES: Local Data for Better Health. Preventing Chronic Disease 19: 210459. https://doi.org/10.5888/pcd19.210459 6. Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. American Sociological Review 15(3): 351-357. 7. Mohai, Paul; Pellow, David; Roberts, J. Timmons (2009). Environmental Justice. Annual Review of Environment and Resources 34: 405-430. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-environ-082508-094348 ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/air-pollution-and-the-vote/build.py (sha256 6f9cb6aec32ee2fc9148cca85e30d7d7269fc59b148880b3f1059f207df0fd91) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/precinct/census_estimates/tract_2020_atlas.parquet | 41,025,289 | 8cd40801ba81ac3d5870313f9e8772790afe7917f983dd24c15efc8719651ab8 | 01b796cc4b00f21457d93c96df76db6edfde80c66e1844919fb7510aecd5efe9 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | 6f6016baa866fcd31da0491d97d2aa4ff979cf2f1a6eb9f958c7c192073fc069 | | figures/ces_within_party.json | 20f0f70c46faeb299510e5a7013d27dbee626b0d55b93fc8a859de2ee63b4a0e | | figures/county_diesel_scatter.json | fb6ea648c95660aa0d6d9cc810989011df1a051b286cb2c1e68a7d355ec661c8 | | figures/county_lean_map.json | 0050505b01dbb29710408d2885ddaa352c1efcb31d6f8d23cd6aa20107c82a53 | | figures/margin_by_diesel_decile.json | ca05ef6ebb03bbac19eebeabc258dc3596149dfab7ffc8bb2ec12b6b227a9d87 | | figures/pollutant_ladder.json | 92d41c4867d1314aa645fa224869173be5108d3303a609a175a1887d3295dcc6 | | figures/tract_profile.json | fb909521f477e2dce17864c7e7cf12bbbd0cef49519471f0bcf73bb52f08be1e | | meta.json | b8627707d8a3f73ad19907d67f1ce028c13dcf74036c1bd85f22c3e4fcf4d90a | | public/data/air-pollution-and-the-vote/county_lean.json | 7f77ad9c813c5895508e875477546b9a21988aec7a95e311e0026d32df182f86 | | refs.json | ad7cbee147ead561f4fb81033ba38cb596d598d070aec1577990f8a7e14e28d5 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/air-pollution-and-the-vote/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/facts.json - Table 1, figure "margin_by_diesel_decile" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/margin_by_diesel_decile.json - Table 2, figure "tract_profile" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/tract_profile.json - Table 3, figure "pollutant_ladder" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/pollutant_ladder.json - Table 4, figure "county_lean_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/county_lean_map.json - Table 5, figure "county_diesel_scatter" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/county_diesel_scatter.json - Table 6, figure "ces_within_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/air-pollution-and-the-vote/figures/ces_within_party.json - Payload of "county_lean_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/air-pollution-and-the-vote/county_lean.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # The ideology of the donor pool: report Chapter 14.4 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: The ideology of the donor pool - Chapter: 14.4 (Part XIV, The money map; The political map) - Question: How did the ideological distribution of campaign donors and candidates change between 1980 and 2024? - Dek: Among reliable individual donors, the share with a CFscore near zero fell from 11.8% in 1980 to 1.2% in 2024, a change in who gives rather than in any donor's score. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - DIME. Stanford DIME public version 4.0: individual donors (contributor CFscores, active cycles, itemized dollars) and federal House and Senate candidates (dynamic CFscores, DW-NOMINATE), election cycles 1980-2024; years: 1979-2024 (23 election cycles); weights: none (administrative records, no sampling); every itemized donor and every scored candidate counted - Cooperative Election Study. Cooperative Election Study, cumulative common content, five-point ideology self-placement, even election years 2006-2024; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight (single-wave survey weight) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026theideologyofthedonorpool ```bibtex @misc{singh2026theideologyofthedonorpool, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {The ideology of the donor pool}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | 11.8% | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | share_1980 | | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | 1.2% | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | share_2024 | | half-width of the band around zero that counts as the center | definition of the center | election cycles 1980-2024 | 0.25 | | | none (constant) | DIME | band | | median CFscore of active reliable donors | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | +0.62 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | median_1980 | | median CFscore of active reliable donors | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | −0.98 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | median_2024 | | minimum number of distinct recipients for the reliable flag | definition of a reliable donor | career | 8 | | | none (constant) | DIME | min_recip | ## Findings Counting donors rather than dollars, the share of reliable individual donors with a CFscore within 0.25 of zero fell from 11.8% in 1980 to 1.2% in 2024. Over the same period the median score of active donors went from +0.62 to −0.98, so a pool that was mostly right of zero in 1980 was mostly left of zero in 2024. DIME assigns each donor one CFscore for all of their giving, so the measure cannot show a donor moving along the scale, and a change over time in the distribution is a change in who is active. A CFscore places a donor on a left-right scale from the donor's giving, with negative scores on the left and positive scores on the right, and a donor is reliable if they gave to at least 8 distinct recipients. The chapter splits the fall between donors who joined the pool and donors who left it, repeats it with other widths of the center, other recipient filters and dollar weights, and sets it beside the share of candidates near zero and a survey measure of self-described moderates. Chapter 14.1, Who donates (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/who-donates; planned) asks who gives at all, Chapter 14.3, Occupation and donations (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/occupation-and-donations; planned) asks how donors' jobs relate to their scores, and Chapter 14.2, The geography of donations (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-geography-of-donations; planned) asks where they live. ### How donors and candidates are scored The data are the Stanford Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections (DIME) [1], which estimates a score for each donor and each candidate from the same records of who gave to whom [2]. The file covers itemized gifts, which are gifts large enough that the recipient must report the giver by name, in 23 two-year election cycles from 1980 to 2024. A CFscore has no natural unit. For scale, the median Democratic candidate scored −0.96 in 2024 and the median Republican candidate +1.35, so a band of 0.25 on each side of zero is narrow next to the 2.31 between those medians. A reliable donor gave to at least 8 distinct recipients over the whole career and has a score estimated from that giving. Donors with fewer recipients have less precise scores, and some have a score carried over from the recipient they gave to instead of one estimated from their own giving. Reliable donors were 20.1% of the 154,785 donors with a score who were active in 1980 and 36.0% of the 7,043,771 active in 2024. The flag is set once from a donor's whole record, so a donor who reached 8 recipients years after first giving counts as reliable in every cycle in which they gave. A donor who joined recently has had less time to reach that number, so the early and late pools are selected by different rules. (Note: DIME puts federal and state donors on one scale, so the donor lines cover gifts to state as well as federal recipients, while the candidates in this chapter are federal House and Senate candidates only. The files hold no link from a donor to a recipient and count only itemized gifts. Dollars are in real 2024 dollars.) ### The near-zero share fell and the pool's median crossed zero Table 1 shows the distribution of scores among active donors in each cycle. In 1980, 34.9% of donors were left of zero, and in 2024, 75.7%. The median crossed zero between 2002 (+0.10) and 2004 (−0.17). The share of donors between −0.75 and 0.75 fell from 45.6% to 6.1%, so the change reaches donors who lean moderately left or right as well as those nearest zero. By 2024 the distribution has two peaks: 72.1% of donors score between −1.3 and −0.7, and a smaller peak holds 18.4% between 1.3 and 1.7. Table 1. The share of donors near zero fell and donors left of zero became the majority between 1980 and 2024 The second view of the figure weights each donor by itemized dollars. Weighted that way, the left side holds 35.9% of dollars in 1980 and 67.4% in 2024, a smaller move than the move in the headcount. ### The near-zero share fell faster after 2002 Table 2 follows the share of active donors within 0.25 of zero. It was 11.8% in 1980, 13.0% in 1986, 9.6% in 2002, 7.7% in 2004, 6.2% in 2008, 3.4% in 2016, 1.5% in 2020 and 1.2% in 2024. The change from 1980 to 2024 is −10.6 points, and −8.4 of it comes after 2002. Measured against its own level, the share fell by 26% from 1986 to 2002, by 88% from 2002 to 2024 and by 90% from 1980 to 2024. The split at 2002 is descriptive, since 2002 has the lowest share of the cycles up to then and every later cycle is lower, and no test for a break was run. After 2002 the share rises in 3 cycles, 2006, 2010 and 2014, by no more than 0.3 points in any of them. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 took effect the day after the 2002 general election and raised the limit on an individual's gift to a candidate from 2003 on [3], so 2004 was the first full cycle under it. This chapter does not separate its effect from other changes. Table 2. The share of donors near the center fell from 13.0% in 1986 to 9.6% in 2002, then to 1.2% in 2024 The pool changed in size as well as in shape. The 2,533,588 reliable donors of 2024 are 81 times the 31,138 of 1980. The count of donors near zero rose from 3,678 in 1980 to 29,446 in 2024, or 8 times, after a peak of 92,461 in 2010, so the share fell while the count rose. Weighted by itemized dollars, with each donor's total in a cycle capped at $1 million, the near-zero share was 12.2% in 1980, 11.7% in 2002 and 3.4% in 2024. Table 5 shows it under other caps. ### Donors who joined account for most of the fall Because DIME assigns each donor one score, the share near zero can change between two cycles in only one way: donors join the pool or leave it, and the donors active in both cycles keep the same score. Table 3 splits each change between consecutive cycles into donors who left and donors who joined, and adds the steps from 1980 to 2024. Joiners changed the share by −11.2 points and leavers by +0.6 points, which sum to the −10.6 points of the whole period. (Note: The split depends on the order of accounting. Removing leavers first credits joiners with −12.8 points and leavers with +2.2. Adding joiners first credits joiners with −9.6 and leavers with −1.1. The figure shows the average of the two orders. A joiner is active in a cycle and not in the one before, which includes donors who return after a gap: 56.6% of joiners were giving for the first time. Online platforms for small gifts, ActBlue (launched in 2004) and WinRed (launched in 2019), may account for part of the entry. The DIME files hold no recipients and no unitemized gifts, so this chapter cannot test how much.) Table 3. Donors who joined the pool account for most of the fall in the near-center share The donors of 1980 have mostly left the pool. Of the 31,138 reliable donors active in 1980, 5,509, or 17.7%, were active in 2024 as well. Table 4 groups donors by the cycle of their first itemized gift. The near-center share was 11.8% for the donors of 1980, 8.6% for those who first gave in 2000, 1.2% for 2012 and 0.24% for 2024. The groups that first gave from 1980 to 1988 had between 11.8% and 13.4% near the center. No group that first gave from 1990 on exceeds 10.1%, and none that first gave from 2010 on exceeds 3.0%. The order is not strict, and the figure shows the cycles in which a group sits nearer the center than the group before it. Table 4. Every group of donors that first gave from 2010 on has 3.0% or less near the center, against 11.8% to 13.4% for the groups of the 1980s The second view compares donors giving for the first time with repeat donors. In 2008, repeat donors were 7.5% near the center and first-time donors 2.6%, and in 2024 the figures were 1.19% and 0.24%. Repeat donors fall as well. With one score per donor, the repeat pool changes only through the mix of earlier groups that stay active, and the third view shows that mix: by 2024, 72.2% of active reliable donors had first given in 2010 or later and 0.9% from 1980 to 1988. This chapter does not test which groups account for the fall among repeat donors. The group of 2024 comes with a caution about selection. A donor counts as reliable only after giving to 8 recipients, so a donor first seen in 2024 must reach that number within one cycle to appear at all. Of the donors first seen in 2024, 2.7% do, against 16.1% of those first seen in 2012. The 65,445 reliable newcomers are 2.6% of the 2024 pool, against 24.9% of the 2020 pool. The count of reliable newcomers fell from 868,613 in 2020 to 139,196 in 2022, so the group of 2022 is affected as well. A single checkout on a platform that splits a gift among several committees could reach the threshold at once, and this chapter does not test how often that happens. Under a filter of 2 recipients the 2024 group has 0.96% near the center, against 13.4% for the 1980 group under the same filter, so the lower share among newer donors does not depend on the recipient filter. ### The fall holds across bands, filters and caps The width of the center and the minimum of 8 recipients are conventions, and Table 5 varies each of them. A center of 0.10 on each side of zero gives 4.8% in 1980 and 0.4% in 2024, and a center of 0.50 gives 26.7% and 2.7%. Tightening the recipient filter to 16 recipients gives 11.2% and 1.3%, and counting every donor with a score, including those whose score rests on few recipients, gives 10.5% and 1.7%. The levels depend on the choices and the direction does not. Table 5. The fall in the near-center share holds for every center band and recipient filter checked, and for dollars once each donor is capped A change in the balance between left and right does not explain the fall by itself. Among donors left of zero, the share within 0.25 of zero fell from 17.5% to 0.8%, and among donors right of zero it fell from 8.7% to 2.1%. The counts of donors near zero rose on each side, from 1,898 to 16,234 on the left and from 1,769 to 13,149 on the right, so the fall is in shares. Dollar-weighted shares depend on the cap. From 2002 on the capped dollar share is above the donor share, and in 2024 it is 2.9 times the donor share, because near-center donors gave more per donor than the others did. The capped share in 2002 is a local high, against 9.6% in 2000 and 8.9% in 2004. Without a cap the share is 24.5% in 2002 and 6.3% in 2024. The cap binds for 456 of the 794,413 reliable donors of 2002 and for 358 of the 2,533,588 of 2024, and this chapter uses the capped series. The dollar share in 2024 is 3.0% with the lower cap of the figure and 3.6% with the higher cap, and both are above the donor share of 1.2%. (Note: Without a cap, one record accounts for 55% of the near-center dollars in 2002 and one donor gave 49% in 2024. The record of 2002 is $1.02 billion in 2024 dollars for a single donor, 8.6 times the next-largest near-center total of $118 million, and it is probably an error in the release.) ### The candidate share was lower in 2020 than in 1980 The same score applies to House and Senate candidates of the two major parties, using the dynamic CFscore, which is estimated period by period, so a candidate's score can differ from one cycle to the next. The candidate figures count candidates with a score, who are 86% to 98% of the major-party House and Senate candidates in the file in each cycle and 63% to 92% of those with under $10,000 in receipts. Table 6 shows the share of candidates with a score within 0.25 of zero. It fell from 13.3% in 1980 to 2.0% in 2020, though not in every cycle: it was 10.5% in 1988 and 12.9% in 1990. The share of seated winners was 16.2% in 1980, 1.5% in 2020 and 2.8% in 2022, the last cycle with winners coded. The candidate share then rose to 2.6% in 2022 and 3.1% in 2024 while the donor share kept falling, so the two lines agree in direction only through 2020. The rise rests on small counts, with 51 of 2,543 candidates in 2020 and 72 of 2,329 in 2024, and among seated winners 7 of 469 in 2020 and 13 of 469 in 2022. The fall is in who ran and raised money, and it does not come only from who won. Table 6. The share of federal candidates near the center fell from 13.3% in 1980 to 2.0% in 2020 and was 3.1% in 2024 One account of the supply of candidates holds that the costs of holding office discourage moderates from running [4]. The DIME candidate file lists candidates who raised money and not people who decided against running, so it cannot test that account. ### Party medians moved apart on both scales Candidate scores and donor scores are estimated from the same giving records, so agreement between the donor line and the candidate line is not evidence from two sources. Table 7 shows the party medians. The median of Democratic candidates went from −0.43 to −0.96 and the median of Republican candidates from +0.97 to +1.35. The gap between them grew from 1.40 to 2.31, with the Democratic median moving further. The 75th percentile of Democratic candidates, the edge of the party nearest zero, went from −0.06 to −0.76, from inside the band of 0.25 around zero to outside it. The other two views use seated members, who won their seats and have a roll-call score. The second view scores them by CFscore and the third by DW-NOMINATE, which comes from roll-call votes and not from donations. The DW-NOMINATE party gap went from 0.63 in 1980 to 0.90 in 2022, but the order of the moves reverses. The Democratic median went from −0.32 to −0.38 and the Republican median from +0.31 to +0.51. The CFscore medians of the same seated members went from −0.43 to −0.78 for Democrats and from +0.94 to +1.20 for Republicans. The two scales therefore disagree about which party moved further, and the difference is not one between candidates and winners. This chapter does not settle which scale is right. (Note: In 2022 the CFscore and the roll-call score of seated members correlate at +0.95 across both parties, −0.03 among Democrats and +0.52 among Republicans, so most of the pooled correlation is the gap between the parties. Earlier work used contribution records to predict roll-call scores [5]. Chapter 1.2, Polarization in Congress (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/polarization-in-congress; planned) covers the roll-call record itself.) Table 7. The parties moved apart on both scales, but CFscores show the Democratic median moving further and roll-call scores the Republican median Earlier work found that members of Congress were more extreme than their constituents and that the median voter was leapfrogged when one House gave way to the next [6]. Chapter 14.5, Candidate extremity and vote share (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/candidate-extremity-and-vote-share; planned) asks whether candidates far from zero lose vote share. ### Self-described moderates changed less than the donor share Donors are a small and self-selected group, so the donor pool does not describe voters. As a coarse comparison, Table 8 places the near-center donor share next to the share of adults who call themselves moderate on the five-point ideology question of the Cooperative Election Study (CES). Each line is scaled to its own 2006 value, so the lines compare relative change. The survey share is weighted, and its interval is a 95% confidence interval built from the effective sample size [7]. The donor share fell from 7.8% in 2006 to 1.2% in 2024, a change of −6.7 points. The survey share was 39.0% (95% CI 38.5% to 39.6%) in 2006, 30.8% (95% CI 30.2% to 31.3%) in 2018 and 35.4% (95% CI 34.7% to 36.1%) in 2024, so it changed by −3.7 (95% CI −4.6 to −2.8) points from 2006 to 2024. Table 8. The donor share near the center fell from 7.8% to 1.2% while self-described moderates stayed between 30.8% and 39.0% The two lines measure different things on different scales: a position estimated from giving among people who give, and a label chosen by adults from five options. The comparison shows that, relative to its 2006 level, the donor share fell by 85% and the survey share by 9%, and that the survey share had no steady direction. Its largest move is the fall from 38.1% (95% CI 37.6% to 38.7%) in 2016 to 30.8% in 2018, −7.4 (95% CI −8.2 to −6.6) points, which this chapter does not explain. The comparison does not show which changed first, because the survey series starts in 2006, when the donor share had already fallen from 11.8% to 7.8%. It also does not show that voters are moderate in any absolute sense. Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-ideology) follows how party and ideology line up among survey respondents. ### What these data cannot show The figures describe who gave in each cycle. They say nothing about whether any donor's views changed, because DIME fixes each donor's score, and every change over time here is a change in the roster of donors. The reliable flag is set once from a donor's whole record, and so is the score, which is estimated from giving after the cycle in which the donor is counted as well as before it. A donor who gave in 1980 and reached 8 recipients years later counts as reliable in 1980, while a donor who joined recently has had less time to reach that number, so the early and late pools are selected by different rules. The checks with other recipient filters show that the direction survives, and they do not remove the difference in career length. DIME starts in 1980, so donors first seen in 1980 include people who gave before it. Only itemized gifts are in the file. Gifts below the itemization threshold are absent, and changes in what gets itemized can change who appears in the pool. The codebook is dated late December 2024 and states coverage through the 2024 cycle without saying how complete the filings of that cycle are, so the 2024 pool may be incomplete. The files hold no recipients, so nothing here says whether a donor gave to one party, to both or to candidates near the middle, and nothing says how much of the entry after 2002 came through online platforms. A CFscore is an estimate, and the shares carry no allowance for its error. Zero is a point on an estimated scale and not a measured middle of public opinion, so near the center means near zero and does not mean moderate in the sense of a survey answer. Counts of the donors in the release are full counts and carry no sampling interval. Candidate scores rest on the same records as donor scores, so only the roll-call check and the survey comparison bring in other sources, and the roll-call check agrees with the CFscores on the size of the party gap and not on which party moved further. The donor lines cover gifts to federal and state recipients and the candidate lines cover federal candidates only. Winners are not coded for 2024, and primary results are coded for only part of the candidates in some cycles, so the chapter does not follow candidates through the primary stage. The data are descriptive. They cannot say whether donors' positions shape which candidates run, whether candidates' positions attract donors, or whether both follow something else, such as the sorting of voters by party. Neither donors nor candidates are a sample of voters. ## Tables ### Table 1. The share of donors near zero fell and donors left of zero became the majority between 1980 and 2024 CFscores of reliable individual donors active in each election cycle, 1980-2024; a donor counts in every cycle in which they gave | Election cycle | Weighted by | CFscore (bin center) | Density | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | | 1980 | Donors | −2.45 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −2.35 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −2.25 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −2.15 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −2.05 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −1.95 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −1.85 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −1.75 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −1.65 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −1.55 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −1.45 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −1.35 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −1.25 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | −1.15 | 0.002 | | 1980 | Donors | −1.05 | 0.036 | | 1980 | Donors | −0.95 | 0.242 | | 1980 | Donors | −0.85 | 0.392 | | 1980 | Donors | −0.75 | 0.445 | | 1980 | Donors | −0.65 | 0.469 | | 1980 | Donors | −0.55 | 0.420 | | 1980 | Donors | −0.45 | 0.387 | | 1980 | Donors | −0.35 | 0.334 | | 1980 | Donors | −0.25 | 0.284 | | 1980 | Donors | −0.15 | 0.244 | | 1980 | Donors | −0.05 | 0.237 | | 1980 | Donors | 0.05 | 0.240 | | 1980 | Donors | 0.15 | 0.217 | | 1980 | Donors | 0.25 | 0.225 | | 1980 | Donors | 0.35 | 0.246 | | 1980 | Donors | 0.45 | 0.258 | | 1980 | Donors | 0.55 | 0.270 | | 1980 | Donors | 0.65 | 0.319 | | 1980 | Donors | 0.75 | 0.408 | | 1980 | Donors | 0.85 | 0.478 | | 1980 | Donors | 0.95 | 0.635 | | 1980 | Donors | 1.05 | 0.877 | | 1980 | Donors | 1.15 | 1.052 | | 1980 | Donors | 1.25 | 0.907 | | 1980 | Donors | 1.35 | 0.310 | | 1980 | Donors | 1.45 | 0.058 | | 1980 | Donors | 1.55 | 0.004 | | 1980 | Donors | 1.65 | 0.001 | | 1980 | Donors | 1.75 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | 1.85 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | 1.95 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | 2.05 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | 2.15 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | 2.25 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | 2.35 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Donors | 2.45 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −2.45 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −2.35 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −2.25 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −2.15 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −2.05 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −1.95 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −1.85 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −1.75 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −1.65 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −1.55 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −1.45 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −1.35 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −1.25 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | −1.15 | 0.001 | | 1980 | Dollars | −1.05 | 0.016 | | 1980 | Dollars | −0.95 | 0.162 | | 1980 | Dollars | −0.85 | 0.405 | | 1980 | Dollars | −0.75 | 0.482 | | 1980 | Dollars | −0.65 | 0.503 | | 1980 | Dollars | −0.55 | 0.445 | | 1980 | Dollars | −0.45 | 0.384 | | 1980 | Dollars | −0.35 | 0.345 | | 1980 | Dollars | −0.25 | 0.316 | | 1980 | Dollars | −0.15 | 0.258 | | 1980 | Dollars | −0.05 | 0.273 | | 1980 | Dollars | 0.05 | 0.233 | | 1980 | Dollars | 0.15 | 0.223 | | 1980 | Dollars | 0.25 | 0.228 | | 1980 | Dollars | 0.35 | 0.256 | | 1980 | Dollars | 0.45 | 0.276 | | 1980 | Dollars | 0.55 | 0.278 | | 1980 | Dollars | 0.65 | 0.309 | | 1980 | Dollars | 0.75 | 0.357 | | 1980 | Dollars | 0.85 | 0.425 | | 1980 | Dollars | 0.95 | 0.628 | | 1980 | Dollars | 1.05 | 0.901 | | 1980 | Dollars | 1.15 | 1.159 | | 1980 | Dollars | 1.25 | 0.900 | | 1980 | Dollars | 1.35 | 0.208 | | 1980 | Dollars | 1.45 | 0.027 | | 1980 | Dollars | 1.55 | 0.002 | | 1980 | Dollars | 1.65 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | 1.75 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | 1.85 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | 1.95 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | 2.05 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | 2.15 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | 2.25 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | 2.35 | 0.000 | | 1980 | Dollars | 2.45 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −2.45 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −2.35 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −2.25 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −2.15 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −2.05 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −1.95 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −1.85 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −1.75 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −1.65 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −1.55 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −1.45 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −1.35 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −1.25 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | −1.15 | 0.006 | | 1982 | Donors | −1.05 | 0.038 | | 1982 | Donors | −0.95 | 0.212 | | 1982 | Donors | −0.85 | 0.359 | | 1982 | Donors | −0.75 | 0.426 | | 1982 | Donors | −0.65 | 0.449 | | 1982 | Donors | −0.55 | 0.425 | | 1982 | Donors | −0.45 | 0.384 | | 1982 | Donors | −0.35 | 0.337 | | 1982 | Donors | −0.25 | 0.296 | | 1982 | Donors | −0.15 | 0.253 | | 1982 | Donors | −0.05 | 0.249 | | 1982 | Donors | 0.05 | 0.258 | | 1982 | Donors | 0.15 | 0.226 | | 1982 | Donors | 0.25 | 0.223 | | 1982 | Donors | 0.35 | 0.254 | | 1982 | Donors | 0.45 | 0.258 | | 1982 | Donors | 0.55 | 0.275 | | 1982 | Donors | 0.65 | 0.335 | | 1982 | Donors | 0.75 | 0.378 | | 1982 | Donors | 0.85 | 0.461 | | 1982 | Donors | 0.95 | 0.613 | | 1982 | Donors | 1.05 | 0.873 | | 1982 | Donors | 1.15 | 1.041 | | 1982 | Donors | 1.25 | 1.010 | | 1982 | Donors | 1.35 | 0.305 | | 1982 | Donors | 1.45 | 0.048 | | 1982 | Donors | 1.55 | 0.007 | | 1982 | Donors | 1.65 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | 1.75 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | 1.85 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | 1.95 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | 2.05 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | 2.15 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | 2.25 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | 2.35 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Donors | 2.45 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −2.45 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −2.35 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −2.25 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −2.15 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −2.05 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −1.95 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −1.85 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −1.75 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −1.65 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −1.55 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −1.45 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −1.35 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −1.25 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | −1.15 | 0.004 | | 1982 | Dollars | −1.05 | 0.043 | | 1982 | Dollars | −0.95 | 0.165 | | 1982 | Dollars | −0.85 | 0.387 | | 1982 | Dollars | −0.75 | 0.458 | | 1982 | Dollars | −0.65 | 0.474 | | 1982 | Dollars | −0.55 | 0.373 | | 1982 | Dollars | −0.45 | 0.335 | | 1982 | Dollars | −0.35 | 0.292 | | 1982 | Dollars | −0.25 | 0.254 | | 1982 | Dollars | −0.15 | 0.208 | | 1982 | Dollars | −0.05 | 0.193 | | 1982 | Dollars | 0.05 | 0.193 | | 1982 | Dollars | 0.15 | 0.173 | | 1982 | Dollars | 0.25 | 0.186 | | 1982 | Dollars | 0.35 | 0.203 | | 1982 | Dollars | 0.45 | 0.204 | | 1982 | Dollars | 0.55 | 0.251 | | 1982 | Dollars | 0.65 | 0.260 | | 1982 | Dollars | 0.75 | 0.286 | | 1982 | Dollars | 0.85 | 0.355 | | 1982 | Dollars | 0.95 | 0.534 | | 1982 | Dollars | 1.05 | 0.943 | | 1982 | Dollars | 1.15 | 1.443 | | 1982 | Dollars | 1.25 | 1.476 | | 1982 | Dollars | 1.35 | 0.281 | | 1982 | Dollars | 1.45 | 0.025 | | 1982 | Dollars | 1.55 | 0.002 | | 1982 | Dollars | 1.65 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | 1.75 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | 1.85 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | 1.95 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | 2.05 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | 2.15 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | 2.25 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | 2.35 | 0.000 | | 1982 | Dollars | 2.45 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −2.45 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −2.35 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −2.25 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −2.15 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −2.05 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −1.95 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −1.85 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −1.75 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −1.65 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −1.55 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −1.45 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −1.35 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | −1.25 | 0.001 | | 1984 | Donors | −1.15 | 0.008 | | 1984 | Donors | −1.05 | 0.067 | | 1984 | Donors | −0.95 | 0.293 | | 1984 | Donors | −0.85 | 0.422 | | 1984 | Donors | −0.75 | 0.460 | | 1984 | Donors | −0.65 | 0.475 | | 1984 | Donors | −0.55 | 0.446 | | 1984 | Donors | −0.45 | 0.383 | | 1984 | Donors | −0.35 | 0.356 | | 1984 | Donors | −0.25 | 0.288 | | 1984 | Donors | −0.15 | 0.267 | | 1984 | Donors | −0.05 | 0.247 | | 1984 | Donors | 0.05 | 0.232 | | 1984 | Donors | 0.15 | 0.217 | | 1984 | Donors | 0.25 | 0.217 | | 1984 | Donors | 0.35 | 0.228 | | 1984 | Donors | 0.45 | 0.244 | | 1984 | Donors | 0.55 | 0.252 | | 1984 | Donors | 0.65 | 0.307 | | 1984 | Donors | 0.75 | 0.356 | | 1984 | Donors | 0.85 | 0.436 | | 1984 | Donors | 0.95 | 0.565 | | 1984 | Donors | 1.05 | 0.785 | | 1984 | Donors | 1.15 | 0.990 | | 1984 | Donors | 1.25 | 1.026 | | 1984 | Donors | 1.35 | 0.369 | | 1984 | Donors | 1.45 | 0.056 | | 1984 | Donors | 1.55 | 0.008 | | 1984 | Donors | 1.65 | 0.001 | | 1984 | Donors | 1.75 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | 1.85 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | 1.95 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | 2.05 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | 2.15 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | 2.25 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | 2.35 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Donors | 2.45 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −2.45 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −2.35 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −2.25 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −2.15 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −2.05 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −1.95 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −1.85 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −1.75 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −1.65 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −1.55 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −1.45 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −1.35 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −1.25 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | −1.15 | 0.006 | | 1984 | Dollars | −1.05 | 0.058 | | 1984 | Dollars | −0.95 | 0.241 | | 1984 | Dollars | −0.85 | 0.434 | | 1984 | Dollars | −0.75 | 0.464 | | 1984 | Dollars | −0.65 | 0.458 | | 1984 | Dollars | −0.55 | 0.377 | | 1984 | Dollars | −0.45 | 0.320 | | 1984 | Dollars | −0.35 | 0.283 | | 1984 | Dollars | −0.25 | 0.236 | | 1984 | Dollars | −0.15 | 0.220 | | 1984 | Dollars | −0.05 | 0.202 | | 1984 | Dollars | 0.05 | 0.188 | | 1984 | Dollars | 0.15 | 0.186 | | 1984 | Dollars | 0.25 | 0.190 | | 1984 | Dollars | 0.35 | 0.181 | | 1984 | Dollars | 0.45 | 0.200 | | 1984 | Dollars | 0.55 | 0.221 | | 1984 | Dollars | 0.65 | 0.238 | | 1984 | Dollars | 0.75 | 0.300 | | 1984 | Dollars | 0.85 | 0.375 | | 1984 | Dollars | 0.95 | 0.529 | | 1984 | Dollars | 1.05 | 0.912 | | 1984 | Dollars | 1.15 | 1.337 | | 1984 | Dollars | 1.25 | 1.502 | | 1984 | Dollars | 1.35 | 0.311 | | 1984 | Dollars | 1.45 | 0.027 | | 1984 | Dollars | 1.55 | 0.003 | | 1984 | Dollars | 1.65 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | 1.75 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | 1.85 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | 1.95 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | 2.05 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | 2.15 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | 2.25 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | 2.35 | 0.000 | | 1984 | Dollars | 2.45 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −2.45 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −2.35 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −2.25 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −2.15 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −2.05 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −1.95 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −1.85 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −1.75 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −1.65 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −1.55 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −1.45 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −1.35 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −1.25 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | −1.15 | 0.009 | | 1986 | Donors | −1.05 | 0.055 | | 1986 | Donors | −0.95 | 0.228 | | 1986 | Donors | −0.85 | 0.366 | | 1986 | Donors | −0.75 | 0.427 | | 1986 | Donors | −0.65 | 0.453 | | 1986 | Donors | −0.55 | 0.426 | | 1986 | Donors | −0.45 | 0.379 | | 1986 | Donors | −0.35 | 0.348 | | 1986 | Donors | −0.25 | 0.293 | | 1986 | Donors | −0.15 | 0.280 | | 1986 | Donors | −0.05 | 0.266 | | 1986 | Donors | 0.05 | 0.255 | | 1986 | Donors | 0.15 | 0.240 | | 1986 | Donors | 0.25 | 0.240 | | 1986 | Donors | 0.35 | 0.257 | | 1986 | Donors | 0.45 | 0.279 | | 1986 | Donors | 0.55 | 0.293 | | 1986 | Donors | 0.65 | 0.334 | | 1986 | Donors | 0.75 | 0.400 | | 1986 | Donors | 0.85 | 0.478 | | 1986 | Donors | 0.95 | 0.602 | | 1986 | Donors | 1.05 | 0.806 | | 1986 | Donors | 1.15 | 0.945 | | 1986 | Donors | 1.25 | 0.942 | | 1986 | Donors | 1.35 | 0.339 | | 1986 | Donors | 1.45 | 0.055 | | 1986 | Donors | 1.55 | 0.006 | | 1986 | Donors | 1.65 | 0.001 | | 1986 | Donors | 1.75 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | 1.85 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | 1.95 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | 2.05 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | 2.15 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | 2.25 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | 2.35 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Donors | 2.45 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −2.45 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −2.35 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −2.25 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −2.15 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −2.05 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −1.95 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −1.85 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −1.75 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −1.65 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −1.55 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −1.45 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −1.35 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −1.25 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | −1.15 | 0.009 | | 1986 | Dollars | −1.05 | 0.055 | | 1986 | Dollars | −0.95 | 0.208 | | 1986 | Dollars | −0.85 | 0.391 | | 1986 | Dollars | −0.75 | 0.428 | | 1986 | Dollars | −0.65 | 0.439 | | 1986 | Dollars | −0.55 | 0.394 | | 1986 | Dollars | −0.45 | 0.354 | | 1986 | Dollars | −0.35 | 0.289 | | 1986 | Dollars | −0.25 | 0.251 | | 1986 | Dollars | −0.15 | 0.234 | | 1986 | Dollars | −0.05 | 0.228 | | 1986 | Dollars | 0.05 | 0.214 | | 1986 | Dollars | 0.15 | 0.220 | | 1986 | Dollars | 0.25 | 0.202 | | 1986 | Dollars | 0.35 | 0.216 | | 1986 | Dollars | 0.45 | 0.242 | | 1986 | Dollars | 0.55 | 0.266 | | 1986 | Dollars | 0.65 | 0.282 | | 1986 | Dollars | 0.75 | 0.342 | | 1986 | Dollars | 0.85 | 0.427 | | 1986 | Dollars | 0.95 | 0.588 | | 1986 | Dollars | 1.05 | 0.925 | | 1986 | Dollars | 1.15 | 1.211 | | 1986 | Dollars | 1.25 | 1.253 | | 1986 | Dollars | 1.35 | 0.294 | | 1986 | Dollars | 1.45 | 0.033 | | 1986 | Dollars | 1.55 | 0.003 | | 1986 | Dollars | 1.65 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | 1.75 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | 1.85 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | 1.95 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | 2.05 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | 2.15 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | 2.25 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | 2.35 | 0.000 | | 1986 | Dollars | 2.45 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −2.45 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −2.35 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −2.25 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −2.15 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −2.05 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −1.95 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −1.85 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −1.75 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −1.65 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −1.55 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −1.45 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −1.35 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −1.25 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | −1.15 | 0.011 | | 1988 | Donors | −1.05 | 0.078 | | 1988 | Donors | −0.95 | 0.345 | | 1988 | Donors | −0.85 | 0.478 | | 1988 | Donors | −0.75 | 0.516 | | 1988 | Donors | −0.65 | 0.502 | | 1988 | Donors | −0.55 | 0.473 | | 1988 | Donors | −0.45 | 0.404 | | 1988 | Donors | −0.35 | 0.353 | | 1988 | Donors | −0.25 | 0.299 | | 1988 | Donors | −0.15 | 0.287 | | 1988 | Donors | −0.05 | 0.255 | | 1988 | Donors | 0.05 | 0.243 | | 1988 | Donors | 0.15 | 0.233 | | 1988 | Donors | 0.25 | 0.239 | | 1988 | Donors | 0.35 | 0.242 | | 1988 | Donors | 0.45 | 0.263 | | 1988 | Donors | 0.55 | 0.282 | | 1988 | Donors | 0.65 | 0.318 | | 1988 | Donors | 0.75 | 0.371 | | 1988 | Donors | 0.85 | 0.444 | | 1988 | Donors | 0.95 | 0.573 | | 1988 | Donors | 1.05 | 0.722 | | 1988 | Donors | 1.15 | 0.838 | | 1988 | Donors | 1.25 | 0.818 | | 1988 | Donors | 1.35 | 0.333 | | 1988 | Donors | 1.45 | 0.070 | | 1988 | Donors | 1.55 | 0.009 | | 1988 | Donors | 1.65 | 0.001 | | 1988 | Donors | 1.75 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | 1.85 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | 1.95 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | 2.05 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | 2.15 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | 2.25 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | 2.35 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Donors | 2.45 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −2.45 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −2.35 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −2.25 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −2.15 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −2.05 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −1.95 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −1.85 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −1.75 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −1.65 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −1.55 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −1.45 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −1.35 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −1.25 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | −1.15 | 0.009 | | 1988 | Dollars | −1.05 | 0.061 | | 1988 | Dollars | −0.95 | 0.291 | | 1988 | Dollars | −0.85 | 0.474 | | 1988 | Dollars | −0.75 | 0.504 | | 1988 | Dollars | −0.65 | 0.492 | | 1988 | Dollars | −0.55 | 0.442 | | 1988 | Dollars | −0.45 | 0.370 | | 1988 | Dollars | −0.35 | 0.325 | | 1988 | Dollars | −0.25 | 0.263 | | 1988 | Dollars | −0.15 | 0.243 | | 1988 | Dollars | −0.05 | 0.221 | | 1988 | Dollars | 0.05 | 0.224 | | 1988 | Dollars | 0.15 | 0.215 | | 1988 | Dollars | 0.25 | 0.200 | | 1988 | Dollars | 0.35 | 0.235 | | 1988 | Dollars | 0.45 | 0.237 | | 1988 | Dollars | 0.55 | 0.253 | | 1988 | Dollars | 0.65 | 0.277 | | 1988 | Dollars | 0.75 | 0.338 | | 1988 | Dollars | 0.85 | 0.420 | | 1988 | Dollars | 0.95 | 0.589 | | 1988 | Dollars | 1.05 | 0.831 | | 1988 | Dollars | 1.15 | 1.047 | | 1988 | Dollars | 1.25 | 1.094 | | 1988 | Dollars | 1.35 | 0.304 | | 1988 | Dollars | 1.45 | 0.037 | | 1988 | Dollars | 1.55 | 0.003 | | 1988 | Dollars | 1.65 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | 1.75 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | 1.85 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | 1.95 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | 2.05 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | 2.15 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | 2.25 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | 2.35 | 0.000 | | 1988 | Dollars | 2.45 | 0.000 | The first 500 of 2300 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/donor_distribution.json. Views: Donors (weight = Donors); Dollars (each donor capped at $1 million) (weight = Dollars). Note: Scores beyond the ends of the axis are counted in the end bins. Note: Dollars are itemized contributions in real 2024 dollars. Each donor's total in a cycle is capped so that a few very large donors do not set the shape. Source: Stanford DIME v4.0 (Bonica), election cycles 1980-2024; full counts of itemized individual donors, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/donor_distribution.json ### Table 2. The share of donors near the center fell from 13.0% in 1986 to 9.6% in 2002, then to 1.2% in 2024 Percent of active reliable donors with a CFscore within 0.25 of zero, by election cycle | Election cycle | Share within 0.25 of zero | Active donors | | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 1980 | 11.8% | 31,138 | | 1982 | 12.3% | 25,207 | | 1984 | 12.0% | 39,460 | | 1986 | 13.0% | 45,211 | | 1988 | 12.7% | 70,902 | | 1990 | 11.3% | 111,512 | | 1992 | 11.0% | 167,283 | | 1994 | 10.7% | 197,604 | | 1996 | 10.7% | 297,838 | | 1998 | 10.1% | 470,028 | | 2000 | 10.0% | 598,971 | | 2002 | 9.6% | 794,413 | | 2004 | 7.7% | 1,033,327 | | 2006 | 7.8% | 1,142,451 | | 2008 | 6.2% | 1,425,885 | | 2010 | 6.6% | 1,409,984 | | 2012 | 4.6% | 1,805,776 | | 2014 | 4.8% | 1,597,010 | | 2016 | 3.4% | 1,978,112 | | 2018 | 2.5% | 2,161,252 | | 2020 | 1.5% | 3,483,649 | | 2022 | 1.4% | 3,082,400 | | 2024 | 1.2% | 2,533,588 | Note: These are full counts of itemized donors, so the line carries no sampling interval. It does not carry the estimation error of each CFscore either. Note: After 2002 the line rises in 3 cycles (2006, 2010 and 2014), by at most 0.3 points. The split at 2002 is descriptive: 2002 has the lowest share of the cycles up to then, and no test for a break was run. Source: Stanford DIME v4.0 (Bonica), election cycles 1980-2024; full counts of itemized individual donors, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/center_share.json ### Table 3. Donors who joined the pool account for most of the fall in the near-center share Change in the percent of active reliable donors within 0.25 of zero, 1980 to 2024, split into donors who left and donors who joined between consecutive cycles | kind | step | value | | --- | --- | ---: | | start | Pool in 1980 | 11.81 | | delta | Donors who left | 0.554 | | delta | Donors who joined | −11.20 | | end | Pool in 2024 | 1.16 | Note: Joined means active in a cycle and not in the cycle before, so it includes donors who return after a gap; left is the reverse. Donors active in both cycles keep their score, so they change the share only through their weight in the pool. Note: The steps are summed over the cycle-to-cycle changes from 1980 to 2024. Full counts: no sampling interval. Source: Stanford DIME v4.0 (Bonica), election cycles 1980-2024; full counts of itemized individual donors, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/entry_exit.json ### Table 4. Every group of donors that first gave from 2010 on has 3.0% or less near the center, against 11.8% to 13.4% for the groups of the 1980s Reliable donors grouped by the cycle of their first itemized gift: percent within 0.25 of zero (first and second views) and share of each cycle's active pool (third view) | View | Series | Cycle | Share (%) | Donors in the group or pool | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | first | 2 or more | 1980 | 13.4 | 57,193 | | first | 2 or more | 1982 | 12.6 | 22,786 | | first | 2 or more | 1984 | 13.4 | 33,569 | | first | 2 or more | 1986 | 14.4 | 33,181 | | first | 2 or more | 1988 | 15.0 | 57,515 | | first | 2 or more | 1990 | 11.2 | 113,379 | | first | 2 or more | 1992 | 11.6 | 145,792 | | first | 2 or more | 1994 | 11.2 | 143,470 | | first | 2 or more | 1996 | 11.1 | 252,535 | | first | 2 or more | 1998 | 10.0 | 448,844 | | first | 2 or more | 2000 | 9.7 | 455,270 | | first | 2 or more | 2002 | 8.9 | 573,418 | | first | 2 or more | 2004 | 5.8 | 767,428 | | first | 2 or more | 2006 | 6.9 | 654,817 | | first | 2 or more | 2008 | 4.4 | 963,119 | | first | 2 or more | 2010 | 5.3 | 661,868 | | first | 2 or more | 2012 | 2.7 | 997,742 | | first | 2 or more | 2014 | 4.0 | 658,594 | | first | 2 or more | 2016 | 1.7 | 1,297,118 | | first | 2 or more | 2018 | 1.1 | 1,198,890 | | first | 2 or more | 2020 | 0.5 | 4,346,273 | | first | 2 or more | 2022 | 1.1 | 971,049 | | first | 2 or more | 2024 | 1.0 | 593,408 | | first | 8 or more | 1980 | 11.8 | 31,138 | | first | 8 or more | 1982 | 12.1 | 11,521 | | first | 8 or more | 1984 | 12.1 | 16,963 | | first | 8 or more | 1986 | 13.4 | 17,042 | | first | 8 or more | 1988 | 12.7 | 29,382 | | first | 8 or more | 1990 | 10.0 | 57,044 | | first | 8 or more | 1992 | 10.0 | 75,594 | | first | 8 or more | 1994 | 9.7 | 72,570 | | first | 8 or more | 1996 | 10.1 | 123,517 | | first | 8 or more | 1998 | 9.0 | 208,027 | | first | 8 or more | 2000 | 8.6 | 206,419 | | first | 8 or more | 2002 | 7.5 | 247,539 | | first | 8 or more | 2004 | 4.3 | 325,622 | | first | 8 or more | 2006 | 4.9 | 256,237 | | first | 8 or more | 2008 | 2.6 | 365,960 | | first | 8 or more | 2010 | 3.0 | 232,556 | | first | 8 or more | 2012 | 1.2 | 387,766 | | first | 8 or more | 2014 | 1.5 | 210,428 | | first | 8 or more | 2016 | 0.5 | 442,260 | | first | 8 or more | 2018 | 0.3 | 441,519 | | first | 8 or more | 2020 | 0.1 | 868,613 | | first | 8 or more | 2022 | 0.3 | 139,196 | | first | 8 or more | 2024 | 0.2 | 65,445 | | first | 16 or more | 1980 | 11.2 | 22,747 | | first | 16 or more | 1982 | 11.5 | 8,088 | | first | 16 or more | 1984 | 11.1 | 12,098 | | first | 16 or more | 1986 | 12.3 | 12,014 | | first | 16 or more | 1988 | 11.7 | 20,702 | | first | 16 or more | 1990 | 9.2 | 39,048 | | first | 16 or more | 1992 | 9.0 | 50,543 | | first | 16 or more | 1994 | 8.7 | 46,220 | | first | 16 or more | 1996 | 9.1 | 74,096 | | first | 16 or more | 1998 | 8.0 | 119,247 | | first | 16 or more | 2000 | 7.3 | 110,534 | | first | 16 or more | 2002 | 6.0 | 123,280 | | first | 16 or more | 2004 | 3.0 | 170,687 | | first | 16 or more | 2006 | 3.3 | 123,728 | | first | 16 or more | 2008 | 1.5 | 179,580 | | first | 16 or more | 2010 | 1.7 | 106,925 | | first | 16 or more | 2012 | 0.6 | 191,626 | | first | 16 or more | 2014 | 0.8 | 99,944 | | first | 16 or more | 2016 | 0.3 | 183,257 | | first | 16 or more | 2018 | 0.2 | 197,639 | | first | 16 or more | 2020 | 0.1 | 287,030 | | first | 16 or more | 2022 | 0.2 | 47,621 | | first | 16 or more | 2024 | 0.1 | 18,907 | | tenure | All active | 1980 | 11.8 | 31,138 | | tenure | All active | 1982 | 12.3 | 25,207 | | tenure | All active | 1984 | 12.0 | 39,460 | | tenure | All active | 1986 | 13.0 | 45,211 | | tenure | All active | 1988 | 12.7 | 70,902 | | tenure | All active | 1990 | 11.3 | 111,512 | | tenure | All active | 1992 | 11.0 | 167,283 | | tenure | All active | 1994 | 10.7 | 197,604 | | tenure | All active | 1996 | 10.7 | 297,838 | | tenure | All active | 1998 | 10.1 | 470,028 | | tenure | All active | 2000 | 10.0 | 598,971 | | tenure | All active | 2002 | 9.6 | 794,413 | | tenure | All active | 2004 | 7.7 | 1,033,327 | | tenure | All active | 2006 | 7.8 | 1,142,451 | | tenure | All active | 2008 | 6.2 | 1,425,885 | | tenure | All active | 2010 | 6.6 | 1,409,984 | | tenure | All active | 2012 | 4.6 | 1,805,776 | | tenure | All active | 2014 | 4.8 | 1,597,010 | | tenure | All active | 2016 | 3.4 | 1,978,112 | | tenure | All active | 2018 | 2.5 | 2,161,252 | | tenure | All active | 2020 | 1.5 | 3,483,649 | | tenure | All active | 2022 | 1.4 | 3,082,400 | | tenure | All active | 2024 | 1.2 | 2,533,588 | | tenure | First-time | 1980 | 11.8 | 31,138 | | tenure | First-time | 1982 | 12.1 | 11,521 | | tenure | First-time | 1984 | 12.1 | 16,963 | | tenure | First-time | 1986 | 13.4 | 17,042 | | tenure | First-time | 1988 | 12.7 | 29,382 | | tenure | First-time | 1990 | 10.0 | 57,044 | | tenure | First-time | 1992 | 10.0 | 75,594 | | tenure | First-time | 1994 | 9.7 | 72,570 | | tenure | First-time | 1996 | 10.1 | 123,517 | | tenure | First-time | 1998 | 9.0 | 208,027 | | tenure | First-time | 2000 | 8.6 | 206,419 | | tenure | First-time | 2002 | 7.5 | 247,539 | | tenure | First-time | 2004 | 4.3 | 325,622 | | tenure | First-time | 2006 | 4.9 | 256,237 | | tenure | First-time | 2008 | 2.6 | 365,960 | | tenure | First-time | 2010 | 3.0 | 232,556 | | tenure | First-time | 2012 | 1.2 | 387,766 | | tenure | First-time | 2014 | 1.5 | 210,428 | | tenure | First-time | 2016 | 0.5 | 442,260 | | tenure | First-time | 2018 | 0.3 | 441,519 | | tenure | First-time | 2020 | 0.1 | 868,613 | | tenure | First-time | 2022 | 0.3 | 139,196 | | tenure | First-time | 2024 | 0.2 | 65,445 | | tenure | Repeat | 1982 | 12.4 | 13,686 | | tenure | Repeat | 1984 | 12.0 | 22,497 | | tenure | Repeat | 1986 | 12.7 | 28,169 | | tenure | Repeat | 1988 | 12.7 | 41,520 | | tenure | Repeat | 1990 | 12.8 | 54,468 | | tenure | Repeat | 1992 | 11.8 | 91,689 | | tenure | Repeat | 1994 | 11.2 | 125,034 | | tenure | Repeat | 1996 | 11.1 | 174,321 | | tenure | Repeat | 1998 | 11.0 | 262,001 | | tenure | Repeat | 2000 | 10.8 | 392,552 | | tenure | Repeat | 2002 | 10.5 | 546,874 | | tenure | Repeat | 2004 | 9.3 | 707,705 | | tenure | Repeat | 2006 | 8.7 | 886,214 | | tenure | Repeat | 2008 | 7.5 | 1,059,925 | | tenure | Repeat | 2010 | 7.3 | 1,177,428 | | tenure | Repeat | 2012 | 5.5 | 1,418,010 | | tenure | Repeat | 2014 | 5.3 | 1,386,582 | | tenure | Repeat | 2016 | 4.2 | 1,535,852 | | tenure | Repeat | 2018 | 3.1 | 1,719,733 | | tenure | Repeat | 2020 | 2.0 | 2,615,036 | | tenure | Repeat | 2022 | 1.4 | 2,943,204 | | tenure | Repeat | 2024 | 1.2 | 2,468,143 | | pool | 1980s | 1980 | 100.0 | 31,138 | | pool | 1980s | 1982 | 100.0 | 25,207 | | pool | 1980s | 1984 | 100.0 | 39,460 | | pool | 1980s | 1986 | 100.0 | 45,211 | | pool | 1980s | 1988 | 100.0 | 70,902 | | pool | 1980s | 1990 | 48.8 | 111,512 | | pool | 1980s | 1992 | 37.9 | 167,283 | | pool | 1980s | 1994 | 29.9 | 197,604 | | pool | 1980s | 1996 | 21.7 | 297,838 | | pool | 1980s | 1998 | 14.2 | 470,028 | | pool | 1980s | 2000 | 12.0 | 598,971 | | pool | 1980s | 2002 | 8.7 | 794,413 | | pool | 1980s | 2004 | 6.7 | 1,033,327 | | pool | 1980s | 2006 | 5.7 | 1,142,451 | | pool | 1980s | 2008 | 4.5 | 1,425,885 | | pool | 1980s | 2010 | 4.1 | 1,409,984 | | pool | 1980s | 2012 | 3.0 | 1,805,776 | | pool | 1980s | 2014 | 3.0 | 1,597,010 | | pool | 1980s | 2016 | 2.2 | 1,978,112 | | pool | 1980s | 2018 | 1.7 | 2,161,252 | | pool | 1980s | 2020 | 1.1 | 3,483,649 | | pool | 1980s | 2022 | 1.0 | 3,082,400 | | pool | 1980s | 2024 | 0.9 | 2,533,588 | | pool | 1990s | 1990 | 51.2 | 111,512 | | pool | 1990s | 1992 | 62.1 | 167,283 | | pool | 1990s | 1994 | 70.1 | 197,604 | | pool | 1990s | 1996 | 78.3 | 297,838 | | pool | 1990s | 1998 | 85.8 | 470,028 | | pool | 1990s | 2000 | 53.5 | 598,971 | | pool | 1990s | 2002 | 44.5 | 794,413 | | pool | 1990s | 2004 | 33.9 | 1,033,327 | | pool | 1990s | 2006 | 30.1 | 1,142,451 | | pool | 1990s | 2008 | 23.2 | 1,425,885 | | pool | 1990s | 2010 | 22.5 | 1,409,984 | | pool | 1990s | 2012 | 16.7 | 1,805,776 | | pool | 1990s | 2014 | 16.3 | 1,597,010 | | pool | 1990s | 2016 | 12.1 | 1,978,112 | | pool | 1990s | 2018 | 9.7 | 2,161,252 | | pool | 1990s | 2020 | 6.4 | 3,483,649 | | pool | 1990s | 2022 | 6.0 | 3,082,400 | | pool | 1990s | 2024 | 5.5 | 2,533,588 | | pool | 2000s | 2000 | 34.5 | 598,971 | | pool | 2000s | 2002 | 46.7 | 794,413 | | pool | 2000s | 2004 | 59.3 | 1,033,327 | | pool | 2000s | 2006 | 64.2 | 1,142,451 | | pool | 2000s | 2008 | 72.3 | 1,425,885 | | pool | 2000s | 2010 | 56.9 | 1,409,984 | | pool | 2000s | 2012 | 49.9 | 1,805,776 | | pool | 2000s | 2014 | 45.2 | 1,597,010 | | pool | 2000s | 2016 | 37.5 | 1,978,112 | | pool | 2000s | 2018 | 31.0 | 2,161,252 | | pool | 2000s | 2020 | 23.9 | 3,483,649 | | pool | 2000s | 2022 | 22.1 | 3,082,400 | | pool | 2000s | 2024 | 21.3 | 2,533,588 | | pool | 2010s | 2010 | 16.5 | 1,409,984 | | pool | 2010s | 2012 | 30.4 | 1,805,776 | | pool | 2010s | 2014 | 35.5 | 1,597,010 | | pool | 2010s | 2016 | 48.2 | 1,978,112 | | pool | 2010s | 2018 | 57.5 | 2,161,252 | | pool | 2010s | 2020 | 43.8 | 3,483,649 | | pool | 2010s | 2022 | 41.6 | 3,082,400 | | pool | 2010s | 2024 | 40.1 | 2,533,588 | | pool | 2020s | 2020 | 24.9 | 3,483,649 | | pool | 2020s | 2022 | 29.3 | 3,082,400 | | pool | 2020s | 2024 | 32.1 | 2,533,588 | Views: By year of first gift (panel = first); First-time and repeat donors (panel = tenure); Pool by decade of first gift (panel = pool). Note: A donor first seen in 1980 may have given before 1980, because DIME starts in 1980, so the 1980 group includes donors who first gave earlier. Note: The reliable flag needs a minimum number of distinct recipients over the career, so a donor first seen in 2024 counts only after reaching that number within one cycle. Only 2.7% of the donors first seen in 2024 do, against 16.1% of those first seen in 2012. Source: Stanford DIME v4.0 (Bonica), election cycles 1980-2024; full counts of itemized individual donors, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/cohort_center.json ### Table 5. The fall in the near-center share holds for every center band and recipient filter checked, and for dollars once each donor is capped Percent of active reliable donors within a band of zero, by election cycle; one choice varied per view | Choice varied | Series | Election cycle | Share (%) | Denominator | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | band | Band 0.10 | 1980 | 4.8 | 31,138 | | band | Band 0.10 | 1982 | 5.1 | 25,207 | | band | Band 0.10 | 1984 | 4.8 | 39,460 | | band | Band 0.10 | 1986 | 5.2 | 45,211 | | band | Band 0.10 | 1988 | 5.0 | 70,902 | | band | Band 0.10 | 1990 | 4.4 | 111,512 | | band | Band 0.10 | 1992 | 4.3 | 167,283 | | band | Band 0.10 | 1994 | 4.1 | 197,604 | | band | Band 0.10 | 1996 | 4.1 | 297,838 | | band | Band 0.10 | 1998 | 3.9 | 470,028 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2000 | 3.9 | 598,971 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2002 | 3.7 | 794,413 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2004 | 3.0 | 1,033,327 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2006 | 3.0 | 1,142,451 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2008 | 2.4 | 1,425,885 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2010 | 2.5 | 1,409,984 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2012 | 1.7 | 1,805,776 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2014 | 1.8 | 1,597,010 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2016 | 1.3 | 1,978,112 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2018 | 1.0 | 2,161,252 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2020 | 0.6 | 3,483,649 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2022 | 0.5 | 3,082,400 | | band | Band 0.10 | 2024 | 0.4 | 2,533,588 | | band | Band 0.15 | 1980 | 7.0 | 31,138 | | band | Band 0.15 | 1982 | 7.5 | 25,207 | | band | Band 0.15 | 1984 | 7.2 | 39,460 | | band | Band 0.15 | 1986 | 7.7 | 45,211 | | band | Band 0.15 | 1988 | 7.5 | 70,902 | | band | Band 0.15 | 1990 | 6.6 | 111,512 | | band | Band 0.15 | 1992 | 6.5 | 167,283 | | band | Band 0.15 | 1994 | 6.2 | 197,604 | | band | Band 0.15 | 1996 | 6.2 | 297,838 | | band | Band 0.15 | 1998 | 5.9 | 470,028 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2000 | 5.8 | 598,971 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2002 | 5.6 | 794,413 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2004 | 4.5 | 1,033,327 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2006 | 4.6 | 1,142,451 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2008 | 3.6 | 1,425,885 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2010 | 3.8 | 1,409,984 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2012 | 2.7 | 1,805,776 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2014 | 2.8 | 1,597,010 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2016 | 2.0 | 1,978,112 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2018 | 1.5 | 2,161,252 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2020 | 0.9 | 3,483,649 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2022 | 0.8 | 3,082,400 | | band | Band 0.15 | 2024 | 0.7 | 2,533,588 | | band | Band 0.25 | 1980 | 11.8 | 31,138 | | band | Band 0.25 | 1982 | 12.3 | 25,207 | | band | Band 0.25 | 1984 | 12.0 | 39,460 | | band | Band 0.25 | 1986 | 13.0 | 45,211 | | band | Band 0.25 | 1988 | 12.7 | 70,902 | | band | Band 0.25 | 1990 | 11.3 | 111,512 | | band | Band 0.25 | 1992 | 11.0 | 167,283 | | band | Band 0.25 | 1994 | 10.7 | 197,604 | | band | Band 0.25 | 1996 | 10.7 | 297,838 | | band | Band 0.25 | 1998 | 10.1 | 470,028 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2000 | 10.0 | 598,971 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2002 | 9.6 | 794,413 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2004 | 7.7 | 1,033,327 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2006 | 7.8 | 1,142,451 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2008 | 6.2 | 1,425,885 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2010 | 6.6 | 1,409,984 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2012 | 4.6 | 1,805,776 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2014 | 4.8 | 1,597,010 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2016 | 3.4 | 1,978,112 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2018 | 2.5 | 2,161,252 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2020 | 1.5 | 3,483,649 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2022 | 1.4 | 3,082,400 | | band | Band 0.25 | 2024 | 1.2 | 2,533,588 | | band | Band 0.35 | 1980 | 17.3 | 31,138 | | band | Band 0.35 | 1982 | 17.9 | 25,207 | | band | Band 0.35 | 1984 | 17.5 | 39,460 | | band | Band 0.35 | 1986 | 18.6 | 45,211 | | band | Band 0.35 | 1988 | 18.4 | 70,902 | | band | Band 0.35 | 1990 | 16.5 | 111,512 | | band | Band 0.35 | 1992 | 16.0 | 167,283 | | band | Band 0.35 | 1994 | 15.7 | 197,604 | | band | Band 0.35 | 1996 | 15.6 | 297,838 | | band | Band 0.35 | 1998 | 14.9 | 470,028 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2000 | 14.7 | 598,971 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2002 | 14.1 | 794,413 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2004 | 11.3 | 1,033,327 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2006 | 11.5 | 1,142,451 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2008 | 9.2 | 1,425,885 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2010 | 9.6 | 1,409,984 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2012 | 6.8 | 1,805,776 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2014 | 7.1 | 1,597,010 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2016 | 5.0 | 1,978,112 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2018 | 3.7 | 2,161,252 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2020 | 2.3 | 3,483,649 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2022 | 2.1 | 3,082,400 | | band | Band 0.35 | 2024 | 1.7 | 2,533,588 | | band | Band 0.50 | 1980 | 26.7 | 31,138 | | band | Band 0.50 | 1982 | 27.4 | 25,207 | | band | Band 0.50 | 1984 | 26.7 | 39,460 | | band | Band 0.50 | 1986 | 28.3 | 45,211 | | band | Band 0.50 | 1988 | 28.1 | 70,902 | | band | Band 0.50 | 1990 | 25.9 | 111,512 | | band | Band 0.50 | 1992 | 24.8 | 167,283 | | band | Band 0.50 | 1994 | 24.4 | 197,604 | | band | Band 0.50 | 1996 | 24.1 | 297,838 | | band | Band 0.50 | 1998 | 23.6 | 470,028 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2000 | 23.2 | 598,971 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2002 | 22.2 | 794,413 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2004 | 17.8 | 1,033,327 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2006 | 18.2 | 1,142,451 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2008 | 14.5 | 1,425,885 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2010 | 15.1 | 1,409,984 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2012 | 10.7 | 1,805,776 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2014 | 11.2 | 1,597,010 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2016 | 8.0 | 1,978,112 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2018 | 6.0 | 2,161,252 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2020 | 3.7 | 3,483,649 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2022 | 3.3 | 3,082,400 | | band | Band 0.50 | 2024 | 2.7 | 2,533,588 | | recipients | All donors | 1980 | 10.5 | 154,785 | | recipients | All donors | 1982 | 11.3 | 86,670 | | recipients | All donors | 1984 | 11.3 | 131,200 | | recipients | All donors | 1986 | 13.2 | 133,774 | | recipients | All donors | 1988 | 11.4 | 214,446 | | recipients | All donors | 1990 | 10.7 | 380,190 | | recipients | All donors | 1992 | 10.4 | 530,583 | | recipients | All donors | 1994 | 9.9 | 607,066 | | recipients | All donors | 1996 | 9.6 | 975,342 | | recipients | All donors | 1998 | 8.9 | 1,682,818 | | recipients | All donors | 2000 | 9.7 | 1,848,013 | | recipients | All donors | 2002 | 9.8 | 2,473,213 | | recipients | All donors | 2004 | 7.6 | 3,033,682 | | recipients | All donors | 2006 | 8.4 | 3,259,135 | | recipients | All donors | 2008 | 6.3 | 4,076,013 | | recipients | All donors | 2010 | 7.1 | 3,815,085 | | recipients | All donors | 2012 | 5.0 | 4,663,505 | | recipients | All donors | 2014 | 5.6 | 4,121,821 | | recipients | All donors | 2016 | 3.5 | 5,905,547 | | recipients | All donors | 2018 | 3.0 | 5,021,757 | | recipients | All donors | 2020 | 1.0 | 14,302,588 | | recipients | All donors | 2022 | 1.3 | 8,692,636 | | recipients | All donors | 2024 | 1.7 | 7,043,771 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 1980 | 13.4 | 57,193 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 1982 | 12.6 | 43,044 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 1984 | 12.8 | 67,054 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 1986 | 13.8 | 73,140 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 1988 | 14.3 | 117,042 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 1990 | 12.2 | 188,933 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 1992 | 12.0 | 279,329 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 1994 | 11.5 | 319,777 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 1996 | 11.3 | 494,892 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 1998 | 10.6 | 811,919 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2000 | 10.5 | 1,000,415 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2002 | 10.1 | 1,330,550 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2004 | 7.9 | 1,747,923 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2006 | 8.4 | 1,877,694 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2008 | 6.5 | 2,439,648 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2010 | 7.2 | 2,300,985 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2012 | 4.9 | 2,988,603 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2014 | 5.5 | 2,604,742 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2016 | 3.6 | 3,494,075 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2018 | 2.8 | 3,568,065 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2020 | 1.4 | 8,698,567 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2022 | 1.4 | 6,146,958 | | recipients_table | 2 or more | 2024 | 1.3 | 5,034,842 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 1980 | 12.6 | 41,298 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 1982 | 12.5 | 33,193 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 1984 | 12.5 | 52,204 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 1986 | 13.4 | 58,793 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 1988 | 13.4 | 92,400 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 1990 | 11.8 | 146,931 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 1992 | 11.6 | 219,442 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 1994 | 11.1 | 258,365 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 1996 | 11.1 | 399,999 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 1998 | 10.5 | 648,297 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2000 | 10.4 | 831,167 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2002 | 10.0 | 1,123,133 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2004 | 8.0 | 1,441,691 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2006 | 8.3 | 1,611,590 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2008 | 6.6 | 2,032,932 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2010 | 7.0 | 1,982,381 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2012 | 4.8 | 2,559,273 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2014 | 5.2 | 2,197,539 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2016 | 3.5 | 2,875,282 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2018 | 2.6 | 2,992,976 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2020 | 1.4 | 5,984,589 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2022 | 1.3 | 4,732,218 | | recipients_table | 4 or more | 2024 | 1.2 | 3,824,633 | | recipients | 8 or more | 1980 | 11.8 | 31,138 | | recipients | 8 or more | 1982 | 12.3 | 25,207 | | recipients | 8 or more | 1984 | 12.0 | 39,460 | | recipients | 8 or more | 1986 | 13.0 | 45,211 | | recipients | 8 or more | 1988 | 12.7 | 70,902 | | recipients | 8 or more | 1990 | 11.3 | 111,512 | | recipients | 8 or more | 1992 | 11.0 | 167,283 | | recipients | 8 or more | 1994 | 10.7 | 197,604 | | recipients | 8 or more | 1996 | 10.7 | 297,838 | | recipients | 8 or more | 1998 | 10.1 | 470,028 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2000 | 10.0 | 598,971 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2002 | 9.6 | 794,413 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2004 | 7.7 | 1,033,327 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2006 | 7.8 | 1,142,451 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2008 | 6.2 | 1,425,885 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2010 | 6.6 | 1,409,984 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2012 | 4.6 | 1,805,776 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2014 | 4.8 | 1,597,010 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2016 | 3.4 | 1,978,112 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2018 | 2.5 | 2,161,252 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2020 | 1.5 | 3,483,649 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2022 | 1.4 | 3,082,400 | | recipients | 8 or more | 2024 | 1.2 | 2,533,588 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 1980 | 11.4 | 26,188 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 1982 | 11.9 | 21,167 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 1984 | 11.6 | 33,259 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 1986 | 12.5 | 38,114 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 1988 | 12.2 | 59,899 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 1990 | 11.0 | 93,515 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 1992 | 10.5 | 139,520 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 1994 | 10.3 | 163,612 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 1996 | 10.3 | 242,380 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 1998 | 9.8 | 374,206 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2000 | 9.6 | 472,789 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2002 | 9.1 | 614,504 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2004 | 7.4 | 798,766 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2006 | 7.5 | 876,096 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2008 | 6.0 | 1,087,790 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2010 | 6.2 | 1,077,733 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2012 | 4.4 | 1,375,276 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2014 | 4.6 | 1,244,871 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2016 | 3.4 | 1,488,357 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2018 | 2.5 | 1,655,596 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2020 | 1.7 | 2,400,789 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2022 | 1.5 | 2,216,874 | | recipients_table | 12 or more | 2024 | 1.2 | 1,863,305 | | recipients | 16 or more | 1980 | 11.2 | 22,747 | | recipients | 16 or more | 1982 | 11.7 | 18,579 | | recipients | 16 or more | 1984 | 11.3 | 29,149 | | recipients | 16 or more | 1986 | 12.2 | 33,418 | | recipients | 16 or more | 1988 | 11.9 | 52,412 | | recipients | 16 or more | 1990 | 10.6 | 81,075 | | recipients | 16 or more | 1992 | 10.2 | 120,528 | | recipients | 16 or more | 1994 | 10.0 | 140,308 | | recipients | 16 or more | 1996 | 10.0 | 204,428 | | recipients | 16 or more | 1998 | 9.5 | 310,744 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2000 | 9.3 | 388,670 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2002 | 8.8 | 497,712 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2004 | 7.2 | 646,757 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2006 | 7.2 | 705,532 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2008 | 5.8 | 871,757 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2010 | 6.0 | 865,388 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2012 | 4.3 | 1,098,706 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2014 | 4.4 | 1,011,317 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2016 | 3.4 | 1,187,456 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2018 | 2.6 | 1,327,072 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2020 | 1.8 | 1,793,107 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2022 | 1.6 | 1,688,734 | | recipients | 16 or more | 2024 | 1.3 | 1,443,230 | | cap | Donors | 1980 | 11.8 | 31,138 | | cap | Donors | 1982 | 12.3 | 25,207 | | cap | Donors | 1984 | 12.0 | 39,460 | | cap | Donors | 1986 | 13.0 | 45,211 | | cap | Donors | 1988 | 12.7 | 70,902 | | cap | Donors | 1990 | 11.3 | 111,512 | | cap | Donors | 1992 | 11.0 | 167,283 | | cap | Donors | 1994 | 10.7 | 197,604 | | cap | Donors | 1996 | 10.7 | 297,838 | | cap | Donors | 1998 | 10.1 | 470,028 | | cap | Donors | 2000 | 10.0 | 598,971 | | cap | Donors | 2002 | 9.6 | 794,413 | | cap | Donors | 2004 | 7.7 | 1,033,327 | | cap | Donors | 2006 | 7.8 | 1,142,451 | | cap | Donors | 2008 | 6.2 | 1,425,885 | | cap | Donors | 2010 | 6.6 | 1,409,984 | | cap | Donors | 2012 | 4.6 | 1,805,776 | | cap | Donors | 2014 | 4.8 | 1,597,010 | | cap | Donors | 2016 | 3.4 | 1,978,112 | | cap | Donors | 2018 | 2.5 | 2,161,252 | | cap | Donors | 2020 | 1.5 | 3,483,649 | | cap | Donors | 2022 | 1.4 | 3,082,400 | | cap | Donors | 2024 | 1.2 | 2,533,588 | | cap | No cap | 1980 | 12.2 | 31,138 | | cap | No cap | 1982 | 9.6 | 25,207 | | cap | No cap | 1984 | 10.0 | 39,460 | | cap | No cap | 1986 | 11.1 | 45,211 | | cap | No cap | 1988 | 11.1 | 70,902 | | cap | No cap | 1990 | 11.5 | 111,512 | | cap | No cap | 1992 | 10.2 | 167,283 | | cap | No cap | 1994 | 10.5 | 197,604 | | cap | No cap | 1996 | 9.4 | 297,838 | | cap | No cap | 1998 | 12.3 | 470,028 | | cap | No cap | 2000 | 9.1 | 598,971 | | cap | No cap | 2002 | 24.5 | 794,413 | | cap | No cap | 2004 | 8.4 | 1,033,327 | | cap | No cap | 2006 | 7.2 | 1,142,451 | | cap | No cap | 2008 | 7.0 | 1,425,885 | | cap | No cap | 2010 | 7.7 | 1,409,984 | | cap | No cap | 2012 | 4.8 | 1,805,776 | | cap | No cap | 2014 | 6.6 | 1,597,010 | | cap | No cap | 2016 | 4.6 | 1,978,112 | | cap | No cap | 2018 | 3.5 | 2,161,252 | | cap | No cap | 2020 | 1.8 | 3,483,649 | | cap | No cap | 2022 | 2.8 | 3,082,400 | | cap | No cap | 2024 | 6.3 | 2,533,588 | | cap | Cap $10m | 1980 | 12.2 | 31,138 | | cap | Cap $10m | 1982 | 9.6 | 25,207 | | cap | Cap $10m | 1984 | 10.0 | 39,460 | | cap | Cap $10m | 1986 | 11.1 | 45,211 | | cap | Cap $10m | 1988 | 11.1 | 70,902 | | cap | Cap $10m | 1990 | 11.5 | 111,512 | | cap | Cap $10m | 1992 | 10.2 | 167,283 | | cap | Cap $10m | 1994 | 10.5 | 197,604 | | cap | Cap $10m | 1996 | 9.4 | 297,838 | | cap | Cap $10m | 1998 | 10.9 | 470,028 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2000 | 9.1 | 598,971 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2002 | 11.0 | 794,413 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2004 | 8.5 | 1,033,327 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2006 | 8.7 | 1,142,451 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2008 | 7.0 | 1,425,885 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2010 | 8.9 | 1,409,984 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2012 | 5.4 | 1,805,776 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2014 | 7.3 | 1,597,010 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2016 | 6.0 | 1,978,112 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2018 | 4.6 | 2,161,252 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2020 | 2.4 | 3,483,649 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2022 | 3.3 | 3,082,400 | | cap | Cap $10m | 2024 | 3.6 | 2,533,588 | | cap | Cap $1m | 1980 | 12.2 | 31,138 | | cap | Cap $1m | 1982 | 9.6 | 25,207 | | cap | Cap $1m | 1984 | 10.0 | 39,460 | | cap | Cap $1m | 1986 | 11.1 | 45,211 | | cap | Cap $1m | 1988 | 11.1 | 70,902 | | cap | Cap $1m | 1990 | 11.5 | 111,512 | | cap | Cap $1m | 1992 | 10.3 | 167,283 | | cap | Cap $1m | 1994 | 10.5 | 197,604 | | cap | Cap $1m | 1996 | 9.5 | 297,838 | | cap | Cap $1m | 1998 | 11.0 | 470,028 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2000 | 9.6 | 598,971 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2002 | 11.7 | 794,413 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2004 | 8.9 | 1,033,327 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2006 | 9.6 | 1,142,451 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2008 | 7.3 | 1,425,885 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2010 | 9.3 | 1,409,984 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2012 | 5.6 | 1,805,776 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2014 | 7.7 | 1,597,010 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2016 | 6.1 | 1,978,112 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2018 | 4.8 | 2,161,252 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2020 | 2.4 | 3,483,649 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2022 | 3.4 | 3,082,400 | | cap | Cap $1m | 2024 | 3.4 | 2,533,588 | | cap | Cap $100k | 1980 | 12.3 | 31,138 | | cap | Cap $100k | 1982 | 9.8 | 25,207 | | cap | Cap $100k | 1984 | 10.1 | 39,460 | | cap | Cap $100k | 1986 | 11.2 | 45,211 | | cap | Cap $100k | 1988 | 11.2 | 70,902 | | cap | Cap $100k | 1990 | 11.5 | 111,512 | | cap | Cap $100k | 1992 | 10.6 | 167,283 | | cap | Cap $100k | 1994 | 10.8 | 197,604 | | cap | Cap $100k | 1996 | 10.3 | 297,838 | | cap | Cap $100k | 1998 | 11.8 | 470,028 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2000 | 10.8 | 598,971 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2002 | 12.3 | 794,413 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2004 | 9.6 | 1,033,327 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2006 | 10.4 | 1,142,451 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2008 | 7.7 | 1,425,885 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2010 | 9.6 | 1,409,984 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2012 | 6.0 | 1,805,776 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2014 | 8.2 | 1,597,010 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2016 | 6.3 | 1,978,112 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2018 | 4.9 | 2,161,252 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2020 | 2.3 | 3,483,649 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2022 | 3.2 | 3,082,400 | | cap | Cap $100k | 2024 | 3.0 | 2,533,588 | | side | Left of zero | 1980 | 17.5 | 10,873 | | side | Left of zero | 1982 | 18.4 | 8,659 | | side | Left of zero | 1984 | 17.4 | 14,647 | | side | Left of zero | 1986 | 19.4 | 15,958 | | side | Left of zero | 1988 | 17.1 | 28,380 | | side | Left of zero | 1990 | 14.1 | 48,231 | | side | Left of zero | 1992 | 12.7 | 77,711 | | side | Left of zero | 1994 | 13.3 | 84,483 | | side | Left of zero | 1996 | 13.8 | 122,604 | | side | Left of zero | 1998 | 11.8 | 214,822 | | side | Left of zero | 2000 | 11.9 | 271,239 | | side | Left of zero | 2002 | 10.7 | 383,397 | | side | Left of zero | 2004 | 7.9 | 544,413 | | side | Left of zero | 2006 | 7.7 | 626,498 | | side | Left of zero | 2008 | 5.8 | 832,129 | | side | Left of zero | 2010 | 6.4 | 787,647 | | side | Left of zero | 2012 | 3.9 | 1,143,079 | | side | Left of zero | 2014 | 4.1 | 1,034,897 | | side | Left of zero | 2016 | 2.7 | 1,369,414 | | side | Left of zero | 2018 | 1.8 | 1,652,669 | | side | Left of zero | 2020 | 1.1 | 2,633,734 | | side | Left of zero | 2022 | 1.0 | 2,294,760 | | side | Left of zero | 2024 | 0.8 | 1,916,881 | | side | Right of zero | 1980 | 8.7 | 20,254 | | side | Right of zero | 1982 | 9.0 | 16,544 | | side | Right of zero | 1984 | 8.9 | 24,806 | | side | Right of zero | 1986 | 9.4 | 29,244 | | side | Right of zero | 1988 | 9.8 | 42,493 | | side | Right of zero | 1990 | 9.2 | 63,248 | | side | Right of zero | 1992 | 9.5 | 89,526 | | side | Right of zero | 1994 | 8.7 | 113,075 | | side | Right of zero | 1996 | 8.5 | 175,176 | | side | Right of zero | 1998 | 8.6 | 255,107 | | side | Right of zero | 2000 | 8.4 | 327,629 | | side | Right of zero | 2002 | 8.5 | 410,878 | | side | Right of zero | 2004 | 7.5 | 488,759 | | side | Right of zero | 2006 | 8.0 | 515,775 | | side | Right of zero | 2008 | 6.8 | 593,591 | | side | Right of zero | 2010 | 6.8 | 622,156 | | side | Right of zero | 2012 | 5.7 | 662,538 | | side | Right of zero | 2014 | 6.1 | 561,957 | | side | Right of zero | 2016 | 5.0 | 608,559 | | side | Right of zero | 2018 | 4.8 | 508,476 | | side | Right of zero | 2020 | 2.8 | 849,809 | | side | Right of zero | 2022 | 2.4 | 787,550 | | side | Right of zero | 2024 | 2.1 | 616,644 | Views: Width of the center (check = band); Recipient filter (check = recipients); Dollar cap (check = cap); Each side of zero (check = side). Note: The recipient filter is set once from the donor's whole record: a donor counts as reliable in every cycle in which they gave, including cycles before reaching the minimum number of recipients. Note: Full counts of itemized donors: no sampling interval. Source: Stanford DIME v4.0 (Bonica), election cycles 1980-2024; full counts of itemized individual donors, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/center_sensitivity.json ### Table 6. The share of federal candidates near the center fell from 13.3% in 1980 to 2.0% in 2020 and was 3.1% in 2024 Percent with a CFscore within 0.25 of zero: reliable donors, House and Senate candidates with a score, and seated winners, by election cycle | Election cycle | Series | Share within 0.25 of zero (%) | Donors or candidates | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | | 1980 | Donors | 11.8 | 31,138 | | 1982 | Donors | 12.3 | 25,207 | | 1984 | Donors | 12.0 | 39,460 | | 1986 | Donors | 13.0 | 45,211 | | 1988 | Donors | 12.7 | 70,902 | | 1990 | Donors | 11.3 | 111,512 | | 1992 | Donors | 11.0 | 167,283 | | 1994 | Donors | 10.7 | 197,604 | | 1996 | Donors | 10.7 | 297,838 | | 1998 | Donors | 10.1 | 470,028 | | 2000 | Donors | 10.0 | 598,971 | | 2002 | Donors | 9.6 | 794,413 | | 2004 | Donors | 7.7 | 1,033,327 | | 2006 | Donors | 7.8 | 1,142,451 | | 2008 | Donors | 6.2 | 1,425,885 | | 2010 | Donors | 6.6 | 1,409,984 | | 2012 | Donors | 4.6 | 1,805,776 | | 2014 | Donors | 4.8 | 1,597,010 | | 2016 | Donors | 3.4 | 1,978,112 | | 2018 | Donors | 2.5 | 2,161,252 | | 2020 | Donors | 1.5 | 3,483,649 | | 2022 | Donors | 1.4 | 3,082,400 | | 2024 | Donors | 1.2 | 2,533,588 | | 1980 | Candidates | 13.3 | 1,265 | | 1982 | Candidates | 9.8 | 1,349 | | 1984 | Candidates | 10.7 | 1,271 | | 1986 | Candidates | 10.7 | 1,240 | | 1988 | Candidates | 10.5 | 1,271 | | 1990 | Candidates | 12.9 | 1,290 | | 1992 | Candidates | 12.4 | 1,793 | | 1994 | Candidates | 11.4 | 1,787 | | 1996 | Candidates | 9.4 | 1,762 | | 1998 | Candidates | 9.3 | 1,402 | | 2000 | Candidates | 8.3 | 1,443 | | 2002 | Candidates | 10.0 | 1,474 | | 2004 | Candidates | 7.8 | 1,472 | | 2006 | Candidates | 7.5 | 1,525 | | 2008 | Candidates | 8.3 | 1,635 | | 2010 | Candidates | 6.8 | 2,113 | | 2012 | Candidates | 5.3 | 1,957 | | 2014 | Candidates | 4.3 | 1,780 | | 2016 | Candidates | 4.7 | 1,750 | | 2018 | Candidates | 2.9 | 2,336 | | 2020 | Candidates | 2.0 | 2,543 | | 2022 | Candidates | 2.6 | 2,745 | | 2024 | Candidates | 3.1 | 2,329 | | 1980 | Winners | 16.2 | 451 | | 1982 | Winners | 12.1 | 461 | | 1984 | Winners | 13.3 | 459 | | 1986 | Winners | 13.8 | 456 | | 1988 | Winners | 13.2 | 463 | | 1990 | Winners | 16.2 | 470 | | 1992 | Winners | 13.9 | 468 | | 1994 | Winners | 13.4 | 464 | | 1996 | Winners | 9.3 | 452 | | 1998 | Winners | 10.8 | 481 | | 2000 | Winners | 10.0 | 470 | | 2002 | Winners | 9.6 | 478 | | 2004 | Winners | 9.0 | 469 | | 2006 | Winners | 8.4 | 476 | | 2008 | Winners | 11.4 | 474 | | 2010 | Winners | 7.6 | 476 | | 2012 | Winners | 4.7 | 471 | | 2014 | Winners | 4.1 | 468 | | 2016 | Winners | 3.8 | 468 | | 2018 | Winners | 3.1 | 459 | | 2020 | Winners | 1.5 | 469 | | 2022 | Winners | 2.8 | 469 | Note: Candidate scores are the dynamic CFscore, estimated from the donors who give to each candidate, so the candidate and donor lines rest on the same giving records. The candidate lines cover federal House and Senate candidates only, and the donor line covers gifts to federal and state recipients. Note: The rise after 2020 rests on small counts: 51 of 2,543 candidates in 2020 and 72 of 2,329 in 2024, and among seated winners 7 of 469 in 2020 and 13 of 469 in 2022. Note: Candidates with a score are 86% to 98% of the major-party House and Senate candidates in the file, by cycle. Candidates without a score are not plotted. Note: General-election winners are not coded for 2024 in this DIME release. Full counts: no sampling interval. Source: Stanford DIME v4.0 (Bonica), election cycles 1980-2024; full counts of federal House and Senate candidates, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/candidate_center.json ### Table 7. The parties moved apart on both scales, but CFscores show the Democratic median moving further and roll-call scores the Republican median Median score and 25th to 75th percentile range of House and Senate candidates by party, by election cycle; other views: seated members by CFscore and by roll-call votes | View | Party | Election cycle | Median | 25th percentile | 75th percentile | Candidates or members | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | cf | Democratic | 1980 | −0.43 | −0.67 | −0.06 | 679 | | cf | Republican | 1980 | 0.97 | 0.72 | 1.12 | 586 | | cf | Democratic | 1982 | −0.56 | −0.73 | −0.24 | 730 | | cf | Republican | 1982 | 0.95 | 0.73 | 1.12 | 619 | | cf | Democratic | 1984 | −0.55 | −0.72 | −0.27 | 695 | | cf | Republican | 1984 | 0.96 | 0.68 | 1.14 | 576 | | cf | Democratic | 1986 | −0.53 | −0.71 | −0.25 | 682 | | cf | Republican | 1986 | 0.95 | 0.65 | 1.15 | 558 | | cf | Democratic | 1988 | −0.53 | −0.71 | −0.27 | 705 | | cf | Republican | 1988 | 0.97 | 0.66 | 1.18 | 566 | | cf | Democratic | 1990 | −0.50 | −0.72 | −0.22 | 696 | | cf | Republican | 1990 | 0.94 | 0.65 | 1.18 | 594 | | cf | Democratic | 1992 | −0.51 | −0.74 | −0.20 | 924 | | cf | Republican | 1992 | 0.92 | 0.63 | 1.17 | 869 | | cf | Democratic | 1994 | −0.52 | −0.75 | −0.21 | 876 | | cf | Republican | 1994 | 0.99 | 0.70 | 1.20 | 911 | | cf | Democratic | 1996 | −0.62 | −0.84 | −0.32 | 884 | | cf | Republican | 1996 | 1.01 | 0.71 | 1.22 | 878 | | cf | Democratic | 1998 | −0.57 | −0.80 | −0.32 | 680 | | cf | Republican | 1998 | 1.02 | 0.73 | 1.24 | 722 | | cf | Democratic | 2000 | −0.59 | −0.83 | −0.35 | 695 | | cf | Republican | 2000 | 1.02 | 0.74 | 1.21 | 748 | | cf | Democratic | 2002 | −0.59 | −0.79 | −0.31 | 724 | | cf | Republican | 2002 | 1.00 | 0.74 | 1.22 | 750 | | cf | Democratic | 2004 | −0.69 | −0.92 | −0.38 | 697 | | cf | Republican | 2004 | 1.03 | 0.76 | 1.25 | 775 | | cf | Democratic | 2006 | −0.74 | −0.98 | −0.41 | 829 | | cf | Republican | 2006 | 1.08 | 0.81 | 1.31 | 696 | | cf | Democratic | 2008 | −0.71 | −0.98 | −0.40 | 859 | | cf | Republican | 2008 | 1.09 | 0.82 | 1.31 | 776 | | cf | Democratic | 2010 | −0.73 | −0.97 | −0.43 | 863 | | cf | Republican | 2010 | 1.19 | 0.94 | 1.39 | 1,250 | | cf | Democratic | 2012 | −0.77 | −1.00 | −0.47 | 907 | | cf | Republican | 2012 | 1.15 | 0.91 | 1.36 | 1,050 | | cf | Democratic | 2014 | −0.81 | −1.00 | −0.53 | 817 | | cf | Republican | 2014 | 1.17 | 0.95 | 1.36 | 963 | | cf | Democratic | 2016 | −0.84 | −1.04 | −0.57 | 851 | | cf | Republican | 2016 | 1.16 | 0.94 | 1.40 | 899 | | cf | Democratic | 2018 | −0.96 | −1.08 | −0.76 | 1,404 | | cf | Republican | 2018 | 1.18 | 0.92 | 1.42 | 932 | | cf | Democratic | 2020 | −0.98 | −1.07 | −0.81 | 1,370 | | cf | Republican | 2020 | 1.33 | 1.11 | 1.49 | 1,173 | | cf | Democratic | 2022 | −0.98 | −1.07 | −0.77 | 1,305 | | cf | Republican | 2022 | 1.37 | 1.12 | 1.52 | 1,440 | | cf | Democratic | 2024 | −0.96 | −1.06 | −0.76 | 1,166 | | cf | Republican | 2024 | 1.35 | 1.07 | 1.52 | 1,163 | | cfseat | Democratic | 1980 | −0.43 | −0.62 | −0.12 | 249 | | cfseat | Democratic | 1982 | −0.51 | −0.68 | −0.24 | 279 | | cfseat | Democratic | 1984 | −0.45 | −0.64 | −0.18 | 259 | | cfseat | Democratic | 1986 | −0.45 | −0.61 | −0.24 | 265 | | cfseat | Democratic | 1988 | −0.47 | −0.61 | −0.29 | 272 | | cfseat | Democratic | 1990 | −0.43 | −0.60 | −0.21 | 284 | | cfseat | Democratic | 1992 | −0.46 | −0.62 | −0.20 | 277 | | cfseat | Democratic | 1994 | −0.43 | −0.61 | −0.21 | 219 | | cfseat | Democratic | 1996 | −0.50 | −0.67 | −0.31 | 207 | | cfseat | Democratic | 1998 | −0.49 | −0.66 | −0.28 | 232 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2000 | −0.49 | −0.66 | −0.26 | 224 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2002 | −0.50 | −0.68 | −0.30 | 220 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2004 | −0.53 | −0.72 | −0.32 | 217 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2006 | −0.59 | −0.75 | −0.35 | 257 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2008 | −0.54 | −0.73 | −0.30 | 276 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2010 | −0.56 | −0.75 | −0.35 | 207 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2012 | −0.66 | −0.81 | −0.46 | 226 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2014 | −0.61 | −0.81 | −0.46 | 197 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2016 | −0.65 | −0.81 | −0.44 | 205 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2018 | −0.75 | −0.90 | −0.53 | 254 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2020 | −0.77 | −0.92 | −0.55 | 237 | | cfseat | Democratic | 2022 | −0.78 | −0.93 | −0.60 | 222 | | cfseat | Republican | 1980 | 0.94 | 0.70 | 1.08 | 196 | | cfseat | Republican | 1982 | 0.88 | 0.70 | 1.04 | 176 | | cfseat | Republican | 1984 | 0.88 | 0.66 | 1.02 | 195 | | cfseat | Republican | 1986 | 0.82 | 0.59 | 1.00 | 186 | | cfseat | Republican | 1988 | 0.82 | 0.61 | 1.03 | 185 | | cfseat | Republican | 1990 | 0.84 | 0.60 | 1.03 | 182 | | cfseat | Republican | 1992 | 0.90 | 0.69 | 1.07 | 188 | | cfseat | Republican | 1994 | 0.99 | 0.78 | 1.17 | 241 | | cfseat | Republican | 1996 | 1.00 | 0.76 | 1.14 | 235 | | cfseat | Republican | 1998 | 0.97 | 0.73 | 1.12 | 237 | | cfseat | Republican | 2000 | 0.98 | 0.78 | 1.13 | 227 | | cfseat | Republican | 2002 | 0.97 | 0.75 | 1.14 | 248 | | cfseat | Republican | 2004 | 0.96 | 0.75 | 1.13 | 246 | | cfseat | Republican | 2006 | 0.99 | 0.78 | 1.12 | 209 | | cfseat | Republican | 2008 | 1.05 | 0.85 | 1.18 | 190 | | cfseat | Republican | 2010 | 1.10 | 0.88 | 1.22 | 266 | | cfseat | Republican | 2012 | 1.07 | 0.92 | 1.19 | 241 | | cfseat | Republican | 2014 | 1.08 | 0.93 | 1.21 | 268 | | cfseat | Republican | 2016 | 1.09 | 0.88 | 1.19 | 260 | | cfseat | Republican | 2018 | 1.11 | 0.92 | 1.22 | 203 | | cfseat | Republican | 2020 | 1.18 | 1.02 | 1.32 | 227 | | cfseat | Republican | 2022 | 1.20 | 1.05 | 1.37 | 239 | | dw | Democratic | 1980 | −0.32 | −0.42 | −0.19 | 249 | | dw | Democratic | 1982 | −0.32 | −0.42 | −0.19 | 279 | | dw | Democratic | 1984 | −0.31 | −0.41 | −0.19 | 259 | | dw | Democratic | 1986 | −0.32 | −0.42 | −0.20 | 265 | | dw | Democratic | 1988 | −0.32 | −0.42 | −0.20 | 272 | | dw | Democratic | 1990 | −0.32 | −0.42 | −0.19 | 284 | | dw | Democratic | 1992 | −0.32 | −0.45 | −0.22 | 277 | | dw | Democratic | 1994 | −0.38 | −0.47 | −0.26 | 219 | | dw | Democratic | 1996 | −0.38 | −0.47 | −0.29 | 207 | | dw | Democratic | 1998 | −0.38 | −0.47 | −0.29 | 232 | | dw | Democratic | 2000 | −0.38 | −0.46 | −0.29 | 224 | | dw | Democratic | 2002 | −0.38 | −0.47 | −0.30 | 220 | | dw | Democratic | 2004 | −0.38 | −0.47 | −0.30 | 217 | | dw | Democratic | 2006 | −0.37 | −0.45 | −0.27 | 257 | | dw | Democratic | 2008 | −0.35 | −0.45 | −0.26 | 276 | | dw | Democratic | 2010 | −0.40 | −0.47 | −0.32 | 207 | | dw | Democratic | 2012 | −0.39 | −0.46 | −0.30 | 226 | | dw | Democratic | 2014 | −0.40 | −0.47 | −0.32 | 197 | | dw | Democratic | 2016 | −0.39 | −0.45 | −0.32 | 205 | | dw | Democratic | 2018 | −0.38 | −0.45 | −0.29 | 254 | | dw | Democratic | 2020 | −0.38 | −0.45 | −0.30 | 237 | | dw | Democratic | 2022 | −0.38 | −0.45 | −0.30 | 222 | | dw | Republican | 1980 | 0.31 | 0.22 | 0.39 | 196 | | dw | Republican | 1982 | 0.33 | 0.23 | 0.40 | 176 | | dw | Republican | 1984 | 0.34 | 0.24 | 0.42 | 195 | | dw | Republican | 1986 | 0.34 | 0.23 | 0.43 | 186 | | dw | Republican | 1988 | 0.34 | 0.23 | 0.44 | 185 | | dw | Republican | 1990 | 0.34 | 0.23 | 0.43 | 182 | | dw | Republican | 1992 | 0.38 | 0.26 | 0.47 | 188 | | dw | Republican | 1994 | 0.38 | 0.28 | 0.49 | 241 | | dw | Republican | 1996 | 0.40 | 0.31 | 0.50 | 235 | | dw | Republican | 1998 | 0.38 | 0.30 | 0.49 | 237 | | dw | Republican | 2000 | 0.40 | 0.31 | 0.50 | 227 | | dw | Republican | 2002 | 0.40 | 0.30 | 0.51 | 248 | | dw | Republican | 2004 | 0.41 | 0.32 | 0.52 | 246 | | dw | Republican | 2006 | 0.42 | 0.33 | 0.53 | 209 | | dw | Republican | 2008 | 0.43 | 0.34 | 0.54 | 190 | | dw | Republican | 2010 | 0.45 | 0.35 | 0.57 | 266 | | dw | Republican | 2012 | 0.49 | 0.38 | 0.58 | 241 | | dw | Republican | 2014 | 0.49 | 0.37 | 0.58 | 268 | | dw | Republican | 2016 | 0.49 | 0.38 | 0.59 | 260 | | dw | Republican | 2018 | 0.51 | 0.42 | 0.61 | 203 | | dw | Republican | 2020 | 0.50 | 0.40 | 0.61 | 227 | | dw | Republican | 2022 | 0.51 | 0.41 | 0.63 | 239 | Views: Candidate CFscores (panel = cf); Seated members, CFscores (panel = cfseat); Seated members, roll-call scores (panel = dw). Note: Bands run from the 25th to the 75th percentile of candidates or members and are not confidence intervals. Full counts: no sampling interval. Note: Roll-call scores (DW-NOMINATE) come with the DIME candidate file for seated members; 2024 winners are not coded. Source: Stanford DIME v4.0 (Bonica), election cycles 1980-2024; full counts of federal House and Senate candidates, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/candidate_medians.json ### Table 8. The donor share near the center fell from 7.8% to 1.2% while self-described moderates stayed between 30.8% and 39.0% Each series as a percent of its own 2006 value: reliable donors within 0.25 of zero (DIME) and adults who call themselves moderate (CES), by election year | Election year | Series | Percent | Index (2006 = 100) | Interval low (index) | Interval high (index) | Donors or respondents | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 2006 | Donors | 7.8 | 100.0 | n/a | n/a | 1,142,451 | | 2008 | Donors | 6.2 | 79.4 | n/a | n/a | 1,425,885 | | 2010 | Donors | 6.6 | 83.6 | n/a | n/a | 1,409,984 | | 2012 | Donors | 4.6 | 58.6 | n/a | n/a | 1,805,776 | | 2014 | Donors | 4.8 | 61.3 | n/a | n/a | 1,597,010 | | 2016 | Donors | 3.4 | 43.5 | n/a | n/a | 1,978,112 | | 2018 | Donors | 2.5 | 32.2 | n/a | n/a | 2,161,252 | | 2020 | Donors | 1.5 | 19.7 | n/a | n/a | 3,483,649 | | 2022 | Donors | 1.4 | 17.8 | n/a | n/a | 3,082,400 | | 2024 | Donors | 1.2 | 14.8 | n/a | n/a | 2,533,588 | | 2006 | Moderates | 39.0 | 100.0 | 98.5 | 101.5 | 34,189 | | 2008 | Moderates | 35.1 | 89.8 | 88.2 | 91.5 | 30,436 | | 2010 | Moderates | 34.8 | 89.1 | 87.4 | 90.8 | 52,342 | | 2012 | Moderates | 36.4 | 93.1 | 91.5 | 94.7 | 50,564 | | 2014 | Moderates | 37.6 | 96.3 | 94.7 | 98.0 | 51,022 | | 2016 | Moderates | 38.1 | 97.7 | 96.3 | 99.1 | 59,815 | | 2018 | Moderates | 30.8 | 78.8 | 77.3 | 80.2 | 54,950 | | 2020 | Moderates | 33.4 | 85.5 | 84.1 | 87.0 | 56,208 | | 2022 | Moderates | 34.5 | 88.3 | 86.8 | 89.8 | 55,606 | | 2024 | Moderates | 35.4 | 90.6 | 88.8 | 92.4 | 56,384 | Note: This is a coarse comparison of direction. It does not date the change in either series, because the survey series starts in 2006, after part of the donor fall. Note: The donor line is a full count and has no interval. The survey band is model based (Kish effective sample size) and ignores clustering; it is the interval of the survey share divided by the 2006 estimate, so it leaves out the uncertainty of the 2006 estimate itself. Source: Stanford DIME v4.0 (Bonica), election cycles 2006-2024, full counts with no weights; Cooperative Election Study, election years 2006-2024, weighted with the single-wave survey weight Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/moderates_comparison.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (172), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | all_1980 | 10.5% | percent of active donors in the group | share of active donors within the center band | all individual donors with a score, projected scores included | 1980 | | 154,785 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | all_2024 | 1.7% | percent of active donors in the group | share of active donors within the center band | all individual donors with a score, projected scores included | 2024 | | 7,043,771 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | b10_1980 | 4.8% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors within a band of 0.10 around zero | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | b10_2024 | 0.4% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors within a band of 0.10 around zero | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | b50_1980 | 26.7% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors within a band of 0.50 around zero | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | b50_2024 | 2.7% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors within a band of 0.50 around zero | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | band | 0.25 | CFscore units, distance from zero | half-width of the band around zero that counts as the center | definition of the center | election cycles 1980-2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | band_high | 0.50 | CFscore units, distance from zero | half-width of the wide check band | widest band checked | election cycles 1980-2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | band_low | 0.10 | CFscore units, distance from zero | half-width of the narrow check band | narrowest band checked | election cycles 1980-2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | both_of_1980 | 17.7% | percent of the 1980 pool | share of the 1980 pool that is also active in 2024 | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 and 2024 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_1980 | 13.3% | percent of candidates | share of candidates with a CFscore within the center band | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 1980 | | 1,265 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_1988 | 10.5% | percent of candidates | share of candidates with a CFscore within the center band | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 1988 | | 1,271 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_1990 | 12.9% | percent of candidates | share of candidates with a CFscore within the center band | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 1990 | | 1,290 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_2020 | 2.0% | percent of candidates | share of candidates with a CFscore within the center band | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2020 | | 2,543 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_2022 | 2.6% | percent of candidates | share of candidates with a CFscore within the center band | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2022 | | 2,745 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_2024 | 3.1% | percent of candidates | share of candidates with a CFscore within the center band | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2024 | | 2,329 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_cov_max | 98% | percent of candidates in the file | share of candidates with a dynamic CFscore | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties in the DIME candidate file, one record per candidate and cycle | highest cycle, 2018 | | 2,385 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_cov_min | 86% | percent of candidates in the file | share of candidates with a dynamic CFscore | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties in the DIME candidate file, one record per candidate and cycle | lowest cycle, 1988 | | 1,477 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_gap_1980 | 1.40 | CFscore units | Republican median minus Democratic median CFscore | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 1980 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_gap_2024 | 2.31 | CFscore units | Republican median minus Democratic median CFscore | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_low_cov_max | 92% | percent of candidates with under $10,000 in receipts | share of candidates with under $10,000 in receipts who have a dynamic CFscore | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties in the DIME candidate file, one record per candidate and cycle | highest cycle, 2020 | | 644 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cand_low_cov_min | 63% | percent of candidates with under $10,000 in receipts | share of candidates with under $10,000 in receipts who have a dynamic CFscore | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties in the DIME candidate file, one record per candidate and cycle | lowest cycle, 1988 | | 540 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cap_dollars | $1 million | real 2024 dollars per donor and cycle | cap applied to each donor's itemized dollars in a cycle | cap on a donor's dollars in the dollar-weighted shares | election cycles 1980-2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | ces_2006 | 39.0% | percent of respondents | weighted share who call themselves moderate | adult respondents to the Cooperative Election Study who placed themselves on the five-point scale | 2006 | 95% CI 38.5% to 39.6% | 34,189 | weight (single-wave survey weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_2016 | 38.1% | percent of respondents | weighted share who call themselves moderate | adult respondents to the Cooperative Election Study who placed themselves on the five-point scale | 2016 | 95% CI 37.6% to 38.7% | 59,815 | weight (single-wave survey weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_2024 | 35.4% | percent of respondents | weighted share who call themselves moderate | adult respondents to the Cooperative Election Study who placed themselves on the five-point scale | 2024 | 95% CI 34.7% to 36.1% | 56,384 | weight (single-wave survey weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_diff | −3.7 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who call themselves moderate | adult respondents to the Cooperative Election Study who placed themselves on the five-point scale | 2006 to 2024 | 95% CI −4.6 to −2.8 | 90,573 | weight (single-wave survey weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_diff_2018 | −7.4 | percentage points | change in the weighted share who call themselves moderate | adult respondents to the Cooperative Election Study who placed themselves on the five-point scale | 2016 to 2018 | 95% CI −8.2 to −6.6 | 114,765 | weight (single-wave survey weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_low | 30.8% | percent of respondents | weighted share who call themselves moderate | adult respondents to the Cooperative Election Study who placed themselves on the five-point scale | 2018 | 95% CI 30.2% to 31.3% | 54,950 | weight (single-wave survey weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_low_year | 2018 | year | election year with the lowest moderate share | Cooperative Election Study | 2006-2024 | | | none (constant) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_rel_2006 | 9% | percent of the 2006 share | relative fall in the weighted share who call themselves moderate | adult respondents to the Cooperative Election Study who placed themselves on the five-point scale | 2006 to 2024 | | | weight (single-wave survey weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | cfseat_dem_1980 | −0.43 | CFscore units | median dynamic CFscore of the party's seated members with a roll-call score | Democratic members: seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 1980 | | 249 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cfseat_dem_2022 | −0.78 | CFscore units | median dynamic CFscore of the party's seated members with a roll-call score | Democratic members: seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 2022 | | 222 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cfseat_rep_1980 | +0.94 | CFscore units | median dynamic CFscore of the party's seated members with a roll-call score | Republican members: seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 1980 | | 196 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | cfseat_rep_2022 | +1.20 | CFscore units | median dynamic CFscore of the party's seated members with a roll-call score | Republican members: seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 2022 | | 239 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | change_after_2002 | −8.4 | percentage points | change in the share of active reliable donors within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 to 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | coh_1980 | 11.8% | percent of the group's reliable donors | share of the group within the center band | reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | first gift in 1980 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | coh_2000 | 8.6% | percent of the group's reliable donors | share of the group within the center band | reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | first gift in 2000 | | 206,419 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | coh_2010_max | 3.0% | percent of the group's reliable donors | highest share within the center band among the groups of 2010 to 2024 | reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | first gift from 2010 to 2024 | | 232,556 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | coh_2012 | 1.2% | percent of the group's reliable donors | share of the group within the center band | reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | first gift in 2012 | | 387,766 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | coh_2024 | 0.24% | percent of the group's reliable donors | share of the group within the center band | reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | first gift in 2024 | | 65,445 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | coh_early_max | 13.4% | percent of the group's reliable donors | highest share within the center band among the groups of 1980 to 1988 | reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | first gift from 1980 to 1988 | | 17,042 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | coh_early_min | 11.8% | percent of the group's reliable donors | lowest share within the center band among the groups of 1980 to 1988 | reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | first gift from 1980 to 1988 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | coh_late_max | 10.1% | percent of the group's reliable donors | highest share within the center band among the groups of 1990 to 2024 | reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | first gift from 1990 to 2024 | | 123,517 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | coh_r2_2024 | 0.96% | percent of the group's donors | share of the group within the center band | donors with a score from 2 or more recipients whose first itemized gift was in 2024 | first gift in 2024 | | 593,408 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | coh_rel_2012 | 16.1% | percent of donors first seen in 2012 | share who are reliable donors | donors whose first itemized gift was in 2012 | first gift in 2012 | | 2,412,170 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | coh_rel_2024 | 2.7% | percent of donors first seen in 2024 | share who are reliable donors | donors whose first itemized gift was in 2024 | first gift in 2024 | | 2,459,713 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dec_entry | −11.2 | percentage points of the near-center share | contribution of donors who joined the pool to the change in the near-center share (average of two orders) | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 to 2024, summed over 22 cycle-to-cycle steps | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dec_entry_a | −12.8 | percentage points of the near-center share | contribution of joiners when leavers are removed first | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 to 2024, summed over 22 cycle-to-cycle steps | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dec_entry_b | −9.6 | percentage points of the near-center share | contribution of joiners when joiners are added first | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 to 2024, summed over 22 cycle-to-cycle steps | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dec_exit | +0.6 | percentage points of the near-center share | contribution of donors who left the pool to the change in the near-center share (average of two orders) | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 to 2024, summed over 22 cycle-to-cycle steps | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dec_exit_a | +2.2 | percentage points of the near-center share | contribution of leavers when leavers are removed first | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 to 2024, summed over 22 cycle-to-cycle steps | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dec_exit_b | −1.1 | percentage points of the near-center share | contribution of leavers when joiners are added first | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 to 2024, summed over 22 cycle-to-cycle steps | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dec_total | −10.6 | percentage points | change in the share of active reliable donors within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dem_med_1980 | −0.43 | CFscore units | median CFscore of the party's candidates | Democratic candidates: House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 1980 | | 679 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dem_med_2024 | −0.96 | CFscore units | median CFscore of the party's candidates | Democratic candidates: House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2024 | | 1,166 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dem_p75_1980 | −0.06 | CFscore units | 75th percentile CFscore of the party's candidates, the edge of the party nearest zero | Democratic candidates: House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 1980 | | 679 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dem_p75_2024 | −0.76 | CFscore units | 75th percentile CFscore of the party's candidates, the edge of the party nearest zero | Democratic candidates: House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2024 | | 1,166 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dleft_1980 | 35.9% | percent of itemized dollars | share of itemized dollars from reliable donors left of zero, each donor capped at $1 million | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dleft_2024 | 67.4% | percent of itemized dollars | share of itemized dollars from reliable donors left of zero, each donor capped at $1 million | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dollar_ratio_2024 | 2.9 | ratio of the dollar share to the donor share | capped dollar share within the center band divided by the donor share within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | donor_change_2006 | −6.7 | percentage points | change in the share of active reliable donors within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2006 to 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | donor_rel_2006 | 85% | percent of the 2006 share | relative fall in the share of active reliable donors within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2006 to 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | donor_rise_max | 0.3 | percentage points | largest rise from one cycle to the next in the share of active reliable donors within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2004 to 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | drop_1980_2024 | 90% | percent of the 1980 share | relative fall in the share of active reliable donors within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 to 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | drop_1986_2002 | 26% | percent of the 1986 share | relative fall in the share of active reliable donors within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1986 to 2002 