Party, belief and the political map

Party identification and liberal-conservative self-placement became more closely aligned among American survey respondents between 1972 and 2024. In the American National Election Studies, their weighted correlationCorrelationA number from minus 1 to plus 1 for how closely two measures move together in a straight-line pattern. Zero means no straight-line pattern; a correlation does not say that one measure causes the other. rose from +0.32 (95% CI 0.27 to 0.36)+0.32 correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placementInterval95% CI 0.27 to 0.36n1,545Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placementPeriod1972SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 1972 to +0.72 (95% CI 0.70 to 0.74)+0.72 correlation coefficient, minus 1 to plus 1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation between party identification and liberal-conservative self-placementInterval95% CI 0.70 to 0.74n4,716Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placementPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024 among respondents who answered both questions, 1,5451,545 respondentsEstimandcount of respondents who answered both questionsWeightsunweighted count of respondentsPopulationANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placementPeriod1972SourceANES Cumulative Data File of them in 1972 and 4,7164,716 respondentsEstimandcount of respondents who answered both questionsWeightsunweighted count of respondentsPopulationANES respondents with a party identification (leaners kept) and a liberal-conservative self-placementPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024. A correlation describes how closely the answers move together: a higher positive value here means that a more Republican identification goes more consistently with a more conservative placement. The intervals describe model-based sampling uncertainty, not every possible source of survey error.The estimates come from the ANES Cumulative Data File, weighted with the cumulative-file weight, and are built in Chapter 1.1, Party and ideology. Each interval uses the Fisher z transformation [1] with the Kish effective sample size [2] and does not incorporate the full survey design. Figure 1 plots the correlation in every survey year, for three surveys.

Figure 1

The party-ideology correlation ended higher than it began on all three surveys

Weighted correlation between party identification (seven-point scale, leaners kept) and liberal-conservative self-placement, respondents who answered both, ANES 1972 to 2024, GSS 1974 to 2024, CES 2006 to 2024, with 95% intervals; the differences view plots the ANES value minus each other survey's value in the same year

All interviewsIn person onlyDifferences between surveys

Show data

Data for The party-ideology correlation ended higher than it began on all three surveys

Survey	Respondents included	Year	Estimate	Interval low	Interval high	Respondents	Effective n
ANES	All interviews	1972	+0.32	+0.27	+0.36	1,545	1,545
ANES	All interviews	1974	+0.33	+0.27	+0.39	1,140	857
ANES	All interviews	1976	+0.38	+0.33	+0.42	1,497	1,441
ANES	All interviews	1978	+0.35	+0.31	+0.39	1,658	1,658
ANES	All interviews	1980	+0.39	+0.33	+0.44	1,004	1,004
ANES	All interviews	1982	+0.41	+0.36	+0.47	891	891
ANES	All interviews	1984	+0.41	+0.37	+0.45	1,546	1,546
ANES	All interviews	1986	+0.36	+0.32	+0.41	1,622	1,622
ANES	All interviews	1988	+0.40	+0.36	+0.45	1,419	1,419
ANES	All interviews	1990	+0.34	+0.29	+0.39	1,315	1,315
ANES	All interviews	1992	+0.44	+0.40	+0.47	1,819	1,812
ANES	All interviews	1994	+0.51	+0.46	+0.55	1,398	1,144
ANES	All interviews	1996	+0.54	+0.50	+0.58	1,326	1,070
ANES	All interviews	1998	+0.44	+0.39	+0.49	1,012	858
ANES	All interviews	2000	+0.47	+0.40	+0.53	669	546
ANES	All interviews	2002	+0.52	+0.47	+0.57	1,223	828
ANES	All interviews	2004	+0.58	+0.53	+0.63	913	766
ANES	All interviews	2008	+0.61	+0.57	+0.65	1,607	1,053
ANES	All interviews	2012	+0.61	+0.59	+0.63	5,288	2,970
ANES	All interviews	2016	+0.70	+0.68	+0.72	3,298	2,332
ANES	All interviews	2020	+0.74	+0.72	+0.75	7,041	3,929
ANES	All interviews	2024	+0.72	+0.70	+0.74	4,716	2,228
GSS	All interviews	1974	+0.17	+0.12	+0.23	1,345	1,122
GSS	All interviews	1975	+0.23	+0.18	+0.29	1,384	1,136
GSS	All interviews	1976	+0.22	+0.16	+0.27	1,393	1,137
GSS	All interviews	1977	+0.22	+0.16	+0.27	1,440	1,160
GSS	All interviews	1978	+0.16	+0.09	+0.22	1,422	885
GSS	All interviews	1980	+0.14	+0.08	+0.21	1,418	941
GSS	All interviews	1982	+0.24	+0.19	+0.30	1,723	1,032
GSS	All interviews	1983	+0.28	+0.20	+0.36	763	482
GSS	All interviews	1984	+0.26	+0.20	+0.32	1,386	889
GSS	All interviews	1985	+0.28	+0.22	+0.34	1,444	919
GSS	All interviews	1986	+0.31	+0.26	+0.36	1,390	1,132
GSS	All interviews	1987	+0.31	+0.25	+0.36	1,666	1,126
GSS	All interviews	1988	+0.30	+0.24	+0.35	1,411	1,139
GSS	All interviews	1989	+0.27	+0.21	+0.32	1,429	1,127
GSS	All interviews	1990	+0.29	+0.23	+0.35	1,301	1,023
GSS	All interviews	1991	+0.26	+0.20	+0.31	1,443	1,105
GSS	All interviews	1993	+0.34	+0.28	+0.38	1,528	1,196
GSS	All interviews	1994	+0.37	+0.34	+0.41	2,806	2,204
GSS	All interviews	1996	+0.38	+0.35	+0.42	2,702	2,168
GSS	All interviews	1998	+0.36	+0.32	+0.40	2,622	2,033
GSS	All interviews	2000	+0.34	+0.30	+0.38	2,593	2,038
GSS	All interviews	2002	+0.37	+0.31	+0.42	1,299	944
GSS	All interviews	2004	+0.43	+0.38	+0.48	1,289	937
GSS	All interviews	2006	+0.47	+0.44	+0.50	4,253	2,952
GSS	All interviews	2008	+0.48	+0.44	+0.52	1,890	1,324
GSS	All interviews	2010	+0.50	+0.46	+0.54	1,914	1,231
GSS	All interviews	2012	+0.47	+0.42	+0.51	1,815	1,153
GSS	All interviews	2014	+0.50	+0.46	+0.53	2,368	1,734
GSS	All interviews	2016	+0.50	+0.46	+0.53	2,668	1,782
GSS	All interviews	2018	+0.56	+0.52	+0.60	2,149	1,285
GSS	All interviews	2021	+0.64	+0.62	+0.67	3,833	2,501
GSS	All interviews	2022	+0.63	+0.59	+0.66	3,303	1,304
GSS	All interviews	2024	+0.63	+0.60	+0.66	3,062	1,557
CES	All interviews	2006	+0.66	+0.65	+0.67	33,755	26,295
CES	All interviews	2007	+0.68	+0.67	+0.70	8,787	4,593
CES	All interviews	2008	+0.68	+0.67	+0.68	29,939	20,888
CES	All interviews	2009	+0.66	+0.64	+0.67	12,229	9,223
CES	All interviews	2010	+0.66	+0.65	+0.66	51,574	20,318
CES	All interviews	2011	+0.60	+0.58	+0.61	18,329	8,715
CES	All interviews	2012	+0.63	+0.62	+0.64	48,972	21,136
CES	All interviews	2013	+0.60	+0.58	+0.61	14,712	7,302
CES	All interviews	2014	+0.62	+0.61	+0.63	49,876	21,741
CES	All interviews	2015	+0.63	+0.61	+0.64	12,807	6,907
CES	All interviews	2016	+0.59	+0.58	+0.60	58,788	30,529
CES	All interviews	2017	+0.63	+0.62	+0.65	16,356	7,800
CES	All interviews	2018	+0.68	+0.68	+0.69	54,063	25,503
CES	All interviews	2019	+0.69	+0.68	+0.70	16,478	9,481
CES	All interviews	2020	+0.69	+0.68	+0.69	55,395	27,431
CES	All interviews	2021	+0.69	+0.68	+0.70	23,450	13,577
CES	All interviews	2022	+0.70	+0.69	+0.70	54,964	24,917
CES	All interviews	2023	+0.65	+0.64	+0.66	22,029	12,323
CES	All interviews	2024	+0.72	+0.71	+0.73	55,835	18,536
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1972	+0.32	+0.27	+0.36	1,545	1,545
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1974	+0.33	+0.27	+0.39	1,140	857
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1976	+0.38	+0.33	+0.42	1,497	1,441
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1978	+0.35	+0.31	+0.39	1,658	1,658
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1980	+0.39	+0.33	+0.44	1,004	1,004
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1982	+0.41	+0.36	+0.47	891	891
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1984	+0.41	+0.37	+0.45	1,546	1,546
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1986	+0.36	+0.32	+0.41	1,622	1,622
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1988	+0.40	+0.36	+0.45	1,419	1,419
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1990	+0.34	+0.29	+0.39	1,315	1,315
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1992	+0.44	+0.40	+0.47	1,819	1,812
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1994	+0.51	+0.46	+0.55	1,398	1,144
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	1996	+0.54	+0.50	+0.58	1,326	1,070
ANES	Left out: telephone or mixed-mode study	1998	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