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | drop_2002_2024 | 88% | percent of the 2002 share | relative fall in the share of active reliable donors within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 to 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dshare_1980 | 12.2% | percent of itemized dollars | share of itemized dollars from reliable donors within the center band, each donor capped at $1 million | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dshare_2000 | 9.6% | percent of itemized dollars | share of itemized dollars from reliable donors within the center band, each donor capped at $1 million | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2000 | | 598,971 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dshare_2002_cap | 11.7% | percent of itemized dollars | share of itemized dollars within the center band, each donor capped at $1 million | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 | | 794,413 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dshare_2002_nocap | 24.5% | percent of itemized dollars | share of itemized dollars from reliable donors within the center band, no cap | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 | | 794,413 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dshare_2004 | 8.9% | percent of itemized dollars | share of itemized dollars from reliable donors within the center band, each donor capped at $1 million | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2004 | | 1,033,327 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dshare_2024 | 3.4% | percent of itemized dollars | share of itemized dollars from reliable donors within the center band, each donor capped at $1 million | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dshare_2024_100k | 3.0% | percent of itemized dollars | share of itemized dollars within the center band, each donor capped at $100,000 | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dshare_2024_10m | 3.6% | percent of itemized dollars | share of itemized dollars within the center band, each donor capped at $10 million | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dshare_2024_nocap | 6.3% | percent of itemized dollars | share of itemized dollars from reliable donors within the center band, no cap | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dw_dem_1980 | −0.32 | DW-NOMINATE first-dimension units | median roll-call score of the party's seated members | Democratic members: seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 1980 | | 249 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dw_dem_2022 | −0.38 | DW-NOMINATE first-dimension units | median roll-call score of the party's seated members | Democratic members: seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 2022 | | 222 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dw_gap_1980 | 0.63 | DW-NOMINATE first-dimension units | Republican median minus Democratic median DW-NOMINATE score | seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 1980 | | 445 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dw_gap_2022 | 0.90 | DW-NOMINATE first-dimension units | Republican median minus Democratic median DW-NOMINATE score | seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 2022 | | 461 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dw_r_2022 | +0.95 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | correlation across members of the dynamic CFscore and DW-NOMINATE | seated House and Senate members with a CFscore and a roll-call score | 2022 | | 461 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dw_r_dem_2022 | −0.03 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | correlation within the party across seated members of the dynamic CFscore and DW-NOMINATE | Democratic members: seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 2022 | | 222 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dw_r_rep_2022 | +0.52 | correlation coefficient, from -1 to +1 | correlation within the party across seated members of the dynamic CFscore and DW-NOMINATE | Republican members: seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 2022 | | 239 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dw_rep_1980 | +0.31 | DW-NOMINATE first-dimension units | median roll-call score of the party's seated members | Republican members: seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 1980 | | 196 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | dw_rep_2022 | +0.51 | DW-NOMINATE first-dimension units | median roll-call score of the party's seated members | Republican members: seated House and Senate members of the two major parties with a roll-call score | 2022 | | 239 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | first_frac_2020 | 24.9% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2020 | | 3,483,649 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | first_frac_2024 | 2.6% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | first_time_2008 | 2.6% | percent of first-time donors | share of first-time donors within the center band | reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | 2008 | | 365,960 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | first_time_2024 | 0.24% | percent of first-time donors | share of first-time donors within the center band | reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | 2024 | | 65,445 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | interior_1980 | 45.6% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the outer limit of zero (center and both sides of it) | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | interior_2024 | 6.1% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the outer limit of zero (center and both sides of it) | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | joined_first_frac | 56.6% | percent of joiners | share of joiners whose first itemized gift was in the cycle they joined | reliable donors active in a cycle and not in the cycle before | 1982 to 2024, all steps | | 8,477,665 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | left_in_1980 | 17.5% | percent of active reliable donors left of zero | share of donors left of zero who are within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | | 10,873 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | left_in_2024 | 0.8% | percent of active reliable donors left of zero | share of donors left of zero who are within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 1,916,881 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | left_share_1980 | 34.9% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore below zero | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | left_share_2024 | 75.7% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore below zero | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | low_receipts | $10,000 | dollars of total receipts | threshold of total receipts below which a candidate counts as low-receipts in the coverage check | definition of a low-receipts candidate | election cycles 1980-2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | max_near_2002 | $1.02 billion | real 2024 dollars | largest total of a single near-center donor in the cycle, no cap | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 | | 1 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | median_1980 | +0.62 | CFscore units | median CFscore of active reliable donors | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | median_2002 | +0.10 | CFscore units | median CFscore of active reliable donors | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 | | 794,413 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | median_2004 | −0.17 | CFscore units | median CFscore of active reliable donors | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2004 | | 1,033,327 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | median_2024 | −0.98 | CFscore units | median CFscore of active reliable donors | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | min_recip | 8 | distinct recipients | minimum number of distinct recipients for the reliable flag | definition of a reliable donor | career | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | n_all_1980 | 154,785 | donors | count of active donors, reliable or not | all individual donors with a score and an itemized gift in the cycle | 1980 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_all_2024 | 7,043,771 | donors | count of active donors, reliable or not | all individual donors with a score and an itemized gift in the cycle | 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_both | 5,509 | donors | count of donors in both pools | reliable donors active in both 1980 and 2024 | 1980 and 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_cand_2020 | 2,543 | candidates | count of candidates with a dynamic CFscore | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2020 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_cand_2024 | 2,329 | candidates | count of candidates with a dynamic CFscore | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_cand_near_2020 | 51 | candidates | count of candidates with a CFscore within the center band | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2020 | | 2,543 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_cand_near_2024 | 72 | candidates | count of candidates with a CFscore within the center band | House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2024 | | 2,329 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_cycles | 23 | election cycles | count of two-year election cycles | cycles from 1980 to 2024 | election cycles 1980-2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | n_donor_rises | 3 | election cycles | count of cycles after 2002 in which the donor share is above the share of the cycle before | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2004 to 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_first_2020 | 868,613 | donors | count of reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2020 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_first_2022 | 139,196 | donors | count of reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in the cycle | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2022 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_first_2024 | 65,445 | donors | count of reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in 2024 | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_left_in_1980 | 1,898 | donors | count of active reliable donors within the center band and left of zero | reliable donors within the center band on the left of zero | 1980 | | 10,873 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_left_in_2024 | 16,234 | donors | count of active reliable donors within the center band and left of zero | reliable donors within the center band on the left of zero | 2024 | | 1,916,881 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_near_1980 | 3,678 | donors | count of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable donors within the center band active in the cycle | 1980 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_near_2024 | 29,446 | donors | count of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable donors within the center band active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_near_peak | 92,461 | donors | highest count of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable donors within the center band active in the cycle | highest cycle, 2010 | | 1,409,984 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_near_peak_year | 2010 | year | cycle with the most near-center donors | reliable donors within the center band | 1980-2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | n_over_cap_2002 | 456 | donors | count of reliable donors whose itemized dollars in the cycle exceed the cap | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 | | 794,413 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_over_cap_2024 | 358 | donors | count of reliable donors whose itemized dollars in the cycle exceed the cap | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_rel_1980 | 31,138 | donors | count of reliable donors with an itemized gift in the cycle | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_rel_2002 | 794,413 | donors | count of reliable donors with an itemized gift in the cycle | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_rel_2024 | 2,533,588 | donors | count of reliable donors with an itemized gift in the cycle | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_right_in_1980 | 1,769 | donors | count of active reliable donors within the center band and right of zero | reliable donors within the center band on the right of zero | 1980 | | 20,254 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_right_in_2024 | 13,149 | donors | count of active reliable donors within the center band and right of zero | reliable donors within the center band on the right of zero | 2024 | | 616,644 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_seat_2020 | 469 | winners | count of general-election winners with a dynamic CFscore | seated winners among House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2020 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_seat_2022 | 469 | winners | count of general-election winners with a dynamic CFscore | seated winners among House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2022 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_seat_near_2020 | 7 | winners | count of general-election winners with a CFscore within the center band | seated winners among House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2020 | | 469 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | n_seat_near_2022 | 13 | winners | count of general-election winners with a CFscore within the center band | seated winners among House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2022 | | 469 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | near_growth | 8 | ratio of the 2024 count to the 1980 count | count of near-center donors in 2024 divided by the count in 1980 | reliable donors within the center band | 1980 and 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | next_near_2002 | $118 million | real 2024 dollars | second-largest total of a single near-center donor in the cycle, no cap | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 | | 1 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | outer | 0.75 | CFscore units, distance from zero | distance from zero beyond which a donor counts as far left or far right | outer limit of the interior of the scale | election cycles 1980-2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | peak_left_2024 | 72.1% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore between -1.3 and -0.7 (0.1-wide bins) | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | peak_left_hi | −0.7 | CFscore units | upper edge of the range around the left peak | ranges used to describe the two peaks of the 2024 distribution | 2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | peak_left_lo | −1.3 | CFscore units | lower edge of the range around the left peak | ranges used to describe the two peaks of the 2024 distribution | 2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | peak_right_2024 | 18.4% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore between 1.3 and 1.7 (0.1-wide bins) | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | peak_right_hi | 1.7 | CFscore units | upper edge of the range around the right peak | ranges used to describe the two peaks of the 2024 distribution | 2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | peak_right_lo | 1.3 | CFscore units | lower edge of the range around the right peak | ranges used to describe the two peaks of the 2024 distribution | 2024 | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | pool_1980s_2024 | 0.9% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors whose first itemized gift was from 1980 to 1988 | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | pool_growth | 81 | ratio of the 2024 pool to the 1980 pool | count of active reliable donors in 2024 divided by the count in 1980 | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 and 2024 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | pool_since_2010_2024 | 72.2% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors whose first itemized gift was in 2010 or later | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | r16_1980 | 11.2% | percent of active donors in the group | share of active donors within the center band | donors with a score and 16 or more distinct recipients | 1980 | | 22,747 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | r16_2024 | 1.3% | percent of active donors in the group | share of active donors within the center band | donors with a score and 16 or more distinct recipients | 2024 | | 1,443,230 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | r2_1980 | 13.4% | percent of active donors in the group | share of active donors within the center band | donors with a score and 2 or more distinct recipients | 1980 | | 57,193 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | rec_high | 16 | distinct recipients | minimum number of distinct recipients in the strict check | strictest recipient filter checked | career | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | rec_low | 2 | distinct recipients | minimum number of distinct recipients in the loose check | loosest recipient filter checked | career | | | none (constant) | DIME | | | rel_frac_1980 | 20.1% | percent of active donors | share of active donors who are reliable | all individual donors with a score and an itemized gift in the cycle | 1980 | | 154,785 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | rel_frac_2024 | 36.0% | percent of active donors | share of active donors who are reliable | all individual donors with a score and an itemized gift in the cycle | 2024 | | 7,043,771 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | rep_med_1980 | +0.97 | CFscore units | median CFscore of the party's candidates | Republican candidates: House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 1980 | | 586 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | rep_med_2024 | +1.35 | CFscore units | median CFscore of the party's candidates | Republican candidates: House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2024 | | 1,163 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | repeat_2008 | 7.5% | percent of active repeat donors | share of repeat donors within the center band | reliable donors active in the cycle and in an earlier cycle | 2008 | | 1,059,925 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | repeat_2024 | 1.19% | percent of active repeat donors | share of repeat donors within the center band | reliable donors active in the cycle and in an earlier cycle | 2024 | | 2,468,143 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | right_in_1980 | 8.7% | percent of active reliable donors right of zero | share of donors right of zero who are within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | | 20,254 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | right_in_2024 | 2.1% | percent of active reliable donors right of zero | share of donors right of zero who are within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 616,644 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | seated_1980 | 16.2% | percent of winners | share of general-election winners with a CFscore within the center band | seated winners among House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 1980 | | 451 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | seated_2020 | 1.5% | percent of winners | share of general-election winners with a CFscore within the center band | seated winners among House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2020 | | 469 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | seated_2022 | 2.8% | percent of winners | share of general-election winners with a CFscore within the center band | seated winners among House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore | 2022 | | 469 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | share_1980 | 11.8% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1980 | | 31,138 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | share_1986 | 13.0% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 1986 | | 45,211 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | share_2002 | 9.6% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 | | 794,413 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | share_2004 | 7.7% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2004 | | 1,033,327 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | share_2006 | 7.8% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2006 | | 1,142,451 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | share_2008 | 6.2% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2008 | | 1,425,885 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | share_2016 | 3.4% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2016 | | 1,978,112 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | share_2020 | 1.5% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2020 | | 3,483,649 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | share_2024 | 1.2% | percent of active reliable donors | share of active reliable donors with a CFscore within the center band | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 2,533,588 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | top_near_2002 | 55% | percent of near-center dollars | share of the near-center dollars in one record, the single largest near-center donor total | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 | | 76,075 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | top_near_2024 | 49% | percent of near-center dollars | share of the near-center dollars in one record, the single largest near-center donor total | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2024 | | 29,446 | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | | top_ratio_2002 | 8.6 | ratio of the largest to the second-largest near-center total | largest single near-center donor total divided by the second-largest | reliable individual donors active in the cycle | 2002 | | | none (administrative records: every itemized donor and every scored candidate is counted) | DIME | | ## Definitions - CFscore: A left-right position estimated from whom a donor gives to, or from who gives to a candidate. Negative values are left and positive values are right, and a donor keeps one score across all their giving. - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - DW-NOMINATE: A left-right score for each member of Congress estimated from roll-call votes. Members who vote alike receive similar scores, and the first dimension mostly separates the parties. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Effective sample size: The number of equally weighted respondents that would give the same precision as the weighted sample. It is smaller than the raw count when the weights vary a lot, and it sets how wide the confidence interval is. ## Methods Sample: individual donors (not committees) in the Stanford DIME public version 4.0 with an itemized contribution in at least one of the 23 election cycles from 1980 to 2024 (gifts to federal and to state recipients, which the release puts on one scale), and House and Senate candidates of the two major parties with a dynamic CFscore (federal candidates only; 39,532 candidate records after keeping one record per candidate and cycle, the one with the larger receipts). The candidates with a score are 86% to 98% of the major-party House and Senate candidates in the file, by cycle, and 63% to 92% of those with under $10,000 in receipts; candidates without a score are not in any candidate figure. A reliable donor has given to at least 8 distinct recipients over the whole career and has a score estimated from the donor's own giving, not projected from a recipient's score: 31,138 donors active in 1980 and 2,533,588 in 2024. Every donor counts once in each cycle in which they gave. Estimands: the share of active reliable donors within 0.25 of zero on the CFscore scale (the center), and the share of their itemized dollars within that band (real 2024 dollars, deflated with CPI-U annual averages, each donor's total in a cycle capped at $1 million). A donor's CFscore is one number for the whole career, so a change in a share over time is a change in who is active. The entry and exit decomposition splits each cycle-to-cycle change into donors active in both cycles (fixed scores), donors who left and donors who joined, and averages the two orders of removal and addition; the steps sum exactly to the change from 1980 to 2024. Candidate scores are the dynamic (period-specific) CFscore; seated winners are coded through 2022; roll-call scores are DW-NOMINATE first-dimension scores in the DIME candidate file. Sensitivity: center bands of 0.10, 0.15, 0.25, 0.35 and 0.50; recipient filters of none, 2, 4, 8, 12 and 16 or more distinct recipients; dollar caps of none, $10 million, $1 million and $100,000. Weights: none for DIME (administrative records; every itemized donor and every scored candidate in the release is counted). The Cooperative Election Study share of respondents who place themselves in the middle category of the five-point ideology scale uses the single-wave weight, even election years 2006 to 2024. Intervals: DIME shares are full counts of the records in the release and carry no sampling interval, and they do not carry the estimation error of the CFscores. The CES share has a 95% normal interval on the Kish effective sample size, which is model based and ignores clustering; the 2006 to 2024 difference combines the two standard errors in quadrature. In the comparison figure each series and each survey interval end is divided by the series' own 2006 estimate and multiplied by 100. The pool by period of first gift groups each cycle's active reliable donors by the decade of their first itemized cycle (1980 to 1988, 1990 to 1998, 2000 to 2008, 2010 to 2018, 2020 to 2024). The party-median figure adds the 25th to 75th percentile range of the CFscores of seated members who have a roll-call score. Suppression: a share of donors needs at least 100 donors in its denominator (the smallest plotted group has 8,088 donors, 451 candidates or seated winners and 176 seated members of one party); CES cells need at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100. Coverage: winners and primary results are not coded for 2024; unitemized contributions are not in the file; the donor file has no link to recipients. The codebook is dated December 29, 2024 and states coverage of federal elections through the 2024 cycle; it does not say how complete the filings of that cycle are, so the 2024 pool may be incomplete. ## What these data cannot show - The figures describe who gave in each cycle. - They say nothing about whether any donor's views changed, because DIME fixes each donor's score, and every change over time here is a change in the roster of donors. - The reliable flag is set once from a donor's whole record, and so is the score, which is estimated from giving after the cycle in which the donor is counted as well as before it. - A donor who gave in 1980 and reached 8 recipients years later counts as reliable in 1980, while a donor who joined recently has had less time to reach that number, so the early and late pools are selected by different rules. - The checks with other recipient filters show that the direction survives, and they do not remove the difference in career length. - DIME starts in 1980, so donors first seen in 1980 include people who gave before it. - Only itemized gifts are in the file. - Gifts below the itemization threshold are absent, and changes in what gets itemized can change who appears in the pool. - The codebook is dated late December 2024 and states coverage through the 2024 cycle without saying how complete the filings of that cycle are, so the 2024 pool may be incomplete. - The files hold no recipients, so nothing here says whether a donor gave to one party, to both or to candidates near the middle, and nothing says how much of the entry after 2002 came through online platforms. - A CFscore is an estimate, and the shares carry no allowance for its error. - Zero is a point on an estimated scale and not a measured middle of public opinion, so near the center means near zero and does not mean moderate in the sense of a survey answer. - Counts of the donors in the release are full counts and carry no sampling interval. - Candidate scores rest on the same records as donor scores, so only the roll-call check and the survey comparison bring in other sources, and the roll-call check agrees with the CFscores on the size of the party gap and not on which party moved further. - The donor lines cover gifts to federal and state recipients and the candidate lines cover federal candidates only. - Winners are not coded for 2024, and primary results are coded for only part of the candidates in some cycles, so the chapter does not follow candidates through the primary stage. - The data are descriptive. - They cannot say whether donors' positions shape which candidates run, whether candidates' positions attract donors, or whether both follow something else, such as the sorting of voters by party. - Neither donors nor candidates are a sample of voters. ## References 1. Bonica, Adam (2024). Database on Ideology, Money in Politics, and Elections: Public version 4.0 [Computer file]. Stanford University Libraries, Stanford, CA. http://data.stanford.edu/dime 2. Bonica, Adam (2014). Mapping the Ideological Marketplace. American Journal of Political Science 58(2): 367-386. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12062 3. United States Congress (2002). Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002. Public Law 107-155, 116 Stat. 81. https://www.congress.gov/107/plaws/publ155/PLAW-107publ155.pdf 4. Hall, Andrew B. (2019). Who Wants to Run? How the Devaluing of Political Office Drives Polarization. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/W/bo35612049.html 5. Bonica, Adam (2018). Inferring Roll-Call Scores from Campaign Contributions Using Supervised Machine Learning. American Journal of Political Science 62(4): 830-848. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12376 6. Bafumi, Joseph; Herron, Michael C. (2010). Leapfrog Representation and Extremism: A Study of American Voters and Their Members in Congress. American Political Science Review 104(3): 519-542. 7. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons. ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/build.py (sha256 87e9bb46caa01ae7a384e7d742ddc7fd96c995411de6cab590beecf857aaeb3b) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/dime/proj/candidates_federal.parquet | 3,266,671 | b090e996702e68cb7a7c4945f38a1d6f2a83d6bd872b9cc5d028b9f4d87f26ef | 232b07e4ced5b8437f9c086a32b94d6b036af827482e834afdf5cf8c4a8108ce | | data/dime/proj/donor_cycle_long.parquet | 346,381,580 | a16da7d5de4235c1366a70994d46b3a75effb0819ae13ca3e46e48fb614250a7 | c98fafa419c773775be32aa39d43e6ffe4ba577fabd74ef067905fd51077c836 | | data/dime/proj/donor_ideology.parquet | 174,315,367 | 5b01a083643fc9586e2f368a71036a7a3d7b60eb07f7b7902626aaaf118b3f8d | ccc98e2c7b02e4fe245f3c34c452337f1c1dc2efca2a972b22c998bf5fc4c35e | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | d24e1a931055961f6599c5d6095447f98b547b504c4698f1d0dad9822506aaca | | figures/candidate_center.json | a309407bf20c605ef853f02bf835830a825bbaa5d2c17a73355b318f261d1c27 | | figures/candidate_medians.json | 15fcd4010162a53a7cf1c4e094c7dd790fd75f456d23115887f6b60511550efb | | figures/center_sensitivity.json | 646a67f1ffd8f153dde53f5ca0d444d3eeef67057dc319b9cc4b02f8d6a77f60 | | figures/center_share.json | a894d862b3ee25e0ffbbd96d3ad059ee69bc8e4d6928423e2093b1da6425bbe7 | | figures/cohort_center.json | d838856cf9748fd4edc9185a6993c372c7ff1140c8c5693226911c24ed05da73 | | figures/donor_distribution.json | 798894f7ac3d95326c2133328e066ef77c341d648518e86e5d552ef0e7b9af67 | | figures/entry_exit.json | 590748b7e2fac44ad5f6787e19cfd825464b862a862275e57e8daf67a9a4e0c6 | | figures/moderates_comparison.json | 18a39b5f1b47bd27b88d798c68b0a1ea7fb49ab405ac827f851d39aa28905907 | | meta.json | 7e1b481c12ad24c1914ff749982763d2011c0627a5233735064db297c447cc75 | | refs.json | b1c1db7eed516e07172bf1d103c3ff4492d319d27425ff595fb9bc0d13d8da88 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/facts.json - Table 1, figure "donor_distribution" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/donor_distribution.json - Table 2, figure "center_share" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/center_share.json - Table 3, figure "entry_exit" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/entry_exit.json - Table 4, figure "cohort_center" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/cohort_center.json - Table 5, figure "center_sensitivity" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/center_sensitivity.json - Table 6, figure "candidate_center" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/candidate_center.json - Table 7, figure "candidate_medians" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/candidate_medians.json - Table 8, figure "moderates_comparison" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool/figures/moderates_comparison.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Counties where donors and voters diverge: report Chapter 14.7 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Counties where donors and voters diverge - Chapter: 14.7 (Part XIV, The money map; The political map) - Question: In which counties does the donor pool lean the opposite way from the vote? - Dek: In 570 of 2,839 counties, or 20.1%, the reliable donors of 1980 to 2024 lean opposite to the county's 2020 presidential vote, a count that depends on the definition of divergence. - Grain: places - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - DIME. Stanford DIME public version 4.0, reliable individual donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; years: 1979-2024 (23 election cycles); weights: none (administrative records); counties counted once or weighted by 2020 two-party votes - County election returns. County presidential returns, 2020 and 2024 (repaired 1868-2024 file); years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts); two-party votes as weights in the vote-weighted estimates - County demographics panel. County demographics panel, 2020 row (decennial population, ACS-based shares interpolated between 2020 and 2024); years: 2000-2024 (election years, interpolated between census and survey anchors); weights: none (full counts and interpolated estimates) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026countieswheredonorsandvotersdiverge ```bibtex @misc{singh2026countieswheredonorsandvotersdiverge, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Counties where donors and voters diverge}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | count of counties on the two off-diagonal sides of the sign rule | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 570 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | n_div | | count of counties in the frame | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 2,839 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | n_counties | | share of counties whose donor lean and vote lean have opposite signs | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 20.1% | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | share_div | | smallest count of divergent counties across the eight rows | counties under each of the eight definitions in the definitions table (the frame differs by row) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 112 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | def_div_lo | | largest count of divergent counties across the eight rows | counties under each of the eight definitions in the definitions table (the frame differs by row) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 1,030 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | def_div_hi | | smallest share of counties that are divergent across the eight rows | counties under each of the eight definitions in the definitions table (the frame differs by row) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 3.9% | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | def_share_lo | | largest share of counties that are divergent across the eight rows | counties under each of the eight definitions in the definitions table (the frame differs by row) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 36.3% | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | def_share_hi | | share of two-party votes cast in divergent counties | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 16.0% | | 2,839 | two-party votes in 2020 | DIME | share_div_votes | | share of reliable donors living in divergent counties | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 12.7% | | 2,839 | reliable donors | DIME | share_div_donors | | count of divergent counties | the 100 counties of the frame with the most two-party votes | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 9 | | 100 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | n_big_div | | size of the group compared | the counties of the frame with the most two-party votes | 2020 presidential vote | 100 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | big_k | | correlation of county Democratic share and county donor lean | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | −0.85 | 95% CI −0.87 to −0.83 | 2,839 | two-party votes in 2020 (county-equal in the companion fact) | DIME | r_all_w | | correlation of county Democratic share and county donor lean | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | −0.67 | 95% CI −0.70 to −0.65 | 2,839 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | r_all_eq | | count of Democratic-voting counties with a right-leaning donor pool | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 98 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | n_dr | | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors that are at least 30% Black | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 74 | | 98 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | n_dr_black | | definition of a group | counties grouped as at least 30% Black | 2020 | 30% | | | none (full counts of counties) | County demographics panel | black_cut | | count of Republican-voting counties with a left-leaning donor pool | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 472 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | n_rl | ## Findings In 570 of 2,839 counties, or 20.1%, the mean score of the reliable donors who gave from 1980 to 2024 leans opposite to the county's 2020 presidential vote. We call these counties divergent. The count depends on the definition, and Table 10 gives counts from 112 to 1,030 counties, or 3.9% to 36.3% of the counties under each definition. A county's donor lean is the mean CFscore of its reliable donors, on a scale where negative is left and positive is right, and a county is divergent when it voted Democratic and its donor lean is right of zero, or voted Republican and its donor lean is left of zero. The donors are those whose most recent county in the DIME files is that county, so a county's pool spans giving from 1980 to 2024 while the vote is a single election. Divergent counties cast 16.0% of the two-party votes and hold 12.7% of the reliable donors, a smaller share than their 20.1% of counties, and 9 of the 100 counties with the most votes are divergent. Donor lean and the vote move together across counties. Donor lean falls as the Democratic share rises, with a correlation of −0.85 (95% CI −0.87 to −0.83) when counties are weighted by their votes and −0.67 (95% CI −0.70 to −0.65) when each county counts once. The exceptions come in two groups. 98 Democratic-voting counties have right-leaning donors, and 74 of them are at least 30% Black. 472 Republican-voting counties have left-leaning donors, and they appear in every region. Zero is where the CFscore scale changes sign, and it is not the middle of the data; the next section returns to this. Table 1. Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors cluster in the South; Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors are in every region ### How donors and votes are measured The donor data are the Stanford DIME files [1]. DIME gives each individual donor one CFscore, estimated from the recipients the donor gave to, and one most recent county. The file holds 36.4 million donors with a score and a county. This chapter keeps the 4.7 million of them (13.0%) who are reliable, meaning that they gave to at least 8 distinct recipients and that their score comes from their own giving. A county's pool is its reliable donors, and a county enters the analysis when its pool has at least 25 donors (the pool floor) and it has a 2020 return. That leaves 2,839 counties with 4.7 million reliable donors. The county vote is the Democratic share of the 2020 two-party presidential vote. Zero is where the CFscore scale changes sign, and it is not the middle of the data. Reliable donors average −0.274 (95% CI −0.275 to −0.273) on the scale, so the pool as a whole leans left, while the average county has a donor lean of +0.18, because the counties with the most donors lean left. A county called left-leaning here can therefore sit to the right of the average donor, and 368 of the 472 Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors do. The standard deviation of reliable donors' scores is 1.01, which is the scale for reading a county lean such as the 0.25 cut used below. Two weightings appear throughout. A count or share of counties counts each county once. A correlation or regression is reported under both weightings, counting each county once and weighting by 2020 two-party votes, because the two answer different questions: whether a pattern holds place by place, and whether it holds where voters live. (Note: Intervals on correlations are 95% confidence intervals from a bootstrap, which recomputes the correlation on many random resamples of the counties, drawn with a fixed seed, and reads the interval from the spread of the results. Counts and shares of counties are full counts and carry no interval. The mean of a single county's donors has a standard error, which the map tooltip, the named counties and the section on pool size use.) The distribution of donor scores over time is the subject of Chapter 14.4, The ideology of the donor pool (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-ideology-of-the-donor-pool), and where the donors live is the subject of Chapter 14.2, The geography of donations (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-geography-of-donations; planned). ### Donor lean tracks the vote in most counties Table 1 marks the divergent counties against the counties where donors and vote lean the same way. Among the Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors, 89 are in the South, 6 in the West, 3 in the Midwest and 0 in the Northeast. Mississippi alone has 16. The Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors are spread across the Midwest (184), the South (139), the West (76) and the Northeast (73). The first group casts 4.5% of the two-party votes and the second 11.6%. Table 2 puts the same two measures on axes. Divergent counties are the dots in the upper right and lower left quadrants, and many lie close to a cut point. Of the Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors, 38.8% have a Democratic share below 55% and 50.0% have a donor lean within 0.25 of zero. The same shares for Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors are 19.9% (a Democratic share of 45% or more) and 73.1%. The tooltip of the map flags the counties that clear both cut points. They number 112. Of these, 27 are Democratic-voting counties with a Democratic share of 55% or more and a donor lean of 0.25 or more, 26 of them in the South. The Republican-voting counties among them, with a share below 45% and a donor lean below minus 0.25, number 85 and lie in all four regions. Together they are 3.9% of counties and cast 1.2% of the two-party votes. Table 2. Donor lean falls as the Democratic share of the vote rises, and the divergent counties lie in the two quadrants where the two measures disagree A straight line fitted through the county dots by least squares, which minimizes the squared vertical distances, crosses zero at a Democratic share of 45.9% when each county counts once and 44.5% when counties are weighted by their votes. A county at an even split of the vote is expected to have donors a little left of zero. 76 of the 472 Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors have a Democratic share at or above the first crossing. The median Democratic-voting county with right-leaning donors gave 57.6% of its two-party vote to the Democratic candidate. ### Democratic-voting exceptions are counties with large Black populations 74 of the 98 Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors are at least 30% Black. Among Democratic-voting counties at that Black share, 58.7% (74 of 126) have right-leaning donors, against 6.5% of the 372 others (Table 3). Pools are smaller in these counties, and a small pool gives a noisy mean. The median Democratic-voting county at least 30% Black has 170 reliable donors, against 3,193 in the others. The gap between the two groups of counties remains when small pools are dropped (Table 4). (Note: The Black share analyses use the 498 Democratic-voting counties that have a Black share, a college share and a median household income in the 2020 demographic file. The counties of Connecticut lack all three there and drop out of these analyses only. Regression standard errors are clustered on the 46 states in this set.) Table 3. Right-leaning donors are more common in Democratic-voting counties that are at least 30% Black: 58.7% of them, against 6.5% of the rest Table 4. At every pool floor, a larger share of Democratic-voting counties at least 30% Black than of the rest have right-leaning donors Among the 498 Democratic-voting counties with a Black share, the correlation between donor lean and Black share is +0.62 (95% CI 0.55 to 0.69) when each county counts once and +0.21 (95% CI 0.07 to 0.37) when counties are weighted by their votes (Table 5). Both intervals lie above zero, and the weighted correlation is smaller. 9 of the 10 counties at least 30% Black with the most voters, among them Philadelphia, Prince George's County in Maryland and Fulton County in Georgia, have donors left of zero. The exception is Jefferson County in Alabama. The Democratic-voting counties at least 30% Black with right-leaning donors have a median of 10,804 two-party votes, against 73,872 for those with left-leaning donors. Table 5. Among Democratic-voting counties, donor lean rises with Black share, and less steeply when counties are weighted by votes A regression of donor lean on Black share fits a straight line and reports how far donor lean moves for each 10 points of Black share (Table 6). With standard errors clustered by state, the coefficient stays above zero after adjusting for college share and median household income when each county counts once, and its interval includes zero when counties are weighted by their votes. A higher college share goes with a more left-leaning donor pool in both weightings. Table 6. The adjusted Black share slope is above zero when each county counts once and includes zero when counties are weighted by votes Counties with a large Black share are not the only ones. 10 of the Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors are at least 50% Hispanic and under 30% Black, 8 of them in Texas, mostly in South Texas. Of the other 14, 9 have a Democratic share below 55%, such as Tarrant County in Texas, which voted almost evenly and has a donor lean close to zero. Table 7 names the counties at the two ends, among counties with at least 75 reliable donors. The Democratic-voting counties with the most right-leaning donors are mostly Mississippi counties, with counties in Georgia and Louisiana. Education and income gradients in the donor pool and in the vote are compared in Chapter 14.2, The geography of donations (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/the-geography-of-donations; planned). Table 7. Mississippi holds 7 of the 10 Democratic-voting counties with the most right-leaning donors ### Pool size moves the two sides in opposite directions Table 8 groups counties by the number of reliable donors. The share of Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors falls from 78.6% in the smallest pools to 6.3% in the largest, and the share of Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors rises from 12.9% to 36.5%. The median county in the analysis has 229 reliable donors, and the median Democratic-voting county with right-leaning donors has 117. 45 of the 98 Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors have fewer than 100 reliable donors, so the average in those counties rests on few donors. Table 8. Democratic-voting counties diverge mostly in small pools, Republican-voting counties in large ones A small pool also gives a noisy mean. If each county's donors are a random draw from a larger set, the expected number of counties whose observed sign differs from the sign of the underlying mean is 138 (4.9%). Among the 570 divergent counties the expected number is 56 (9.8%). That benchmark uses only each county's own donors and is a lower bound. A version that shrinks each county mean toward a straight line fitted through the county dots gives 83 (14.5%), and the derivation of both is in the methods note. Noise of that size moves some counties across the line and leaves most divergent counties divergent. Noise is more likely to move the sign of a county in the group with a large Black share, where pools are smaller. The comparison of shares at pool floors of 100 and 500 donors in Table 4 is the check on this, and the gap remains. ### Republican-voting exceptions are the less Republican counties With zero as the neutral point, the Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors are a larger group than the Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors (472 against 98). The order reverses when the mean CFscore of all reliable donors is the neutral point (104 against 240). Their median county voted 38.4% Democratic, against 26.2% in the median Republican-voting county with right-leaning donors, and their median college share is 24.2%, against 19.6%. Table 9 shows that the share of Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors is highest in the Northeast and lowest in the South. Table 7 lists the 10 with the most left-leaning donors, in 7 states, and none is at least 30% Black. The size of this group depends on the donor definition and on the neutral point, as the next section shows. Table 9. Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors are 63.5% of Northeast counties and 12.5% of Southern ones ### The counts depend on the definition Table 10 repeats the count under other definitions. Changing the donor pool, the vote year or the pool floor moves the Democratic-voting group between 62 and 188 counties and the Republican-voting group between 113 and 542. Moving the neutral point is a larger change. With the mean of all reliable donors (−0.274) the groups are 240 and 104, and with the median county (+0.19) they are 57 and 973, which makes 36.3% of counties divergent. Counting all donors with a score, which brings in donors with few recipients and donors whose score is inherited from a recipient, reverses the balance of the two groups, to 188 and 113 on a set of 3,105 counties. Table 10. The number of divergent counties runs from 112 to 1,030 across the definitions tested The Black share pattern survives the changes of donor definition when each county counts once. The correlation of donor lean with Black share among Democratic-voting counties is +0.60 with the stricter donor definition and +0.55 with all donors. The vote-weighted correlation with all donors is +0.06, close to zero. Both groups exist under every definition, and the number in each changes with the definition. The counts in this chapter therefore describe reliable donors with zero as the neutral point, and they should not be read as the number of counties where donors disagree with voters in general. ### The Black share gap appears in every donor cohort A donor's CFscore is fixed, so donors who first gave in different election cycles form groups with different average scores. Reliable donors who first gave in 1980 to 1996 average +0.228 (95% CI 0.225 to 0.230), those who first gave in 1998 to 2008 average −0.081, and those who first gave in 2010 to 2016 and in 2018 to 2024 average −0.467 and −0.457. Within each cohort, the difference in mean donor lean between Democratic-voting counties at least 30% Black and other Democratic-voting counties is 0.19 (95% CI 0.10 to 0.28) CFscore units for donors who first gave in 1980 to 1996 and 0.32 (95% CI 0.24 to 0.40) for 2018 to 2024. Every cohort's interval lies above zero (Table 11). A county needs at least 25 donors from the cohort to count, so the county set changes between cohorts. 59 of the 374 Democratic-voting counties with a pool in every cohort are at least 30% Black, and in that fixed set the difference runs from 0.16 to 0.31. (Note: Counting the counties whose cohort pool leans right mixes the gap with the difference between cohorts in where the whole pool sits. Among Democratic-voting counties at least 30% Black, 86.8% have a right-leaning pool for donors who first gave in 1980 to 1996 and 22.5% for 2018 to 2024. The data table of the cohort figure gives all four cohorts.) Table 11. Counties at least 30% Black sit to the right of other Democratic-voting counties in every donor cohort The level differs by cohort. In the oldest cohort both groups of counties average right of zero. In the two cohorts that first gave in 2010 or later both average left of zero, with the counties at least 30% Black further right than the others. The newer cohorts are larger (1.5 million donors for 2018 to 2024, against 0.4 million for 1980 to 1996). A cohort is defined by the first election cycle in which a donor appears, so a difference between cohorts is a difference in who gave. The gap also holds under a stricter rule for a reliable donor. With at least 15 distinct recipients it runs from 0.19 (95% CI 0.07 to 0.30) to 0.35 (95% CI 0.26 to 0.45) CFscore units across the four cohorts, and every interval lies above zero. The reliable rule keeps 19.3% of the donors who first gave in 1980 to 1996 and 9.6% of those who first gave in 2018 to 2024, so a cohort comparison inherits a rule that selects different shares of donors in different eras. ### What these data cannot show A county's donor lean describes the donors in the county and not any resident, and a pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among people, the problem known as ecological inference [2]. DIME does not record the race, income or vote of a donor, so the Black share results say that donor leans differ between counties with different Black shares and cannot say who the donors in those counties are. Studies that observe donors directly find that Black and Latino donors supply smaller shares of contributions than of the population [3], and a study that merges survey responses to donation records compares donors with non-donors [4]. Those studies are about individuals and neither tests nor contradicts the county pattern here. The files do not say which candidates a donor gave to. A CFscore is an estimate from the recipients' positions, and the chapter cannot separate a donor who gives to Republican candidates from one who gives to moderate Democrats. Geography is the most recent record, so a donor who moved is counted where the last gift came from, and a county's pool spans giving from 1980 to 2024 while the vote is a single election. The reliable-donor rule keeps the donors who gave to many recipients, and the counts in Table 10 change when it is relaxed. No threshold below 8 distinct recipients was tested. The divergence rule pivots on the sign of a mean at zero, which is not the middle of the county distribution, since the median county has a donor lean of +0.19. The chapter also leaves out donor dollars, and it does not test any mechanism. Whether the donor lean of a county reflects who can give or who is asked cannot be separated with county means. How a county's stated ideology compares with its donors' is the subject of Chapter 14.6, Stated and funded ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/stated-and-funded-ideology; planned), and how donors who live in counties their side lost behave is the subject of Chapter 15.4, Partisans in the other party's territory (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/partisans-outvoted-at-home; planned). A county with a small pool has a noisy mean, and the intervals on individual counties treat donors as independent draws, which understates the uncertainty if donors in a county resemble each other. ## Tables ### Table 1. Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors cluster in the South; Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors are in every region Counties classed by whether the 2020 two-party presidential vote and the mean CFscore of the county's reliable donors lean the same way (negative CFscore is left, positive is right) No inline rows: the values of Table 1 are in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/donor_vote_map.json. Note: A county with too few reliable donors, and every county in Alaska and Hawaii, which have no donors in the county-matched donor file, is drawn as no data. Note: Votes are full counts. The tooltip gives a county's donor lean with a 95% interval that treats its reliable donors as independent draws, and the number of reliable donors; a county with a small pool has a wide interval. Source: DIME public version 4.0, reliable donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; county presidential returns, 2020; county demographics, 2020; full counts of records, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/donor_vote_map.json ### Table 2. Donor lean falls as the Democratic share of the vote rises, and the divergent counties lie in the two quadrants where the two measures disagree Mean CFscore of reliable donors against the Democratic share of the two-party presidential vote, one dot per county (n = 2,839 counties), 2020 vote | County | Democratic share (%) | Donor lean (mean CFscore) | Donor lean, 95% interval, low | Donor lean, 95% interval, high | Two-party votes | Reliable donors | Group | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | Autauga, AL | 27.4 | +0.680 | +0.54 | +0.82 | 27,341 | 223 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Baldwin, AL | 22.7 | +0.364 | +0.31 | +0.42 | 108,122 | 1,914 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Barbour, AL | 46.1 | +0.441 | +0.24 | +0.64 | 10,438 | 100 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bibb, AL | 20.9 | +0.700 | +0.43 | +0.97 | 9,511 | 47 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Blount, AL | 9.7 | +0.468 | +0.29 | +0.64 | 27,351 | 158 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bullock, AL | 75.0 | +0.369 | +0.04 | +0.69 | 4,592 | 40 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Butler, AL | 42.1 | +0.759 | +0.53 | +0.98 | 9,423 | 61 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Calhoun, AL | 30.2 | +0.462 | +0.37 | +0.55 | 50,317 | 522 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Chambers, AL | 42.1 | +0.485 | +0.25 | +0.72 | 15,118 | 83 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Cherokee, AL | 13.3 | +0.572 | +0.37 | +0.78 | 12,207 | 121 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Chilton, AL | 16.0 | +0.650 | +0.45 | +0.85 | 19,158 | 112 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Clarke, AL | 44.0 | +0.584 | +0.35 | +0.82 | 13,079 | 66 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Clay, AL | 18.4 | +0.740 | +0.50 | +0.98 | 6,868 | 51 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Cleburne, AL | 9.4 | +0.852 | +0.54 | +1.16 | 7,159 | 35 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Coffee, AL | 23.1 | +0.690 | +0.57 | +0.82 | 21,975 | 258 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Colbert, AL | 30.3 | +0.335 | +0.20 | +0.47 | 27,546 | 259 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Conecuh, AL | 46.3 | +0.734 | +0.41 | +1.06 | 6,408 | 32 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Coosa, AL | 33.1 | +0.357 | −0.07 | +0.78 | 5,427 | 27 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Covington, AL | 15.7 | +0.421 | +0.24 | +0.61 | 17,307 | 140 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Crenshaw, AL | 25.9 | +0.425 | +0.07 | +0.78 | 6,564 | 31 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Cullman, AL | 10.8 | +0.516 | +0.40 | +0.63 | 41,358 | 355 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Dale, AL | 26.5 | +0.590 | +0.43 | +0.75 | 19,473 | 184 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Dallas, AL | 68.9 | +0.209 | +0.03 | +0.39 | 17,754 | 138 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | DeKalb, AL | 14.7 | +0.385 | +0.25 | +0.52 | 29,048 | 243 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Elmore, AL | 25.6 | +0.557 | +0.44 | +0.68 | 40,531 | 344 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Escambia, AL | 31.2 | +0.895 | +0.75 | +1.04 | 15,787 | 120 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Etowah, AL | 24.6 | +0.381 | +0.28 | +0.48 | 47,095 | 475 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Fayette, AL | 16.0 | +0.727 | +0.46 | +0.99 | 8,695 | 47 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Franklin, AL | 16.7 | +0.546 | +0.34 | +0.75 | 12,462 | 88 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Geneva, AL | 12.8 | +0.967 | +0.76 | +1.18 | 12,443 | 68 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Greene, AL | 81.6 | +0.066 | −0.29 | +0.42 | 4,759 | 29 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Hale, AL | 59.5 | +0.792 | +0.49 | +1.09 | 7,877 | 35 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Henry, AL | 28.3 | +0.755 | +0.47 | +1.04 | 9,213 | 53 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Houston, AL | 28.4 | +0.697 | +0.61 | +0.78 | 45,535 | 592 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Jackson, AL | 15.9 | +0.341 | +0.16 | +0.52 | 23,387 | 166 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Jefferson, AL | 56.7 | +0.060 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 320,531 | 6,805 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Lamar, AL | 13.7 | +0.656 | +0.36 | +0.96 | 7,152 | 42 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lauderdale, AL | 27.3 | +0.219 | +0.13 | +0.31 | 43,636 | 574 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lawrence, AL | 22.4 | +0.357 | +0.10 | +0.61 | 15,884 | 78 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lee, AL | 39.8 | +0.137 | +0.07 | +0.20 | 70,081 | 1,117 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Limestone, AL | 28.3 | +0.348 | +0.24 | +0.45 | 48,312 | 490 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lowndes, AL | 73.0 | +0.581 | +0.22 | +0.94 | 6,808 | 32 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Macon, AL | 82.2 | −0.281 | −0.49 | −0.07 | 8,649 | 90 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Madison, AL | 45.9 | +0.137 | +0.10 | +0.17 | 190,066 | 4,343 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Marengo, AL | 50.7 | +0.433 | +0.17 | +0.70 | 10,831 | 64 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Marion, AL | 10.7 | +0.541 | +0.37 | +0.71 | 13,668 | 119 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Marshall, AL | 15.2 | +0.619 | +0.52 | +0.72 | 39,134 | 433 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Mobile, AL | 44.0 | +0.429 | +0.39 | +0.47 | 180,717 | 2,624 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Monroe, AL | 42.0 | +0.713 | +0.47 | +0.96 | 10,602 | 51 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Montgomery, AL | 66.0 | +0.312 | +0.27 | +0.35 | 97,840 | 2,364 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Morgan, AL | 25.0 | +0.442 | +0.36 | +0.53 | 52,898 | 653 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pickens, AL | 41.8 | +0.589 | +0.34 | +0.84 | 9,616 | 54 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pike, AL | 41.2 | +0.653 | +0.50 | +0.81 | 13,678 | 145 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Randolph, AL | 20.5 | +0.591 | +0.32 | +0.87 | 10,762 | 58 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Russell, AL | 53.2 | −0.042 | −0.23 | +0.14 | 21,092 | 143 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | St. Clair, AL | 17.6 | +0.481 | +0.35 | +0.61 | 43,910 | 309 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Shelby, AL | 29.4 | +0.373 | +0.32 | +0.43 | 112,968 | 1,769 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sumter, AL | 74.4 | +0.470 | +0.19 | +0.75 | 6,246 | 56 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Talladega, AL | 37.1 | +0.472 | +0.35 | +0.60 | 35,373 | 277 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Tallapoosa, AL | 28.1 | +0.527 | +0.37 | +0.68 | 20,822 | 179 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Tuscaloosa, AL | 42.5 | +0.137 | +0.08 | +0.20 | 88,882 | 1,319 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Walker, AL | 15.7 | +0.659 | +0.55 | +0.77 | 30,836 | 265 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Washington, AL | 25.6 | +0.546 | +0.19 | +0.90 | 8,822 | 36 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Wilcox, AL | 68.8 | +0.643 | +0.34 | +0.95 | 5,881 | 36 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Winston, AL | 8.7 | +0.666 | +0.44 | +0.89 | 11,169 | 79 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Apache, AZ | 67.1 | +0.003 | −0.15 | +0.16 | 34,735 | 245 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Cochise, AZ | 40.0 | −0.097 | −0.15 | −0.04 | 59,289 | 1,742 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Coconino, AZ | 62.3 | −0.528 | −0.56 | −0.49 | 71,750 | 2,490 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Gila, AZ | 32.7 | +0.207 | +0.11 | +0.30 | 27,320 | 610 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Graham, AZ | 27.3 | +0.370 | +0.19 | +0.55 | 14,783 | 166 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Greenlee, AZ | 32.7 | +0.005 | −0.34 | +0.35 | 3,615 | 47 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | La Paz, AZ | 30.4 | +0.640 | +0.43 | +0.85 | 7,365 | 120 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Maricopa, AZ | 51.1 | −0.112 | −0.12 | −0.10 | 2,036,439 | 60,280 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Mohave, AZ | 24.0 | +0.447 | +0.39 | +0.50 | 103,366 | 1,858 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Navajo, AZ | 45.8 | +0.232 | +0.14 | +0.32 | 51,040 | 729 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pima, AZ | 59.5 | −0.427 | −0.44 | −0.41 | 512,739 | 23,180 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pinal, AZ | 41.2 | −0.069 | −0.11 | −0.03 | 182,183 | 3,495 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Santa Cruz, AZ | 68.0 | −0.435 | −0.52 | −0.35 | 19,332 | 550 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Yavapai, AZ | 35.1 | −0.070 | −0.10 | −0.04 | 141,129 | 5,698 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Yuma, AZ | 46.9 | +0.357 | +0.29 | +0.43 | 68,744 | 1,150 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Arkansas, AR | 29.7 | +0.309 | +0.18 | +0.44 | 6,122 | 129 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Ashley, AR | 27.7 | +0.631 | +0.44 | +0.83 | 7,673 | 78 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Baxter, AR | 22.6 | +0.355 | +0.24 | +0.47 | 20,471 | 365 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Benton, AR | 36.4 | +0.144 | +0.10 | +0.19 | 116,214 | 2,249 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Boone, AR | 18.3 | +0.382 | +0.25 | +0.52 | 16,716 | 226 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bradley, AR | 34.2 | +0.305 | +0.09 | +0.52 | 3,549 | 53 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Carroll, AR | 35.1 | −0.496 | −0.60 | −0.39 | 11,447 | 327 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Chicot, AR | 56.3 | +0.532 | +0.31 | +0.75 | 4,012 | 55 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Clark, AR | 42.7 | −0.062 | −0.19 | +0.06 | 8,054 | 194 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Clay, AR | 19.1 | +0.206 | −0.03 | +0.44 | 5,048 | 55 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Cleburne, AR | 16.1 | +0.530 | +0.39 | +0.67 | 12,316 | 206 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Cleveland, AR | 18.5 | +0.745 | +0.49 | +1.00 | 3,518 | 34 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Columbia, AR | 33.8 | +0.553 | +0.42 | +0.69 | 8,314 | 163 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Conway, AR | 31.5 | +0.284 | +0.10 | +0.47 | 8,309 | 123 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Craighead, AR | 31.8 | +0.254 | +0.18 | +0.33 | 37,479 | 729 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Crawford, AR | 21.0 | +0.366 | +0.22 | +0.51 | 23,566 | 222 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Crittenden, AR | 53.7 | +0.298 | +0.15 | +0.44 | 15,847 | 204 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Cross, AR | 26.4 | +0.092 | −0.06 | +0.24 | 6,718 | 125 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Desha, AR | 51.2 | +0.270 | +0.08 | +0.46 | 3,937 | 61 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Drew, AR | 35.8 | +0.426 | +0.23 | +0.63 | 6,775 | 95 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Faulkner, AR | 34.8 | +0.105 | +0.04 | +0.17 | 52,768 | 860 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Franklin, AR | 18.6 | +0.355 | +0.11 | +0.60 | 6,977 | 70 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Fulton, AR | 20.7 | +0.331 | 0.00 | +0.66 | 4,996 | 49 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Garland, AR | 32.6 | +0.085 | +0.02 | +0.15 | 43,114 | 1,070 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Grant, AR | 15.7 | +0.292 | +0.05 | +0.53 | 8,062 | 81 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Greene, AR | 19.4 | +0.290 | +0.16 | +0.42 | 15,728 | 201 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hempstead, AR | 32.4 | +0.477 | +0.27 | +0.69 | 6,608 | 72 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hot Spring, AR | 25.1 | +0.262 | +0.06 | +0.47 | 12,284 | 116 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Howard, AR | 28.5 | +0.155 | −0.10 | +0.41 | 4,707 | 55 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Independence, AR | 20.0 | +0.221 | +0.10 | +0.34 | 14,056 | 252 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Izard, AR | 18.1 | +0.189 | −0.08 | +0.46 | 5,652 | 58 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Jackson, AR | 27.5 | +0.181 | +0.02 | +0.35 | 4,958 | 93 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Jefferson, AR | 61.1 | +0.163 | +0.07 | +0.25 | 24,502 | 388 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Johnson, AR | 24.8 | +0.077 | −0.15 | +0.30 | 9,221 | 93 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lafayette, AR | 32.3 | +0.576 | +0.24 | +0.91 | 2,596 | 26 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lawrence, AR | 19.1 | +0.620 | +0.37 | +0.87 | 5,649 | 50 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lee, AR | 52.5 | +0.409 | +0.20 | +0.62 | 2,709 | 41 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Little River, AR | 24.8 | +0.536 | +0.15 | +0.92 | 4,941 | 31 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Logan, AR | 19.3 | +0.330 | +0.10 | +0.56 | 7,985 | 78 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lonoke, AR | 22.6 | +0.404 | +0.30 | +0.51 | 29,570 | 366 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Madison, AR | 21.6 | +0.046 | −0.22 | +0.32 | 7,221 | 66 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Marion, AR | 20.9 | +0.175 | −0.04 | +0.39 | 7,314 | 115 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Miller, AR | 26.3 | +0.414 | +0.26 | +0.56 | 16,165 | 174 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Mississippi, AR | 38.5 | +0.358 | +0.23 | +0.49 | 11,854 | 168 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Monroe, AR | 42.6 | +0.596 | +0.31 | +0.88 | 2,692 | 35 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Montgomery, AR | 19.4 | −0.025 | −0.46 | +0.41 | 3,777 | 27 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Nevada, AR | 33.5 | −0.148 | −0.43 | +0.13 | 3,209 | 32 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Newton, AR | 18.2 | −0.475 | −0.76 | −0.19 | 3,901 | 47 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Ouachita, AR | 43.0 | +0.482 | +0.31 | +0.66 | 9,289 | 131 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Perry, AR | 22.5 | +0.252 | −0.09 | +0.60 | 4,491 | 38 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Phillips, AR | 60.0 | −0.002 | −0.17 | +0.16 | 6,040 | 101 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pike, AR | 15.5 | +0.292 | −0.08 | +0.67 | 4,163 | 32 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Poinsett, AR | 19.4 | +0.341 | +0.14 | +0.54 | 7,342 | 80 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Polk, AR | 15.0 | +0.324 | +0.10 | +0.55 | 8,281 | 99 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pope, AR | 24.2 | +0.320 | +0.21 | +0.43 | 23,853 | 387 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Prairie, AR | 19.0 | +0.301 | 0.00 | +0.61 | 3,440 | 38 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pulaski, AR | 61.5 | −0.163 | −0.19 | −0.14 | 165,634 | 6,188 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Randolph, AR | 18.5 | +0.174 | −0.07 | +0.42 | 6,570 | 66 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | St. Francis, AR | 52.6 | +0.051 | −0.12 | +0.23 | 6,846 | 101 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Saline, AR | 28.9 | +0.318 | +0.23 | +0.41 | 55,616 | 707 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Searcy, AR | 14.9 | +0.434 | +0.06 | +0.81 | 3,953 | 34 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sebastian, AR | 31.7 | +0.359 | +0.29 | +0.43 | 45,685 | 795 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sevier, AR | 22.3 | +0.219 | −0.07 | +0.51 | 5,000 | 51 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sharp, AR | 19.1 | +0.318 | +0.08 | +0.56 | 7,336 | 82 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Stone, AR | 20.4 | −0.072 | −0.31 | +0.16 | 5,796 | 86 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Union, AR | 34.8 | +0.616 | +0.53 | +0.71 | 16,062 | 328 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Van Buren, AR | 20.9 | +0.008 | −0.22 | +0.24 | 7,627 | 96 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Washington, AR | 48.0 | −0.346 | −0.39 | −0.31 | 91,328 | 2,238 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | White, AR | 19.8 | +0.410 | +0.31 | +0.51 | 30,160 | 392 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Woodruff, AR | 35.7 | +0.129 | −0.14 | +0.40 | 2,399 | 36 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Yell, AR | 19.7 | +0.370 | +0.12 | +0.61 | 6,510 | 67 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Alameda, CA | 81.9 | −0.840 | −0.85 | −0.83 | 753,968 | 39,788 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Alpine, CA | 66.1 | −0.565 | −0.86 | −0.27 | 720 | 37 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Amador, CA | 37.5 | −0.183 | −0.27 | −0.09 | 21,738 | 601 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Butte, CA | 50.9 | −0.425 | −0.46 | −0.39 | 99,156 | 3,195 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Calaveras, CA | 37.8 | −0.346 | −0.42 | −0.27 | 26,564 | 752 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Colusa, CA | 41.5 | +0.603 | +0.46 | +0.75 | 7,788 | 191 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Contra Costa, CA | 73.1 | −0.706 | −0.71 | −0.70 | 569,263 | 32,404 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Del Norte, CA | 42.0 | −0.404 | −0.52 | −0.28 | 11,138 | 296 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | El Dorado, CA | 45.5 | −0.318 | −0.35 | −0.28 | 113,459 | 3,482 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Fresno, CA | 54.0 | −0.054 | −0.08 | −0.03 | 357,489 | 6,335 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Glenn, CA | 36.1 | +0.410 | +0.26 | +0.56 | 11,058 | 222 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Humboldt, CA | 67.3 | −0.733 | −0.76 | −0.70 | 66,538 | 2,877 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Imperial, CA | 62.5 | +0.191 | +0.10 | +0.28 | 55,525 | 619 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Inyo, CA | 50.1 | −0.354 | −0.46 | −0.24 | 9,254 | 367 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Kern, CA | 44.8 | +0.166 | +0.13 | +0.20 | 297,850 | 4,703 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Kings, CA | 43.7 | +0.363 | +0.27 | +0.46 | 42,771 | 557 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lake, CA | 53.2 | −0.516 | −0.58 | −0.45 | 28,064 | 886 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lassen, CA | 23.8 | +0.236 | +0.06 | +0.41 | 11,769 | 190 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Los Angeles, CA | 72.6 | −0.592 | −0.60 | −0.59 | 4,174,415 | 163,108 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Madera, CA | 44.1 | +0.063 | −0.01 | +0.13 | 52,546 | 1,085 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Marin, CA | 83.9 | −0.808 | −0.82 | −0.80 | 152,900 | 17,069 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Mariposa, CA | 40.7 | −0.366 | −0.48 | −0.25 | 10,038 | 342 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Mendocino, CA | 68.4 | −0.787 | −0.82 | −0.76 | 42,049 | 2,280 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Merced, CA | 55.4 | +0.056 | 0.00 | +0.12 | 88,388 | 1,336 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Modoc, CA | 27.0 | −0.146 | −0.39 | +0.10 | 4,259 | 87 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Mono, CA | 61.5 | −0.672 | −0.78 | −0.57 | 6,526 | 246 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Monterey, CA | 71.1 | −0.507 | −0.53 | −0.48 | 160,252 | 6,087 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Napa, CA | 70.7 | −0.604 | −0.63 | −0.58 | 70,493 | 3,603 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Nevada, CA | 57.6 | −0.640 | −0.67 | −0.61 | 63,138 | 3,193 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Orange, CA | 54.6 | −0.158 | −0.17 | −0.15 | 1,490,507 | 45,983 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Placer, CA | 46.6 | −0.292 | −0.32 | −0.27 | 229,357 | 6,860 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Plumas, CA | 41.4 | −0.339 | −0.45 | −0.23 | 11,006 | 365 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Riverside, CA | 54.1 | −0.289 | −0.30 | −0.27 | 976,647 | 21,059 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sacramento, CA | 63.0 | −0.518 | −0.53 | −0.51 | 700,213 | 21,776 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | San Benito, CA | 62.5 | −0.327 | −0.42 | −0.24 | 28,218 | 570 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | San Bernardino, CA | 55.4 | −0.093 | −0.11 | −0.07 | 822,116 | 12,800 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | San Diego, CA | 61.6 | −0.356 | −0.36 | −0.35 | 1,564,744 | 54,884 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | San Francisco, CA | 87.0 | −0.866 | −0.87 | −0.86 | 434,573 | 45,868 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | San Joaquin, CA | 57.1 | −0.110 | −0.14 | −0.08 | 282,235 | 4,837 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | San Luis Obispo, CA | 56.7 | −0.497 | −0.52 | −0.47 | 155,746 | 7,100 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | San Mateo, CA | 79.4 | −0.680 | −0.69 | −0.67 | 366,973 | 24,189 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Santa Barbara, CA | 66.4 | −0.523 | −0.54 | −0.50 | 195,699 | 9,410 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Santa Clara, CA | 74.2 | −0.659 | −0.67 | −0.65 | 832,579 | 39,175 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Santa Cruz, CA | 80.9 | −0.829 | −0.84 | −0.82 | 141,183 | 9,842 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Shasta, CA | 33.0 | −0.025 | −0.08 | +0.03 | 90,789 | 2,004 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Sierra, CA | 39.0 | −0.589 | −0.83 | −0.35 | 1,872 | 59 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Siskiyou, CA | 41.9 | −0.376 | −0.45 | −0.30 | 22,883 | 748 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Solano, CA | 65.5 | −0.543 | −0.57 | −0.52 | 200,945 | 5,487 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sonoma, CA | 76.4 | −0.802 | −0.81 | −0.79 | 261,763 | 16,125 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Stanislaus, CA | 50.4 | −0.094 | −0.13 | −0.06 | 209,986 | 3,633 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sutter, CA | 41.6 | +0.353 | +0.28 | +0.43 | 41,742 | 761 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Tehama, CA | 31.8 | +0.127 | +0.02 | +0.23 | 28,052 | 471 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Trinity, CA | 47.2 | −0.558 | −0.70 | −0.41 | 6,039 | 161 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Tulare, CA | 46.0 | +0.283 | +0.24 | +0.33 | 143,684 | 2,372 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Tuolumne, CA | 40.4 | −0.327 | −0.40 | −0.25 | 29,667 | 904 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Ventura, CA | 60.8 | −0.369 | −0.39 | −0.35 | 413,595 | 13,838 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Yolo, CA | 71.2 | −0.707 | −0.73 | −0.69 | 94,890 | 5,165 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Yuba, CA | 38.9 | −0.024 | −0.13 | +0.08 | 28,906 | 444 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Adams, CO | 58.4 | −0.280 | −0.31 | −0.25 | 229,859 | 4,579 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Alamosa, CO | 49.6 | −0.256 | −0.39 | −0.12 | 7,572 | 218 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Arapahoe, CO | 62.7 | −0.143 | −0.16 | −0.12 | 340,930 | 12,669 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Archuleta, CO | 41.9 | −0.133 | −0.25 | −0.02 | 8,927 | 390 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Baca, CO | 14.5 | +0.857 | +0.56 | +1.15 | 2,184 | 35 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bent, CO | 32.8 | +0.177 | −0.16 | +0.51 | 2,235 | 44 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Boulder, CO | 78.9 | −0.722 | −0.73 | −0.71 | 201,590 | 16,281 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Broomfield, CO | 64.1 | −0.389 | −0.44 | −0.33 | 45,372 | 1,328 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Chaffee, CO | 53.5 | −0.429 | −0.51 | −0.35 | 13,382 | 588 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Clear Creek, CO | 56.7 | −0.287 | −0.41 | −0.16 | 6,358 | 280 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Conejos, CO | 46.1 | −0.252 | −0.47 | −0.03 | 4,245 | 73 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Costilla, CO | 63.9 | −0.388 | −0.65 | −0.13 | 2,052 | 54 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Crowley, CO | 25.6 | +0.546 | +0.16 | +0.93 | 1,708 | 34 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Custer, CO | 31.0 | −0.008 | −0.20 | +0.18 | 3,586 | 150 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Delta, CO | 31.0 | −0.167 | −0.26 | −0.08 | 18,968 | 623 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Denver, CO | 81.4 | −0.617 | −0.63 | −0.61 | 384,911 | 23,946 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Dolores, CO | 23.8 | −0.301 | −0.66 | +0.06 | 1,430 | 34 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Douglas, CO | 46.3 | +0.009 | −0.02 | +0.04 | 225,923 | 6,476 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Eagle, CO | 65.3 | −0.381 | −0.43 | −0.33 | 28,480 | 1,278 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Elbert, CO | 24.2 | +0.468 | +0.35 | +0.59 | 18,517 | 384 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | El Paso, CO | 44.4 | +0.075 | +0.05 | +0.10 | 364,769 | 9,653 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Fremont, CO | 29.6 | +0.012 | −0.09 | +0.11 | 24,886 | 547 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Garfield, CO | 51.2 | −0.297 | −0.35 | −0.24 | 30,144 | 1,288 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Gilpin, CO | 54.8 | −0.415 | −0.57 | −0.26 | 4,056 | 162 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Grand, CO | 49.1 | −0.170 | −0.29 | −0.05 | 9,593 | 321 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Gunnison, CO | 65.6 | −0.516 | −0.60 | −0.43 | 10,867 | 450 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hinsdale, CO | 41.9 | −0.526 | −0.87 | −0.18 | 608 | 28 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Huerfano, CO | 48.5 | −0.318 | −0.49 | −0.15 | 4,279 | 152 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Jefferson, CO | 59.5 | −0.256 | −0.27 | −0.24 | 366,813 | 15,446 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Kit Carson, CO | 17.4 | +0.885 | +0.69 | +1.08 | 3,806 | 93 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lake, CO | 60.6 | −0.395 | −0.60 | −0.19 | 3,800 | 96 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | La Plata, CO | 59.1 | −0.451 | −0.49 | −0.41 | 34,781 | 1,929 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Larimer, CO | 58.0 | −0.393 | −0.41 | −0.37 | 217,609 | 8,555 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Las Animas, CO | 44.9 | −0.059 | −0.23 | +0.11 | 7,781 | 178 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Lincoln, CO | 18.0 | +0.797 | +0.53 | +1.06 | 2,605 | 59 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Logan, CO | 21.5 | +0.716 | +0.58 | +0.86 | 10,305 | 214 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Mesa, CO | 35.7 | +0.103 | +0.06 | +0.14 | 88,430 | 2,839 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Mineral, CO | 42.6 | −0.297 | −0.70 | +0.11 | 744 | 29 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Moffat, CO | 17.5 | +0.549 | +0.35 | +0.74 | 6,873 | 123 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Montezuma, CO | 38.5 | −0.171 | −0.27 | −0.07 | 15,142 | 512 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Montrose, CO | 31.4 | +0.061 | −0.02 | +0.14 | 24,457 | 733 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Morgan, CO | 28.8 | +0.367 | +0.20 | +0.53 | 13,469 | 198 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Otero, CO | 38.5 | +0.364 | +0.17 | +0.56 | 9,361 | 136 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Ouray, CO | 60.0 | −0.439 | −0.56 | −0.32 | 3,942 | 279 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Park, CO | 41.2 | −0.178 | −0.31 | −0.04 | 11,894 | 281 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Phillips, CO | 19.9 | +0.995 | +0.77 | +1.22 | 2,444 | 57 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pitkin, CO | 76.4 | −0.479 | −0.53 | −0.43 | 11,769 | 1,134 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Prowers, CO | 26.7 | +0.456 | +0.23 | +0.68 | 5,466 | 98 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pueblo, CO | 50.9 | −0.090 | −0.13 | −0.04 | 86,024 | 2,174 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Rio Blanco, CO | 15.5 | +0.518 | +0.23 | +0.80 | 3,622 | 63 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Rio Grande, CO | 40.5 | +0.218 | +0.03 | +0.41 | 6,155 | 140 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Routt, CO | 64.1 | −0.390 | −0.46 | −0.32 | 16,507 | 824 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Saguache, CO | 57.1 | −0.539 | −0.68 | −0.39 | 3,297 | 161 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | San Miguel, CO | 77.5 | −0.701 | −0.77 | −0.63 | 5,060 | 380 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sedgwick, CO | 21.2 | +0.615 | +0.19 | +1.04 | 1,422 | 26 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Summit, CO | 70.4 | −0.455 | −0.52 | −0.39 | 17,953 | 818 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Teller, CO | 32.0 | +0.032 | −0.08 | +0.14 | 16,519 | 454 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Washington, CO | 12.4 | +1.023 | +0.79 | +1.26 | 2,964 | 52 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Weld, CO | 40.7 | +0.127 | +0.09 | +0.17 | 162,205 | 3,242 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Yuma, CO | 16.0 | +0.768 | +0.62 | +0.92 | 4,892 | 160 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Fairfield, CT | 63.8 | −0.250 | −0.26 | −0.24 | 466,544 | 30,979 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hartford, CT | 64.1 | −0.301 | −0.31 | −0.29 | 442,392 | 20,961 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Litchfield, CT | 47.4 | −0.317 | −0.34 | −0.29 | 105,765 | 5,480 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Middlesex, CT | 58.3 | −0.305 | −0.33 | −0.28 | 97,513 | 5,051 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | New Haven, CT | 58.8 | −0.365 | −0.38 | −0.35 | 412,521 | 17,560 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | New London, CT | 58.2 | −0.291 | −0.31 | −0.27 | 136,569 | 6,270 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Tolland, CT | 55.8 | −0.308 | −0.34 | −0.28 | 78,825 | 3,558 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Windham, CT | 47.8 | −0.344 | −0.38 | −0.30 | 55,842 | 2,010 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Kent, DE | 52.1 | −0.135 | −0.18 | −0.09 | 85,561 | 1,752 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | New Castle, DE | 68.8 | −0.434 | −0.45 | −0.42 | 283,398 | 10,135 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sussex, DE | 44.3 | −0.304 | −0.33 | −0.27 | 127,912 | 4,390 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | District of Columbia, DC | 94.5 | −0.721 | −0.73 | −0.72 | 335,909 | 41,702 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Alachua, FL | 63.8 | −0.423 | −0.44 | −0.40 | 140,676 | 6,112 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Baker, FL | 14.6 | +0.526 | +0.38 | +0.67 | 13,948 | 170 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bay, FL | 27.9 | +0.438 | +0.39 | +0.48 | 91,711 | 2,078 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bradford, FL | 23.4 | +0.307 | +0.13 | +0.49 | 13,494 | 142 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Brevard, FL | 41.7 | +0.070 | +0.05 | +0.09 | 356,432 | 8,999 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Broward, FL | 65.0 | −0.270 | −0.28 | −0.26 | 952,161 | 25,659 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Calhoun, FL | 18.6 | +0.478 | +0.26 | +0.70 | 6,483 | 69 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Charlotte, FL | 36.6 | +0.151 | +0.11 | +0.19 | 115,516 | 3,209 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Citrus, FL | 29.3 | +0.124 | +0.07 | +0.18 | 92,444 | 1,865 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Clay, FL | 31.2 | +0.221 | +0.17 | +0.27 | 122,797 | 2,128 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Collier, FL | 37.6 | +0.267 | +0.24 | +0.29 | 206,571 | 8,751 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Columbia, FL | 27.2 | +0.343 | +0.25 | +0.43 | 32,750 | 513 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | DeSoto, FL | 33.9 | +0.402 | +0.25 | +0.56 | 12,572 | 185 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Dixie, FL | 16.8 | +0.442 | +0.24 | +0.65 | 8,124 | 93 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Duval, FL | 51.9 | +0.069 | +0.05 | +0.09 | 486,318 | 10,369 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Escambia, FL | 42.3 | +0.203 | +0.17 | +0.24 | 167,603 | 3,450 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Flagler, FL | 39.5 | −0.017 | −0.07 | +0.04 | 71,204 | 1,769 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Franklin, FL | 31.2 | −0.284 | −0.42 | −0.14 | 6,795 | 183 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Gadsden, FL | 68.4 | −0.013 | −0.11 | +0.08 | 23,618 | 483 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Gilchrist, FL | 17.7 | +0.239 | +0.05 | +0.43 | 9,595 | 119 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Glades, FL | 26.8 | +0.373 | +0.19 | +0.56 | 5,167 | 101 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Gulf, FL | 24.5 | +0.463 | +0.29 | +0.64 | 8,098 | 135 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hamilton, FL | 34.0 | +0.446 | +0.20 | +0.70 | 5,778 | 66 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hardee, FL | 27.3 | +0.714 | +0.59 | +0.84 | 8,420 | 164 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hendry, FL | 38.4 | +0.509 | +0.41 | +0.60 | 12,835 | 306 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hernando, FL | 34.8 | +0.124 | +0.07 | +0.18 | 107,931 | 1,858 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Highlands, FL | 32.7 | +0.321 | +0.25 | +0.39 | 51,811 | 967 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hillsborough, FL | 53.5 | −0.074 | −0.09 | −0.06 | 703,765 | 18,101 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Holmes, FL | 10.3 | +0.746 | +0.50 | +0.99 | 9,004 | 58 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Indian River, FL | 39.1 | +0.246 | +0.21 | +0.28 | 96,716 | 3,511 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Jackson, FL | 30.4 | +0.352 | +0.24 | +0.46 | 22,254 | 322 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Jefferson, FL | 46.5 | +0.070 | −0.06 | +0.20 | 8,376 | 227 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lafayette, FL | 14.0 | +0.374 | +0.14 | +0.61 | 3,638 | 56 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lake, FL | 39.9 | +0.099 | +0.06 | +0.13 | 209,364 | 4,216 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lee, FL | 40.3 | +0.109 | +0.09 | +0.13 | 390,942 | 10,970 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Leon, FL | 64.3 | −0.193 | −0.21 | −0.18 | 160,970 | 8,772 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Levy, FL | 27.0 | +0.152 | +0.04 | +0.26 | 22,954 | 370 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Liberty, FL | 19.6 | +0.541 | +0.27 | +0.81 | 3,540 | 37 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Madison, FL | 40.2 | +0.170 | −0.01 | +0.35 | 9,323 | 114 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Manatee, FL | 41.9 | −0.049 | −0.08 | −0.02 | 215,153 | 6,414 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Marion, FL | 36.9 | +0.143 | +0.11 | +0.18 | 202,684 | 4,176 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Martin, FL | 37.6 | +0.185 | +0.15 | +0.22 | 98,061 | 3,874 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Miami-Dade, FL | 53.7 | −0.211 | −0.22 | −0.20 | 1,150,697 | 32,297 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Monroe, FL | 46.0 | −0.146 | −0.19 | −0.10 | 47,574 | 2,331 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Nassau, FL | 26.8 | +0.165 | +0.11 | +0.22 | 58,130 | 1,562 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Okaloosa, FL | 30.0 | +0.471 | +0.43 | +0.52 | 114,046 | 2,325 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Okeechobee, FL | 27.7 | +0.428 | +0.29 | +0.56 | 15,860 | 213 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Orange, FL | 61.7 | −0.112 | −0.13 | −0.10 | 640,412 | 15,210 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Osceola, FL | 57.0 | −0.081 | −0.13 | −0.03 | 170,777 | 1,721 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Palm Beach, FL | 56.4 | −0.138 | −0.15 | −0.13 | 768,283 | 30,149 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pasco, FL | 39.9 | +0.041 | +0.01 | +0.07 | 298,694 | 4,933 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pinellas, FL | 50.1 | −0.165 | −0.18 | −0.15 | 553,659 | 17,100 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Polk, FL | 42.7 | +0.222 | +0.19 | +0.25 | 339,635 | 5,874 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Putnam, FL | 29.2 | +0.128 | +0.04 | +0.21 | 36,041 | 655 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | St. Johns, FL | 36.5 | +0.118 | +0.09 | +0.15 | 174,796 | 4,993 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | St. Lucie, FL | 49.2 | −0.028 | −0.07 | +0.01 | 170,968 | 3,325 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Santa Rosa, FL | 26.3 | +0.347 | +0.29 | +0.40 | 104,997 | 1,659 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sarasota, FL | 44.7 | −0.192 | −0.21 | −0.17 | 268,480 | 12,109 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Seminole, FL | 51.4 | −0.005 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 257,769 | 5,947 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sumter, FL | 31.9 | +0.149 | +0.10 | +0.19 | 92,102 | 2,913 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Suwannee, FL | 21.5 | +0.319 | +0.20 | +0.44 | 20,895 | 308 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Taylor, FL | 22.9 | +0.363 | +0.20 | +0.53 | 10,050 | 151 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Union, FL | 17.0 | +0.485 | +0.23 | +0.74 | 6,186 | 51 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Volusia, FL | 42.9 | +0.030 | +0.01 | +0.05 | 304,396 | 7,428 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Wakulla, FL | 29.4 | −0.147 | −0.27 | −0.03 | 18,225 | 269 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Walton, FL | 23.9 | +0.292 | +0.22 | +0.36 | 43,285 | 993 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Washington, FL | 19.2 | +0.529 | +0.39 | +0.67 | 12,223 | 173 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Appling, GA | 21.4 | +1.015 | +0.81 | +1.22 | 8,354 | 60 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Atkinson, GA | 26.4 | +0.801 | +0.42 | +1.18 | 3,125 | 26 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bacon, GA | 13.5 | +0.679 | +0.40 | +0.96 | 4,642 | 44 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Baldwin, GA | 50.7 | +0.295 | +0.17 | +0.42 | 18,043 | 304 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Banks, GA | 10.7 | +0.418 | +0.04 | +0.80 | 8,727 | 47 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Barrow, GA | 28.1 | +0.447 | +0.31 | +0.58 | 37,257 | 316 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bartow, GA | 24.3 | +0.503 | +0.40 | +0.60 | 49,763 | 515 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Ben Hill, GA | 36.8 | +0.468 | +0.21 | +0.72 | 6,504 | 69 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Berrien, GA | 16.5 | +0.901 | +0.68 | +1.12 | 7,688 | 66 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bibb, GA | 62.0 | +0.229 | +0.18 | +0.28 | 69,967 | 1,508 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Bleckley, GA | 23.3 | +0.430 | +0.09 | +0.77 | 5,641 | 42 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Brantley, GA | 9.1 | +0.250 | −0.10 | +0.60 | 7,693 | 39 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Brooks, GA | 39.6 | +0.718 | +0.48 | +0.96 | 7,052 | 75 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bryan, GA | 32.1 | +0.295 | +0.15 | +0.44 | 20,978 | 268 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bulloch, GA | 38.0 | +0.347 | +0.25 | +0.44 | 29,635 | 482 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Burke, GA | 49.1 | +0.818 | +0.58 | +1.05 | 10,608 | 69 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Butts, GA | 28.0 | +0.868 | +0.68 | +1.06 | 11,680 | 104 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Camden, GA | 34.3 | +0.303 | +0.18 | +0.43 | 23,216 | 330 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Candler, GA | 28.8 | +0.353 | +0.12 | +0.59 | 4,402 | 91 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Carroll, GA | 30.2 | +0.397 | +0.31 | +0.48 | 53,712 | 696 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Catoosa, GA | 21.6 | +0.313 | +0.17 | +0.46 | 32,099 | 264 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Charlton, GA | 24.4 | +0.423 | +0.14 | +0.71 | 4,524 | 55 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Chatham, GA | 59.5 | −0.017 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 131,479 | 3,489 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Chattooga, GA | 18.7 | +0.322 | +0.03 | +0.61 | 9,918 | 59 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Cherokee, GA | 30.0 | +0.207 | +0.16 | +0.26 | 142,364 | 2,404 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Clarke, GA | 71.4 | −0.431 | −0.47 | −0.39 | 50,505 | 2,075 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Clayton, GA | 85.8 | −0.408 | −0.47 | −0.35 | 111,277 | 1,006 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Clinch, GA | 26.1 | +0.783 | +0.53 | +1.04 | 2,849 | 44 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Cobb, GA | 57.3 | −0.002 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 387,283 | 9,997 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Coffee, GA | 29.9 | +0.705 | +0.57 | +0.84 | 15,089 | 182 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Colquitt, GA | 26.2 | +0.942 | +0.85 | +1.04 | 15,967 | 240 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Columbia, GA | 36.9 | +0.332 | +0.26 | +0.40 | 79,245 | 1,093 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Cook, GA | 29.6 | +0.836 | +0.61 | +1.06 | 6,959 | 59 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Coweta, GA | 32.0 | +0.272 | +0.19 | +0.35 | 75,711 | 1,010 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Crawford, GA | 26.7 | +0.840 | +0.56 | +1.12 | 6,043 | 42 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Crisp, GA | 37.4 | +0.759 | +0.60 | +0.92 | 7,967 | 118 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Dade, GA | 17.2 | +0.486 | +0.23 | +0.74 | 7,327 | 86 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Dawson, GA | 15.7 | +0.544 | +0.36 | +0.72 | 15,884 | 162 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Decatur, GA | 41.4 | +0.636 | +0.47 | +0.80 | 11,537 | 124 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | DeKalb, GA | 84.1 | −0.672 | −0.69 | −0.66 | 366,539 | 12,992 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Dodge, GA | 27.1 | +0.681 | +0.48 | +0.88 | 8,015 | 79 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Dooly, GA | 47.0 | +0.611 | +0.35 | +0.87 | 4,070 | 44 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Dougherty, GA | 70.2 | +0.364 | +0.28 | +0.45 | 35,009 | 504 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Douglas, GA | 62.7 | −0.042 | −0.12 | +0.04 | 68,268 | 835 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Early, GA | 47.5 | +0.634 | +0.32 | +0.95 | 5,160 | 33 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Effingham, GA | 24.8 | +0.411 | +0.25 | +0.57 | 31,079 | 220 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Elbert, GA | 31.6 | +0.369 | +0.16 | +0.58 | 9,105 | 108 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Emanuel, GA | 30.6 | +0.529 | +0.31 | +0.75 | 9,439 | 85 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Evans, GA | 31.4 | +0.712 | +0.45 | +0.98 | 4,212 | 50 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Fannin, GA | 17.4 | +0.146 | 0.00 | +0.29 | 14,739 | 288 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Fayette, GA | 46.6 | +0.001 | −0.06 | +0.06 | 71,018 | 1,629 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Floyd, GA | 29.2 | +0.419 | +0.33 | +0.50 | 40,823 | 703 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Forsyth, GA | 33.1 | +0.281 | +0.23 | +0.33 | 127,331 | 2,008 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Franklin, GA | 14.9 | +0.628 | +0.39 | +0.86 | 10,662 | 84 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Fulton, GA | 73.5 | −0.264 | −0.28 | −0.25 | 517,459 | 23,387 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Gilmer, GA | 17.9 | +0.259 | +0.11 | +0.40 | 16,361 | 278 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Glynn, GA | 38.3 | +0.220 | +0.15 | +0.29 | 41,499 | 1,112 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Gordon, GA | 18.4 | +0.631 | +0.49 | +0.77 | 23,789 | 264 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Grady, GA | 34.0 | +0.452 | +0.23 | +0.68 | 10,653 | 90 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Greene, GA | 36.6 | +0.638 | +0.49 | +0.79 | 11,153 | 195 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Gwinnett, GA | 59.3 | −0.099 | −0.13 | −0.07 | 408,394 | 6,263 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Habersham, GA | 17.6 | +0.360 | +0.23 | +0.49 | 20,199 | 296 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hall, GA | 28.1 | +0.481 | +0.42 | +0.54 | 89,216 | 1,599 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hancock, GA | 72.1 | −0.129 | −0.53 | +0.27 | 4,130 | 32 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Haralson, GA | 12.7 | +0.851 | +0.65 | +1.05 | 14,121 | 126 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Harris, GA | 27.6 | +0.407 | +0.27 | +0.55 | 19,776 | 272 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Hart, GA | 25.0 | +0.642 | +0.48 | +0.80 | 12,622 | 167 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Heard, GA | 15.4 | +0.764 | +0.33 | +1.20 | 5,343 | 27 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Henry, GA | 60.3 | −0.158 | −0.22 | −0.10 | 121,702 | 1,450 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Houston, GA | 43.7 | +0.442 | +0.37 | +0.51 | 73,779 | 1,040 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Irwin, GA | 24.3 | +0.964 | +0.75 | +1.18 | 4,142 | 46 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Jackson, GA | 20.6 | +0.386 | +0.28 | +0.50 | 37,144 | 460 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Jasper, GA | 23.2 | +0.697 | +0.44 | +0.95 | 7,583 | 67 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Jeff Davis, GA | 18.0 | +0.571 | +0.17 | +0.97 | 5,723 | 29 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Jefferson, GA | 53.4 | +0.538 | +0.23 | +0.84 | 7,595 | 47 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Jenkins, GA | 36.9 | +0.967 | +0.65 | +1.28 | 3,427 | 25 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Jones, GA | 32.9 | +0.316 | +0.12 | +0.51 | 14,822 | 136 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lamar, GA | 29.3 | +0.266 | +0.02 | +0.51 | 8,951 | 96 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lanier, GA | 28.9 | +0.307 | 0.00 | +0.61 | 3,528 | 37 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Laurens, GA | 35.8 | +0.670 | +0.55 | +0.79 | 22,567 | 274 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lee, GA | 27.5 | +0.552 | +0.37 | +0.74 | 16,565 | 130 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Liberty, GA | 62.2 | −0.023 | −0.16 | +0.12 | 21,063 | 230 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lincoln, GA | 31.1 | +0.570 | +0.17 | +0.97 | 4,605 | 34 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Long, GA | 36.6 | −0.332 | −0.72 | +0.05 | 5,562 | 29 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Lowndes, GA | 43.9 | +0.417 | +0.32 | +0.51 | 45,808 | 565 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Lumpkin, GA | 20.4 | −0.050 | −0.19 | +0.09 | 15,289 | 266 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | McDuffie, GA | 40.3 | +0.679 | +0.47 | +0.88 | 10,337 | 100 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | McIntosh, GA | 39.4 | +0.122 | −0.12 | +0.37 | 6,628 | 90 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Macon, GA | 61.6 | +0.760 | +0.45 | +1.07 | 4,641 | 40 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Madison, GA | 23.1 | +0.092 | −0.13 | +0.31 | 14,737 | 119 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Meriwether, GA | 39.7 | +0.555 | +0.27 | +0.84 | 10,811 | 73 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Mitchell, GA | 44.7 | +0.720 | +0.55 | +0.89 | 8,928 | 99 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Monroe, GA | 28.4 | +0.417 | +0.26 | +0.58 | 15,442 | 176 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Montgomery, GA | 24.9 | +0.893 | +0.66 | +1.13 | 3,940 | 44 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Morgan, GA | 28.9 | +0.372 | +0.21 | +0.53 | 11,584 | 195 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Murray, GA | 15.1 | +0.465 | +0.21 | +0.72 | 15,245 | 82 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Muscogee, GA | 62.2 | +0.156 | +0.10 | +0.21 | 79,553 | 1,535 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Newton, GA | 55.5 | +0.081 | −0.02 | +0.18 | 53,658 | 526 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Oconee, GA | 33.0 | +0.016 | −0.07 | +0.10 | 24,757 | 686 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Oglethorpe, GA | 30.4 | −0.147 | −0.41 | +0.11 | 8,031 | 77 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Paulding, GA | 35.3 | +0.186 | +0.10 | +0.27 | 84,212 | 798 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Peach, GA | 47.7 | +0.333 | +0.16 | +0.50 | 12,428 | 186 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pickens, GA | 16.7 | +0.305 | +0.16 | +0.45 | 16,934 | 285 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pierce, GA | 12.2 | +0.836 | +0.66 | +1.02 | 8,998 | 91 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pike, GA | 14.2 | +0.601 | +0.34 | +0.86 | 10,632 | 85 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Polk, GA | 21.2 | +0.611 | +0.42 | +0.80 | 17,244 | 136 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Pulaski, GA | 30.4 | +0.739 | +0.49 | +0.99 | 4,045 | 53 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Putnam, GA | 29.4 | +0.608 | +0.46 | +0.75 | 11,739 | 223 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Rabun, GA | 21.0 | +0.041 | −0.12 | +0.20 | 9,458 | 200 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Richmond, GA | 68.8 | +0.211 | +0.15 | +0.27 | 85,899 | 1,340 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Rockdale, GA | 70.6 | −0.295 | −0.40 | −0.19 | 44,251 | 477 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Screven, GA | 40.5 | +0.750 | +0.51 | +0.99 | 6,576 | 64 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Seminole, GA | 32.5 | +0.540 | +0.19 | +0.89 | 3,869 | 34 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Spalding, GA | 39.5 | +0.345 | +0.21 | +0.48 | 29,932 | 331 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Stephens, GA | 20.3 | +0.716 | +0.53 | +0.90 | 11,753 | 115 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Sumter, GA | 52.4 | +0.295 | +0.14 | +0.45 | 12,047 | 183 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Talbot, GA | 60.3 | +0.082 | −0.33 | +0.49 | 3,506 | 31 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Tattnall, GA | 25.4 | +0.881 | +0.71 | +1.05 | 8,116 | 82 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Taylor, GA | 36.4 | +0.567 | +0.26 | +0.87 | 3,808 | 29 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Telfair, GA | 34.5 | +0.674 | +0.32 | +1.02 | 4,313 | 29 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Terrell, GA | 54.2 | +0.656 | +0.37 | +0.94 | 4,380 | 42 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Thomas, GA | 40.2 | +0.598 | +0.50 | +0.70 | 21,677 | 402 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Tift, GA | 33.0 | +0.834 | +0.74 | +0.92 | 16,102 | 319 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Toombs, GA | 27.2 | +0.758 | +0.63 | +0.88 | 10,811 | 186 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Towns, GA | 19.5 | +0.241 | +0.07 | +0.42 | 7,934 | 183 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Troup, GA | 39.0 | +0.537 | +0.42 | +0.66 | 29,719 | 324 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Turner, GA | 37.5 | +0.496 | +0.17 | +0.82 | 3,758 | 39 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Twiggs, GA | 46.3 | +0.551 | +0.21 | +0.90 | 4,414 | 26 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Union, GA | 18.1 | +0.120 | −0.02 | +0.26 | 15,450 | 271 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Upson, GA | 32.8 | +0.586 | +0.37 | +0.80 | 12,809 | 102 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Walker, GA | 19.9 | +0.435 | +0.29 | +0.58 | 28,943 | 265 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Walton, GA | 25.1 | +0.524 | +0.41 | +0.63 | 50,522 | 481 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Ware, GA | 29.6 | +0.631 | +0.51 | +0.75 | 14,072 | 231 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Washington, GA | 50.4 | +0.677 | +0.49 | +0.86 | 9,411 | 117 | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | | Wayne, GA | 21.2 | +0.674 | +0.50 | +0.85 | 12,675 | 127 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | White, GA | 16.5 | +0.145 | −0.01 | +0.30 | 14,633 | 232 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Whitfield, GA | 29.4 | +0.494 | +0.40 | +0.59 | 36,324 | 474 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Wilcox, GA | 26.4 | +0.962 | +0.64 | +1.28 | 3,263 | 25 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Wilkes, GA | 43.3 | +0.409 | +0.18 | +0.64 | 4,983 | 94 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Wilkinson, GA | 43.8 | +0.297 | −0.06 | +0.65 | 4,739 | 37 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Worth, GA | 26.0 | +0.880 | +0.70 | +1.06 | 9,225 | 99 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Ada, ID | 48.0 | −0.214 | −0.24 | −0.19 | 251,238 | 7,720 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Adams, ID | 23.3 | +0.221 | −0.10 | +0.55 | 2,532 | 56 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bannock, ID | 38.6 | −0.238 | −0.32 | −0.16 | 38,013 | 720 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Bear Lake, ID | 10.7 | +0.746 | +0.39 | +1.10 | 3,264 | 36 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Benewah, ID | 20.1 | +0.209 | −0.06 | +0.47 | 4,855 | 80 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bingham, ID | 21.2 | +0.483 | +0.32 | +0.65 | 19,419 | 187 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Blaine, ID | 68.9 | −0.475 | −0.53 | −0.42 | 12,950 | 1,017 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Boise, ID | 25.7 | +0.125 | −0.10 | +0.35 | 4,689 | 110 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Bonner, ID | 31.1 | −0.076 | −0.16 | +0.01 | 26,679 | 758 | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | | Bonneville, ID | 27.4 | +0.152 | +0.08 | +0.22 | 52,059 | 955 | Vote and donors lean the same way | | Boundary, ID | 19.8 | +0.304 | +0.10 | +0.51 | 6,157 | 134 | Vote and donors lean the same way | The first 500 of 2839 rows; every row is in https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/donor_vs_vote.json. Note: Votes are full counts. The data table gives each county's 95% interval for its donor lean, which treats its reliable donors as independent draws; the tooltip gives n, the number of reliable donors, and a county with a small pool has a noisy donor lean. The intervals on the binned means are 95% intervals across the counties in each bin. Source: DIME public version 4.0, reliable donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; county presidential returns, 2020; county demographics, 2020; donors are not weighted, and county values, binned means and the fitted line count each county once Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/donor_vs_vote.json ### Table 3. Right-leaning donors are more common in Democratic-voting counties that are at least 30% Black: 58.7% of them, against 6.5% of the rest Share of counties whose donor pool leans opposite to the vote, by non-Hispanic Black share of residents, for Democratic-voting and Republican-voting counties, 2020 vote | Black share of residents | Vote | Divergent counties (% of counties voting that way) | Divergent counties | Counties | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Under 5% Black | Democratic-voting counties | 6.9 | 14 | 202 | | 5 to 15% Black | Democratic-voting counties | 2.8 | 3 | 108 | | 15 to 30% Black | Democratic-voting counties | 11.3 | 7 | 62 | | 30 to 50% Black | Democratic-voting counties | 43.9 | 25 | 57 | | 50% or more Black | Democratic-voting counties | 71.0 | 49 | 69 | | Under 5% Black | Republican-voting counties | 23.4 | 372 | 1,593 | | 5 to 15% Black | Republican-voting counties | 20.6 | 81 | 393 | | 15 to 30% Black | Republican-voting counties | 5.6 | 12 | 214 | | 30 to 50% Black | Republican-voting counties | 3.8 | 5 | 131 | Note: The counties of Connecticut, which have no Black share in the demographic file, are left out. Note: Each bar is the share of the counties in the analysis in that band, so it carries no sampling interval; the tooltip gives the number of counties. Source: DIME public version 4.0, reliable donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; county presidential returns, 2020; county demographics, 2020; full counts of records, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/who_diverges.json ### Table 4. At every pool floor, a larger share of Democratic-voting counties at least 30% Black than of the rest have right-leaning donors Share of Democratic-voting counties whose donor pool leans right, by whether the county is at least 30% Black, among counties with at least the stated number of reliable donors, 2020 vote | Counties with at least | Group | Counties with right-leaning donors (%) | Counties with right-leaning donors | Counties | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 25 or more donors | Counties at least 30% Black | 58.7 | 74 | 126 | | 25 or more donors | Other Democratic-voting counties | 6.5 | 24 | 372 | | 100 or more donors | Counties at least 30% Black | 43.9 | 36 | 82 | | 100 or more donors | Other Democratic-voting counties | 4.8 | 17 | 357 | | 500 or more donors | Counties at least 30% Black | 30.2 | 13 | 43 | | 500 or more donors | Other Democratic-voting counties | 4.1 | 13 | 320 | Note: The counties of Connecticut, which have no Black share in the demographic file, are left out. Note: Each bar is the share of the counties with at least that many reliable donors, so it carries no sampling interval; the tooltip gives the number of counties. Source: DIME public version 4.0, reliable donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; county presidential returns, 2020; county demographics, 2020; full counts of records, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/black_pool_floor.json ### Table 5. Among Democratic-voting counties, donor lean rises with Black share, and less steeply when counties are weighted by votes Mean CFscore of reliable donors against non-Hispanic Black share of residents, Democratic-voting counties (n = 498), 2020 vote and demographics | County | Black share (%) | Donor lean (mean CFscore) | Donor lean, 95% interval, low | Donor lean, 95% interval, high | Two-party votes | Reliable donors | Group | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | Bullock, AL | 69.0 | +0.369 | +0.04 | +0.69 | 4,592 | 40 | Donors lean right | | Dallas, AL | 70.6 | +0.209 | +0.03 | +0.39 | 17,754 | 138 | Donors lean right | | Greene, AL | 80.1 | +0.066 | −0.29 | +0.42 | 4,759 | 29 | Donors lean right | | Hale, AL | 56.9 | +0.792 | +0.49 | +1.09 | 7,877 | 35 | Donors lean right | | Jefferson, AL | 42.5 | +0.060 | +0.03 | +0.09 | 320,531 | 6,805 | Donors lean right | | Lowndes, AL | 74.2 | +0.581 | +0.22 | +0.94 | 6,808 | 32 | Donors lean right | | Macon, AL | 79.7 | −0.281 | −0.49 | −0.07 | 8,649 | 90 | Donors lean left | | Marengo, AL | 51.3 | +0.433 | +0.17 | +0.70 | 10,831 | 64 | Donors lean right | | Montgomery, AL | 58.3 | +0.312 | +0.27 | +0.35 | 97,840 | 2,364 | Donors lean right | | Russell, AL | 44.7 | −0.042 | −0.23 | +0.14 | 21,092 | 143 | Donors lean left | | Sumter, AL | 69.7 | +0.470 | +0.19 | +0.75 | 6,246 | 56 | Donors lean right | | Wilcox, AL | 70.2 | +0.643 | +0.34 | +0.95 | 5,881 | 36 | Donors lean right | | Apache, AZ | 0.9 | +0.003 | −0.15 | +0.16 | 34,735 | 245 | Donors lean right | | Coconino, AZ | 1.3 | −0.528 | −0.56 | −0.49 | 71,750 | 2,490 | Donors lean left | | Maricopa, AZ | 5.4 | −0.112 | −0.12 | −0.10 | 2,036,439 | 60,280 | Donors lean left | | Pima, AZ | 3.3 | −0.427 | −0.44 | −0.41 | 512,739 | 23,180 | Donors lean left | | Santa Cruz, AZ | 0.2 | −0.435 | −0.52 | −0.35 | 19,332 | 550 | Donors lean left | | Chicot, AR | 53.5 | +0.532 | +0.31 | +0.75 | 4,012 | 55 | Donors lean right | | Crittenden, AR | 49.6 | +0.298 | +0.15 | +0.44 | 15,847 | 204 | Donors lean right | | Desha, AR | 48.2 | +0.270 | +0.08 | +0.46 | 3,937 | 61 | Donors lean right | | Jefferson, AR | 56.0 | +0.163 | +0.07 | +0.25 | 24,502 | 388 | Donors lean right | | Lee, AR | 55.0 | +0.409 | +0.20 | +0.62 | 2,709 | 41 | Donors lean right | | Phillips, AR | 61.8 | −0.002 | −0.17 | +0.16 | 6,040 | 101 | Donors lean left | | Pulaski, AR | 36.8 | −0.163 | −0.19 | −0.14 | 165,634 | 6,188 | Donors lean left | | St. Francis, AR | 53.6 | +0.051 | −0.12 | +0.23 | 6,846 | 101 | Donors lean right | | Alameda, CA | 9.7 | −0.840 | −0.85 | −0.83 | 753,968 | 39,788 | Donors lean left | | Alpine, CA | 0.4 | −0.565 | −0.86 | −0.27 | 720 | 37 | Donors lean left | | Butte, CA | 1.7 | −0.425 | −0.46 | −0.39 | 99,156 | 3,195 | Donors lean left | | Contra Costa, CA | 8.1 | −0.706 | −0.71 | −0.70 | 569,263 | 32,404 | Donors lean left | | Fresno, CA | 4.3 | −0.054 | −0.08 | −0.03 | 357,489 | 6,335 | Donors lean left | | Humboldt, CA | 1.1 | −0.733 | −0.76 | −0.70 | 66,538 | 2,877 | Donors lean left | | Imperial, CA | 2.2 | +0.191 | +0.10 | +0.28 | 55,525 | 619 | Donors lean right | | Inyo, CA | 0.5 | −0.354 | −0.46 | −0.24 | 9,254 | 367 | Donors lean left | | Lake, CA | 2.2 | −0.516 | −0.58 | −0.45 | 28,064 | 886 | Donors lean left | | Los Angeles, CA | 7.6 | −0.592 | −0.60 | −0.59 | 4,174,415 | 163,108 | Donors lean left | | Marin, CA | 2.1 | −0.808 | −0.82 | −0.80 | 152,900 | 17,069 | Donors lean left | | Mendocino, CA | 0.5 | −0.787 | −0.82 | −0.76 | 42,049 | 2,280 | Donors lean left | | Merced, CA | 2.7 | +0.056 | 0.00 | +0.12 | 88,388 | 1,336 | Donors lean right | | Mono, CA | 0.1 | −0.672 | −0.78 | −0.57 | 6,526 | 246 | Donors lean left | | Monterey, CA | 2.2 | −0.507 | −0.53 | −0.48 | 160,252 | 6,087 | Donors lean left | | Napa, CA | 1.8 | −0.604 | −0.63 | −0.58 | 70,493 | 3,603 | Donors lean left | | Nevada, CA | 0.3 | −0.640 | −0.67 | −0.61 | 63,138 | 3,193 | Donors lean left | | Orange, CA | 1.5 | −0.158 | −0.17 | −0.15 | 1,490,507 | 45,983 | Donors lean left | | Riverside, CA | 6.1 | −0.289 | −0.30 | −0.27 | 976,647 | 21,059 | Donors lean left | | Sacramento, CA | 9.1 | −0.518 | −0.53 | −0.51 | 700,213 | 21,776 | Donors lean left | | San Benito, CA | 0.8 | −0.327 | −0.42 | −0.24 | 28,218 | 570 | Donors lean left | | San Bernardino, CA | 7.6 | −0.093 | −0.11 | −0.07 | 822,116 | 12,800 | Donors lean left | | San Diego, CA | 4.5 | −0.356 | −0.36 | −0.35 | 1,564,744 | 54,884 | Donors lean left | | San Francisco, CA | 4.8 | −0.866 | −0.87 | −0.86 | 434,573 | 45,868 | Donors lean left | | San Joaquin, CA | 6.7 | −0.110 | −0.14 | −0.08 | 282,235 | 4,837 | Donors lean left | | San Luis Obispo, CA | 1.3 | −0.497 | −0.52 | −0.47 | 155,746 | 7,100 | Donors lean left | | San Mateo, CA | 2.1 | −0.680 | −0.69 | −0.67 | 366,973 | 24,189 | Donors lean left | | Santa Barbara, CA | 1.6 | −0.523 | −0.54 | −0.50 | 195,699 | 9,410 | Donors lean left | | Santa Clara, CA | 2.3 | −0.659 | −0.67 | −0.65 | 832,579 | 39,175 | Donors lean left | | Santa Cruz, CA | 0.8 | −0.829 | −0.84 | −0.82 | 141,183 | 9,842 | Donors lean left | | Solano, CA | 12.8 | −0.543 | −0.57 | −0.52 | 200,945 | 5,487 | Donors lean left | | Sonoma, CA | 1.5 | −0.802 | −0.81 | −0.79 | 261,763 | 16,125 | Donors lean left | | Stanislaus, CA | 2.7 | −0.094 | −0.13 | −0.06 | 209,986 | 3,633 | Donors lean left | | Ventura, CA | 1.7 | −0.369 | −0.39 | −0.35 | 413,595 | 13,838 | Donors lean left | | Yolo, CA | 2.4 | −0.707 | −0.73 | −0.69 | 94,890 | 5,165 | Donors lean left | | Adams, CO | 3.3 | −0.280 | −0.31 | −0.25 | 229,859 | 4,579 | Donors lean left | | Arapahoe, CO | 10.6 | −0.143 | −0.16 | −0.12 | 340,930 | 12,669 | Donors lean left | | Boulder, CO | 0.8 | −0.722 | −0.73 | −0.71 | 201,590 | 16,281 | Donors lean left | | Broomfield, CO | 1.2 | −0.389 | −0.44 | −0.33 | 45,372 | 1,328 | Donors lean left | | Chaffee, CO | 1.6 | −0.429 | −0.51 | −0.35 | 13,382 | 588 | Donors lean left | | Clear Creek, CO | 0.4 | −0.287 | −0.41 | −0.16 | 6,358 | 280 | Donors lean left | | Costilla, CO | 1.1 | −0.388 | −0.65 | −0.13 | 2,052 | 54 | Donors lean left | | Denver, CO | 8.7 | −0.617 | −0.63 | −0.61 | 384,911 | 23,946 | Donors lean left | | Eagle, CO | 0.8 | −0.381 | −0.43 | −0.33 | 28,480 | 1,278 | Donors lean left | | Garfield, CO | 0.6 | −0.297 | −0.35 | −0.24 | 30,144 | 1,288 | Donors lean left | | Gilpin, CO | 1.6 | −0.415 | −0.57 | −0.26 | 4,056 | 162 | Donors lean left | | Gunnison, CO | 0.3 | −0.516 | −0.60 | −0.43 | 10,867 | 450 | Donors lean left | | Jefferson, CO | 1.1 | −0.256 | −0.27 | −0.24 | 366,813 | 15,446 | Donors lean left | | Lake, CO | 0.1 | −0.395 | −0.60 | −0.19 | 3,800 | 96 | Donors lean left | | La Plata, CO | 0.4 | −0.451 | −0.49 | −0.41 | 34,781 | 1,929 | Donors lean left | | Larimer, CO | 1.0 | −0.393 | −0.41 | −0.37 | 217,609 | 8,555 | Donors lean left | | Ouray, CO | 0.9 | −0.439 | −0.56 | −0.32 | 3,942 | 279 | Donors lean left | | Pitkin, CO | 0.4 | −0.479 | −0.53 | −0.43 | 11,769 | 1,134 | Donors lean left | | Pueblo, CO | 1.7 | −0.090 | −0.13 | −0.04 | 86,024 | 2,174 | Donors lean left | | Routt, CO | 0.6 | −0.390 | −0.46 | −0.32 | 16,507 | 824 | Donors lean left | | Saguache, CO | 0.5 | −0.539 | −0.68 | −0.39 | 3,297 | 161 | Donors lean left | | San Miguel, CO | 0.5 | −0.701 | −0.77 | −0.63 | 5,060 | 380 | Donors lean left | | Summit, CO | 0.3 | −0.455 | −0.52 | −0.39 | 17,953 | 818 | Donors lean left | | Kent, DE | 25.7 | −0.135 | −0.18 | −0.09 | 85,561 | 1,752 | Donors lean left | | New Castle, DE | 24.8 | −0.434 | −0.45 | −0.42 | 283,398 | 10,135 | Donors lean left | | District of Columbia, DC | 43.1 | −0.721 | −0.73 | −0.72 | 335,909 | 41,702 | Donors lean left | | Alachua, FL | 19.4 | −0.423 | −0.44 | −0.40 | 140,676 | 6,112 | Donors lean left | | Broward, FL | 27.5 | −0.270 | −0.28 | −0.26 | 952,161 | 25,659 | Donors lean left | | Duval, FL | 28.7 | +0.069 | +0.05 | +0.09 | 486,318 | 10,369 | Donors lean right | | Gadsden, FL | 53.8 | −0.013 | −0.11 | +0.08 | 23,618 | 483 | Donors lean left | | Hillsborough, FL | 15.4 | −0.074 | −0.09 | −0.06 | 703,765 | 18,101 | Donors lean left | | Leon, FL | 30.5 | −0.193 | −0.21 | −0.18 | 160,970 | 8,772 | Donors lean left | | Miami-Dade, FL | 14.8 | −0.211 | −0.22 | −0.20 | 1,150,697 | 32,297 | Donors lean left | | Orange, FL | 19.4 | −0.112 | −0.13 | −0.10 | 640,412 | 15,210 | Donors lean left | | Osceola, FL | 9.4 | −0.081 | −0.13 | −0.03 | 170,777 | 1,721 | Donors lean left | | Palm Beach, FL | 18.1 | −0.138 | −0.15 | −0.13 | 768,283 | 30,149 | Donors lean left | | Pinellas, FL | 9.7 | −0.165 | −0.18 | −0.15 | 553,659 | 17,100 | Donors lean left | | Seminole, FL | 11.1 | −0.005 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 257,769 | 5,947 | Donors lean left | | Baldwin, GA | 41.6 | +0.295 | +0.17 | +0.42 | 18,043 | 304 | Donors lean right | | Bibb, GA | 54.4 | +0.229 | +0.18 | +0.28 | 69,967 | 1,508 | Donors lean right | | Chatham, GA | 39.0 | −0.017 | −0.05 | +0.02 | 131,479 | 3,489 | Donors lean left | | Clarke, GA | 26.8 | −0.431 | −0.47 | −0.39 | 50,505 | 2,075 | Donors lean left | | Clayton, GA | 68.7 | −0.408 | −0.47 | −0.35 | 111,277 | 1,006 | Donors lean left | | Cobb, GA | 26.6 | −0.002 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 387,283 | 9,997 | Donors lean left | | DeKalb, GA | 51.6 | −0.672 | −0.69 | −0.66 | 366,539 | 12,992 | Donors lean left | | Dougherty, GA | 69.8 | +0.364 | +0.28 | +0.45 | 35,009 | 504 | Donors lean right | | Douglas, GA | 48.0 | −0.042 | −0.12 | +0.04 | 68,268 | 835 | Donors lean left | | Fulton, GA | 42.6 | −0.264 | −0.28 | −0.25 | 517,459 | 23,387 | Donors lean left | | Gwinnett, GA | 27.5 | −0.099 | −0.13 | −0.07 | 408,394 | 6,263 | Donors lean left | | Hancock, GA | 70.9 | −0.129 | −0.53 | +0.27 | 4,130 | 32 | Donors lean left | | Henry, GA | 48.1 | −0.158 | −0.22 | −0.10 | 121,702 | 1,450 | Donors lean left | | Jefferson, GA | 52.8 | +0.538 | +0.23 | +0.84 | 7,595 | 47 | Donors lean right | | Liberty, GA | 40.4 | −0.023 | −0.16 | +0.12 | 21,063 | 230 | Donors lean left | | Macon, GA | 60.2 | +0.760 | +0.45 | +1.07 | 4,641 | 40 | Donors lean right | | Muscogee, GA | 45.9 | +0.156 | +0.10 | +0.21 | 79,553 | 1,535 | Donors lean right | | Newton, GA | 46.3 | +0.081 | −0.02 | +0.18 | 53,658 | 526 | Donors lean right | | Richmond, GA | 55.7 | +0.211 | +0.15 | +0.27 | 85,899 | 1,340 | Donors lean right | | Rockdale, GA | 56.2 | −0.295 | −0.40 | −0.19 | 44,251 | 477 | Donors lean left | | Sumter, GA | 51.3 | +0.295 | +0.14 | +0.45 | 12,047 | 183 | Donors lean right | | Talbot, GA | 55.2 | +0.082 | −0.33 | +0.49 | 3,506 | 31 | Donors lean right | | Terrell, GA | 58.9 | +0.656 | +0.37 | +0.94 | 4,380 | 42 | Donors lean right | | Washington, GA | 53.0 | +0.677 | +0.49 | +0.86 | 9,411 | 117 | Donors lean right | | Blaine, ID | 0.5 | −0.475 | −0.53 | −0.42 | 12,950 | 1,017 | Donors lean left | | Latah, ID | 1.1 | −0.521 | −0.59 | −0.46 | 19,708 | 763 | Donors lean left | | Teton, ID | 0.0 | −0.606 | −0.73 | −0.48 | 6,176 | 204 | Donors lean left | | Champaign, IL | 13.4 | −0.559 | −0.59 | −0.53 | 92,352 | 2,846 | Donors lean left | | Cook, IL | 22.4 | −0.645 | −0.65 | −0.64 | 2,284,242 | 79,175 | Donors lean left | | DeKalb, IL | 7.0 | −0.418 | −0.48 | −0.36 | 46,548 | 977 | Donors lean left | | DuPage, IL | 4.8 | −0.268 | −0.28 | −0.25 | 474,833 | 13,593 | Donors lean left | | Jackson, IL | 14.4 | −0.471 | −0.54 | −0.40 | 22,071 | 711 | Donors lean left | | Kane, IL | 5.0 | −0.299 | −0.33 | −0.27 | 226,941 | 4,842 | Donors lean left | | Kendall, IL | 7.5 | −0.211 | −0.29 | −0.13 | 62,660 | 778 | Donors lean left | | Lake, IL | 6.4 | −0.351 | −0.37 | −0.33 | 327,626 | 11,440 | Donors lean left | | McLean, IL | 8.3 | −0.147 | −0.20 | −0.10 | 84,435 | 1,893 | Donors lean left | | Peoria, IL | 17.5 | +0.153 | +0.11 | +0.20 | 81,830 | 1,863 | Donors lean right | | Rock Island, IL | 10.4 | −0.176 | −0.24 | −0.12 | 65,294 | 1,254 | Donors lean left | | St. Clair, IL | 28.7 | −0.237 | −0.28 | −0.19 | 125,475 | 1,899 | Donors lean left | | Will, IL | 11.3 | −0.254 | −0.28 | −0.22 | 339,031 | 4,794 | Donors lean left | | Winnebago, IL | 12.2 | −0.093 | −0.14 | −0.05 | 124,917 | 2,120 | Donors lean left | | Lake, IN | 23.1 | −0.180 | −0.22 | −0.14 | 216,630 | 3,215 | Donors lean left | | Marion, IN | 27.5 | −0.087 | −0.10 | −0.07 | 381,947 | 12,551 | Donors lean left | | Monroe, IN | 3.4 | −0.632 | −0.66 | −0.60 | 61,932 | 2,880 | Donors lean left | | St. Joseph, IN | 12.4 | −0.263 | −0.30 | −0.23 | 113,060 | 2,944 | Donors lean left | | Tippecanoe, IN | 5.8 | −0.210 | −0.26 | −0.16 | 69,598 | 1,822 | Donors lean left | | Black Hawk, IA | 9.3 | −0.093 | −0.14 | −0.05 | 65,287 | 2,260 | Donors lean left | | Johnson, IA | 7.6 | −0.642 | −0.66 | −0.62 | 82,102 | 4,678 | Donors lean left | | Linn, IA | 5.7 | −0.149 | −0.18 | −0.12 | 124,238 | 4,110 | Donors lean left | | Polk, IA | 7.0 | −0.254 | −0.27 | −0.24 | 253,050 | 10,474 | Donors lean left | | Scott, IA | 7.2 | +0.055 | +0.02 | +0.09 | 90,609 | 2,850 | Donors lean right | | Story, IA | 2.4 | −0.307 | −0.35 | −0.27 | 49,515 | 2,394 | Donors lean left | | Douglas, KS | 4.1 | −0.652 | −0.68 | −0.62 | 56,173 | 2,444 | Donors lean left | | Johnson, KS | 4.7 | −0.217 | −0.24 | −0.20 | 339,890 | 10,750 | Donors lean left | | Riley, KS | 6.3 | −0.220 | −0.29 | −0.15 | 23,114 | 776 | Donors lean left | | Shawnee, KS | 7.3 | −0.087 | −0.13 | −0.05 | 83,458 | 2,469 | Donors lean left | | Wyandotte, KS | 19.5 | −0.372 | −0.44 | −0.30 | 54,078 | 762 | Donors lean left | | Fayette, KY | 14.4 | −0.183 | −0.20 | −0.16 | 149,460 | 6,292 | Donors lean left | | Jefferson, KY | 21.1 | −0.209 | −0.22 | −0.19 | 379,004 | 12,408 | Donors lean left | | Caddo Parish, LA | 48.9 | +0.435 | +0.39 | +0.48 | 103,131 | 2,088 | Donors lean right | | East Baton Rouge Parish, LA | 44.6 | +0.237 | +0.21 | +0.27 | 203,997 | 4,356 | Donors lean right | | East Carroll Parish, LA | 66.4 | +0.918 | +0.73 | +1.11 | 2,980 | 39 | Donors lean right | | Iberville Parish, LA | 45.8 | +0.460 | +0.32 | +0.60 | 16,407 | 170 | Donors lean right | | Madison Parish, LA | 62.8 | +0.590 | +0.27 | +0.91 | 4,584 | 30 | Donors lean right | | Orleans Parish, LA | 56.2 | −0.412 | −0.44 | −0.39 | 174,518 | 4,054 | Donors lean left | | St. James Parish, LA | 48.4 | +0.386 | +0.15 | +0.62 | 12,464 | 65 | Donors lean right | | St. John the Baptist Parish, LA | 56.8 | +0.029 | −0.15 | +0.21 | 21,120 | 141 | Donors lean right | | Cumberland, ME | 3.2 | −0.636 | −0.65 | −0.62 | 188,343 | 9,080 | Donors lean left | | Hancock, ME | 0.9 | −0.672 | −0.71 | −0.63 | 34,351 | 1,687 | Donors lean left | | Kennebec, ME | 0.8 | −0.458 | −0.50 | −0.42 | 69,623 | 1,846 | Donors lean left | | Knox, ME | 0.4 | −0.683 | −0.72 | −0.64 | 25,092 | 1,324 | Donors lean left | | Lincoln, ME | 0.6 | −0.569 | −0.62 | −0.52 | 22,940 | 1,061 | Donors lean left | | Sagadahoc, ME | 0.6 | −0.610 | −0.66 | −0.56 | 23,283 | 942 | Donors lean left | | Waldo, ME | 0.4 | −0.725 | −0.78 | −0.68 | 23,541 | 827 | Donors lean left | | York, ME | 1.0 | −0.520 | −0.55 | −0.49 | 126,006 | 3,277 | Donors lean left | | Anne Arundel, MD | 17.0 | −0.101 | −0.12 | −0.08 | 300,644 | 12,835 | Donors lean left | | Baltimore, MD | 29.5 | −0.192 | −0.21 | −0.18 | 404,611 | 16,353 | Donors lean left | | Charles, MD | 47.6 | −0.299 | −0.34 | −0.26 | 87,750 | 1,989 | Donors lean left | | Frederick, MD | 9.8 | −0.187 | −0.22 | −0.16 | 141,357 | 4,536 | Donors lean left | | Howard, MD | 19.2 | −0.420 | −0.44 | −0.40 | 177,823 | 8,811 | Donors lean left | | Kent, MD | 13.9 | −0.095 | −0.17 | −0.02 | 10,524 | 641 | Donors lean left | | Montgomery, MD | 18.1 | −0.620 | −0.63 | −0.61 | 520,791 | 44,044 | Donors lean left | | Prince George's, MD | 59.7 | −0.675 | −0.69 | −0.66 | 416,298 | 13,183 | Donors lean left | | Talbot, MD | 11.4 | +0.036 | −0.02 | +0.09 | 22,008 | 1,400 | Donors lean right | | Baltimore city, MD | 60.0 | −0.659 | −0.67 | −0.65 | 232,634 | 11,002 | Donors lean left | | Barnstable, MA | 2.8 | −0.434 | −0.45 | −0.42 | 147,305 | 8,714 | Donors lean left | | Berkshire, MA | 2.5 | −0.744 | −0.76 | −0.73 | 69,769 | 4,151 | Donors lean left | | Bristol, MA | 3.9 | −0.336 | −0.35 | −0.32 | 273,249 | 7,640 | Donors lean left | | Dukes, MA | 3.4 | −0.789 | −0.83 | −0.75 | 12,545 | 1,132 | Donors lean left | | Essex, MA | 3.4 | −0.393 | −0.40 | −0.38 | 412,035 | 19,895 | Donors lean left | | Franklin, MA | 1.1 | −0.815 | −0.84 | −0.79 | 41,231 | 2,730 | Donors lean left | | Hampden, MA | 7.7 | −0.299 | −0.32 | −0.28 | 213,266 | 7,389 | Donors lean left | | Hampshire, MA | 2.4 | −0.827 | −0.84 | −0.81 | 85,643 | 7,012 | Donors lean left | | Middlesex, MA | 4.8 | −0.642 | −0.65 | −0.64 | 844,152 | 65,745 | Donors lean left | | Nantucket, MA | 8.3 | −0.595 | −0.66 | −0.53 | 7,155 | 473 | Donors lean left | | Norfolk, MA | 6.9 | −0.413 | −0.42 | −0.40 | 398,606 | 19,805 | Donors lean left | | Plymouth, MA | 8.4 | −0.280 | −0.30 | −0.26 | 294,857 | 11,536 | Donors lean left | | Suffolk, MA | 18.3 | −0.658 | −0.66 | −0.65 | 329,135 | 30,811 | Donors lean left | | Worcester, MA | 4.6 | −0.325 | −0.34 | −0.31 | 420,456 | 16,172 | Donors lean left | | Genesee, MI | 19.3 | −0.269 | −0.29 | −0.24 | 218,104 | 5,020 | Donors lean left | | Ingham, MI | 11.1 | −0.330 | −0.35 | −0.31 | 141,851 | 9,117 | Donors lean left | | Kalamazoo, MI | 10.7 | −0.321 | −0.35 | −0.30 | 140,509 | 5,418 | Donors lean left | | Kent, MI | 9.2 | −0.058 | −0.08 | −0.04 | 353,656 | 10,227 | Donors lean left | | Leelanau, MI | 0.5 | −0.378 | −0.43 | −0.32 | 16,711 | 1,155 | Donors lean left | | Marquette, MI | 1.4 | −0.367 | −0.42 | −0.31 | 36,751 | 1,175 | Donors lean left | | Muskegon, MI | 12.6 | −0.239 | −0.28 | −0.20 | 90,776 | 2,193 | Donors lean left | | Oakland, MI | 12.9 | −0.218 | −0.23 | −0.21 | 760,119 | 33,789 | Donors lean left | | Saginaw, MI | 18.2 | −0.026 | −0.06 | +0.01 | 101,873 | 2,611 | Donors lean left | | Washtenaw, MI | 11.5 | −0.656 | −0.67 | −0.64 | 213,377 | 14,415 | Donors lean left | | Wayne, MI | 37.3 | −0.318 | −0.33 | −0.31 | 861,723 | 22,501 | Donors lean left | | Blue Earth, MN | 4.5 | −0.324 | −0.40 | −0.25 | 35,061 | 706 | Donors lean left | | Carlton, MN | 2.4 | −0.326 | −0.46 | −0.19 | 19,889 | 266 | Donors lean left | | Clay, MN | 4.2 | −0.234 | −0.33 | −0.14 | 31,400 | 575 | Donors lean left | | Cook, MN | 0.7 | −0.742 | −0.84 | −0.64 | 3,699 | 190 | Donors lean left | | Dakota, MN | 7.0 | −0.301 | −0.33 | −0.27 | 255,793 | 5,568 | Donors lean left | | Hennepin, MN | 13.2 | −0.536 | −0.55 | −0.53 | 738,596 | 31,656 | Donors lean left | | Lake, MN | 0.4 | −0.636 | −0.77 | −0.50 | 7,040 | 161 | Donors lean left | | Nicollet, MN | 3.5 | −0.353 | −0.49 | −0.22 | 18,640 | 237 | Donors lean left | | Olmsted, MN | 6.9 | −0.313 | −0.36 | −0.27 | 89,183 | 2,017 | Donors lean left | | Ramsey, MN | 11.8 | −0.631 | −0.65 | −0.61 | 288,996 | 10,485 | Donors lean left | | St. Louis, MN | 1.6 | −0.470 | −0.51 | −0.43 | 116,721 | 2,515 | Donors lean left | | Washington, MN | 5.1 | −0.301 | −0.34 | −0.27 | 162,929 | 3,724 | Donors lean left | | Winona, MN | 1.5 | −0.267 | −0.36 | −0.17 | 26,560 | 490 | Donors lean left | | Adams, MS | 54.2 | +0.390 | +0.22 | +0.56 | 13,613 | 158 | Donors lean right | | Bolivar, MS | 63.6 | +0.406 | +0.22 | +0.59 | 13,575 | 129 | Donors lean right | | Clay, MS | 59.8 | +0.394 | +0.12 | +0.67 | 10,025 | 59 | Donors lean right | | Coahoma, MS | 75.6 | +0.126 | −0.09 | +0.34 | 8,395 | 90 | Donors lean right | | Copiah, MS | 51.2 | +0.373 | +0.09 | +0.66 | 12,720 | 54 | Donors lean right | | Hinds, MS | 72.2 | +0.218 | +0.17 | +0.26 | 98,691 | 1,945 | Donors lean right | | Holmes, MS | 82.4 | −0.087 | −0.52 | +0.35 | 7,957 | 28 | Donors lean left | | Jasper, MS | 52.9 | +0.833 | +0.54 | +1.12 | 8,643 | 33 | Donors lean right | | Leflore, MS | 74.5 | +0.547 | +0.35 | +0.74 | 10,777 | 110 | Donors lean right | | Marshall, MS | 45.1 | +0.317 | +0.07 | +0.57 | 15,623 | 82 | Donors lean right | | Noxubee, MS | 72.9 | +0.699 | +0.30 | +1.10 | 5,280 | 27 | Donors lean right | | Oktibbeha, MS | 36.2 | −0.018 | −0.16 | +0.12 | 19,303 | 266 | Donors lean left | | Pike, MS | 53.8 | +0.411 | +0.21 | +0.61 | 17,125 | 118 | Donors lean right | | Sharkey, MS | 75.1 | +0.881 | +0.57 | +1.20 | 2,153 | 25 | Donors lean right | | Sunflower, MS | 73.3 | +0.708 | +0.51 | +0.90 | 9,580 | 77 | Donors lean right | | Warren, MS | 48.9 | +0.354 | +0.21 | +0.49 | 20,807 | 239 | Donors lean right | | Washington, MS | 71.6 | +0.420 | +0.27 | +0.57 | 17,803 | 185 | Donors lean right | | Yazoo, MS | 56.9 | +0.844 | +0.66 | +1.03 | 10,328 | 92 | Donors lean right | | Boone, MO | 9.2 | −0.379 | −0.41 | −0.35 | 88,710 | 3,332 | Donors lean left | | Jackson, MO | 22.5 | −0.448 | −0.47 | −0.43 | 326,377 | 8,537 | Donors lean left | | St. Louis, MO | 24.1 | −0.266 | −0.28 | −0.25 | 527,644 | 18,470 | Donors lean left | | St. Louis city, MO | 43.8 | −0.696 | −0.72 | −0.68 | 131,563 | 4,257 | Donors lean left | | Big Horn, MT | 0.1 | +0.284 | +0.03 | +0.54 | 4,698 | 80 | Donors lean right | | Blaine, MT | 0.4 | +0.375 | +0.17 | +0.58 | 3,058 | 106 | Donors lean right | | Deer Lodge, MT | 0.9 | −0.402 | −0.52 | −0.28 | 4,748 | 184 | Donors lean left | | Gallatin, MT | 0.4 | −0.194 | −0.23 | −0.16 | 68,740 | 3,697 | Donors lean left | | Glacier, MT | 0.3 | +0.253 | +0.06 | +0.44 | 5,494 | 126 | Donors lean right | | Missoula, MT | 0.5 | −0.476 | −0.50 | −0.45 | 69,704 | 4,316 | Donors lean left | | Silver Bow, MT | 0.2 | −0.250 | −0.31 | −0.19 | 18,137 | 807 | Donors lean left | | Douglas, NE | 10.5 | −0.137 | −0.16 | −0.11 | 269,509 | 5,980 | Donors lean left | | Lancaster, NE | 3.7 | −0.336 | −0.37 | −0.30 | 152,385 | 3,366 | Donors lean left | | Clark, NV | 11.5 | −0.086 | −0.10 | −0.07 | 952,782 | 21,629 | Donors lean left | | Washoe, NV | 2.3 | −0.102 | −0.13 | −0.08 | 244,888 | 8,427 | Donors lean left | | Carroll, NH | 0.6 | −0.307 | −0.36 | −0.25 | 32,799 | 1,231 | Donors lean left | | Cheshire, NH | 0.7 | −0.607 | −0.65 | −0.57 | 43,398 | 1,681 | Donors lean left | | Grafton, NH | 1.1 | −0.645 | −0.67 | −0.61 | 53,085 | 2,708 | Donors lean left | | Hillsborough, NH | 2.2 | −0.336 | −0.36 | −0.31 | 226,969 | 7,210 | Donors lean left | | Merrimack, NH | 1.5 | −0.505 | −0.53 | −0.48 | 88,244 | 3,264 | Donors lean left | | Rockingham, NH | 0.7 | −0.319 | −0.34 | −0.29 | 195,922 | 6,331 | Donors lean left | | Strafford, NH | 1.1 | −0.553 | −0.59 | −0.51 | 72,210 | 2,041 | Donors lean left | | Sullivan, NH | 0.6 | −0.545 | −0.61 | −0.48 | 23,898 | 802 | Donors lean left | | Atlantic, NJ | 13.1 | −0.245 | −0.28 | −0.21 | 138,246 | 2,337 | Donors lean left | | Bergen, NJ | 5.3 | −0.393 | −0.41 | −0.38 | 490,384 | 14,359 | Donors lean left | | Burlington, NJ | 15.9 | −0.435 | −0.46 | −0.41 | 257,940 | 5,675 | Donors lean left | | Camden, NJ | 18.0 | −0.507 | −0.53 | −0.49 | 261,272 | 5,603 | Donors lean left | | Cumberland, NJ | 17.5 | −0.078 | −0.15 | 0.00 | 61,694 | 735 | Donors lean left | | Essex, NJ | 36.7 | −0.649 | −0.66 | −0.64 | 342,295 | 12,548 | Donors lean left | | Gloucester, NJ | 10.1 | −0.350 | −0.39 | −0.31 | 170,042 | 2,108 | Donors lean left | | Hudson, NJ | 10.6 | −0.722 | −0.74 | −0.70 | 247,150 | 6,251 | Donors lean left | | Mercer, NJ | 18.8 | −0.561 | −0.58 | −0.54 | 174,173 | 7,770 | Donors lean left | | Middlesex, NJ | 9.6 | −0.481 | −0.50 | −0.46 | 369,717 | 7,514 | Donors lean left | | Morris, NJ | 3.0 | −0.273 | −0.29 | −0.25 | 295,015 | 9,213 | Donors lean left | | Passaic, NJ | 10.0 | −0.324 | −0.36 | −0.29 | 221,106 | 3,427 | Donors lean left | | Somerset, NJ | 9.3 | −0.347 | −0.37 | −0.32 | 183,169 | 6,234 | Donors lean left | | Union, NJ | 19.6 | −0.438 | −0.46 | −0.42 | 250,247 | 6,564 | Donors lean left | | Bernalillo, NM | 2.5 | −0.421 | −0.43 | −0.41 | 309,892 | 17,755 | Donors lean left | | Cibola, NM | 1.6 | −0.129 | −0.31 | +0.05 | 8,720 | 144 | Donors lean left | | Doña Ana, NM | 1.4 | −0.245 | −0.28 | −0.21 | 80,759 | 3,540 | Donors lean left | | Grant, NM | 0.6 | −0.385 | −0.45 | −0.32 | 14,143 | 830 | Donors lean left | | Guadalupe, NM | 1.8 | −0.239 | −0.47 | 0.00 | 2,151 | 56 | Donors lean left | | Los Alamos, NM | 0.8 | −0.413 | −0.47 | −0.35 | 11,832 | 1,052 | Donors lean left | | McKinley, NM | 0.5 | −0.399 | −0.49 | −0.30 | 25,830 | 380 | Donors lean left | | Mora, NM | 0.0 | −0.273 | −0.51 | −0.04 | 2,648 | 71 | Donors lean left | | Rio Arriba, NM | 0.5 | −0.615 | −0.68 | −0.55 | 16,398 | 552 | Donors lean left | | Sandoval, NM | 2.1 | −0.424 | −0.46 | −0.39 | 74,762 | 3,193 | Donors lean left | | San Miguel, NM | 1.2 | −0.622 | −0.69 | −0.56 | 11,309 | 498 | Donors lean left | | Santa Fe, NM | 0.8 | −0.754 | −0.77 | −0.74 | 80,859 | 9,669 | Donors lean left | | Socorro, NM | 0.5 | −0.165 | −0.27 | −0.06 | 6,977 | 359 | Donors lean left | | Taos, NM | 0.3 | −0.841 | −0.87 | −0.81 | 16,836 | 1,249 | Donors lean left | | Albany, NY | 11.5 | −0.437 | −0.45 | −0.42 | 150,555 | 6,876 | Donors lean left | | Bronx, NY | 28.7 | −0.666 | −0.68 | −0.65 | 423,114 | 6,603 | Donors lean left | | Broome, NY | 5.0 | −0.227 | −0.26 | −0.19 | 90,810 | 2,656 | Donors lean left | | Clinton, NY | 3.4 | −0.376 | −0.44 | −0.32 | 34,878 | 913 | Donors lean left | | Columbia, NY | 3.8 | −0.588 | −0.62 | −0.55 | 34,850 | 2,166 | Donors lean left | | Dutchess, NY | 9.6 | −0.421 | −0.45 | −0.40 | 148,315 | 5,701 | Donors lean left | | Erie, NY | 12.4 | −0.275 | −0.29 | −0.26 | 464,701 | 11,948 | Donors lean left | | Essex, NY | 2.4 | −0.435 | −0.50 | −0.37 | 18,923 | 738 | Donors lean left | | Kings, NY | 28.0 | −0.817 | −0.82 | −0.81 | 906,082 | 53,300 | Donors lean left | | Monroe, NY | 13.8 | −0.466 | −0.48 | −0.45 | 371,407 | 9,948 | Donors lean left | | Nassau, NY | 11.0 | −0.233 | −0.24 | −0.22 | 723,220 | 24,604 | Donors lean left | | New York, NY | 12.4 | −0.722 | −0.73 | −0.72 | 688,225 | 82,833 | Donors lean left | | Onondaga, NY | 10.4 | −0.357 | −0.38 | −0.34 | 229,513 | 6,799 | Donors lean left | | Queens, NY | 16.7 | −0.575 | −0.58 | −0.56 | 781,703 | 21,248 | Donors lean left | | Rensselaer, NY | 6.1 | −0.353 | −0.39 | −0.32 | 77,469 | 2,655 | Donors lean left | | Rockland, NY | 10.7 | −0.380 | −0.40 | −0.36 | 148,988 | 5,111 | Donors lean left | | Saratoga, NY | 1.6 | −0.368 | −0.40 | −0.34 | 129,776 | 4,033 | Donors lean left | | Schenectady, NY | 9.7 | −0.353 | −0.39 | −0.32 | 73,206 | 2,225 | Donors lean left | | Tompkins, NY | 3.7 | −0.902 | −0.92 | −0.89 | 44,715 | 3,703 | Donors lean left | | Ulster, NY | 5.6 | −0.705 | −0.73 | −0.69 | 95,560 | 4,766 | Donors lean left | | Westchester, NY | 13.0 | −0.524 | −0.53 | −0.52 | 457,084 | 28,687 | Donors lean left | | Anson, NC | 46.4 | +0.095 | −0.11 | +0.30 | 11,110 | 95 | Donors lean right | | Bertie, NC | 60.3 | +0.174 | −0.04 | +0.39 | 9,756 | 87 | Donors lean right | | Buncombe, NC | 5.5 | −0.631 | −0.65 | −0.61 | 158,927 | 7,570 | Donors lean left | | Chatham, NC | 10.6 | −0.577 | −0.61 | −0.54 | 47,973 | 2,423 | Donors lean left | | Cumberland, NC | 36.5 | −0.020 | −0.06 | +0.02 | 144,501 | 2,442 | Donors lean left | | Durham, NC | 33.5 | −0.720 | −0.74 | −0.70 | 177,147 | 7,257 | Donors lean left | | Edgecombe, NC | 56.4 | +0.033 | −0.08 | +0.14 | 25,295 | 263 | Donors lean right | | Forsyth, NC | 25.0 | −0.122 | −0.15 | −0.09 | 198,097 | 5,065 | Donors lean left | | Guilford, NC | 33.7 | −0.202 | −0.23 | −0.18 | 280,380 | 6,703 | Donors lean left | | Halifax, NC | 51.7 | −0.049 | −0.16 | +0.06 | 25,625 | 264 | Donors lean left | | Hertford, NC | 57.7 | +0.149 | −0.04 | +0.34 | 10,576 | 91 | Donors lean right | | Hoke, NC | 32.3 | −0.024 | −0.18 | +0.14 | 21,257 | 170 | Donors lean left | | Mecklenburg, NC | 30.4 | −0.225 | −0.24 | −0.21 | 557,318 | 14,217 | Donors lean left | | Nash, NC | 40.2 | +0.173 | +0.11 | +0.23 | 51,774 | 932 | Donors lean right | | New Hanover, NC | 11.8 | −0.112 | −0.14 | −0.08 | 129,469 | 4,063 | Donors lean left | | Northampton, NC | 54.9 | −0.144 | −0.33 | +0.04 | 10,058 | 102 | Donors lean left | | Orange, NC | 10.5 | −0.790 | −0.80 | −0.78 | 83,770 | 6,374 | Donors lean left | | Pasquotank, NC | 35.0 | +0.048 | −0.07 | +0.16 | 19,602 | 285 | Donors lean right | | Pitt, NC | 34.7 | −0.011 | −0.06 | +0.04 | 86,234 | 1,596 | Donors lean left | | Vance, NC | 48.2 | +0.067 | −0.04 | +0.18 | 20,822 | 263 | Donors lean right | | Wake, NC | 19.1 | −0.345 | −0.36 | −0.33 | 619,533 | 19,577 | Donors lean left | | Warren, NC | 48.6 | −0.064 | −0.25 | +0.13 | 10,152 | 131 | Donors lean left | | Washington, NC | 48.1 | +0.253 | +0.01 | +0.50 | 6,177 | 71 | Donors lean right | | Watauga, NC | 1.6 | −0.450 | −0.51 | −0.39 | 31,573 | 1,050 | Donors lean left | | Wilson, NC | 39.0 | +0.154 | +0.08 | +0.23 | 40,335 | 655 | Donors lean right | | Rolette, ND | 0.4 | −0.554 | −0.85 | −0.25 | 3,739 | 33 | Donors lean left | | Athens, OH | 2.5 | −0.450 | −0.49 | −0.41 | 25,634 | 1,548 | Donors lean left | | Cuyahoga, OH | 28.7 | −0.276 | −0.29 | −0.26 | 618,875 | 23,440 | Donors lean left | | Franklin, OH | 22.8 | −0.242 | −0.25 | −0.23 | 620,381 | 24,733 | Donors lean left | | Hamilton, OH | 24.7 | −0.064 | −0.08 | −0.05 | 424,152 | 16,160 | Donors lean left | | Lucas, OH | 18.8 | −0.112 | −0.14 | −0.09 | 197,174 | 5,534 | Donors lean left | | Montgomery, OH | 20.4 | −0.042 | −0.06 | −0.02 | 264,098 | 7,598 | Donors lean left | | Summit, OH | 14.0 | −0.160 | −0.18 | −0.14 | 276,501 | 8,586 | Donors lean left | | Benton, OR | 1.1 | −0.775 | −0.80 | −0.75 | 50,705 | 2,808 | Donors lean left | | Clackamas, OR | 0.9 | −0.508 | −0.53 | −0.49 | 249,552 | 8,097 | Donors lean left | | Clatsop, OR | 0.8 | −0.584 | −0.65 | −0.52 | 23,134 | 710 | Donors lean left | | Deschutes, OR | 0.4 | −0.490 | −0.52 | −0.46 | 121,608 | 4,163 | Donors lean left | | Hood River, OR | 0.7 | −0.595 | −0.66 | −0.53 | 12,719 | 611 | Donors lean left | | Lane, OR | 1.0 | −0.713 | −0.73 | −0.70 | 214,702 | 8,764 | Donors lean left | | Lincoln, OR | 0.3 | −0.692 | −0.74 | −0.64 | 29,845 | 1,091 | Donors lean left | | Marion, OR | 1.1 | −0.388 | −0.42 | −0.36 | 159,874 | 4,011 | Donors lean left | | Multnomah, OR | 5.3 | −0.832 | −0.84 | −0.82 | 450,244 | 27,726 | Donors lean left | | Washington, OR | 2.1 | −0.624 | −0.64 | −0.61 | 309,013 | 10,104 | Donors lean left | | Allegheny, PA | 12.6 | −0.360 | −0.37 | −0.35 | 713,672 | 22,455 | Donors lean left | | Bucks, PA | 3.7 | −0.315 | −0.33 | −0.30 | 392,079 | 11,801 | Donors lean left | | Centre, PA | 3.2 | −0.466 | −0.50 | −0.43 | 76,427 | 2,948 | Donors lean left | | Chester, PA | 5.1 | −0.309 | −0.33 | −0.29 | 310,937 | 11,849 | Donors lean left | | Dauphin, PA | 17.0 | −0.077 | −0.11 | −0.04 | 145,391 | 3,383 | Donors lean left | | Delaware, PA | 21.6 | −0.342 | −0.36 | −0.32 | 324,955 | 10,870 | Donors lean left | | Erie, PA | 6.9 | −0.137 | −0.18 | −0.10 | 135,155 | 2,515 | Donors lean left | | Lackawanna, PA | 2.8 | −0.364 | −0.39 | −0.34 | 114,325 | 2,937 | Donors lean left | | Lehigh, PA | 5.8 | −0.156 | −0.19 | −0.12 | 182,547 | 4,019 | Donors lean left | | Monroe, PA | 12.9 | −0.154 | −0.20 | −0.10 | 82,786 | 1,720 | Donors lean left | | Montgomery, PA | 9.1 | −0.424 | −0.44 | −0.41 | 504,971 | 19,994 | Donors lean left | | Northampton, PA | 5.5 | −0.229 | −0.26 | −0.20 | 168,941 | 3,962 | Donors lean left | | Philadelphia, PA | 39.2 | −0.708 | −0.72 | −0.70 | 736,530 | 22,171 | Donors lean left | | Bristol, RI | 1.0 | −0.572 | −0.61 | −0.54 | 27,795 | 1,478 | Donors lean left | | Kent, RI | 1.7 | −0.354 | −0.39 | −0.32 | 91,114 | 2,527 | Donors lean left | | Newport, RI | 3.6 | −0.526 | −0.56 | −0.49 | 45,208 | 2,168 | Donors lean left | | Providence, RI | 7.5 | −0.567 | −0.58 | −0.55 | 267,563 | 9,814 | Donors lean left | | Washington, RI | 1.2 | −0.488 | −0.52 | −0.46 | 74,367 | 3,048 | Donors lean left | | Allendale, SC | 69.7 | +0.462 | +0.11 | +0.81 | 3,553 | 30 | Donors lean right | | Bamberg, SC | 59.2 | −0.137 | −0.37 | +0.10 | 6,427 | 58 | Donors lean left | | Charleston, SC | 24.3 | −0.073 | −0.10 | −0.05 | 214,782 | 7,861 | Donors lean left | | Fairfield, SC | 55.8 | +0.017 | −0.15 | +0.19 | 12,007 | 136 | Donors lean right | | Hampton, SC | 52.2 | +0.276 | +0.03 | +0.52 | 9,229 | 63 | Donors lean right | | Jasper, SC | 36.8 | +0.059 | −0.07 | +0.19 | 14,263 | 314 | Donors lean right | | Lee, SC | 62.8 | +0.203 | −0.04 | +0.45 | 8,337 | 64 | Donors lean right | | Marion, SC | 55.8 | −0.067 | −0.19 | +0.05 | 14,583 | 188 | Donors lean left | | Marlboro, SC | 48.8 | −0.001 | −0.17 | +0.17 | 11,334 | 102 | Donors lean left | | Orangeburg, SC | 61.0 | −0.075 | −0.16 | +0.01 | 40,898 | 485 | Donors lean left | | Richland, SC | 46.9 | −0.065 | −0.09 | −0.04 | 190,883 | 6,257 | Donors lean left | | Sumter, SC | 46.3 | +0.307 | +0.22 | +0.39 | 48,379 | 563 | Donors lean right | | Williamsburg, SC | 63.6 | +0.169 | 0.00 | +0.34 | 15,821 | 133 | Donors lean right | | Clay, SD | 1.8 | −0.449 | −0.59 | −0.30 | 5,539 | 161 | Donors lean left | | Davidson, TN | 25.5 | −0.316 | −0.33 | −0.30 | 299,921 | 11,400 | Donors lean left | | Haywood, TN | 49.8 | +0.424 | +0.15 | +0.70 | 7,355 | 62 | Donors lean right | | Shelby, TN | 52.9 | −0.008 | −0.03 | +0.02 | 375,920 | 7,775 | Donors lean left | | Bexar, TX | 7.2 | +0.015 | 0.00 | +0.03 | 757,070 | 21,728 | Donors lean right | | Cameron, TX | 0.4 | +0.101 | +0.05 | +0.15 | 113,095 | 1,628 | Donors lean right | | Dallas, TX | 22.2 | −0.098 | −0.11 | −0.09 | 905,652 | 34,865 | Donors lean left | | Dimmit, TX | 0.6 | +0.734 | +0.44 | +1.03 | 3,648 | 39 | Donors lean right | | Duval, TX | 1.0 | −0.111 | −0.45 | +0.23 | 5,018 | 42 | Donors lean left | | El Paso, TX | 3.0 | −0.105 | −0.13 | −0.08 | 262,457 | 5,462 | Donors lean left | | Fort Bend, TX | 20.2 | +0.076 | +0.05 | +0.10 | 353,270 | 7,548 | Donors lean right | | Harris, TX | 18.6 | +0.031 | +0.02 | +0.04 | 1,618,823 | 52,471 | Donors lean right | | Hays, TX | 3.8 | −0.294 | −0.33 | −0.26 | 107,204 | 3,889 | Donors lean left | | Hidalgo, TX | 0.5 | −0.005 | −0.04 | +0.03 | 218,726 | 3,097 | Donors lean left | | Jim Hogg, TX | 0.2 | +0.374 | −0.08 | +0.83 | 2,030 | 25 | Donors lean right | | Maverick, TX | 0.3 | +0.158 | −0.04 | +0.36 | 15,213 | 95 | Donors lean right | | Presidio, TX | 0.0 | −0.518 | −0.74 | −0.30 | 2,184 | 69 | Donors lean left | | Starr, TX | 0.2 | +0.200 | +0.04 | +0.36 | 17,370 | 117 | Donors lean right | | Tarrant, TX | 16.8 | +0.074 | +0.06 | +0.09 | 821,308 | 21,852 | Donors lean right | | Travis, TX | 7.9 | −0.498 | −0.51 | −0.49 | 597,197 | 38,262 | Donors lean left | | Webb, TX | 0.4 | −0.109 | −0.16 | −0.05 | 67,718 | 1,119 | Donors lean left | | Willacy, TX | 1.1 | +0.660 | +0.41 | +0.91 | 5,549 | 69 | Donors lean right | | Williamson, TX | 6.4 | −0.172 | −0.20 | −0.15 | 283,524 | 8,006 | Donors lean left | | Zavala, TX | 0.8 | +0.301 | −0.10 | +0.70 | 4,354 | 32 | Donors lean right | | Grand, UT | 0.2 | −0.683 | −0.79 | −0.58 | 5,054 | 241 | Donors lean left | | Salt Lake, UT | 1.7 | −0.376 | −0.39 | −0.36 | 520,080 | 12,366 | Donors lean left | | Summit, UT | 0.5 | −0.430 | −0.48 | −0.38 | 25,496 | 1,337 | Donors lean left | | Addison, VT | 1.0 | −0.800 | −0.84 | −0.76 | 21,259 | 1,288 | Donors lean left | | Bennington, VT | 1.0 | −0.692 | −0.74 | −0.64 | 19,819 | 905 | Donors lean left | | Caledonia, VT | 0.7 | −0.723 | −0.78 | −0.66 | 15,562 | 557 | Donors lean left | | Chittenden, VT | 2.4 | −0.808 | −0.82 | −0.79 | 95,978 | 5,183 | Donors lean left | | Franklin, VT | 0.3 | −0.520 | −0.60 | −0.44 | 24,885 | 460 | Donors lean left | | Grand Isle, VT | 0.6 | −0.762 | −0.86 | −0.66 | 4,715 | 207 | Donors lean left | | Lamoille, VT | 0.9 | −0.639 | −0.70 | −0.57 | 14,403 | 603 | Donors lean left | | Orange, VT | 0.4 | −0.841 | −0.88 | −0.80 | 16,491 | 889 | Donors lean left | | Orleans, VT | 0.8 | −0.708 | −0.79 | −0.63 | 13,659 | 369 | Donors lean left | | Rutland, VT | 0.7 | −0.634 | −0.69 | −0.58 | 32,902 | 935 | Donors lean left | | Washington, VT | 0.8 | −0.818 | −0.84 | −0.79 | 34,119 | 2,172 | Donors lean left | | Windham, VT | 0.9 | −0.899 | −0.92 | −0.88 | 25,207 | 1,819 | Donors lean left | | Windsor, VT | 0.6 | −0.843 | −0.87 | −0.82 | 33,347 | 1,833 | Donors lean left | | Albemarle, VA | 9.1 | −0.495 | −0.53 | −0.46 | 63,270 | 3,609 | Donors lean left | | Arlington, VA | 9.1 | −0.552 | −0.57 | −0.54 | 127,662 | 12,157 | Donors lean left | | Brunswick, VA | 52.8 | +0.117 | −0.19 | +0.42 | 7,909 | 57 | Donors lean right | | Charles City, VA | 42.2 | +0.167 | −0.14 | +0.47 | 4,385 | 57 | Donors lean right | | Chesterfield, VA | 22.7 | −0.121 | −0.16 | −0.09 | 200,261 | 3,855 | Donors lean left | | Fairfax, VA | 9.5 | −0.335 | −0.35 | −0.33 | 588,344 | 35,920 | Donors lean left | | Henrico, VA | 29.3 | −0.219 | −0.25 | −0.19 | 180,012 | 5,120 | Donors lean left | | James City, VA | 12.4 | −0.127 | −0.18 | −0.07 | 48,706 | 1,743 | Donors lean left | | Loudoun, VA | 7.5 | −0.284 | −0.31 | −0.26 | 220,460 | 6,211 | Donors lean left | | Montgomery, VA | 4.0 | −0.532 | −0.58 | −0.48 | 43,847 | 1,221 | Donors lean left | | Northampton, VA | 31.3 | −0.214 | −0.37 | −0.05 | 6,622 | 170 | Donors lean left | | Prince Edward, VA | 30.5 | −0.102 | −0.29 | +0.08 | 9,407 | 138 | Donors lean left | | Prince William, VA | 20.0 | −0.115 | −0.15 | −0.08 | 224,085 | 4,228 | Donors lean left | | Stafford, VA | 18.5 | −0.038 | −0.10 | +0.02 | 77,881 | 1,393 | Donors lean left | | Surry, VA | 41.1 | +0.111 | −0.26 | +0.48 | 4,422 | 42 | Donors lean right | | Sussex, VA | 54.8 | −0.367 | −0.73 | 0.00 | 5,046 | 26 | Donors lean left | | Alexandria city, VA | 21.1 | −0.412 | −0.43 | −0.39 | 80,784 | 5,491 | Donors lean left | | Charlottesville city, VA | 17.0 | −0.809 | −0.84 | −0.78 | 23,790 | 1,437 | Donors lean left | | Chesapeake city, VA | 28.8 | +0.021 | −0.04 | +0.08 | 124,557 | 1,616 | Donors lean right | | Danville city, VA | 49.5 | +0.194 | +0.07 | +0.32 | 19,138 | 266 | Donors lean right | | Fairfax city, VA | 5.7 | −0.353 | −0.42 | −0.29 | 13,181 | 793 | Donors lean left | | Falls Church city, VA | 4.1 | −0.621 | −0.67 | −0.57 | 8,636 | 942 | Donors lean left | | Franklin city, VA | 54.7 | +0.172 | −0.20 | +0.55 | 4,012 | 39 | Donors lean right | | Fredericksburg city, VA | 18.9 | −0.265 | −0.35 | −0.18 | 12,554 | 502 | Donors lean left | | Hampton city, VA | 48.7 | −0.359 | −0.42 | −0.30 | 64,650 | 1,126 | Donors lean left | | Harrisonburg city, VA | 7.1 | −0.319 | −0.43 | −0.21 | 16,613 | 365 | Donors lean left | | Hopewell city, VA | 41.9 | −0.190 | −0.48 | +0.10 | 9,450 | 50 | Donors lean left | | Lexington city, VA | 6.0 | −0.540 | −0.66 | −0.42 | 2,697 | 192 | Donors lean left | | Lynchburg city, VA | 27.6 | −0.084 | −0.16 | 0.00 | 35,145 | 747 | Donors lean left | | Manassas city, VA | 12.2 | −0.158 | −0.26 | −0.06 | 16,612 | 483 | Donors lean left | | Manassas Park city, VA | 13.8 | −0.109 | −0.32 | +0.10 | 5,971 | 108 | Donors lean left | | Martinsville city, VA | 44.6 | +0.060 | −0.10 | +0.22 | 5,931 | 143 | Donors lean right | | Newport News city, VA | 40.3 | −0.164 | −0.22 | −0.11 | 79,476 | 1,291 | Donors lean left | | Norfolk city, VA | 39.5 | −0.358 | −0.40 | −0.32 | 87,883 | 2,173 | Donors lean left | | Petersburg city, VA | 75.2 | −0.285 | −0.46 | −0.11 | 13,973 | 107 | Donors lean left | | Portsmouth city, VA | 51.1 | −0.207 | −0.30 | −0.12 | 43,703 | 528 | Donors lean left | | Radford city, VA | 9.5 | −0.325 | −0.50 | −0.15 | 6,144 | 136 | Donors lean left | | Richmond city, VA | 43.2 | −0.371 | −0.40 | −0.34 | 108,778 | 3,714 | Donors lean left | | Roanoke city, VA | 28.1 | −0.234 | −0.29 | −0.17 | 42,380 | 1,108 | Donors lean left | | Staunton city, VA | 10.5 | −0.429 | −0.53 | −0.33 | 12,676 | 388 | Donors lean left | | Suffolk city, VA | 41.1 | −0.099 | −0.18 | −0.02 | 48,758 | 662 | Donors lean left | | Virginia Beach city, VA | 18.2 | +0.035 | 0.00 | +0.07 | 222,480 | 4,904 | Donors lean right | | Williamsburg city, VA | 14.7 | −0.316 | −0.40 | −0.24 | 6,753 | 608 | Donors lean left | | Winchester city, VA | 8.8 | −0.087 | −0.19 | +0.01 | 11,831 | 420 | Donors lean left | | Clallam, WA | 0.9 | −0.296 | −0.34 | −0.25 | 47,783 | 2,417 | Donors lean left | | Clark, WA | 1.9 | −0.357 | −0.38 | −0.34 | 266,627 | 8,984 | Donors lean left | | Island, WA | 2.4 | −0.402 | −0.44 | −0.37 | 51,959 | 3,211 | Donors lean left | | Jefferson, WA | 0.5 | −0.680 | −0.71 | −0.65 | 24,135 | 2,303 | Donors lean left | | King, WA | 6.4 | −0.617 | −0.62 | −0.61 | 1,176,477 | 82,113 | Donors lean left | | Kitsap, WA | 2.3 | −0.457 | −0.48 | −0.44 | 151,840 | 7,507 | Donors lean left | | Pierce, WA | 6.8 | −0.234 | −0.25 | −0.22 | 447,236 | 13,942 | Donors lean left | | San Juan, WA | 0.5 | −0.672 | −0.72 | −0.63 | 12,782 | 1,295 | Donors lean left | | Skagit, WA | 0.7 | −0.335 | −0.37 | −0.30 | 71,014 | 3,117 | Donors lean left | | Snohomish, WA | 3.4 | −0.344 | −0.36 | −0.33 | 423,156 | 13,697 | Donors lean left | | Thurston, WA | 3.0 | −0.485 | −0.50 | −0.47 | 161,885 | 8,440 | Donors lean left | | Whatcom, WA | 0.9 | −0.509 | −0.53 | −0.49 | 134,149 | 6,667 | Donors lean left | | Whitman, WA | 1.6 | −0.151 | −0.22 | −0.08 | 20,251 | 832 | Donors lean left | | Ashland, WI | 0.6 | −0.521 | −0.62 | −0.42 | 8,642 | 345 | Donors lean left | | Bayfield, WI | 0.5 | −0.542 | −0.61 | −0.48 | 10,764 | 753 | Donors lean left | | Dane, WI | 4.9 | −0.599 | −0.61 | −0.59 | 338,985 | 25,420 | Donors lean left | | Door, WI | 0.2 | −0.193 | −0.26 | −0.13 | 19,796 | 1,177 | Donors lean left | | Douglas, WI | 1.0 | −0.233 | −0.31 | −0.16 | 24,141 | 709 | Donors lean left | | Eau Claire, WI | 1.2 | −0.142 | −0.18 | −0.10 | 56,961 | 3,014 | Donors lean left | | Green, WI | 0.7 | −0.025 | −0.11 | +0.06 | 21,020 | 700 | Donors lean left | | Iowa, WI | 0.8 | −0.271 | −0.35 | −0.20 | 13,737 | 726 | Donors lean left | | La Crosse, WI | 1.6 | −0.220 | −0.26 | −0.18 | 66,530 | 3,429 | Donors lean left | | Menominee, WI | 0.5 | +0.032 | −0.43 | +0.49 | 1,581 | 29 | Donors lean right | | Milwaukee, WI | 25.7 | −0.462 | −0.47 | −0.45 | 451,627 | 23,734 | Donors lean left | | Portage, WI | 0.7 | −0.195 | −0.24 | −0.15 | 39,727 | 1,715 | Donors lean left | | Rock, WI | 4.6 | −0.052 | −0.09 | −0.01 | 83,796 | 2,935 | Donors lean left | | Sauk, WI | 0.7 | −0.062 | −0.12 | 0.00 | 35,601 | 1,347 | Donors lean left | | Albany, WY | 1.0 | −0.364 | −0.44 | −0.29 | 17,671 | 649 | Donors lean left | | Teton, WY | 0.6 | −0.230 | −0.29 | −0.17 | 14,189 | 1,158 | Donors lean left | Note: Votes are full counts. The data table gives each county's 95% interval for its donor lean, which treats its reliable donors as independent draws; the tooltip gives n, the number of reliable donors, and a county with a small pool has a noisy donor lean. The intervals on the binned means are 95% intervals across the counties in each bin. Note: The counties of Connecticut, which have no college share or median income in the demographic file, are left out. Source: DIME public version 4.0, reliable donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; county presidential returns, 2020; county demographics, 2020; donors are not weighted, county values are counted once, and the second set of estimates is weighted by 2020 two-party votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/black_share_gradient.json ### Table 6. The adjusted Black share slope is above zero when each county counts once and includes zero when counties are weighted by votes Regression coefficients of county donor lean, per 10 points of Black share or college share, Democratic-voting counties (n = 498), 95% intervals from standard errors clustered on state | Measure | Weighting | Change in donor lean per 10 points | 95% interval, low | 95% interval, high | Counties | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Black share, alone | Each county counted once | +0.101 | +0.077 | +0.125 | 498 | | Black share, alone | Weighted by two-party votes | +0.040 | +0.005 | +0.075 | 498 | | Black share, adjusted | Each county counted once | +0.068 | +0.042 | +0.094 | 498 | | Black share, adjusted | Weighted by two-party votes | +0.028 | −0.006 | +0.062 | 498 | | College share, adjusted | Each county counted once | −0.120 | −0.156 | −0.085 | 498 | | College share, adjusted | Weighted by two-party votes | −0.108 | −0.154 | −0.061 | 498 | Note: Adjusted rows hold the other two measures fixed in one regression. Democratic-voting counties without a college share or median household income, which are in Connecticut, are left out. Source: DIME public version 4.0, reliable donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; county presidential returns, 2020; county demographics, 2020; donors are not weighted; regression estimates count each county once or weight by 2020 two-party votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/black_slopes.json ### Table 7. Mississippi holds 7 of the 10 Democratic-voting counties with the most right-leaning donors The 10 Democratic-voting counties with the highest mean CFscore of reliable donors and the 10 Republican-voting counties with the lowest, among counties with a pool large enough to rank, 2020 vote | County | Group | Democratic share (%) | Donor lean (mean CFscore) | 95% interval, low | 95% interval, high | Reliable donors | Black share (%) | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Yazoo, MS | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | 53.2 | +0.84 | +0.66 | +1.03 | 92 | 56.9 | | Sunflower, MS | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | 70.8 | +0.71 | +0.51 | +0.91 | 77 | 73.3 | | Washington, GA | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | 50.4 | +0.68 | +0.49 | +0.86 | 117 | 53.0 | | Leflore, MS | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | 71.0 | +0.55 | +0.35 | +0.74 | 110 | 74.5 | | Iberville Parish, LA | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | 51.9 | +0.46 | +0.32 | +0.60 | 170 | 45.8 | | Caddo Parish, LA | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | 53.4 | +0.43 | +0.39 | +0.48 | 2,088 | 48.9 | | Washington, MS | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | 70.2 | +0.42 | +0.27 | +0.57 | 185 | 71.6 | | Pike, MS | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | 50.5 | +0.41 | +0.21 | +0.61 | 118 | 53.8 | | Bolivar, MS | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | 65.6 | +0.41 | +0.22 | +0.59 | 129 | 63.6 | | Adams, MS | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | 58.2 | +0.39 | +0.22 | +0.56 | 158 | 54.2 | | Floyd, VA | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | 32.5 | −0.65 | −0.77 | −0.53 | 192 | 2.1 | | Schuyler, NY | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | 41.0 | −0.61 | −0.71 | −0.50 | 232 | 0.9 | | Jackson, OR | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | 48.2 | −0.60 | −0.63 | −0.58 | 4,773 | 0.7 | | Tillamook, OR | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | 49.1 | −0.60 | −0.68 | −0.52 | 492 | 0.7 | | Trinity, CA | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | 47.2 | −0.56 | −0.70 | −0.41 | 161 | 0.8 | | Nelson, VA | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | 47.3 | −0.52 | −0.61 | −0.42 | 351 | 12.0 | | Washington, ME | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | 39.9 | −0.51 | −0.61 | −0.42 | 372 | 0.6 | | Madison, NC | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | 38.1 | −0.51 | −0.60 | −0.42 | 371 | 1.2 | | Rice, MN | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | 49.9 | −0.51 | −0.57 | −0.44 | 842 | 6.2 | | St. Lawrence, NY | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | 44.0 | −0.50 | −0.57 | −0.44 | 865 | 2.2 | Note: Counties are named only when their pool has enough donors to rank; the smallest pools are in the map and the scatter but not in this figure. Note: Votes are full counts. The interval is the 95% interval of the county's donor mean and treats its donors as independent draws. Source: DIME public version 4.0, reliable donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; county presidential returns, 2020; county demographics, 2020; full counts of records, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/named_counties.json ### Table 8. Democratic-voting counties diverge mostly in small pools, Republican-voting counties in large ones Share of counties whose donor pool leans opposite to the vote, by number of reliable donors in the county, for Democratic-voting and Republican-voting counties, 2020 vote | Reliable donors in the county | Vote | Divergent counties (% of counties voting that way) | Divergent counties | Counties | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 25 to 49 donors | Democratic-voting counties | 78.6 | 22 | 28 | | 50 to 99 donors | Democratic-voting counties | 74.2 | 23 | 31 | | 100 to 199 donors | Democratic-voting counties | 45.9 | 17 | 37 | | 200 to 499 donors | Democratic-voting counties | 25.6 | 10 | 39 | | 500 to 999 donors | Democratic-voting counties | 11.8 | 6 | 51 | | 1,000 or more donors | Democratic-voting counties | 6.3 | 20 | 318 | | 25 to 49 donors | Republican-voting counties | 12.9 | 41 | 318 | | 50 to 99 donors | Republican-voting counties | 12.6 | 59 | 468 | | 100 to 199 donors | Republican-voting counties | 12.8 | 57 | 445 | | 200 to 499 donors | Republican-voting counties | 21.6 | 117 | 542 | | 500 to 999 donors | Republican-voting counties | 33.7 | 88 | 261 | | 1,000 or more donors | Republican-voting counties | 36.5 | 110 | 301 | Note: Each bar is the share of the counties in the analysis in that band, so it carries no sampling interval; the tooltip gives the number of counties. Source: DIME public version 4.0, reliable donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; county presidential returns, 2020; county demographics, 2020; full counts of records, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/pool_size.json ### Table 9. Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors are 63.5% of Northeast counties and 12.5% of Southern ones Share of counties whose donor pool leans opposite to the vote, by Census region, for Republican-voting and Democratic-voting counties, 2020 vote | Region | Vote | Divergent counties (% of counties voting that way) | Divergent counties | Counties | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Northeast | Republican-voting counties | 63.5 | 73 | 115 | | Northeast | Democratic-voting counties | 0.0 | 0 | 102 | | West | Republican-voting counties | 27.8 | 76 | 273 | | West | Democratic-voting counties | 5.1 | 6 | 117 | | Midwest | Republican-voting counties | 22.1 | 184 | 832 | | Midwest | Democratic-voting counties | 3.6 | 3 | 83 | | South | Republican-voting counties | 12.5 | 139 | 1,115 | | South | Democratic-voting counties | 44.1 | 89 | 202 | Note: Each bar is the share of the counties in that region, so it carries no sampling interval; the tooltip gives the number of counties. Source: DIME public version 4.0, reliable donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; county presidential returns, 2020; county demographics, 2020; full counts of records, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/regions.json ### Table 10. The number of divergent counties runs from 112 to 1,030 across the definitions tested Counties whose donor pool leans opposite to the vote under the chapter's definition and under changes to the donor pool, the pool floor, the vote year, the neutral point of the donor scale and the divergence rule | Definition | Divergent counties | Share of counties (%) | Democratic vote, right-leaning donors | Republican vote, left-leaning donors | Counties | Share of votes (%) | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Chapter definition | 570 | 20.1 | 98 | 472 | 2,839 | 16.0 | | Donor pool: at least 15 distinct recipients | 617 | 25.4 | 75 | 542 | 2,432 | 18.3 | | Donor pool: all donors with a CFscore | 301 | 9.7 | 188 | 113 | 3,105 | 18.3 | | Vote year: 2024 | 590 | 20.8 | 68 | 522 | 2,835 | 22.6 | | Pool floor: at least 75 donors per county | 462 | 20.9 | 62 | 400 | 2,212 | 16.0 | | Neutral point: mean of all donors | 344 | 12.1 | 240 | 104 | 2,839 | 26.9 | | Neutral point: median county | 1,030 | 36.3 | 57 | 973 | 2,839 | 24.5 | | Divergence rule: both cut points cleared | 112 | 3.9 | 27 | 85 | 2,839 | 1.2 | Note: The 2024 row leaves out four Missouri counties (Jackson, Clay, Platte and Cass) because the 2024 returns report Kansas City separately from them. Note: Votes are full counts. Each row counts counties once, and the share of votes is weighted by 2020 two-party votes. Source: DIME public version 4.0, donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; county presidential returns, 2020 and 2024 (repaired file); donors are not weighted, counties are counted once, and the share of votes is weighted by two-party votes Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/definitions.json ### Table 11. Counties at least 30% Black sit to the right of other Democratic-voting counties in every donor cohort Mean CFscore of reliable donors, or the difference between two groups of counties, by the election cycles in which donors first gave, Democratic-voting counties with a large Black share and other Democratic-voting counties, 2020 vote | County set | Donor cohort | Group | Mean CFscore, or difference | 95% interval, low | 95% interval, high | Counties (donors for all) | Counties with a right-leaning pool | Counties with a right-leaning pool (%) | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Every county with a pool | First gave 1980-96 | Counties at least 30% Black | +0.395 | +0.308 | +0.482 | 68 | 59 | 86.8 | | Every county with a pool | First gave 1980-96 | Other Democratic-voting counties | +0.205 | +0.168 | +0.242 | 317 | n/a | n/a | | Every county with a pool | First gave 1980-96 | All reliable donors | +0.228 | +0.225 | +0.230 | 422,794 | n/a | n/a | | Every county with a pool | First gave 1998-2008 | Counties at least 30% Black | +0.193 | +0.116 | +0.269 | 90 | 63 | 70.0 | | Every county with a pool | First gave 1998-2008 | Other Democratic-voting counties | −0.176 | −0.207 | −0.145 | 363 | n/a | n/a | | Every county with a pool | First gave 1998-2008 | All reliable donors | −0.081 | −0.083 | −0.080 | 1,562,979 | n/a | n/a | | Every county with a pool | First gave 2010-16 | Counties at least 30% Black | −0.304 | −0.366 | −0.242 | 72 | 7 | 9.7 | | Every county with a pool | First gave 2010-16 | Other Democratic-voting counties | −0.565 | −0.587 | −0.543 | 356 | n/a | n/a | | Every county with a pool | First gave 2010-16 | All reliable donors | −0.467 | −0.469 | −0.465 | 1,249,312 | n/a | n/a | | Every county with a pool | First gave 2018-24 | Counties at least 30% Black | −0.239 | −0.315 | −0.163 | 80 | 18 | 22.5 | | Every county with a pool | First gave 2018-24 | Other Democratic-voting counties | −0.560 | −0.580 | −0.540 | 356 | n/a | n/a | | Every county with a pool | First gave 2018-24 | All reliable donors | −0.457 | −0.459 | −0.455 | 1,482,136 | n/a | n/a | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 1980-96 | Counties at least 30% Black | +0.363 | +0.272 | +0.454 | 59 | 50 | 84.7 | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 1980-96 | Other Democratic-voting counties | +0.204 | +0.167 | +0.241 | 315 | n/a | n/a | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 1980-96 | All reliable donors | +0.228 | +0.225 | +0.230 | 422,794 | n/a | n/a | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 1998-2008 | Counties at least 30% Black | +0.135 | +0.038 | +0.231 | 59 | 38 | 64.4 | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 1998-2008 | Other Democratic-voting counties | −0.180 | −0.212 | −0.147 | 315 | n/a | n/a | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 1998-2008 | All reliable donors | −0.081 | −0.083 | −0.080 | 1,562,979 | n/a | n/a | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 2010-16 | Counties at least 30% Black | −0.311 | −0.383 | −0.238 | 59 | 6 | 10.2 | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 2010-16 | Other Democratic-voting counties | −0.557 | −0.581 | −0.534 | 315 | n/a | n/a | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 2010-16 | All reliable donors | −0.467 | −0.469 | −0.465 | 1,249,312 | n/a | n/a | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 2018-24 | Counties at least 30% Black | −0.305 | −0.390 | −0.220 | 59 | 10 | 16.9 | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 2018-24 | Other Democratic-voting counties | −0.562 | −0.583 | −0.542 | 315 | n/a | n/a | | Same counties in every cohort | First gave 2018-24 | All reliable donors | −0.457 | −0.459 | −0.455 | 1,482,136 | n/a | n/a | | Gap between the two groups | First gave 1980-96 | Difference in mean donor lean | +0.190 | +0.095 | +0.285 | 385 | n/a | n/a | | Gap between the two groups | First gave 1998-2008 | Difference in mean donor lean | +0.368 | +0.286 | +0.451 | 453 | n/a | n/a | | Gap between the two groups | First gave 2010-16 | Difference in mean donor lean | +0.261 | +0.195 | +0.327 | 428 | n/a | n/a | | Gap between the two groups | First gave 2018-24 | Difference in mean donor lean | +0.320 | +0.242 | +0.399 | 436 | n/a | n/a | Views: Every county with a pool (set = Every county with a pool); Same counties in every cohort (set = Same counties in every cohort); Gap between the two groups (set = Gap between the two groups). Note: A donor's CFscore is fixed, so a difference between cohorts is a difference in who gave, and a cohort is the set of donors whose first cycle falls in the window. Note: The second view keeps only the counties that have a pool in every cohort; the third plots the difference between the two groups of counties. Note: Intervals on county groups are 95% intervals from the spread of county means; the interval of the gray dot treats donors as independent draws. Source: DIME public version 4.0, reliable donors by most recent county, 1980-2024; county presidential returns, 2020; county demographics, 2020; full counts of records, no weights Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/cohorts.