ANES	Left out: telephone or mixed-mode study	2000	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
ANES	Left out: telephone or mixed-mode study	2002	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
ANES	All respondents (mode not recorded before 2008)	2004	+0.58	+0.53	+0.63	913	766
ANES	Face-to-face respondents	2008	+0.61	+0.57	+0.65	1,607	1,053
ANES	Face-to-face respondents	2012	+0.63	+0.59	+0.67	1,454	794
ANES	Face-to-face respondents	2016	+0.67	+0.62	+0.71	903	598
ANES	Face-to-face respondents	2024	+0.72	+0.68	+0.77	868	442
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1974	+0.17	+0.12	+0.23	1,345	1,122
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1975	+0.23	+0.18	+0.29	1,384	1,136
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1976	+0.22	+0.16	+0.27	1,393	1,137
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1977	+0.22	+0.16	+0.27	1,440	1,160
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1978	+0.16	+0.09	+0.22	1,422	885
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1980	+0.14	+0.08	+0.21	1,418	941
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1982	+0.24	+0.19	+0.30	1,723	1,032
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1983	+0.28	+0.20	+0.36	763	482
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1984	+0.26	+0.20	+0.32	1,386	889
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1985	+0.28	+0.22	+0.34	1,444	919
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1986	+0.31	+0.26	+0.36	1,390	1,132
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1987	+0.31	+0.25	+0.36	1,666	1,126
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1988	+0.30	+0.24	+0.35	1,411	1,139
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1989	+0.27	+0.21	+0.32	1,429	1,127
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1990	+0.29	+0.23	+0.35	1,301	1,023
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1991	+0.26	+0.20	+0.31	1,443	1,105
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1993	+0.34	+0.28	+0.38	1,528	1,196
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1994	+0.37	+0.34	+0.41	2,806	2,204
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1996	+0.38	+0.35	+0.42	2,702	2,168
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	1998	+0.36	+0.32	+0.40	2,622	2,033
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	2000	+0.34	+0.30	+0.38	2,593	2,038
GSS	All respondents (no mode variable before 2004)	2002	+0.37	+0.31	+0.42	1,299	944
GSS	In-person respondents	2004	+0.44	+0.38	+0.50	1,025	761
GSS	In-person respondents	2006	+0.47	+0.44	+0.49	3,972	2,812
GSS	In-person respondents	2008	+0.46	+0.42	+0.51	1,667	1,180
GSS	In-person respondents	2010	+0.49	+0.45	+0.54	1,706	1,100
GSS	In-person respondents	2012	+0.47	+0.42	+0.52	1,579	1,016
GSS	In-person respondents	2014	+0.48	+0.44	+0.52	2,054	1,503
GSS	In-person respondents	2016	+0.51	+0.47	+0.54	2,487	1,651
GSS	In-person respondents	2018	+0.55	+0.51	+0.59	1,920	1,177
GSS	In-person respondents	2022	+0.59	+0.53	+0.64	1,424	566
GSS	In-person respondents	2024	+0.56	+0.50	+0.61	1,029	536
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1974	+0.15	+0.07	+0.24	2,485	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1976	+0.16	+0.09	+0.23	2,890	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1978	+0.19	+0.12	+0.27	3,080	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1980	+0.24	+0.16	+0.33	2,422	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1982	+0.17	+0.09	+0.25	2,614	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1984	+0.15	+0.07	+0.22	2,932	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1986	+0.05	−0.01	+0.12	3,012	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1988	+0.11	+0.04	+0.18	2,830	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1990	+0.05	−0.02	+0.12	2,616	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1994	+0.13	+0.08	+0.19	4,204	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1996	+0.16	+0.10	+0.21	4,028	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	1998	+0.08	+0.01	+0.15	3,634	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	2000	+0.12	+0.05	+0.20	3,262	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	2002	+0.15	+0.07	+0.22	2,522	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	2004	+0.15	+0.08	+0.22	2,202	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	2008	+0.13	+0.07	+0.19	3,497	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	2012	+0.14	+0.09	+0.19	7,103	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	2016	+0.20	+0.16	+0.24	5,966	n/a
ANES minus GSS	All interviews in both surveys	2024	+0.09	+0.06	+0.13	7,778	n/a
ANES minus GSS	ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents	2008	+0.15	+0.09	+0.21	3,274	n/a
ANES minus GSS	ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents	2012	+0.16	+0.10	+0.22	3,033	n/a
ANES minus GSS	ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents	2016	+0.16	+0.10	+0.22	3,390	n/a
ANES minus GSS	ANES face-to-face and GSS in-person respondents	2024	+0.16	+0.09	+0.24	1,897	n/a
ANES minus CES	All interviews in both surveys	2008	−0.06	−0.10	−0.03	31,546	n/a
ANES minus CES	All interviews in both surveys	2012	−0.02	−0.04	+0.01	54,260	n/a
ANES minus CES	All interviews in both surveys	2016	+0.11	+0.09	+0.13	62,086	n/a
ANES minus CES	All interviews in both surveys	2020	+0.05	+0.04	+0.07	62,436	n/a
ANES minus CES	All interviews in both surveys	2024	0.00	−0.02	+0.02	60,551	n/a

The increase is one starting point for this book. It shows that knowing someone's party tells us more about their ideological label than it did in the earlier survey. It does not establish that their views became more extreme, that their positions on different issues became identical to their party's, or that party attachment caused their beliefs to change. Those are separate questions.

The Public Mind studies how political identities, beliefs and electoral choices align, and where they remain distinct. The American evidence is its center. Comparisons across countries test whether relationships familiar in the United States hold elsewhere. Election returns and campaign-finance records extend the inquiry to the places where votes are cast and the people who give money to political campaigns.

Political alignment has several meanings

Party identification is a person's attachment to a political party. Ideological self-placement is the label a person chooses for their views. A policy preference is an answer to a more specific question, such as what government should provide or what the law should allow. These measures often move together, but they describe different things.

Partisan sortingParty sortingThe alignment of party with other traits, such as ideology, religion, race and place, so that people who share a party also tend to share those traits. means that political characteristics become more consistently associated with party. It can occur when people change parties while keeping their opinions. It can also occur when their opinions change, or when the composition of the groups changes. A series of surveys interviewing different people can describe the resulting alignment without identifying which process produced it.

Issue polarization concerns the distance between positions on policy. Affective polarizationAffective polarizationThe gap between how warmly people feel toward their own party and how coldly they feel toward the other party. It measures feeling, not disagreement on issues. concerns the difference between feelings toward one's own party and the other party. A person can dislike the opposing party while holding some views in common with its supporters. An ideological moderate can be a committed partisan. A county that divides its vote closely can contain reporting units with very different margins.