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (158), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | bal_gap_max | 0.31 | CFscore units | difference in mean county donor lean, counties at least 30% Black minus other Democratic-voting counties, largest across the four cohorts | Democratic-voting counties with 25 or more reliable donors in every cohort | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI 0.21 to 0.42 | 374 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | Normal interval from the spread of county means within each group. | | bal_gap_min | 0.16 | CFscore units | difference in mean county donor lean, counties at least 30% Black minus other Democratic-voting counties, smallest across the four cohorts | Democratic-voting counties with 25 or more reliable donors in every cohort | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI 0.06 to 0.26 | 374 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | Normal interval from the spread of county means within each group. | | bal_k | 59 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties at least 30% Black with a pool in every cohort | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 59 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | big_black_k | 10 | counties | size of the group compared | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, at least 30% Black, the ones with the most two-party votes | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | big_k | 100 | counties | size of the group compared | the counties of the frame with the most two-party votes | 2020 presidential vote | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | black_cut | 30% | percent of residents, non-Hispanic Black | definition of a group | counties grouped as at least 30% Black | 2020 | | | none (full counts of counties) | County demographics panel | | | cell_floor | 10 | counties | minimum number of counties for a band to be plotted | a band on one side of the vote | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | college_net_eq | −0.120 | CFscore units per 10 points of college share | regression coefficient of county donor lean on college share, net of Black share and median income | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI −0.156 to −0.085 | 498 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | State-clustered standard errors (46 states). | | college_net_w | −0.108 | CFscore units per 10 points of college share | regression coefficient of county donor lean on college share, net of Black share and median income | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI −0.154 to −0.061 | 498 | two-party votes in 2020 (county-equal in the companion fact) | DIME | State-clustered standard errors (46 states). | | college_rl | 24.2% | percent of adults 25 and over with a bachelor degree | median county college share | Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors | 2020 | | 472 | none (full counts of counties) | County demographics panel | | | college_rr | 19.6% | percent of adults 25 and over with a bachelor degree | median county college share | Republican-voting counties with right-leaning donors | 2020 | | 1,863 | none (full counts of counties) | County demographics panel | | | corr_black_all_eq | +0.55 | correlation coefficient | correlation of donor lean and Black share | Democratic-voting counties with a 2020 Black share and at least 25 reliable donors, all donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 528 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | | | corr_black_all_w | +0.06 | correlation coefficient | correlation of donor lean and Black share | Democratic-voting counties with a 2020 Black share and at least 25 reliable donors, all donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 528 | two-party votes in 2020 (county-equal in the companion fact) | DIME | | | corr_black_eq | +0.62 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county donor lean and Black share | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI 0.55 to 0.69 | 498 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | County bootstrap, 2000 replicates, seed 12345. | | corr_black_strict_eq | +0.60 | correlation coefficient | correlation of donor lean and Black share | Democratic-voting counties with a 2020 Black share and at least 25 reliable donors, stricter donor definition | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 463 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | | | corr_black_w | +0.21 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county donor lean and Black share | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.37 | 498 | two-party votes in 2020 (county-equal in the companion fact) | DIME | County bootstrap, 2000 replicates, seed 12345. | | county_mean_lean | +0.18 | CFscore units (negative is left) | mean of the county donor lean, each county counted once | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | county_median_lean | +0.19 | CFscore units (negative is left) | median of the county donor lean, each county counted once | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | cross_eq | 45.9% | percent Democratic, two-party vote | vote share at which a least-squares line of donor lean crosses zero | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | | | cross_w | 44.5% | percent Democratic, two-party vote | vote share at which a least-squares line of donor lean crosses zero | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | two-party votes in 2020 (county-equal in the companion fact) | DIME | | | def_div_hi | 1,030 | counties | largest count of divergent counties across the eight rows | counties under each of the eight definitions in the definitions table (the frame differs by row) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | def_div_lo | 112 | counties | smallest count of divergent counties across the eight rows | counties under each of the eight definitions in the definitions table (the frame differs by row) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | def_dr_hi | 188 | counties | largest count of Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors across the five rows | the five definitions of the donor pool, the vote year and the pool floor | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | def_dr_lo | 62 | counties | smallest count of Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors across the five rows | the five definitions of the donor pool, the vote year and the pool floor | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | def_rl_hi | 542 | counties | largest count of Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors across the five rows | the five definitions of the donor pool, the vote year and the pool floor | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | def_rl_lo | 113 | counties | smallest count of Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors across the five rows | the five definitions of the donor pool, the vote year and the pool floor | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | def_share_hi | 36.3% | percent of counties | largest share of counties that are divergent across the eight rows | counties under each of the eight definitions in the definitions table (the frame differs by row) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | def_share_lo | 3.9% | percent of counties | smallest share of counties that are divergent across the eight rows | counties under each of the eight definitions in the definitions table (the frame differs by row) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | dem_pool_large | 6.3% | percent of counties | share with a right-leaning donor pool | Democratic-voting counties with 1,000 or more reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 318 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | dem_pool_small | 78.6% | percent of counties | share with a right-leaning donor pool | Democratic-voting counties with 25 to 49 reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 28 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | donor_sd | 1.01 | CFscore units | standard deviation of donor CFscores | reliable donors in the donor file | 1980-2024 | | 4,717,221 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | dr_median_share | 57.6% | percent Democratic, two-party vote | median county Democratic share | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors | 2020 | | 98 | none (full counts of counties) | County election returns | | | gap_c1 | 0.19 | CFscore units | difference in mean county donor lean, counties at least 30% Black minus other Democratic-voting counties | Democratic-voting counties with 25 or more reliable donors who first gave in 1980-96 | 2020 vote; donors first active 1980-96 | 95% CI 0.10 to 0.28 | 385 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | Normal interval from the spread of county means within each group. | | gap_c2 | 0.37 | CFscore units | difference in mean county donor lean, counties at least 30% Black minus other Democratic-voting counties | Democratic-voting counties with 25 or more reliable donors who first gave in 1998-2008 | 2020 vote; donors first active 1998-2008 | 95% CI 0.29 to 0.45 | 453 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | Normal interval from the spread of county means within each group. | | gap_c3 | 0.26 | CFscore units | difference in mean county donor lean, counties at least 30% Black minus other Democratic-voting counties | Democratic-voting counties with 25 or more reliable donors who first gave in 2010-16 | 2020 vote; donors first active 2010-16 | 95% CI 0.19 to 0.33 | 428 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | Normal interval from the spread of county means within each group. | | gap_c4 | 0.32 | CFscore units | difference in mean county donor lean, counties at least 30% Black minus other Democratic-voting counties | Democratic-voting counties with 25 or more reliable donors who first gave in 2018-24 | 2020 vote; donors first active 2018-24 | 95% CI 0.24 to 0.40 | 436 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | Normal interval from the spread of county means within each group. | | gap_strict_max | 0.35 | CFscore units | difference in mean county donor lean, counties at least 30% Black minus other Democratic-voting counties, largest across the four cohorts, donors with at least 15 distinct recipients | Democratic-voting counties with 25 or more donors of at least 15 distinct recipients who first gave in the cohort | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI 0.26 to 0.45 | 410 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | Normal interval from the spread of county means within each group. | | gap_strict_min | 0.19 | CFscore units | difference in mean county donor lean, counties at least 30% Black minus other Democratic-voting counties, smallest across the four cohorts, donors with at least 15 distinct recipients | Democratic-voting counties with 25 or more donors of at least 15 distinct recipients who first gave in the cohort | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI 0.07 to 0.30 | 346 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | Normal interval from the spread of county means within each group. | | hisp_cut | 50% | percent of residents, Hispanic | definition of a group | counties grouped as majority Hispanic | 2020 | | | none (full counts of counties) | County demographics panel | | | lean_cut | 0.25 | CFscore units | definition of a map class | cut of the map on either side of zero | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | median_pool_all | 229 | reliable donors | median pool size | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | median_pool_black30 | 170 | reliable donors | median pool size | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, at least 30% Black | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 126 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | median_pool_dem_other | 3,193 | reliable donors | median pool size | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, under 30% Black | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 372 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | median_pool_dr | 117 | reliable donors | median pool size | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 98 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | median_votes_bl_left | 73,872 | two-party votes | median county two-party votes | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, at least 30% Black, with left-leaning donors | 2020 | | 52 | none (full counts of counties) | County election returns | | | median_votes_bl_right | 10,804 | two-party votes | median county two-party votes | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, at least 30% Black, with right-leaning donors | 2020 | | 74 | none (full counts of counties) | County election returns | | | n_balanced | 374 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with 25 or more reliable donors in every cohort | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 374 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_big_black_left | 9 | counties | count with a left-leaning donor pool | the 10 counties at least 30% Black with the most two-party votes among Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 10 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_big_div | 9 | counties | count of divergent counties | the 100 counties of the frame with the most two-party votes | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 100 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_black30_p1 | 82 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, at least 30% Black, with 100 or more reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 82 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_black30_p2 | 43 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, at least 30% Black, with 500 or more reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 43 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_black_frame | 498 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 498 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_black_states | 46 | states | number of states, the clusters of the regressions | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 46 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_clear | 112 | counties | count of counties in the two corner classes of the map | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_clear_dr | 27 | counties | count of counties in the Democratic-vote, right-donor corner class of the map | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_clear_dr_south | 26 | counties | count of counties | counties in the Democratic-vote, right-donor corner class, in the South | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 27 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_clear_rl | 85 | counties | count of counties in the Republican-vote, left-donor corner class of the map | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_cohort_donors_c1 | 0.4 million | donors | count of donors | reliable donors who first gave in 1980-96 | donors first active 1980-96 | | 422,794 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_cohort_donors_c4 | 1.5 million | donors | count of donors | reliable donors who first gave in 2018-24 | donors first active 2018-24 | | 1,482,136 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_counties | 2,839 | counties | count of counties in the frame | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_counties_all | 3,105 | counties | count of counties | counties with a pool and a return under all donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 3,105 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dem_black30 | 126 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, at least 30% Black | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 126 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dem_black30_right | 74 | counties | count with a right-leaning donor pool | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, at least 30% Black | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 126 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dem_other | 372 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, under 30% Black | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 372 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_div | 570 | counties | count of counties on the two off-diagonal sides of the sign rule | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_donors_all | 4.7 million | donors | count of donors | reliable individual donors with a CFscore and a county | 1980-2024 | | 4,717,221 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_donors_alldef | 36.4 million | donors | count of donors | all individual donors with a CFscore and a county, reliable or not | 1980-2024 | | 36,402,792 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_donors_frame | 4.7 million | donors | count of donors | reliable donors in the counties of the frame | 1980-2024 | | 4,713,191 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr | 98 | counties | count of Democratic-voting counties with a right-leaning donor pool | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_2024 | 68 | counties | count of Democratic-voting counties with a right-leaning pool | counties with a pool and a return under the 2024 vote | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,835 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_all | 188 | counties | count of Democratic-voting counties with a right-leaning pool | counties with a pool and a return under all donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 3,105 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_black | 74 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors that are at least 30% Black | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 98 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_hisp | 10 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors that are under 30% Black and majority Hispanic | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 98 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_hisp_tx | 8 | counties | count of counties | those majority-Hispanic counties that are in Texas | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 10 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_midwest | 3 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors, in the Midwest | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 3 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_ms | 16 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors, in Mississippi | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 16 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_northeast | 0 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors, in the Northeast | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 0 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_other | 14 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors that are neither | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 98 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_other_even | 9 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors that are neither, with a Democratic share below the upper cut | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 14 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_refmed | 57 | counties | count of Democratic-voting counties with donor lean above the reference | counties in the frame, with the donor lean measured from the median county | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_refpool | 240 | counties | count of Democratic-voting counties with donor lean above the reference | counties in the frame, with the donor lean measured from the mean of all reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_small | 45 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors and fewer than 100 reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 98 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_south | 89 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors, in the South | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 89 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_strict | 75 | counties | count of Democratic-voting counties with a right-leaning pool | counties with a pool and a return under the stricter donor definition | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,432 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_dr_west | 6 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors, in the West | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 6 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_other_p1 | 357 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, under 30% Black, with 100 or more reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 357 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_other_p2 | 320 | counties | count of counties | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, under 30% Black, with 500 or more reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 320 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl | 472 | counties | count of Republican-voting counties with a left-leaning donor pool | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl_2024 | 522 | counties | count of Republican-voting counties with a left-leaning pool | counties with a pool and a return under the 2024 vote | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,835 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl_above_line | 76 | counties | count with a Democratic share at or above the point where the county-equal fitted line crosses zero, as printed (45.9%) | Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 472 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl_all | 113 | counties | count of Republican-voting counties with a left-leaning pool | counties with a pool and a return under all donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 3,105 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl_midwest | 184 | counties | count of counties | Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors, in the Midwest | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 184 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl_northeast | 73 | counties | count of counties | Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors, in the Northeast | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 73 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl_refmed | 973 | counties | count of Republican-voting counties with donor lean below the reference | counties in the frame, with the donor lean measured from the median county | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl_refpool | 104 | counties | count of Republican-voting counties with donor lean below the reference | counties in the frame, with the donor lean measured from the mean of all reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl_right_of_pool | 368 | counties | count with a donor lean above the mean CFscore of all reliable donors | Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 472 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl_south | 139 | counties | count of counties | Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors, in the South | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 139 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl_strict | 542 | counties | count of Republican-voting counties with a left-leaning pool | counties with a pool and a return under the stricter donor definition | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,432 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_rl_west | 76 | counties | count of counties | Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors, in the West | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 76 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_top | 10 | counties | length of the list | each list of named counties | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_top_black30 | 10 | counties | count at least 30% Black | the ten Democratic-voting counties with the most right-leaning donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 10 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_top_ms | 7 | counties | count in Mississippi | the ten Democratic-voting counties with the most right-leaning donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 10 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | n_top_rl_states | 7 | states | number of states | the ten Republican-voting counties with the most left-leaning donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 10 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | named_floor | 75 | reliable donors | minimum pool for a county to be ranked | counties named in the table | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | nat_c1 | +0.228 | CFscore units (negative is left) | mean CFscore, each donor counted once | reliable donors who first gave in 1980-96 | donors first active 1980-96 | 95% CI 0.225 to 0.230 | 422,794 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | nat_c2 | −0.081 | CFscore units (negative is left) | mean CFscore, each donor counted once | reliable donors who first gave in 1998-2008 | donors first active 1998-2008 | 95% CI −0.083 to −0.080 | 1,562,979 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | nat_c3 | −0.467 | CFscore units (negative is left) | mean CFscore, each donor counted once | reliable donors who first gave in 2010-16 | donors first active 2010-16 | 95% CI −0.469 to −0.465 | 1,249,312 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | nat_c4 | −0.457 | CFscore units (negative is left) | mean CFscore, each donor counted once | reliable donors who first gave in 2018-24 | donors first active 2018-24 | 95% CI −0.459 to −0.455 | 1,482,136 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | noise_all_n | 138 | counties | expected number of counties whose observed donor sign differs from the sign of the underlying donor mean | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | Normal model with the county standard error sd over the square root of n; flat prior. | | noise_all_share | 4.9% | percent of counties | expected share of counties whose observed donor sign differs from the underlying sign | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | noise_div_n | 56 | counties | expected number of divergent counties whose underlying donor sign is the aligned one | divergent counties in the frame | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 570 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | Normal model with the county standard error; flat prior. | | noise_div_share | 9.8% | percent of divergent counties | expected share of divergent counties whose underlying donor sign is the aligned one | divergent counties in the frame | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 570 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | noise_eb_n | 83 | counties | expected number of divergent counties whose underlying donor sign is the aligned one, county means shrunk toward a line in the Democratic share | divergent counties in the frame | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 570 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | Normal model; underlying county means scatter around a least-squares line in the Democratic share with standard deviation 0.27 (method of moments). | | noise_eb_share | 14.5% | percent of divergent counties | expected share of divergent counties whose underlying donor sign is the aligned one, county means shrunk toward a line in the Democratic share | divergent counties in the frame | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 570 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | pool_chk1 | 100 | reliable donors | minimum pool | pool floor of a check on the Black share comparison | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | pool_chk2 | 500 | reliable donors | minimum pool | pool floor of a check on the Black share comparison | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | pool_floor | 25 | reliable donors | definition of the frame (minimum pool) | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | pool_mean_all | −0.274 | CFscore units (negative is left) | mean CFscore, each donor counted once | reliable donors in the donor file | 1980-2024 | 95% CI −0.275 to −0.273 | 4,717,221 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | Donors are administrative records, so the interval treats them as independent draws. | | r_all_eq | −0.67 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county Democratic share and county donor lean | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI −0.70 to −0.65 | 2,839 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | County bootstrap, 2000 replicates, seed 12345. | | r_all_w | −0.85 | correlation coefficient | correlation of county Democratic share and county donor lean | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI −0.87 to −0.83 | 2,839 | two-party votes in 2020 (county-equal in the companion fact) | DIME | County bootstrap, 2000 replicates, seed 12345. | | recipients_min | 8 | distinct recipients | definition of a reliable donor | donors counted as reliable | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | recipients_strict | 15 | distinct recipients | definition of the stricter check | donors in the stricter check | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | rel_share_c1 | 19.3% | percent of donors | share of donors who are reliable | individual donors with a CFscore and a county who first gave in 1980-96 | donors first active 1980-96 | | 2,195,412 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | rel_share_c4 | 9.6% | percent of donors | share of donors who are reliable | individual donors with a CFscore and a county who first gave in 2018-24 | donors first active 2018-24 | | 15,418,884 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | rep_pool_large | 36.5% | percent of counties | share with a left-leaning donor pool | Republican-voting counties with 1,000 or more reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 301 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | rep_pool_small | 12.9% | percent of counties | share with a left-leaning donor pool | Republican-voting counties with 25 to 49 reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 318 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | rl_median_share | 38.4% | percent Democratic, two-party vote | median county Democratic share | Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors | 2020 | | 472 | none (full counts of counties) | County election returns | | | rr_median_share | 26.2% | percent Democratic, two-party vote | median county Democratic share | Republican-voting counties with right-leaning donors | 2020 | | 1,863 | none (full counts of counties) | County election returns | | | share_black30_right_p1 | 43.9% | percent of counties | share with a right-leaning donor pool | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, at least 30% Black, with 100 or more reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 82 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_black30_right_p2 | 30.2% | percent of counties | share with a right-leaning donor pool | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, at least 30% Black, with 500 or more reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 43 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_clear | 3.9% | percent of counties | share of counties in the two corner classes | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_clear_votes | 1.2% | percent of two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in the two corner classes | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | two-party votes in 2020 | DIME | | | share_dem_black30_right | 58.7% | percent of counties | share with a right-leaning donor pool | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, at least 30% Black | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 126 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_dem_other_right | 6.5% | percent of counties | share with a right-leaning donor pool | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, under 30% Black | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 372 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_div | 20.1% | percent of counties | share of counties whose donor lean and vote lean have opposite signs | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_div_donors | 12.7% | percent of reliable donors | share of reliable donors living in divergent counties | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | reliable donors | DIME | | | share_div_refmed | 36.3% | percent of counties | share of divergent counties | counties in the frame, with the donor lean measured from the median county | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_div_votes | 16.0% | percent of two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in divergent counties | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | two-party votes in 2020 | DIME | | | share_dr_near_even | 38.8% | percent of counties | share with a Democratic share below the upper cut | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 98 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_dr_near_zero | 50.0% | percent of counties | share with donor lean within the cut of zero | Democratic-voting counties with right-leaning donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 98 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_other_right_p1 | 4.8% | percent of counties | share with a right-leaning donor pool | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, under 30% Black, with 100 or more reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 357 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_other_right_p2 | 4.1% | percent of counties | share with a right-leaning donor pool | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income, under 30% Black, with 500 or more reliable donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 320 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_reliable | 13.0% | percent of donors | share of donors who are reliable | all individual donors with a CFscore and a county | 1980-2024 | | 36,402,792 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_right_c1 | 86.8% | percent of counties | share with a right-leaning cohort pool | Democratic-voting counties at least 30% Black with 25 or more reliable donors who first gave in 1980-96 | 2020 vote; donors first active 1980-96 | | 68 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_right_c4 | 22.5% | percent of counties | share with a right-leaning cohort pool | Democratic-voting counties at least 30% Black with 25 or more reliable donors who first gave in 2018-24 | 2020 vote; donors first active 2018-24 | | 80 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_rl_near_even | 19.9% | percent of counties | share with a Democratic share at or above the lower cut | Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 472 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_rl_near_zero | 73.1% | percent of counties | share with donor lean within the cut of zero | Republican-voting counties with left-leaning donors | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 472 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_rl_northeast | 63.5% | percent of counties | share with a left-leaning donor pool | Republican-voting counties in the Northeast | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 115 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_rl_south | 12.5% | percent of counties | share with a left-leaning donor pool | Republican-voting counties in the South | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 1,115 | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | share_votes_dr | 4.5% | percent of two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in these counties | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | two-party votes in 2020 | DIME | | | share_votes_rl | 11.6% | percent of two-party votes | share of two-party votes cast in these counties | counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 two-party presidential return (the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii) | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | 2,839 | two-party votes in 2020 | DIME | | | slope_net_eq | +0.068 | CFscore units per 10 points of Black share | regression coefficient of county donor lean net of college share and median income, ordinary least squares | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI 0.042 to 0.094 | 498 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | State-clustered standard errors (46 states). | | slope_net_w | +0.028 | CFscore units per 10 points of Black share | regression coefficient of county donor lean net of college share and median income, weighted least squares | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI −0.006 to 0.062 | 498 | two-party votes in 2020 (county-equal in the companion fact) | DIME | State-clustered standard errors (46 states). | | slope_raw_eq | +0.101 | CFscore units per 10 points of Black share | regression coefficient of county donor lean on Black share alone, ordinary least squares | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI 0.077 to 0.125 | 498 | none (each county counted once) | DIME | State-clustered standard errors (46 states). | | slope_raw_w | +0.040 | CFscore units per 10 points of Black share | regression coefficient of county donor lean on Black share alone, weighted least squares | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | 95% CI 0.005 to 0.075 | 498 | two-party votes in 2020 (county-equal in the companion fact) | DIME | State-clustered standard errors (46 states). | | slope_step | 10 points | percentage points of Black share or college share | scale of the regression coefficients | Democratic-voting counties in that frame with a Black share, a college share and a median income | 2020 presidential vote; donors 1980-2024 | | | none (full counts of counties) | DIME | | | vote_hi | 55% | percent Democratic, two-party vote | definition of a map class | upper cut of the map | 2020 | | | none (full counts of counties) | County election returns | | | vote_lo | 45% | percent Democratic, two-party vote | definition of a map class | lower cut of the map | 2020 | | | none (full counts of counties) | County election returns | | ## Definitions - CFscore: A left-right position estimated from whom a donor gives to, or from who gives to a candidate. Negative values are left and positive values are right, and a donor keeps one score across all their giving. - Correlation: A number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Clustered standard errors: Standard errors that allow answers within the same group, such as the same county or the same week, to be related. They are wider than ordinary errors when members of a group resemble each other. - Ecological inference: Drawing a conclusion about individuals from data on groups or places, such as counties. A pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among the people who live in them. ## Methods Sample. 2,839 counties with at least 25 reliable donors and a 2020 presidential return, from the 48 contiguous states and the District of Columbia. Alaska is dropped from the returns, and the county-matched donor file has no donors in Alaska or Hawaii (the DIME donor file has records in both states; the county match excluded Alaska by design and returned no Hawaii county). Two counties are recoded to their successors (Bedford city to Bedford County, Virginia; Shannon to Oglala Lakota County, South Dakota). Donors. Individual donors in the Stanford DIME public version 4.0 with a CFscore and a most recent county, 36,402,792 in all, of whom 4,717,221 are reliable (at least 8 distinct recipients, and a score not inherited from a recipient). Measures. The county donor lean is the mean CFscore of the county's reliable donors (positive is right, negative is left); the county vote is the Democratic share of the 2020 two-party presidential vote from the repaired county file. A county is divergent when it voted Democratic (share above 50%) and its donor lean is positive, or voted Republican and its donor lean is negative. Zero is the neutral point of the CFscore scale, and the definitions table repeats the count with the mean of all reliable donors and with the median county as the neutral point. A county clears both cut points when its Democratic share is 55% or more with a donor lean of 0.25 or more, or its share is below 45% with a lean below −0.25, assigned on unrounded values. Regions are the four Census Bureau regions. Weights and intervals. Shares and counts count each county once; correlations and regressions are reported twice, counting each county once and weighting by 2020 two-party votes; donors are not weighted. Correlations across counties use a county bootstrap (2,000 replicates, seed 12345); regression coefficients use standard errors clustered on state (46 states); the fitted line in the scatter of donor lean on the Democratic share counts each county once and has a band from state-clustered standard errors; group means of counties use a normal interval from the spread of county means; a donor mean uses its standard error and treats donors as independent. County counts and shares are full counts and carry no interval. Noise benchmark. The probability that a county's underlying donor mean has the other sign is the normal probability of a value beyond the county mean in units of its standard error, summed over counties; a second version shrinks each county mean toward a least-squares line in the Democratic share, with the variance of the true county means estimated by the method of moments, and gives the higher count. Pool floors and cohorts. The Black share comparison is repeated for counties with at least 100 and at least 500 reliable donors. Cohorts group donors by the election cycle of their first record (1980 to 1996, 1998 to 2008, 2010 to 2016, 2018 to 2024); the cohort gaps are repeated with donors of at least 15 distinct recipients, and the share of donors who are reliable is reported by cohort. Suppression. A county needs at least 25 reliable donors (and in a cohort view at least 25 donors who first gave in the cohort); counties are named only with at least 75; a band of a bar chart needs at least 10 counties on a side. Missing data. Ten counties lack a college share or median income (the eight Connecticut counties, whose 2020 boundaries changed, De Baca, New Mexico, and Jeff Davis, Texas); the Democratic-voting ones, all in Connecticut, drop out of the Black share correlations and regressions only. Vote-year check. 2024 returns from the repaired file, without four Missouri counties whose 2024 returns exclude Kansas City. ## What these data cannot show - A county's donor lean describes the donors in the county and not any resident, and a pattern across counties can differ from the pattern among people, the problem known as ecological inference [2]. - DIME does not record the race, income or vote of a donor, so the Black share results say that donor leans differ between counties with different Black shares and cannot say who the donors in those counties are. - Studies that observe donors directly find that Black and Latino donors supply smaller shares of contributions than of the population [3], and a study that merges survey responses to donation records compares donors with non-donors [4]. - Those studies are about individuals and neither tests nor contradicts the county pattern here. - The files do not say which candidates a donor gave to. - A CFscore is an estimate from the recipients' positions, and the chapter cannot separate a donor who gives to Republican candidates from one who gives to moderate Democrats. - Geography is the most recent record, so a donor who moved is counted where the last gift came from, and a county's pool spans giving from 1980 to 2024 while the vote is a single election. - The reliable-donor rule keeps the donors who gave to many recipients, and the counts in Table 10 change when it is relaxed. - No threshold below 8 distinct recipients was tested. - The divergence rule pivots on the sign of a mean at zero, which is not the middle of the county distribution, since the median county has a donor lean of +0.19. - The chapter also leaves out donor dollars, and it does not test any mechanism. - Whether the donor lean of a county reflects who can give or who is asked cannot be separated with county means. - How a county's stated ideology compares with its donors' is the subject of Chapter 14.6, Stated and funded ideology (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/stated-and-funded-ideology; planned), and how donors who live in counties their side lost behave is the subject of Chapter 15.4, Partisans in the other party's territory (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/partisans-outvoted-at-home; planned). - A county with a small pool has a noisy mean, and the intervals on individual counties treat donors as independent draws, which understates the uncertainty if donors in a county resemble each other. ## References 1. Bonica, Adam (2014). Mapping the Ideological Marketplace. American Journal of Political Science 58(2): 367-386. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12062 2. Robinson, W. S. (1950). Ecological Correlations and the Behavior of Individuals. American Sociological Review 15(3): 351-357. https://doi.org/10.2307/2087176 3. Grumbach, Jacob M.; Sahn, Alexander (2020). Race and Representation in Campaign Finance. American Political Science Review 114(1): 206-221. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055419000637 4. Hill, Seth J.; Huber, Gregory A. (2017). Representativeness and Motivations of the Contemporary Donorate: Results from Merged Survey and Administrative Records. Political Behavior 39(1): 3-29. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-016-9343-y ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/build.py (sha256 0034dffb5087fc8654308e1dd799189e2965b167b7f2afaccc9287aadb62f4f8) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/county/county_demographics_2000_2024.parquet | 4,334,220 | 45cdaf63128da1aa0c12e1196d7e60835697d7432ab9bff1acd2f5559fdb5130 | 90293a64867bf37645b53eaf5ab343f3b284c0d2c3fc3b8e0f38d32f1649fee4 | | data/county/pres_county_1868_2024.parquet | 6,295,675 | bec11c7a0cb5d4180bbd6809d048bc892dd00dfcdde527fa4da871b1dd3f835f | b2a4f000f2eea72d09af8939555289e924875cca40cd95ec8869104cd575bed7 | | data/dime/proj/donor_geo.parquet | 454,097,716 | 431c728357416b580a013fa84a4a0c2bbbb60138df5107331b3defd67deef181 | 954449d38b21d1d754c6804e0736544b802ca2a2503acafbe0bd3ca67aab9f10 | | C:/github/politics-book/lib/geo/us-counties-2020.v1.json | 193,748 | 6474d2da777fefee9adf1cc1827cb947987896aaa1183a223968430114e19009 | 6474d2da777fefee9adf1cc1827cb947987896aaa1183a223968430114e19009 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | e38d402e8fd3e85677d4421bf73c25cc2ec6008acd7f88662ecba724a1adc740 | | figures/black_pool_floor.json | 732d732e891c116e26b28873f71746a5d49fec85a9c2ccd132b264b2fd908a91 | | figures/black_share_gradient.json | 23cc152a6f56d32bc3be5f9cd78188c8352aeb27b997734baf3db513bc08dca9 | | figures/black_slopes.json | b0af26f3198519f3b3e66b75c5d81ab37901afd3a17a014a79767318ad8d46ae | | figures/cohorts.json | 12cb69f4de27f7c63779c0f814d0b0d2902e6e135c2d1e45293a9670a0660417 | | figures/definitions.json | 6340f53784e56aa62043aa4e52353f491ed1d9cd0926ffc5268a6f2ba659ad50 | | figures/donor_vote_map.json | 07261a7eb1e2ca870f3e265a5d8952d55b06aa322a1c88b67dbf639c88e2f29f | | figures/donor_vs_vote.json | 3319c838a734f9443bb8f6bc30657f634dbb8fe0dfab5a605b4d80595ae41e3c | | figures/named_counties.json | 329ed238858fa166bc9bedb66c6cf82ae8f5a5be10dfae149edca4ca441d9937 | | figures/pool_size.json | f222733770db2046b5a37c48ab2981f83b7fc1bf4675185f50b759245d2201b1 | | figures/regions.json | 36345d3838e65c29e0d22d42c57cc4abc8f14d0378be022177491625a1f80ae3 | | figures/who_diverges.json | 2921e113570b41ea90a94352f288ebe47bf47758787d89d783f82697252e93fe | | meta.json | b59165872cab3e3c8733b4f1187148ac505eaecae793c86d2dc19f1ad09da290 | | public/data/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/donor_vote_map.json | b0a76b3e1c74723aeb2e0aa8c9137d77c10e1e00d8b122d4439a068ee10444df | | refs.json | 5042fa39bf2af677f8a768f9f76c08ab600ba25c63a1a10516b8c62ca60c4290 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/facts.json - Table 1, figure "donor_vote_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/donor_vote_map.json - Table 2, figure "donor_vs_vote" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/donor_vs_vote.json - Table 3, figure "who_diverges" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/who_diverges.json - Table 4, figure "black_pool_floor" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/black_pool_floor.json - Table 5, figure "black_share_gradient" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/black_share_gradient.json - Table 6, figure "black_slopes" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/black_slopes.json - Table 7, figure "named_counties" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/named_counties.json - Table 8, figure "pool_size" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/pool_size.json - Table 9, figure "regions" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/regions.json - Table 10, figure "definitions" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/definitions.json - Table 11, figure "cohorts" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/figures/cohorts.json - Payload of "donor_vote_map" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/data/counties-where-donors-and-voters-diverge/donor_vote_map.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt --- # Party and place: report Chapter 15.1 of The Public Mind, by Vishal Singh (NYU Stern). Generated from the chapter's data files; the reading version is at https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place. Table n of this report is figure n of the chapter. ## Identification - Title: Party and place - Chapter: 15.1 (Part XV, Place and opinion; The political map) - Question: How much do partisans' issue positions differ between deep-red and deep-blue counties, compared with the gap between parties? - Dek: Across 12 policy issues in 2013 to 2021, Democrats and Republicans in the same kind of county differ by 43.1 points, and one party's members in deep-blue and deep-red counties differ by 5.6 points. - Grain: individuals - Status: draft - Published: 2026-09-30 - Updated: not revised - Data sources: - Cooperative Election Study. Cooperative Election Study cumulative common content, 2006-2021 policy items, party identification and county FIPS; years: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years); weights: weight_cumulative - County election returns. County presidential returns 2004-2020 (repaired file), two-party margin; years: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024; weights: none (full counts) - State presidential returns. State presidential returns 1976-2024, two-party margin; years: 1976-2024 (13 elections); weights: none (full counts) - ANES Cumulative Data File. ANES Time Series Cumulative Data File, waves 2012-2024, state identifier, issue items; years: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study); weights: weight (VCF0009z) - Canonical URL: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place - Report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place/report - Markdown: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place/report.md - BibTeX key: singh2026partyandplace ```bibtex @misc{singh2026partyandplace, author = {Singh, Vishal}, title = {Party and place}, year = {2026}, url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place}, note = {In The Public Mind. Published 30 September 2026.