The book keeps these distinctions visible. Its chapter on economic and cultural dimensions finds that the correlation between its economic and cultural indices rose from +0.10+0.10 correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval)Interval95% CI 0.05 to 0.15n1,508Weightsweight (VCF0009z)Populationadults with at least two of three items answered on each indexPeriod1984SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 1984 to +0.51+0.51 correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1Estimandweighted Pearson correlation of the economic and cultural conservatism indices (Fisher z interval)Interval95% CI 0.48 to 0.55n4,387Weightsweight (VCF0009z)Populationadults with at least two of three items answered on each indexPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024 and is still below one, at +0.69+0.69 correlation coefficient, from −1 to +1Estimandobserved correlation divided by the square root of the product of the two alphas (bootstrap percentile interval)Interval95% CI 0.65 to 0.74n4,387Weightsweight (VCF0009z)Populationadults with at least two of three items answered on each indexPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File, after correction for measurement error. Its chapter on partisan feeling finds a long-run fall in ratings of the other party, from 48.048.0 points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometerEstimandweighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size)Interval95% CI 47.1 to 48.9n1,723Weightsweight (VCF0009z)Populationpartisans, leaners included, with a rating of both partiesPeriod1978SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 1978 to 20.620.6 points on the 0 to 100 feeling thermometerEstimandweighted mean rating (95% interval from the Kish effective sample size)Interval95% CI 19.8 to 21.5n5,080Weightsweight (VCF0009z)Populationpartisans, leaners included, with a rating of both partiesPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024 on the feeling thermometer, while the average own-party rating ends near its starting level. The recent movement in those ratings also depends on which interview modes are compared.

The American alignment developed on different schedules

The first volume, The great sorting, examines the changing relationship between party identity and ideology, then follows the evidence through partisan feeling, electoral groups, issues, racial attitudes and institutional confidence.

The timing differs by subject. On abortion, the surveys show a widening party gap over their observed periods, from 3.53.5 percentage pointsEstimandweighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice'Interval95% CI −1.8 to 8.8n1,313Weightsweight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted)PopulationDemocratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion questionPeriod1980SourceANES Cumulative Data File points in 1980 to 52.352.3 percentage pointsEstimandweighted Democratic share minus weighted Republican share; the ANES four-category abortion question, answer 'always allowed as a matter of personal choice'Interval95% CI 48.8 to 55.9n4,666Weightsweight (VCF0009z; equals 1 for every respondent from 1980 to 1990, so those years are unweighted)PopulationDemocratic and Republican identifiers (leaners included) who answered the ANES abortion questionPeriod2024SourceANES Cumulative Data File in 2024 in the American National Election Studies. The economic-perception chapter describes a gap that reverses at each change of party in the presidency. Partisans are more likely to say that the national economy got better over the past year when their own party holds the presidency, by 34.034.0 percentage pointsEstimandmean of the yearly premiums, each survey counted once; the interval covers sampling error within each survey onlyInterval95% CI 32.5 to 35.4n20,874Weightsweight (VCF0009z)PopulationANES respondents who identify with or lean toward a party and answered the itemPeriod2012 to 2024 (four surveys)SourceANES Cumulative Data File points on average. A persistent difference on an issue and a difference that changes sign with control of government are different patterns, and the chapters describe each without explaining it.The chapters behind this paragraph are Chapter 4.1, The abortion sort, Chapter 1.3, Sort dates by attitude and Chapter 4.4, Perceptions of the economy.

The composition of political groups matters too. The income chapter finds a change in the comparison between the highest and lowest household-income brackets, from −9.1−9.1 percentage points of Democratic two-party vote shareEstimandDemocratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errorsInterval95% CI −12.9 to −5.4n5,534Weightsweight_cumulativePopulationhighest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household incomePeriod2008SourceCooperative Election Study points in 2008 to +5.7+5.7 percentage points of Democratic two-party vote shareEstimandDemocratic share in the highest bracket minus that in the lowest; weighted regression on the two brackets, state-clustered standard errorsInterval95% CI 1.1 to 10.3n12,281Weightsweight_cumulativePopulationhighest minus lowest bracket, two-party presidential voters who reported household incomePeriod2024SourceCooperative Election Study in 2024, but the 2024 profile is U-shaped rather than a simple rising ladder. Within education groups the 2024 gap cannot be told apart from zero, although it still rose after 2008. A straight line summarizes a U poorly, so a description of the parties as the parties of the rich or the poor leaves out that structure.See Chapter 3.3, The income ladder.

The volume also asks how the alignment changed within birth cohorts. A cohortCohortPeople born in the same period, such as the same decade. Comparing cohorts shows whether a difference comes from when people were born, as distinct from their age or the year they were surveyed. is a group of people born in the same years. Its average can change as its members change their views, but also as people enter or leave the observed group. The cohort analysis therefore cannot identify individual switching. Its estimates of the contribution of replacement depend on assumptions about cohort rates.See Chapter 1.4, Cohort change in partisan sorting.

Left and right contain different combinations of beliefs

The second volume, Ideology, values and religion, examines the content behind political labels. It distinguishes economic from cultural views, considers the relationship between basic values and ideological placement, and studies religious attendance and affiliation.

Cross-national comparisons are useful because the American combination is only one observed combination. In the book's comparative analysis, left-right placement follows economic attitudes most closely in some countries, the importance of God in others and moral attitudes in others, and in the remaining countries no one attitude leads clearly. Even within post-communist Europe, conservation values, meaning the importance people give to conformity, tradition and security, can relate to the left in one country and the right in another. The post-communist average conceals opposite signs, so it does not support one uniform regional account.The chapters behind this paragraph are Chapter 7.4, Left and right across countries, Chapter 8.1, Basic values and left-right and Chapter 8.4, The obedience-autonomy disposition.

These comparisons also test the measures. Questions about the qualities desirable in a child differ from portraits used to measure personal values. Religious attendance differs from the importance of God. When related measures give similar results, that agreement is informative. It does not make the questions interchangeable or prove that they all measure a single disposition.

The comparative chapters written so far therefore qualify the American account. It asks which relationships recur and which depend on the political label, the survey question or the country. The strength of an association and its direction are empirical questions, even when a theory predicts both.

Election maps describe distributions of votes

The third volume, The political map, begins with county election returns and then examines finer reporting units, demographic characteristics, local economic and environmental conditions, and political donations. It ends by relating the geography of voting to individual opinion.

A county's margin describes its result in one election. Its swing describes the change between elections. Counties can swing by similar amounts while remaining far apart in their levels of support. The nationalization chapter measures the spread of those changes. The county-margin chapter measures distance from the national result within an election. The measures answer different questions.The chapters behind this paragraph are Chapter 10.1, Nationalization of the county vote and Chapter 10.2, Distance from the national vote, 1868 to 2024.

Figure 2

The share of counties within 5 points of the national swing rose from 21.2% in 1972 to 1976 to 75.6% in 2020 to 2024

Change in each county's Democratic minus Republican margin, minus the national change, percentage points, for each of 39 pairs of presidential elections

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County swing minus national swing (points)

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Values outside −40 to +40 take the end colors.

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Hover or tap a county for its value, or search by name. Zoom with the buttons on the map, then drag to move it.

• Alaska draws as no data. Its election returns are reported by election district, and the district codes cannot be matched to boroughs and census areas.

Moving below the county line reveals variation that a county average hides. The precinct chapter compares counties that finished near a tie but had different distributions of reporting-unit margins. A close county result does not tell us whether most units were close or whether more one-sided results balanced each other. Nor does a reporting-unit margin reveal the views of every resident; some reporting units are categories of ballots rather than geographic neighborhoods.See Chapter 11.1, Precincts within counties.

Campaign-finance records supply another comparison. Donors are a selected group, and their scores are inferred from giving rather than chosen as survey labels. The donor-pool chapter follows changes in who is active on a scale that assigns each donor a fixed score. The donor-voter chapter compares county pools drawn from a long record of giving with a particular election. Neither comparison directly measures how an individual donor voted.The chapters behind this paragraph are Chapter 14.4, The ideology of the donor pool and Chapter 14.7, Counties where donors and voters diverge.

People and places answer different questions

A relationship across places can differ from a relationship among the people who live in them. Across ZIP codes, for example, more capital-gains filers went with a swing toward the Democrats, while within education groups investors were more Republican than non-investors; with education held fixed, the two results agree in sign. The book places those comparisons alongside one another and identifies the different populations and periods they describe.See Chapter 12.4, Wages, capital and the ZIP code vote.