} } ``` ## Principal estimates The facts the dek and the opening prose cite, in order of appearance. | Estimand | Population | Period | Value | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Fact id | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | count of issues | the CES policy questions used in the chapter | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 12 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_issues | | average over the issues of the party gap: Democratic minus Republican share taking the Democratic side, averaged over deep-red and deep-blue counties | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 43.1 | 95% CI 41.8 to 44.5 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | party_gap_mean | | average over the issues of the place gap: deep-blue minus deep-red county share taking the Democratic side, averaged over Democrats and Republicans | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 5.6 | 95% CI 4.7 to 6.6 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | place_gap_mean | | average party gap divided by average place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 7.6 | 95% CI 6.4 to 9.3 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | ratio_means | | count of issues | issues whose average place gap has an interval above zero | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 12 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_place_avg_ci_pos | | a county is deep red or deep blue at this margin or more | county classification | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 20 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | deep_cut | | count of respondents | CES respondents interviewed in 2013 to 2021 with a matched county and a positive weight, in any party group or none | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 333,335 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_matched | | count of respondents | CES respondents interviewed in 2013 to 2021 with a matched county, a positive weight and one of the five party groups | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 320,988 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_pool | | number of resampling clusters | states and the District of Columbia with matched respondents, Alaska excluded | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 50 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | n_states | | bootstrap replicates | cluster bootstrap | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 2,000 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | boot_reps | | definition of the scale | the top of the scale on which every issue is coded, where 100 is the side that Democrats take more often | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 100 | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | scale_max | ## Findings Among Democrats and Republicans interviewed by the Cooperative Election Study (CES) from 2013 to 2021 who live in deep-red or deep-blue counties, the party gap averages 43.1 (95% CI 41.8 to 44.5) points over 12 issues and the place gap averages 5.6 (95% CI 4.7 to 6.6) points. Both gaps are differences in the share of respondents who take the Democratic side of a policy question. The party gap is larger than the place gap on every issue, and the ratio of the two averages is 7.6 (95% CI 6.4 to 9.3). Before adjustment, the interval for the place gap lies above zero on all 12 issues, so the place gap is small and not zero. The party gap compares Democrats with Republicans who live in the same kind of county. The place gap compares members of one party who live in deep-blue counties with those who live in deep-red counties, where a deep county has a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more toward one party. A stricter cutoff compares more extreme places, and the adjustments for demographics and state in the section on Republican and Democratic place gaps compare respondents who resemble each other or live in the same state. Each of these choices defines which respondents are compared, and under every one of them the place gap is a difference between people who live in different places rather than an estimate of what living there does to a person, since people choose where to live. Table 1. On every issue the gap between parties is larger than the gap between deep-red and deep-blue counties The data are CES interviews from 2013 to 2021, 333,335 of which could be matched to a county, and 320,988 of those belong to a party group used in this chapter. Each is matched to the two-party margin of the respondent's county in the most recent presidential election, counting the election of the interview year, and every estimate uses survey weights. The main comparison of party and place uses the 2013 to 2021 interviews. The trend across presidential cycles in Table 8 uses the longer source window of 2006 to 2021, so it includes surveys that the main comparison leaves out. (Note: Unless stated otherwise, every interval in this chapter is a 95% interval from a bootstrap that resamples whole states (50 clusters, 2,000 replicates). The exceptions and the method are in the methods note at the end of the chapter.) The Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/how-the-sort-happened) chapter follows the growth of party differences within birth cohorts, and this chapter asks how much of what remains depends on where a respondent lives. Respondents are Democrats or Republicans by the three-point party question, so leaners belong to neither group. Each issue is a yes-or-no question, coded so that 100 is the side that Democrats take more often: support for an assault weapons ban, for example, and opposition to repealing the Affordable Care Act (ACA). The party gap on an issue is the Democratic minus Republican difference in the share taking that side, averaged over deep-red and deep-blue counties. The place gap is the deep-blue minus deep-red difference in that share, averaged over Democrats and Republicans. ### The party gap exceeds the place gap on every issue Table 1 shows both gaps for each issue. The party gap runs from 13.3 (95% CI 12.0 to 14.9) points on universal background checks to 64.1 (95% CI 62.5 to 65.8) points on spending for a border wall. The place gap runs from 2.1 (95% CI 0.9 to 3.1) points on background checks to 12.0 (95% CI 9.2 to 14.6) points on abortion. On no issue do the intervals for the two gaps touch. Repeal of the ACA shows what the two gaps look like in levels. (Note: The cumulative CES file codes the 2014 answers to the question on repealing the ACA in the opposite direction from the other years: the Republican minus Democratic share supporting repeal is negative in 2014 and positive in each of the other nine survey years. The 2014 answers are reversed here on that evidence and on the cumulative file's release notes; the 2014 value labels have not been checked against the original questionnaire. The sections on ratios and trends report what changes if they are dropped instead.) In deep-red counties 83.1% of Republicans and 25.6% of Democrats support repeal, and in deep-blue counties 78.6% and 21.7%. The party gap on this issue is 57.2 points and the place gap is 4.2 points, a ratio of 13.7. On an assault weapons ban the party gap is 41.9 points and the place gap 7.5 points, a ratio of 5.6. On spending for a border wall the party gap is 64.1 points and the place gap 4.1 points, a ratio of 15.5. The issues were asked in different years, listed in the data table under the figure. Border wall spending was asked only from 2017, and legal gay marriage only through 2016, so the averages combine periods and describe a set of questions rather than a single year. ### The ratio varies widely by issue Table 2 divides the party gap by the place gap on each issue. The ratio is 3.6 (95% CI 2.6 to 5.6) on legal gay marriage and 15.5 (95% CI 12.0 to 22.0) on spending for a border wall. The issues with the two smallest ratios, legal gay marriage and abortion, are the two with the largest place gaps, 10.2 and 12.0 points, against party gaps of 36.4 and 46.5 points. The ratios for repeal of the ACA and Medicare for All are the next largest after the border wall's, and the intervals for the three largest ratios overlap, so their order is not settled. If the 2014 answers to the ACA question are dropped instead of reversed, repeal of the ACA has the largest ratio, 16.7 (95% CI 12.0 to 28.8). The ratio for Medicare for All, 12.1 (95% CI 7.9 to 31.4), has the widest interval, because its place gap of 4.2 points is small and a small denominator makes a ratio move with the sample. The median ratio across issues is 8.4 (95% CI 6.7 to 11.0) and the ratio of the average gaps is 7.6 (95% CI 6.4 to 9.3); each interval lies above equal gaps. Table 2. The party gap is between 3.6 and 15.5 times the place gap, depending on the issue #### Sensitivity to the county cutoff and to leaners Two choices in the definition of the gaps move their levels. A deep county is one at or beyond a cutoff on the county margin, and a stricter cutoff compares more extreme places. Table 3 reports the averages at cutoffs of 10 and 40 points as well as the 20 used elsewhere, and with leaners counted as partisans. The place gap is larger when counties are more extreme, the ratio falls as the cutoff rises, and the party gap is larger than the place gap under every definition. Table 3. The party gap exceeds the place gap under every definition, and the ratio falls as the county cutoff rises ### Support varies less across county margins than between the parties The deep-county comparison uses only the two ends of the distribution of counties. Table 4 uses every county, grouped into seven bins by two-party margin, for the issues in the panels. In every panel the Democratic and Republican lines are at least 33.0 points apart in every bin. In 9 of the 10 lines the change from the most Republican to the most Democratic bin is toward the Democratic side of the issue, with an interval that excludes zero. The exception is Republican support for a path to legal status, which changes by +3.1 (95% CI −1.1 to 8.5) points. Table 4. Within each party, support changes less across county margins than it differs between the parties The two largest changes are among Republicans, +20.1 (95% CI 14.8 to 24.0) points on abortion and +17.0 (95% CI 10.3 to 21.5) points on legal gay marriage, which are also the issues with the largest place gaps. On the assault weapons ban, Republican support rises from 36.5% in the most Republican bin to 49.0% in the most Democratic bin, a change of +12.6 (95% CI 8.6 to 16.9) points, and Democratic support goes from 81.2% to 87.3%. Republican respondents in Democratic counties support a ban more often than Republican respondents in Republican counties, and the change is shallow next to the 41.9 points that separate the parties on this issue. ### Republican place gaps are larger on most issues Table 5 splits the place gap by party, and the difference between the two parties' average place gaps has an interval that includes zero. Of the 24 place gaps, one for each party on each issue, all 24 have deep-blue counties on the more Democratic side, and 22 have an interval above zero. The Republican gap is larger than the Democratic gap on 9 of the 12 issues, and the two are equal to one decimal on easier concealed carry. The interval for the difference lies above zero on 5 of them, and on 4 of those its lower end is below 1 point. It lies below zero on no issue. Averaged over issues, the Republican place gap is 6.8 (95% CI 5.0 to 8.5) points and the Democratic place gap 4.5 (95% CI 2.8 to 6.3) points. The difference, 2.3 (95% CI −0.7 to 5.1) points, has an interval that includes zero. Table 5. The Republican place gap is larger on most issues, but the interval for the average difference includes zero The second and third views of the figure adjust for education, race, age and gender in a weighted linear probability model, and the third adds state fixed effects, so that the comparison is between respondents in the same state. Adjusting for demographics alone leaves 15 of the 24 gaps smaller than the raw gap, and adding state fixed effects leaves 22, with 16 of the 24 having an interval above zero. The state fixed effects compare respondents within states, so they rest on the 34 to 38 states, depending on party and issue, that hold both deep-red and deep-blue counties. The change from the raw gap therefore combines the adjustment with a change in sample. With both adjustments the Republican gap is larger than the Democratic gap on 8 of the 12 issues, and the interval for the difference lies above zero on the assault weapons ban and background checks only. On the assault weapons ban the adjusted Republican gap is 8.7 (95% CI 6.8 to 10.7) points and the Democratic gap 4.4 (95% CI 2.3 to 6.6) points, a difference of +4.3 (95% CI 1.3 to 7.3) points. On abortion and legal gay marriage the adjusted intervals for the two parties overlap. ### Independents with no lean have larger place gaps than partisans Here an independent is a respondent at the middle of the seven-point party scale who did not name a party, and the two groups of leaners are shown apart. Across the 12 issues, the average place gap of independents with no lean is 9.2 (95% CI 7.4 to 10.7) points, which is 3.5 (95% CI 1.9 to 5.0) points more than the average for Democrats and Republicans together. Table 6 shows all five groups. In point estimates the place gap of independents with no lean is larger than both partisan place gaps on 9 of the 12 issues. Democratic leaners have an average place gap of 3.3 points and Republican leaners of 6.7 points. Table 6. The average place gap is larger among independents with no lean than among Democrats and Republicans Table 7 follows one issue, support for universal background checks, which has the smallest party gap and the smallest place gap of the issues in Table 1, across the bins of county margin for all the party groups. Democrats support the policy at 95.0% to 96.3% in every bin, near the top of the scale, which leaves little room to rise, and Republicans at 80.3% to 84.4%. Independents with no lean go from 79.0% support in the most Republican bin to 86.1% in the most Democratic bin, a change of +7.1 (95% CI 3.2 to 10.8) points. Republican leaners go from 71.0% to 79.3%, a change of +8.3 (95% CI 3.8 to 11.9) points. Both intervals lie above zero. For Democrats and Democratic leaners the interval for the change includes zero, and for Republicans the change is +3.4 (95% CI 0.0 to 5.9) points and the interval reaches zero. Table 7. Support for background checks rises with county margin among independents and Republican leaners, not among Democrats ### The party gap rose on most issues Table 8 follows 4 issues across presidential cycles, including the two with the longest history, border security and a path to legal status. A presidential cycle pools the surveys from one presidential election to the next and uses the county margin of that election, so the 2016 cycle covers surveys from 2016 to 2019. The trend draws on the 2006 to 2021 source window rather than on the 2013 to 2021 interviews of the main comparison alone, so its earlier cycles include surveys from before 2013. Between the first and last cycle in which an issue was asked, the party gap rose on 3 of the 4 issues, with an interval above zero. On repeal of the ACA the party gap went from 53.8 points in the 2012 cycle to 55.8 points in the 2020 cycle, a change of +2.0 (95% CI 0.0 to 4.1) points whose interval reaches zero. With the 2014 answers dropped instead of reversed, the change is +5.9 (95% CI 3.6 to 8.3) points, with an interval above zero. (Note: Not every issue was asked in every survey, so an endpoint can rest on one or two surveys. The 2004 cycle is the 2007 survey alone and its groups are small, universal background checks in the 2020 cycle rest on the 2021 survey alone, and abortion in the 2012 cycle rests on the 2014 and 2015 surveys. The survey years behind every point are in the data tables.) Table 8. The party gap rose on 3 of these 4 issues across presidential cycles and stayed above both place gaps Table 9 gives the change for all 12 issues, grouped by the span of cycles over which each was asked. The party gap rose on 8 of them with an interval above zero. It fell on universal background checks, where the change is −3.3 (95% CI −6.0 to −0.7) points, and the interval includes zero on 3: legal gay marriage, repeal of the ACA and cutting legal immigration. The issues asked over the longest span, border security and a path to legal status, have the widest intervals: between the 2004 and 2020 cycles the party gap rose by +16.7 points on border security and +15.5 points on a path to legal status. Between the 2012 and 2020 cycles it rose by +13.4 points on abortion and +10.3 points on the assault weapons ban. Table 9. The party gap rose on 8 of 12 issues over spans that differ by issue, and fell on background checks The average place gap changed by more than sampling error on 3 of the 12 issues, and each change is a fall: −5.8 (95% CI −8.7 to −2.4) points on abortion, −4.2 (95% CI −6.4 to −1.8) on legal gay marriage and −3.1 (95% CI −5.3 to −0.9) on repeal of the ACA. With the 2014 answers to the ACA question dropped instead of reversed, the change on repeal of the ACA is −0.7 (95% CI −3.0 to 1.6) points, and its interval includes zero. The fall on abortion is mostly a Democratic one: the Democratic place gap goes from 14.6 points in the 2012 cycle to 4.9 points in the 2020 cycle, and the Republican gap from 13.8 to 12.0 points. The Democratic place gap on a path to legal status changed by −7.1 (95% CI −10.3 to −4.2) points between the 2012 and 2016 cycles, from 9.0 to 1.9 points. It was 1.7 points in the 2020 cycle, a change of −0.2 (95% CI −2.6 to 2.2) points from 2016. The steps before 2012 have intervals that include zero. ### A second survey gives ratios of the same order The CES records the respondent's county. The American National Election Studies (ANES) record only the state, so a check with ANES uses a coarser place. Table 10 repeats the calculation for strong and not very strong partisans in deep states, meaning states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more. The four groups of party by state type hold 3,752 to 4,410 respondents in all, depending on the measure, and 3,933 on the liberal-conservative scale. (Note: ANES states are known for only part of the 2024 sample, and the gun question was not asked in 2024. The ANES partisans are those who call themselves strong or not very strong Democrats or Republicans, which matches the three-point CES measure. Leaners are excluded.) The liberal-conservative scale, rescaled so that 100 is the most liberal answer, has a party gap of 41.3 points and a place gap of 4.7 points, a ratio of 8.8 (95% CI 4.7 to 24.2). The ratios on the ANES issue questions have smaller point estimates: 3.2 for making it harder to buy a gun, 2.9 for not decreasing immigration, 2.8 for a law against job discrimination and 2.5 (95% CI 1.5 to 4.2) for abortion. Among these questions only the interval for abortion lies below the interval for the ideology scale, as the ratio tab of the figure shows. Table 10. In both surveys the party gap is larger than the place gap on every measure Abortion is the one question asked in both surveys. At the state level, ANES gives a party gap of 42.9 points and a place gap of 17.4 points, and the CES gives 46.4 and 14.3, a ratio of 3.2 (95% CI 2.3 to 4.3) against 2.5 in ANES. Over all issues at the state level, the CES party gap is 43.3 points, the place gap 5.5 points and the ratio 7.9 (95% CI 5.1 to 13.7), close to the county-level values in Table 1. The ANES intervals are wide because each group of party by state type holds a limited number of states and respondents, and the two surveys differ in questions, years and level of place. They agree on the order of magnitude of the ratio, and the intervals are too wide to say more. ### The party gap does not vary clearly with state partisanship Table 11 asks whether the party gap depends on how Democratic or Republican a state is. Each dot is a state, with its party gap averaged over the issues plotted against the state's mean two-party margin. The state party gap averages 45.7 points, with a standard deviation of 5.4 points across 49 states. That spread includes the sampling error of each state's estimate, whose standard error is 1.3 points in the median state. The District of Columbia is not plotted because too few issues have enough respondents of each party there. The fitted slope is −0.5 (95% CI −1.3 to 0.4) points of party gap per 10 points of Democratic margin. The point estimate is a fall in the gap as states become more Democratic, and the interval also includes no change. Table 11. The party gap averages 45.7 points across states and shows no clear relation to a state's partisanship Hopkins argued that American political behavior has nationalized, with voters more engaged with national politics than with the politics of places nearer home [1]. If that account holds, the party gap should depend little on a state's partisanship, and the flat slope is consistent with it, though the interval also allows a modest fall. This chapter does not test the account, and a flat relation across states says nothing about influence inside a county or a neighborhood, which Chapter 15.3, Variation in opinion within places (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/variation-in-opinion-within-places; planned) takes up. ### What these data cannot show The place gap is a difference between respondents who live in different counties. It is not an estimate of what a county does to a person. People choose where to live, and the respondents who live in deep-blue counties may differ from those in deep-red counties in ways that survey questions on education, race, age and gender do not capture. Mummolo and Nall ask why partisans do not sort more by place and study the constraints on political segregation [2]. Earlier work on political context, from a 1984 survey in South Bend, Indiana, found that people build discussion networks that match their own views, that the political composition of their social context limits this, and that the interaction favors the local majority [3]. A cross-section cannot separate influence from selection, and evidence on people who move is the design that can. Chapter 15.6, Movers and opinion change (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/movers-and-opinion-change; planned) takes up that design. The party gap is not an estimate of what a party does to an opinion either. Party identification and issue positions shape each other, and party has taken on other identities, so a Democrat and a Republican also differ in race, religion and much else [4]. The two gaps are also measured on 12 questions that were available in the survey, on guns, immigration, abortion, marriage, health care and climate. Their ratio would change with a different set of issues, and the ceiling of a share on a yes-or-no question limits how large a gap can be. The policy questions end in 2021, so the chapter says nothing about later years. The county is one level of place. A finer level, such as a neighborhood, could show larger place gaps, and a coarser one, such as the state, shows the ANES and CES gaps above. The chapter does not measure the variation in opinion among people who live in one place, which Chapter 15.3, Variation in opinion within places (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/variation-in-opinion-within-places; planned) measures, or the share of partisans who live where their party loses, which Chapter 15.4, Partisans in the other party's territory (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/partisans-outvoted-at-home; planned) measures. Place-specific contexts such as recent immigration may matter more for some issues than the county margin does, as Chapter 15.2, Immigration and local context (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration-and-local-context; planned) examines, and the change in a county's vote over time has its own accounting in Chapter 15.5, Composition and behavior in county change (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/composition-and-behavior-in-county-change; planned). The intervals describe sampling variation in an opt-in online panel. They treat the states as an independent sample of clusters and the survey weights as correct, and they do not cover error from who joins the panel or from question wording. With few clusters, standard cluster-robust tests can over-reject [5], and the resampling method used here is simpler than the one that paper proposes. The ratio is uncertain where the place gap is small. ## Tables ### Table 1. On every issue the gap between parties is larger than the gap between deep-red and deep-blue counties Gap in the share taking the Democratic side, in points, by issue; Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | Issue | Democratic side of the question | Survey years | Party gap | Party gap, low | Party gap, high | Place gap | Place gap, low | Place gap, high | Ratio | Smallest group, n | | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Assault weapons ban | Support an assault weapons ban | 2013 to 2021 | 41.9 | 40.3 | 43.8 | 7.5 | 6.1 | 9.0 | 5.6 | 16,440 | | Background checks | Support universal background checks for gun buyers | 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 13.3 | 12.0 | 14.9 | 2.1 | 0.9 | 3.1 | 6.5 | 13,375 | | Concealed carry | Oppose easier concealed carry | 2013 to 2021 | 38.8 | 37.1 | 40.7 | 4.8 | 3.4 | 6.4 | 8.1 | 16,452 | | Border security | Oppose more spending on border security | 2013 to 2021, not 2018 | 40.2 | 38.6 | 42.0 | 5.3 | 3.7 | 6.7 | 7.6 | 13,428 | | Path to legal status | Support a path to legal status for undocumented immigrants | 2013 to 2021, not 2018 | 38.7 | 36.9 | 40.3 | 4.1 | 2.6 | 5.8 | 9.6 | 13,422 | | Border wall | Oppose spending on a border wall | 2017 to 2021, not 2019 | 64.1 | 62.5 | 65.8 | 4.1 | 2.9 | 5.3 | 15.5 | 8,257 | | Gay marriage | Support legal gay marriage | 2013 to 2016 | 36.4 | 33.6 | 39.3 | 10.2 | 6.6 | 13.7 | 3.6 | 7,161 | | Repeal the ACA | Oppose repealing the Affordable Care Act | 2013 to 2021 | 57.2 | 55.8 | 58.8 | 4.2 | 2.8 | 5.4 | 13.7 | 16,459 | | EPA regulates CO2 | Support letting the EPA regulate carbon dioxide | 2014 to 2021 | 44.4 | 42.3 | 46.5 | 5.2 | 3.5 | 6.9 | 8.6 | 15,459 | | Abortion legal | Support always allowing abortion as a matter of choice | 2014 to 2021 | 46.5 | 44.7 | 48.7 | 12.0 | 9.2 | 14.6 | 3.9 | 15,818 | | Medicare for All | Support Medicare for All | 2018 to 2021 | 51.3 | 49.3 | 53.6 | 4.2 | 1.7 | 6.4 | 12.1 | 8,385 | | Cut immigration | Oppose cutting legal immigration by half | 2018 to 2020 | 44.2 | 42.6 | 45.7 | 4.1 | 2.5 | 5.9 | 10.8 | 7,157 | Note: A deep county is one where the two-party presidential margin is at or beyond the cutoff stated in the text. The share is measured on the side of each issue that Democrats take more often, which the data table names for each question. Note: The issues were asked in different survey years, listed in the data table, so the averages combine periods. The number in a tooltip is the smallest of the four party by county-type groups behind the row. Note: Ratios are computed from unrounded gaps, so a ratio can differ in its last digit from the quotient of the gaps as printed. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states; they are model based and ignore the design of the panel. Source: CES cumulative common content, 2013-2021; county returns for the two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/gaps_by_issue.json ### Table 2. The party gap is between 3.6 and 15.5 times the place gap, depending on the issue Party gap divided by place gap, by issue, with 95% intervals; Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | issue | n | ratio | ratio_hi | ratio_lo | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Border wall | 8,257 | 15.48 | 21.99 | 12.04 | | Repeal the ACA | 16,459 | 13.75 | 20.22 | 10.67 | | Medicare for All | 8,385 | 12.13 | 31.41 | 7.86 | | Abortion legal | 15,818 | 3.89 | 5.16 | 3.12 | | EPA regulates CO2 | 15,459 | 8.60 | 13.07 | 6.22 | | Cut immigration | 7,157 | 10.76 | 17.65 | 7.43 | | Assault weapons ban | 16,440 | 5.62 | 7.09 | 4.55 | | Border security | 13,428 | 7.61 | 10.85 | 6.02 | | Concealed carry | 16,452 | 8.15 | 11.59 | 6.08 | | Path to legal status | 13,422 | 9.55 | 15.43 | 6.43 | | Gay marriage | 7,161 | 3.56 | 5.62 | 2.63 | | Background checks | 13,375 | 6.47 | 14.12 | 4.23 | Note: The number in a tooltip is the smallest of the four party by county-type groups behind the ratio. The interval is skewed to the right where the place gap is small. The intervals for the three largest ratios overlap, and with the 2014 answers to the ACA question dropped instead of reversed, repeal of the ACA has the largest ratio. Note: Ratios are computed from unrounded gaps, so a ratio can differ in its last digit from the quotient of the gaps as printed. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states; they are model based and ignore the design of the panel. Source: CES cumulative common content, 2013-2021; county returns for the two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/ratio_by_issue.json ### Table 3. The party gap exceeds the place gap under every definition, and the ratio falls as the county cutoff rises Average party gap and place gap over the issues, in points (share taking the Democratic side), and their ratio, with 95% intervals; CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | Definition | Party gap | Party gap, low | Party gap, high | Place gap | Place gap, low | Place gap, high | Ratio | Ratio, low | Ratio, high | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Deep county: margin of 10 points or more | 43.8 | 42.7 | 45.0 | 4.5 | 3.8 | 5.2 | 9.8 | 8.4 | 11.7 | | Deep county: margin of 20 points or more (used in this chapter) | 43.1 | 41.8 | 44.5 | 5.6 | 4.7 | 6.6 | 7.6 | 6.4 | 9.3 | | Deep county: margin of 40 points or more | 42.3 | 40.1 | 44.5 | 7.3 | 5.8 | 8.9 | 5.8 | 4.6 | 7.5 | | Leaners counted as partisans, margin of 20 points or more | 44.6 | 43.4 | 46.0 | 5.4 | 4.5 | 6.3 | 8.3 | 7.1 | 10.1 | Note: Ratios are computed from unrounded gaps, so a ratio can differ in its last digit from the quotient of the gaps as printed. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states; they are model based and ignore the design of the panel. Source: CES cumulative common content, 2013-2021; county returns for the two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/definition_checks.json ### Table 4. Within each party, support changes less across county margins than it differs between the parties Share supporting the policy (%) by party and two-party margin of the respondent's county, seven bins of counties; five issues; CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | bin | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | issue | margin | n | party | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | --- | | Below -40 | 83.49 | 78.63 | 81.16 | Assault weapons ban | −53.35 | 8,553 | Democrats | | -40 to -20 | 84.61 | 81.24 | 83.00 | Assault weapons ban | −29.09 | 13,631 | Democrats | | -20 to -5 | 86.74 | 82.80 | 84.81 | Assault weapons ban | −12.70 | 13,578 | Democrats | | -5 to 5 | 87.03 | 82.65 | 84.91 | Assault weapons ban | 0.112 | 13,026 | Democrats | | 5 to 20 | 87.40 | 85.78 | 86.56 | Assault weapons ban | 12.20 | 25,300 | Democrats | | 20 to 40 | 88.29 | 85.24 | 86.68 | Assault weapons ban | 28.48 | 21,675 | Democrats | | Above 40 | 88.59 | 86.32 | 87.29 | Assault weapons ban | 56.26 | 27,716 | Democrats | | Below -40 | 38.65 | 34.48 | 36.47 | Assault weapons ban | −53.35 | 14,432 | Republicans | | -40 to -20 | 40.55 | 36.62 | 38.73 | Assault weapons ban | −29.09 | 15,619 | Republicans | | -20 to -5 | 42.39 | 37.62 | 40.22 | Assault weapons ban | −12.70 | 11,652 | Republicans | | -5 to 5 | 43.05 | 37.73 | 40.29 | Assault weapons ban | 0.112 | 9,253 | Republicans | | 5 to 20 | 45.48 | 40.82 | 43.35 | Assault weapons ban | 12.20 | 14,228 | Republicans | | 20 to 40 | 48.90 | 44.40 | 46.96 | Assault weapons ban | 28.48 | 9,629 | Republicans | | Above 40 | 53.43 | 44.84 | 49.04 | Assault weapons ban | 56.26 | 6,811 | Republicans | | Below -40 | 75.61 | 69.08 | 72.62 | Path to legal status | −53.35 | 6,731 | Democrats | | -40 to -20 | 74.12 | 70.02 | 72.14 | Path to legal status | −29.09 | 10,838 | Democrats | | -20 to -5 | 74.83 | 70.90 | 72.89 | Path to legal status | −12.70 | 11,500 | Democrats | | -5 to 5 | 75.21 | 70.21 | 72.70 | Path to legal status | 0.112 | 10,868 | Democrats | | 5 to 20 | 75.95 | 73.97 | 74.97 | Path to legal status | 12.20 | 21,339 | Democrats | | 20 to 40 | 78.10 | 74.79 | 76.47 | Path to legal status | 28.48 | 18,012 | Democrats | | Above 40 | 79.18 | 76.62 | 77.95 | Path to legal status | 56.26 | 23,266 | Democrats | | Below -40 | 36.16 | 32.90 | 34.40 | Path to legal status | −53.35 | 11,088 | Republicans | | -40 to -20 | 36.32 | 33.01 | 34.63 | Path to legal status | −29.09 | 12,294 | Republicans | | -20 to -5 | 35.04 | 32.07 | 33.68 | Path to legal status | −12.70 | 9,881 | Republicans | | -5 to 5 | 37.36 | 33.83 | 35.49 | Path to legal status | 0.112 | 7,640 | Republicans | | 5 to 20 | 37.94 | 32.68 | 35.41 | Path to legal status | 12.20 | 11,721 | Republicans | | 20 to 40 | 39.71 | 35.64 | 37.72 | Path to legal status | 28.48 | 7,837 | Republicans | | Above 40 | 42.74 | 34.03 | 37.53 | Path to legal status | 56.26 | 5,585 | Republicans | | Below -40 | 29.34 | 25.13 | 27.44 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | −53.35 | 8,556 | Democrats | | -40 to -20 | 26.22 | 22.46 | 24.38 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | −29.09 | 13,619 | Democrats | | -20 to -5 | 25.96 | 22.44 | 24.14 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | −12.70 | 13,555 | Democrats | | -5 to 5 | 24.41 | 21.30 | 22.93 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | 0.112 | 13,014 | Democrats | | 5 to 20 | 23.21 | 19.73 | 21.69 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | 12.20 | 25,277 | Democrats | | 20 to 40 | 24.37 | 19.24 | 21.95 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | 28.48 | 21,665 | Democrats | | Above 40 | 23.79 | 18.73 | 21.58 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | 56.26 | 27,714 | Democrats | | Below -40 | 83.72 | 80.90 | 82.42 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | −53.35 | 14,470 | Republicans | | -40 to -20 | 84.83 | 82.53 | 83.71 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | −29.09 | 15,630 | Republicans | | -20 to -5 | 86.79 | 84.59 | 85.73 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | −12.70 | 11,652 | Republicans | | -5 to 5 | 84.54 | 82.01 | 83.16 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | 0.112 | 9,251 | Republicans | | 5 to 20 | 83.07 | 80.21 | 81.47 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | 12.20 | 14,220 | Republicans | | 20 to 40 | 80.89 | 77.95 | 79.42 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | 28.48 | 9,633 | Republicans | | Above 40 | 79.84 | 76.22 | 77.40 | Repeal the ACA (support for repeal) | 56.26 | 6,826 | Republicans | | Below -40 | 73.89 | 66.74 | 70.37 | Abortion legal | −53.35 | 8,255 | Democrats | | -40 to -20 | 76.25 | 71.90 | 74.15 | Abortion legal | −29.09 | 13,015 | Democrats | | -20 to -5 | 79.82 | 76.77 | 78.39 | Abortion legal | −12.70 | 12,696 | Democrats | | -5 to 5 | 80.64 | 75.54 | 78.21 | Abortion legal | 0.112 | 12,287 | Democrats | | 5 to 20 | 82.08 | 78.67 | 80.43 | Abortion legal | 12.20 | 24,028 | Democrats | | 20 to 40 | 82.96 | 77.85 | 80.38 | Abortion legal | 28.48 | 20,804 | Democrats | | Above 40 | 84.98 | 81.98 | 83.59 | Abortion legal | 56.26 | 26,619 | Democrats | | Below -40 | 23.12 | 19.97 | 21.57 | Abortion legal | −53.35 | 14,058 | Republicans | | -40 to -20 | 27.82 | 23.39 | 25.76 | Abortion legal | −29.09 | 15,033 | Republicans | | -20 to -5 | 31.62 | 26.02 | 28.88 | Abortion legal | −12.70 | 10,900 | Republicans | | -5 to 5 | 34.39 | 29.48 | 32.33 | Abortion legal | 0.112 | 8,783 | Republicans | | 5 to 20 | 35.55 | 29.43 | 32.95 | Abortion legal | 12.20 | 13,516 | Republicans | | 20 to 40 | 38.48 | 32.15 | 35.59 | Abortion legal | 28.48 | 9,260 | Republicans | | Above 40 | 45.05 | 36.31 | 41.62 | Abortion legal | 56.26 | 6,558 | Republicans | | Below -40 | 68.37 | 59.64 | 63.90 | Gay marriage | −53.35 | 3,353 | Democrats | | -40 to -20 | 71.41 | 64.60 | 67.99 | Gay marriage | −29.09 | 6,079 | Democrats | | -20 to -5 | 75.93 | 68.93 | 72.89 | Gay marriage | −12.70 | 6,730 | Democrats | | -5 to 5 | 76.62 | 67.97 | 72.01 | Gay marriage | 0.112 | 6,378 | Democrats | | 5 to 20 | 77.24 | 70.62 | 74.08 | Gay marriage | 12.20 | 11,861 | Democrats | | 20 to 40 | 77.28 | 67.94 | 72.45 | Gay marriage | 28.48 | 9,357 | Democrats | | Above 40 | 79.15 | 70.81 | 75.20 | Gay marriage | 56.26 | 12,598 | Democrats | | Below -40 | 27.81 | 22.79 | 25.22 | Gay marriage | −53.35 | 5,044 | Republicans | | -40 to -20 | 31.00 | 26.70 | 28.98 | Gay marriage | −29.09 | 6,668 | Republicans | | -20 to -5 | 35.05 | 28.89 | 31.87 | Gay marriage | −12.70 | 5,720 | Republicans | | -5 to 5 | 39.46 | 33.00 | 36.45 | Gay marriage | 0.112 | 4,399 | Republicans | | 5 to 20 | 40.11 | 34.02 | 37.51 | Gay marriage | 12.20 | 6,431 | Republicans | | 20 to 40 | 41.78 | 35.92 | 38.96 | Gay marriage | 28.48 | 4,079 | Republicans | | Above 40 | 45.50 | 35.94 | 42.18 | Gay marriage | 56.26 | 3,082 | Republicans | Note: Counties are grouped by the Democratic minus Republican margin of the most recent presidential election; the data table names the bins. The two outer bins cover a wider range of margins than the others. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states; they are model based and ignore the design of the panel. Source: CES cumulative common content, 2013-2021; county returns for the two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/support_by_margin.json ### Table 5. The Republican place gap is larger on most issues, but the interval for the average difference includes zero Place gap in points (deep-blue minus deep-red counties, share taking the Democratic side) for Democrats and Republicans, by issue; CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | Model | Issue | Democrats | Democrats, low | Democrats, high | Republicans | Republicans, low | Republicans, high | Republican minus Democratic | Difference, low | Difference, high | Democrats, n | Republicans, n | Democrats, states | Republicans, states | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | raw | Border wall | 1.9 | −0.5 | 4.3 | 6.4 | 3.8 | 8.4 | +4.5 | +0.2 | +8.4 | 36,261 | 24,614 | 50 | 50 | | raw | Repeal the ACA | 3.8 | 1.4 | 6.3 | 4.5 | 2.6 | 6.0 | +0.7 | −3.0 | +3.9 | 71,554 | 46,559 | 50 | 50 | | raw | Medicare for All | 2.7 | 1.2 | 4.2 | 5.7 | 0.8 | 9.7 | +3.0 | −1.9 | +7.1 | 36,118 | 25,023 | 50 | 50 | | raw | Abortion legal | 9.5 | 6.1 | 12.9 | 14.4 | 10.9 | 17.5 | +4.9 | +0.5 | +8.5 | 68,693 | 44,909 | 50 | 50 | | raw | EPA regulates CO2 | 3.7 | 1.9 | 5.5 | 6.6 | 3.5 | 10.0 | +2.9 | −0.9 | +7.1 | 66,941 | 43,698 | 50 | 50 | | raw | Cut immigration | 3.5 | 1.3 | 6.0 | 4.8 | 2.8 | 6.8 | +1.3 | −1.5 | +4.1 | 30,037 | 21,417 | 50 | 50 | | raw | Assault weapons ban | 4.7 | 2.9 | 6.9 | 10.2 | 7.9 | 12.6 | +5.4 | +2.0 | +8.6 | 71,575 | 46,491 | 50 | 50 | | raw | Border security | 6.2 | 3.3 | 9.1 | 4.3 | 2.1 | 6.4 | −1.9 | −6.0 | +2.4 | 58,832 | 36,812 | 50 | 50 | | raw | Concealed carry | 4.8 | 2.8 | 7.2 | 4.8 | 2.4 | 7.4 | 0.0 | −3.5 | +3.6 | 71,622 | 46,533 | 50 | 50 | | raw | Path to legal status | 5.0 | 2.8 | 7.3 | 3.1 | 0.5 | 6.0 | −1.9 | −5.7 | +1.9 | 58,847 | 36,804 | 50 | 50 | | raw | Gay marriage | 7.5 | 2.4 | 12.5 | 13.0 | 9.3 | 16.2 | +5.5 | +0.7 | +10.2 | 31,387 | 18,873 | 50 | 50 | | raw | Background checks | 0.5 | −0.2 | 1.3 | 3.6 | 1.4 | 5.6 | +3.0 | +0.5 | +5.3 | 58,365 | 37,872 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | Border wall | 1.2 | −1.0 | 3.3 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 4.1 | +1.1 | −2.3 | +4.5 | 36,193 | 24,604 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | Repeal the ACA | 3.6 | 1.7 | 5.5 | 2.7 | 1.1 | 4.2 | −0.9 | −3.4 | +1.5 | 71,486 | 46,549 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | Medicare for All | 2.0 | 0.6 | 3.5 | 3.3 | 0.5 | 6.1 | +1.3 | −1.7 | +4.2 | 36,050 | 25,013 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | Abortion legal | 10.1 | 7.1 | 13.1 | 12.8 | 9.5 | 16.0 | +2.7 | −0.3 | +5.6 | 68,625 | 44,899 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | EPA regulates CO2 | 3.8 | 2.2 | 5.4 | 5.7 | 3.1 | 8.2 | +1.9 | −1.3 | +5.0 | 66,873 | 43,688 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | Cut immigration | 2.6 | 0.6 | 4.7 | 0.4 | −1.5 | 2.3 | −2.3 | −4.7 | +0.2 | 30,037 | 21,417 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | Assault weapons ban | 5.7 | 4.0 | 7.5 | 10.5 | 8.2 | 12.8 | +4.8 | +1.9 | +7.7 | 71,507 | 46,481 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | Border security | 4.9 | 2.4 | 7.4 | 1.7 | −0.1 | 3.5 | −3.1 | −6.7 | +0.4 | 58,764 | 36,802 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | Concealed carry | 5.7 | 3.9 | 7.5 | 5.1 | 2.6 | 7.6 | −0.7 | −3.7 | +2.4 | 71,554 | 46,523 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | Path to legal status | 3.2 | 1.3 | 5.1 | 1.1 | −1.3 | 3.5 | −2.1 | −5.2 | +1.0 | 58,779 | 36,794 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | Gay marriage | 10.2 | 6.6 | 13.8 | 12.7 | 9.0 | 16.3 | +2.5 | −1.7 | +6.6 | 31,387 | 18,873 | 50 | 50 | | demographics | Background checks | 1.0 | 0.3 | 1.8 | 4.1 | 1.8 | 6.4 | +3.1 | +0.5 | +5.6 | 58,297 | 37,862 | 50 | 50 | | demographics_state | Border wall | 0.7 | −1.6 | 2.9 | 2.1 | −0.1 | 4.4 | +1.4 | −2.5 | +5.3 | 36,193 | 24,604 | 37 | 35 | | demographics_state | Repeal the ACA | 2.8 | 0.6 | 4.9 | 1.5 | −0.2 | 3.1 | −1.3 | −4.1 | +1.5 | 71,486 | 46,549 | 38 | 35 | | demographics_state | Medicare for All | 1.7 | 0.2 | 3.2 | 2.5 | −0.2 | 5.2 | +0.8 | −2.2 | +3.9 | 36,050 | 25,013 | 37 | 35 | | demographics_state | Abortion legal | 6.4 | 3.4 | 9.4 | 8.1 | 6.1 | 10.1 | +1.7 | −1.9 | +5.2 | 68,625 | 44,899 | 38 | 35 | | demographics_state | EPA regulates CO2 | 2.6 | 0.8 | 4.3 | 5.5 | 3.1 | 7.9 | +2.9 | −0.6 | +6.5 | 66,873 | 43,688 | 38 | 35 | | demographics_state | Cut immigration | 1.9 | 0.1 | 3.8 | 1.0 | −1.3 | 3.3 | −0.9 | −3.1 | +1.3 | 30,037 | 21,417 | 37 | 34 | | demographics_state | Assault weapons ban | 4.4 | 2.3 | 6.6 | 8.7 | 6.8 | 10.7 | +4.3 | +1.3 | +7.3 | 71,507 | 46,481 | 37 | 35 | | demographics_state | Border security | 3.1 | 0.5 | 5.7 | 1.6 | −0.2 | 3.5 | −1.4 | −5.2 | +2.4 | 58,764 | 36,802 | 38 | 35 | | demographics_state | Concealed carry | 4.5 | 2.5 | 6.4 | 4.9 | 2.6 | 7.2 | +0.5 | −3.1 | +4.0 | 71,554 | 46,523 | 38 | 35 | | demographics_state | Path to legal status | 2.7 | 0.7 | 4.7 | 2.0 | −0.4 | 4.4 | −0.7 | −4.0 | +2.6 | 58,779 | 36,794 | 38 | 35 | | demographics_state | Gay marriage | 5.6 | 1.2 | 10.1 | 8.6 | 4.7 | 12.5 | +3.0 | −1.7 | +7.6 | 31,387 | 18,873 | 36 | 34 | | demographics_state | Background checks | 0.7 | −0.3 | 1.6 | 3.3 | 1.3 | 5.3 | +2.6 | +0.5 | +4.7 | 58,297 | 37,862 | 37 | 35 | Views: Raw (model = raw); Demographics (model = demographics); Demographics + state fixed effects (model = demographics_state). Note: Raw gaps and the raw difference come from a bootstrap over states. Adjusted gaps are coefficients from weighted linear regressions among Democrats or Republicans in deep counties, with standard errors clustered by state and normal intervals. The adjusted difference is the coefficient on deep-blue by Republican in a regression with every term interacted with party, clustered the same way. Note: Rows are in the order of the first figure (party gap, largest first) in every view. The numbers in a tooltip are the respondents behind each dot. The data table gives the difference, its interval and the number of states behind each gap. Source: CES cumulative common content, 2013-2021; county returns for the two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/place_gap_by_party.json ### Table 6. The average place gap is larger among independents with no lean than among Democrats and Republicans Place gap averaged over the issues, in points (deep-blue minus deep-red counties, share taking the Democratic side), by party group, with 95% intervals; CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | n | party_id | place_gap | place_gap_hi | place_gap_lo | | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | | 9,432 | Democrats | 4.49 | 6.29 | 2.79 | | 2,804 | Democratic leaners | 3.33 | 4.59 | 1.98 | | 5,761 | Independents (no lean) | 9.18 | 10.70 | 7.37 | | 2,783 | Republican leaners | 6.69 | 8.78 | 4.58 | | 7,157 | Republicans | 6.78 | 8.47 | 5.00 | Note: The tooltip shows the smallest of the two county-type groups behind each average. The place gaps of Democrats and Republicans in this figure are the same as the averages in the figure on Republican and Democratic place gaps. Intervals are 95% intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states; they are model based and ignore the design of the panel. Source: CES cumulative common content, 2013-2021; county returns for the two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/place_gap_by_party_id.json ### Table 7. Support for background checks rises with county margin among independents and Republican leaners, not among Democrats Share supporting universal background checks (%) by party identification and two-party margin of the respondent's county, seven bins of counties; CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | bin | conf_high | conf_low | estimate | margin | n | party_id | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | --- | | Below -40 | 96.81 | 94.81 | 95.91 | −53.35 | 7,003 | Democrats | | -40 to -20 | 95.87 | 94.21 | 95.02 | −29.09 | 11,448 | Democrats | | -20 to -5 | 96.78 | 95.46 | 96.20 | −12.70 | 11,168 | Democrats | | -5 to 5 | 97.09 | 95.31 | 96.29 | 0.112 | 10,899 | Democrats | | 5 to 20 | 96.46 | 95.23 | 95.87 | 12.20 | 20,631 | Democrats | | 20 to 40 | 96.70 | 95.37 | 96.04 | 28.48 | 17,396 | Democrats | | Above 40 | 96.61 | 95.06 | 95.80 | 56.26 | 22,518 | Democrats | | Below -40 | 96.66 | 92.91 | 94.77 | −53.35 | 2,183 | Lean Dem. | | -40 to -20 | 96.23 | 93.87 | 95.06 | −29.09 | 3,477 | Lean Dem. | | -20 to -5 | 95.66 | 92.41 | 94.06 | −12.70 | 3,152 | Lean Dem. | | -5 to 5 | 96.77 | 93.52 | 95.18 | 0.112 | 2,952 | Lean Dem. | | 5 to 20 | 97.06 | 95.64 | 96.37 | 12.20 | 5,520 | Lean Dem. | | 20 to 40 | 97.23 | 94.11 | 95.61 | 28.48 | 4,321 | Lean Dem. | | Above 40 | 97.13 | 95.46 | 96.21 | 56.26 | 4,813 | Lean Dem. | | Below -40 | 82.12 | 75.65 | 78.95 | −53.35 | 5,500 | Independents | | -40 to -20 | 83.92 | 79.89 | 82.06 | −29.09 | 6,604 | Independents | | -20 to -5 | 85.36 | 78.83 | 82.51 | −12.70 | 5,603 | Independents | | -5 to 5 | 87.87 | 82.44 | 85.18 | 0.112 | 4,769 | Independents | | 5 to 20 | 86.61 | 83.58 | 85.13 | 12.20 | 8,452 | Independents | | 20 to 40 | 87.70 | 83.30 | 85.67 | 28.48 | 6,078 | Independents | | Above 40 | 87.81 | 83.76 | 86.09 | 56.26 | 5,701 | Independents | | Below -40 | 73.68 | 68.67 | 70.95 | −53.35 | 3,870 | Lean Rep. | | -40 to -20 | 74.74 | 68.63 | 71.91 | −29.09 | 4,417 | Lean Rep. | | -20 to -5 | 77.88 | 70.76 | 74.35 | −12.70 | 3,652 | Lean Rep. | | -5 to 5 | 78.91 | 73.10 | 76.15 | 0.112 | 2,888 | Lean Rep. | | 5 to 20 | 81.74 | 76.67 | 79.38 | 12.20 | 4,687 | Lean Rep. | | 20 to 40 | 83.15 | 77.37 | 80.47 | 28.48 | 3,132 | Lean Rep. | | Above 40 | 82.15 | 75.74 | 79.28 | 56.26 | 2,270 | Lean Rep. | | Below -40 | 81.79 | 78.63 | 80.31 | −53.35 | 11,459 | Republicans | | -40 to -20 | 82.36 | 78.79 | 80.73 | −29.09 | 13,038 | Republicans | | -20 to -5 | 83.15 | 79.25 | 81.50 | −12.70 | 9,468 | Republicans | | -5 to 5 | 84.38 | 80.03 | 82.26 | 0.112 | 7,663 | Republicans | | 5 to 20 | 84.28 | 80.85 | 82.84 | 12.20 | 11,619 | Republicans | | 20 to 40 | 86.17 | 82.45 | 84.42 | 28.48 | 7,804 | Republicans | | Above 40 | 85.67 | 80.29 | 83.66 | 56.26 | 5,571 | Republicans | Note: The vertical axis starts at 60%, not at zero, so slopes look steeper than in the county-margin figure with a full axis. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states; they are model based and ignore the design of the panel. Source: CES cumulative common content, 2013-2021; county returns for the two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/bg_checks_by_party_id.json ### Table 8. The party gap rose on 3 of these 4 issues across presidential cycles and stayed above both place gaps Gap in points (share taking the Democratic side) by presidential cycle, Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; four issues; CES surveys 2006 to 2021 | Issue | Series | Presidential cycle | Survey years | Estimate | Low | High | Smallest group, n | | --- | --- | ---: | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Path to legal status | Between-party gap | 2004 | 2007 | 27.8 | 20.8 | 33.1 | 367 | | Path to legal status | Place gap, Democrats | 2004 | 2007 | 11.2 | 2.2 | 18.4 | 367 | | Path to legal status | Place gap, Republicans | 2004 | 2007 | 1.9 | −3.5 | 9.3 | 367 | | Path to legal status | Between-party gap | 2008 | 2010 and 2011 | 32.1 | 29.3 | 34.9 | 2,932 | | Path to legal status | Place gap, Democrats | 2008 | 2010 and 2011 | 9.2 | 4.2 | 14.8 | 2,932 | | Path to legal status | Place gap, Republicans | 2008 | 2010 and 2011 | 2.7 | −0.6 | 6.9 | 2,932 | | Path to legal status | Between-party gap | 2012 | 2012 to 2015 | 35.7 | 32.9 | 38.1 | 6,215 | | Path to legal status | Place gap, Democrats | 2012 | 2012 to 2015 | 9.0 | 5.5 | 12.5 | 6,215 | | Path to legal status | Place gap, Republicans | 2012 | 2012 to 2015 | 3.8 | 0.2 | 7.8 | 6,215 | | Path to legal status | Between-party gap | 2016 | 2016 and 2017 and 2019 | 40.0 | 37.7 | 42.0 | 5,394 | | Path to legal status | Place gap, Democrats | 2016 | 2016 and 2017 and 2019 | 1.9 | 0.0 | 3.7 | 5,394 | | Path to legal status | Place gap, Republicans | 2016 | 2016 and 2017 and 2019 | 3.5 | −0.4 | 7.5 | 5,394 | | Path to legal status | Between-party gap | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 43.3 | 41.4 | 45.3 | 4,267 | | Path to legal status | Place gap, Democrats | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 1.7 | −0.2 | 3.6 | 4,267 | | Path to legal status | Place gap, Republicans | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 2.5 | −0.4 | 5.2 | 4,267 | | Border security | Between-party gap | 2004 | 2007 | 30.1 | 20.5 | 37.9 | 367 | | Border security | Place gap, Democrats | 2004 | 2007 | 6.2 | −2.6 | 12.7 | 367 | | Border security | Place gap, Republicans | 2004 | 2007 | −2.8 | −11.5 | 8.4 | 367 | | Border security | Between-party gap | 2008 | 2010 and 2011 | 29.4 | 27.0 | 31.4 | 2,932 | | Border security | Place gap, Democrats | 2008 | 2010 and 2011 | 9.5 | 5.9 | 13.3 | 2,932 | | Border security | Place gap, Republicans | 2008 | 2010 and 2011 | 2.3 | −1.5 | 5.7 | 2,932 | | Border security | Between-party gap | 2012 | 2012 to 2015 | 33.2 | 30.6 | 35.9 | 6,215 | | Border security | Place gap, Democrats | 2012 | 2012 to 2015 | 6.1 | 2.4 | 9.6 | 6,215 | | Border security | Place gap, Republicans | 2012 | 2012 to 2015 | 3.7 | 0.1 | 6.9 | 6,215 | | Border security | Between-party gap | 2016 | 2016 and 2017 and 2019 | 41.0 | 38.9 | 42.9 | 5,396 | | Border security | Place gap, Democrats | 2016 | 2016 and 2017 and 2019 | 6.8 | 3.4 | 10.2 | 5,396 | | Border security | Place gap, Republicans | 2016 | 2016 and 2017 and 2019 | 4.0 | 1.7 | 6.9 | 5,396 | | Border security | Between-party gap | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 46.8 | 45.1 | 48.8 | 4,271 | | Border security | Place gap, Democrats | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 7.5 | 3.4 | 10.8 | 4,271 | | Border security | Place gap, Republicans | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 4.6 | 2.0 | 6.6 | 4,271 | | Repeal the ACA | Between-party gap | 2012 | 2012 to 2015 | 53.8 | 51.8 | 55.8 | 6,062 | | Repeal the ACA | Place gap, Democrats | 2012 | 2012 to 2015 | 8.6 | 5.5 | 11.6 | 6,062 | | Repeal the ACA | Place gap, Republicans | 2012 | 2012 to 2015 | 2.3 | −0.4 | 4.7 | 6,062 | | Repeal the ACA | Between-party gap | 2016 | 2016 to 2019 | 59.5 | 58.0 | 61.5 | 8,476 | | Repeal the ACA | Place gap, Democrats | 2016 | 2016 to 2019 | 1.2 | −1.8 | 4.0 | 8,476 | | Repeal the ACA | Place gap, Republicans | 2016 | 2016 to 2019 | 5.2 | 3.4 | 6.9 | 8,476 | | Repeal the ACA | Between-party gap | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 55.8 | 54.2 | 57.7 | 4,262 | | Repeal the ACA | Place gap, Democrats | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 0.2 | −2.8 | 3.0 | 4,262 | | Repeal the ACA | Place gap, Republicans | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 4.5 | 1.7 | 7.0 | 4,262 | | Abortion legal | Between-party gap | 2012 | 2014 and 2015 | 39.6 | 36.9 | 42.3 | 3,052 | | Abortion legal | Place gap, Democrats | 2012 | 2014 and 2015 | 14.6 | 9.6 | 19.2 | 3,052 | | Abortion legal | Place gap, Republicans | 2012 | 2014 and 2015 | 13.8 | 9.0 | 17.8 | 3,052 | | Abortion legal | Between-party gap | 2016 | 2016 to 2019 | 46.5 | 44.3 | 49.2 | 8,493 | | Abortion legal | Place gap, Democrats | 2016 | 2016 to 2019 | 9.2 | 5.6 | 12.7 | 8,493 | | Abortion legal | Place gap, Republicans | 2016 | 2016 to 2019 | 15.6 | 11.3 | 19.3 | 8,493 | | Abortion legal | Between-party gap | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 53.0 | 50.4 | 55.7 | 4,273 | | Abortion legal | Place gap, Democrats | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 4.9 | 2.0 | 8.2 | 4,273 | | Abortion legal | Place gap, Republicans | 2020 | 2020 and 2021 | 12.0 | 7.5 | 15.7 | 4,273 | Note: A presidential cycle pools the surveys from one presidential election to the next and uses the county margin of that election. Not every issue was asked in every survey, so the first and last cycle of an issue can rest on one or two surveys. Survey years behind the first and last cycle of each panel: Path to legal status, 2004 cycle 2007 and 2020 cycle 2020 and 2021; Border security, 2004 cycle 2007 and 2020 cycle 2020 and 2021; Repeal the ACA, 2012 cycle 2012 to 2015 and 2020 cycle 2020 and 2021; Abortion legal, 2012 cycle 2014 and 2015 and 2020 cycle 2020 and 2021. The data table gives the survey years behind every point. Note: The 2004 cycle rests on one survey year, so its bands are wide. A cycle with a party by county-type group below the suppression floor would be dropped; none was. The number in a tooltip is the smallest of the four party by county-type groups behind the estimate. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states; they are model based and ignore the design of the panel. Source: CES cumulative common content, 2006-2021; county returns for the two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/gap_trend.json ### Table 9. The party gap rose on 8 of 12 issues over spans that differ by issue, and fell on background checks Change in the between-party gap in points (share taking the Democratic side), first to last presidential cycle in which each issue was asked, grouped by span; Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; CES surveys 2006 to 2021 | Issue | Cycles | Survey years, first cycle | Survey years, last cycle | Party gap change | Low | High | Party gap change per cycle | Place gap change | Place gap change, low | Place gap change, high | Smaller endpoint, n | | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | Border security | Cycles 2004 to 2020 | 2007 | 2020 and 2021 | +16.7 | +9.4 | +26.0 | +4.2 | +4.3 | −2.6 | +10.6 | 2,767 | | Path to legal status | Cycles 2004 to 2020 | 2007 | 2020 and 2021 | +15.5 | +10.2 | +22.9 | +3.9 | −4.5 | −9.8 | +0.9 | 2,767 | | Abortion legal | Cycles 2012 to 2020 | 2014 and 2015 | 2020 and 2021 | +13.4 | +9.8 | +17.0 | +6.7 | −5.8 | −8.7 | −2.4 | 20,940 | | Assault weapons ban | Cycles 2012 to 2020 | 2013 to 2015 | 2020 and 2021 | +10.3 | +7.6 | +13.4 | +5.2 | −1.5 | −4.5 | +1.4 | 25,669 | | Concealed carry | Cycles 2012 to 2020 | 2013 to 2015 | 2020 and 2021 | +6.8 | +3.8 | +10.2 | +3.4 | −0.9 | −3.7 | +1.8 | 25,716 | | EPA regulates CO2 | Cycles 2012 to 2020 | 2014 and 2015 | 2020 and 2021 | +3.5 | +0.3 | +7.2 | +1.8 | −1.0 | −4.4 | +2.3 | 20,800 | | Repeal the ACA | Cycles 2012 to 2020 | 2012 to 2015 | 2020 and 2021 | +2.0 | 0.0 | +4.1 | +1.0 | −3.1 | −5.3 | −0.9 | 31,281 | | Background checks | Cycles 2012 to 2020 | 2013 to 2015 | 2021 | −3.3 | −6.0 | −0.7 | −1.6 | −1.3 | −3.6 | +1.1 | 9,240 | | Gay marriage | Cycles 2012 to 2016 | 2012 to 2015 | 2016 | −2.1 | −4.3 | +0.5 | −2.1 | −4.2 | −6.4 | −1.8 | 24,606 | | Border wall | Cycles 2016 to 2020 | 2017 and 2018 | 2020 and 2021 | +6.1 | +4.1 | +8.3 | +6.1 | −0.3 | −2.2 | +1.6 | 29,562 | | Medicare for All | Cycles 2016 to 2020 | 2018 and 2019 | 2020 and 2021 | +5.7 | +3.2 | +8.5 | +5.7 | −1.6 | −4.1 | +0.8 | 29,844 | | Cut immigration | Cycles 2016 to 2020 | 2018 and 2019 | 2020 | −0.5 | −3.0 | +2.1 | −0.5 | +0.2 | −2.0 | +2.4 | 22,064 | Views: Party gap; Place gap. Note: Issues were asked over different spans, so the cycles differ by row. The survey years behind each cycle, the change per cycle and the change in the place gap with its interval are in the data table. The number in a tooltip is the size of the smaller of the two endpoint cycles. Note: Universal background checks were not asked in 2020, so the last cycle for that issue rests on the 2021 survey alone. Note: Intervals are 95% intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states; they are model based and ignore the design of the panel. Source: CES cumulative common content, 2006-2021; county returns for the two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/party_gap_change.json ### Table 10. In both surveys the party gap is larger than the place gap on every measure Party gap and place gap at the state level, and their ratio, by measure; ANES waves 2012 to 2024 and CES survey years 2013 to 2021 #### Table 10.1. Gaps The party gap is larger than the place gap on every measure in both surveys Gap in points on a 0 to 100 scale, strong and not very strong partisans in deep states; ANES waves 2012 to 2024 and CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | Measure | Place level | Party gap | Party gap, low | Party gap, high | Place gap | Place gap, low | Place gap, high | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES ideology | state | 41.3 | 38.8 | 43.6 | 4.7 | 1.7 | 8.8 | 3,933 | | ANES abortion | state | 42.9 | 37.7 | 47.6 | 17.4 | 11.2 | 28.2 | 4,410 | | ANES gun purchase | state | 44.1 | 41.0 | 50.0 | 13.8 | 6.7 | 19.3 | 3,752 | | ANES immigration | state | 27.7 | 23.0 | 30.5 | 9.4 | 2.9 | 18.0 | 4,005 | | ANES job discrimination | state | 16.5 | 11.5 | 19.6 | 6.0 | 1.6 | 13.2 | 3,889 | | CES abortion | state | 46.4 | 43.7 | 48.7 | 14.3 | 11.2 | 18.9 | 113,602 | | CES all issues, state | state | 43.3 | 41.2 | 45.2 | 5.5 | 3.3 | 8.2 | 67,860 | | CES all issues, county | county | 43.1 | 41.8 | 44.5 | 5.6 | 4.7 | 6.6 | 118,638 | #### Table 10.2. Ratio Among the ANES measures, only the abortion ratio has an interval below the one for the ideology scale Party gap divided by place gap, with 95% intervals, strong and not very strong partisans in deep states; ANES waves 2012 to 2024 and CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | Measure | Place level | Ratio | Ratio, low | Ratio, high | Respondents | | --- | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | ANES ideology | state | 8.8 | 4.7 | 24.2 | 3,933 | | ANES abortion | state | 2.5 | 1.5 | 4.2 | 4,410 | | ANES gun purchase | state | 3.2 | 2.3 | 6.5 | 3,752 | | ANES immigration | state | 2.9 | 1.4 | 9.0 | 4,005 | | ANES job discrimination | state | 2.8 | 1.1 | 8.9 | 3,889 | | CES abortion | state | 3.2 | 2.3 | 4.3 | 113,602 | | CES all issues, state | state | 7.9 | 5.1 | 13.7 | 67,860 | | CES all issues, county | county | 7.6 | 6.4 | 9.3 | 118,638 | Note: ANES partisans are strong and not very strong identifiers, which matches the three-point CES measure. Leaners are excluded. State is known for only part of the 2024 ANES sample, and the gun question was not asked in 2024. Note: Each issue in ANES is a different question from the CES issues except abortion, so only the abortion rows compare the same wording. Intervals come from a bootstrap over the states in the ANES sample and are wide because the deep-state groups are small. Source: ANES cumulative data file, waves 2012-2024, weighted (VCF0009z); CES cumulative common content, 2013-2021, weighted (weight_cumulative); state returns for the two-party margin Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/anes_check.json ### Table 11. The party gap averages 45.7 points across states and shows no clear relation to a state's partisanship State party gap averaged over the issues, in points, against the state's mean two-party presidential margin; Democrats and Republicans; CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | State | State two-party margin | Party gap | Standard error | Party gap, low | Party gap, high | Respondents per issue | | --- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | | AL | −26.3 | 41.5 | 1.3 | 38.9 | 44.1 | 2,259 | | AZ | −4.6 | 49.9 | 1.0 | 48.0 | 51.9 | 3,836 | | AR | −27.1 | 41.0 | 1.7 | 37.7 | 44.2 | 1,287 | | CA | +28.9 | 44.1 | 0.6 | 43.0 | 45.2 | 15,069 | | CO | +7.3 | 53.3 | 1.2 | 51.0 | 55.7 | 2,446 | | CT | +16.6 | 41.3 | 1.8 | 37.8 | 44.8 | 1,569 | | DE | +15.7 | 43.0 | 2.4 | 38.3 | 47.8 | 650 | | FL | −1.0 | 41.8 | 0.6 | 40.7 | 42.9 | 12,328 | | GA | −4.9 | 42.6 | 0.9 | 40.9 | 44.3 | 5,087 | | HI | +36.0 | 31.5 | 3.2 | 25.2 | 37.7 | 479 | | ID | −34.3 | 51.2 | 2.2 | 46.8 | 55.6 | 761 | | IL | +17.6 | 43.5 | 0.8 | 41.8 | 45.1 | 6,436 | | IN | −16.1 | 44.4 | 1.0 | 42.4 | 46.4 | 3,457 | | IA | −4.0 | 47.9 | 1.3 | 45.3 | 50.5 | 1,539 | | KS | −20.7 | 49.8 | 1.6 | 46.7 | 52.9 | 1,215 | | KY | −27.6 | 39.5 | 1.4 | 36.9 | 42.2 | 2,683 | | LA | −19.1 | 38.0 | 1.6 | 34.9 | 41.0 | 1,758 | | ME | +8.5 | 49.2 | 2.1 | 45.1 | 53.3 | 789 | | MD | +28.9 | 46.7 | 1.0 | 44.8 | 48.7 | 3,066 | | MA | +28.3 | 45.8 | 1.4 | 43.1 | 48.6 | 2,552 | | MI | +3.8 | 44.5 | 1.0 | 42.6 | 46.5 | 4,873 | | MN | +5.0 | 52.2 | 1.1 | 50.0 | 54.4 | 2,676 | | MS | −15.8 | 37.1 | 1.8 | 33.7 | 40.6 | 1,162 | | MO | −15.4 | 48.1 | 1.0 | 46.1 | 50.2 | 3,397 | | MT | −18.6 | 56.2 | 2.2 | 51.9 | 60.5 | 502 | | NE | −23.5 | 52.7 | 1.6 | 49.6 | 55.9 | 950 | | NV | +4.0 | 46.4 | 1.6 | 43.3 | 49.5 | 1,851 | | NH | +3.7 | 50.5 | 2.2 | 46.2 | 54.8 | 692 | | NJ | +16.0 | 42.0 | 0.9 | 40.1 | 43.8 | 4,431 | | NM | +10.1 | 49.3 | 1.9 | 45.5 | 53.1 | 1,018 | | NY | +27.8 | 38.9 | 0.7 | 37.6 | 40.3 | 10,028 | | NC | −2.7 | 44.9 | 0.8 | 43.2 | 46.5 | 4,781 | | ND | −31.9 | 48.4 | 3.2 | 42.1 | 54.6 | 313 | | OH | −4.4 | 42.3 | 0.7 | 40.9 | 43.8 | 6,810 | | OK | −36.0 | 47.4 | 1.7 | 44.1 | 50.7 | 1,528 | | OR | +13.2 | 57.3 | 1.1 | 55.2 | 59.4 | 2,468 | | PA | +1.8 | 43.3 | 0.6 | 42.1 | 44.5 | 9,050 | | RI | +21.5 | 39.6 | 3.4 | 33.0 | 46.2 | 404 | | SC | −12.8 | 43.4 | 1.1 | 41.2 | 45.7 | 2,259 | | SD | −26.2 | 52.7 | 2.5 | 47.8 | 57.6 | 413 | | TN | −24.3 | 45.5 | 1.2 | 43.2 | 47.9 | 3,129 | | TX | −10.5 | 43.4 | 0.6 | 42.2 | 44.6 | 10,983 | | UT | −32.2 | 45.1 | 1.7 | 41.7 | 48.5 | 1,215 | | VT | +34.0 | 41.2 | 3.9 | 33.6 | 48.8 | 298 | | VA | +6.1 | 45.5 | 1.0 | 43.6 | 47.3 | 4,569 | | WA | +17.3 | 53.2 | 1.1 | 51.0 | 55.5 | 3,329 | | WV | −37.4 | 37.8 | 1.8 | 34.2 | 41.3 | 1,078 | | WI | +2.2 | 48.4 | 0.9 | 46.5 | 50.2 | 3,156 | | WY | −47.1 | 54.4 | 3.0 | 48.5 | 60.4 | 265 | Note: The dots carry no whiskers because the scatter chart draws none. The data table gives each state's standard error and a 95% interval (normal, from a linearised standard error that treats respondents within a state as independent). The largest standard error is 3.9 points, and the smallest state has 265 Democrats and Republicans per issue on average. Note: A state needs at least 50 Democrats and 50 Republicans on an issue for that issue to count, and at least ten issues to appear. The tooltip shows the average number of respondents per issue. The District of Columbia has fewer than ten such issues and is not plotted, so the scatter has 49 states while the bootstrap for the other estimates has 50 clusters. Source: CES cumulative common content, 2013-2021; state presidential returns (MEDSL) for the state two-party margin; weighted (weight_cumulative) Data: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/state_party_gap.json ## All estimates Every fact in facts.json (148), sorted by id. | Fact id | Value | Unit | Estimand | Population | Period | Interval | n | Weights | Source | Note | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | ---: | --- | --- | --- | | abort_dem_2012 | 14.6 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | Democratic place gap on abortion | Democrats in deep counties | CES surveys pooled in the 2012 presidential cycle | 95% CI 9.6 to 19.2 | 20,940 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | abort_dem_2020 | 4.9 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | Democratic place gap on abortion | Democrats in deep counties | CES surveys pooled in the 2020 presidential cycle | 95% CI 2.0 to 8.2 | 31,326 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | abort_party_change | +13.4 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | change in the party gap from the first to the last cycle in which the issue was asked | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES cycles 2012 to 2020 | 95% CI 9.8 to 17.0 | 52,266 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | abort_party_gap | 46.5 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval of the party gap or place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2014 to 2021 | 95% CI 44.7 to 48.7 | 113,602 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | abort_place_change | −5.8 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | change in the place gap averaged over the two parties | Democrats and Republicans in deep counties | CES cycles 2012 to 2020 | 95% CI −8.7 to −2.4 | 52,266 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | abort_place_gap | 12.0 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval of the party gap or place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2014 to 2021 | 95% CI 9.2 to 14.6 | 113,602 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | abort_ratio | 3.9 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval; ratio of the two | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2014 to 2021 | 95% CI 3.1 to 5.2 | 113,602 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | abort_rep_2012 | 13.8 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | Republican place gap on abortion | Republicans in deep counties | CES surveys pooled in the 2012 presidential cycle | 95% CI 9.0 to 17.8 | 20,940 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | abort_rep_2020 | 12.0 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | Republican place gap on abortion | Republicans in deep counties | CES surveys pooled in the 2020 presidential cycle | 95% CI 7.5 to 15.7 | 31,326 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | abort_rep_diff | +20.1 | points (change in the share supporting, most Democratic bin minus most Republican bin) | difference in the weighted share supporting between the most Democratic and the most Republican bin of counties; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republicans | CES survey years 2014 to 2021 | 95% CI 14.8 to 24.0 | 20,616 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_dem_blue | 21.7% | percent of respondents supporting repeal of the ACA | weighted share supporting repeal; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Democrats in deep-blue counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 19.7% to 23.5% | 49,379 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_dem_red | 25.6% | percent of respondents supporting repeal of the ACA | weighted share supporting repeal; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Democrats in deep-red counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 23.8% to 27.0% | 22,175 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_party_2012 | 53.8 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | party gap in the 2012 cycle | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES surveys pooled in the 2012 presidential cycle | 95% CI 51.8 to 55.8 | 41,833 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_party_2020 | 55.8 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | party gap in the 2020 cycle | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES surveys pooled in the 2020 presidential cycle | 95% CI 54.2 to 57.7 | 31,281 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_party_change | +2.0 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | change in the party gap from the first to the last cycle in which the issue was asked | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES cycles 2012 to 2020 | 95% CI 0.0 to 4.1 | 73,114 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_party_change_drop | +5.9 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | repeal of the ACA, change in the party gap from the 2012 to the 2020 cycle, with the 2014 answers dropped instead of reversed | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES cycles 2012 to 2020 without 2014 | 95% CI 3.6 to 8.3 | 73,114 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_party_gap | 57.2 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval of the party gap or place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 55.8 to 58.8 | 118,113 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_place_change | −3.1 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | change in the place gap averaged over the two parties | Democrats and Republicans in deep counties | CES cycles 2012 to 2020 | 95% CI −5.3 to −0.9 | 73,114 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_place_change_drop | −0.7 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | repeal of the ACA, change in the place gap averaged over the two parties from the 2012 to the 2020 cycle, with the 2014 answers dropped instead of reversed | Democrats and Republicans in deep counties | CES cycles 2012 to 2020 without 2014 | 95% CI −3.0 to 1.6 | 73,114 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_place_gap | 4.2 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval of the party gap or place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 2.8 to 5.4 | 118,113 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_ratio | 13.7 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval; ratio of the two | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 10.7 to 20.2 | 118,113 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_ratio_drop | 16.7 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | repeal of the ACA, party gap divided by place gap, with the 2014 answers dropped instead of reversed | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 without 2014 | 95% CI 12.0 to 28.8 | 101,590 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_rep_blue | 78.6% | percent of respondents supporting repeal of the ACA | weighted share supporting repeal; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republicans in deep-blue counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 77.5% to 80.0% | 16,459 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | aca_rep_red | 83.1% | percent of respondents supporting repeal of the ACA | weighted share supporting repeal; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republicans in deep-red counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 82.0% to 84.1% | 30,100 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | anes_abort_party | 42.9 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | party gap at the state level; state-cluster bootstrap interval | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 37.7 to 47.6 | 4,410 | weight (VCF0009z, ANES cumulative full-sample weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_abort_place | 17.4 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | place gap at the state level; state-cluster bootstrap interval | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 11.2 to 28.2 | 4,410 | weight (VCF0009z, ANES cumulative full-sample weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_abort_ratio | 2.5 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | party gap divided by place gap at the state level; state-cluster bootstrap interval | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 1.5 to 4.2 | 4,410 | weight (VCF0009z, ANES cumulative full-sample weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_guns_ratio | 3.2 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | party gap divided by place gap at the state level | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 2.3 to 6.5 | 3,752 | weight (VCF0009z, ANES cumulative full-sample weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ideo_party | 41.3 | points (difference in the liberal-conservative index, liberal = 100, on a 0 to 100 scale) | party gap at the state level; state-cluster bootstrap interval | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 38.8 to 43.6 | 3,933 | weight (VCF0009z, ANES cumulative full-sample weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ideo_place | 4.7 | points (difference in the liberal-conservative index, liberal = 100, on a 0 to 100 scale) | place gap at the state level; state-cluster bootstrap interval | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 1.7 to 8.8 | 3,933 | weight (VCF0009z, ANES cumulative full-sample weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_ideo_ratio | 8.8 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | party gap divided by place gap at the state level; state-cluster bootstrap interval | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 4.7 to 24.2 | 3,933 | weight (VCF0009z, ANES cumulative full-sample weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_imm_ratio | 2.9 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | party gap divided by place gap at the state level | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 1.4 to 9.0 | 4,005 | weight (VCF0009z, ANES cumulative full-sample weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_lgbt_ratio | 2.8 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | party gap divided by place gap at the state level | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | 95% CI 1.1 to 8.9 | 3,889 | weight (VCF0009z, ANES cumulative full-sample weight) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_n_max | 4,410 | respondents | largest count of respondents in the four cells behind any of the five ANES measures | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_n_min | 3,752 | respondents | smallest count of respondents in the four cells behind any of the five ANES measures | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | anes_n_partisans | 3,933 | respondents | count of respondents in the four cells behind the ideology scale | strong and not very strong Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | ANES waves 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 | | | none (count) | ANES Cumulative Data File | | | awb_adj_diff | +4.3 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | Republican minus Democratic place gap, coefficient on deep-blue by Republican in a weighted regression with education, race, age, gender and state fixed effects; every term interacted with party; standard errors clustered by state | Democrats and Republicans in deep counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 1.3 to 7.3 | 118,066 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | awb_dem_adj | 4.4 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | place gap from a weighted linear regression with education, race, age, gender and state fixed effects; standard errors clustered by state | Democrats in deep counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 2.3 to 6.6 | 71,507 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | awb_dem_first | 81.2% | percent of respondents supporting | weighted share supporting the policy; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Democrats in the most Republican bin of counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 78.6% to 83.5% | 8,553 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | awb_dem_last | 87.3% | percent of respondents supporting | weighted share supporting the policy; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Democrats in the most Democratic bin of counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 86.3% to 88.6% | 27,716 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | awb_party_change | +10.3 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | change in the party gap from the first to the last cycle in which the issue was asked | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES cycles 2012 to 2020 | 95% CI 7.6 to 13.4 | 56,992 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | awb_party_gap | 41.9 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval of the party gap or place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 40.3 to 43.8 | 118,066 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | awb_place_gap | 7.5 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval of the party gap or place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 6.1 to 9.0 | 118,066 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | awb_ratio | 5.6 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval; ratio of the two | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 4.6 to 7.1 | 118,066 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | awb_rep_adj | 8.7 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | place gap from a weighted linear regression with education, race, age, gender and state fixed effects; standard errors clustered by state | Republicans in deep counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 6.8 to 10.7 | 46,481 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | awb_rep_diff | +12.6 | points (change in the share supporting, most Democratic bin minus most Republican bin) | difference in the weighted share supporting between the most Democratic and the most Republican bin of counties; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republicans | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 8.6 to 16.9 | 21,243 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | awb_rep_first | 36.5% | percent of respondents supporting | weighted share supporting the policy; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republicans in the most Republican bin of counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 34.5% to 38.6% | 14,432 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | awb_rep_last | 49.0% | percent of respondents supporting | weighted share supporting the policy; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republicans in the most Democratic bin of counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021 | 95% CI 44.8% to 53.4% | 6,811 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_axis_start | 60 | percent | axis start | the lower end of the vertical axis of the background-check figure | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_dem_max | 96.3% | percent of respondents supporting universal background checks | weighted share supporting; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Democrats, highest of the seven county bins | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 95% CI 95.3% to 97.1% | 10,899 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_dem_min | 95.0% | percent of respondents supporting universal background checks | weighted share supporting; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Democrats, lowest of the seven county bins | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 95% CI 94.2% to 95.9% | 11,448 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_ind_diff | +7.1 | points (change in the share supporting, most Democratic bin minus most Republican bin) | difference in the weighted share supporting between the most Democratic and the most Republican bin of counties; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Independents with no lean | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 95% CI 3.2 to 10.8 | 11,201 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_ind_first | 79.0% | percent of respondents supporting | weighted share supporting the policy; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Independents with no lean in the most Republican bin of counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 95% CI 75.6% to 82.1% | 5,500 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_ind_last | 86.1% | percent of respondents supporting | weighted share supporting the policy; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Independents with no lean in the most Democratic bin of counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 95% CI 83.8% to 87.8% | 5,701 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_lr_diff | +8.3 | points (change in the share supporting, most Democratic bin minus most Republican bin) | difference in the weighted share supporting between the most Democratic and the most Republican bin of counties; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republican leaners | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 95% CI 3.8 to 11.9 | 6,140 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_lr_first | 71.0% | percent of respondents supporting | weighted share supporting the policy; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republican leaners in the most Republican bin of counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 95% CI 68.7% to 73.7% | 3,870 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_lr_last | 79.3% | percent of respondents supporting | weighted share supporting the policy; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republican leaners in the most Democratic bin of counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 95% CI 75.7% to 82.2% | 2,270 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_party_change | −3.3 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | change in the party gap from the first to the last cycle in which the issue was asked | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES cycles 2012 to 2020 | 95% CI −6.0 to −0.7 | 35,013 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_rep_diff | +3.4 | points (change in the share supporting, most Democratic bin minus most Republican bin) | difference in the weighted share supporting between the most Democratic and the most Republican bin of counties; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republicans | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 95% CI 0.0 to 5.9 | 17,030 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_rep_max | 84.4% | percent of respondents supporting universal background checks | weighted share supporting; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republicans, highest of the seven county bins | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 95% CI 82.4% to 86.2% | 7,804 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bg_rep_min | 80.3% | percent of respondents supporting universal background checks | weighted share supporting; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republicans, lowest of the seven county bins | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2020 | 95% CI 78.6% to 81.8% | 11,459 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | bin_gap_min | 33.0 | points (distance between the Democratic and Republican lines) | smallest distance between the two party lines over the seven county bins and the five issues, in the share supporting the policy | Democrats and Republicans in the five panels of the county-margin figure | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | 35 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | boot_reps | 2,000 | replicates | bootstrap replicates | cluster bootstrap | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | border_party_change | +16.7 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | change in the party gap from the first to the last cycle in which the issue was asked | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES cycles 2004 to 2020 | 95% CI 9.4 to 26.0 | 34,077 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_abort_state_party | 46.4 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | abortion always legal, state level | Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2014 to 2021 | 95% CI 43.7 to 48.7 | 113,602 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_abort_state_place | 14.3 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | abortion always legal, state level | Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2014 to 2021 | 95% CI 11.2 to 18.9 | 113,602 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_abort_state_ratio | 3.2 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | abortion always legal, state level | Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2014 to 2021 | 95% CI 2.3 to 4.3 | 113,602 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_state_party | 43.3 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues at the state level | Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 41.2 to 45.2 | 67,860 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_state_place | 5.5 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues at the state level | Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 3.3 to 8.2 | 67,860 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ces_state_ratio | 7.9 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | average over the issues at the state level | Democrats and Republicans in states with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 5.1 to 13.7 | 67,860 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | deep_cell_n_min | 7,157 | respondents | smallest cell count | smallest of the party by county-type cells behind any issue | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | deep_cut | 20 | points of two-party margin | a county is deep red or deep blue at this margin or more | county classification | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | fe_states_max | 38 | states | count of states that identify the state fixed effects gap | states holding both a deep-red and a deep-blue county for the party and issue (most over the combinations) | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | fe_states_min | 34 | states | count of states that identify the state fixed effects gap | states holding both a deep-red and a deep-blue county for the party and issue (fewest over the combinations) | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | gay_party_gap | 36.4 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval of the party gap or place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2016 | 95% CI 33.6 to 39.3 | 50,260 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | gay_place_change | −4.2 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | change in the place gap averaged over the two parties | Democrats and Republicans in deep counties | CES cycles 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI −6.4 to −1.8 | 67,144 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | gay_place_gap | 10.2 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval of the party gap or place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2016 | 95% CI 6.6 to 13.7 | 50,260 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | gay_ratio | 3.6 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval; ratio of the two | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2016 | 95% CI 2.6 to 5.6 | 50,260 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | gay_rep_diff | +17.0 | points (change in the share supporting, most Democratic bin minus most Republican bin) | difference in the weighted share supporting between the most Democratic and the most Republican bin of counties; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republicans | CES survey years 2013 to 2016 | 95% CI 10.3 to 21.5 | 8,126 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ind_minus_partisan | 3.5 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average place gap of Independents with no lean minus the average place gap of Democrats and Republicans | Independents with no lean, Democrats and Republicans in deep counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 1.9 to 5.0 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ind_place_mean | 9.2 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues of the place gap among Independents with no lean | Independents who lean toward neither party (middle of the seven-point scale) in deep counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 7.4 to 10.7 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | lean_dem_place_mean | 3.3 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues of the place gap among Democratic leaners | Democratic leaners in deep counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 2.0 to 4.6 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | lean_rep_place_mean | 6.7 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues of the place gap among Republican leaners | Republican leaners in deep counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 4.6 to 8.8 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | m4a_place_gap | 4.2 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval of the party gap or place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2018 to 2021 | 95% CI 1.7 to 6.4 | 61,141 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | m4a_ratio | 12.1 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval; ratio of the two | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2018 to 2021 | 95% CI 7.9 to 31.4 | 61,141 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | margin_step | 10 | points of two-party margin | step in the state margin used for the slope | slope of the state party gap on the state margin | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_adj_ci_pos | 16 | party by issue combinations | count of combinations, model with demographics and state fixed effects | adjusted place gaps with an interval above zero | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_adj_diff_ci_pos_demo | 2 | issues | count of issues | issues where the interval for the adjusted Republican minus Democratic difference lies above zero, demographics only | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_adj_diff_ci_pos_fe | 2 | issues | count of issues | issues where the interval for the adjusted Republican minus Democratic difference lies above zero, demographics and state fixed effects | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_adj_smaller | 22 | party by issue combinations | count of combinations, model with demographics and state fixed effects | adjusted place gaps smaller than the raw gap | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_adj_smaller_demo | 15 | party by issue combinations | count of combinations, model with demographics only | adjusted place gaps smaller than the raw gap | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_bin_lines | 10 | lines | count of lines | party lines drawn in the five panels of the county-margin figure | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_bin_lines_toward | 9 | lines | count of lines | lines whose change from the most Republican to the most Democratic bin is toward the Democratic side of the issue with an interval that excludes zero | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_ind_larger | 9 | issues | count of issues, point estimates | issues where the Independents' place gap exceeds both partisan gaps | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_issues | 12 | policy questions | count of issues | the CES policy questions used in the chapter | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_matched | 333,335 | respondents | count of respondents | CES respondents interviewed in 2013 to 2021 with a matched county and a positive weight, in any party group or none | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_partisans_deep | 118,638 | respondents | count of respondents with a county margin and a party, any issue | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_party_flat | 3 | issues | count of issues | issues whose party gap change between the first and last cycle has an interval that includes zero | CES cycles | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_party_up | 8 | issues | count of issues | issues whose party gap rose between the first and last cycle, with an interval above zero | CES cycles | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_party_up_panels | 3 | issues | count of issues | issues drawn in the trend panels whose party gap rose between the first and last cycle, with an interval above zero | CES cycles | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_place_avg_ci_pos | 12 | issues | count of issues | issues whose average place gap has an interval above zero | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_place_cells | 24 | party by issue combinations | count of combinations | Democrats and Republicans on each issue | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_place_change_sig | 3 | issues | count of issues whose change has an interval that excludes zero | issues whose average place gap changed by more than sampling error between the first and last cycle | CES cycles | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_place_ci_pos | 22 | party by issue combinations | count of combinations with a positive interval | combinations whose interval lies above zero | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_place_pos | 24 | party by issue combinations | count of combinations with a positive point estimate | combinations with a place gap above zero | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_pool | 320,988 | respondents | count of respondents | CES respondents interviewed in 2013 to 2021 with a matched county, a positive weight and one of the five party groups | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_rep_larger | 9 | issues | count of issues with a point estimate of the difference above zero to one decimal | issues where the Republican place gap exceeds the Democratic one by at least a tenth of a point | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_rep_larger_ci | 5 | issues | count of issues | issues where the difference has an interval above zero | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_rep_larger_ci_thin | 4 | issues | count of issues | issues where the interval for the difference lies above zero by less than one point at its lower end | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_rep_larger_demo | 7 | issues | count of issues with a positive point estimate | issues where the adjusted Republican place gap exceeds the Democratic one, demographics only | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_rep_larger_fe | 8 | issues | count of issues with a positive point estimate | issues where the adjusted Republican place gap exceeds the Democratic one, demographics and state fixed effects | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_states | 50 | clusters | number of resampling clusters | states and the District of Columbia with matched respondents, Alaska excluded | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_states_scatter | 49 | states | count of states in the scatter | states with enough respondents on at least ten issues | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | n_trend_items | 4 | issues | count of issues | issues drawn in the trend panels | CES cycles | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | party_gap_max | 64.1 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | largest party gap over the issues (border wall) | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 62.5 to 65.8 | 60,875 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | party_gap_mean | 43.1 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues of the party gap: Democratic minus Republican share taking the Democratic side, averaged over deep-red and deep-blue counties | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 41.8 to 44.5 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | party_gap_min | 13.3 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | smallest party gap over the issues (universal background checks) | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 12.0 to 14.9 | 96,237 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | place_dem_mean | 4.5 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues of the Democratic place gap | Democrats in deep counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 2.8 to 6.3 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | place_diff_mean | 2.3 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues of the Republican place gap minus the Democratic place gap | Democrats and Republicans in deep counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI −0.7 to 5.1 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | place_gap_max | 12.0 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | largest place gap over the issues (abortion) | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 9.2 to 14.6 | 113,602 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | place_gap_mean | 5.6 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues of the place gap: deep-blue minus deep-red county share taking the Democratic side, averaged over Democrats and Republicans | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 4.7 to 6.6 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | place_gap_min | 2.1 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | smallest place gap over the issues (universal background checks) | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 0.9 to 3.1 | 96,237 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | place_rep_mean | 6.8 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | average over the issues of the Republican place gap | Republicans in deep counties | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 5.0 to 8.5 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ratio_max | 15.5 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | largest party to place ratio over the issues (border wall) | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 12.0 to 22.0 | 60,875 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ratio_means | 7.6 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | average party gap divided by average place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 6.4 to 9.3 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ratio_means_county | 7.6 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | average party gap divided by average place gap; bootstrap interval resampling counties instead of states | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 6.7 to 8.9 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ratio_median | 8.4 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | median over the issues of the party gap divided by the place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 6.7 to 11.0 | 118,638 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | ratio_min | 3.6 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | smallest party to place ratio over the issues (legal gay marriage) | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI 2.6 to 5.6 | 50,260 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | scale_max | 100 | points | definition of the scale | the top of the scale on which every issue is coded, where 100 is the side that Democrats take more often | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | state_gap_mean | 45.7 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | mean over states of the state party gap averaged over the issues | Democrats and Republicans in each state, states with at least 50 of each on an issue | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | 49 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | state_gap_sd | 5.4 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | standard deviation across states of the state party gap | Democrats and Republicans in each state, states with at least 50 of each on an issue | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | 49 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | The spread includes sampling error in each state's estimate. No interval. | | state_gap_slope | −0.5 | points of party gap per 10 points of state Democratic margin | least squares slope of the state party gap on the state's mean two-party margin, times 10; bootstrap over states | Democrats and Republicans in each state, states with at least 50 of each on an issue | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | 95% CI −1.3 to 0.4 | 49 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | state_n_min | 265 | respondents | average number of Democrats and Republicans per issue in the state with the fewest | Democrats and Republicans in each state, states with at least 50 of each on an issue | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | 265 | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | state_se_max | 3.9 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | largest across states of the standard error of the state party gap averaged over the issues (Taylor linearisation) | Democrats and Republicans in each state, states with at least 50 of each on an issue | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | 49 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | state_se_median | 1.3 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | median across states of the standard error of the state party gap averaged over the issues (Taylor linearisation, respondents treated as independent within a state) | Democrats and Republicans in each state, states with at least 50 of each on an issue | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | 49 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | thin_cut | 1 | points | cutoff used to count intervals that only just clear zero | a lower interval end within this many points of zero is called close to zero | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | thr_high | 40 | points of two-party margin | higher cutoff tried | sensitivity check on the deep-county cutoff | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | thr_low | 10 | points of two-party margin | lower cutoff tried | sensitivity check on the deep-county cutoff | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was asked | | | none (count) | Cooperative Election Study | | | undoc_dem_2012 | 9.0 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | Democratic place gap on a path to legal status | Democrats in deep counties | CES surveys pooled in the 2012 presidential cycle | 95% CI 5.5 to 12.5 | 42,924 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | undoc_dem_2016 | 1.9 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | Democratic place gap on a path to legal status | Democrats in deep counties | CES surveys pooled in the 2016 presidential cycle | 95% CI 0.0 to 3.7 | 38,453 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | undoc_dem_2020 | 1.7 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | Democratic place gap on a path to legal status | Democrats in deep counties | CES surveys pooled in the 2020 presidential cycle | 95% CI −0.2 to 3.6 | 31,307 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | undoc_dem_step_last | −0.2 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | change in the Democratic place gap on a path to legal status between cycles | Democrats in deep counties | CES cycles 2016 to 2020 | 95% CI −2.6 to 2.2 | 69,760 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | undoc_dem_step_mid | −7.1 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | change in the Democratic place gap on a path to legal status between cycles | Democrats in deep counties | CES cycles 2012 to 2016 | 95% CI −10.3 to −4.2 | 81,377 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | undoc_party_change | +15.5 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | change in the party gap from the first to the last cycle in which the issue was asked | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES cycles 2004 to 2020 | 95% CI 10.2 to 22.9 | 34,074 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | undoc_rep_diff | +3.1 | points (change in the share supporting, most Democratic bin minus most Republican bin) | difference in the weighted share supporting between the most Democratic and the most Republican bin of counties; state-cluster bootstrap interval | Republicans | CES survey years 2013 to 2021, not 2018 | 95% CI −1.1 to 8.5 | 16,673 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | wall_party_gap | 64.1 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval of the party gap or place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2017 to 2021, not 2019 | 95% CI 62.5 to 65.8 | 60,875 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | wall_place_gap | 4.1 | points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval of the party gap or place gap | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2017 to 2021, not 2019 | 95% CI 2.9 to 5.3 | 60,875 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | | wall_ratio | 15.5 | ratio (party gap divided by place gap) | difference in the weighted share taking the Democratic side; state-cluster bootstrap interval; ratio of the two | Democrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or more | CES survey years 2017 to 2021, not 2019 | 95% CI 12.0 to 22.0 | 60,875 | weight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight) | Cooperative Election Study | | ## Definitions - Percentage point: The unit for the difference between two percentages. A change from one share to another is stated in points, not in percent, so that absolute and relative change are not confused. - County two-party margin: The Democratic vote minus the Republican vote, divided by the sum of the two, so a positive value is a Democratic lead. Votes for other candidates are left out. - Survey weights: Numbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. - Confidence interval: A range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. - Partisan leaner: A respondent who first says they are independent but, when asked, says they lean toward one party. Most figures group leaners with the party they lean toward, and each chapter says which grouping it uses. - Linear probability model: A regression of a yes-or-no outcome on predictors, fitted by least squares so that each coefficient is a change in the probability of yes. The book weights it and reports robust standard errors. - Fixed effects: Regression terms that give each group, such as each country or each year, its own baseline. The other coefficients then compare respondents within the same group. - Standard deviation: A measure of how far values typically fall from their average. A larger standard deviation means the values are more spread out. ## Methods Sample: Cooperative Election Study interviews in 2013 to 2021 (2006 to 2021 for the trend by presidential cycle) that could be matched to a county with presidential returns, Alaska excluded, with a positive weight: 333,335 interviews in 2013 to 2021, of which 320,988 are in a party group used here and 118,638 are Democrats or Republicans in deep counties. Coding: in the cumulative file the 2014 answers to the question on repealing the Affordable Care Act have the partisan pattern of the opposite code from the other years (the Republican minus Democratic share supporting repeal is negative in 2014 and positive in every other year), so the 2014 answers are reversed. The guide to the cumulative policy file records that the 2014 question was worded differently from the other years (a vote to repeal, in Congress, after a description of the law, where the adjacent years asked whether the respondent supported or opposed repeal) and that an earlier release of the file had switched the 2014 answers and the current release does not. The guide gives one pooled set of value labels and no year-specific labels for 2014, so the reversal rests on the partisan pattern and on that record, and the original 2014 labels have not been checked against the questionnaire. The build stops if any issue has a Democratic minus Republican gap at or below zero in any survey year, which tests the expected partisan direction and is not an independent check of the coding. Party: the three-point identification, so leaners are outside the Democrats and Republicans; independents are respondents at the middle of the seven-point scale, and leaners are shown apart. Place: the two-party margin of the respondent's county in the most recent presidential election, counting the election of the interview year, from the repaired county returns file; a deep county has a margin of 20 points or more toward one party. Outcomes: 12 yes-or-no policy questions, each oriented so that 100 is the side that Democrats take more often. Weights: weight_cumulative, which gives every survey year the same total weight. Estimator: weighted means in party by county-type cells; the party gap is the Democratic minus Republican difference averaged over deep-red and deep-blue counties, the place gap is the deep-blue minus deep-red difference averaged over Democrats and Republicans, and the ratio is the party gap divided by the place gap. Adjusted place gaps are coefficients on a deep-blue indicator in weighted linear regressions with education, race, age and gender, with and without state fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by state; the adjusted Republican minus Democratic difference is the coefficient on deep-blue by Republican in a regression with every term interacted with party. Intervals: unless stated otherwise, 95% percentile intervals from a bootstrap that resamples whole states (50 clusters, the states and the District of Columbia, 2,000 replicates, seed 12345), with gaps, ratios and medians computed inside each replicate. Respondents in one state share a political environment, so treating them as independent can give intervals that are too narrow; with few clusters even cluster-robust tests can over-reject (Cameron, Gelbach and Miller 2008), and the percentile bootstrap used here is simpler than the wild cluster bootstrap-t of that paper. The exceptions are the adjusted gaps (normal intervals from the clustered regressions), the ANES intervals (a bootstrap over the states in the ANES sample), the band on the state scatter (a bootstrap over the plotted states) and the state intervals in its data table (linearised standard errors). Resampling counties instead of states gives a narrower interval around the ratio of the average gaps, 7.6. These intervals are model based and ignore the design of the online panel. Suppression: a cell needs at least 100 respondents and an effective sample of 100; the smallest cell behind an issue holds 7,157 respondents and none fell below the floor. The state-level check uses the ANES cumulative file for 2012, 2016, 2020 and 2024 (strong and not very strong partisans, respondents with a known state, weight VCF0009z) and the same estimator with deep states, a two-party margin of 20 points or more from the state returns. ## What these data cannot show - The place gap is a difference between respondents who live in different counties. - It is not an estimate of what a county does to a person. - People choose where to live, and the respondents who live in deep-blue counties may differ from those in deep-red counties in ways that survey questions on education, race, age and gender do not capture. - Mummolo and Nall ask why partisans do not sort more by place and study the constraints on political segregation [2]. - Earlier work on political context, from a 1984 survey in South Bend, Indiana, found that people build discussion networks that match their own views, that the political composition of their social context limits this, and that the interaction favors the local majority [3]. - A cross-section cannot separate influence from selection, and evidence on people who move is the design that can. - Chapter 15.6, Movers and opinion change (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/movers-and-opinion-change; planned) takes up that design. - The party gap is not an estimate of what a party does to an opinion either. - Party identification and issue positions shape each other, and party has taken on other identities, so a Democrat and a Republican also differ in race, religion and much else [4]. - The two gaps are also measured on 12 questions that were available in the survey, on guns, immigration, abortion, marriage, health care and climate. - Their ratio would change with a different set of issues, and the ceiling of a share on a yes-or-no question limits how large a gap can be. - The policy questions end in 2021, so the chapter says nothing about later years. - The county is one level of place. - A finer level, such as a neighborhood, could show larger place gaps, and a coarser one, such as the state, shows the ANES and CES gaps above. - The chapter does not measure the variation in opinion among people who live in one place, which Chapter 15.3, Variation in opinion within places (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/variation-in-opinion-within-places; planned) measures, or the share of partisans who live where their party loses, which Chapter 15.4, Partisans in the other party's territory (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/partisans-outvoted-at-home; planned) measures. - Place-specific contexts such as recent immigration may matter more for some issues than the county margin does, as Chapter 15.2, Immigration and local context (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/immigration-and-local-context; planned) examines, and the change in a county's vote over time has its own accounting in Chapter 15.5, Composition and behavior in county change (https://vishalsingh.org/politics/composition-and-behavior-in-county-change; planned). - The intervals describe sampling variation in an opt-in online panel. - They treat the states as an independent sample of clusters and the survey weights as correct, and they do not cover error from who joins the panel or from question wording. - With few clusters, standard cluster-robust tests can over-reject [5], and the resampling method used here is simpler than the one that paper proposes. - The ratio is uncertain where the place gap is small. ## References 1. Hopkins, Daniel J. (2018). The Increasingly United States: How and Why American Political Behavior Nationalized. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/I/bo27596045.html 2. Mummolo, Jonathan; Nall, Clayton (2017). Why Partisans Do Not Sort: The Constraints on Political Segregation. The Journal of Politics 79(1): 45-59. https://doi.org/10.1086/687569 3. Huckfeldt, Robert; Sprague, John (1987). Networks in Context: The Social Flow of Political Information. American Political Science Review 81(4): 1197-1216. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/american-political-science-review/article/abs/networks-in-context-the-social-flow-of-political-information/393FFEC212ECE14C0E0F79715E086D60 4. Mason, Lilliana (2018). Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity. University of Chicago Press. https://press.uchicago.edu/ucp/books/book/chicago/U/bo27527354.html 5. Cameron, A. Colin; Gelbach, Jonah B.; Miller, Douglas L. (2008). Bootstrap-Based Improvements for Inference with Clustered Errors. The Review of Economics and Statistics 90(3): 414-427. https://direct.mit.edu/rest/article/90/3/414/57731/Bootstrap-Based-Improvements-for-Inference-with ## Provenance - Pipeline version: 1.0.0 - Build script: book3/chapters/party-and-place/build.py (sha256 a4ecb5de36d0f1b0a07aa01f54170e898c2151cde9ed440d141ed61b040b4ef1) - Built on: 2026-09-30 - Site commit: 70da8d22fae66721148b0b2ade831dda2a1ebdd8 Inputs: | File | Size (bytes) | SHA-256, first 1 MB | SHA-256, last 1 MB | | --- | ---: | --- | --- | | data/anes/anes_cdf_clean.parquet | 15,640,720 | b3f0c2d8ae5673b2c40cf6df71318ea3f712cd845c4f1aad0460f28d1b022643 | 04f06dae56b65649291caf6cf77aab9767d9c92d0c2669c6d3655d9063970583 | | data/cces/cces_clean.parquet | 53,454,868 | 9430e88b3196c9ca2250bdda1908d3920e80e276ca0c529c514e2fc2bdd00806 | f61097c727c38fd8d7c8e53fe86935fb626f351a64d99ccb1ae0b56715b2c405 | | data/county/pres_county_1868_2024.parquet | 6,295,675 | bec11c7a0cb5d4180bbd6809d048bc892dd00dfcdde527fa4da871b1dd3f835f | b2a4f000f2eea72d09af8939555289e924875cca40cd95ec8869104cd575bed7 | | data/state/1976-2024-president.csv | 514,108 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | 9936410a6dd4ecc8be7fe202c6dff5b5f8fee59d88f35ab542ed12879941dcb7 | Outputs: | File | SHA-256 | | --- | --- | | facts.json | c7aadf423f1ef59d59aaf7ee50ced06ff442b18ceb481acd2f7367548887cd27 | | figures/anes_check.json | d1d3a380c95ac57c81f5fdb9f0221b0af50b732b5e35808a4d501ea844a7b701 | | figures/bg_checks_by_party_id.json | 5a9f7e468b5675d68baed350e0397487032c532d19e67f5902cae8684ae713be | | figures/definition_checks.json | 9530fe85714ea8d5fc97216fbaf33ef014afbfde852eb46f9f0398b0851b3586 | | figures/gap_trend.json | 322b3363fcc157c5e250dd01e88290d133e31ddd4b8062e7eb384f0bdcba0240 | | figures/gaps_by_issue.json | 100be0bddfa5d2c27e21156b7c6756cbf0049c929c6a46938f1b181c06efe0bb | | figures/party_gap_change.json | 595f8060da049d02f77da7962123e44a9b5b58f31eb2d19212d156f6e9714a9f | | figures/place_gap_by_party.json | 470941bae4a58e5b7c61da795ee1e879226794b77bd398365032a765e0e4a533 | | figures/place_gap_by_party_id.json | f176b560c6e4152c46320c96939f78c0c5ddda2991bfe2fea14b570d603dc05e | | figures/ratio_by_issue.json | f61572ce27dc5999b38e517e9cd31a4956f0ff770070d5d07e0193aef244126d | | figures/state_party_gap.json | ff7f11f0608494aa0c414863bf5d974a1a7acaa404a28a75d89e0112f8434fc9 | | figures/support_by_margin.json | 3ca5171f8dec09701f82d38b2b2a648ded7aacb286b854449379b311ea67cc47 | | meta.json | 91c1795aaea5d404de24adc324bda6e9b3b4d2d95e36721b0f1c6802f09f2604 | | refs.json | 06999dc144727ceab5ccfeefad2049838287acb9d56edda65dace53fcc5b1002 | ## Machine formats - Report (HTML): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place/report - Report (Markdown): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-and-place/report.md - Every estimate (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/facts.json - Table 1, figure "gaps_by_issue" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/gaps_by_issue.json - Table 2, figure "ratio_by_issue" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/ratio_by_issue.json - Table 3, figure "definition_checks" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/definition_checks.json - Table 4, figure "support_by_margin" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/support_by_margin.json - Table 5, figure "place_gap_by_party" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/place_gap_by_party.json - Table 6, figure "place_gap_by_party_id" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/place_gap_by_party_id.json - Table 7, figure "bg_checks_by_party_id" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/bg_checks_by_party_id.json - Table 8, figure "gap_trend" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/gap_trend.json - Table 9, figure "party_gap_change" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/party_gap_change.json - Table 10, figure "anes_check" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/anes_check.json - Table 11, figure "state_party_gap" (JSON): https://vishalsingh.org/politics/report/party-and-place/figures/state_party_gap.json - Index of every report: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms.txt; all reports in one file: https://vishalsingh.org/politics/llms-full.txt