The final part returns directly to survey respondents. Chapter 15.1, Party and place compares Democrats and Republicans living in the same kind of county, then compares members of the same party across strongly Democratic and strongly Republican counties. On every issue it examines (Figure 3), the party gap is larger than the within-party place gap, averaging 43.143.1 points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale)Estimandaverage over the issues of the party gap: Democratic minus Republican share taking the Democratic side, averaged over deep-red and deep-blue countiesInterval95% CI 41.8 to 44.5n118,638Weightsweight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or morePeriodCES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was askedSourceCooperative Election Study and 5.65.6 points (difference in the share taking the Democratic side, on a 0 to 100 scale)Estimandaverage over the issues of the place gap: deep-blue minus deep-red county share taking the Democratic side, averaged over Democrats and RepublicansInterval95% CI 4.7 to 6.6n118,638Weightsweight_cumulative (CES cumulative weight; each survey year carries the same total weight)PopulationDemocrats and Republicans (three-point party identification, leaners excluded) in counties with a two-party presidential margin of 20 points or morePeriodCES survey years 2013 to 2021, each issue in the years it was askedSourceCooperative Election Study points. The place differences remain observable, and their size depends on the issue and adjustment.

Figure 3

On every issue the gap between parties is larger than the gap between deep-red and deep-blue counties

Gap in the share taking the Democratic side, in points, by issue; Democrats and Republicans in deep counties; CES survey years 2013 to 2021

• Place gap
• Party gap

Show data

Data for On every issue the gap between parties is larger than the gap between deep-red and deep-blue counties

Issue	Democratic side of the question	Survey years	Party gap	Party gap, low	Party gap, high	Place gap	Place gap, low	Place gap, high	Ratio	Smallest group, n
Assault weapons ban	Support an assault weapons ban	2013 to 2021	41.9	40.3	43.8	7.5	6.1	9.0	5.6	16,440
Background checks	Support universal background checks for gun buyers	2013 to 2021, not 2020	13.3	12.0	14.9	2.1	0.9	3.1	6.5	13,375
Concealed carry	Oppose easier concealed carry	2013 to 2021	38.8	37.1	40.7	4.8	3.4	6.4	8.1	16,452
Border security	Oppose more spending on border security	2013 to 2021, not 2018	40.2	38.6	42.0	5.3	3.7	6.7	7.6	13,428
Path to legal status	Support a path to legal status for undocumented immigrants	2013 to 2021, not 2018	38.7	36.9	40.3	4.1	2.6	5.8	9.6	13,422
Border wall	Oppose spending on a border wall	2017 to 2021, not 2019	64.1	62.5	65.8	4.1	2.9	5.3	15.5	8,257
Gay marriage	Support legal gay marriage	2013 to 2016	36.4	33.6	39.3	10.2	6.6	13.7	3.6	7,161
Repeal the ACA	Oppose repealing the Affordable Care Act	2013 to 2021	57.2	55.8	58.8	4.2	2.8	5.4	13.7	16,459
EPA regulates CO2	Support letting the EPA regulate carbon dioxide	2014 to 2021	44.4	42.3	46.5	5.2	3.5	6.9	8.6	15,459
Abortion legal	Support always allowing abortion as a matter of choice	2014 to 2021	46.5	44.7	48.7	12.0	9.2	14.6	3.9	15,818
Medicare for All	Support Medicare for All	2018 to 2021	51.3	49.3	53.6	4.2	1.7	6.4	12.1	8,385
Cut immigration	Oppose cutting legal immigration by half	2018 to 2020	44.2	42.6	45.7	4.1	2.5	5.9	10.8	7,157

That comparison does not establish what moving to another county would do to someone's views. People select where they live, party attachments relate to other characteristics, and the measured county margin captures only one aspect of local context. Separating influence from selection requires different evidence.

Reading the evidence

Each chapter defines the comparison its figures make. Survey weightsSurvey weightsNumbers that scale each respondent so the sample matches the population on known traits such as age, race, education and region. A weighted average counts a respondent with a large weight for more than one with a small weight. adjust how much each respondent contributes so that the sample matches specified population characteristics. They do not guarantee that the sample represents people on every unobserved characteristic. Confidence intervalsConfidence intervalA range around an estimate that would contain the true value in 95% of repeated samples if the sampling model held. The book reports 95% intervals unless it says otherwise. describe uncertainty under an estimator's assumptions; they do not automatically include errors from wording, nonresponse or selection into an online panel.

Election returns count recorded votes. Estimates allocated from precincts to other geographic areas add modeling assumptions. Historical returns also describe the people who could and did vote under the rules of their period. Campaign-finance files describe the contributions covered by their reporting and scoring procedures. These sources cannot be treated as equivalent samples of the public. The methods reference explains the recurring choices.

The chapters can be read in sequence, through the map-first path or by subject. Each provides its data sources, methods and limitations so that it can be read on its own. Planned chapters are identified as questions still to be investigated; their presence in the contents is not evidence of a finding.

What these data cannot show

The analyses in the current chapters describe relationships more often than they identify causes. They cannot by themselves determine whether party leaders changed voters' views, whether voters selected leaders who matched them, or whether both responded to other changes. Those limits apply to the interpretation of the patterns, even when the patterns themselves are measured precisely.

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Data sources

• ANES Cumulative Data FileANES Time Series Cumulative Data File, 1972-2024: seven-point party identification and seven-point liberal-conservative scale, respondents who answered bothYears: 1948-2024 (33 study years; even years only after 2004; no 2006, 2010 or 2014 study) · Weights: weight (VCF0009z) · License: Free download after accepting the ANES terms of use; cite the release.
• General Social SurveyGeneral Social Survey, 1974-2024: partyid and polviews, in the reused party-ideology figure onlyYears: 1972-2024 (35 study years) · Weights: weight_use · License: See the provider's terms of use.
• Cooperative Election StudyCooperative Election Study: the cumulative file, 2006-2024, in the party-ideology figure; the cumulative common content, 2013-2021, in the party gap and place gap figureYears: 2006-2024 (every year; self-reported turnout is available in the 10 even years) · Weights: weight (single wave); weight_cumulative (pooled waves) · License: See the provider's terms of use.
• County election returnsCounty presidential returns, 1868-2024, in the county swing map; 2004-2020, with the CES, in the party gap and place gap figureYears: President 1868-2024 (40 elections); House and Senate 1990-2024 · Weights: none (full counts) · License: The Heideman file is CC BY 4.0 (doi:10.5281/zenodo.22976553), but the state records behind it keep their own terms, and the sites of Florida, Indiana, Colorado and Wisconsin restrict reuse.

All data sources

Methods

Sample: ANES respondents who answered both the seven-point party-identification question and the seven-point liberal-conservative self-placement question, 1,545 in 1972 and 4,716 in 2024. Estimator: the survey-weighted Pearson correlation within a survey year, with the ANES weight (VCF0009z), computed by the code of the chapter Party and ideology. Party identification runs from strong Democrat to strong Republican and keeps leaners on their own points; self-placement runs from extremely liberal to extremely conservative, so a positive correlation means that conservatives sit with Republicans. Respondents who do not place themselves are missing on that item and are left out. Intervals: 95% intervals from Fisher z on the Kish effective sample size; they treat the weighted sample as a simple random sample and do not follow the sampling design. The three figures are reused from the chapters Party and ideology, Nationalization of the county vote and Party and place, with their rows, specifications, source lines, alt text and views. Each of those chapters gives the sample, weights, estimators and suppression rules for its figure in its own methods note, and the numbers a figure prints are read from the same chapter's facts. The county swing map uses full counts of votes and has no sampling interval. The numbers printed in sentences about other chapters are read from those chapters' facts files, and the other statements about chapters describe what those chapters report.

References

1. Fisher, Ronald A. (1921). On the Probable Error of a Coefficient of Correlation Deduced from a Small Sample. Metron 1(4): 3-32.
2. Kish, Leslie (1965). Survey Sampling. John Wiley and Sons.

How to cite

@misc{singh2026partybeliefandthepoliticalmap,
  author = {Singh, Vishal},
  title = {Party, belief and the political map},
  year = {2026},
  url = {https://vishalsingh.org/politics/party-belief-and-the-political-map},
  note = {In The Public Mind. Published 3 October 2026.}
}